Appendix — Washington v. Barger

App. 1

[Filed December 22, 1994]

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

Docket No. 76945—Agenda 27--September 1994.

MICHAEL BARGER et al., Appellees, v.

HOWARD PETERS III, Director of Corrections, Appellant.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The question in this case is whether Public Act 88-311,

which excludes inmates from the opportunity to increase

good-conduct credit, violates the ex post facto clauses of

the Federal and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., art.

I, $10; Til. Const. 1970, art. I, $16). We hold that it does.

BACKGROUND

As of September 10, 1990, section 3-6-3 of the Unified

Code of Corrections applied a multiplier to increase the

“day for a day” credit certain prisoners could earn toward

early release. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3

(amended by Pub. Act 86-1373, eff. September 10, 1990).)

Inmates engaged in Department of Corrections educational

programs who met specified goals were eligible to receive

credit increased by a factor of 1.25. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991,

ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3.) The multiplier was not available for

those convicted of first or second degree murder or those

convicted of a Class X felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch.

38, par. 1003-6-3.) Nor was it available for inmates who

were convicted of a felony while engaged in the programs.

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3.

Public Act 88-311, effective August 11, 1993, amended

section 3-6-3. (Pub. Act 88-311, eff. August 11, 1993 (amend-

App. 2

ing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3).) Among the

changes, the act precluded application of the multiplier

to categories of inmates previously eligible for it under

section 3-6-3. (Pub. Act 88-311, eff. August 11, 1993 (amend-

ing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3).) Pertinent

here, the act rendered ineligible for the multiplier inmates

convicted of criminal sexual assault, felony criminal sex-

ual abuse, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and ag-

gravated battery with a firearm, as well as related in-

choate offenses. Pub. Act 88-311, eff. August 11, 1993

(amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3).

Pursuant to a certified class action, the circuit court of

Cook County ruled that Public Act 88-311 violates ex post

facto prohibitions. The suit had been brought by Michael

Barger and Richard Maez, convicted, respectively, of crim-

inal sexual assault and attempted armed robbery. Barger

and Maez represented inmates whose crimes and convic-

tions fell between September 10, 1990, the effective date

of Public Act 86-1373, and August 11, 1993, the effective

date of Public Act 88-311, making them ineligible for in-

creased credit. Finding Public Act 88-311 unconstitutional,

the circuit court permanently enjoined the Department

of Corrections from applying it to the plaintiff class.

The matter lies here on direct appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 302).

DISCUSSION

The Federal Constitution prohibits States from enacting

any ex post facto law. (U.S. Const., art. I, $10.) Although

that limitation renders it unnecessary, the same protec-

tion historically has been included in this State’s constitu-

tions. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, $16; Ill. Const. 1870, art.

II, $14; Ill. Const. 1848, art. XIII, §17; Ill. Const. 1818,

art. VIII, $16; F. Grad, The State Bill of Rights, in Con-

App. 3

Con, Issues for the Illinois Constitutional Convention 44

(V. Ranney ed. 1970); G. Braden & R. Cohn, The Illinois

Constitution: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 75

(1969).) It has been suggested that there is, nevertheless,

some utility in the provisions’ coexistence, the thought

being that the prohibitions, together, lend greater assur-

ance of the constitutional protection than the Federal

clause alone. G. Braden & R. Cohn, The Illinois Constitu-

tion: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 75 (1969).

But the drafters of our modern constitution intended

the Illinois ex post facto clause to do no more than con-

form to the Federal Constitution’s general prohibition on

the States. (3 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Consti-

tutional Convention 1476; 6 Committee Proposals, Sixth

Illinois Constitutional Convention 55.) Thus, in constru-

ing this State’s constitutional provision, we are without

a basis to depart from the Supreme Court’s construction

of the Federal ex post facto clause. (See People v. Tisler

(1984), 103 Ill. 2d 226, 243-45.) And, in fact, this court has

long interpreted our own constitutional provision in step

with Supreme Court pronouncements. See, e.g., People v.

Ramey (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 41, 63-64.

In Weaver v. Graham (1981), 450 U.S. 24, 67 L. Ed.

2d 17, 101 S. Ct. 960, the Supreme Court used an ex-

pansive interpretation of the ex post facto clause to strike

down a Florida statute which reduced “gain-time”’ credit

earned for avoiding disciplinary infractions and perform-

ing assigned tasks. Such legislation, the Court explained,

could be constitutionally applied retrospectively only if it

did not work to a prisoner’s “detriment.” (Weaver, 450

U.S. at 33, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 25, 101 S. Ct. at 966.) Because

the statute “change{d] ‘the quantum of punishment’ ” for

prisoners who committed crimes before its enactment, it

was disadvantageous with respect to them. (Weaver, 450

App. 4

U.S. at 33, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 25, 101 S. Ct. at 966, quoting

Dobbert v. Florida (1977), 482 U.S. 282, 298-94, 53 L. Ed.

2d 344, 356, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 2298.) The disadvantage: con-

stricting the opportunity to earn early release effective-

ly “lengthenfed]’” the period of actual incarceration, mak-

ing more onerous the punishment for already committed

crimes. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 33-34, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 26,

101 S. Ct. at 966-67.

This court, in Tiller v. Klincar (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 1, used

the same interpretation of the ex post facto prohibition

to invalidate legislation curtailing the frequency of parole

hearings which had been previously mandated every year.

The “possibility of parole,” the court noted, “is an ele-

ment of the punishment annexed to any crime.” (Tiller,

138 Ill. 2d at 11.) Thus, in lengthening the period between

parole hearings, the legislation eliminated the opportuni-

ty for earlier release to the disadvantage of those already

incarcerated. Tiller, 138 Ill. 2d at 11-12.

The notion that the ex post facto prohibition nullifies

any law which “ ‘alters the situation of a party to his dis-

advantage’ ” (emphasis omitted) was established in Kring

v. Missouri (1883), 107 U.S. 221, 228-29, 27 L. Ed. 506, 509,

2S. Ct. 448, 449, quoting United States v. Hall (D. Pa.

1809), 26 F. Cas. 84, 86 (No. 15,285). But, in Collins v.

Youngblood (1990), 497 U.S. 37, 48-49, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30,

42-43, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2722, the Supreme Court overruled

Kring, holding that the quoted language indicated an un-

justified expansion of the ex post facto prohibition beyond

the categories of laws the Framers intended to come with-

in the clause’s ambit.

Those categories were established in Calder v. Bull

(1798), 3 U.S. (8 Dall.) 386, 1 L. Ed. 648, shortly after

ratification of the Constitution. They included, as is rele-

vant here, “{elvery law that changes the punishment, and

App. 5

inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the

crime, when committed.” (Emphasis in original.) (Calder,

3 U.S. (8 Dall.) at 390, 1 L. Ed. 650.) Summarized differ-

ently, such a law would be one “which makes more bur-

densome the punishment for a crime{ ] after its commis-

sion.” (Beazell v. Ohio (1925), 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 70 L.

