Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Salazar v. Whink Products Co.
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Supreme Court, U.8.
FILED
\\ 941228 JAN 1 35 1995
No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1994
SANDRA SALAZAR,
Petitioner,
WHINK PRODUCTS CO., an Iowa corporation,
Respondent.
Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Colorado Supreme Court
¢
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
F. JaMes DonneLLy, Esq.
Dyer DONNELLY & LILLEY
825 Logan Street
Denver, CO 80203-3114
(303) 861-3003
Attorney of Record
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the limited preemption provision contained in
the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §1261 et
seq. bars petitioner’s state common law tort claim.
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ...........
TABLS OF} All TPs ee s+ 60h eee a kee eeueeaeeas
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL
REPORTS OF OPINIONS DELIVERED IN THE
CASE 2k nn dccsassscckne sees Hane
CCC SCSECH4CCECHEREEHOROAHCHEBSO SOA ASRAAM 62 EO 2E ae 6.24 6 Oe ee es eS
PURE, BRIN 6 6 6s dns ble eae a ee
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC.............
SIATEMENT OF} TPR. CAG 6 5 xs cesicisusukesensnss
STAGE AT PROCEEDINGS FEDERAL QUESTIONS
WERE RARSE. . «+ <kin cugenis eae ees
ARGUMENT AMPLIFYING REASONS FOR WRIT..
A. BACKCsCAIING? FUG Bees ceeds euaweecavesses
B. LAW REGARDING BREADTH OF FEDERAL
PRRENGE CURIE 6 00 46a0 aca eee eee et
C. THE FEDERAL HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
WR Ri Oe te rs re ge eee
D. THE APPLICATION OF THE CIPOLLONE
CASE TO SALAZAR HEREIN IS PARTIC-
ULARES CPUS 305055 beaker hae aee eee eas
COIGCAARIIIN o05.0ks0000 seu ee eee,
10
APY DIUUses «vnc k0euk sateen see eee App. 1
ill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations
Board, 330 U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 91 L.Ed. 1234
5 orn r rr rrr Trt eet ete ol eee 7
Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579 (Colo.
| NSP TTT eer eet ee ee 18
Burke v. Dow Chemical Co., 797 F.Supp. 1128 (E.D.
Be PN iin vc itw ences vence sess cntevesssucees 15, 16
Chemical Specialties Manufacturers v. Allenby, 958
F.2d 942 (1992)... .. cc ccc cece cece cece cee reeeeees 17
Cipollone v. Liggett, __ U.S. __, 112 $.Ct. 2608, 120
L.B.2d 407 (1992)... 2.2... ccccerccccsecccees passim
Coutre v. Dow Chemical U.S.A., 804 F.Supp. 1298
(D. Mont. 1992) ........c cece cece cece renee eecees 15
CSX Transp. Inc. v. Easterwood, __ U.S. __ 113
S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993) ......---+-+-+5- 10
DeHaun v. Whink Products Company, 1994 WL
24322 (N.D. Ill. No. 91C0014).........-----+--- 20, 21
Duplin v. Whink Products Co., 1994 WL 197612
(Conn. Super. 1994)...... 0... e cece eee eee teen es 21
Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L.Ed.2d
OG TPM oon cc cece cece ccc ececceescccntteceneseees 7
Hawkinson v. A.H. Robbins Co. Inc., 595 F.Supp.
1290 (D. Colo. 1984)........ 6. cece eee eee teen eens 18
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laborato-
ries, 471 U.S. 707, 104 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714
CREE 06.0 5k Nua tbe Nees eee wer eae rer tae ss tees 7
Jenkins v. James B. Day & Company, 634 N.E.2d 998
or erry ee re re errr e ee apy 12
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 97 S.Ct.
i we ee Rs ere eer eer er ree 6
Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 837 P.2d 1273
so ot vor o's 5G Wd eS Re ee os 17
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 101 S.Ct. 2114,
Gide DO SEI 84455 Cav eee canceehie veers 8
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4
ee 2S Perr err recere rT re er rere 6
Moss v. Parks Corporation, 985 F.2d 736 (4th Cir.
Ee a ree PP ees Senne 12, 20, 21
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conserva-
tion and Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 103
SN. TEES, Fo Ce Fak EAN 8S ce scceres Gas cee 7
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 104
SC. GES, 7B Lute ae OES Coons ccd ctigcnsccess. 7
Tafoya v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 884 F.2d 1330 (10th
ee Pere ere ere ee ere Perr ere 18
Toy Mfrs. of America, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 806 F.Supp.
Dae Te GP BOD 6a 50% cbc eee ecsaeeeeose es sca’ 17
Union Ins. Co. v. RCA, 724 P.2d 89 (Colo.App.
ROR nnn 4 40ky 4 des chad cue dae a deeanes tae eeae er Gl 18
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Uptain v. Huntington Labs, 723 P.2d 1322 (Colo.
i.) ern rrr rrr ee ete 14
Wisconsin Public Intervenors v. Mortier, 501 U.S.
597, 111 S.Ct. 2476, 115 L.Ed.2d 532 i) ee 7
AUTHORITIES
Article VI, Clause 2, United States Constitution. . . 2, 6, 22
CRD VED oo kd ik cos von eewne ase Cee ene Ceres 18
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
(1965) 15 U.S.C. §1340...... 6. eee eee eee eens 8, 9
Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 USC.
