Opposition Brief — Southview Farm v. Concerned Area Residents for the Environment
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October Term, 1994
SOUTHVIEW FARM and RICHARD H. POPP,
Petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED AREA _ RESIDENTS FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT, et ai.,
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
ALAN J. KNAUF DONALD W. O’BRIEN, JR.
KNAUF, CRAIG & DORAN, P.C. Counsel of Record
183 East Main Street DEANNA R. NELSON
Rochester, New York 14604 WOODS, OVIATT, GILMAN,
(716) 546-8430 STURMAN & CLARKE, LLP
44 Exchange Street
Rochester, New York 14614
(716) 454-5370
Attorneys for Respondents
(800) 3 APPEAL + (800) 5 APPEAL » (800) BRIEF 21 : |
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Was the Second Circuit justified in upholding the
unanimous jury verdict which found that the petitioners violated
the Clean Water Act?
2. Was the Second Circuit’s characterization of the
petitioners’ cattle barn complex as a large concentrated animal
feeding operation consistent with the applicable statutory and
regulatory definitions?
3. Are point source discharges of agricultural pollutants
exempted from the Clean Water Act merely because they occur on
rainy days?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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Reasons for Denying the Writ ......cccccccccccccces 8
I. The Second Circuit was justified in upholding the
unanimous jury verdict which found that the
petitioners violated the Clean WaterAct. ....... 8
II. Southview Farm constitutes a concentrated animal
COOTRRRGUUTNEGR. ono vcccsincsacvioneesvane 14
III. A discharge is no less a point source discharge
because it occurs on arainy day. .............. 18
IV. The decision of the Second Circuit is consistent
with sound PUBEIC DOREY. ..ccccscccedccceuscs 22
COMING onc ce cocnnsstcunesecadeececsasuesasin 24
ili
Contents
Page
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases Cited:
Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp.
525 (W.D. La. 1979), aff’d in relevant part, 715 F.2d
es cede beeevencecneeess 13
Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055 (Sth Cir.
ee cee eben es eeneeseeces 15
Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview
Farm, No. CIV-91-60311L, slip op. at 4 (W.D. N.Y.
EE ccccdacabeecsnsecesseseses 2
Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm,
834 F. Supp. 1410 (W.D. N.Y. 1993) ...........6... 1,3
Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 505 __U.S.__, 112 S. Ct. 2638,
oo | 10,11, 20, 21
Farmegg Prods., Inc. v. Humboldt County, 190 N.W. 2d
ESS re 14
Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 640 F. Supp. 442 (N.D.
ee Ace cede ie end bneeateceoncss 1]
CUES CEN GAGS euda cats ¥eed edness vecccaces 12
iv
Contents
Page
Higbee v. Starr, 598 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Ark. 1984), aff’d
without op., 782 F.2d 1048 (8th Cir. 1985) .......... 15
In re N. Adirondack Farms, Inc., DEC Decl. Rul. 17-07
tf re re ee rere Cer igen a ee 20
Natural Resource Defense Council (“NRDC”) v. Costle,
SOS Fe Ra ae GR SOFT ic cacnvccncsckeensds 9,10
O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D.
Fis MONEE io 4h050 080605050818080004b RO 12
RAIL v. Diversified Sys., 804 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Tenn.
POD co 064 Ke oo e464 hae e eee ee ceaees ees 20
Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co.,620F.2d41 ......... 9,10, 12
Smith v. Lighting Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363 (2nd Cir.
SEE wecndds ovaned 0608s 9
United States v. Earth Science, Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir.
. , NE eee erm Rn MN mE ears Aenea ene ye 10
United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (N.D. Fla.
SGP) 5. 5scuns dundscdcvewe ene 13
United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods., 487 F.
Supp. 852.(E.D. Pa. 1960) ... 0 ccccccncccsccescas 11,12
United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610 (D.C. Va. 1983),
aff'd, 769 F.2d 182, rev’d on other grounds, 481 U.S.
412, 107S. Ct. 1831, 95 L. Ed. 2d 365 (1987) ....... 13
)
3
5
4
:
Vv
Contents
Page
United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945
EEE cise cee a Aes enseaeweeescoss 12
United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D. Fla.
Sk dh bh nehaeRKesekedanbenedesceseeeoens 13
Statutes Cited:
Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, §503 ..... 19
New York Environmental Conservation Law section 17-
OS ee ee 20
PE CREATEED nek weesnecesceseseceecesees 1
PD bob kann esses er oredancsauseees 19
eS So fg: Perr eTeT yer TTT rere 1,2,6,9, 10, 13, 14
EL BEV COUT TT TeCEL TET ETTE EET EE Tee 2
Other Authorities Cited:
UNDE EBESS 656 cbaee cons dasrcesenaces 16
I SIRE peace cas db ceccdsccessusacs 20
WE THOME RPIOD cccdccccdceessecsesccsvees 20
Gh PU: BUMULABIO) ccccccccosevesvcccsccvcse 16
vi
Contents
Page
58 Fed. Reg. 7616(1993) .......cceeceeceeceeceeces 15
58 Fed. Reg. 7627 (1993) ......cccccccccceccesceeee 17
58 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1993) .....cccccccccccccccsceess 17
58 Fed. Reg. 7631 (1993) ....cccscccccccccccccccess 17
58 Fed. Reg. 7632 (1993) ....cccccccccscccccccccess 14,17
40 C.E.R. § 122.23 (1994) ..cccccccccescccccsececes 6
40 C.FR. § 122.23(b)(1) (1993) ...... cc ccecceecenees 14, 16
40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1)(i) (1993)... 2... ee eee eee eee 16
40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1)(ii) (1993) 2.2... ee eee eee eee 16
40 C.F.R. § 122.23(B)(a)(1) (1993) «2.6... ee eee eee eee ut
40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(13) (1994) .. 0... cece e eee eee 20
40 C.ER. § 125.4(h) (1973) ....cccccccceccccccccces 19
40 C.F.R. § 412.11-412.13 (1994) ........ eee eee eee 21
George A. Gould, Agriculture, Non-Point Source Pollution
and Federal Law, 23 U.S.C. at Davis L. Rev., 461
a a ee ae ee a ee ee
lee 6 ih that ngoe,
vii
Contents
Page
Larry C. Frarey and Staci J. Pratt, Environmental
Regulation of Livestock Production Operations, Nat.
