Opposition Brief — Southview Farm v. Concerned Area Residents for the Environment

Supreme Court brief1995

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October Term, 1994

SOUTHVIEW FARM and RICHARD H. POPP,

Petitioners,

vs.

CONCERNED AREA _ RESIDENTS FOR THE

ENVIRONMENT, et ai.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

ALAN J. KNAUF DONALD W. O’BRIEN, JR.

KNAUF, CRAIG & DORAN, P.C. Counsel of Record

183 East Main Street DEANNA R. NELSON

Rochester, New York 14604 WOODS, OVIATT, GILMAN,

(716) 546-8430 STURMAN & CLARKE, LLP

44 Exchange Street

Rochester, New York 14614

(716) 454-5370

Attorneys for Respondents

(800) 3 APPEAL + (800) 5 APPEAL » (800) BRIEF 21 : |

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Was the Second Circuit justified in upholding the

unanimous jury verdict which found that the petitioners violated

the Clean Water Act?

2. Was the Second Circuit’s characterization of the

petitioners’ cattle barn complex as a large concentrated animal

feeding operation consistent with the applicable statutory and

regulatory definitions?

3. Are point source discharges of agricultural pollutants

exempted from the Clean Water Act merely because they occur on

rainy days?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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Reasons for Denying the Writ ......cccccccccccccces 8

I. The Second Circuit was justified in upholding the

unanimous jury verdict which found that the

petitioners violated the Clean WaterAct. ....... 8

II. Southview Farm constitutes a concentrated animal

COOTRRRGUUTNEGR. ono vcccsincsacvioneesvane 14

III. A discharge is no less a point source discharge

because it occurs on arainy day. .............. 18

IV. The decision of the Second Circuit is consistent

with sound PUBEIC DOREY. ..ccccscccedccceuscs 22

COMING onc ce cocnnsstcunesecadeececsasuesasin 24

ili

Contents

Page

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Cited:

Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp.

525 (W.D. La. 1979), aff’d in relevant part, 715 F.2d

es cede beeevencecneeess 13

Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055 (Sth Cir.

ee cee eben es eeneeseeces 15

Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview

Farm, No. CIV-91-60311L, slip op. at 4 (W.D. N.Y.

EE ccccdacabeecsnsecesseseses 2

Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm,

834 F. Supp. 1410 (W.D. N.Y. 1993) ...........6... 1,3

Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991),

rev'd on other grounds, 505 __U.S.__, 112 S. Ct. 2638,

oo | 10,11, 20, 21

Farmegg Prods., Inc. v. Humboldt County, 190 N.W. 2d

ESS re 14

Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 640 F. Supp. 442 (N.D.

ee Ace cede ie end bneeateceoncss 1]

CUES CEN GAGS euda cats ¥eed edness vecccaces 12

iv

Contents

Page

Higbee v. Starr, 598 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Ark. 1984), aff’d

without op., 782 F.2d 1048 (8th Cir. 1985) .......... 15

In re N. Adirondack Farms, Inc., DEC Decl. Rul. 17-07

tf re re ee rere Cer igen a ee 20

Natural Resource Defense Council (“NRDC”) v. Costle,

SOS Fe Ra ae GR SOFT ic cacnvccncsckeensds 9,10

O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D.

Fis MONEE io 4h050 080605050818080004b RO 12

RAIL v. Diversified Sys., 804 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Tenn.

POD co 064 Ke oo e464 hae e eee ee ceaees ees 20

Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co.,620F.2d41 ......... 9,10, 12

Smith v. Lighting Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363 (2nd Cir.

SEE wecndds ovaned 0608s 9

United States v. Earth Science, Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir.

. , NE eee erm Rn MN mE ears Aenea ene ye 10

United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (N.D. Fla.

SGP) 5. 5scuns dundscdcvewe ene 13

United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods., 487 F.

Supp. 852.(E.D. Pa. 1960) ... 0 ccccccncccsccescas 11,12

United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610 (D.C. Va. 1983),

aff'd, 769 F.2d 182, rev’d on other grounds, 481 U.S.

412, 107S. Ct. 1831, 95 L. Ed. 2d 365 (1987) ....... 13

)

3

5

4

:

Vv

Contents

Page

United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945

EEE cise cee a Aes enseaeweeescoss 12

United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D. Fla.

Sk dh bh nehaeRKesekedanbenedesceseeeoens 13

Statutes Cited:

Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, §503 ..... 19

New York Environmental Conservation Law section 17-

OS ee ee 20

PE CREATEED nek weesnecesceseseceecesees 1

PD bob kann esses er oredancsauseees 19

eS So fg: Perr eTeT yer TTT rere 1,2,6,9, 10, 13, 14

EL BEV COUT TT TeCEL TET ETTE EET EE Tee 2

Other Authorities Cited:

UNDE EBESS 656 cbaee cons dasrcesenaces 16

I SIRE peace cas db ceccdsccessusacs 20

WE THOME RPIOD cccdccccdceessecsesccsvees 20

Gh PU: BUMULABIO) ccccccccosevesvcccsccvcse 16

vi

Contents

Page

58 Fed. Reg. 7616(1993) .......cceeceeceeceeceeces 15

58 Fed. Reg. 7627 (1993) ......cccccccccceccesceeee 17

58 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1993) .....cccccccccccccccsceess 17

58 Fed. Reg. 7631 (1993) ....cccscccccccccccccccess 17

58 Fed. Reg. 7632 (1993) ....cccccccccscccccccccess 14,17

40 C.E.R. § 122.23 (1994) ..cccccccccescccccsececes 6

40 C.FR. § 122.23(b)(1) (1993) ...... cc ccecceecenees 14, 16

40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1)(i) (1993)... 2... ee eee eee eee 16

40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1)(ii) (1993) 2.2... ee eee eee eee 16

40 C.F.R. § 122.23(B)(a)(1) (1993) «2.6... ee eee eee eee ut

40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(13) (1994) .. 0... cece e eee eee 20

40 C.ER. § 125.4(h) (1973) ....cccccccceccccccccces 19

40 C.F.R. § 412.11-412.13 (1994) ........ eee eee eee 21

George A. Gould, Agriculture, Non-Point Source Pollution

and Federal Law, 23 U.S.C. at Davis L. Rev., 461

a a ee ae ee a ee ee

lee 6 ih that ngoe,

vii

Contents

Page

Larry C. Frarey and Staci J. Pratt, Environmental

Regulation of Livestock Production Operations, Nat.