Ed. 216, 217, 46 S. Ct. 68, 68.) If the law does not so

affect the punishment associated with a crime, it is of no

moment that the law may work to a prisoner’s disadvan-

tage. See Collins, 497 U.S. at 48, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 42-43,

110 S. Ct. at 2722.

The question here then becomes whether elimination of

an opportunity to increase good-conduct credit is a change

in the punishment associated with a crime or results in

the infliction of greater punishment. In the wake of Collins,

that question is not to be answered against what disad-

vantage may be visited upon the plaintiff class through

elimination of the opportunity for early release. But be-

cause Collins otherwise left unaffected the Court’s hold-

ing in Weaver and, by implication, this court’s decision

in Tiller, the question ultimately turns on the meaning

the Court ascribes to the term “punishment.”

The Supreme Court does not view punishment for ex

post facto clause purposes to mean simply the period of

incarceration prescribed by a judge for a person convicted

of a crime—that is, the sentence. Instead, the Court con-

strues punishment to mean the actual time that such a

person spends in prison. The Florida statute invalidated

in Weaver did not affect, retrospectively, the sentence im-

posed on any inmate. The “ ‘quantum of punishment’ ”

affected was nothing but the time for which an inmate

was actually incarcerated under the sentence imposed.

Generally, then, any legislation curtailing the possibility

of reducing actual prison time makes more onerous the

App. 6

consequence associated with a crime. It is entirely inconse-

quential that capitalizing on the opportunity may depend

on an inmate’s success in staying out of trouble or attain-

ing other goals.

Public Act 88-311 does not change the prescribed period

of incarceration imposed for the crimes committed by

members of the plaintiff class. If understanding the con-

sequence associated with a crime was limited by the more

common notion of equating punishment with sentence, the

act would comport with the constitutional clauses. But

when the consequence associated with a crime is viewed

in the manner indicated by the Supreme Court in Weaver,

the act does, indeed, make more burdensome the punish-

ment associated with certain crimes already committed.

We must, as in Tiller, apply that more generous under-

standing of punishment here. Public Act 88-311 curtails

the opportunity for an earlier release as permitted under

section 3-6-3 in its form as existed between September

10, 1990, and August 11, 1993. Public Act 88-311 curtails

the opportunity for an earlier release as permitted under

section 3-6-3 in its form as existed between September

10, 1990, and August 11, 1993, and so makes more burden-

some the punishment associated with the crimes of the

plaintiff class. The class consists of inmates who were

eligible as of September 10, 1990, to enhance their good-

conduct credit by a factor of 1.25 under section 3-6-3 but

who were, as of August 11, 1993, deprived of that op-

portunity by Public Act 88-311. As to that class, Public

Act 88-311 violates the ex post facto prohibitions of the

Federal and Illinois Constitutions.

We therefore affirm the permanent injunction entered

by the circuit court. The injunction precludes application

of Public Act 88-311 “to persons who committed the of-

App. 7

fenses for which they were convicted on and after Sep-

tember 10, 1990{,] to and including August 10, 1993, were

committed to the Illinois Department of Corrections, and

were or would have been eligible on August 10, 1993(,]

for the 1.25 enhanced educational good conduct credit”’

under section 3-6-3 as unamended by Public Act 88-311.

Affirmed.

JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:

When the instant criminal plaintiffs were sentenced for

their crimes, section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Correc-

tions provided that certain prisoners were eligible to earn

credits toward early release through their participation

in prison educational programs. (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(aX4)

(West 1992).) Then, in 1993, Public Act 88-311 became ef-

fective, which modified the Unified Code of Corrections

so that certain categories of prisoners were no longer

eligible to earn any additional education credits. The plain-

tiffs’ resulting class action suit alleged, and the majority

has found, that Public Act 88-311 constitutes an imper-

missible ex post facto law in that it makes more burden-

some the punishment of their crimes. I dissent.

Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Collins v. Young-

blood (1990), 497 U.S. 37, 50, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30, 44, 110

S. Ct. 2715, 2723, ex post facto jurisprudence in the United

States had devolved into finding a violation wherever a

law retroactively worked a disadvantage on a prisoner.

Essentially, the majority employs this outdated, broader

approach in finding that Public Act 88-311 is an ex post

facto law unconstitutionally disadvantaging the instant

plaintiffs.

In Collins, however, the Supreme Court returned ex

post facto jurisprudence to its rightful roots by reaffirm-

App. 8

ing the definition delivered by Justice Chase in Calder

y. Bull. (Collins, 497 U.S. at 50, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 44,

110 S. Ct. at 2723, citing Calder v. Bull (1798), 3 U.S.

(Dall.) 386, 1 L. Ed. 648.) Calder held, in pertinent part,

that an ex post facto violation occurs only where a retro-

active law “changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater

punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when

committed.” (Emphasis added.) Calder, 3 U.S. at 390, 1

L. Ed. at 650.

The majority errs in its application of the Calder defini-

tion by focusing solely on the meaning of the term “pun-

ishment.” It finds that Public Act 88-311 inflicts a greater

punishment in that it curtails the possibility of reducing

the plaintiffs’ actual prison time. What the majority ig-

nores, however, is the threshold requirement that the law

at issue constitute a change in the punishment “annexed

to the crime, when committed.” Calder, 3 U.S. at 390,

1 L. Ed. at 650.

The dangers inherent in ignoring this requirement

become clear upon considering the absurd conclusions to

which it logically leads. Consider section 3-6-3(aX3) of the

Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(aX3) (West

1992)), which gives prison officials the discretion to grant

an additional 180 days of good-conduct credit for meritori-

ous conduct. Accepting the majority’s rationale, if, at the

time of the crime, good-conduct credit could be earned

by a prisoner for cleaning prison latrines, then the sub-

sequent assignment of such services to an employed jani-

tor might arguably be deemed a violation of the prisoner’s

rights. More directly to the point, however, the major-

ity’s approach improvidently raises both equal protection

and ex post facto questions as to the thousands of

prisoners who are currently on the waiting lists for edu-

cational programs.

DN Rect canteeras cP Ae 2 verona esa

App. 9

At the time Public Act 88-311 was enacted, there were

in excess of 4,000 prisoners on waiting lists for educational

programs. (See 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings,

April 16, 1993, at 1 (comments of Senator Hawkinson).)

As of November 1, 1994, some 4,992 inmates remained

on educational program waiting lists. Doubtless, many of

these prisoners will have served their prison terms with-

out ever being offered participation in educational pro-

grams.