Resources and Env’t (A.B.A. Nat. Resources, Energy
and Envtl. L. Sec.), Winter 1995 ..........cccceees 23
Neil D. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future: Six Philosophical
Issues Shaping Agricultural Law, 72 Neb. L. Rev.
ee ci ee aweebens 22
Stuart D. Klausner, Managing the Land Application and
Animal Manures: Agronomic Considerations, Dairy
Manure Mgmt. (Ne. Regional Agric. Engineering Serv.,
syracuse, N.Y.), Feb. 22-24, 1989 ... 0. ccc ccc cee 23
William P. Browne, et al., Sacred Cows and Hot Potatoes:
Agrarian Myths in Agricultural Policy(1992) ....... 23,24
Office of Water, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Nat’l Water
Quality Inventory: 1992 Rep. to Congress 9-13 (1994)
EE re 22
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Perceptions About EPA’s Actions
in the Southview Farm Case 1 (Dec. 12, 1994) ....... 16
H.R. 961, 104th Congress, Ist Sess. (1995) ............ 24
25 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2124 (March3, 1995) ........... 24
1
This brief is respectfully submitted on behalf of the
respondents, Concerned Area Residents for the Environment
(“CARE”),' in opposition to the petition for writ of certiorari
seeking review of the Second Circuit’s opinion.
OPINIONS BELOW
This case was brought in the United States District Court for
the Western District of New York pursuant to the Clean Water Act
of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (“CWA”). A motion for
summary judgment brought on behalf of the petitioners,
Southview Farm (“Southview”) and Richard H. Popp (“Popp”)
was denied in April of 1993. Concerned Area Residents for the
Env't v. Southview Farm, 834 F. Supp. 1410 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
Following a unanimous jury verdict in Respondents’ favor on
five CWA violations and the state law trespass claim, the district
court granted judgment as a matter of law on the five CWA
violations but left intact the verdict on the trespass cause of
action. (Pet. App. at 23a.) On September 2, 1994, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, upholding the jury’s verdict,
unanimously reversed the district court.
STATUTE INVOLVED
The statutory provision at issue in this case is 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Procedural History
On May 9, 1990, the respondents gave notice of their
1. The full listing of individual respondents is included in the “parties”
section of the petition for certiorari.
2
intention to sue pursuant to the CWA citizen’s suit provision, 33
U.S.C. § 1365. The original complaint was filed on January 22,
1991. The complaint set forth a single cause of action under the
CWA and included several state law claims. Before an answer
was interposed, Petitioners moved to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action. Prior to a ruling on the motion, an amended
complaint was served. The amended complaint became the
operative pleading in the lawsuit.
On August 29, 1991, the district court denied Petitioners’
motion to dismiss in its entirety. Rejecting the petitioners’
argument that the respondents had not alleged a discharge from a
point source, the court noted:
After reviewing the complaint and the
relevant case law, I find that plaintiffs have
sufficiently alleged a point source discharge
to withstand a motion to dismiss. The courts
have not interpreted “point source” as
narrowly as defendants suggest; indeed,
several courts have stressed that the term
should be construed broadly.
CARE v. Southview Farm, No. CIV-91-6031L, slip op. at 4
(W.D.N.Y. filed August 29, 1991).
Petitioners moved for summary judgment upon completion
of discovery, arguing that no point source discharges could be
established to substantiate the CWA claims. Petitioners also
argued that several of the discharges identified in the amended
complaint were exempt agricultural stormwater discharges. See
generally, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
On April 7, 1993, the district court denied Petitioners’
motion for summary judgment. 834 F. Supp. 1410. Again
3
endorsing a broad “point source” interpretation, the court ruled as
follows:
In the case at bar, plaintiffs have presented
photographs and both lay and expert
testimony tending to show that Southview
Farm contains both natural and manmade
streams and ditches which, if plaintiffs’
allegations are true, can and have conveyed
pollutants from defendants’ manure
spreading activity into navigable waters.
834 F. Supp. at 1419. The court rejected the petitioners’ argument
that certain of the alleged discharges could be considered
agricultural stormwater discharges as a matter of law. The court
noted:
Defendants rely in part on their assertion that
the pollutants, if any, migrate because of
rainwater run-off. However, the fact that
some of the alleged discharges may have
resulted from rainwater run-off does not
necessarily mean that the discharge did not
Originate from a _ point source.
Notwithstanding that it may result from such
natural phenomenon as rainfall and gravity,
the surface run-off of contaminated waters,
once channeled or collected, constitutes
discharge by point source.
834 F. Supp. at 1418.
Neen gis eC A
A supplemental complaint was thereafter served identifying
additional point source discharges which had occurred since the
filing of the amended complaint. The case was tried before an
4
eight-person jury from April 26, 1993 to May 17, 1993.
Following the district court’s charge to the jury, the written
instructions were furnished to the jury to consult during
deliberations.