Resources and Env’t (A.B.A. Nat. Resources, Energy

and Envtl. L. Sec.), Winter 1995 ..........cccceees 23

Neil D. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future: Six Philosophical

Issues Shaping Agricultural Law, 72 Neb. L. Rev.

ee ci ee aweebens 22

Stuart D. Klausner, Managing the Land Application and

Animal Manures: Agronomic Considerations, Dairy

Manure Mgmt. (Ne. Regional Agric. Engineering Serv.,

syracuse, N.Y.), Feb. 22-24, 1989 ... 0. ccc ccc cee 23

William P. Browne, et al., Sacred Cows and Hot Potatoes:

Agrarian Myths in Agricultural Policy(1992) ....... 23,24

Office of Water, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Nat’l Water

Quality Inventory: 1992 Rep. to Congress 9-13 (1994)

EE re 22

U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Perceptions About EPA’s Actions

in the Southview Farm Case 1 (Dec. 12, 1994) ....... 16

H.R. 961, 104th Congress, Ist Sess. (1995) ............ 24

25 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2124 (March3, 1995) ........... 24

1

This brief is respectfully submitted on behalf of the

respondents, Concerned Area Residents for the Environment

(“CARE”),' in opposition to the petition for writ of certiorari

seeking review of the Second Circuit’s opinion.

OPINIONS BELOW

This case was brought in the United States District Court for

the Western District of New York pursuant to the Clean Water Act

of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (“CWA”). A motion for

summary judgment brought on behalf of the petitioners,

Southview Farm (“Southview”) and Richard H. Popp (“Popp”)

was denied in April of 1993. Concerned Area Residents for the

Env't v. Southview Farm, 834 F. Supp. 1410 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).

Following a unanimous jury verdict in Respondents’ favor on

five CWA violations and the state law trespass claim, the district

court granted judgment as a matter of law on the five CWA

violations but left intact the verdict on the trespass cause of

action. (Pet. App. at 23a.) On September 2, 1994, the Second

Circuit Court of Appeals, upholding the jury’s verdict,

unanimously reversed the district court.

STATUTE INVOLVED

The statutory provision at issue in this case is 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(14).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Procedural History

On May 9, 1990, the respondents gave notice of their

1. The full listing of individual respondents is included in the “parties”

section of the petition for certiorari.

2

intention to sue pursuant to the CWA citizen’s suit provision, 33

U.S.C. § 1365. The original complaint was filed on January 22,

1991. The complaint set forth a single cause of action under the

CWA and included several state law claims. Before an answer

was interposed, Petitioners moved to dismiss for failure to state a

cause of action. Prior to a ruling on the motion, an amended

complaint was served. The amended complaint became the

operative pleading in the lawsuit.

On August 29, 1991, the district court denied Petitioners’

motion to dismiss in its entirety. Rejecting the petitioners’

argument that the respondents had not alleged a discharge from a

point source, the court noted:

After reviewing the complaint and the

relevant case law, I find that plaintiffs have

sufficiently alleged a point source discharge

to withstand a motion to dismiss. The courts

have not interpreted “point source” as

narrowly as defendants suggest; indeed,

several courts have stressed that the term

should be construed broadly.

CARE v. Southview Farm, No. CIV-91-6031L, slip op. at 4

(W.D.N.Y. filed August 29, 1991).

Petitioners moved for summary judgment upon completion

of discovery, arguing that no point source discharges could be

established to substantiate the CWA claims. Petitioners also

argued that several of the discharges identified in the amended

complaint were exempt agricultural stormwater discharges. See

generally, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).

On April 7, 1993, the district court denied Petitioners’

motion for summary judgment. 834 F. Supp. 1410. Again

3

endorsing a broad “point source” interpretation, the court ruled as

follows:

In the case at bar, plaintiffs have presented

photographs and both lay and expert

testimony tending to show that Southview

Farm contains both natural and manmade

streams and ditches which, if plaintiffs’

allegations are true, can and have conveyed

pollutants from defendants’ manure

spreading activity into navigable waters.

834 F. Supp. at 1419. The court rejected the petitioners’ argument

that certain of the alleged discharges could be considered

agricultural stormwater discharges as a matter of law. The court

noted:

Defendants rely in part on their assertion that

the pollutants, if any, migrate because of

rainwater run-off. However, the fact that

some of the alleged discharges may have

resulted from rainwater run-off does not

necessarily mean that the discharge did not

Originate from a _ point source.

Notwithstanding that it may result from such

natural phenomenon as rainfall and gravity,

the surface run-off of contaminated waters,

once channeled or collected, constitutes

discharge by point source.

834 F. Supp. at 1418.

Neen gis eC A

A supplemental complaint was thereafter served identifying

additional point source discharges which had occurred since the

filing of the amended complaint. The case was tried before an

4

eight-person jury from April 26, 1993 to May 17, 1993.

Following the district court’s charge to the jury, the written

instructions were furnished to the jury to consult during

deliberations.

