Appendix — Johnson Controls, Inc. v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Industry

Supreme Court brief1995

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Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1994

JOHNSON CONTROLS, INCORPORATED, SYSTEMS

& SERVICES DIVISION, and PNEUMATIC CONTROL

SYSTEMS COUNCIL,

Petitioners,

Vv.

UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND

APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPE

FITTING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES AND

CANADA, AFL-CIO, and ITS LOCAL 353,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DOUGLAS A. DARCH*

THEODORE C. STAMATAKOS

RONALD J. KRAMER

SEYFARTH, SHAW, FAIRWEATHER

& GERALDSON

55 East Monroe Street, Suite 4200

Chicago, Illinois 60603-5803

(312) 346-8000

Attorneys for Petitioners

JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC. AND

PNEUMATIC CONTROL SYSTEMS COUNCIL

*Counsel of Record

"Chiengo Legal Copies, Inc. (312) 332-7777

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Decision of the United States Court of Appeals

Sor the Seventh Civcmit 2... ese A-|]

Decision and Order of the United States

District Court for the Central District of Illinois B-1

Decision of the Arbitrator ............... C-]

Pe I a ob hee er Ra oe ene D-|

a tt en ta ——_—

A-1

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 94-1278

JOHNSON CONTROLS, INCORPORATED, 3

SYSTEMS & SERVICES DIVISION, and

PNEUMATIC CONTROL SYSTEMS COUNCIL,

ss Plaintiffs-Appellees,

UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND

APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPE

FITTING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES

AND CANADA, AFL-CIO, and Its LOCAL 353,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Central District

of Illinois, Peoria Division

No. 93 C 1123 - Michael M. Mihm, Chief Judge

Argued September 14, 1994

Decided November 15, 1994

JUDGES: Before LAY, EASTERBROOK and RIPPLE,

Circuit Judges.

"The Honorable Donald P. Lay, Circuit Judge for the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting

by designation.

No. 94-1278 A-2

LAY, Circuit Judge. Johnson Controls, Inc. and the United

Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing

and Pipe Fitting Industry ("the Union") dispute whether

Johnson’s assignment of certain preventive maintenance work

to nonbargaining unit employees violates their collective

bargaining agreement. On September 26, 1989, the Union

initiated a grievance against Johnson alleging that Johnson was

using nonbargaining unit personnel to perform maintenance

work on mechanical equipment. The grievance could not be

resolved and the dispute was submitted to arbitration. The

arbitrator found in favor of the Union, concluding the

agreement covered the maintenance work. The district court

vacated the arbitrator’s award and granted summary judgment

in favor of Johnson, concluding the arbitrator went beyond the

terms of the agreement. The Union now appeals. Jurisdiction

is vested in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the

reasons set forth below, we reverse.

Background

Johnson Controls, Inc. is a member of the Pneumatic

Control Systems Council ("the PCSC"). The PCSC is

responsible for negotiating bargaining agreements with the

Union on behalf of its members. The Union is a qualified

labor organization under 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(5) and 185(a), and

represents employees of PCSC members for purposes of

collective bargaining. The Union’s Local 353 represents

various employees at Johnson’s Peoria location. The Union

and PCSC entered into the National Pneumatic Control

Systems Agreement ("the Agreement"), at issue in this case, on

March 31, 1989.

The Agreement mandates arbitration for certain

grievances arising between the signing parties. Paragraph 53

—— Lr .

A-3 No. 94-1278

of the Agreement defines the scope of the arbitrator’s authority

as follows:

The authority of the . . . impartial arbitrator shall be

limited to the construction and enforcement of the

express language of this Agreement as applied to the

specific grievance or issue stated in the request for

arbitration. The... impartial arbitrator shall have no

authority or jurisdiction, directly or indirectly, to add

to, subtract from, change, modify or supplement any of

the specific provisions of this Agreement.

In July, 1989, a different local chapter of the Union

filed a grievance in St. Louis against Johnson for the

assignment of some preventive maintenance work to

nonbargaining unit employees in breach of a provision of

Paragraph 13(1) of the Agreement. Paragraph 13(1) provides

in pertinent part:

This Agreement covers the rates of pay, hours and

working conditions of journeymen and apprentices

engaged in the installation, service, and maintenance of

all plumbing and/or pipe fitting systems, including

pneumatic controls and mechanical equipment and

component parts....

(emphasis added). In October 1990, the arbitrator in that

dispute found that the parties could not "agree on what was

decided between them" as to whether these workers were

covered by Paragraph 13(1). The first arbitrator concluded that

No. 94-1278 A-2

LAY, Circuit Judge. Johnson Controls, Inc. and the United

Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing

and Pipe Fitting Industry ("the Union") dispute whether

Johnson’s assignment of certain preventive maintenance work

to nonbargaining unit employees violates their collective

bargaining agreement. On September 26, 1989, the Union

initiated a grievance against Johnson alleging that Johnson was

using nonbargaining unit personnel to perform maintenance

work on mechanical equipment. The grievance could not be

resolved and the dispute was submitted to arbitration. The

arbitrator found in favor of the Union, concluding the

agreement covered the maintenance work. The district court

vacated the arbitrator’s award and granted summary judgment

in favor of Johnson, concluding the arbitrator went beyond the

terms of the agreement. The Union now appeals. Jurisdiction

is vested in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the

reasons set forth below, we reverse.

Background

Johnson Controls, Inc. is a member of the Pneumatic

Control Systems Council ("the PCSC"). The PCSC is

responsible for negotiating bargaining agreements with the

Union on behalf of its members. The Union is a qualified

labor organization under 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(5) and 185(a), and

represents employees of PCSC members for purposes of

collective bargaining. The Union’s Local 353 represents

various employees at Johnson’s Peoria location. The Union

and PCSC entered into the National Pneumatic Control

Systems Agreement ("the Agreement"), at issue in this case, on

March 31, 1989.

The Agreement mandates arbitration for certain

grievances arising between the signing parties. Paragraph 53

A-3 No. 94-1278

of the Agreement defines the scope of the arbitrator’s authority

as follows:

The authority of the . . . impartial arbitrator shall be

limited to the construction and enforcement of the

express language of this Agreement as applied to the

specific grievance or issue stated in the request for

arbitration. The .. . impartial arbitrator shall have no

authority or jurisdiction, directly or indirectly, to add

to, subtract from, change, modify or supplement any of

the specific provisions of this Agreement.

In July, 1989, a different local chapter of the Union

filed a grievance in St. Louis against Johnson for the

assignment of some preventive maintenance work to

nonbargaining unit employees in breach of a provision of

Paragraph 13(1) of the Agreement. Paragraph 13(1) provides

in pertinent part:

This Agreement covers the rates of pay, hours and

working conditions of journeymen and apprentices

engaged in the installation, service, and maintenance of

all plumbing and/or pipe fitting systems, including

pneumatic controls and mechanical equipment and

component parts ....

(emphasis added). In October 1990, the arbitrator in that

dispute found that the parties could not "agree on what was

decided between them" as to whether these workers were

covered by Paragraph 13(1). The first arbitrator concluded that

No. 94-1278 A-4

Paragraph 13(1) did not cover preventive maintenance work

and therefore held for Johnson.'

On September 26, 1989, Local 353 filed this grievance

against Johnson advancing the same claim; namely, that

Paragraph 13(1) provides for preventive maintenance work on

mechanical equipment to be performed by collective bargaining

personnel. After determining the St. Louis Arbitration did not

preclude a determination on the merits, the arbitrator’ issued an

award for the Union, holding Paragraph 13(1) includes

preventive maintenance work, and thus such work is reserved

for bargaining personnel. The arbitrator drew this conclusion

after undergoing a detailed analysis of the relationship and

bargaining history of the parties. Johnson filed suit in district

court to vacate the arbitrator’s award.

eee ee ee ee

The District Court for the Central District of Illinois”

vacated the arbitrator’s award and granted summary judgment

for Johnson. Although the court did not question the

arbitrator’s factual findings, it took issue with the arbitrator’s

reasoning. In discussing why he reached the opposite result of

the St. Louis proceeding, the arbitrator stated:

'The Union filed suit to have this decision vacated. The

District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri refused to

vacate this decision, and granted summary judgment in favor

of Johnson.

*Arbitrator George Edward Larney.

*The Honorable Michael M. Mihm, Chief Judge.

A-5 No. 94-1278

[T]here was a recognition by the [PCSC] and the

Union that a resolution of the issue had not necessarily

been resolved, that it had been fudged for whatever

their respective reasons and that there was almost an

understanding that the matter would have to be

disposed of in arbitration as evidenced by the remark

made by Tarkowski to Moore at the last bargaining

session that if the Union felt the new paragraph [13(1)]

covered the work of [preventive maintenance

inspectors], the Union could file a grievance. Based on

this remark and the uncertainty as to the meaning of

what had been agreed to, the Arbitrator is of the view

that the instant case, like the St. Louis case before

Erbs, represents an exception to the "maxim" [that a

party should be barred from securing through

arbitration what it was unable to secure through

negotiations].

The court interpreted this statement to mean that the arbitrator

had found no "meeting of the minds" between the parties with

regard to the meaning of Paragraph 13(1). The court went on

to conclude that because the parties reached no agreement,

further arbitration on this issue was beyond the arbitrator’s

authority. Thus, the court vacated the arbitrator’s award

because he had drawn his interpretation of Paragraph 13(1)

from outside the Agreement. The Union now appeals the

court’s grant of summary judgment, and its denial of the

Union’s counterclaim for enforcement of the arbitration award,

attorneys’ fees, and prejudgment interest.

No. 94-1278 A-8

548 F.2d 1288, 1294 (7th Cir.) (quoting Ludwig Honold Mfg.

Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969)), cert.

denied, 431 U.S. 905 (1977). Moreover, the Agreement’s

arbitration clause provides for this type of contract

construction.‘ Thus, the thrust of the arbitrator’s analysis falls

squarely within his authority to interpret the contract. See

Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 599 (stating a court has no

business second-guessing an arbitrator’s construction of the

collective bargaining agreement); Colfax Envelope Corp. v.

Local No. 458-3M, Chicago Graphic Communications Int’l

Union, 20 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1994) (indicating arbitrators

are meant to resolve questions of interpretation when the

meaning of a contract term is unclear).

The possible inconsistency of one paragraph of the

arbitrator’s opinion does not justify vacating the arbitrator’s

award. As we stated in Ethyl, supra, "It is only when the

arbitrator must have based his award on some body of thought,

or feeling, or policy, or law that is outside the contract... .

that the award can be said not to ‘draw its essence from the

collective bargaining agreement... ."" 768 F.2d at 185

(quoting Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597) (citations omitted)

(emphasis in original). The arbitrator’s opinion is dominated

by a discussion of the meaning of express language of

Paragraph 13(1). In addition, the Supreme Court has stressed

that a "mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award,

which permits the inference that the arbitrator may have

‘The clause limits the arbitrator’s authority to "construction

and enforcement of the express language" of the Agreement.

The arbitrator’s analysis of the bargaining history of the parties

to discern the meaning of the express language of Paragraph

13(1) falls squarely within this clause.

A-9 No. 94-1278

exceeded his authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce

the award." Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 598; see also

Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times,

Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1506 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating arbitrators’

opinions need not be well written and should not be subjected

to "beady-eyed scrutiny"). Thus, any confusion the arbitrator

may have caused is insufficient to support the lower court’s

decision.

We also reject the district court’s conclusion that

because the arbitrator found the parties came to no "meeting of

the minds” concerning the scope of Paragraph 13(1), further

arbitration on this issue was beyond his authority. Assuming

arguendo that the arbitrator actually concluded the parties

reached no "meeting of the minds" on the meaning of

Paragraph 13(1), such a finding does not prohibit the arbitrator

from interpreting the provision. In Colfax Envelope, supra, we

declared that contracting parties’ disparate understandings of

a particular provision of a collective bargaining agreement do

not render the provision nonarbitrable. 20 F.3d at 754. We

stated, "It is common for contracting parties to agree--that is,

to signify agreement--to a term to which each party attaches a

different meaning. It is just a gamble on a favorable

interpretation by the authorized tribunal should a dispute arise."

Id. (emphasis in original). We further clarified this principle:

"When parties agree to a patently ambiguous term, they submit

to have any dispute over it resolved by interpretation. That is

what courts and arbitrators are for in contract cases--to resolve

‘Our analysis is in agreement with the Union’s argument

that neither the first arbitrator nor Arbitrator Larney’s opinion

found there was no agreement. Neither party ever submitted

this argument at either arbitration proceeding.

No. 94-1278 A-10

interpretive questions founded on ambiguity." Jd. (emphasis in

original). Only if the contract provision contains a "latent

ambiguity," or, in other words, is the result of a mutual

misunderstanding, is it subject to rescission and outside the

arbitrator’s interpretive authority. Jd Because Paragraph

13(1) clearly is not the product of a mutual misunderstanding

between PCSC and the Union, the district court’s "meeting of

the minds" analysis was erroneous.

Thus, we hold the district court improperly upset the

arbitrator's award. We therefore reverse with directions to

enforce the award.

II.

The Union also argues the district court erred in

denying its request for attorneys’ fees and costs. Although we

find in favor of the Union, this case presents at least a

colorable question of law. We cannot conclude, therefore, that

Johnson’s arguments before the district court and on appeal

were frivolous or in bad faith. Thus, we agree with the district

court’s denial of an award of fees and costs. See, e.g,

Chicago Newspaper Publishing Ass'n v. Chicago Web Printing

Pressmen’s Union No. 7, 821 F.2d 390, 398 (7th Cir. 1987)

(stating that while the court disagreed with the employer’s

argument, it would not award fees to the union because the

employer did not exhibit bad faith in challenging the

arbitration award).

IIT.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of Johnson is reversed with

directions to enforce the arbitration award. The district court’s

A-11 No. 94-1278 |

denial of the Union’s request for attorneys’ fees, however, is

affirmed.

A true Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

B-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC. SYSTEMS )

& SERVICES DIVISION, and )°

PNEUMATIC CONTROL SYSTEMS )

COUNCIL, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

V. ) Case No

) 93-1123

UNITED ASSOCIATION OF )

JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES OF ) (Final

THE PLUMBING AND PIPE FITTING ) Judgment

INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES _) entered

AND CANADA, AFL-CIO, and Its ) 1/21/94)

LOCAL 353, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Johnson Controls’

and Pneumatic Control Systems’ Motion for Summary

Judgment [11] and Defendant United Association’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, Attorneys’ Fees and Prejudgment Interest

[14]. For the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiffs’ Motion is

granted, and the Defendants’ Motion is denied.

B-2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Johnson Controls, Inc. [Johnson] is one of

several members of the Pneumatic Control Systems Council

[PCSC]. PCSC exists to negotiate collective bargaining

agreements on behalf of its constituent members with

Defendant United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices

of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry [United Association].

United Association is a labor organization within the meaning

of 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(5) and 185(a) representing employees for

purposes of collective bargaining on behalf its members

employed by members of PCSC. Defendant Local 353 is a

local union of United Association that represents, for collective

bargaining purposes, certain employees at Johnson Controls’

Peoria, Illinois operation. United Association and PCSC

entered into the National Pneumatic Control Systems

Agreement [Agreement], effective March 31, 1989.

The Agreement provides for the arbitration of

grievances arising between the parties thereto. Art. XVII, 51.

Article XVII, Paragraph 53 provides that:

[t]he authority of the Arbitration Board and of

the impartial arbitrator shall be limited to the

construction and enforcement of the express

language of this Agreement as applied to the

specific grievance or issue stated in the request

for arbitration. The Arbitration Board and the

impartial arbitrator shall have no authority,

directly or indirectly, to add to, subtract from,

change, modify, or supplement any of the

specific provisions of this Agreement.

On July 6, 1989, Local 562 of United Association in St.

Louis, Missouri, filed a grievance against Johnson for the

os 0 a cai erie ae aaa cea aay

B-3

assignment of certain preventative maintenance work to non-

bargaining unit employees, in breach of Paragraph 13 of the

Agreement. Article II, Trade and Work Jurisdiction, Paragraph

13, provides in pertinent part:

(1) This Agreement covers the rates of pay, hours and

working conditions of journeymen and apprentices

engaged in the installation, service, and maintenance of

all plumbing and/or pipe fitting systems, including

pneumatic controls and mechanical equipment and

component parts...

The grievance was heard by Arbitrator Thomas J. Erbs on

June 5, 1990. On October 5, 1990, Arbitrator Erbs found that

an agreement had not been reached by the parties on this issue

and held that provisions not expressly stated in the contract

should not be created by "implication or arbitral fiat."

Therefore, Arbitrator Erbs found for Johnson. On

December 28, 1990, United Association and the Local Union

filed suit to vacate Arbitrator Erbs’ award in district court. The

District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted

summary judgment for the defendants on August 18, 1992.