The jury deliberated for nearly two days and returned a
unanimous verdict in favor of the respondents on five of the
eleven Clean Water Act claims submitted for consideration. The
jury found in favor of the petitioners on Respondents’ nuisance
and negligence claims. but returned a verdict in favor of the
respondents on the trespass claim, awarding a total of $4,101 in
damages. The jury determined that the CWA had been violated by
the petitioners on July 12, 1989, July 13, 1989, August 22, 1989,
September 26, 1990 and April 15, 1991. The 1989 discharges all
occurred at one location within Southview, namely, the Wyant
Farm, Field 104 while the 1990 and 1991 discharges occurred on
two adjacent fields near the property of one of Southview’s
neighbors.
The petitioners next moved for judgment as a matter of law.
On October 19, 1993, a decision, order and judgment was issued
by the district court, setting aside the jury’s verdict on the Clean
Water Act violations and sustaining the verdict with respect to the
trespass claim. (Pet. App. at 23a-57a.) With respect to the CWA
violations of July 12, 1989 and August 22, 1989, the district court
concluded that insufficient evidence was presented to support the
jury’s verdict. Regarding the violations of September 26, 1990
and April 15, 1990, the district court found, as a matter of law, that
the discharges qualified as agricultural stormwater discharges
and, therefore, were exempt from the CWA. The district court
held that the discharge occurring on July 13, 1989 was not from a
point source as contemplated by the CWA.
Respondents appealed the judgment as a matter of law to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On
September 2, 1994, the Second Circuit unanimously reversed the
pO APR 9
5
district court and upheld the jury’s verdict on the CWA violations
(Pet. App. at la.)
With respect to the 1989 violations from Field 104, the
Second Circuit rejected the district court’s opinion that the liquid
manure exiting the field on those days reached navigable waters
“in too diffuse a manner to create a point source discharge.” (Pet.
App. at 8a.) Instead, the Second Circuit concluded that the jury
had a reasonable basis to conclude that the improved swale at the
edge of Field 104, coupled with the drainage pipe under the
stonewall leading into the ditch that leads into the Genesee River
tributary was “in and of itself a point source.” (Pet. App. at 9a.)
Alternatively, the Second Circuit accepted the respondents’
argument that the manure spreading vehicles themselves were
point sources, and rejected the district court’s opinion that “the
connection between defendants’ activity and the alleged
discharge was too far removed to consider the tractors or
spreaders as point sources.” (Pet. App. at 47a.) The Second
Circuit also overturned the district court’s holding that the proof
of the July 12, 1989 and August 22, 1989 discharges was too
circumstantial to support the jury’s verdict. (Pet. App. at 12a-
13a.)
With respect to the September 26, 1990 and April 15, 1991
violations, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court’s
conclusion that the discharges were exempt from the CWA
because they constituted agricultural stormwater discharges.
According to the Second Circuit, “the real issue is not whether the
discharges occurred during rainfall or were mixed with rainwater
run-off, but rather, whether the discharges were the result of
precipitation.” (Pet. App. at 14a.) The Second Circuit concluded
that the jury was entitled to find that the discharges on those two
dates were caused by over-saturation of the fields with liquid
manure rather than the rain, and also that sufficient quantities of
liquid manure were present so that the discharges would not
qualify as “stormwater.” (Pet. App. at 14a-15a.)
6
The Second Circuit also determined as a matter of law that
Southview constitutes a concentrated animal feeding operation
(“CAFO”) which is, by definition, a point source under the Clean
Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). See also, 40 C.F.R. § 122.23
(1994). Reviewing the uncontroverted evidence presented at trial
relative to the size of Southview’s dairy herd and the manner in
which the herd is confined, the Second Circuit concluded iat
Southview is a large CAFO and, as a result, each discharge of
manure into the navigable waters of the United States constituted
a point source discharge in violation of the CWA. For this
additional reason, the Second Circuit sustained the jury’s verdict.
The district court had denied Respondents’ request to charge the
jury that Southview was a CAFO.
B. Factual Background
Petitioner Southview Farm is one of the largest dairy farms
in the State of New York. The farm employs 28 full-time and nine
part-time employees. As of August, 1992, Southview owned
1,100 acres of land and had a cattle population of 1,290 milking
cows with over 900 head of young cattle, for a total of 2,200 dairy
animals.
Southview’s cows are not pastured; they remain in the barns
and are moved only for milking three times per day. The milking
parlor is washed down and the milking machines are flushed after
every milking with a chlorine cleanser and rinsed with a
phosphoric acid solution. The resulting washwater is then
pumped into a 2,000-gallon storage tank. The solution in the tank
is subsequently used to wash the milkhouse floor. In the last step,
the waste wash solution flows down an incline into one of five
manure storage lagoons located on the farm.
The largest of Southview’s manure storage lagoons covers
four acres and has acapacity of approximately six to eight million
tele Sense S27,
7
gallons of liquid cow manure and process wastes. In conjunction
with the large lagoon, Southview installed a separator which
pumps the cow manure over a mechanical device that drains off
the liquid and passes the solids out through a compressing
process. The solids that remain are dropped into bins for transport
while the liquid is transported by gravity to the large manure
storage lagoon.
Southview uses various technologies to apply the liquid cow
manure (which includes the farm’s chemical process waste) to its
fields. One of the devices is a center pivot irrigation system. The
center pivot irrigator is connected by a series of pipes to the liquid
manure storage lagoon and is self-propelled. Southview also uses
a “hard hose traveler,” essentially, a long piece of plastic tubing
on a large reel. The tubing is unwound from the reel and has a gun
on the end which can propel liquid manure 150 feet into any
direction, making a 300-foot wide swath for purposes of
depositing the wastes on the fields.