The jury deliberated for nearly two days and returned a

unanimous verdict in favor of the respondents on five of the

eleven Clean Water Act claims submitted for consideration. The

jury found in favor of the petitioners on Respondents’ nuisance

and negligence claims. but returned a verdict in favor of the

respondents on the trespass claim, awarding a total of $4,101 in

damages. The jury determined that the CWA had been violated by

the petitioners on July 12, 1989, July 13, 1989, August 22, 1989,

September 26, 1990 and April 15, 1991. The 1989 discharges all

occurred at one location within Southview, namely, the Wyant

Farm, Field 104 while the 1990 and 1991 discharges occurred on

two adjacent fields near the property of one of Southview’s

neighbors.

The petitioners next moved for judgment as a matter of law.

On October 19, 1993, a decision, order and judgment was issued

by the district court, setting aside the jury’s verdict on the Clean

Water Act violations and sustaining the verdict with respect to the

trespass claim. (Pet. App. at 23a-57a.) With respect to the CWA

violations of July 12, 1989 and August 22, 1989, the district court

concluded that insufficient evidence was presented to support the

jury’s verdict. Regarding the violations of September 26, 1990

and April 15, 1990, the district court found, as a matter of law, that

the discharges qualified as agricultural stormwater discharges

and, therefore, were exempt from the CWA. The district court

held that the discharge occurring on July 13, 1989 was not from a

point source as contemplated by the CWA.

Respondents appealed the judgment as a matter of law to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On

September 2, 1994, the Second Circuit unanimously reversed the

pO APR 9

5

district court and upheld the jury’s verdict on the CWA violations

(Pet. App. at la.)

With respect to the 1989 violations from Field 104, the

Second Circuit rejected the district court’s opinion that the liquid

manure exiting the field on those days reached navigable waters

“in too diffuse a manner to create a point source discharge.” (Pet.

App. at 8a.) Instead, the Second Circuit concluded that the jury

had a reasonable basis to conclude that the improved swale at the

edge of Field 104, coupled with the drainage pipe under the

stonewall leading into the ditch that leads into the Genesee River

tributary was “in and of itself a point source.” (Pet. App. at 9a.)

Alternatively, the Second Circuit accepted the respondents’

argument that the manure spreading vehicles themselves were

point sources, and rejected the district court’s opinion that “the

connection between defendants’ activity and the alleged

discharge was too far removed to consider the tractors or

spreaders as point sources.” (Pet. App. at 47a.) The Second

Circuit also overturned the district court’s holding that the proof

of the July 12, 1989 and August 22, 1989 discharges was too

circumstantial to support the jury’s verdict. (Pet. App. at 12a-

13a.)

With respect to the September 26, 1990 and April 15, 1991

violations, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court’s

conclusion that the discharges were exempt from the CWA

because they constituted agricultural stormwater discharges.

According to the Second Circuit, “the real issue is not whether the

discharges occurred during rainfall or were mixed with rainwater

run-off, but rather, whether the discharges were the result of

precipitation.” (Pet. App. at 14a.) The Second Circuit concluded

that the jury was entitled to find that the discharges on those two

dates were caused by over-saturation of the fields with liquid

manure rather than the rain, and also that sufficient quantities of

liquid manure were present so that the discharges would not

qualify as “stormwater.” (Pet. App. at 14a-15a.)

6

The Second Circuit also determined as a matter of law that

Southview constitutes a concentrated animal feeding operation

(“CAFO”) which is, by definition, a point source under the Clean

Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). See also, 40 C.F.R. § 122.23

(1994). Reviewing the uncontroverted evidence presented at trial

relative to the size of Southview’s dairy herd and the manner in

which the herd is confined, the Second Circuit concluded iat

Southview is a large CAFO and, as a result, each discharge of

manure into the navigable waters of the United States constituted

a point source discharge in violation of the CWA. For this

additional reason, the Second Circuit sustained the jury’s verdict.

The district court had denied Respondents’ request to charge the

jury that Southview was a CAFO.

B. Factual Background

Petitioner Southview Farm is one of the largest dairy farms

in the State of New York. The farm employs 28 full-time and nine

part-time employees. As of August, 1992, Southview owned

1,100 acres of land and had a cattle population of 1,290 milking

cows with over 900 head of young cattle, for a total of 2,200 dairy

animals.

Southview’s cows are not pastured; they remain in the barns

and are moved only for milking three times per day. The milking

parlor is washed down and the milking machines are flushed after

every milking with a chlorine cleanser and rinsed with a

phosphoric acid solution. The resulting washwater is then

pumped into a 2,000-gallon storage tank. The solution in the tank

is subsequently used to wash the milkhouse floor. In the last step,

the waste wash solution flows down an incline into one of five

manure storage lagoons located on the farm.

The largest of Southview’s manure storage lagoons covers

four acres and has acapacity of approximately six to eight million

tele Sense S27,

7

gallons of liquid cow manure and process wastes. In conjunction

with the large lagoon, Southview installed a separator which

pumps the cow manure over a mechanical device that drains off

the liquid and passes the solids out through a compressing

process. The solids that remain are dropped into bins for transport

while the liquid is transported by gravity to the large manure

storage lagoon.

Southview uses various technologies to apply the liquid cow

manure (which includes the farm’s chemical process waste) to its

fields. One of the devices is a center pivot irrigation system. The

center pivot irrigator is connected by a series of pipes to the liquid

manure storage lagoon and is self-propelled. Southview also uses

a “hard hose traveler,” essentially, a long piece of plastic tubing

on a large reel. The tubing is unwound from the reel and has a gun

on the end which can propel liquid manure 150 feet into any

direction, making a 300-foot wide swath for purposes of

depositing the wastes on the fields.