On September 26, 1989, Local 353 of the Union

Association in Peoria, Illinois filed a grievance against Johnson

advancing the same claim and violation of the same Agreement

_ provision as the St. Louis grievance. The grievance turned on

the issue of whether Paragraph 13(1) of the Agreement

provided for preventative maintenance work on mechanical

equipment to be performed by collective or non-collective

bargaining unit personnel. On April 9, 1991, Arbitrator George

Edward Larney held an arbitration hearing. On May 19, 1992,

Arbitrator Larney, in an interim award, found that Arbitrator

Erbs’ 1990 decision did not preclude a determination on the

merits of the Peoria grievance, and on February 3, 1993, in a

B-4

56 page written opinion, Arbitrator Larney issued an award for

United Association and the Local Union on the merits. In that

opinion, Arbitrator Larney held that Paragraph 13(1) of the

Agreement included preventative maintenance work and that

Johnson breached the Agreement by assigning preventative

maintenance work to non-bargaining personnel.

On April 5, 1993, Johnson and PCSC filed this action

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 185 to vacate Arbitrator Larney’s

award.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On a motion for summary judgment, the district court

must determine "whether the record shows that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Colan v. Cutler-

Hammer, Inc., 812 F.2d 357, 360 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 820, 108 S.Ct. 79 (1987), quoted in Wolf v.

City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1329 (7th Cir. 1989). The

moving party has the burden of establishing the lack of such an

issue.

Of course, a party seeking summary judgment

always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of "the

pleadings, depositions, answers. to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any," which it believes

demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548

(1986).

ee ee

B-5

Once the movant has made a properly supported motion,

the non-movant has the responsibility of going beyond the

pleading and setting forth specific facts demonstrating the

existence of a genuine issue of fact for trial. Randle v. LaSalle

Telecommunications, Inc., 876 F.2d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 1989);

Flip Side Productions, Inc. v. Jam Productions, Ltd., 843 F.2d

1024, 1031-32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909, 109 S.Ct.

261 (1988). See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. A material fact

must be "outcome determinative under the governing law."

Shlay v. Montgomery, 802 F.2d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1986),

quoting Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 296 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983). The fact is genuinely disputed

when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986), quoted

in Mays v. Chicago Sun-Times, 865 F.2d 134, 136 (7th Cir.),

cert. denied sub nom. Platt v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit, et al., 493 U.S. 900, 110 S.Ct. 259 (1989).

Thus, the non-movant must produce proper documentary

evidence to support his contentions. Howland v. Kilquist, 833

F.2d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 1987).

DISCUSSION

The scope of judicial review of arbitration awards is

extremely narrow. United Paperworkers Int’] Union v. Misco,

Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43, 108 S.Ct. 364, 373 (1987); Ethyl Corp.

v. United Steelworkers of America, 768 F.2d 180, 183 (7th Cir.

1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 1184 (1986). An

arbitration award will be upheld so long as it "draws its essence

from the collective bargaining agreement." Ethyl, 768 F.2d at

184, quoting, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car

Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361 (1960). This is

true even where the court finds that the arbitrator misinterpreted

the contract. Ethyl, 768 F.2d at 184.

B-6

The test of whether an award "draws its essence from"

the underlying agreement is "whether the arbitrator had

exceeded the powers delegated to him by the parties." Ethyl,

768 F.2d at 184. An arbitrator derives his authority exclusively

from the parties as expressed through the agreement.

Therefore, an arbitrator's authority is limited to the

interpretation and application of the applicable collective

bargaining agreement. United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 597,

80 S.Ct. at 1361; Ethyl, 768 F.2d at 185. If an arbitration

award is found to be within the confines of the arbitrator’s

authority and based on an "honest decision" by the arbitrator,

"after a full and fair hearing of the parties," the award will be

upheld even if a court finds the award was based on an error of

either fact or law. Ethyl, 768 F.2d at 183. In other words, if

the court finds that the arbitrator interpreted the contract in

making the award, the court’s function is at an end. Ethyl, 768

F.2d at 187. Moreover, reasonable doubts on this determination

must be resolved in favor of enforcing the award. Ethyl, 768

F.2d at 185. To set aside an arbitration award, the court must

find that the award was not based on the contract.

Therefore, the only issue for this Court is whether

Arbitrator Larney, in making the February 3, 1993 award,

exceeded his jurisdiction to arbitrate this matter.

The issue before Arbitrator Larney was whether

Paragraph 13(1) of the Agreement provided for preventative

maintenance work on mechanical equipment to be performed by

collective or non-collective bargaining unit personnel. Prior to

this Agreement, the work at issue was performed by

non-collective bargaining unit personnel. Whether the language

modifications to Paragraph 13(1) of this Agreement actually

changed the work jurisdiction at issue from that of the previous

agreement necessarily required a determination on the intent of

the parties to this Agreement. The parties to this litigation do

‘i

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a

4

B-7

not dispute that to determine the intent of the parties, Arbitrator

Larney could consider extrinsic evidence.

Arbitrator Larney stated at pages 36 and 37 of his

written opinion that: :

In his testimony in [the St. Louis arbitration],

[Jim] Tarkowski [Manager for Human Resources

at Johnson Controls and Chairman of the

Council’s bargaining committee] testified that

when the Council agreed to drop its proposed

Paragraph [13(2)], the list of tasks/duties it

viewed as not work falling within the [United

Association’s] jurisdiction, and, at’ the same

time, accepting the language of Paragraph

[13(1)] as modified, he (Tarkowski) stated to

[M. Eddie Moore, Chairman of United

Association Negotiating Committee] more than

one time that in accepting the language of .

[13(1)], the member companies [of PCSC] would

continue to operate as they had in the past, and

that the Council was not agreeing the

Paragraph [13(1)] covered work done by

[preventative maintenance inspectors] or Tech

Reps. (Emphasis added).

Arbitrator Larney also stated that Tarkowski testified to stating

during negotiations that, "if the Union felt the [modified

paragraph] covered the [work of preventative maintenance

instructors] the Union could file a grievance." Tarkowski also

testified that Moore did not respond to this comment when it

was made at the negotiations. According to Tarkowski, as

restated by Arbitrator Larney, the Council’s view was that the

language modification of Paragraph 13(1) resulted in the Union

B-8

completely giving up the right to perform preventative

maintenance work.

In contrast to this, Arbitrator Larney’s opinion also

acknowledged Tarkowski’s testimony that he knew the Union

was emphatic about the language modifications to Paragraph

13(1) and that Moore’s stated purpose for the language

modifications was to increase the scope of United Association’s

work. Arbitrator Larney wrote, however, that Tarkowski

testified that "he does not recall whether he responded to Moore

by telling him it was the Council’s view that by eliminating the

‘incidental to’ language [of Paragraph 13], the Union was

decreasing the scope of its work jurisdiction."

This Court is unable to ascertain the chronology of the

above testimony of Tarkowski as it relates to the negotiations

process of the Agreement. The exact chronology would be

probative on the issue of the intent of the parties with regard to

their understanding of the substance of Paragraph 13. What is

obvious from the above, however, is that the parties agreed to

accept the language of Paragraph 13(1) as modified. On the

other hand, what is not obvious is whether the parties agreed as

to just what that language meant in terms of the Union’s work

jurisdiction or, as the Defendants argue, whether the parties

agreed that the meaning of that Paragraph would be determined

later by filing a grievance.

In any event, the decision of this Court turns on

Arbitrator Larney’s determination as to the intent of the parties.

At page 55 of his written opinion, Larney stated that:

there was a recognition by the Council and the

Union that a resolution of the issue had not

necessarily been resolved, that it had been

fudged for whatever their respective reasons and

. 3

B-9

that there was almost an understanding that the

matter would have to be disposed of in

arbitration as evidenced by the remark made by

Tarkowski to Moore at the last bargaining

session that if the Union felt the new paragraph

[13(1)] covered the work of [preventative

maintenance inspectors], the Union could file a

grievance. (Emphasis added).

Arbitrator Larney wrote that "[b]ased on this remark and the

uncertainty as to what had been agreed to, [he] is of the view

that the instant case, like the St. Louis case ..., represents an

exception to the ‘maxim’" that a party should be barred from

securing through arbitration what it was unable to secure

through negotiations.

If the parties to this Agreement intended that the agreed

upon language would be determined later by an arbitrator, the

Agreement did not articulate that intent, and Arbitrator Larney’s

findings of fact, as quoted above, did not indicate as much. In

fact, Arbitrator Larney, as the above quote states, concluded

that an agreement on the meaning of Paragraph 13(1) had not

been reached. Once Arbitrator Larney made the determination

that there was no meeting of the minds regarding Paragraph

13(1) and the Union’s work jurisdiction, further arbitration of

this issue on the merits was beyond the scope of Arbitrator

Larney’s authority pursuant to the Agreement. Paragraph 53 of

Article XVII provides that the arbitrator’s authority is "limited

to the construction and enforcement of the express language of

this Agreement ... and the impartial arbitrator shall have no

authority or jurisdiction, directly or indirectly, to add to,

subtract from, change, modify, or supplement ... this

Agreement."

B-10

With all due respect to Arbitrator Larney, his words

here reveal a violation of the limits of his authority under the

Agreement and to his obligation at law to interpret and apply

the collective bargaining agreement. The issue before

Arbitrator Larney was the intent of the parties; the

interpretation of the paragraph at issue turned on such a

determination; and as he admittedly states, there was no

meeting of the minds with respect to Paragraph 13(1).

Necessarily, Arbitrator Larney’s award was based "on some

body of thought, or feeling, or policy, or law that is outside the

contract." Ethyl, 768 F.2d at 185, quoting, United

Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, this Court finds that Arbitrator Larney’s

award did not draw its essence from the collective bargaining

Agreement. The Plaintiffs’ Motion is granted. The

Defendants’ Motion is denied. The Arbitration Award is

vacated. Case terminated.

ENTERED this 19th day of January, 1994.

Michael M. Mihm

Chief United States District Judge

B-11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

JOHNSON CONTROLS INC., Systems

& Services Division

PNEUMATIC CONTROL SYSTEMS

COUNCIL

Plaintiffs

Case No. 93-1123

vs. (Final Judgment

entered 1/21/94)

UNITED ASSOCIATION OF

JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES OF

THE PLUMBING AND PIPE FITTING

INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES

AND CANADA, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 353

Defendants

UNITED ASSOCIATION OF

JOURNEYMEN AND APRENTICES OF

THE PLUMBING AND PIPE FITTING

INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES

AND CANADA, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 353

Counter-Claimants

vs.

JOHNSON CONTROLS INC.

PNEUMATIC CONTROL SYSTEMS COUNCIL

Counter-Defendants

B-12

oO JURY VERDICT. This action came before the Court

for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has

rendered its verdict.

1 DECISION BY THE COURT. This action came to

hearing before the Court. The issues have been heard and a

decision has been rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment is

entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.

ENTER this 20th day of January, 1994.

JOHN M. WATERS, CLERK

BY: DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE MATTER

OF THE ARBITRATION

BETWEEN

EMPLOYER

JOHNSON CONTROLS,

INC. SYSTEMS &

SERVICES DIVISION

PEORIA, ILLINOIS and

PNEUMATIC CONTROL

SYSTEMS COUNCIL

AND

UNION

UNITED ASSOCIATION

OF JOURNEYMEN AND

APPRENTICES OF THE

PLUMBING AND PIPE

FITTING INDUSTRY OF

THE UNITED STATES

AND CANADA, AFL-

CIO; LOCAL 353

FMCS 90-26923

RIEVANCE

DETERMINATION AS TO

WHETHER EMPLOYER

VIOLATED ARTICLE II,

PARAGRAPH 13(1) OF

THE NATIONAL

AGREEMENT BY

ASSIGNING DISPUTED

WORK TO NON-

BARGAINING UNIT

EMPLOYEES

OPINION AND AWARD

(Decided February 3, 1994)

C-2

PRELIMINARY INFORMATION

CASE PRESENTATION - APPEARANCES

EMPLOYER UNION

RAY J. SCHOONHOVEN ~ BRIAN A. POWERS

DOUGLAS A. DARCH SALLY M. TEDROW

JEFFREY C. KAUFFMAN Attorneys

Attorneys for Pneumatic O’DONOGHUE &

Control Systems Council O’ DONOGHUE

SEYFARTH, SHAW, 4748 Wisconsin Avenue,

FAIRWEATHER & N.W.

GERALDSON Washington, D.C. 20016

55 East Monroe Street (202) 362-0041

Suite 4200

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 346-8000

AND

JOHN W. BRAHM

Attorney for Johnson

Controls, Inc.

FOLEY & LARDNER

First Wisconsin Center

777 East Wisconsin

Avenue

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

53202

(414) 271-2400

C-3

CHRONOLOGY OF RELEVANT EVENTS’

Decision by the Arbitrator that the Subject May 19, 1992

Grievance Originating in the Company’s

Peoria Branch Office and Involving Eight

(8) Union Locals Located in Central Illinois

Was Substantively Arbitrable; Decision

Rendered

Post-Hearing Briefs Pertaining to the Merits

Received by the Arbitrator:

UNION August 7, 1992

EMPLOYER August 8,1992

By Letter Dated August 10, 1992 To the August 18, 1992

Parties, the Arbitrator Interchanged the

Post-Hearing Briefs and Declared The Case

Record on the Merits Officially Closed As

Of the Date the Last Brief Was Received;

Case Record Closed As of Decision by

United States District Judge, August 18, 1992

Clyde S. Cahill, Wherein He Dismissed )

The Union’s Suit to Vacate Arbitrator

Thomas J. Erbs’ Award Rendered

October 5, 1990 Concerning The St. Louis

Work Jurisdiction Grievance (Grievance 7-

‘This Chronology Section is a continuation of the

Chronology Section set forth by the Arbitrator in the

Opinion and Disposition he rendered in the matter of the

Subject grievance’s substantive arbitrability.

Ca

6-89), Cahill Holding that Arbitrator Erbs

Did, In Fact, "Interpret" the Contract In

His Ultimate Decision; Order Granting

Employer’s (Defendant) Motion For

Summary Judgment and Denying Union’s

(Plaintiff) Motion For Summary Judgment

and Further Order Dismissing the Matter

Dated

Letter Dated August 20, 1992 From Jeffrey August 20, 1992

C. Kauffman, One of the Attorneys for

PCSC, Advising This Arbitrator of Judge

Cahill’s Decision to Dismiss the Union’s

Suit to Vacate Arbitrator Erbs’ Award and

Forwarding a Copy of Judge Cahill’s

Judgment and Memorandum Opinion Dated

August 18, 1992; Letter and Copy of

Cahill’s Opinion Hand Delivered to

Arbitrator and Received by Him

Letter to the Parties From the Arbitrator August 24, 1992

Acknowledging Receipt of Judge Cahill’s

Judgment and Order and Memorandum and

Order Both Dated August 18, 1992

Forwarded to Him by Employer Counsel,

Jeffrey C. Kauffman, and Apprising the

Parties That, Upon His Review of Cahill’s

Memorandum and Order, the Arbitrator

Found Judge Cahill’s Holding Not to Be

Inconsistent With the Arbitrator’s Ruling

on Arbitrability Rendered May 19, 1992,

Stating the View That the Court Correctly

Recognized Its Charge of Judicial Review

of Erbs’ Award to be Narrow, Thereby

C-5

Refraining From Revisiting the Merits of

the Case Holding that Erbs Performed the

Task For Which He Was Hired,

Specifically that Erbs Interpreted a Section

of the National Agreement Deemed by the -

Court to be Ambiguous and that Erbs Did

So Without Exceeding His Authority; This

Arbitrator Apprised the Parties That He

Did Not Read Into Judge Cahill’s Decision

That The Court In Any Way Deemed Erbs’

Decision To Be the Correct Holding Or

That It Concurred In the Decision

Rendered by Erbs; This Arbitrator Further

-Apprised the Parties That Even Assuming,

Arguendo, the Court Was In Concurrence

With Erbs’ Decision, Such Concurrence

Did Not Affect The May 19, 1992

Arbitrability Decision and, Additionally,

Stating That It Was Irrelevant As To

Whether Or Not the Court Vacated the

Erbs’ Award Relative to This Arbitrator’s

Finding That Pursuant to Paragraph 53 of

the National Agreement, Each Specific

Initiated Grievance Is To Be Decided On a

Case-by-Case Basis; The Arbitrator

Apprised That Notwithstanding These

Determinations, He Would Incorporate

Judge Cahill’s Judgment and Order and the

Accompanying Memorandum and Order As

Part of the Record Evidence In This Instant

Matter; Letter Dated

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ISSUE

In the absence of a joint stipulation of the issue and given the |

finding rendered by this Arbitrator previously that the issue is |

an arbitrable one, the following is an independent statement by

each Party of the issue to be resolved on the merits.

UNION

Did Johnson Control’s branch office in Peoria violate

Paragraph 13 of the Agreement (Jt. Ex. IP) by

assigning bargaining unit work to non-bargaining unit

employees? (Tr. p. 13)

If so, the Union requests as a remedy an Award

declaring that the disputed work is covered by the

Agreement (Jt. Ex. IP), specifically Article II,

Paragraph 13 and ordering all affected employees to be

made whole.