Since 1988, Southview has had in place a piping system. The
system pipes liquid manure from the storage lagoon to various
locations across the Southview property without the use of
vehicles. Southview’s piping system extends underneath both
state and town highways to nearby properties owned by the
petitioners.
In addition to the above, Southview also uses manure
spreading equipment, including spreaders pulled by tractors and
other self-propelled vehicles. The vehicles are generally used to
spread manure from the smaller lagoons which did not receive
liquid manure from the separation system. In all, Southview’s
manure spreading records reflect the application of millions of
gallons of manure to its fields.
8
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
The petitioners have failed to satisfy criteria traditionally
applied by the Court in determining whether to grant a writ of
certiorari. The Second Circuit, in a manner consistent with other
circuit courts, correctly interpreted and applied the applicable
provisions of the Clean Water Act and the corresponding
regulations. In an attempt to obtain review here, the petitioners
have mischaracterized the holding of the court below and, with
little or no foundation, have exaggerated the impact the decision
will have on agricultural enterprises.
I.
THE SECOND CIRCUIT WAS JUSTIFIED IN
UPHOLDING THE UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICT
WHICH FOUND THAT THE PETITIONERS VIOLATED
THE CLEAN WATER ACT.
The central question in this case is whether each of the
discharges of liquid manure into the navigable waters of the
United States — established to the jury’s satisfaction — came
from a “point source.” “Point source” is defined in the CWA as:
Any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance, including, but not limited to, any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well,
discrete fissure, rolling stock, concentrated
animal feeding operation, vessel or other
floating craft, or landfill leachate collection
system from which pollutants are or may be
discharged. This term does not include
agricultural stormwater discharges and return
flows from irrigated agriculture.
9
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). This definition was incorporated in the
jury instructions read at the conclusion of the case and furnished
to the jurors to consult during their deliberations. Petitioners’
zeal to portray the Second Circuit’s decision as renegade judicial
lawmaking has led them to repeatedly sidestep the fact that the
Second Circuit simply upheld the unanimous verdict of an eight-
person jury. If consideration of Southview’s petition starts, as it
should, with the premise that the jury, after weighing the
evidence, concluded that the discharges in question were from
point sources, then the petitioners’ argument loses its vitality.” So
long as proper deference is paid to the jury’s verdict, the
petitioners’ argument that the Second Circuit ignored the
pertinent law lacks merit.
The flaw in the petitioners’ analysis is that they proceed on
the assumption that agricultural discharges and point source
discharges are mutually exclusive terms. They are not. While it
may be true that most agricultural discharges are nonpoint source
in nature, there is nothing in the Clean Water Act nor any of the
regulations promulgated thereunder which supports the general
proposition that all agricultural discharges are nonpoint source in
nature. Petitioners have cited no authority for such a proposition.
Furthermore, a careful reading of the Clean Water Act militates
against such an interpretation. While Congress intended to
exempt nonpoint pollution, there is no general exemption for
agricultural activities in the Clean Water Act. Thus, “EPA has
been held to be precluded from exempting from the act ...
agricultural and silvicultural activities.” Sierra Club v. Alston
Constr. Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 41, 44 (Sth Cir. 1980), citing Natural
2. Petitioners appear to have overlooked this point when they complain
that the Second Circuit, in reinstating the jury verdict, “impermissibly
substituted its own unsubstantiated factfinding for the findings of the district
court...” (Pet. atn.7.) Of course, it was the district court which impermissibly
substituted its judgment for that of the jury. See Smith v. Lighting Bolt Prods.,
Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 367 (2nd Cir. 1988).
10
Resource Defense Council (“NRDC”) v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369,
1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
In NRDC v. Costle, the D.C. Circuit set aside EPA’s attempt
to grant an across-the-board exemption for all “discharges of
pollutants from agricultural and silvicultural activities ...
including run-off from cultivated crops, [and] pastures” from the
requirement for NPDES permits. 568 F.2d at 1372 n.5. The courts
have been unable to discern any intention on the part of Congress
to provide a blanket exemption for agricultural activities.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the 1987 Clean Water Act
amendments which suggests that Congress sought, at that time, to
provide such a blanket amendment. As noted below, the only
effect of the 1987 amendment was to add a specific exemption for
“agricultural stormwater discharges” to the exemption which was
added earlier for “return flows for irrigated agriculture.” 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14), as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-4, tit. V, §
502(a.) The fact that Congress has elected on those two separate
occasions to incorporate specific agricultural exemptions in the
CWA definition of the term “point source,” suggests that
agricultural discharges which come under the general definition
but do not qualify for either exemption constitute point source
discharges within the reach of the CWA.
In the absence of any express exemption for agricultural
discharges, the jury was entitled to evaluate whether or not the
discharges at issue constituted point source discharges as defined
in the CWA. In upholding the jury’s conclusion that these
discharges were from a point source, the Second Circuit
recognized that the definition of a point source is to be broadly
interpreted. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1354 (2d
Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 505 U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 2638,
120 L. Ed. 2d 449 (1992); see also, Sierra Club v. Abston Constr.
Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45-46; United States v. Earth Science, Inc., 599
F.2d 368, 378 (10th Cir. 1979) (“The concept of a point source
PoE Se Se ARENA ed Oe NaF Rel a ee -
11
was designed to further this [regulatory] scheme by embracing
the broadest possible definition of any identifiable conveyance
from which pollutants might enter the waters of the United
States.”)
In light of the uniformly broad interpretation given the
definition of point source in the CWA, the Second Circuit did no
violence to the statutory scheme when it concluded that the
drainage ditch at the edge of Field 104 constituted a point source.