Since 1988, Southview has had in place a piping system. The

system pipes liquid manure from the storage lagoon to various

locations across the Southview property without the use of

vehicles. Southview’s piping system extends underneath both

state and town highways to nearby properties owned by the

petitioners.

In addition to the above, Southview also uses manure

spreading equipment, including spreaders pulled by tractors and

other self-propelled vehicles. The vehicles are generally used to

spread manure from the smaller lagoons which did not receive

liquid manure from the separation system. In all, Southview’s

manure spreading records reflect the application of millions of

gallons of manure to its fields.

8

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The petitioners have failed to satisfy criteria traditionally

applied by the Court in determining whether to grant a writ of

certiorari. The Second Circuit, in a manner consistent with other

circuit courts, correctly interpreted and applied the applicable

provisions of the Clean Water Act and the corresponding

regulations. In an attempt to obtain review here, the petitioners

have mischaracterized the holding of the court below and, with

little or no foundation, have exaggerated the impact the decision

will have on agricultural enterprises.

I.

THE SECOND CIRCUIT WAS JUSTIFIED IN

UPHOLDING THE UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICT

WHICH FOUND THAT THE PETITIONERS VIOLATED

THE CLEAN WATER ACT.

The central question in this case is whether each of the

discharges of liquid manure into the navigable waters of the

United States — established to the jury’s satisfaction — came

from a “point source.” “Point source” is defined in the CWA as:

Any discernible, confined and discrete

conveyance, including, but not limited to, any

pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well,

discrete fissure, rolling stock, concentrated

animal feeding operation, vessel or other

floating craft, or landfill leachate collection

system from which pollutants are or may be

discharged. This term does not include

agricultural stormwater discharges and return

flows from irrigated agriculture.

9

33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). This definition was incorporated in the

jury instructions read at the conclusion of the case and furnished

to the jurors to consult during their deliberations. Petitioners’

zeal to portray the Second Circuit’s decision as renegade judicial

lawmaking has led them to repeatedly sidestep the fact that the

Second Circuit simply upheld the unanimous verdict of an eight-

person jury. If consideration of Southview’s petition starts, as it

should, with the premise that the jury, after weighing the

evidence, concluded that the discharges in question were from

point sources, then the petitioners’ argument loses its vitality.” So

long as proper deference is paid to the jury’s verdict, the

petitioners’ argument that the Second Circuit ignored the

pertinent law lacks merit.

The flaw in the petitioners’ analysis is that they proceed on

the assumption that agricultural discharges and point source

discharges are mutually exclusive terms. They are not. While it

may be true that most agricultural discharges are nonpoint source

in nature, there is nothing in the Clean Water Act nor any of the

regulations promulgated thereunder which supports the general

proposition that all agricultural discharges are nonpoint source in

nature. Petitioners have cited no authority for such a proposition.

Furthermore, a careful reading of the Clean Water Act militates

against such an interpretation. While Congress intended to

exempt nonpoint pollution, there is no general exemption for

agricultural activities in the Clean Water Act. Thus, “EPA has

been held to be precluded from exempting from the act ...

agricultural and silvicultural activities.” Sierra Club v. Alston

Constr. Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 41, 44 (Sth Cir. 1980), citing Natural

2. Petitioners appear to have overlooked this point when they complain

that the Second Circuit, in reinstating the jury verdict, “impermissibly

substituted its own unsubstantiated factfinding for the findings of the district

court...” (Pet. atn.7.) Of course, it was the district court which impermissibly

substituted its judgment for that of the jury. See Smith v. Lighting Bolt Prods.,

Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 367 (2nd Cir. 1988).

10

Resource Defense Council (“NRDC”) v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369,

1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

In NRDC v. Costle, the D.C. Circuit set aside EPA’s attempt

to grant an across-the-board exemption for all “discharges of

pollutants from agricultural and silvicultural activities ...

including run-off from cultivated crops, [and] pastures” from the

requirement for NPDES permits. 568 F.2d at 1372 n.5. The courts

have been unable to discern any intention on the part of Congress

to provide a blanket exemption for agricultural activities.

Furthermore, there is nothing in the 1987 Clean Water Act

amendments which suggests that Congress sought, at that time, to

provide such a blanket amendment. As noted below, the only

effect of the 1987 amendment was to add a specific exemption for

“agricultural stormwater discharges” to the exemption which was

added earlier for “return flows for irrigated agriculture.” 33

U.S.C. § 1362(14), as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-4, tit. V, §

502(a.) The fact that Congress has elected on those two separate

occasions to incorporate specific agricultural exemptions in the

CWA definition of the term “point source,” suggests that

agricultural discharges which come under the general definition

but do not qualify for either exemption constitute point source

discharges within the reach of the CWA.

In the absence of any express exemption for agricultural

discharges, the jury was entitled to evaluate whether or not the

discharges at issue constituted point source discharges as defined

in the CWA. In upholding the jury’s conclusion that these

discharges were from a point source, the Second Circuit

recognized that the definition of a point source is to be broadly

interpreted. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1354 (2d

Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 505 U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 2638,

120 L. Ed. 2d 449 (1992); see also, Sierra Club v. Abston Constr.

Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45-46; United States v. Earth Science, Inc., 599

F.2d 368, 378 (10th Cir. 1979) (“The concept of a point source

PoE Se Se ARENA ed Oe NaF Rel a ee -

11

was designed to further this [regulatory] scheme by embracing

the broadest possible definition of any identifiable conveyance

from which pollutants might enter the waters of the United

States.”)

In light of the uniformly broad interpretation given the

definition of point source in the CWA, the Second Circuit did no

violence to the statutory scheme when it concluded that the

drainage ditch at the edge of Field 104 constituted a point source.