EMPLOYER

Whether the Company has violated the 1989-91

National Collective Bargaining Agreement (Jt. Ex. IP)

between the Council and Union by assigning filter

changing, oiling and greasing, belt adjusting, and other

routine preventative maintenance work to Preventive

Maintenance Inspectors (PMIs) at the Peoria branch?

C-7

RELEVANT DOCUMENTATION

APPLICABLE CONTRACT PROVISIONS (Jt. Ex. IP)

AR II

T E AND WORK JURISDICTION

13. (1) This Agreement covers the rates of pay,

hours and working conditions of journeymen and

apprentices engaged in the installation, service, and

maintenance of all plumbing and/or pipe fitting

systems, including pneumatic controls and mechanical

equipment and component parts for all of the above

which also includes fabrication, assembling, erection,

| installation, dismantling, replacement, repairing,

reconditioning, adjusting, altering, calibrating, servicing

of all plumbing and/or pipe fitting systems, pneumatic

controls and/or mechanical equipment, and handling,

unloading, distributing, reloading, tying-on, and

hoisting of all piping materials, appurtenances and

equipment used in connection to said plumbing or

piping systems, pneumatic controls, and/or mechanical

equipment, by any method, including all hangers and

supports of every description and all other work

included in the trade jurisdictional claims of the United

Association.

(2) Any dispute over the meaning and

interpretation of Paragraph 13 shall be immediately

submitted to United Association representatives of the

General Office on the one hand, and the Secretary of

the Labor Relations Committee of the Council on the

other (per Paragraph 51, Step 2). With the exception

that if not settled within three (3) working days, the

grievance shall be reduced to writing and submitted to

C-8

Arbitration as set forth in Steps 3 and 4 of Paragraph

51 of the Agreement.

PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT

* * * *

WHEREAS, the Employer is engaged in the

pneumatic control systems industry throughout the

United States and is known as a "National Pneumatic

Control Contractor," and in the performance of such

work requires the services of competent, skilled and

qualified journeymen and apprentices; and

WHEREAS, the Union is affiliated with the

American Federation of Labor and Congress of

Industrial Organizations and has in its membership in

local unions throughout the United States and Canada

skilled and qualified journeymen and apprentices

competent to perform all the work coming within the

trade and craft jurisdiction in the pneumatic control

systems industry; and

WHEREAS, the Employer and the Union desire

to mutually establish and stabilize wages, hours and

working conditions for journeymen and apprentices

employed on a nationwide basis with said Employer;

and

WHEREAS, to encourage closer cooperation

and understanding between the Employer and the

Union in the pneumatic control systems industry to the

j

C-9

end that satisfactory, continuous and harmonious labor

relations exist between the parties to this Agreement;

* * * *

ARTICLE I

RECOGNITION

11. The Council recognizes the Union as the sole

and exclusive bargaining representative for all

journeymen and apprentices in the employ of the

Employer with respect to wages, hours and other terms

and conditions of employment, on any and all work in

the pneumatic control systems industry described in

Article II of this Agreement.

1A. The management of the Employer’s business

including, but not limited to, the direction of the

working force, the right to hire, to plan, direct, control

and schedule all operations (including the scheduling of

the work force), and the right to establish, eliminate,

change or introduce new or improved methods,

machinery, quality standards or facilities, is the sole

and exclusive prerogative and responsibility of the

Employer. All rights not specifically nullified by this

Agreement are retained by the Employer.

ARTICLE VIII

SUPPLYING JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES

* * * *

23. The Employer shall notify the local union to

refer competent and skilled journeymen and apprentices

as required.

26.

43.

If a requirement for journeymen, competent and

skilled in the work covered by this Agreement, exists,

and such journeymen cannot be obtained under this

Article, the Employer shall be permitted to hire and

train persons, subject to the provisions of Article IV.

It is understood that preference for such employment

and training shall be given to journeymen with previous

experience in the plumbing and pipe fitting industry.

* * * *

ARTICLE Xill

SUBCONTRACTING

* * * *

In order to secure work for employees working

for the Employer under this Agreement, and in order to

protect wages and working conditions of such

employees, the Employer agrees to make reasonable

effort to perform service and maintenance work

covered by Article II, Paragraph 13 of this Agreement

with employees covered by this Agreement. However,

after such effort, the Employer reserves the right to

subcontract the work referred to herein.

BACKGROUND

As set forth in the May 19, 1992 Opinion and Disposition

addressing the sole issue of the subject grievance’s

arbitrability, the Employer shall be referred to variously as

Johnson Controls, Johnson, JCI, or the Company; the Union

shall be referred to variously as the United Association, UA,

C-11

or the Union; and together the Company and the Union shall

be known as the Parties. Further, the voluntary unincorporated

association known as the Pneumatic Control Systems Council

to which Johnson is one of five (5) Company members and

under whose auspices the National Collective Bargaining

Agreement (Jt. Ex. IP) is negotiated on behalf of numerous

companies signatory to the Agreement, shall be referred to

herein as the Council.'

Historically, the Council and the Union entered into a formal

collective bargaining relationship with the negotiation of an

initial national collective bargaining agreement in early 1969.

This occurred apparently as a result of the desire of companies

operating in the pneumatic control systems industry to have a

labor contract that better suited the unique aspects of their

business as opposed to continuing to be party to the generic

and much broader national construction agreement. According

to the record evidence, until the initial national pneumatic

control systems agreement became effective April 1, 1969, the

pneumatic control employers continued operating under the

1965 National Construction Agreement (Un. Ex. 1-Stl.). At

'The other company members that comprise the Council

are Barber-Colman Company, Honeywell, Inc., Landis & Gyr

Powers, and Robertshaw Controls Company (Jt. Ex. IP, P16).

In addition to these companies and Johnson Controls, other

signatory companies are known to the Parties as either

Associate member companies, those that are sponsored by, and

licensees of the five (5) companies comprising the Council and

Independent member companies, those companies that are not

affiliated in any way with any of the other companies party to

the Agreement. It is estimated that altogether, nationwide,

there are approximately fifty (50) companies all inclusive that

are signatories to the Agreement (Jt. Ex. IP).

C-12

the outset, the Council and the Union were cognizant of the

importance of trade or work jurisdiction of bargaining unit

members vis-a-vis as encompassed by the type of work

performed by companies in the pneumatic control system

industry. That work involved plumbing and pipe fitting as

related to the installation, service and maintenance of all

pneumatic control systems, and component parts thereof and

were associated primarily with new construction. As such, the

Council and the Union agreed upon the following work

jurisdiction clause as set forth in Article II, Paragraph 13 and

guaranteed that work to be exclusively bargaining unit work as

set forth in Paragraphs 14 and 15 which also follow as set

forth below:

ARTICLE II

TRADE AND WORK JURISDICTION

13. This Agreement covers the rates of pay, hours

and working conditions of all journeymen and

apprentices employed by the Employer doing plumbing

and pipe fitting as related to the installation, service,

and maintenance of all pneumatic control systems, and

component parts thereof, including fabrication,

assembling, erection, installation, dismantling,

repairing, reconditioning, adjusting, altering, and

servicing of said pneumatic control systems, and the

handling, unloading, distributing, reloading, tying on,

and hoisting of all piping materials, and appurtenances

and equipment used in connection with said pneumatic

control systems by any method, including all hangers

and supports of every description, and all other work

included in the trade jurisdictional claims of the United

Association.

C- 13

14. In recognition of the above work jurisdiction

claims, it is understood and agreed that the assignment

of work and the settlement of jurisdictional disputes

involving any other building trades organizations, shall

be settled and adjusted in accordance with the

procedure established by the National Joint Board for

the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes, or any

successor agency of the Building and Construction

Trades Department. There shall be no work stoppages

because of jurisdictional disputes.

15. All journeyman and apprentice work tasks

coming under this Agreement shall be assigned only to

employees covered by this Agreement.

(Jt. Ex. 8-Stl.)

According to the record evidence, during the time the initial

Agreement (Jt. Ex. 8-Stl.) was in force from April 1, 1969 to

April 30, 1972, two (2) major problems presented themselves,

one of which had to do with the assignment of bargaining unit

work as set forth in Article I], Paragraph 13 to a class of

"technicians" or other employees not covered by the

Agreement. Although the Council and the Union did not

modify in any way the language of Paragraph 13 in

negotiations for the successor 1972 Agreement (Jt. Ex. 7-Stl.),

they did address the problem nevertheless in side letters they

each sent to their respective constituents about the problem and

incorporating those side letters into the Agreement as

Appendix B. In the letter dated February 25, 1972 sent by the

Council to all of its member companies, the Council

highlighted the problem of mis-assignments referencing them

as occasional and apprised that with respect to this problem the

Council and the Union were in complete agreement that "all

work coming under the UA-PCSC Agreement shall be assigned

C-14

only to members of the United Association." The Council

went on to advise its constituent members that in order to

comply with this commitment that had been made by the

Council’s Negotiating Committee, the companies were to

include in a notice to field management of the Agreement’s

renewal, a statement of policy that it (each company) would

comply with all terms of the 1972 Agreement, without

exception, and with special emphasis on the commitment to

assign work set out in Paragraph 13 to no one other than a

member of the Union in accordance with Paragraph 15, the

language of which was also left unchanged from the initial

agreement.? In complying with the Council’s directive,

Johnson Controls Manager, Field Labor Relations, K.E

Goetschel, sent an undated letter to the appropriate field

managers apprising of the two problems and stating with

respect to the work jurisdiction problem, the following:

We wish to emphasize the fact that it is the Company’s

intent to comply with all the terms of this [1972]

Agreement. We especially wish to reaffirm the policy

of our company that all journeymen and apprentice

work tasks coming under this agreement will be

assigned only to employees covered by this Agreement.

(Jt. Ex. 7-Stl.)

"It was further agreed as noted in this letter that samples

of the notices from each company, as well as those to be sent

by the Union addressing the second problem, that is the

invocation of work stoppages by some local unions to force a

settlement of grievances in violation of Paragraph 57 of the

Agreement (Jt. Ex. 8-Stl.) were to be in the UA’s and

Council’s hands before the successor 1972 Labor Agreement

(Jt. Ex. 7-Stl.) was formally signed.

C - 15

According to the record evidence, work jurisdiction had

become a problem during the term of the initial Agreement (Jt.

Ex. 8-Stl.) as a result of a transition that was taking place

relative to the type of work the companies in the Pneumatic

Control Systems industry was expanding into im response to

changing economic conditions. Specifically, in response to

declining work in the construction industry, the pneumatic

control companies began competing with mechanical contractor

companies for the service and maintenance work on heating,

air conditioning, refrigeration, and other mechanical systems.

According to the Union, part of this new work entailed

scheduled periodic routine preventive service and maintenance

of HVAC (heating, ventilation, air conditioning) equipment,

including refrigeration and other mechanical systems which

was provided as a result of prepaid service and maintenance

contracts sold to customers. The record evidence reflects that

in branching out into this type of work, the pneumatic control

companies put themselves into direct competition with

companies either members of or associated with a

multi-employer group known as the Mechanical Contractors

Association, hereinafter Association or MCA, which, like the

Council, were party to a nationwide collective bargaining

agreement with the Union, known as the National Mechanical

Equipment Service Agreement. A review of the scope of work

performed by companies signatory to the MCA Agreement,

reflects that included as part of mechanical service and

maintenance work performed on a contract basis are such tasks

as cleaning and adjusting which are deemed to constitute the

work known as preventive or routine maintenance (Jt. Ex.

4-Stl.).

M. Eddie Moore, Assistant General President of the Union,

testified that he first became involved in negotiations for the

Master Pneumatic Control Agreement in 1976 and it was at

this negotiation he learned that in agreeing to language changes

C - 16

in the Work Jurisdiction clause, Paragraph 13, in the National

negotiations for the 1974 Master Agreement, the Union had

facilitated full-blown entry for the pneumatic companies into

the business of mechanical equipment service and maintenance.

The clause as rewritten reads as follows:

ARTICLE Il

TRADE AND WORK SDICTION

13. This Agreement covers the rates of pay, hours,

and working conditions of all jourmeymen and

apprentices employed by the Employer doing plumbing

and pipe fitting as related to the installation, service,

and maintenance of all pneumatic control or other

piping systems, and component parts thereof, including

fabrication, assembling, erection, installation,

dismantling, repairing, reconditioning, adjusting,

altering, and servicing of said pneumatic control or

other piping systems, and the handling, unloading,

distributing, reloading, tying on, and hoisting of all

piping materials, appurtenances, and equipment used in

connection with said pneumatic control or other piping

systems by any method, including all hangers and

supports of every description, and all other work

included in the trade jurisdictional claims of the United

Association.

(Jt. Ex. 6-Stl.)

Even though there was no specific reference to the work of

preventive maintenance in connection with servicing

mechanical systems, nonetheless, Moore asserted the Union

gained all work of maintenance, including preventive

maintenance, in agreeing to the revisions made in the language

of Paragraph 13. Specifically, Moore explained, the work of

preventive maintenance accrued unto the Union’s jurisdiction

C-17

through the three added references in the language of

Paragraph 13 that declared, "or other piping" systems, which

he asserted meant mechanical equipment.’ Moore testified that

at the time the 1974 National Agreement (Jt. Ex. 6-Stl.) was

consummated, he was Business Manager of Local 602 in

Washington, D.C. and he recalled receiving an instruction from

the UA that pneumatic control companies could now go into

the service work of refrigeration, air conditioning, and heating.

The record evidence reflects that following the conclusion of

the negotiations for the 1974 National Agreement, the

incumbent UA General President, Martin J. Ward, by letter

dated January 8, 1975 (Un. Ex. 3-Stl.), apprised all Local

Union Business Representatives, among others, of the

following, among other things:

During the negotiation of this Agreement, it was fully

understood and agreed by both the United Association

and the Pneumatic Control Systems Council that the

terms of this Agreement cover plumbing and pipe

fitting on pneumatic controls, refrigeration equipment,

industrial piping, pneumatic tube systems, and other

piping or plumbing work performed by the Pneumatic

*The Arbitrator takes judicial notice of the fact that in its

post-hearing brief (p. 10), the Employer’s position with respect

to any pertinent comparisons between the 1972 and 1974

National Agreements was that the work jurisdiction clauses

(Article II, Paragraph 13) remained unchanged in pertinent

part. It appears, therefore, that the Employer does not attach

any significance to the added reference of "or other piping"

systems in the 1974 work jurisdiction clause, whereas the

Union attaches a great deal of significance to the added

language.

C- 18

Control Contractors. Paragraph 13 has been modified

to clarify and avoid any misunderstanding.

* * * *

The United Association and the Pneumatic Control

Systems Council have entered into this Agreement in

good faith to protect the work of the United

Association and to meet business requirements of the

Pneumatic Control Industry. * * *

(Un. Ex. 3 - Stl.)

According to Joseph Shallbetter, Operations Manager of the

Company’s Peoria Branch, at least with respect to the Central

Illinois area serviced by members of the eight (8) Union

Locals who have an interest in this case, the limited amount of

preventive maintenance work that existed in the period

between 1974 and 1976 was performed by UA mechanics,

meaning journeymen and apprentice plumbers.

Moore testified that in and around the same time the Union

negotiated the Master Agreement in 1974 for the Pneumatic

Control Industry, it also negotiated the Master Agreement in

the Mechanical Equipment Industry. In the latter negotiations,

Moore related the Union and the Mechanical Contractors

agreed to add a new job classification known as Tradesman

and that employees in this classification would perform all the

tasks associated with the work of preventive maintenance, such

as oiling and greasing and other such duties. Moore noted that

even though Tradesman was a bargaining unit job, the pay for

such position, relative to skilled journeymen and apprentice

plumbers, was substantially lower, given the unskilled nature

of the job. Moore explained that, in having reserved the work

of preventive maintenance exclusively to journeymen and

Se hase gp ut vena or?

C-19

apprentice plumbers under the Pneumatic Control Industry

Master Agreement, while at the same time negotiating a

separate lower paid classification of Tradesman to perform the

very same preventive maintenance work under the Mechanical

Equipment Industry Master Agreement, the resuit was that in

bidding for service contracts, the companies in the Mechanical

Contractors Association gained a competitive edge over the

companies in the Pneumatic Controls Industry. According to

Moore, who was a participant in the national negotiations for

the 1976 Master Agreement in the Pneumatic Control Industry,

this competitive edge by the companies in the Mechanical

Equipment Industry was viewed as a source of consternation

and a problem that needed to be confronted in bargaining for

the ‘successor agreement to the 1974 Master Agreement.