The petitioners’ description of the swale at the edge of Field 104
as a mere “depression” is misleading since it ignores the fact that
the drainage at this location had been improved with the
placement of a drainage tile pipe emptying into a drainage ditch
which, itself, empties into a tributary of the Genesee River. Since
the term “ditch” is included in the CWA definition of point
source, the petitioners should not be heard to claim that such a
conveyance was not within the contemplation of Congress.
The petitioners would have the Court limit point source
discharges to classic “end-of-the-pipe” discharges. The cases
demonstrate, however, that the term “point source” has been
given much broader sweep. For example, in Dague v. City of
Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, the emission of pollutants leaching
from a landfill into a railroad culvert was properly considered a
“point source.” In Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 640 F.
Supp. 442 (N.D. Pa. 1986), overflow from a lagoon through an
unchannelized area into a stream was considered a point source.
Furthermore, in United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods.,
487 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1980), the court found that an
indictment, which alleged that a spray irrigation system was a
point source, was legally sufficient:
Oxford has a spray irrigation system,
designed to spray wastewater onto fields in
quantities small enough to be absorbed by
12
those fields; none of the discharge should run-
off into the surface water. The discharges
forming the basis of the indictment resulted
from spraying an overabundance of
wastewater onto the surface of the irrigation
fields, which in turn ran-off into a nearby
stream through a break in the berm around
those fields.
487 F. Supp. at 844. Similarly, there is no requirement that the
point source discharge directly into navigable waters in order to
violate the CWA. In United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 438 F.
Supp. 945 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), discharges to the city sewers which
eventually emptied into the Mississippi River were considered a
point source. In O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp.
642 (E.D. Pa. 1980), a landfill which discharged through such
methods as “gullies, trenches and ditches” was found to be a
“point source,” even though it was not directly connected to the
waters of the United States. Likewise, in Friends of Sakonnet v.
Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623 (D.R.I. 1991), the point source included
the defendants’ septic system, which leached through a pipe
installed by the municipality.
Finally, there is no requirement that the conveyance which
qualifies as the point source be man-made. In Sierra Club v.
Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, the Fifth Circuit held: “nothing
in the Act relieves miners from liability simply because the
operators did not actually construct those conveyances, so long as
they are reasonably likely to be the means by which pollutants are
ultimately deposited into a navigable body of water.” 620 F.2d at
45. There is nothing in the Clean Water Act definition of point
source that exempts natural conveyances.
The Second Circuit was also acting in harmony with existing
precedent when it decided that the manure spreading vehicles
CP ee Re SS ee
Dey Ese
Dees |,
13
themselves constitute point sources. Section 1362(14) defines a
“point source” to include a “container” or “rolling stock” and the
cases have routinely found vehicles to be within the definition of
point source. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). See, e.g., United States v.
Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 622 (D.C. Va. 1983), aff’d, 769 F.2d 182,
rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412, 107 S. Ct. 1831, 95 L. Ed.
2d 365 (1987); United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 1337
(N.D. Fla. 1980); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Alexander,
473 F. Supp. 525, 532 (W.D. La. 1979), aff’d in relevant part, 715
F.2d 897 (Sth Cir. 1983); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp.
665, 668 (N.D. Fla. 1974). As noted above, the fact that the
manure spreading vehicles did not discharge directly into
navigable waters is irrelevant.’ Accordingly, the Second Circuit’s
decision to uphold the jury verdict is entirely consistent with
existing precedent and does not frustrate the congressional intent
behind the Clean Water Act. Agricultural point source discharges
can and do occur, and are increasing as farms like Southview
grow in size and intensity. (See Point IV, infra. )*
3. The petitioners, like the district court, appear to concede that the
manure spreading vehicles could be point sources so long as the connection
between the manure application and the discharge into the navigable waters
was sufficiently direct. Once again, since indirect point source discharges
violate the CWA, the temporal element cannot be the dispositive factor. In any
event, this point, at best, raises a fact question which the jury resolved against
Southview.
4. Not surprisingly, the petitioners make no mention of the incident
which occurred during July of 1992 when one of Southview’s liquid manure
pipelines ruptured and discharged thousands of gallons of manure into nearby
ponds, wetlands and a stream which eventually led to the Genesee River in
Letchworth State Park. Extensive fish kills from nearby ponds were reported
and discolored water and mounds of manure-laden foam were visible for weeks
from various scenic overlooks in the state park. Contrary to the description
contained in the petition (Pet. at 12), Southview is far from a conventional
farm.
14
II.
SOUTHVIEW FARM CONSTITUTES A CONCEN-
TRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATION.
Although Southview’s general position that most
agricultural pollution is nonpoint source in origin is accepted,
there is no avoiding the reciprocal truth: some agricultural
pollution is from point sources. CAFOs are one such point
source, a source deemed so important by Congress that they were
enumerated as a point source class within the CWA. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14) (“point source” includes “any discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any ...
concentrated animal feeding operation”). When the CAFO
definition is evaluated, it is apparent that Southview is indeed
within the class.
Animal feeding operation (“AFO”) is defined by regulation
as “a lot or facility” where animals “have been, are, or will be
stabled or confined and fed or maintained for a total of 45 days or
more in any 12-month period,” and “[c]rops, vegetative forage
growth, or post-harvest residues are not sustained in the normal
growing season over any portion of the lot or facility.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.23(b)(1) (1993). A dairy farm AFO becomes a regulated
large CAFO when it houses more than 700 mature dairy cattle.
Id., app. B (a)(1) (1993). There is a zero-discharge standard for
large CAFOs. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23, app. B (a)(1); 58 Fed. Reg.
7632 (1993).