The petitioners’ description of the swale at the edge of Field 104

as a mere “depression” is misleading since it ignores the fact that

the drainage at this location had been improved with the

placement of a drainage tile pipe emptying into a drainage ditch

which, itself, empties into a tributary of the Genesee River. Since

the term “ditch” is included in the CWA definition of point

source, the petitioners should not be heard to claim that such a

conveyance was not within the contemplation of Congress.

The petitioners would have the Court limit point source

discharges to classic “end-of-the-pipe” discharges. The cases

demonstrate, however, that the term “point source” has been

given much broader sweep. For example, in Dague v. City of

Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, the emission of pollutants leaching

from a landfill into a railroad culvert was properly considered a

“point source.” In Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 640 F.

Supp. 442 (N.D. Pa. 1986), overflow from a lagoon through an

unchannelized area into a stream was considered a point source.

Furthermore, in United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods.,

487 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1980), the court found that an

indictment, which alleged that a spray irrigation system was a

point source, was legally sufficient:

Oxford has a spray irrigation system,

designed to spray wastewater onto fields in

quantities small enough to be absorbed by

12

those fields; none of the discharge should run-

off into the surface water. The discharges

forming the basis of the indictment resulted

from spraying an overabundance of

wastewater onto the surface of the irrigation

fields, which in turn ran-off into a nearby

stream through a break in the berm around

those fields.

487 F. Supp. at 844. Similarly, there is no requirement that the

point source discharge directly into navigable waters in order to

violate the CWA. In United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 438 F.

Supp. 945 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), discharges to the city sewers which

eventually emptied into the Mississippi River were considered a

point source. In O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp.

642 (E.D. Pa. 1980), a landfill which discharged through such

methods as “gullies, trenches and ditches” was found to be a

“point source,” even though it was not directly connected to the

waters of the United States. Likewise, in Friends of Sakonnet v.

Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623 (D.R.I. 1991), the point source included

the defendants’ septic system, which leached through a pipe

installed by the municipality.

Finally, there is no requirement that the conveyance which

qualifies as the point source be man-made. In Sierra Club v.

Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, the Fifth Circuit held: “nothing

in the Act relieves miners from liability simply because the

operators did not actually construct those conveyances, so long as

they are reasonably likely to be the means by which pollutants are

ultimately deposited into a navigable body of water.” 620 F.2d at

45. There is nothing in the Clean Water Act definition of point

source that exempts natural conveyances.

The Second Circuit was also acting in harmony with existing

precedent when it decided that the manure spreading vehicles

CP ee Re SS ee

Dey Ese

Dees |,

13

themselves constitute point sources. Section 1362(14) defines a

“point source” to include a “container” or “rolling stock” and the

cases have routinely found vehicles to be within the definition of

point source. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). See, e.g., United States v.

Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 622 (D.C. Va. 1983), aff’d, 769 F.2d 182,

rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412, 107 S. Ct. 1831, 95 L. Ed.

2d 365 (1987); United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 1337

(N.D. Fla. 1980); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Alexander,

473 F. Supp. 525, 532 (W.D. La. 1979), aff’d in relevant part, 715

F.2d 897 (Sth Cir. 1983); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp.

665, 668 (N.D. Fla. 1974). As noted above, the fact that the

manure spreading vehicles did not discharge directly into

navigable waters is irrelevant.’ Accordingly, the Second Circuit’s

decision to uphold the jury verdict is entirely consistent with

existing precedent and does not frustrate the congressional intent

behind the Clean Water Act. Agricultural point source discharges

can and do occur, and are increasing as farms like Southview

grow in size and intensity. (See Point IV, infra. )*

3. The petitioners, like the district court, appear to concede that the

manure spreading vehicles could be point sources so long as the connection

between the manure application and the discharge into the navigable waters

was sufficiently direct. Once again, since indirect point source discharges

violate the CWA, the temporal element cannot be the dispositive factor. In any

event, this point, at best, raises a fact question which the jury resolved against

Southview.

4. Not surprisingly, the petitioners make no mention of the incident

which occurred during July of 1992 when one of Southview’s liquid manure

pipelines ruptured and discharged thousands of gallons of manure into nearby

ponds, wetlands and a stream which eventually led to the Genesee River in

Letchworth State Park. Extensive fish kills from nearby ponds were reported

and discolored water and mounds of manure-laden foam were visible for weeks

from various scenic overlooks in the state park. Contrary to the description

contained in the petition (Pet. at 12), Southview is far from a conventional

farm.

14

II.

SOUTHVIEW FARM CONSTITUTES A CONCEN-

TRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATION.

Although Southview’s general position that most

agricultural pollution is nonpoint source in origin is accepted,

there is no avoiding the reciprocal truth: some agricultural

pollution is from point sources. CAFOs are one such point

source, a source deemed so important by Congress that they were

enumerated as a point source class within the CWA. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(14) (“point source” includes “any discernible, confined

and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any ...

concentrated animal feeding operation”). When the CAFO

definition is evaluated, it is apparent that Southview is indeed

within the class.

Animal feeding operation (“AFO”) is defined by regulation

as “a lot or facility” where animals “have been, are, or will be

stabled or confined and fed or maintained for a total of 45 days or

more in any 12-month period,” and “[c]rops, vegetative forage

growth, or post-harvest residues are not sustained in the normal

growing season over any portion of the lot or facility.” 40 C.F.R.

§ 122.23(b)(1) (1993). A dairy farm AFO becomes a regulated

large CAFO when it houses more than 700 mature dairy cattle.

Id., app. B (a)(1) (1993). There is a zero-discharge standard for

large CAFOs. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23, app. B (a)(1); 58 Fed. Reg.