It should be recognized that the amendments contained

in Public Act 88-311 can only constitute an ex post facto

law if the pre-amendment provisions constituted a law an-

nexed to the plaintiffs’ crimes when committed. In deter-

mining whether a law is annexed to a crime when com-

mitted, it is appropriate to note that, by including the

ex post facto prohibition in the Constitution, the Framers

sought to “assure that legislative Acts give fair warning

of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their

meaning until explicitly changed.” (Weaver v. Graham

(1981), 450 U.S. 24, 28-29, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17, 23, 101 S. Ct.

960, 964.) In other words, the ex post facto clause ensures

that a criminal knows in advance the consequences of his

crime.

These consequences, of course, include the sentence that

a criminal can expect under the law. In Illinois, for ex-

ample, criminals understand that, except for certain pro-

scribed offenders, the sentence imposed by a trial judge

will automatically be reduced by their good behavior while

in prison. (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(aX2) (West 1992).) Such auto-

matic credit for good behavior is a law annexed to the

crime when committed because, inter alia, this guaranteed

“eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant fac-

tor entering into both the defendant’s decision to plea bar-

gain and the judge’s calculation of the sentence to be im-

App. 10

posed.” Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 25, 101

S. Ct. at 966.

This is not the case, however, regarding enhanced credit

for participation in educational programs. Unlike automatic

credit for good behavior, the possibility of earning educa-

tional credit in Illinois has always been uncertain. It de-

pends upon the vagaries of State funding, the prison that

an inmate is randomly assigned to, and even upon the

innate abilities of a given prisoner.

The arbitrary and uncertain availability of the educa-

tional programs precludes any suggestion that criminals

anticipate that their sentences will be reduced if they

choose to participate in educational programs. For, choose

though they might, their desires are likely to be frus-

trated by the unavailability of such programs. Consequent-

ly, unlike automatic good-conduct credit, the law making

these educational programs available does not constitute

a law annexed to the crime when committed.

Insofar as the availability of educational participation

credits could not have been depended upon when the

plaintiffs committed their crimes, Public Act 88-311, which

only modifies the availability of the educational classes,

is not an ex post facto law. Any disadvantages caused by

Public Act 88-311 are thus constitutionally irrelevant.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from

the majority opinion.

JUSTICE NICKELS joins in this dissent.

App. 11

[Entered January 27, 1994]

IN THE

CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

MICHAEL BARGER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. No. 93 CH 10462

HOWARD PETERS,

Defendant.

ORDER

This cause coming to be heard on defendant’s motion

to dismiss, the parties having given argument and filed

written responses and the Court being fully advised in

the premises.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendants motion to dismiss is denied;

2. Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, Allowed

to be Amended to a motion for permanent injunction is

granted, and defendants motion for stay pending appeal

is granted;

3. Plaintiff's oral motion for judgment on the pleadings

is granted.

ENTER: T. O’Brien, Judge

App. 12

[Entered February 8, 1994]

IN THE

CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION

MICHAEL BARGER and RICHARD MAEZ, individually

and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v. No. 93 CH 10462

HOWARD A. PETERS, III, Director, Illinois Department

of Corrections, in his official capacity, ;

Defendant.

ORDER

This matter having come before the Court on Plaintiff's

Motion for Class Certification (pursuant to 735 ILCS

§ 5/2-801 (1993)); Counsel for the Parties being present;

and the Court being fully advised;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendant having raised no objections, the Court

finds that the prerequisites for the maintenance of a class

action set forth in 735 ILCS § 5/2-801—numerosity; com-

mon questions of fact or law which predominate over any

questions affecting only individual class members; repre-

sentative parties will fairly and adequately protect the in-

terest of the class; and class action is an appropriate

method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the case—

have been met.

2. Accordingly, the Court certifies a class in this action

consisting of:

App. 13

All persons who: 1) committed offenses on or after

September 10, 1990 to and including August 10, 1993,

2) have been or will be committed to the Illinois De-

partment of Corrections, 3) were or would have been

eligible on August 10, 1993 for the 1.25 enhanced

educational good conduct credit under Pub. Act 86-

1373 (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(aX4) (1993)), and 4) were ren-

dered ineligible for enhanced educational good con-

duct credit under Pub. Act 88-311 (eff. August 11,

1993).

3. Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend their complaint

so that the complaint’s class description conforms to the

above class description.

4. As to the named plaintiffs and members of the plain-

tiff class, the Court holds that Pub. Act 88-311 (eff.

August 11, 1993) is unconstitutional as it applies to per-

sons who committed the offenses for which they were con-

victed on and after September 10, 1990 to and including

August 10, 1998, were committed to the Illinois Depart-

ment of Corrections, and were or would have been eligi-

ble on August 10, 1998 for the 1.25 enhanced educational

good conduct credit under Pub. Act 86-1373, for the reason

that such application violates the ex post facto prohibi-

tions of the United States (art. I, § 10) and Illinois (art. I,

§ 16) Constitutions.

5. The Court’s permanent injunction, entered and

stayed, pending appeal by defendant, on January 27, 1994,

extends to the named plaintiffs and members of the plain-

tiff class as follows:

Defendant Peters is permanently enjoined from:

a) applying Pub. Act 88-311 (eff. Aug. 11, 1993)

(1993 Ill. Leg. Serv. 2605) (‘1993 Law’) and the

Rules defendant Peters promulgated thereunder—20

Iil. Admin. Code §§ 107.145 and 107.520 (eff. Sept.

17, 1993)—to the named plaintiffs and members of the

App. 14

plaintiff class who: (i) were or would have been eligi-

ble to earn 1.25 enhanced educational good conduct

credit pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(aX4) (1993) (Pub.

Act 86-1373, eff. Sept. 10, 1990, 1990 Ill. Laws 2844-

46 (West)) (“1990 Law’’) and (ii) have been rendered

ineligible to earn 1.25 enhanced educational good con-

duct credit pursuant to the 1993 Law;

b) failing to award enhanced educational good con-

duct credit to the named plaintiffs and members of

the plaintiff class who: (i) were or would have been

eligible to earn the 1.25 enhanced educational good

conduct credit pursuant to the 1990 Law and (ii) have

been rendered ineligible to earn the 1.25 enhanced

educational good conduct credit pursuant to the 1990

Law; and

ce) failing to release the named plaintiffs and class

members on the date on which they would be re-

leased if awarded the 1.25 enhanced educational good

conduct credit pursuant to the 1990 Law.

6. The issue of attorney’s fees and costs is reserved.

Plaintiffs are granted 28 days in which to file their mo-

tion.

7. This Order is a final and appealable Order. The

Court expressly finds that there is no just cause for delay

of enforcement or appeal of this Order or its Order of

January 27, 1994.