Southview’s strained argument that it is not a CAFO because
it has adjacent lands* which bear vegetation during portions of the
5. The reference in Southview’s petition to Farmegg Prods., Inc. v.
Humboldt County, 190 N.W. 2d 454 (Iowa 1971), defining appropriate
characteristics of “industrial” agricultural operations begs the question before
the Court. Congress and the EPA have defined “industrial” agricultural
(Cont'd)
. hs
=
a
Ff
°
=
15
growing year is nonsensical.° If the petitioners’ argument to this
Court is accepted, the presence of any vegetated areas adjacent to
a large CAFO would lift it from the regulated industrial cattle
arena. Clearly, Congress’ intent was not to exclude concentrated
animal feeding operations from regulation simply because they
exist in a rural setting and the operators happen to own and use
vegetated, adjacent lands. The presence and use of adjacent fields
have not prevented other federal circuits from finding a facility to
be a CAFO. See Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055 (Sth
Cir. 1991) (Facility was CAFO despite use of waste manure on
adjacent crop fields for irrigation and fertilization; and as noted in
an earlier opinion in the same case: “the fields produce alfalfa,
rye and other grains for cattle feed.” 924 F.2d 558, 559); Higbee v.
Starr, 598 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Ark. 1984), aff’d without op., 782
F.2d 1048 (8th Cir. 1985) (hog houses were a CAFO although
collected wastes were spread on adjacent fields). The Second
(Cont’d)
operations as CAFOs. Simply because Southview views its high-tech waste-
handling operations and its 2,000-head herd of cattle in a pastoral light does not
mean that it should be exempt from the CAFO classification drafted by
Congress, defined by the EPA, and accepted by Congress for nearly 20 years. In
fact, Petitioner distorts the true state of affairs by claiming that “few dairy
farms today rely on pasturage to feed their mature lifestock.” (Pet. at 22.)
According to the 1987 Census of Agriculture, only 780 dairy farms nationally
qualify as large CAFOs.
6. Note that confined in pasture operations (CIPOs) are distinguished
from CAFOs by the EPA. The definition of CAFOs explicitly excludes
operations which confine animals in an outdoor, vegetated environment, and
distinguishes large CIPOs from large CAFOs, since CAFOs undoubtedly have
more severe waste management difficulties. See generally, 58 Fed. Reg. 7616
(1993) (exempting CIPOs from CAFO permitting requirements). Petitioners
distort the holding of the Second Circuit by claiming it requires a dairy farm to
grow crops inside its barns to avoid being classified as a CAFO. (Pet. at 13.) On
the contrary, if a dairy farm pastures its cows as farmers have done through the
ages, it will not qualify as a CAFO.
16
Circuit’s ruling on the CAFO issue is supported by statutory and
regulatory construction and was advanced by the EPA in its
amicus brief.
The fact that Southview grows crops on adjacent fields is of
no legal significance, since the animals were not pastured on
those fields. Any other interpretation of the regulation would be
contrary to the intent of Congress and the EPA since most CAFOs
do grow some crops. “EPA presumes that most, if not all, feedlots
have some vegetation nearby.” U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Perceptions About EPA's Actions in the Southview Farm Case |
(Dec. 12, 1994).
The regulatory history of the “vegetation criterion” is
telling. When originally proposed, the AFO definition
encompassed a “a lot or facility” in which “crops, vegetation or
forage growth are not sustained in the area of confinement.” 40
C.FR. § 125.51(a)(1) (proposed), 40 Fed. Reg. 54185 (1975).
However, in responding to subsequent comments questioning
whether growth of vegetation in only part of the confined area
disqualified a facility from being an AFO, the regulation was
changed to make a “clarification” stating “that only confined
areas which lack vegetation, crops, etc. in every part or portion of
the lot or facility are included.” 41 Fed. Reg. 11458 (1976).
While the new version did substitute “lot or facility” for
“confined area” in the vegetation criterion, that was due to the
fact that EPA used the term “confined area” interchangeably with
“Jot or facility.” The agency never indicated any intent to change
the locus of inquiry from the confined area to all of the feedlot
owner’s property. Thus, the phrase “lot or facility,” found in both
40 C.F.R. §§ 122.23(b)(1) and 122.23(b)(1)(ii) (1993), refers to
the same location — the area where the animals are “confined,”
40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1)(i), and not some larger area.
Te MT) ete Fe
ht Nig tN Ok Sy A
i Sad Boia ES”
17
The presence of adjacent fields does nothing to mitigate the
monumental animal waste production going on within the
confined animal area itself. As the Second Circuit noted, there is a
two-fold rationale for the exemption in the CAFO definition for
vegetated confinement facilities: (1) the fact that vegetation can
be sustained in the area in which the animals are confined
suggests a lower density of animals; and (2) the vegetation helps
to absorb and reduce the amount of pollution. (Pet. App. at 19a.)
CAFO permitting requirements reflect this reality. 58 Fed. Reg.
7631 (dealing with wastewater removal and land application
relative to CAFOs).
Land disposal of waste like that engaged in by Southview
has been addressed by the EPA. The EPA established a general
CAFO permit for its Region 6 (Louisiana, New Mexico,
Oklahoma and Texas). Under this general CAFO permit, waste
handling, treatment, and management must not create
environmental or public health hazard of any kind. Specifically,
the wastes must be disposed of in a manner such as to prevent
them from being discharged to waters of the United States. 58
Fed. Reg. 7627, 7629. Discharge of waste from the application
site is prohibited.’ 58 Fed. Reg. 7632. Thus, EPA has already
addressed operations like Southview’s without crippling
agriculture, as Petitioners have warned.