According to Moore, the Parties, in seeking to level the

competitive playing field between the companies in the two

industries, agreed to limit the scope of preventive maintenance

work performed by the more highly paid skilled journeymen

and apprentice plumbers so as to allow the companies to hire

less skilled lower paid non-bargaining unit personnel to

perform the bulk of the preventive maintenance work.* Moore

explained that this change was accomplished by adding an

entirely new section to Paragraph 13 of Article II that

specifically addressed the work of mechanical equipment

service and maintenance and delineated the individual tasks

‘It is noted that in ceding the bulk of the preventive

maintenance work to lower paid personnel, the companies in

the Pneumatic Controls Industry were enabled to compete

better in the bidding process for scheduled service and

maintenance contracts against companies in the Mechanical

Equipment Industry who had on their payrolls employees in

the lower paid classification of Tradesmen who performed such

work.

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C - 20

comprising this work. Moore noted that the first section which

had previously constituted the whole of Paragraph 13 in the

previous 1974 Master Agreement (Jt. Ex. 6 - Stl.) was left

unchanged. The new section of Paragraph 13 denoted in the

1976 Master Agreement (Jt. Ex. 5 - Stl.) as 13(2) read, in

whole, as follows:

(2) The following mechanical equipment service

and maintenance work tasks are included in this

Agreement: repair and replacement of oil burners,

boilers, boiler water feeders, low water cut offs, traps,

strainers, valves, pumps, heating coils, interchangers,

and converters of steam or hot water heating systems;

the repair and replacement of cooling coils,

compressors, condensers, evaporators, interchangers,

and cooling towers of refrigeration systems including

the replacement of parts, evacuation, and recharging of

refrigeration equipment, and other repairs required to

make unit and/or equipment operational, belt

adjustment, oiling, greasing and cleaning of equipment

when incidental to or part of the repair or replacement.

Moore explained that the language in the last line of this

section referencing, "incidental to or part of the repair or

replacement" was the language that restricted the scope of

preventive maintenance work such as belt adjustment, oiling,

greasing and cleaning of equipment that had previously been

within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bargaining unit

journeymen and apprentice plumber employees.°

‘Moore related that the new section of Paragraph 13 had

come about in response to a proposal advanced by the Council

and that UA Assistant General President, Gene Bradshaw,

(continued...)

C - 21

In a letter dated April 26, 1977 to All Business Representatives

of Local Unions, among other UA officials (Un. Ex. 4 - Stl.),

UA General President, Martin J. Ward, in advising of the

changes made in the 1976 Master Agreement stated the

following with respect to the Trade and Work- Jurisdiction

clause, that is, specifically, with respect to the newly added

section of Paragraph 13.

Additional clarification as to work assignments on

certain types of Mechanical Equipment Service has

been added to this Article which changes will require

a transition period to accomplish same and we seek

your cooperation in this matter. (Un. Ex. 4 - Stl.).°

*(...continued)

functioning as the Chairman of the Union bargaining

committee, in agreeing with the new section, relinquished the

work of preventive maintenance, but not totally. According to

Moore, Bradshaw’s prime example, with respect to this new

demarcation in work jurisdiction between bargaining and

non-bargaining unit work as it related to the performance of

preventive maintenance work, was that if a company had a

contract to change one thousand (1,000) filters in an office

building, such work could be performed by a non-bargaining

unit employee, but that if such a filter change was required

while a UA Mechanic (Journeyman or Apprentice Plumber)

was performing the work of repair, replacement, et cetera, then

the duty of making the filter change, which otherwise

constituted preventive maintenance type work, was within the

work jurisdiction of the bargaining unit.

‘In its post-hearing brief, specifically in footnote 12, the

Employer asserted that in 1977, the Union leadership explained

(continued...)

xe eS 2

dina a Brae bated

C -22

Whereas the Union asserts it ceded what might be referred to

as the non-incidental preventive maintenance work to

non-bargaining unit employees under the language of the new

second section of Paragraph 13 in the 1976 Master Agreement

(Jt. Ex. 5-Stl.), the Employer asserts the opposite, stating that

this new second section added to the work jurisdiction of the

bargaining unit by enumerating a number of specific

tasks/duties and that, among these tasks/duties were belt

adjustment, oiling, greasing and cleaning of equipment when

those tasks/duties were incidental to or part of the repair or

replacement. The Employer further asserts that these

tasks/duties fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the

bargaining unit only when they were "incidental to" repair or

replacement of parts and further, that said tasks/duties were not

considered "service and maintenance” tasks for had they been

so considered, "incidental to" language would necessarily have

been rendered redundant. The Employer maintained there is

no evidence to support a claim that the tasks/duties falling

under the rubric of preventive maintenance were made the

exclusive work of the bargaining unit under the terms of the

1974 Master Agreement (Jt. Ex. 6 - Stl.). To the contrary, the

Employer asserts that non-bargaining unit employees

performed preventive maintenance work before 1976, citing as

support, the testimony of Council Member, Larry Smith, who

°(...continued)

to their membership and local officials that the new 1976-79

Council’s work jurisdiction agreement "added" "work

requirements on certain types of Mechanical Equipment service

..." If the Employer is basing this observation on the Union’s

letter dated April 26, 1977 (Un. Ex. 4 - Stl.), it appears that

the Employer has mischaracterized what the letter stated as the

term "added" had reference to additional clarification regarding

work assignments and not work requirements.

Aan PT eh DURE LPS LO LIAG PFOA RE PTA eres Looe iat wt ie

ith.

TEARS ens -

Vie SERA ON FAG NRE No

PREPARE UPSET

7" ~

C - 23

drafted the "incidental to" language in negotiations for the

1976 Master Agreement (Jt. Ex. 5 - Stl.). Smith testified that

in these negotiations, the Union proposed to add the UA Job

Classification of Tradesman into the Master Agreement (PCSC

Agreement), but that the Council rejected this proposal. Smith

testified that the thrust of the "incidental to" language was to

grant the UA jurisdiction over the work specifically referenced,

preceding the words, "incidental to", namely, belt adjustment,

oiling, greasing and cleaning of equipment. Smith testified he

had worked for Honeywell, a Council company member, for

thirty (30) years and that over the years prior to 1989,

Honeywell had utilized non-bargaining unit employees to

perform work characterized as preventive maintenance, more

specifically, work not involving repairing or replacing, but

rather work involving such tasks/duties as changing filters and

belts. Smith, in his testimony, took issue with the intent of the

language "or other piping" systems added to Paragraph 13 in

the 1974 Master Agreement as conveyed by the Union,

recalling this had to do with the fact that some of the signatory

companies were in the sprinkler business, and that the language

insured that these companies would be able to obtain the

necessary labor to perform this work, and that it was not for

the purpose of UA gaining work jurisdiction over mechanical

equipment service and maintenance work. Smith conceded

that, notwithstanding the "incidental to" language, in some

cases UA Mechanics were performing both the "incidental to"

work and the same tasks/duties of preventive maintenance that

fell in the opposite category of non-incidental preventive

maintenance work. Smith averred that the performance of

such non-incidental preventive maintenance work by UA

Mechanics in some cases did not arise out of any work

jurisdiction language contained in the 1974 Master Agreement,

but rather it came about as a matter of specific work

assignments.

C - 24

Eddie Moore testified that after the 1976 Master Agreement

(Jt. Ex. 5 - Stl.) went into effect, two major problems arose,

to-wit: (1) numerous complaints were relayed by the local

unions that non-bargaining unit employees known at Johnson

Controls as PMI’s, an acronym for Preventive Maintenance

Inspectors, were performing tasks/duties beyond the scope of

preventive maintenance work; and (2) numerous complaints by

the competitor companies in the Mechanical Contractors

Association party to the National Mechanical Equipment

Service and Maintenance Agreement that by their use of

non-bargaining unit employees (at Johnson, PMI’s and at

Honeywell, Mech. Reps.) to perform duties beyond preventive

maintenance, the pneumatic companies were bidding for

service contracts on the basis of cheaper labor costs and,

therefore, they were beating them out for these contracts. In

effect, the mechanical contractor companies charged there

existed a state of unfair competition. For reasons not disclosed

in the voluminous record evidence submitted in this instant

case, the Council and the Union did not act to remedy either

or both problems through the bargaining of a successor

agreement to the 1976 Master Agreement until 1986.’

According to Moore, the Union, in its negotiation for the 1986

Master Agreement (Jt. Ex. 3 - Stl.) attempted to address the

problems arising from the complaints by its local unions and

the mechanical contractor companies by expanding the

"Like the predecessor master agreements in 1974, 1972,

and 1969, the 1976 Agreement in the Duration and

Termination clause (Article XX) provided that the Agreement

would, after its date certain of termination, here October 31,

1979, continue from year to year thereafter unless notice of

termination or modification was given in writing by either

party to the other party, sixty (60) days prior to each

anniversary date of October 31.

C-25

tasks/duties included in the second section of Paragraph 13.

Moore related the Union was successful in adding the

following work to its work jurisdiction under Paragraph 13(2).

l. boiler pressure safeties, fuel valves, gas pressure

regulators, and flow control valves;

y low pressure safeties, high pressure safeties, oil

pressure safeties, expansion valves and liquid

line solenoid valves; and

3. other incidental repairs required to make such

mechanical systems and/or equipment

operational.®

In a letter dated October 15, 1986 to All Business

Representatives of local unions among other UA officials (Un.

Ex. 5 - Stl.), UA General President, Marvin J. Boede apprised

of the changes that were made in the 1986 Master Agreement

(Jt. Ex. 3 - Stl.) stating the following with regard to Paragraph

13(2).

Paragraph 13(2) defines the scope of service and

maintenance work to include devices having both piped

connections to system media piping and control

terminations.

“Additionally, a modification was made to the existing

language by inserting the word "such" before equipment in the

line that referenced preventive maintenance work so that the

line now read, "belt adjustment, oiling, greasing and cleaning

of such equipment when incidental to or part of the repair or

replacement."

C - 26

Additionally, Boede apprised that a new third section had been

added to Paragraph 13 designated 13(3) that provided for the

expedited handling of unresolved jurisdictional disagreements

that might arise with respect to the agreement. This third

section read as follows:

(3) Any dispute over the meaning and interpretation

of paragraph 13 shall be immediately submitted

to United Association representatives of the

General Office on the one hand, and the

Secretary of Labor Relations Committee of the

Council on the other (per paragraph 51, Step 2).

With the exception that if not settled within

three (3) working days, the grievance shall be

reduced to writing and submitted to Arbitration

as set forth in Steps 3 and 4 of Paragraph 51 of

the Agreement.”

*It is noted that not since the successor 1972 Master

Agreement (Jt. Ex. 7 - Stl.) to the initial 1969 Master

Agreement (Jt. Ex. 8 - Stl.) had the Council and the Union

provided language in the Master Agreement under Article II to

address the resolution of jurisdictional claims. However, the

language in the 1986 Master Agreement differed from the

language in the two predecessor agreements in that it made

available the grievance procedure to handle claims arising over

the meaning and interpretation, specifically of Paragraph 13,

whereas in the 1969 and 1972 Master Agreements

jurisdictional disputes only of the type involving other building

trades organizations, as well as the assignment of work was to

be settled and adjusted in accordance with the procedure

established by the National Joint Board for the Settlement of

Jurisdictional Disputes or any successor agency of the Building

and Construction Trades Department.

BEA a Bde ee al A le i all Sr hiahS elai

C-27

According to Moore, the changes that were made to Paragraph

13(2) and the addition of Paragraph 13(3) in the 1986 Master

Agreement (Jt. Ex. 3 - Stl.) did not correct the problems

complained of by the local unions and the mechanical

contractor companies and, as a result, the complaints continued

to increase. The record evidence reflects that one such

complaint came from UA Local 597 in Chicago. In a letter

dated September 23, 1987, (Un. Ex. 16 - Stl.), Local 597

Business Representative Tom Cade apprised UA International

Representative Francis J. Coyne that Johnson Controls "wishes

to broaden the duties of the PMI employees by the following

to do tube work on boilers (such as cleaning) also to install

condensers and refrigeration equipment and to take reading of

amperage of electric motors and to carry gauges to take

readings on refrigeration equipment as to whether any

additional refrigerant would be required ..." Cade stated he felt

that if there was not a clarification of the intent of Paragraph

13(2), the situation would possibly "mushroom" and could be

just the tip of the iceberg. Cade requested a reply as soon as

possible, explaining that a member had called on September

22, 1987 to apprise that such work by a PMI was being

implemented on a Sears account, and that the PMI was

working on the job. The record evidence reflects that in

response to Cade’s letter, UA General President Marvin Boede

met with Ken E. Goetschel, Executive Secretary of the

Council, to discuss the PMI situation for the purpose of

clarifying the matter. In a letter dated November 24, 1987

(Un. Ex. 17 - Stl.), Boede apprised Local 597 Business

Manager, Francis X. McCartin, that he met with Goetschel on

November 16, 1987, and that he and Goetschel reviewed the

work scope in question as defined under Paragraph 13(2) of

the 1986 Master Agreement (Jt. Ex. 3 - Stl.). Boede further

apprised that Goetschel assured him that work assignments

would be made in accordance with the Agreement and that

Johnson Controls had no intention to expand the PMI’s work

ie tk ne tee ew

C - 28

tasks into the areas mentioned in Cade’s letter. Boede went on

to apprise that since its inception in the 1976 Master

Agreement, many questions had been raised concerning the

intent of Paragraph 13(2) and that 13(2) was revised in 1986

to clarify the intent of the phrase, "other incidental repairs

required to make such unit and/or equipment operational."

Boede apprised that according to a Memo of Understanding

signed August 12, 1986, the intent of the Work Scope of the

1986 Master Agreement was that work covered is to be

performed by UA employees defining the scope of service and

maintenance to include devices having both piped connections

to the system and control terminations. Boede continued, it

was agreed that, in addition to the work task listed in the

Agreement (Jt. Ex. 3 - Stl.), all work tasks on the boiler

devices and refrigeration devices are intended to be included

in the Agreement. Further, Boede apprised, Article II must be

read in its entirety, referencing the phrase in Paragraph 13(2),

"all other work included in the trade jurisdictional claims of

the United Association." Boede then went on to state that

certain scheduled maintenance inspections and work tasks have

been accepted as the work assignments of PMI’s, provided

they are not a service call and are not incidental to or a part of

a repair or replacement. Boede identified the accepted work

assignments of PMIs to be as follows:

Belt adjustment; oiling and greasing of pumps and

motors, logging and tagging of equipment for proper

lubrication; cleaning of equipment and replacement of

air filters; water treatment sampling; [and visual

systems inspection and the reporting of repairs ...].

Boede concluded by advising McCartin that PMI’s could be

organized and be brought into the bargaining unit.

C - 29

The record evidence reflects that other formal complaints were

received by the UA during the term of the 1986 Master

Agreement regarding work assignments made to non-Union

personnel employed at Johnson Controls For example, James

H. Young, Business Agent of Local 189 in Columbus, Ohio,

in a letter dated August 18, 1988 (Co. Ex. 5 - Stl.) to UA

International Representative Donald F. McNamara, requested

McNamara’s assistance concerning disputed work assignments

made by Johnson Controls to non-Union personnel. Young

identified the work in question to be filter-changing, cleaning

of equipment and various other duties at several locations in

the Columbus area Young charged that, in his view, such work

assignments constituted a violation of Paragraph 13(2) of the

1986 Master Agreement (Jt. Ex. 3 - Stl.). In turn, UA General

President Boede forwarded this complaint to Goetschel at the

Council and in a letter dated August 29, 1988, Goetschel

apprised Boede, among other things, that "Local 189 should be

reminded that Johnson Controls and other PCSC members are

not in violation of the NPCSC [Agreement] if such preventive

maintenance tasks are not part of repair or replacement and are

performed by personnel other than UA members." As another

example, Local 562 Business Manager Donald Devitt, by letter

dated August 29, 1988 (Un. Ex. 8 - Stl.), apprised Rick

Tinucci, Johnson Controls’ St. Louis Branch Manager that it

had come to the Local’s attention the Company had hired a

man to perform service work and that this represented a

violation of Article VIII of the Master Agreement. Devitt

concluded the letter by stating the union expected the problem

to be rectified immediately. By letter dated August 31, 1988

(Un. Ex. 8 - Stl.), Tinucci responded to Devitt’s complaint and

allegation of a Contract violation by apprising Devitt of the

following:

Our new employee’s job duties include belt adjusting,

oiling, greasing and cleaning as allowed by Article II,

C - 30

Paragraph 13 of the UA National Pneumatic Control

Systems Agreement. We in no way intend to use this

employee to perform work that falls within Local 562

jurisdiction.

The St. Louis Branch intends to honor the current and

any future National Agreements to which we are

signatory.

The record evidence reflects that, notwithstanding Tinucci’s

response, Devitt perceived a continuing problem which

culminated in a request to UA General President Boede by

letter dated October 11, 1988 (Un. Ex. 8 - Stl.) to arbitrate

what Devitt characterized as a "serious problem in the St.