ENTERED Thomas J. O’Brien, Judge, 1994

RUTHANNE DEWOLFE

W. DAVID KOENINGER

LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION

OF CHICAGO — 91017

343 S. Dearborn, Suite 700

Chicago, IL 60604

(312) 347-8309

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

App. 15

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

AND STATUTES INVOLVED

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

Art. 1, $10

Section 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty,

Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and

Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; e any

Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of

Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or

Law impairing the obligation of Contracts, or grant any

Title of Nobility.

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,

lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except

what may be absolutely necessary for executing its in-

spection Laws; and the net Produce of ali Duties and Im-

posts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be

for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and

all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Con-

troul of the Congress.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay

any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in

time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with

another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War,

unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as

will not admit of delay.

CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Art. I, $16

§ 16. Ex Post Facto Laws and Impairing Contracts

No ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation

of contracts or making an irrevocable grant of special

privileges or immunities, shall be passed.

App. 16

PUBLIC ACT 88-311

(Senate Bill No. 956)

AN ACT in relation to criminal law, amending named

Acts.

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, rep-

resented in the General Assembly:

x**x* * * *

Section 15. The Unified Code of Corrections is amended

by changing Sections 3-2-2, 3-6-3, 5-8-1, 5-8-1.1, 5-8A-2, and

5-8A-3 as follows:

x * kK Ke #

(730 ILCS 5/3-6-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3)

Sec. 3-6-3. Rules and Regulations for Early Release.

(aX1) The Department of Corrections shall prescribe rules

and regulations for the early release on account of good

conduct of persons committed to the Department which

shall be subject to review by the Prisoner Review Board.

(2) Such rules and regulations shall provide that the

prisoner shall receive one day of good conduct credit for

each day of service in prison other than where a sentence

of “natural life’ has been imposed. Each day of good con-

duct credit shall reduce by one day the inmate’s period

of incarceration set by the court.

(3) Such rules and regulations shall also provide that

the Director may award up to 180 days additional good

conduct credit for meritorious service in specific instances

as the Director deems proper; except that the additional

90 days of good conduct credit for meritorious service

provided by this amendatory Act of 1990 shall not be

awarded to any prisoner who is serving a sentence for

conviction of first degree murder, reckless homicide while

under the influence of alcohol or any other drug, aggra-

vated kidnapping, kidnapping, aggravated criminal sexual

assault, criminal sexual assault, deviate sexual assault, ag-

gravated criminal sexual abuse, aggravated indecent lib-

erties with a child, indecent liberties with a child, child

pornography, heinous battery, aggravated battery of a

App. 17

spouse, aggravated battery of a spouse with a firearm,

aggravated battery of a child, endangering the life or

health of a child, cruelty to a child, or narcotic racketeer-

ing.

(4) Such rules and regulations shall also provide that

the good conduct credit accumulated and retained under

paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of this Section by any in-

mate during ific periods of time in which such inmate

is engaged full-time in substance abuse programs, correc-

tional industry assignments, or educational programs pro-

vided by the Department under this paragraph (4) and

satisfactorily completes the assigned program as deter-

mined by the standards of the Department, shall be multi-

plied by a factor of 1.25 for program participation before

the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1993 and 1.50

for program participation on or after that date. However,

no inmate shall be eligible for the additional good con-

duct credit under this paragraph (4) while assigned to a

boot camp, mental health unit, or electronic detention, or

if convicted of first degree murder, a Class X felony, crim-

inal sexual assault, felony criminal sexual abuse, ag-

gravated criminal sexual abuse, aggravated battery with

a firearm, or any predecessor or successor offenses with

the same or substantially the same elements, or any in-

choate offenses relating to the foregoing offenses. No in-

mate shall be eligible for the additional good conduct

credit under this paragraph (4) who (i) has previously re-

ceived increased good conduct credit under this paragraph

(4) and has subsequently been convicted of a felony, or

(ii) has previously served more than one prior sentence of

imprisonment for a felony in an adult correctional facility.

Educational, vocational, substance abuse and correctional

industry programs under which good conduct credit may

be increased under this paragraph (4) shall be evaluated

by the Department on the basis of documented standards.

The Department shall report the results of these evalua-

tions to the Governor and the General Assembly by Sep-

tember 30th of each year. The reports shall include data

relating to the recidivism rate among program partici-

pants.

App. 18

Availability of such programs shall be subject to the

limits of fiscal resources appropriated by the General As-

sembly for such purpose. Eligible inmates who are denied

immediate admission shall be placed on a waiting list

under criteria established by the Department. The inabil-

ity of any inmate to become engaged in any such pro-

grams by reason of insufficient program resources or for

any other reason established under the rules and regula-

tions of the Department shall not be deemed a cause of

action under which the Department or any employee or

agent of the Department shall be liable for damages to

the inmate.

(5) Whenever the Department is to release any inmate

earlier than it otherwise would because of a grant of good

conduct credit for meritorious service given at any time

during the term, the Department shall give reasonable

advance notice of such impending release to the State’s

attorney of the county where the prosecution of the in-

mate took place.

(b) Whenever a person is or has been committed under

several convictions, with separate sentences, such sen-

tences shall be construed under Section 5-8-4 in granting

and forfeiting of good time.

(c) The Department shall prescribe rules and regula-

tions for revoking good conduct credit, or suspending or

reducing the rate of accumulation thereof for specific rule

violations, during imprisonment. Such rules and regula-

tions shall provide that:

(1) Good conduct credits previously earned shall accumu-

late on a monthly basis.

(2) No inmate may be penalized more than one year

of good conduct credit for any one infraction.

When the Department seeks to revoke, suspend or re-

duce the rate of accumulation of any good conduct credits

for an alleged infraction of its rules, it shall bring charges

therefor against the prisoner sought to be so deprived of

good conduct credits before the Prisoner Review Board

App. 19

as provided in subparagraph (aX4) of Section 3-3-2 of this

Code, if the amount of credit at issue exceeds 30 days

or when during any 12 month period, the cumulative

amount of credit revoked exceeds 30 days except where

the infraction is committed or discovered within 60 days

of scheduled release. In such cases, the Department of

Corrections may revoke up to 30 days of good conduct

credit. The Board may subsequently approve the revoca-

tion of additional good conduct credit, if the Department

seeks to revoke good conduct credit in excess of thirty

days. However, the Board shall not be empowered to re-

view the Department’s decision with respect to the loss

of 30 days of good conduct credit within any calendar year

for any prisoner or to increase any penalty beyond the

length requested by the Department.

The Director of the Department of Corrections, in ap-

propriate cases, may restore up to 30 days good conduct

eredits which have been revoked, suspended or reduced.

Any restoration of good conduct credits in excess of 30

days shall be subject to review by the Prisoner Review

Board. However, the Board may not restore good con-

duct credit in excess of the amount requested by the

Director.

Nothing contained in this Section shall prohibit the

Prisoner Review Board from ordering, pursuant to Section

3-3-9(aX3XiXB), that a prisoner serve up to one year of

the sentence imposed by the court which was not served

due to the accumulation of good conduct credit.