Once it has been established that a dairy operation
constitutes a large CAFO, the only issue which remains is
whether there has been a discharge into navigable waters. Since
even the petitioners cannot dispute that there were discharges into
navigable waters on the five dates in question, the CAFO
requirements have been satisfied.
7. Note that, under this permit, large CAFOs may apply animal wastes to
fields in amounts exceeding nutrient uptakes only if the sites are isolated from
surface waters and no potential exists for run-off to reach a water of the United
States. 58 Fed. Reg. 7632. There was no judicial challenge to EPA’s Region 6
permit.
18
Il.
A DISCHARGE IS NO LESS A POINT SOURCE
DISCHARGE BECAUSE IT OCCURS ON A RAINY DAY.
Petitioners’ basic proposition with regard to the
“agricultural stormwater discharge” exception is that as long as it
rains, an agricultural enterprise can pollute the nation’s waters at
will. In contrast, the Second Circuit reasoned that “the real issue
is not whether the discharges occurred during rainfall or were
mixed with rainwater run-off, but rather, whether the discharges
were the result of precipitation.” (Pet. App. at 14a.) Thus, “while
the statute does include an exception for ‘agricultural stormwater
discharged,’ there can be no escape from liability for agricultural
pollution simply because it occurs on rainy days.” (Pet. App. at
13a.)
The Second Circuit’s holding is consistent with the district
court’s charge to the jury. The charge stated that the exemption
pertains to discharges caused “primarily” by “ordinary, natural”
runoff of precipitation:
Point source does not include agricultural
storm water discharges. Storm water means
storm water run-off or snow melt run-off or
surface water run-off and draining. The
ordinary, natural run-off of rain water, that is
the flow of excess precipitation, is not a point
source. ... Disparate, random, naturally
induced run-off of pollutants, whatever kind,
caused primarily by rainfall or other natural
precipitation around activities that employ or
cause pollutants is not a point source
discharge...
serves initt ma slain tell
42a MAES Sar we
Rib at tidtided ina Mad Rati ene Mae Sedans o
19
(Tr., vol. v, at 2118-2119.) Thus, Petitioners’ attack not only
second-guesses the jury’s evaluation of the credibility of the
evidence presented, but also challenges both lower courts’
interpretation of the applicable law.*®
The Second Circuit’s interpretation is consistent with the
relevant legislative and regulatory history. The exemption was
added by the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 503,
at the same time that “Congress mandated comprehensive
regulation of certain forms of industrial and municipal
stormwater run-off under Clean Water Act § 402(p), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(p). (Pet. App. at 13a.) Given the enactment of the new
stormwater permit program, however, Congress (especially
members from agricultural states) wanted to avoid any
possibility of bringing run-off caused by stormwater from farms
under the new program. Therefore, as the Second Circuit noted:
“one can infer that Congress wanted to make it clear that
agriculture was not included in this new program.” (Pet. App. at
13a.)
It is evident that Congress intended to preserve the status
quo, which had existed during the fifteen years between
enactment of the Clean Water Act in 1972 and enactment of the
exception, pursuant to which “agricultural stormwater runoff was
always considered nonpoint pollution exempt from the Act.”
(Pet. App. at 13a.) See, e.g., 40 C.FR. § 125.4(h) (1973)
(exception for run-off from cultivated crops).
Early on, EPA recognized that the test for determining if a
8. When setting aide the jury verdict, Judge Larimer found it necessary
to rule that the manure “would have remained on [petitioners’ } land had it not
been for a heavy rain.” (Pet. App. at 352.). Thus, he adhered to his prior ruling
that the primary cause of the discharge was the relevant area of inquiry. The
problem was that he substituted his own findings of fact for the reasonable
findings of the jury.
20
stormwater discharge occurred is whether the discharge was
“caused or initiated solely by natural processes such as
precipitation,” so that “[t]he intent of the regulations is to exclude
from the NPDES permit program all natural runoff from
agricultural land which results from precipitation events.” 41
Fed. Reg. 7963, 7964 (1976).
Although EPA regulai:ons do not define “agricultural
stormwater discharge,” regulations promulgated on November
16, 1990 to implement the 1987 industrial/municipal stormwater
regulatory program defined the general term “storm water” as
“storm water runoff, snow melt runoff, and surface runoff and
drainage.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b) (13) (1994). No reported
judicial decision could be found interpreting the meaning of
“asricultural stormwater,” yet the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation has ruled that in order for the
identical exception under New York Environmental
Conservation Law section 17-0105(6) to apply, “the waste water
being discharged must result from precipitation which runs off
the crop field.” In re N. Adirondack Farms, Inc., DEC Decl. Rul.
17-07 at 6 (1992).
Thus, for the discharges in question, the issue was not
whether they occurred during rainfall, or whether the discharge
was mixed with rainwater run-off,’ but whether the discharge was
9. Petitioners make much of the Second Circuit’s statement, with regard
to the September 26, 1990 discharge, that the jury could have properly found
that “sufficient quantities of manure were present so that the run-off could not
be classified as ‘stormwater.’ ” (Pet. App. at 15a.) The reference to “sufficient
quantities” is taken out of context, and was merely an acceptance of
Respondents’ alternative argument that even if the discharge was caused by
precipitation, it would not qualify for the exemption if it is so polluted that it
cannot be considered “stormwater.” See, e.g., RAIL v. Diversified Systems, 804
F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (E.D. Tenn. 1992) (run-off contaminated by leachate was
not stormwater); Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991),
(Cont’d)
‘3
Fd
“ oe .
BEC EAR MR RG id | RE bile
21
the result of precipitation. Otherwise, farmers would be free to
dispose of excess waste in conjunction with meteorological
forecasts of precipitation, and the months of March and April
would be open season for discharges due to snow melt run-off.