Louis area." In this letter, Devitt apprised Boede that when

the problem first occurred, the local union Business

Representative Jim O’ Mara met with Johnson Controls’ official

Ken McClendon and informed McClendon of the Contract

violation and, at the same time, offered the Company the use

of a tradesman to perform the disputed work, but that

McClendon declined the offer, informing O’Mara that the

Company did not want to set up another category. Devitt

apprised Boede that one year previous to this meeting, the

local union invited all contractors to a meeting held at the

union hall of which Johnson Controls was an attendee, and that

at this meeting the union fully explained how the contractors

could use Tradesmen to be competitive. Devitt apprised Boede

that the union had a Tradesman Program that had been in

effect for over a year, and that presently, there were over 30

Tradesmen working in the industry. Devitt then went on to

detail several violations concluding that between Johnson and

Honeywell, [their use of non-union employees to perform

C - 31

so-called PMI work] was unfair to the union’s other service

contractors. '°

The record evidence reflects that while the PSCS 1986 Master

Agreement was still in effect, the UA negotiated a successor

National Mechanical Equipment Service and Maintenance

Agreement with the MCA and its Service and Maintenance

Bureau (SMB) effective August 16, 1988 (Co. Ex. 17 - Stl.).

Article VIII, the Classification of Employees clause, under

Paragraph 25, provided the following with respect to

Maintenance Tradesmen:

25. | Maintenance Tradesmen must be qualified to

perform and shall be allowed to perform the work

listed below:

All routine maintenance and _ inspections

regardless of size or location of the mechanical

equipment being inspected or maintained, where

this work is done as a periodic routine service,

inspection and maintenance procedure by the

Employer, such as:

a) Filter changing and maintenance thereof

b) Oil and greasing

c) Belt adjusting or replacement

The record evidence before this Arbitrator contains

similar complaints by other UA locals concerning Honeywell’s

use of non-union personnel to perform work the UA claimed

fell within its work jurisdiction (See Co. Ex. 18 - Stl. and Co.

Ex. 16 - Stl.).

C - 32

d) Cleaning of cooling towers, coils,

evaporator and condenser tubes and

water treatment

e) General housekeeping

f) Delivery and truck driving of parts or

equipment trucks

g) Systems operation under contract with

customer

h) in an area where a problem exists with

non-UA competition, the assignment of

tradesmen duties may be adjusted to

meet local conditions

i) Cleaning and routine maintenance of

solar energy equipment and HVAC

power electronics control devices and

the electronic side of building

automation systems

(Co. Ex. 17 - Stl.)

Moore asserted in his testimony that it was in response to these

complaints that centered around Johnson’s use of PMIs and

Honeywell’s use of Mech Reps that prompted the Union to

reopen the Master Agreement in 1988. Moore testified that in

the Union’s view, PMIs were the main issue in the 1988

negotiations. According to Moore, it was the Union’s

objective to eliminate PMIs and that this issue was so "big"

that the Union was willing to go so far as to give up the

Master Agreement.'' Meeting notes taken by the UA at the

"Moore explained that in other situations the Union

unilaterally develops a national agreement, and it is up to the

individual contractors as to whether they sign and become a

(continued...)

PP PS Te ty Fo eae YO

pb ods dinth ie? «so ne ae ee Seg is Btory

C - 33

first bargaining session held on October 6, 1988 (Un. Ex. 19

- Stl.) reflect the following with regard to the Union’s intent

in these negotiations:!”

Chairman Moore opened the meeting and explained the

history of UA-NCA negotiations and why the UA has

requested to reopen the Agreement. The main reason

being the difference between the PCSA and the

NMES&M Agreement, and the UA does not want

different agreements and working conditions for

refrigeration and air-conditioning service and

maintenance work.

At the second bargaining session held November 1, 1988, the

UA Meeting Notes (Un. Ex. 20 - Stl.) reflect the following

with respect to the Union’s position regarding Paragraph 13(2):

"(...continued)

party to the agreement. In other words, there is no negotiation

that takes place with respect to these national agreements and

in this regard, the situation involving the Pneumatic Council is

different.

"According to the record evidence, the Council and the

UA met a total of ten (10) times in bargaining sessions

beginning October 6, 1988 and ending March 22, 1989. The

specific dates of these bargaining sessions were:

October 6, 1988 January 12, 1989

November 1, 1988 February 7, 1989

November 15, 1988 February 8, 1989

December 13, 1988 March 21, 1989

January 11, 1989 March 22, 1989

——

C - 34

After a complete discussion of all proposals, Mr.

Moore let the PCSC know that the UA is taking a very

strong stand on Article II, Paragraph 13(2), our work

jurisdiction, in particular, belt adjustment, oiling,

greasing, etc. If we cannot get it resolved, we will

have to reassess our position on whether we want the

Agreement or not. Mr. Tarkowski [Chairman of the

Council’s bargaining committee] explained they would

have to go to their Executive Committee on this before

they could move. He asked about the rest of the UA

proposals and Mr. Moore indicated we could clear them

up in short order if we come to agreement on 13(2).

In its first proposal to the Council, the record evidence reflects

the UA attempted to address its objectives regarding work

jurisdiction in two ways, to-wit: (1) It proposed adding two

new paragraphs to the preamble section, Parties to the

Agreement, the thrust of which was to clarify the fact the

signatory companies were in the business of service and

maintenance of mechanical equipment and to specifically state

that among other work reserved to UA employees was the

work of preventive maintenance; and (2) It proposed adding

three new sub-sections to Paragraph 13, all pertaining to an

enumeration of work tasks/duties that were covered by the

Agreement with one of these new sub-sections detailing the

particular tasks/duties falling under the category of work

referenced routine maintenance and inspection (Co. Ex. 1 -

Stl.).

At the third negotiating meeting held November 15, 1988, the

UA Meeting Notes (Un. Ex. 21 - Stl.) reflect that with respect

to the Union’s proposed new sub-section 4 of Paragraph 13

referencing specific tasks/duties of routine maintenance and

inspection work, a discussion occurred centering about the use

of tradesmen or apprentices on belts, oiling and greasing, etc.

C - 35

and indicating that the contractors see a problem with their

companies understanding or going along with this.

The UA Meeting Notes of the fourth bargaining session held

December 13, 1988 (Un. Ex. 22 - Stl.) reflect that prior to

getting into the negotiations the Council wanted to express a

number of points with regard to the UA’s proposal on

Paragraph 13. Two of the six (6) points noted, the ones most

pertinent to the case at bar were the following:

« * * *

3) Expanding UA jurisdiction causes problems for

both company and union, competitiveness and

job loss.

5) Routine Maintenance - they can’t ask their

salaried people to join union and if fitters do

work, cost goes up (Pipefitters don’t want

menial work and UA can’t supply tradesmen).

The notes further reflect that Moore responded to all six (6)

points stating, among other things, that the work the Council

was worried about was traditional work of the UA that had

been performed for the last 75 years, whereas the member

companies had only been in the business (referring to

mechanical equipment service and maintenance) for the last 14

years (since about 1974). The notes reflect a continuing

dialogue occurred between the Council and UA with respect to

Paragraph 13 at this meeting and that, whereas the UA put

forth several options such as, for example, eliminating or

rewriting Article XVIII, the No Strike, No Lockout clause to

allow the Union to picket for organizing PMIs (tech reps) or,

C - 36

in the alternative, to picket when non-union personnel was

performing bargaining unit work, the Council did not produce

any concrete proposals of its own to address the issues raised

in connection with Paragraph 13.

The UA Notes of the fifth bargaining session (Un. Ex. 23 -

Stl.), held January 11, 1989, reflect that the Council informed

the Union it was their estimate that there were between two to

three hundred salaried employees throughout the country that

were performing PMI type work and then read a list of duties

the Council viewed that the salaried employees could perform

without being in violation of the Agreement. As characterized

by the UA in its notes, this list was extremely long and seemed

to cover everything but installation and replacement of

pneumatic or mechanical equipment. The Council declined to

give a copy of this list of duties to the Union according to the

UA notes. Additionally, the UA recorded in its notes that a

lengthy discussion ensued regarding the various problems the

Union faced with respect to this Agreement, that the Council

acknowledged its understanding of these problems, but that,

nevertheless, the Council did not have any proposals to present

to the Union. At this juncture, the UA presented to the

Council a complete Agreement as its second proposal (Co. Ex.

2 -Stl.) and briefly gave an explanation of the most important

differences between the proposed agreement and the existing

agreement (Jt. Ex. 3 - Stl.). A comparison of the two

agreements relevant to the work jurisdiction issue reveals the

following changes:

1) Paragraph 6 of the Preamble section, Parties to

the Agreement, was restated.

2)

C - 37

a) 1986-88 Agreement (Jt. Ex. 3 - Stl.)

Paragraph 6 -

WHEREAS, the Employer is engaged in

pneumatic control systems, industry throughout

the United States and is known as a National

Pneumatic Control Contractor,’ and in the

performance of such work requires the services

of competent, skilled and qualified journeymen

and apprentices; and

b) UA Proposed Agreement (Co. Ex. 2 -

Stl.)

Paragraph 6 -

WHEREAS, the Employer is engaged in

the plumbing and pipe fitting industry

throughout the United States, and in the

performance of such work requires the services

of competent, skilled and qualified employee,

and

Article I], Paragraphs 13, 14 and 15, the

Trade/Work Jurisdiction clause was redrafted.

a) 1986-88 Agreement

13. (1) This Agreement covers the rates

of pay, hours, and working conditions of all

journeymen and apprentices employed by the

Employer doing plumbing and pipe fitting as

related to the installation, service, and

maintenance of all pneumatic control or other

piping systems, and component parts thereof,

including fabrication, assembling, erection,

C - 38

installation, dismantling, repairing,

reconditioning, adjusting, altering, and servicing

of said pneumatic control or other piping

systems, and the handling, unloading,

distributing, reloading, tying on, and hoisting of

all piping materials, appurtenances, and

equipment used in connection with said

pneumatic control or other piping systems by

any method, including all hangers and supports

of every description, and all other work

included in the trade jurisdictional claims of the

United Association.

(2) The following mechanical equipment

service and maintenance work tasks are

included in this Agreement: Repair and

replacement of oil burners, boilers, boiler water

feeders, low water cut-offs, traps, strainers,

valves, pumps, heating coils, interchangers, and

converters of steam or hot water heating

systems, boiler pressure safeties, fuel valves,

gas pressure regulators, and flow control valves;

the repair and replacement of cooling coils,

compressors, condensers, evaporators,

interchangers, low pressure safeties, high

pressure safeties, oil pressure safeties, expansion

valves, pressure regulators, hot gas bypass

valves and liquid line solenoid valves, and

cooling towers of refrigeration systems

including the replacement of parts, evacuation,

and recharging of refrigeration equipment; belt

adjustment, oiling, greasing and cleaning of

such equipment when incidental to or part of

the repair or replacement; and other incidental

14.

15.

C - 39

repairs required to make such mechanical

systems and/or equipment operational.

(3) Any dispute over the meaning and

interpretation of paragraph 13 shall be

immediately submitted to United Association

representatives of the General Office on the one

hand, and the Secretary of the Labor Relations

Committee of the Council on the other (per

Paragraph 51, Step 2). With the exception that

if not settled within three (3) working days, the

grievance shall be reduced to writing and

submitted to Arbitration as set forth in Steps 3

and 4 of Paragraph 51 of the Agreement.

There shall be no work stoppages because of

jurisdictional disputes.

All journeyman and apprentice work tasks coming

under this Agreement shall be assigned only to

employees covered by this Agreement.

b)

UA Proposed Agreement

(13) 1. This agreement covers the rates of

pay, hours and working conditions of all

employees engaged in the installation, service,

and maintenance of all plumbing and/or pipe

fitting systems including but not limited to

pneumatic controls and mechanical equipment

service and component parts for all of the above

which also includes fabrication, assembling,

erection, installation, dismantling, replacement,

repairing, reconditioning, adjusting, altering,

servicing of all plumbing, and/or pipefitting

C - 40

systems, pneumatic controls, and/or mechanical

equipment service, and handling, unloading,

distributing, reloading, tying-on, and hoisting of

all piping materials, appurtenances and

equipment used in connection to said plumbing

Or piping systems, pneumatic controls, and/or

mechanical equipment service, by any method,

including all hangers and supports of every

description and all other work included in the

trade jurisdictional claims of the United

Association.

2. Any dispute over the meaning

and interpretation of paragraph 13 shall be

immediately submitted to United Association

representatives of the General Office on the one

hand, and the Secretary of the Labor Relations

Committee of the Council on the other, with the

exception that if not settled within three (3)

working days, the grievance shall be reduced to

writing and submitted to arbitration as set forth

in Steps 3 and 4 of paragraph 52 of the

agreement.

3. In recognition of the above work

jurisdictional claims, it is understood that the

assignment of work and settlement of

jurisdiction disputes with other Building Trades

Organizations shall be adjusted in accordance

with the procedures established by the Impartial

Jurisdictional Disputes Board or any successor

agency of the Building and Construction Trades

Department.

C - 41

(14) There shall be no sit-down or work

stoppage by the employees because of

jurisdictional disputes.

(15) All work coming under this agreement

shall be assigned only to employees covered by

this agreement.

3) Addition of an entirely new Article establishing

the Job Classification of Maintenance

Tradesmen

a) UA Proposed Agreement”

ARTICLE X

MAINTENANCE TRADESMEN

36) Maintenance Tradesmen must be qualified to

perform and shall be allowed to perform the

work below:

"It is noted that with but two (2) differences, the proposed

new Article X was virtually identical to Article VIII, Paragraph

25 pertaining to the Job Classification of Maintenance

Tradesmen contained in the 1988 National Mechanical

Equipment Service and Maintenance Agreement (Co. Ex. 17

- Stl.) (see also p. 21 of this Award, Supra). Those two

differences were as follows: (1) In Item i) on the list of

enumerated duties, the proposed agreement added repairing and

eliminated the phrase, and the electronic side of building

automation systems; and (2) the proposed agreement added a

second section to the Article that is not contained in the

Mechanical Master Agreement.

C-42

1. All routine maintenance and inspections

regardless of size or location of the mechanical

equipment being inspected or maintained, where

this work is done as a periodic routine service,

inspections and maintenance procedure by the

Employer, such as:

a. filter changing and maintenance

thereof

b. oil and greasing

c. belt adjusting or replacement

d. cleaning of cooling towers, coils,

evaporator and condenser tubes

and water treatment

e. general housekeeping

f. delivery and truck driving of

parts or equipment trucks

g. systems operations under

contract with customer

h. in an area where a problem

exists with non-union

competition, the assignment of

tradesmen duties may _ be

adjusted, by written agreement to

meet local conditions

1. cleaning, repairing, and routine

maintenance of solar energy

equipment and HVAC power

electronics control devices

ya Where there is no legal service and

maintenance agreement’ establishing a

"Maintenance Tradesmen" classification,

including rate and fringes for such

classification, the basic hourly wage rate for

IERIE aie te cee cece ire ee menT RE RTS OPN eo es TO eNO

C - 43

this classification shall be established at a rate

of 50% of the service and maintenance

journeymen hourly wage. The Employer may

carry an employee with the Tradesmen

classification on a health/welfare plan from an

alternate source, and shall carry said employee

on the UA National Pension Plan. The

Employer shall contribute one (1) dollar per

hour for each hour worked to the Plumbers and

Pipefitters National Pension Fund.

The UA Notes of the sixth bargaining session held on

January 12, 1989 (Un. Ex. 24 - Stl.) reflect that the Council

indicated it had reviewed the Union’s proposed Agreement

(Co. Ex. 2 - Stl.) and that in so doing, it had identified a total

of nineteen (19) changes of which they viewed three (3) as

being major in nature and then requested the Union to provide

an explanation regarding the kind of complaints and problems

it was receiving concerning the non-union PMIs (Techs): In

response, the Union related that complaints came from

Business Managers of local unions claiming that the Master

Agreement undermines other National Agreements and Local

Agreements and complaints came from contractors who

claimed they were rendered non-competitive against Council

contractors. The Union further explained the main problem

was the abuse by Council contractors of the use of PMIs

(Techs) on commercial work and the use of Instrument Techs

on industrial construction and maintenance projects.

According to the UA Notes, the Council and the Union

adjourned after caucusing and agreed to reconvene on February

7, 1989 and to extend the Current Agreement (Jt. Ex. 3 - Stl.)

to February 10, 1989.

In a Memorandum dated January 23, 1989 (Un. Ex. 9 - Stl.),

UA General President Boede apprised all Building Trades

C-44

Local Unions in the United States that the Union was

attempting to negotiate a new National Pneumatic Control

Systems Agreement, and that the crux of the changes proposed

by the Union related to a series of difficulties reported by

many local unions throughout the country concerning the Trade

and Work Jurisdiction provision of the Agreement (Jt. Ex. 3 -

Stl.). Boede further apprised it was the intention of the UA to

do all in its power to reach a fair resolution of the dispute and

continue to have a national agreement which protects and

preserves the work opportunities for the members of the UA.