(Source: P.A. 86-1090; 86-1373; 87-435.)

x * eK *

Section 99. This Act takes effect upon becoming law.

Passed in the General Assembly July 12, 1993.

Approved August 11, 1993.

Effective August 11, 1993.

1993 Ill. Laws 2604-19

App. 20

PUBLIC ACT 86-1373

(House Bill No. 3167)

AN ACT to amend the Unified Code of Corrections by

changing Section 3-6-3.

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois,

represented in the General Assembly:

Section 1. The Unified Code of Corrections is amended

by changing Section 3-6-3 as follows:

(Ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3)

Sec. 3-63. Rules and Regulations for Early Release.)

(aX1) The Department of Corrections shall prescribe rules

and regulations for the early release on account of good

conduct of persons committed to the Department which

shall be subject to review by the Prisoner Review Board.

(2) Such rules and regulations shall provide that the

prisoner shall receive one day of good conduct credit for

each day of service in prison other than where a sentence

of “natural life’ has been imposed. Each day of good con-

duct credit shall reduce by one day the inmate’s period

of incarceration set by the court.

(3) Such rules and regulations shall also provide that

the Director may award up to 90 days additional good

conduct credit for meritorious service in specific instances

as the Director deems proper.

(4) Such rules and regulations shall also provide that

the good conduct credit accumulated and retained under

paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of this Section by any in-

mate during specific periods of time in which such inmate

is engaged full-time in educational programs provided by

the Department under this paragraph (4) ae achieves a

goal of improved literacy or has satisfactorily completed

other academic or vocational training programs provided

by the Department as determined by the standards of the

Department of Corrections School District, shall be multi-

plied by a factor of 1.25. However, no inmate shall be

eligible for the additional good conduct credit under this

paragraph (4), if convicted of first degree murder, second

degree murder, or a Class X felony. No inmate shall be

App. 21

eligible for the additional good conduct credit under this

=e (4) if such inmate has engaged in the educa-

tional, academic or vocational training programs provided

by the Department under this paragraph (4) and has sub-

sequently been convicted of a felony. Educational pro-

grams under which good conduct credit may be increased

through the achievement of academic goals shall be pro-

vided by the Department on the basis of documented pro-

fessional standards and shall be made available to any in-

mate seeking admission to such programs within the limits

of fiscal resources appropriated by the General Assembly

for such purpose. Eligible inmates who are denied immedi-

ate admission shall be placed on a waiting list under

criteria established by the Department. The inability of any

inmate to become engaged in any such educational program

by reason of insufficient program resources or for any other

reason established under the rules and regulations of the

Department shall not be deemed a cause of action under

which the Department or any employee or agent of the

Department shall be liable for damages to the inmate.

(5) Whenever the Department is to release any inmate

earlier than it otherwise would because of a grant of good

conduct credit for meritorious service given at any time dur-

ing the term, the Department shall give reasonable advance

notice of such impending release to the State’s attorney of

the county where the prosecution of the inmate took place.

(b) Whenever a person is or has been committed under

several convictions, with separate sentences, such sen-

tences shall be construed under Section 5-8-4 in granting

and forfeiting of good time.

(c) The Department shall prescribe rules and regula-

tions for revoking good conduct credit, or suspending or

reducing the rate of accumulation thereof for specific rule

violations, during imprisonment. Such rules and regula-

tions shall provide that:

(1) good conduct credits previously earned shall accumu-

late on a monthly basis.

(2) no inmate may be penalized more than one year of

good conduct credit for any one infraction.

App. 22

When the Department seeks to revoke, suspend or re-

duce the rate of accumulation of any good conduct credits

for an alleged infraction of its rules, it shall bring charges

therefor against the prisoner sought to be so deprived of

good conduct credits before the Prisoner Review Board

as provided in subparagraph (aX4) of Section 3-3-2 of this

Code, if the amount of credit at issue exceeds 30 days

or when during any 12 month period, the cumulative

amount of credit revoked exceeds 30 days except where

the infraction is committed or discovered within 60 days

of scheduled release. In such cases, the Department of

Corrections may revoke up to 30 days of good conduct

credit. The Board may subsequently approve the revoca-

tion of additional good conduct credit, if the Department

seeks to revoke good conduct credit in excess of thirty

days. However, the Board shall not be empowered to

review the Department’s decision with respect to the loss

of 30 days of good conduct credit within any calendar year

for any prisoner or to increase any penalty beyond the

length requested by the Department.

(3) The Director of the Department of Corrections, in

appropriate cases, may restore up to 30 days good con-

duct credits which have been revoked, suspended or re-

duced. Any restoration of good conduct credits in excess

of 30 days shall be subject to review by the Prisoner Re-

view Board. However, the Board may not restore good

conduct credit in excess of the amount requested by the

Director.

(4) Nothing contained in this Section shall prohibit the

Prisoner Review Board from ordering, pursuant to Sec-

tion 3-3-9(aX3\iXB), that a prisoner serve up to one year

of the sentence imposed by the court which was not served

due to the accumulation of good conduct credit.

(Source: P.A. 83-1362.)

Section 2. This Act takes effect upon becoming law.

Passed in the General Assembly June 26, 1990.

aang September 10, 1990.

Effective September 10, 1990.

1990 Ill. Laws 2844-45

App. 23

ILLINOIS REGISTER

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

NOTICE OF ADOPTED AMENDMENT

Section 107.145 Educational Good Conduct Credits

Committed persons who are enrolled in full-time vocational

or academic educational programs approved by the Depart-

ment may be eligible to receive educational good conduct

credits in addition to good conduct credits awarded in ac-

cordance with this Part. Educational good conduct credits

shall be awarded at the rate of .25 days for each day dur-

ing which educational goals have been achieved in accord-

ance with 20 Ill. Adm. Code 405.

(Source: Added at 15 Ill. Reg. 5638, effective April 15,

1991)

15 Ill. Reg. 5641

Section 405.20 Adult and Juvenile

Educational Programs

a) The opportunity for educational programs shall be

available in the Adult and Juvenile Divisions through

the Department of Corrections School District #428.

Nothing in this Part shall be construed to require

educational opportunities for all committed persons.

1) Adult Division educational programs shall include:

A) Adult basic education and General Educa-

tional Development (G.E.D.) training;

B) Special education;

C) Vocational education and career counseling;

and

D) Post-secondary education where possible.

2) Juvenile Division educational programs shall in-

clude: ,

b)

c)

d)

App. 24

A) Basic education and G.E.D.;

B) High school credits;

C) Special education;

D) Vocational education; and

E) Post-secondary education where possible.

Committed persons shall, upon request, be considered

for enrollment in an educational program for which

they are eligible or placement on the waiting list for

the program if one exists. Waiting lists shall be main-

tained in chronological order.