7632 (1993).

Southview’s strained argument that it is not a CAFO because

it has adjacent lands* which bear vegetation during portions of the

5. The reference in Southview’s petition to Farmegg Prods., Inc. v.

Humboldt County, 190 N.W. 2d 454 (Iowa 1971), defining appropriate

characteristics of “industrial” agricultural operations begs the question before

the Court. Congress and the EPA have defined “industrial” agricultural

(Cont'd)

. hs

=

a

Ff

°

=

15

growing year is nonsensical.° If the petitioners’ argument to this

Court is accepted, the presence of any vegetated areas adjacent to

a large CAFO would lift it from the regulated industrial cattle

arena. Clearly, Congress’ intent was not to exclude concentrated

animal feeding operations from regulation simply because they

exist in a rural setting and the operators happen to own and use

vegetated, adjacent lands. The presence and use of adjacent fields

have not prevented other federal circuits from finding a facility to

be a CAFO. See Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055 (Sth

Cir. 1991) (Facility was CAFO despite use of waste manure on

adjacent crop fields for irrigation and fertilization; and as noted in

an earlier opinion in the same case: “the fields produce alfalfa,

rye and other grains for cattle feed.” 924 F.2d 558, 559); Higbee v.

Starr, 598 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Ark. 1984), aff’d without op., 782

F.2d 1048 (8th Cir. 1985) (hog houses were a CAFO although

collected wastes were spread on adjacent fields). The Second

(Cont’d)

operations as CAFOs. Simply because Southview views its high-tech waste-

handling operations and its 2,000-head herd of cattle in a pastoral light does not

mean that it should be exempt from the CAFO classification drafted by

Congress, defined by the EPA, and accepted by Congress for nearly 20 years. In

fact, Petitioner distorts the true state of affairs by claiming that “few dairy

farms today rely on pasturage to feed their mature lifestock.” (Pet. at 22.)

According to the 1987 Census of Agriculture, only 780 dairy farms nationally

qualify as large CAFOs.

6. Note that confined in pasture operations (CIPOs) are distinguished

from CAFOs by the EPA. The definition of CAFOs explicitly excludes

operations which confine animals in an outdoor, vegetated environment, and

distinguishes large CIPOs from large CAFOs, since CAFOs undoubtedly have

more severe waste management difficulties. See generally, 58 Fed. Reg. 7616

(1993) (exempting CIPOs from CAFO permitting requirements). Petitioners

distort the holding of the Second Circuit by claiming it requires a dairy farm to

grow crops inside its barns to avoid being classified as a CAFO. (Pet. at 13.) On

the contrary, if a dairy farm pastures its cows as farmers have done through the

ages, it will not qualify as a CAFO.

16

Circuit’s ruling on the CAFO issue is supported by statutory and

regulatory construction and was advanced by the EPA in its

amicus brief.

The fact that Southview grows crops on adjacent fields is of

no legal significance, since the animals were not pastured on

those fields. Any other interpretation of the regulation would be

contrary to the intent of Congress and the EPA since most CAFOs

do grow some crops. “EPA presumes that most, if not all, feedlots

have some vegetation nearby.” U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,

Perceptions About EPA's Actions in the Southview Farm Case |

(Dec. 12, 1994).

The regulatory history of the “vegetation criterion” is

telling. When originally proposed, the AFO definition

encompassed a “a lot or facility” in which “crops, vegetation or

forage growth are not sustained in the area of confinement.” 40

C.FR. § 125.51(a)(1) (proposed), 40 Fed. Reg. 54185 (1975).

However, in responding to subsequent comments questioning

whether growth of vegetation in only part of the confined area

disqualified a facility from being an AFO, the regulation was

changed to make a “clarification” stating “that only confined

areas which lack vegetation, crops, etc. in every part or portion of

the lot or facility are included.” 41 Fed. Reg. 11458 (1976).

While the new version did substitute “lot or facility” for

“confined area” in the vegetation criterion, that was due to the

fact that EPA used the term “confined area” interchangeably with

“Jot or facility.” The agency never indicated any intent to change

the locus of inquiry from the confined area to all of the feedlot

owner’s property. Thus, the phrase “lot or facility,” found in both

40 C.F.R. §§ 122.23(b)(1) and 122.23(b)(1)(ii) (1993), refers to

the same location — the area where the animals are “confined,”

40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1)(i), and not some larger area.

Te MT) ete Fe

ht Nig tN Ok Sy A

i Sad Boia ES”

17

The presence of adjacent fields does nothing to mitigate the

monumental animal waste production going on within the

confined animal area itself. As the Second Circuit noted, there is a

two-fold rationale for the exemption in the CAFO definition for

vegetated confinement facilities: (1) the fact that vegetation can

be sustained in the area in which the animals are confined

suggests a lower density of animals; and (2) the vegetation helps

to absorb and reduce the amount of pollution. (Pet. App. at 19a.)

CAFO permitting requirements reflect this reality. 58 Fed. Reg.

7631 (dealing with wastewater removal and land application

relative to CAFOs).

Land disposal of waste like that engaged in by Southview

has been addressed by the EPA. The EPA established a general

CAFO permit for its Region 6 (Louisiana, New Mexico,

Oklahoma and Texas). Under this general CAFO permit, waste

handling, treatment, and management must not create

environmental or public health hazard of any kind. Specifically,

the wastes must be disposed of in a manner such as to prevent

them from being discharged to waters of the United States. 58

Fed. Reg. 7627, 7629. Discharge of waste from the application

site is prohibited.’ 58 Fed. Reg. 7632. Thus, EPA has already

addressed operations like Southview’s without crippling

agriculture, as Petitioners have warned.