According to UA Notes of the seventh and eighth bargaining

sessions held on February 7 and 8, 1989 (Un. Ex. 25 - Stl),

the Council opened the negotiations by re-capping where each

side was respectively and stating, among other things that the

UA’s proposal to include the Job Classification of Maintenance

Tradesmen to perform non-skilled work that had been

performed by non-bargaining unit employees for years was a

non-mandatory subject of bargaining, and as such, it refused to

bargain any further with regard to that proposal. The Council

clarified its position, stating its refusal to bargain on the

Maintenance Tradesmen category concerned an expansion of

the bargaining unit but did not extend to bargaining with

respect to the scope of work. The Union responded that it was

not attempting to organize the PMIs (Techs) that what it was

bargaining was the scope of work and that the Council did not

have to use tradesmen unless they wanted to. According to the

UA’s notes, the Union offered to take the new Article on

Maintenance Tradesmen out and leave the [proposed]

agreement as is. With respect to the enumerated duties of the

Tradesmen, the Union offered to put it back into either

C - 45

Paragraph 13(1) or (2) as an exclusion."* At the beginning of

the bargaining session on February 8, 1989, the Council

presented a proposal regarding Paragraph 13(1) and (2) to

which the UA responded it had problems with the proposal,

Stating it felt strongly that the duties listed in the proposed

Paragraph 36 (1), items (a) through (i) was bargaining unit

work with or without the inclusion of a Tradesmen category

and that the Union objected to non-bargaining unit men

performing routine maintenance. Following discussion of

another Council proposal, the Union stated there were a lot of

unsettled problems/questions pertaining mostly to routine

maintenance that the Council and the Union seemed unable:to

resolve and suggested that the existing Agreement (Jt. Ex. 3 -

Stl.) be extended sixty (60) days and a termination date of

April 9, 1989 be set. The Union explained that on April 9th,

the Contractors would have several options, to-wit: they could

sign local or national agreements, such as NCA (extend to

commercial work) or the NMES & M Agreement (Co. Ex. 17

- Stl.); or they could sign a UA developed Independent

Pneumatic Control Systems Agreement; or they could operate

without the UA. The Union agreed to meet in further

bargaining sessions during the sixty (60) day extension, but

declined the Council’s suggestion of submitting the talks to

federal mediation. In response to a Council’s request for the

Union to make a list of what UA tasks should be covered by

the Master Agreement, the Union stated, "inspect, test and

perform preventive maintenance on mechanical systems

(including belt adjustment, oiling, greasing and cleaning of

equipment) from Johnson Controls’ list of SSI Level I duties."

“It appears, based on subsequent reported statements

articulated by the Union, and positions taken in negotiations

that the reference to "exclusion" was incorrect.

C - 46

The Council and the Union agreed to reconvene in bargaining

on March 21 and 22, 1989.

In a Memorandum dated February 13, 1989 (Un. Ex. 10 -

Stl.), UA General President Boede apprised all Building Trades

Local Unions in the United States that bargaining to date had

not resulted in a new national agreement and that a deadline

date of April 9, 1989 had been set as a termination date for the

1986 Master Agreement (Jt. Ex. 3 - Stl.). Boede further

apprised additional negotiation meetings had been scheduled

prior to April 9th, but that in any event, in the interim period,

the UA would develop a new national agreement which would

be available for signing by any contractor presently working

under the existing Master Agreement. Boede advised the local

unions they would be notified in ample time prior to the April

9th deadline date of what action they might have to take to

make sure their members were protected in any transition

period.

As the UA had apprised the Council at the conclusion of the

February 8th bargaining session and its local unions in its

Memorandum of February 13th, it unilaterally developed a new

National Control Systems Agreement (Co. Ex. 8 - Stl. and Un.

Ex. 15 - Stl.) which it distributed to all its Building Trades

Local Unions in the United States (Un. Ex. 14 - Stl.) and to

the Council Member companies (Un. Ex. 13 - Stl.), the

Associate Member companies (Un. Ex. 12 - Stl.) and to the

Independent companies (Un. Ex. 11 - Stl.) by transmittal letter

dated March 6, 1989. In the transmittal letter, of which there

were two versions with but little difference, one to the local

unions and the other to the signatory companies, the Union

apprised that the major differences between the existing Master

Agreement (Jt. Ex. 3 - Stl.) and the developed Agreement (Co.

Ex. 8 - Stl. and Un. Ex. 15 - Stl.) was a deletion of all

references to the "Pneumatic Council," a rewritten work

j

|

‘|

C - 47

jurisdiction clause renumbered as paragraph 8 under Article II

for the purpose of more clearly defining the work jurisdiction

of the UA and establishment of a new grievance procedure.

The new Article II in the developed agreement read as follows:

ARTICLE II

TRADE OR WORK JURISDICTION

(8) l. This agreement covers the rates

of pay, hours and working conditions of all

employees engaged in the installation, service,

and maintenance of all plumbing and/or pipe

fitting systems including but not limited to

pneumatic controls and mechanical equipment

and component parts for all of the above which

also includes fabrication, assembling, erection,

installation, dismantling, replacement, repairing,

reconditioning, adjusting, altering, calibrating,

servicing of all plumbing, and/or pipefitting

Systems, pneumatic controls, and/or mechanical

equipment, and _ handling, unloading,

distributing, reloading, tying-on, and hoisting of

all piping materials, appurtenances and

equipment used in connection to said plumbing

or piping systems, pneumatic controls, and/or

mechanical equipment, by any method,

including all hangers and supports of every

description and all other work included in the

trade jurisdictional claims of the United

Association.

y a Any dispute over the meaning

and interpretation of paragraph 8 shall be

immediately submitted to United Association

C - 48

representatives of the General Office on the one

hand, and the Employer on the other, with the

exception that if not settled within three (3)

working days, the grievance shall be reduced to

writing and submitted to arbitration as set forth

in the grievance and arbitration procedures of

Article XVII.

(9) In recognition of the above work

jurisdictional claims, it is understood that the

assignment of work and _ settlement of

jurisdiction disputes with other Building Trades

organizations shall be adjusted in accordance

with the procedures established by the Impartial

Jurisdictional Disputes Board or any successor

agency of the Building and Construction Trades

Department.

(10) There shall be no sit-down or work

stoppage by the employees because of

jurisdictional disputes.

(11) All work coming under this agreement

shall be assigned only to employees covered by

this agreement.

(Un. Ex. 15 - Stl.)

'°4 comparison between the developed Article II and the

Article I] contained in the 1986 Master Agreement reflects that

) Paragraph 8(1) was an attempt on the part of the UA to merge

Paragraphs 13(1) and (2). In the rewriting, the UA dropped

phrases and added new ones in their place and added two new

(continued...)

C - 49

Subsequent to the distribution of the developed Agreement, the

Council and the Union reconvened negotiations on dates of

March 21 and 22, 1989. According to the UA Notes of these

meetings (Un. Ex. 26 - Stl.), the Council presented a

counterproposal to the Article II contained in the developed

'5(...continued)

functions of "replacement" and "calibrating." The following are

phrases dropped and added:

Dropped: "employed by the Employer doing

plumbing and pipe fitting as related to

the"

Added: “engaged in the"

Dropped: “pneumatic control or other piping

systems"

Added: "plumbing and/or pipe fitting systems

including but not limited to pneumatic

controls and mechanical equipment"

Dropped: "thereof, including"

Added: "for all of the above which also

includes"

Dropped: "said pneumatic control or other piping

systems"

Added: "All plumbing, and/or pipe fitting

systems, pneumatic controls, and/or

mechanical equipment"

It is noted that changes were also effected to the other sections

of Article II as well.

C - 50

Agreement (Un. Ex. 15 - Stl.) This counterproposal reads as

follows:

Replace Paragraph 8(1) with the following:

(8) 1. Subject to subparagraph (2), below, this

Agreement covers the rates of pay, hours and working

conditions of journeymen and apprentices engaged in

the installation, service, and maintenance of all

plumbing and/or pipe fitting systems, including

pneumatic controls and mechanical equipment and

component parts for all of the above which includes

fabrication, assembling, erection, installation,

dismantling, replacement, repairing, reconditioning,

adjusting, altering, calibrating, servicing of all

plumbing (at non-industrial sites) and/or pipefitting

systems, pneumatic controls and/or mechanical

equipment, and handling, unloading, distributing,

reloading, tying-on, and hoisting of all piping materials,

appurtenances and equipment used in connection to said

plumbing or piping systems, pneumatic controls, and/or

mechanical equipment, by any method, including all

hangers and supports of every description and all other

work included within the trade jurisdiction claims of

the United Association.

Replace paragraph 8(2) with the following:

y J Non bargaining unit employees of the

Employer or the Employer’s vendors or

contractors may perform work relating to:

(a) testing, monitoring and diagnosing

performance problems,

(b) electronic controls,

Soo

C-51

(c) computer and communications systems,

(d) work for the purpose of instruction and

training; and work when done on a

scheduled basis (not as incidental to the

work performed pursuant to

subparagraph 1, above), as follows:

(1) Filter changing and maintenance

: thereof

(2) Oiling and greasing

(3) Belt adjusting or replacement

(4) Cleaning of cooling towers,

coils, evaporators and condenser

: tubes

(5) Testing and monitoring water

: treatment systems

(6) General housekeeping or

cosmetic work

(7) Delivery and driving of parts

and equipment delivery trucks

(8) Systems operation § under

contracts with customers

Change designation for paragraph 8(2) to paragraph

8(3). Also replace word ’employer’ with ’Secretary of

Labor Relations Committee of the Council.’

) In Paragraph 10, remove the words ’by the employees’.

(Un. Ex. 18 - Stl.)

According to the UA Notes, after reviewing the Council’s

counterproposal, the Union stated its opposition mainly to

Paragraph 8(1) and 8(2) and took the position that under the

Interim Agreement effective April 9, 1989, the work in 8(2)

Dich Listen «nina ions alo ® a databases rine eae

C - 52

would be performed by the UA. The Council stated it felt it

was unfair of the UA to attempt to eliminate the PMI’s (Tech

Reps) after 13 years of using them and that the Union

responded its effort to do so was as a result of abuse of using

Tech Reps on routine maintenance. The notes further reflect

that the Council agreed to take its proposed 8(1) language as

amended to replace sections 1 and 2 of Paragraph 13 in the

1986 Agreement. The final Agreement with respect to Article

II is reflected in the successor 1989 Master Agreement (Jt. Ex.

IP) which reads as follows:

a This Agreement covers the rates of pay,

hours, and working conditions of journeymen and

apprentices engaged in the installation, service, and

maintenance of all plumbing and/or pipe fitting

systems, including pneumatic controls and mechanical

equipment and component parts for all of the above

which also includes fabrication, assembling, erection,

installation, dismantling, replacement, repairing,

reconditioning, adjusting, altering, calibrating, servicing

of all plumbing and/or pipe fitting systems, pneumatic

controls and/or mechanical equipment, and handling,

unloading, distributing, reloading, tying on, and

hoisting of all piping materials, appurtenances, and

equipment used in connection to said plumbing or

piping systems, pneumatic controls and/or mechanical

equipment, by any method, including all hangers and

supports of every description, and all other work

included in the trade jurisdictional claims of the United

Association.

(2) Any dispute over the meaning and

interpretation of paragraph 13 shall be immediately

submitted to United Association representatives of the

General Office on the one hand, and the Secretary of

C - 53

the Labor Relations Committee of the Council on the

other (per Paragraph 51, Step 2). With the exception

that if not settled within three (3) working days, the

grievance shall be reduced to writing and submitted to

Arbitration as set forth in Steps 3 and 4 of Paragraph

51 of the Agreement.

14. There shall be no work stoppages because of

jurisdictional disputes.

15. All journeyman and apprentice work tasks

coming under this Agreement shall be assigned only to

employees covered by this Agreement.

(Jt. Ex. IP)

In a letter dated May 19, 1989, (Un. Ex. 6 - Stl.), UA General

President apprised all Building Trades Local Unions in the

United States that a new National Pneumatic Control Systems

Council Agreement had been negotiated effective March 31,

1989 and that the only change in the Agreement was to Article

II, specifically that Paragraph 13(2) had been eliminated and

a new Paragraph 13 agreed to. Boede noted that the word

calibrating had been added to the wording and that the changes

made in the Paragraph were intended to eliminate confusion

and to strengthen the claims of its rightful jurisdiction.

A comparison of the new Paragraph 13 in the 1989 Agreement

(Jt. Ex. IP) with paragraph 8(1) promulgated by the Union in

its developed Agreement (Un. Ex. 15 - Stl.) reflects the two

paragraphs are virtually identical. The only differences are

that in the developed Agreement, the word employees was

used instead of journeymen and apprentices and that in the

new Paragraph 13, journeymen and apprentices was restored to

the language in place of employees and the phrase "but not

C - 54

limited to" that appeared in Paragraph 8(1) line 4 after the

word "including" but before the word "pneumatic" was deleted.

Moore testified that agreement was reached on Paragraph 13

the last day of negotiations because the Council had accepted

virtually all of the language that constituted Paragraph 8(1) in

the developed Agreement (Un. Ex. 15 - Stl.) and because the

Council agreed to drop Paragraph 8(2) from _ its

counterproposal [Un. Ex. 18 - Stl.] which set forth specific

tasks/duties that constituted work that could be performed by

non-bargaining unit employees. According to Moore, the

Union took the position in negotiations that with the exception

of three (3) duties listed, the remaining work set out in the

proposed Paragraph 8(2) belonged within the UA’s

jurisdiction." Moore recalled that in agreeing to drop its

proposed Paragraph 8(2), Jim Tarkowski, Manager for Human

Resources at Johnson Controls and Chairman of the Council’s

bargaining committee, remarked in the form of a question,

"[w]hat are we going to do with the PMI’s?", to which he

(Moore) responded, [t]hat’s your problem, there are other

'°The three (3) exceptions were: (1) Item 2(b) - electronic

controls; (2) Item 6 - General housekeeping or cosmetic work;

and (3) Item 7 - Delivery and driving of parts and equipment

| delivery trucks. The Arbitrator notes as an interesting aside

that when the UA tendered its second proposal in these

| negotiations, proposing, among other things, the establishment

of the Job Classification of Maintenance Tradesmen, that it

listed among the duties of this classification general

housekeeping and the delivery and truck driving of parts or

equipment trucks. In any event, Moore asserted he was not

amenable to making specific reference in the Master

Agreement to work that was not work within the UA’s

jurisdiction.

eae ET TR en Ne mR

C - 55

duties for the PMI’s." Moore explained that the other duties he

was referring to were any duties not under the trade

jurisdiction of the UA. Moore related in his testimony that by

agreeing to Paragraph 8(1) as slightly modified by the Council,

the Union did not press to retain Paragraph 13(2) as set forth

in the 1986 Master Agreement as it viewed this paragraph as

being unnecessary, given the rewritten Paragraph 8(1).!”

Moore asserted in his testimony that the concession originally

granted by the UA with respect to its jurisdiction over

preventive maintenance work in 1976 and continued in the

1986 Master Agreement (Jt. Ex. 3 - Stl.) evidenced by the

"incidental to" language that appeared in Paragraph 13(2) of

both the 1976 and 1986 Agreements was rescinded by the new

language of Paragraph 13 in the 1989 Agreement (Jt. Ex. 1P).'®

In other words, Moore related, the new language brought back

all the preventive maintenance work within the jurisdiction of

the UA where it had resided prior to the 1976 Agreement (Jt.

Ex. 5 - Stl.).

The record evidence reflects that approximately a week after

the conclusion of the last bargaining session, Tarkowski, as

Spokesman for the Council’s Labor Relations Committee,

advised Moore in a letter dated March 28, 1989 (Co. Ex. 9 -

Stl.) that the Executive Committee of the Council had

approved the text of a letter that had been sent to the

"It is noted in the developed Agreement (Un. Ex. 15 -

Stl.), unilaterally written by the UA, that the UA was the party

who had dropped from Article II, the entire Paragraph of

13(2).

''The specific language referenced here is, "belt

adjustment, oiling, greasing and cleaning of such equipment

when incidental to or part of the repair or replacement."

C - 56

Management of each respective company, informing them of

the newly negotiated 1989 Master Agreement (Jt. Ex. IP).

Tarkowski concluded the letter by advising Moore that if he

had any questions or comments he should not hesitate to

contact him (Tarkowski). The letter sent by the Council to the

various companies reads as follows:

The PCSC and the United Association of Plumbers and

Pipefitters have negotiated a new two-year agreement,

effective March 31, 1989. The only change is in

paragraph 13, the scope of work. The existing

language was shortened and reworded to reduce

misunderstandings at the local level. In addition, in

agreeing on this new language, the Union and the

Company negotiators acknowledged across the

bargaining table, that the companies employ and will

continue to employ non-UA represented field

employees who, over the years, have performed, and

who will continue to perform, non-journeymen work.