In determining eligibility for enrollment in educational

programs the Department shall consider, among other

factors, the committed person’s composite scores on

achievement tests, the safety and security of the facil-

ity or any person, staff recommendations, require-

ments for admission to specific pro , administra-

tive concerns, and the committed person’s institu-

tional behavior, disciplinary record, educational rec-

ord, projected release date, and medical and mental

health status.

In the Adult Division, committed persons may be

eligible to enroll in:

1) Adult Basic Education if they test below the 6.0

grade level.

2) G.E.D. training if they test at the 6.0 grade level

or above and they do not have a verified GED

certificate or a High School diploma.

3) Special education regardless of test scores.

4) School District #428 vocational education regard-

less of test scores.

5) College vocational programs if they test at the

6.0 grade level or above and the college policy

permits admission.

6) Two-year college degree academic programs if

they have a verified GED certificate or High

School diploma.

e)

g)

App. 25

7) Four-year college degree academic programs if

they have a verified GED certificate or High

School diploma, and they have 30 hours of col-

lege transfer credit.

In the Juvenile Division, committed persons may be

eligible to enroll in:

1) Basic Education if they test below the 6.0 grade

level.

2) G.E.D. Training if they test at the 6.0 grade

level or above and they do not have a verified

GED certificate or High School diploma.

3) High School credits if they test at the 6.0 grade

level or above and they do not have a verified

GED certificate or High School diploma.

4) Special Education regardless of test scores.

5) School District #428 vocational education if they

test at the 3.0 grade level or above.

6) College vocational programs if they test at the

6.0 grade level or above and the college policy

permits admission.

7) Two-year college academic programs if they have

a verified GED certificate or High School diploma.

Committed persons shall be required to attend and

actively participate in classes for which they are

enrolled and shall be subject to discipline under 20

Ill. Adm. Code 504, unless absent due to verified ill-

nesses, approved visits, court writs, furloughs, dis-

— lockdowns, and other reasons approved by the

ief Administrative Officer. Active participation

shall mean, but shall not be limited to, instances in

which the committed person is attentive, responsive,

and cooperative and completes assigned work.

Committed persons shall adhere to attendance require-

— A, the educational program in which they are

enrolled:

1)

2)

App. 26

Committed persons enrolled in non-college aca-

demic programs in the Adult and Juvenile Divi-

sions shall be required to attend and to active-

ly participate in the number of instructional days

specified to complete the program and shall not

be absent from the program or shall not be docu-

mented as not actively participating in the pro-

gram for more than 30 instructional days, not

including days absent due to lockdowns.

Persons committed in the Community Services

Division and committed persons enrolled in col-

lege academic courses shall attend scheduled

classes and shall not be absent more thax al-

lowed under the requirements of the educational

provider or the correctional facility policy. Com-

mitted persons shall be advised of the specific

requirements of the program in which they are

enrolled.

h) Committed persons may be removed from educational

programs due to:

1)

2)

3)

4)

Disciplinary action.

Failure to adhere to attendance requirements.

Administrative reasons approved by the Educa-

tional Administrator or the Chief Administrative

Officer including, but not limited to, disruptive

behavior, lack of active participation, termination

or suspension of the program, and safety and se-

curity reasons.

The committed person’s transfer to another facil-

ity or program.

(Source: Amended at 15 Ill. Reg. 5642, effective April 15,

1991)

15 Ill. Reg. 5646-49

App. 27

Section 405.55 Educational Good Conduct Credits

a)

b)

9)

d)

e)

Committed persons who enroll full-time in an aca-

demic or vocational education program approved by

the Department shall be eligible to receive educa-

tional good conduct credits provided:

1) They are eligible to receive good time in accord-

ance with 20 Ill. Adm. Code 107, Subpart B;

2) They have not been convicted of first degree

murder, second degree murder, or a Class X

felony;

3) They have not been convicted of a felony which

was committed after a previous award of educa-

tional good conduct credits; and

4) They achieve the educational goals established by

the Department within a specified time period.

Goals shall be established in writing for committed

persons who are eligible to receive educational good

conduct credits and shall be signed by the committed

person. The goal statement shall include the goal

period, attendance requirements, and the educational

goals the committed person is expected to achieve.

The goal period for persons committed in the Adult

and Juvenile Divisions who are enrolled in any pro-

gram except college academic programs shall be 90

instructional days of attendance or the number of in-

structional days of attendance required to complete

the program if less than 90 instructional days.

The goal period for persons committed in the Adult

and Juvenile Divisions who are enrolled in college

academic programs and for persons committed in the

Community Services Division shall be the period of

time during which the classes are scheduled.

Educational goals shall be determined based on the

committed person’s current level of achievement and

ability. Educational goals may include, but not be

limited to, one or more of the following factors:

g)

h)

App. 28

1) Achievement of a specified grade level;

2) Attainment of a GED certificate;

3) Attainment of a specific number of high school

or college credits;

4) Achievement of specified skills; and/or

5) Maintaining a grade of “C” or better in each

class or maintaining a passing grade where a

pass/fail grading system is used.

Educational goals may, with the approval of the

Educational Administrator or the Chief Administra-

tive Officer, be revised in writing and signed by the

committed person if it is determined that the orig-

inal educational goals need to be revised based,

among other matters, on a reassessment of the com-

mitted person’s level of competency or ability. How-

ever, the goal period may not be changed.

When a committed person completes the educational

program early, the goal period shall be revised to the

date of completion and the committed person shall

be eligible to receive educational good conduct credits

for the revised goal period.

Committed persons may be removed from the educa-

tional program in accordance with Section 405.20(h).

1) If the committed person is removed from the

educational program due to placement in protec-

tive custody, non-voluntarv transfers for other

than disciplinary reasons, termination or suspen-

sion of the educational program by the Depart-

ment, release on parole or mandatory supervised

release, or other reasons approved by the Chief

Administrative Officer, the goal period may be

revised to the date removed from the program.

In determining whether to revise a goal period,

the Department shall consider, among other fac-

tors, the committed person’s medical and men-

tal health status, protection needs, projected

i)

))

2)

App. 29

release date, and time in the program. The com-

mitted person may be eligible to receive educa-

tional good conduct credits for the revised goal

period provided satisfactory progress has been

made towards achieving stated goals.

If the committed person is removed from the

educational program prior to program completion

due to reasons other than those stated in sub-

section (hX1) of this Section, the committed per-

son shall not receive any educational good con-

duct credit for participation in the educational

program.

Within 15 working days, whenever feasible, of com-

pletion of the goal period or removal from the pro-

gram, the Educational Administrator or Chief Admin-

istrative Officer shall:

1)

2)

3)

4)

Determine whether or not the committed per-

son achieved the stated educational goals, com-

plied with attendance requirements, or was mak-

ing satisfactory progress toward achieving such

als in accordance with subsection (hX1) of this

ection.