Once it has been established that a dairy operation

constitutes a large CAFO, the only issue which remains is

whether there has been a discharge into navigable waters. Since

even the petitioners cannot dispute that there were discharges into

navigable waters on the five dates in question, the CAFO

requirements have been satisfied.

7. Note that, under this permit, large CAFOs may apply animal wastes to

fields in amounts exceeding nutrient uptakes only if the sites are isolated from

surface waters and no potential exists for run-off to reach a water of the United

States. 58 Fed. Reg. 7632. There was no judicial challenge to EPA’s Region 6

permit.

18

Il.

A DISCHARGE IS NO LESS A POINT SOURCE

DISCHARGE BECAUSE IT OCCURS ON A RAINY DAY.

Petitioners’ basic proposition with regard to the

“agricultural stormwater discharge” exception is that as long as it

rains, an agricultural enterprise can pollute the nation’s waters at

will. In contrast, the Second Circuit reasoned that “the real issue

is not whether the discharges occurred during rainfall or were

mixed with rainwater run-off, but rather, whether the discharges

were the result of precipitation.” (Pet. App. at 14a.) Thus, “while

the statute does include an exception for ‘agricultural stormwater

discharged,’ there can be no escape from liability for agricultural

pollution simply because it occurs on rainy days.” (Pet. App. at

13a.)

The Second Circuit’s holding is consistent with the district

court’s charge to the jury. The charge stated that the exemption

pertains to discharges caused “primarily” by “ordinary, natural”

runoff of precipitation:

Point source does not include agricultural

storm water discharges. Storm water means

storm water run-off or snow melt run-off or

surface water run-off and draining. The

ordinary, natural run-off of rain water, that is

the flow of excess precipitation, is not a point

source. ... Disparate, random, naturally

induced run-off of pollutants, whatever kind,

caused primarily by rainfall or other natural

precipitation around activities that employ or

cause pollutants is not a point source

discharge...

serves initt ma slain tell

42a MAES Sar we

Rib at tidtided ina Mad Rati ene Mae Sedans o

19

(Tr., vol. v, at 2118-2119.) Thus, Petitioners’ attack not only

second-guesses the jury’s evaluation of the credibility of the

evidence presented, but also challenges both lower courts’

interpretation of the applicable law.*®

The Second Circuit’s interpretation is consistent with the

relevant legislative and regulatory history. The exemption was

added by the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 503,

at the same time that “Congress mandated comprehensive

regulation of certain forms of industrial and municipal

stormwater run-off under Clean Water Act § 402(p), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(p). (Pet. App. at 13a.) Given the enactment of the new

stormwater permit program, however, Congress (especially

members from agricultural states) wanted to avoid any

possibility of bringing run-off caused by stormwater from farms

under the new program. Therefore, as the Second Circuit noted:

“one can infer that Congress wanted to make it clear that

agriculture was not included in this new program.” (Pet. App. at

13a.)

It is evident that Congress intended to preserve the status

quo, which had existed during the fifteen years between

enactment of the Clean Water Act in 1972 and enactment of the

exception, pursuant to which “agricultural stormwater runoff was

always considered nonpoint pollution exempt from the Act.”

(Pet. App. at 13a.) See, e.g., 40 C.FR. § 125.4(h) (1973)

(exception for run-off from cultivated crops).

Early on, EPA recognized that the test for determining if a

8. When setting aide the jury verdict, Judge Larimer found it necessary

to rule that the manure “would have remained on [petitioners’ } land had it not

been for a heavy rain.” (Pet. App. at 352.). Thus, he adhered to his prior ruling

that the primary cause of the discharge was the relevant area of inquiry. The

problem was that he substituted his own findings of fact for the reasonable

findings of the jury.

20

stormwater discharge occurred is whether the discharge was

“caused or initiated solely by natural processes such as

precipitation,” so that “[t]he intent of the regulations is to exclude

from the NPDES permit program all natural runoff from

agricultural land which results from precipitation events.” 41

Fed. Reg. 7963, 7964 (1976).

Although EPA regulai:ons do not define “agricultural

stormwater discharge,” regulations promulgated on November

16, 1990 to implement the 1987 industrial/municipal stormwater

regulatory program defined the general term “storm water” as

“storm water runoff, snow melt runoff, and surface runoff and

drainage.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b) (13) (1994). No reported

judicial decision could be found interpreting the meaning of

“asricultural stormwater,” yet the New York State Department of

Environmental Conservation has ruled that in order for the

identical exception under New York Environmental

Conservation Law section 17-0105(6) to apply, “the waste water

being discharged must result from precipitation which runs off

the crop field.” In re N. Adirondack Farms, Inc., DEC Decl. Rul.

17-07 at 6 (1992).

Thus, for the discharges in question, the issue was not

whether they occurred during rainfall, or whether the discharge

was mixed with rainwater run-off,’ but whether the discharge was

9. Petitioners make much of the Second Circuit’s statement, with regard

to the September 26, 1990 discharge, that the jury could have properly found

that “sufficient quantities of manure were present so that the run-off could not

be classified as ‘stormwater.’ ” (Pet. App. at 15a.) The reference to “sufficient

quantities” is taken out of context, and was merely an acceptance of

Respondents’ alternative argument that even if the discharge was caused by

precipitation, it would not qualify for the exemption if it is so polluted that it

cannot be considered “stormwater.” See, e.g., RAIL v. Diversified Systems, 804

F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (E.D. Tenn. 1992) (run-off contaminated by leachate was

not stormwater); Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991),

(Cont’d)

‘3

Fd

“ oe .

BEC EAR MR RG id | RE bile

21

the result of precipitation. Otherwise, farmers would be free to

dispose of excess waste in conjunction with meteorological

forecasts of precipitation, and the months of March and April

would be open season for discharges due to snow melt run-off.