It is important to both the Companies and to the UA

that all branches understand the intent of the revised

wording of Paragraph 13. We will be contacting you

through area management shortly.

By letter dated April 12, 1989, Moore responded to

Tarkowski’s letter of March 28, 1989 (Co. Ex. 10 - Stl.). This

letter reads in full as follows:

Dear James:

I have reviewed the text of your letter sent to

the managers of the companies represented by the

| Council informing them of the recent United

=

C - 57

Association-National Pneumatic Control Systems

Council Agreement.

We agree that the new language in Paragraph 13

was intended to reduce misunderstandings at the local

level. In this regard, the elimination of the old

Paragraph 13.2 which stated in part ’when incidental to

or part of the repair and replacement’ should go a long

way in avoiding future disputes concerning the scope of

the United Association work jurisdiction.

Sincerely yours,

(s) / M. E. Moore

Chairman

United Association

Negotiating Committee

In his testimony in a preceding arbitration, Tarkowski testified

that when the Council agreed to drop its proposed Paragraph

8(2), the list of tasks/duties it viewed as not work falling

within the UA’s jurisdiction, and, at the same time, accepting

the language of Paragraph 8(1) as modified, he (Tarkowski)

stated to Moore more than one time that in accepting the

language of 8(1), the member companies would continue to

operate as they had in the past, and that the Council was not

agreeing that Paragraph 8(1) covered work done by PMI’s or

Tech Reps. Tarkowski testified he also stated that if the Union

felt the new Paragraph 8(1) covered the work of PMI’s the

Union could file a grievance. According to Tarkowski, Moore

did not respond to this comment, but rather he remained silent.

In cross-examination, Tarkowski acknowledged that from the

very outset of the 1988-89 negotiations, the Union let it be

known that its primary thrust was to change the trade work

jurisdiction clause, specifically Paragraph 13, but that the

C - 38

Council sent the message it was not going to allow the Union

to secure the PMI work under its jurisdiction and that it

rejected every proposal made by the UA along these lines.

Tarkowski further acknowledged that the Union made clear its

intent to eliminate the "incidental to" language as a means of

addressing the problems it was having from the local unions

regarding the use of PMI’s, and that it was the Council’s view

that when it agreed to the elimination of this "incidental to"

language that what resulted was the Union had completely

given up the right to perform the PMI type work. Tarkowski

further testified that the Union was emphatic about taking out

the "incidental to" language and that Moore stated the purpose

of eliminating this language was to increase the scope of the

UA work. Tarkowski further testified he does not recall

whether he responded to Moore by telling him it was the

Council’s view that by eliminating the "incidental to" language,

the Union was decreasing the scope of its work jurisdiction.

Tarkowski explained, however, that it was the Council’s view

that Paragraph 8(1) as re-written which subsequently was

incorporated in the 1989 Agreement as Paragraph 13(1)

combined the work jurisdiction that was covered by Paragraphs

13(1) and 13(2) in the 1986 Master Agreement and that the

only major change was the elimination of the "incidental to"

language. Tarkowski related that the reference in the new

Paragraph 13(1) to service and maintenance of mechanical

equipment is all service and maintenance other than preventive

maintenance. According to Tarkowski, it is akin to, in

metaphorical terms, the difference between replacing brakes on

an automobile and changing out the oil. Tarkowski averred

that even though he did not impart to the Union the Council’s

view that by eliminating the "incidental to" language, it was

decreasing its scope of work, he was of the view the Union

knew this to be the case based on the fact of its years of

experience in negotiating agreements. Tarkowski stated that,

given his years of negotiating experience, he feels no

a

C - 59

obligation to point out to the other side a proposal the other

side makes that is unfavorable to their position and favorable

to his side’s position.

The record evidence reflects that nearly three-and one-half

months after the Council and UA reached agreement on the

1989 Master Agreement (Jt. Ex. IP), Local 562 located in St.

Louis, Missouri filed a grievance charging Johnson Controls

with violating the Agreement and identifying Paragraph 13 as

one of the clauses breached by its hiring of non-bargaining unit

employees to perform so-called "PMI" work which the Local

claimed was bargaining unit work. According to the grievance

(Jt. Ex. 2 - Stl.), Johnson Controls hired three (3) employees

to grease, change filters, units, belts, and perform general

maintenance and calibrations including service work. The

record evidence reflects the Council, Johnson Controls and

Local 562 and the UA progressed this grievance to arbitration.

The case was heard by Arbitrator Thomas J. Erbs on June 5,

1990 and Erbs rendered an Award October 5, 1990, denying

the grievance. That Award was incorporated into this

Arbitrator’s Award of May 19, 1992, addressing the sole issue

of arbitrability as Appendix A and by way of extension, the

Erbs Award is a part of this decision on the merits. Among

other findings, it was Erbs’ view that the Union’s position the

Council had agreed to higher paid journeymen performing the

disputed preventive maintenance work in question when, in

bargaining, it had rejected adding the lower paid Tradesman

classification was a conclusion that did not appear to be

supported by either the record or by logic. Erbs stated that

under previous agreements, neither journeymen nor apprentices

performed preventive maintenance work unless it was

performed as an incident to other specifically authorized

journeymen work. Erbs found notable that whereas the Union

was successful in adding the work of calibrating to its work

jurisdiction by one of the changes it made to the language of

C - 60

the new Paragraph 13(1), it did not effect such a change with

respect to preventive maintenance work. Erbs further found

the Union’s less than straightforward claim to its local unions

as to what was gained in negotiations, specifically that it had

‘gained jurisdiction over the preventive maintenance work, to

be an indication that the Union believed the issue was ripe for

arbitration. Erbs cited, however, the well-respected maxim that

a party should not be allowed to secure through arbitration

what it was unable to secure through negotiations. In noting

that the Union carried the burden of proof, Erbs observed that

that burden required him to find that the Company impliedly

conceded, after specifically rejecting, a major point of its

negotiating posture and on the facts before him, he could not

conclude that the Council did so. Erbs held that the Union had

not proven it was successful in securing for the journeymen

and apprentices the work jurisdiction of preventive

maintenance and that, accordingly, the Company did not

violate the National Agreement, as applied to the St. Louis

Branch, by assigning the disputed work to non-union

personnel.

The record evidence reflects that nearly three (3) months after

UA Local 562 filed its grievance that was eventually denied by

Arbitrator Erbs, UA General President Boede filed a written

grievance via letter dated September 26, 1989 (Jt. Grp. Ex. 2P)

with the Labor Relations Committee of the Council, wherein

the Union alleged Johnson Controls at its office in Peoria,

Illinois had employed a non-union employee to perform

bargaining unit work and, therefore, charged Johnson Controls

with a violation of multiple articles and paragraphs of the 1989

Master Agreement (Jt. Ex. IP) including Article II, Paragraph

13, the Work Jurisdiction clause. In addition to the grievance

which Boede requested be progressed to Step 2 of the

grievance procedure, Boede submitted a report that was

forwarded to him by UA Local 353 Business Manager, Larry

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Dawson, which Boede stated substantiated the allegations

contained in the grievance. The record evidence reflects that

by letter dated September 13, 1989 (Jt. Grp. Ex. 2P), Dawson

apprised Boede that officials from eight (8) locals in Central

Illinois, covering a geographical area within which Johnson

Controls conducts business, met with Johnson Controls

Management on two (2) occasions, once on September 1, 1989

and again on September 7, 1989 for the purpose of attempting

to resolve the "PMI issue".'? Dawson related Johnson

Control’s position was to employ PMIs and the Union’s

position was it would file a grievance if the PMI was

performing UA work. Dawson reminded Boede that

previously he had sent his office detailed information and work

sheets that Johnson had assigned UA work to a PMI. The

record evidence reflects the detailed information referenced by

Dawson had been forwarded by him to UA International

Representative Donald F. McNamara by transmittal letter dated

September 6, 1989 just one day prior to the second meeting

between the eight (8) locals and Johnson Controls. The record

evidence further reflects that the information was compiled by

UA Member of Local 353, Robert M. Lawless, a Journeyman

Fitter. This report is reproduced in full hereinbelow:

''As noted in the previous decision addressing the

arbitrability issue, the eight (8) Union Locals were: 25, 65,

81, 99, 137, 149, 293, and 353. The Peoria Office falls within

the geographical purview of Local 353. The PMI performing

the alleged UA work was working within the geographical

purview of each of the eight (8) UA Locals identified above.

Local #

WHERE DONE

#353 Item #1. Broadmoor School, Pekin, IL

8-17-89 Work task originally assigned

to Randy Wright (Fitter).

(A) Re-assigned and done by Joe

Kerner (PMI)

4-11-89 Work task originally assigned

to Russ Watts (PMI).

(A) Work performed by Jim Parrott

and Randy Wright (Fitters).

#25 = Item #2. Information only! Sears, Quincy, IL

5-3-89 Work done by Bob Lawless,

Local 353 Fitter.

#99 ~—s Item #3. Post Office, Bloomington, IL

Work originally assigned to and done by

Mark Blanchard (Fitter #99).

(A) Work re-assigned and done by

Joe Kerner (PMI) on 8-15-89.

#353 Item #4. Boy Scouts, Peoria, IL

Work originally assigned to and done by

Jim Parrott (Fitter #353).

(A) 8-3-89 work re-assigned and

done by Joe Kerner (PMI).

#353 Item #5. Dupont Chemical, El] Paso, IL

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This temporary repair work done as a

result of a fire, 4-6-89.

Work done by Joe Shallbetter and Russ

Watts of JCI.

Fitter was dispatched on following day

to make permanent repairs.

No fitter was originally dispatched to

make temporary repairs.

#149 Item #6. Farm Credit Services, Champaign, IL

Work originally assigned to and done by

Larry Swope (Fitter #149).

(A) 8-10-89 work re-assigned to and

done by Joe Kerner (PMI).

Item #7. Eye Witness Report

Eye witness report of a violation of

Jurisdiction job - Dupont Chemical

Date: 8-3-89

Time: Approximately 3:55 p.m.

Location of Violation: Johnson’s Shop,

9006 Industrial Road, Peoria, IL

On August 3rd, approximately 3:55 p.m., Randy Wright and

Jim Parrott (Fitters) returned to shop (9006 Industrial Road) to

pick up material for the following work day. Upon entering

shop area, they found Joe Kerner (PMI) laying inside of an

evaporator section of an air handling unit with his tools

scattered about him. Upon approaching him (Joe Kerner) he

was just snapping a drive belt back onto the unit fan and motor

assembly. Upon further inspection it was found that the motor

had been replaced with one of a closed housing style. This

was a new unit.

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On August 7th, at approximately 8:35 a.m., Jerry Bastian (JCI)

was asked by Bob Lawiess (Fitter JCI) in the presence of Tom

Meyer (Fitter), Randy Wright (Fitter), part time parts procurer,

Jim Parrott (Fitter), and Russ Watts (JCI part time PMI) if that

was a different motor on that air handler. Jerry Bastian replied

that it was necessary because the air handler was not equipped

with an explosion proof motor and that where it was going

required that it have one.

Jerry Bastian also acknowledged that it probably wasn’t the

smartest thing to have Joe Kerner (PMI) change out the motor.

This unit was shipped out on a trailer pulled by Jim Parrott

(Fitter #353) on 8-7-89, to the job site in El Paso.

Unit was installed by: Larry Mooney (Fitter #353) who

worked for mechanical

contractor, General Power and

John Venson (Tinner #1) of

Dumont Sheet Metal.

Robert M. Lawless

Local #353

Card #325-40-4316

(Jt. Grp. Ex. 2P)

At this arbitration hearing, Lawless testified he first learned of

Johnson Controls’ interest in filling a PMI position at its

Peoria Branch office sometime in June of 1988. According to

Lawless, on date of July 24, 1988, Johnson hired non-union

employee Joe Kerner for the PMI position.” Lawless recalled

*"It is noted by the Arbitrator that Kerner’s hiring preceded

the effective date of the 1989 Master Agreement (Jt. Ex. IP).

(continued...)

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that prior to hiring Kerner, Johnson interviewed another

prospective candidate for the position and on this date, July 14.

1988, he confronted Joseph Shallbetter, the Operations

Manager of the Peoria Branch office, apprising him that Local

353 was about to take in nine (9) apprentices and that Johnson

could certainly utilize them to perform some of the preventive

maintenance work. According to Lawless, Shallbetter

responded with the comment, "[W]e’re going to go nose to

nose on this" to which he replied, "[W]e certainly will."

Lawless testified that, in the past, Johnson had used apprentices

to perform the duties of preventive maintenance citing, as

examples, himself and employee Jim Parrott when he and

Parrott were initially hired as apprentices. According to the

record evidence, the duties the PMI was to perform were as

follows:

1) visual inspection of the equipment

2) oil and greasing

3) belt adjustments

4) changing of filters

5) troubleshooting to determine if there is anything

wrong

6) ordering parts to make any necessary repairs or

replacements.”!

°(...continued)

As an interesting aside, the Arbitrator notes this was in and

around the same time period Local 562 in St. Louis lodged a

complaint concerning the hiring of a PMI (see p. 20 of this

Award, Supra).

*"It is noted that the Parties at the hearing stipulated to this

list of duties with the understanding that in performing the

(continued...)

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Lawless testified he reported to Dawson that Johnson had hired

a PMI and that Dawson directed him to keep an eye on the

PMI to see what he was doing. Lawless explained that since

the nature of the job does not permit one to accompany a

fellow employee on service calls, the way in which he

accomplished Dawson’s directive was through monitoring his

own accounts, in other words, the accounts assigned to him to

determine whether the PMI was doing any of the work that he

was doing and, in addition, gathering the same kind of

observational data about the PMI from fellow steamfitters.

Lawless explained this was the methodology used in compiling

the information reproduced hereinabove which he submitted to

Dawson and which Dawson in turn submitted to UA

International Representative, McNamara (see pp. 40 and 41

above).

Lawless asserted that with the possible exception of two

particular duties performed by Kerner and listed among the

documents submitted into evidence, such as, for example,

resetting the main, all the duties performed by Kerner and

listed in the information that he submitted to Dawson was UA

work per the provisions of the 1989 Master Agreement (Jt. Ex.

| IP). Lawless acknowledged that between the years 1983 and

| 1989. Johnson Controls occasionally hired PMI type employees

| but that in August of 1989 it, for the first time, aggressively

pursued using a PMI offering Kerner as the example. Lawless

explained that what he meant by aggressively pursuing the use

of a PMI is what was reflected by the information he compiled

| which showed that UA Fitters were pulled off contracts and

71(__ continued)

duties of troubleshooting and ordering parts, the PMI does not

put tools to the equipment and tear it down to determine if

there is something wrong.

a a NE NC ONES SIREN MAR Meera NmDe Maw nes eoeP NOS lpr a

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the scheduled maintenance work reassigned to Kerner.

Lawless maintained that prior to August of 1989 or perhaps

prior to July of 1988 when Johnson hired Russ Watts to

perform PMI duties on a part-time basis, assignment of

scheduled maintenance work was only sporadically made to

non-union personnel. Lawless asserted that up until the time

Johnson hired Kerner, UA Mechanics were regularly assigned

routes in which they performed scheduled maintenance which

was not associated with an equipment breakdown or the work

of a repair and replacement. Lawless maintained that

scheduled maintenance work was exclusively UA work up until

1989 with the few exceptions that occurred in the 1983-1989

period. According to Lawless, under the 1989 Master

Agreement (Jt. Ex. IP), scheduled maintenance work was

recognized as UA work and that Johnson was in violation of

the Agreement when it hired Kerner as a PMI and reassigned

the scheduled maintenance work to him.

Larry Swope, a Business Agent for UA Local 149, one of the

eight (8) locals involved in the instant grievance, testified he

had been employed by Johnson Controls as a Service Mechanic

for nearly five years between the years 1984 and 1989.

According to Swope, in the time he worked for Johnson

Controls, he performed both service work and preventive

maintenance work which he estimated was evenly split 50-50

on a percentage basis. Swope explained that on a periodic

basis, either monthly or quarterly, he would visit an account

and perform scheduled maintenance work which involved such

duties as: (1) check calibration, (2) oiling and changing oil, (3)

greasing bearings, (4) changing belts, and (5) replacing filters.

Swope testified he considers preventive maintenance to be

skilled work explaining that in performing the various duties

except for filter changing, one is constantly evaluating the

HVAC system and ascertaining what, if any, improvements can

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be made to the system based on the customer’s needs.”

Swope identified the other UA Mechanics that worked in the

Central Illinois area, naming seven (7) to eight (8) employees

and testified that notwithstanding the fact their routes were

different than his, the whole of the work they performed was

no different than the whole of the work he performed.

Swope further testified that prior to Johnson Controls having

Watts and Kerner, there was only one instance he could recall

that the Company used a non-bargaining unit employee to

perform PMI work in his geographic area and that was a man

named Ron Sneeden. According to Swope, the then incumbent

Business Manager of Local 149 asked Sneeden to leave.