Document the number of days, if any, for which

the committed person is eligible to receive educa-

tional good conduct credits. This shall be the

number of calendar days during the goal period,

less days absent and days not attended due to

lockdowns or class cancellations.

Document the reasons for ineligibility for award

of educational good conduct credits.

Ensure educational good conduct credits are com-

puted at the rate of .25 of the number of days

eligible for such award.

The award of educational good conduct credits shall

be subject to the review and approval of the Direc-

tor. A copy of the award of educational good conduct

credits shall be filed in the committed person’s

master record file.

App. 30

k) Committed persons shall be advised in writing of the

award of educational gooc conduct credits or the

reasons for ineligibility of the award.

1) Committed persons may grieve the establishment of

goals or the decision not to award educational good

— credits under 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504, Sub-

part F.

m) New goal periods and goals shall be established upon

re-enrollment.

(Source: Added at 15 Ill. Reg. 5642, effective April 15,

1991)

15 Ill. Reg. 5651-54

Section 405.70 Suspension of Programs

Unless otherwise provided by law, any of the provisions

of this Part may be suspended by the Director for reasons

including, but not limited to, safety and security, budgetary

constraints, insufficient program resources, inadequate

space or unavailability of educational staff.

(Source: Amended at 15 Ill. Reg. 5642, effective April 15,

1991)

15 Ill. Reg. 5655

App. 31

STATE OF ILLINOIS

88TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

REGULAR SESSION

SENATE TRANSCRIPT

FIRST PROOF

35th Legislative Day April 16, 1993

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

Senator Hawkinson? Read the bill, Madam Secretary.

956.

ACTING SECRETARY HAWKER:

Senate Bill 956.

(Secretary reads title of bill)

3rd Reading of the bill.

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

Senator Hawkinson.

SENATOR HAWKINSON.

Thank you, Mr. President. This is the Senate Judiciary

Committee bill encompassing some of the recommenda-

tions of the Governor’s Task Force on Crime and Cor-

rections. It was my privilege, along with Senator Tom

Dunn to serve on that commission under the leadership

of former U.S. Attorney Anton Valukas, represented by

law enforcement officers and a board spectrum of—of cor-

rections and community folks. Unless something is done,

our prison capacity, including our recently opened prison

and the boot camps, will be at the total maximum and

prisoners would have to start being released in July of

1994. This report contains many of the recommendations

App. 32

of that Task Force, but not all of them. Some of the most

important ones are not included here. Building a super

max prison, which will enable us to control the most dan-

gerous criminals and remove them from the ordinary prison

system, is not in here. About six years ago, this Body

passed a Community Corrections Act, which would allow

our—our courts the full broad range of—of sentences, but

we only funded it for a quarter of a year. One of the best

recommendations of the Task Force is that that be fully

funded so that the early offenders and young offenders

can be dealt with before they reach prison stage. We also

recommend some bed expansion and construction in East

St. Louis. But none of those things are in this bill. This—

this bill deals with a few of the recommendations. It ex-

pands the impact incarceration, or the boot camp eligibili-

ty. It expands the earned time. It does not include the

worst of our offenders. Although the recommendation was

to include some Class X, this bill does not include Class

X offenders for the increased earned time. We have a

waiting list of some four thousand inmates who are cur-

rently eligible, under our current laws, for your educa-

tional programs, but they’re not able to get in because

we’re not funding. And although it’s not in this bill, it’s

recommended that we spend an additional seven million

dollars this year to expand those programs, because the

evidence has shown from this State and other states that,

first of all, some forty percent of our inmates are recidi-

vists. That means they’ve been in before. They get out,

and within a short time, they’re back in again. But the—

and that—those folks really constitute a menace to our

citizens. The evidence has shown that if, while in prison,

they get a degree, they get some education, they learn

a skill through correctional industries or they get drug

and alcohol treatment, that they tend not to recidivate

at as high a rate. And if we can keep those folks from

App. 33

getting back into crime when they get out, that is help-

ful. Because we have a waiting list of four thousand, I

considered, and the Judiciary Committee did not expand

the list of eligibles to include Class X, and I’m opposed

to including those; but, for those who do qualify, I think

we ought to have the programs available, and we ought

to cut back on recidivism. I’d be happy to answer any

questions; otherwise, I would strongly urge the adoption

of Senate Bill 956.

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

Is there discussion? Senator Cullerton.

SENATOR CULLERTON:

Yes. I also rise in support of the bill. As Senator Hawk-

inson has pointed out, we are very close to having the

federal courts run our prison system. That is, by the way,

the case in Cook County. I don’t know if people realize

that, but in Cook County, the Cook County jail is run

by a federal judge. And when judges set bonds, some

bureaucrat might release that person out into the streets,

even though a judge set a bond and that person didn’t

make bond. That’s because there’s just not enough beds.

We are—unless we do something about it, are going—

are going to come to that point here in the—in the State.

Now this bill, and these recommendations, are going to

cost some money. It’s going to be about seven or eight

million dollars, and I would hope that when we do the

budget, that we do certainly include that money, because

in the long run, it’s going to be saving money. There’s

probably about seventy-five hundred inmates that, as a

result of this bill, will be—not have to go into the over-

crowded prisons, but rather. their incarceration might be

in a boot camp or with other type of restraints, other than

having to send them to—to jail. So it’s important that we

App. 34

do this, and it’s important that we understand, every time

we keep on raising penalties, that we have to—there’s a

cost associated with that. Unless we’re willing to pay that

cost, we’re going to end up having—turning over our—

our prison system to some federal judge. So I think it’s

a—it’s—it was a very fine effort on behalf of the members

of the Task Force. We ought to support the bill, but keep

in mind that it might cost some money.

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

Senator del Valle. Senator del Valle?

SENATOR dEL VALLE:

Thank you, Mr. President. Senator Hawkinson, I com-

mend the Task Force. I think many of the recommenda-

tions are certainly long overdue, but I’m concened about

how we’re going to generate the additional funds to be

able to—to provide enough opportunities for people to par-

ticipate in the educational programs and in the substance

abuse program. This bill increases the weighted good time

for individuals who participate. But my understanding is,

for example, in the prison industries program, that there

are about eighteen hundred participants in that program.

Is that correct?

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

Senator Hawkinson.

SENATOR HAWKINSON:

Yes. Do you want me to answer your question now, or

do you have more of it before I go on?

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

Senator Hawkinson.