Petitioners’ position would lead to the absurd result that a farmer
could dispose of his waste by mixing it with a few drops of
rainwater. While there is a line to be drawn somewhere, it was up
to the jury and not the trial judge to draw it. As the Second Circuit
recognized, “all discharges eventually mix the precipitation run-
off in ditches or streams or the navigable water so the fact that the
discharge might have mixed with runoff cannot be
determinative.” (Pet. App. at 14a.)
Accordingly, since the jury had a reasonable basis to find
that the discharges on September 26, 1990 and April 15, 1991
“were not the result of rain, but simply occurred on days when it
rained,” the Second Circuit properly upheld their verdict. (Pet.
App. at 14a.)
(Cont'd) :
rev'd on other grounds, 505 U.S.__, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 120 L. Ed. 24. 449 (1992)
(leachate generated by percolation of precipitation required NPDES permit).
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit also accepted the respondents’ main
contentions that “the jury could properly find that the run-off was primarily
caused by the over-saturation of fields,” and “could have found a discharge
unaffected by rain.” (Pet. App. at 15a.) Therefore, the question of “sufficient
quantities” is in no way a necessary component of the decision. Also note that,
because the discharges included “process waste water” (including waste
chemicals), 40 C.F.R. § 412.11-412.13 (1994), it was not stormwater.
22
IV.
THE DECISION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT IS
CONSISTENT WITH SOUND PUBLIC POLICY.
As noted above, the Second Circuit decision conforms to
existing precedent and represents a reasoned application of
current agricultural policy as expressed in the Clean Water Act
and its accompanying regulations. It is inconsistent with sound
public policy to place intensive, technologically-oriented dairy
farms like Southview with their potential for massive discharges
of manure beyond the purview of the Clean Water Act.
“American agriculture is changing rapidly — becoming
more concentrated, more technically advanced and more
integrated with the input and marketing sectors. “In other words,
American agriculture is rapidly becoming industrialized.” Neil
D. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future: Six Philosophical Issues
Shaping Agricultural Law, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 210, 213 (1993).
Accordingly, agriculture, like any other industry, should be
required to internalize its fair share of the cost of cleaner water.
George A. Gould, Agriculture, Non-Point Source Pollution and
Federal Law, 23 U.S.C. at Davis L. Rev., 461, 488 (1990). It is
both unrealistic and unfair for the petitioners to expect that the
public should bear the costs of water quality impairment caused
by their own improper manure management practices. Instead, it
is appropriate to require that the petitioners and their counterparts
in the agricultural community ameliorate the environmental
impacts of their increasingly industrialized operations.
Recent studies indicate that agriculture is, far and away, the
leading source of water quality impairment of this country’s lakes
and rivers. Office of Water, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Nat’l Water
Quality Inventory: 1992 Rep. to Congress 9-13 (1994). Virtually
every region of the country has experienced water quality
ALS a Sate, nokwets Se a -
23
problems resulting from livestock waste. Larry C. Frarey and
Staci J. Pratt, Environmental Regulation of Livestock Production
Operations, Nat. Resources and Env’t (A.B.A. Nat. Resources,
Energy and Envtl. L. Sec.), Winter 1995, at 8. Even the
agronomist used at trial as an expert witness on behalf of the
petitioners has written that careless manure management
practices pose serious environmental hazards:
Excessive rates of manure will over-supply
nutrients that may affect plant growth and
animal nutrition. Excessive rates of
application as well as accumulations of
manure around barn lots will eventually
cause water pollution. Preventing such
problems calls for a combination of
appropriate soil and water conservation
practices and proper management of the rate,
timing and method of manure application. In
extreme cases, additional land must be used
to lower the application rate.
Stuart D. Klausner, Managing the Land Application and Animal
Manures: Agronomic Considerations, Dairy Manure Mgmt. (Ne.
Regional Agric. Engineering Serv., Syracuse, N.Y.), Feb. 22-24,
1989 at 79, 86. The Second Circuit’s decision is simply a
reflection of a statutory and regulatory framework designed to
address, in part, the serious and widespread environmental risks
posed by large industrialized dairy farming and other livestock
enterprises. In essence, Southview Farm is more like an industrial
enterprise than an old-fashioned family farm. The Court,
therefore, should view with a jaundiced eye Petitioners’ attempts
to invoke protections more properly aimed at traditional
agriculture. See, Neil D. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future: Six
Philosophical Issues Shaping Agricultural Law, 72 Neb. L. Rev.
at 215-216. See, generally, William P. Browne, et al., Sacred
24
Cows and Hot Potatoes: Agrarian Myths in Agricultural Policy
(1992).
Ultimately, if the petitioners seek to overrule the Second
Circuit’s determination in this case, Congress is the proper
forum. Currently, Congress is considering a CWA rewrite bill
which, among other things, would modify the definition of point
source in the CWA to exclude all land applications of manure.
H.R. 961, 104th Congress, Ist Sess. (1995); see, 25 Env’t Rep.
(BNA) 2124 (March 3, 1995). If the prevailing policy, as
embodied in the CWA, is to be revised, Petitioners should direct
their efforts at Congress, not this Court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the respondents respectfully
request that the Court deny the petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
ALAN J. KNAUF DONALD W. O’BRIEN, JR.
KNAUF, CRAIG & DORAN, Counsel of Record
PC. WOODS, OVIATT,
183 East Main Street GILMAN, STURMAN &
Rochester, New York 14604 CLARKE, LLP
(716) 546-8430 44 Exchange Street
Rochester, New York 14614
(716) 454-5370
Attorneys jor Respondents
April 1995
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.