Swope testified that in his capacity as a Business Agent of

Local 149, he had, on more than one occasion, investigated the

type of work Kerner was performing. Swope testified that he

discovered Kerner had been assigned a service call to

determine why a boiler was not operating. According to

Swope, he discussed this assignment with Shallbetter, advising

him that the work in question was UA work and that giving

the work to Kerner was a breach of the National Agreement.

Swope testified that Shallbetter acknowledged he was right and

apologized, explaining that under the circumstances which

were that Kerner was in the area at the time, he (Shallbetter)

had to assign Kerner the work.

“In partial testimony, Operations Manager Joseph

Shallbetter stated just the opposite, that is, that in his view the

PMI duties referenced by Swope do not constitute skilled

work. The Arbitrator notes that earlier testimony proffered by

Moore concerning the lower rated Job Classification of

| Tradesman in the Mechanical Equipment industry supports the

view that preventive maintenance for the most part is not

skilled work.

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According to testimony by Rick Terven, Business Manager of

Local 99, subsequent to Dawson forwarding the information to

the UA concerning instances in which the Company had

violated the National Agreement (Jt. Ex. IP), by assigning UA

work to Kerner, a non-bargaining unit employee, he received

a telephone call from Mark Blanchard, a member of Local 99,

who reported that a "gentleman" was performing UA work at

the State Farm Corporate building located in Bloomington,

Illinois, and that he should come over to the building for a

first-hand look. Terven testified he responded to Blanchard’s

call by going to State Farm and there encountered Joe Kerner

wearing a tool belt, standing on a ladder and engaged in the

work of calibrating an aqua-stat on a steam unit heater.

Terven related he asked Kerner if he knew that the work he

was performing was UA work, that is, the work of pipefitters,

to which he responded in the affirmative, stating Management

had asked him to do the work and that he just wished this

situation (meaning the work jurisdiction issue) would be

resolved. Terven testified he read Paragraph 13 to Kerner and

after Kerner acknowledged his belief that the work he was

performing was UA work, he informed Kerner he was going

to call Kerner’s boss, Jerry Bastian, and advised Kerner he

really did not want him to do UA work. Terven testified he

called Bastian and reported the incident, that Bastian responded

he would look into the matter and would get back to him but

that Bastian never did get back to him. Local 353 Business

Manager Larry Dawson testified he received a telephone call

from Blanchard who apprised him he had observed Kerner

performing UA work at State Farm and that he advised

Blanchard to call his Busimess Manager Rick Terven.

Subsequent to Blanchard’s call, the record evidence reflects

that Blanchard reduced his observation to writing in a letter

dated October 10, 1989, which he sent to Dawson (Un. Ex.

7-P). Dawson related, after receiving the letter, he called Jerry

Bastian and he informed Bastian he had hard proof that Kerner

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performed UA work. According to Dawson, Bastian told him

he would look into the allegation but that Bastian never got

back to him.

Joseph Shallbetter, the Operations Manager in the Peoria

Branch of the Systems and Service Division of Johnson

Controls, testified that the business of the Division is to sell,

install, service and maintain automatic temperature controls,

fire alarms, and security systems for industrial and commercial

buildings. Shallbetter related that in 1989 the Peoria Branch

had in its employ two (2) PMIs, Russ Watts and Joe Kerner.

Shallbetter noted that Watts commenced employment in late

1988 and Kerner commenced his employment sometime in

August, 1989. According to Shallbetter, the duties to be

performed by the PMIs were as follows:

l. Check on air handling unit, heating and cooling

equipment for proper operation

a. Check filters on a programmed basis and

replace if necessary

Inspect, grease and lube fans and motors on a

periodic basis

U2

oe Check the temperature control and air

compressor for run times and record that date

on the scheduled maintenance visit report

5. Clean condenser and evaporator coils on air

handling units on a programmed basis

6. Adjustment and/or replacement of belts on a

scheduled basis

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7. Changing oil in the air compressor on a

programmed basis

8. Cleaning the general area

Shallbetter stated that none of the aforelisted duties require a

skilled employee to perform them. In testifying about specific

work Kerner performed which the Union claimed was UA

work, Shallbetter stated the following:

A) Worked Performed at Farm Credit - 4/9/90 (Un.

Ex. 6 - P) Shallbetter testified that Kerner

pushed a reset button on a boiler and, using a

screwdriver, adjusted the operating limit

downward from 210 degrees to 160 degrees.

Kerner also checked the pump operation, the

operation of the boiler and the controls and

noted they were working properly. Shallbetter

acknowledged in later testimony that this

assignment given to Kerner could be viewed as

a service call and that this was not work of a

PMI.

B) Worked performed at State Farm - 10/89 (Un.

Ex. 7 - P) Shallbetter testified that Kerner

dialed the pneumatic thermostat up and down to

check to see if the fan was working.

Shallbetter, in his testimony, confirmed he attended the

September, 1989 meetings with the eight (8) local unions and

that under discussion was the PMI work and that there was no

final resolution of the issue and essentially the parties agreed

they were in disagreement about the terms of the 1989

Agreement (Jt. Ex. IP) as it related to PMI work. Shallbetter

testified that in his review of the work orders of work assigned

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to and performed by Kerner that formed the basis of the seven

(7) items complained of by the local unions that is now the

subject of this arbitration, he was unable to discern any work

Kerner performed that fell outside of the preventive

maintenance tasks he identified hereinabove. Shallbetter

testified that preventive maintenance work except for that

falling within the parameters of the "incidental to" language

has never been the exclusive work of the bargaining unit but,

even so, there are occasions when he will assign non-incidental

scheduled preventive maintenance work to bargaining unit

employees such as when PMIs are overloaded with work or by

reason of convenience if the Fitter happens to be in the

specific geographic area of the account. Shallbetter testified

that prior to hiring Russ Watts in July of 1988, the Peoria

office had very little scheduled maintenance contract work but

that the limited amount of such work was performed by UA

mechanics.

As the Parties were unable to reach a mutually satisfactory

resolution of the instant dispute through the Contractual

grievance procedure, the matter now comes before this

Arbitrator for a final and binding determination.

CONTENTIONS

UNION’S POSITION

It is the position of the Union as set forth in its extensive

post-hearing brief, that the work identified to constitute

preventive maintenance is work belonging to the jurisdiction

of the Union pursuant to Article II, Paragraph 13(1) of the

1989 Master Agreement (Jt. Ex. IP). In pertinent part, the

Union’s post-hearing brief is incorporated as part of this

Opinion and Award and appended hereto as Appendix A.

eS

EMPLOYER’S POSITION

it is the position of the Company and Council as set forth in

its extensive post-hearing brief that the disputed work in

question is not covered by the 1989 Master Agreement and

therefore the performance of this work by non-union PMIs

does not constitute a violation of Article II, Paragraph 13(1) of

the Agreement (Jt. Ex. IP). In pertinent part, the Employer’s

post-hearing brief is incorporated as part of this Opinion and

Award and appended hereto as Appendix B.

OPINION

Collective bargaining is a process by which each party to the

bargain attempts to secure that which will satisfy its wants and

needs and, in the alternative, if it lacks the power to obtain

such rights and benefits, it will attempt to minimize any

arrangements that will be to its detriment. Collective

bargaining is a dynamic process so that over time, factors and

conditions once perceived as important and _ influential

considerations in the advancement of a party’s best interests,

ebb and flow, and other factors and conditions take their place.

The same holds true in terms of the balance of power between

the bargaining parties; that is, to say, that in some negotiations,

the employer will have the "upper hand", while at other times,

it will be the union. There also exists the situation where each

party is equally powerful, which makes for interesting and

tough negotiations and, in viewing the bargaining history

between the Parties at bar here, this seems to have been the

hallmark throughout the years of their relationship.

In an overall general sense, the driving force for employers in

bargaining is the economic considerations of marketplace

competition and the goal to maximize profits, whereas for the

unions it is the economic well-being of their constituent

C- 74

members as measured by wages, hours and the state of

working conditions. While parties may perceive their

respective needs and wants as being conflicting, that is, what

is beneficial to the employer may not also be beneficial to the

union, and vice-versa, there is generally an understanding by

the parties that a certain underlying compatibility of interests

exists between them that will insure an outcome that is not

lopsided in terms of the benefits gained or the concessions

made. In the simplest of terms, collective bargaining is a

process of give and take where the most beneficial outcome is

one in which neither party "loses" and neither party "wins", but

one in which both parties walk away from the negotiation

believing that each side, to the best of their ability, came as

close as they could to satisfying their respective objectives at

the bargaining table. Such satisfaction, however, does not

mean victory on all fronts at the expense of total capitulation

by the other side. What it does mean is that each party made

the necessary compromises in order to strike the best bargain

they could given all the prevailing pressures attendant on them

to reach agreement under all the prevailing circumstances.

An amusing story about the give and take nature of collective

bargaining, was told to this Arbitrator early on in his career in

labor relations by the illustrious neutral, David Cole, when he

served as Chairman of the National Commission for Industrial

Peace, and this Arbitrator served as the Presidential

Commission’s Executive Director. During the 1940’s, when

Cyrus Ching was serving as the first Director of the Federal

Mediation and Conciliation Service, he became involved in

settling a very contentious strike in the coal industry. The coal

association’s principal spokesperson was George Humphreys,

who later was to serve as U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, and

on labor’s side, the principal spokesperson was the powerful

President of the United Mine Workers, John L. Lewis.

Humphreys and Lewis were described as not very friendly to

C - 75

each other and very adversarial in their bargaining relationship,

so much so that the two men resisted ordinary attempts to

reconvene negotiations. Cyrus Ching, under political pressure

to get the nationwide strike settled, called a secret meeting

between himself, Humphreys and Lewis to be held in an

obscure hotel located in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia,

outside of Washington, D.C., where all three resided. Wishing

to avoid media attention and coverage of the meeting, each

traveled to West Virginia separately and incognito. At the

appointed time, the three met in Ching’s hotel room. Ching

opened the meeting by thanking Humphreys and Lewis for

consenting to meet and then launched into a spiel about the

importance of settling the strike for the good of the nation,

concluding with the observation that collective bargaining was

a process of give and take, and then turning to Lewis, he asked

what his thoughts were, hoping that Lewis had picked up on

the idea of at least thinking about making some concessions.

Lewis looked at Ching and without any hesitation said, "I'll

take anything this SOB Humphreys wants to give me", to

which Humphreys replied, "I’ll be damned if I’ll give him

anything." This meeting, having lasted for only several

minutes, ended on this note, and a settlement of the dispute

was deferred until a later date.

The point of this story relative to the case at bar is an

illustration of the dictum, "the past is prologue", meaning that

one necessarily has to be versed in what preceded an event or

outcome in order to comprehend the meaning of the event or

outcome. Even though the Union maintains the instant

grievance can be decided without the necessity of having to

delve into a twenty (20) year history of collective bargaining

because, in its view, the language of Paragraph 13 in the 1989

Master Agreement (Jt. Ex. IP) is clear and unambiguous, the

Arbitrator respectfully disagrees with this position on grounds

that the present language of Paragraph 13, no matter how clear

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and unambiguous it appears to be on the surface, is definitely

a product of the give and take nature of bargaining that has

occurred in response to the changes and developments that

have occurred in the industry since the Parties commenced

their formal bargaining relationship in 1969. Furthermore, as

revealed by a review of the bargaining history, the issue of the

Union’s work jurisdiction has been a matter of vital interest to

both sides in every one of its six (6) rounds of negotiations as

evidenced by the remarkable revisions made to the clause since

the first Master Agreement (Jt. Ex. 8 - Stl.) was consummated.

A review of the bargaining history reflects that between 1969

and 1974, a period within which the Parties here negotiated

two Master Agreements, 1969 and 1972, the Parties left

unchanged the language of Paragraph 13, the work jurisdiction

clause, notwithstanding the fact that the five (5) principal

companies comprising the Council, along with other companies

signatory to the Master Agreements that were national in scope

were moving apace to diversify their business into service and

maintenance work of mechanical equipment. Although there

was the briefest of reference to the existence of "technicians"

that apparently were non-union employees used by some of the

companies comprising the Council, more specifically,

Honeywell and Johnson Controls, there is no evidence before

this Arbitrator regarding the tasks/duties performed by these

"technicians", nor the number of technicians that were actually

employed. In any event, it cannot be determined from the

state of this record whether the tasks/duties known by the

Parties to constitute preventive maintenance to mechanical

equipment was performed solely by technicians or whether

such work which appears not to have been too extensive at this

time was performed by technicians at some locations, by

journeymen and apprentices at other locations, or by both

technicians and journeymen and apprentices at still other

locations.

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In 1974, the record evidence reflects that a revision was made

to Paragraph 13 by the addition of the phrase "or other piping"

systems inserted three (3) times within the work jurisdiction

clause. The Union asserts that this added language reflected

‘jurisdiction over the service and maintenance.to mechanical

equipment work that the pneumatic companies were continuing

to acquire through fixed price, scheduled maintenance

contracts, on a bid basis which previously had been work

performed primarily by companies in the mechanical

equipment industry. In the latter industry, which is also

organized by the Union, such service and maintenance work is

reserved to bargaining-unit employees, but to a lower rated

classification of employees known as Tradesman. In any

event, the Union makes the case, based on the existence of the

Tradesman classification, that the work of preventive

maintenance is work that belongs to the Union, and that while

there was no such Tradesman classification in the Pneumatic

Controls industry, the work of preventive maintenance was still

work that fell within its jurisdiction as a result of the added

language, even though it was performed by the higher rated

paid journeymen and apprentices. The only testimony

presented by the Employer in refutation of the Union’s

position was that proffered by Larry Smith, a former employee

of Honeywell who was a member of the Council’s Labor

Relations Committee in the years 1969 to 1979, and who

asserted that the added language of "or other piping" systems

referred to sprinkler systems which some of the contractors

serviced and maintained. While there is really no way in

which to resolve this conflict in testimony since both witnesses

appear to have rendered credible testimony, the Arbitrator is

persuaded that since the language of "or other piping" systems

is general in scope as compared to the more specific, sprinkler

systems, the Parties must have had in mind a much broader

coverage of work. It is therefore highly plausible that "or

other piping" systems contemplated the inclusion of service

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and maintenance work to mechanical equipment. As support

for this finding, the Arbitrator notes that in the complete

revision of Paragraph 13(1) that resulted in the 1989 Master

Agreement (Jt. Ex. IP), the reference to "or other piping"

systems was deleted and specific references to mechanical

equipment were added.

In his decision in the St. Louis case, Arbitrator Erbs appears

not to have considered the significance of the 1974 work

jurisdiction clause and seemingly confined his review of the

historical evolution of preventive maintenance work back to

the 1976 Agreement only. This is evident by the following

findings made by Erbs wherein he averred that "historically,

the parties have viewed preventive maintenance work as

different from other service, maintenance and repair work on

various equipment." Erbs went on to identify preventive

maintenance tasks as including "oiling, greasing, various belt

adjustments, cleaning and other jobs associated with routine

maintenance outside of repair or replacement." Erbs then held

that such preventive maintenance work, in fact, had been

“carved out of the agreement as_a separate item which

belonged to the Council unless performed in conjunction with

a repair." Clearly, the record evidence detailing the history of

negotiations demonstrates that the development to which Erbs

makes reference did not occur until 1976, and that Erbs failed

to consider the state of affairs prior to 1976 but more

specifically, to the jurisdiction of work that existed between

1974 and 1976 which occasioned the carving out of a portion

of maintenance work from the whole of maintenance work.

While there is support for Erbs’ observation that preventive

maintenance work was viewed as different from other

maintenance work attendant to repair work on various

equipment, as evidenced by the results of bargaining between

the UA and the contractors party to the 1974 Mechanical

Equipment Service and Maintenance, Agreement wherein it

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was agreed to establish a "Tradesman" job classification to

perform such preventive type maintenance work, and where

such attempt was made by the UA to establish such a

Tradesman category with contractors in the pneumatic controls

industry but failed, nevertheless, the critical paint here is not

the distinction between maintenance work and preventive

maintenance work, but rather that the UA considered both

types of maintenance work as falling within their work

jurisdiction. Nowhere in this record evidence has the Council

demonstrated by any conclusive proof that between 1974 and

1976 the tasks/duties identified as constituting preventive

maintenance work were not the exclusive work of the Union.

In fact, given the circumstances extant in 1976, the only

plausible explanation for revising the work jurisdiction clause

with the insertion of the "incidental to" language was the

recognition by the Council that preventive maintenance work

was work within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union. As

was noted above, the driving force for employers in bargaining

a labor contract are considerations of marketplace competition

and the ability to maximize profits. The situation that the

Council contractors found themselves in, in 1976, was that

they were disadvantaged with respect to marketplace

competition with mechanical equipment contractors for bidding

fixed price scheduled maintenance contracts and successfully

obtaining this work because the mechanical equipment

contractors were able to utilize the services of the lower paid

Tradesmen classification to perform the work, whereas the

Council contractors had to utiliz

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