App. 35

SENATOR HAWKINSON:

I think the Senator raises a—a extremely important

point. First, technically, this bill does not mandate the

inclusion unless the funds are available. But Senator

Cullerton touched on that this is going to cost money; it’s

going to cost some seven or eight million dollars in this

year to expand these programs. The alternatives, how-

ever, are much more expensive. To build each prison is

a fifty-five-/sixty-million-dollar proposition to house some

nine hundred inmates. Now, we’re going to have to build

some more, but we can’t build our way out of it complete-

ly. If we increase the educational programs, the drug

abuse programs, the correctional industries programs,

which was at issue in another bill yesterday, but some-

thing the Task Force feels that we desperately need to

do, so—we can give jobs to some of these people on the

outside. And the reason we do that is so that they will

not prey upon our citizens and create new victims of

crimes once they get out and, therefore, have to be re-

turned to prison. But this will not be inexpensive. I men-

tioned in my opening remarks that we desperately need

to fund the community corrections program. That will be

expensive; it will take dollars. This is not cheap, but there

is no cheap answer to the problem of crime in Illinois or

crime in America. We have to either put the money in—in

ever-expanding prisons—and I favor building them as we

need them, and I’ve supported them in the past. But we

need to put them in programs, and we’re going to have

to face up to that. Now, this bill doesn’t contain the fund-

ing. That’ll have to come in the budget, Senator, but I

will support that funding because we have to do it in

order to deal with the problem—to deal with the problem

of crime in Illinois.

App. 36

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WATSON)

Senator del Valle.

SENATOR dEL VALLE:

Again, for—for clarification. Your projection is that an

additional eight—seven to eight million dollars will be

needed to expand the education, substance abuse pro-

grams and for electronic detention and the boot camp pro-

grams. A total of seven to eight million dollars for all

these areas will be needed?

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

Senator Hawkinson.

SENATOR HAWKINSON:

The expense to expand the programs to the degree

necessary is seven to eight million dollars. The Depart-

ment advises me that the net cost after the savings, be-

cause of the additional beds saved, will be four million

dollars this year.

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

Senator del Valle.

SENATOR dEL VALLE:

Well, based on the—on the growth of the inmate popula-

tion, I—I don’t see how they could project a savings, be-

cause that population is going to continue to increase.

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

Senator Hawkinson.

SENATOR HAWKINSON:

Well, I think you raised a good point, Senator. I think

seven or eight million is probably close, but the Depart-

App. 37

ment estimates some cost savings of four million. As we

refill these beds, I’m not sure where those cost savings

will come from. But you’re—you’re on target. It is going

to cost money, but I think it will cost less money than

the alternative.

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

Senator Dunn.

SENATOR R. DUNN:

Thank you, Mr. President. I hate to interrupt a good

debate, but I’d like a point of personal privilege, please.

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

State your point.

SENATOR R. DUNN:

I have a group from Evansville, Illinois. The eighth

grade in the gallery behind me here—thirty-three of them—

and they’ve been up and been listening now for the

debate, and let’s welcome them to the Legislature.

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

Will our guests in the gallery please rise? And welcome

to Springfield, Senator Demuzio.

SENATOR DEMUZIO:

Well, thank you, Mr. President. Let me—I, too, rise

to—to support this—this measure, and I only disagree with

one thing that you’ve said, Senator Hawkinson. You—

you indicated that we might be able to spend our way

out of this. I don’t think we’re going to be able to spend

our way out of this, and this thing. . . I probably have

more prisoners incarcerated in my district, because of the

fact of the number of prisons that I have in my district.

App. 38

And I think electronic detention and some of the things

that are other aspects in this bill, I think, are absolutely

necessary, and I would rise to support this bill in its—in

its total.

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

Senator Stern.

SENATOR STERN:

Mr. President and Members of the Senate, I don’t think

you need an additional support voice, but I think this is

genuinely constructive legislation and precisely the kind

of thing that we should be laying our emphasis on. We

know these things work, and we should all be voting Yes

on this. It’s not a crisis that we’re responding to, as we

often are; this is constructive, long-range possible solu-

tions to intransigent problems. Thank you.

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

Senator Fawell.

SENATOR FAWELL:

Thank you very much. Five years ago, four years ago,

three years ago, and two years ago, I introduced a bill

which gave good time for going to school and trying to

educate these prisoners. It’s nice to see that the—the rest

of the Assembly has finally come around. It is true; about

eighty-seven percent of our prisoners are functionally il-

literate when they go into prison. If we don’t start edu-

cating them, they’re just going to turn right around. I—

this is a good bill.

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

Any further discussion? Senator Rea.

App. 39

SENATOR REA:

Thank you, Mr. President. I just want to say that I

think that with the serious problems that we have within

our correctional facilities, I’m very pleased with the recom-

mendations that have come back from the Task Force,

and I feel that we should move as—as early as possible

in the implementation of most of those recommendations.

I think this bill addresses many of those concerns and

certainly support it.

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

Senator Butler.

SENATOR BUTLER:

Thank you, Mr. President. I, too, support this, but I

want to add a word of caution. I had a long conversation

with a downstate judge over the weekend, and they are—

there is apparent growing concern about good time and

its net effect on the attitude of—of potential criminals;

that is, he was saying he could sentence somebody to a

year and they’re out in fifty-nine days. And of course,

that’s—that same kind of mathematics works as the—as

the sentence expands. The point is that I hope the Judi-

ciary Committee takes a really good look at—at—at good

time to make sure we’re not going overboard and we’re

creating a negative attitude on the part of potential—let’s

call them potential prisoners.

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

Senator Hawkinson, to close.

SENATOR HAWKINSON:

Well, first, let me respond to a couple of comments. If

I did, I certainly didn’t intend to say we could spend our

way out of this. It’s going to be a very expensive propo-

App. 40

sition. We cannot build our way out. I did indicate I think

we probably are going to have to build some more, how-

ever. But that’s not in this bill either, although we do

recommend as part of the Task Force a super max prison

and some additional construction. Senator Butler, I share

your concerns on good time. As a matter of fact, I think

eventually we ought to move to do away for all—with all

the day-to-day good time that’s given out automatically

and replace it completely with an earned time concept;

that you have to earn it by getting an education or get-

ting your drug abuse training or getting a skill through

correctional industries. We balanced it in this report by

not allowing the most serious offenders to get this new

good time. The Class X offenders—your robbers, your

rapists—they are not eligible. And this bill does not make

them eligible for that kind of good time. But the evidence

has shown that for those who we’ve already made eligi-

ble, that if they get the education, if they get the skill,

they are less likely to be back within a year having com-

mitted another crime upon our citizens. And that’s why

it is recommended in this Task Force. I think it’s impor-

tant that we pass this part of the package, and I would

urge your Aye vote.

PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR WEAVER)

The question is, shall Senate Bill 956 pass. Those in

favor will vote Aye. Those opposed will vote Nay. The

voting is open. Have all voted who wish? Have all voted

who wish? Take the record, Madam Secretary. On that

question, the Ayes are 53, the Nays are 1, none voting

Present. Senate Bill 956, having received the constitutional

majority, is declared passed.