Petitioners’ position would lead to the absurd result that a farmer

could dispose of his waste by mixing it with a few drops of

rainwater. While there is a line to be drawn somewhere, it was up

to the jury and not the trial judge to draw it. As the Second Circuit

recognized, “all discharges eventually mix the precipitation run-

off in ditches or streams or the navigable water so the fact that the

discharge might have mixed with runoff cannot be

determinative.” (Pet. App. at 14a.)

Accordingly, since the jury had a reasonable basis to find

that the discharges on September 26, 1990 and April 15, 1991

“were not the result of rain, but simply occurred on days when it

rained,” the Second Circuit properly upheld their verdict. (Pet.

App. at 14a.)

(Cont'd) :

rev'd on other grounds, 505 U.S.__, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 120 L. Ed. 24. 449 (1992)

(leachate generated by percolation of precipitation required NPDES permit).

Nonetheless, the Second Circuit also accepted the respondents’ main

contentions that “the jury could properly find that the run-off was primarily

caused by the over-saturation of fields,” and “could have found a discharge

unaffected by rain.” (Pet. App. at 15a.) Therefore, the question of “sufficient

quantities” is in no way a necessary component of the decision. Also note that,

because the discharges included “process waste water” (including waste

chemicals), 40 C.F.R. § 412.11-412.13 (1994), it was not stormwater.

22

IV.

THE DECISION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT IS

CONSISTENT WITH SOUND PUBLIC POLICY.

As noted above, the Second Circuit decision conforms to

existing precedent and represents a reasoned application of

current agricultural policy as expressed in the Clean Water Act

and its accompanying regulations. It is inconsistent with sound

public policy to place intensive, technologically-oriented dairy

farms like Southview with their potential for massive discharges

of manure beyond the purview of the Clean Water Act.

“American agriculture is changing rapidly — becoming

more concentrated, more technically advanced and more

integrated with the input and marketing sectors. “In other words,

American agriculture is rapidly becoming industrialized.” Neil

D. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future: Six Philosophical Issues

Shaping Agricultural Law, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 210, 213 (1993).

Accordingly, agriculture, like any other industry, should be

required to internalize its fair share of the cost of cleaner water.

George A. Gould, Agriculture, Non-Point Source Pollution and

Federal Law, 23 U.S.C. at Davis L. Rev., 461, 488 (1990). It is

both unrealistic and unfair for the petitioners to expect that the

public should bear the costs of water quality impairment caused

by their own improper manure management practices. Instead, it

is appropriate to require that the petitioners and their counterparts

in the agricultural community ameliorate the environmental

impacts of their increasingly industrialized operations.

Recent studies indicate that agriculture is, far and away, the

leading source of water quality impairment of this country’s lakes

and rivers. Office of Water, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Nat’l Water

Quality Inventory: 1992 Rep. to Congress 9-13 (1994). Virtually

every region of the country has experienced water quality

ALS a Sate, nokwets Se a -

23

problems resulting from livestock waste. Larry C. Frarey and

Staci J. Pratt, Environmental Regulation of Livestock Production

Operations, Nat. Resources and Env’t (A.B.A. Nat. Resources,

Energy and Envtl. L. Sec.), Winter 1995, at 8. Even the

agronomist used at trial as an expert witness on behalf of the

petitioners has written that careless manure management

practices pose serious environmental hazards:

Excessive rates of manure will over-supply

nutrients that may affect plant growth and

animal nutrition. Excessive rates of

application as well as accumulations of

manure around barn lots will eventually

cause water pollution. Preventing such

problems calls for a combination of

appropriate soil and water conservation

practices and proper management of the rate,

timing and method of manure application. In

extreme cases, additional land must be used

to lower the application rate.

Stuart D. Klausner, Managing the Land Application and Animal

Manures: Agronomic Considerations, Dairy Manure Mgmt. (Ne.

Regional Agric. Engineering Serv., Syracuse, N.Y.), Feb. 22-24,

1989 at 79, 86. The Second Circuit’s decision is simply a

reflection of a statutory and regulatory framework designed to

address, in part, the serious and widespread environmental risks

posed by large industrialized dairy farming and other livestock

enterprises. In essence, Southview Farm is more like an industrial

enterprise than an old-fashioned family farm. The Court,

therefore, should view with a jaundiced eye Petitioners’ attempts

to invoke protections more properly aimed at traditional

agriculture. See, Neil D. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future: Six

Philosophical Issues Shaping Agricultural Law, 72 Neb. L. Rev.

at 215-216. See, generally, William P. Browne, et al., Sacred

24

Cows and Hot Potatoes: Agrarian Myths in Agricultural Policy

(1992).

Ultimately, if the petitioners seek to overrule the Second

Circuit’s determination in this case, Congress is the proper

forum. Currently, Congress is considering a CWA rewrite bill

which, among other things, would modify the definition of point

source in the CWA to exclude all land applications of manure.

H.R. 961, 104th Congress, Ist Sess. (1995); see, 25 Env’t Rep.

(BNA) 2124 (March 3, 1995). If the prevailing policy, as

embodied in the CWA, is to be revised, Petitioners should direct

their efforts at Congress, not this Court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the respondents respectfully

request that the Court deny the petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

ALAN J. KNAUF DONALD W. O’BRIEN, JR.

KNAUF, CRAIG & DORAN, Counsel of Record

PC. WOODS, OVIATT,

183 East Main Street GILMAN, STURMAN &

Rochester, New York 14604 CLARKE, LLP

(716) 546-8430 44 Exchange Street

Rochester, New York 14614

(716) 454-5370

Attorneys jor Respondents

April 1995

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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