GUIGL na ons cc ccanscdnnacddecneseg sd ye eee erre® passim
Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 oe. ae
Se: Preeti rere tr fe. 2: 44 33 Uh, Se
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) 7 U.S.C. §136 et seq. ..------+++eeeee: 15
Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C.
ey RON errie cree re tee 10
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, H.R. Rep. No. 861, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. 2
(1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News, 2833......--cecceeeee cee eeereeseees 10
H.R. Rep. No. 2166, 89th Cong.2d Sess. 6,
reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News, 4095 at 4097. .......-. ccc cece reece cere eens 11
Ohio Code, Section R.C. 2307.76(A)(1)....-----+-- 13, 14
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued
Page
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act (1969), 15
es Ses 65 6H KA nas Cad aoa 1450S EE 9
Restatement (2nd) of Torts §402A................... 14
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
a OR PS 66 vc cievccseiddedsti sees 8
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL
REPORTS OF OPINIONS DELIVERED IN THE CASE.
1. Trial court’s opinion upon defendant's
motion for summary judgment (Appendix
E)
2. Colorado Court of Appeals decision found
at Salazar v. Whink Products Co., 881 P.2d 431
(Colo.App. 1994) (Appendix C)
a Y *
GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION IS SOUGHT
Jurisdiction is sought for review by this court in
that the Colorado Supreme Court has decided
an important question of federal law which has
not, but should be, settled by this court.
Judgment was entered by the trial court on Sep-
tember 14, 1992.
The Colorado Court of Appeals decision was
issued April 7, 1994.
The Petition for Rehearing was denied by the
Colorado Court of Appeals on June 27, 1994.
The Petition for Certiorari was denied by the
Colorado Supreme Court on October 17, 1994.
¢
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court to
review the judgment by writ of certiorari pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. §2104 and Rule 10(c) of the
Supreme Court Rules.
ore
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC.
See Appendix for following pertinent texts.
1. U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2
(Appendix F)
2. 15 U.S.C. §1261 (Appendix G)
3. 15 U.S.C. §1262 (Appendix H)
4. 15 U.S.C. §1261 (Historical Note) (Appendix
I)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a personal injury action brought
by Sandra Salazar for injuries which occurred while Ms.
Salazar was using a household cleaning product manu-
factured by defendant, Whink Rust Stain Remover.
Ms. Salazar purchased the product from a grocery
store in order to wash her windows. She took the product
home and diluted it in water. She then wrapped a towel
around her finger, dipped that finger in the Whink/ water
mixture, and began washing her windows.
Whink contains a substance termed hydrofluoric acid
which does incipient damage to the human body. By the
time Ms. Salazar felt pain, it was too late. After a series of
operations, all uninsured, Ms. Salazar’s right index finger
had to be amputated. She continues to suffer reflex sym-
pathetic dystrophy as a result of the loss of the finger.
The trial court erroneously entered summary judg-
ment against plaintiff entirely upon state law grounds.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s
ruling. The Colorado Court of Appeals, however, did not
reach the issues relied upon by the trial court. Instead,
relying upon the recently decided case of Cipollone v.
Liggett, __ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407
(1992), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that plaintiff's
claims were preempted by the Federal Hazardous Sub-
stances Act, 15 U.S.C. §1261 et seq. It is with this holding,
and its unfair application, that appellant takes issue. Cer-
tiorari was denied by the Colorado Supreme Court on
October 17, 1994.
+
STAGE AT PROCEEDINGS FEDERAL
QUESTIONS WERE RAISED
The issue of preemption was first raised by defen-
dant Whink in its motion for summary judgment filed
January 7, 1992. In essence, Whink claimed that peti-
tioner’s claim was preempted by 15 U.S.C. §1261 et seq.
The trial court never reached the preemption issue.
The issue of preemption was next raised on appeal by
defendant Whink in their Reply Brief before the Court of
Appeals. The issue was briefed fully by both sides before
the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals ruled in Whink’s favor on the
Federal preemption issue. (Appendix C) The entire opin-
ion concerned the preemption issue.
The Colorado Supreme Court denied petitioner's
writ of Certiorari on the issue of Federal preemption.
(Appendix A)
ARGUMENT AMPLIFYING REASONS FOR WRIT
A. BACKGROUND FACTS
Plaintiff is a woman born in 1962, who resides in
Monte Vista, Colorado (R. p. 461, ll. 6-7). She has two
children who at the time of the accident were 14 and 7 (R.
p. 465, ll. 7-14).
At the time of the incident in question, plaintiff was
employed as an assistant manager at a Yellow Front store (R.
p. 472, ll. 10-19). In addition, she performed part-time work
as a cleaning lady (R. p. 463, ll. 6-11). Plaintiff did not
complete high school, and at the time of the incident she was
working to complete her GED (R. p. 462, |. 25 to p. 463, 1. 1).
On July 17, 1989 (R. p. 472, ll. 20-24) plaintiff was in
the process of doing some general house cleaning work
around her home (R. p. 474, ll. 8-10). Towards that pur-
pose, plaintiff visited Monte Vista Super Foods in order
to pick up some window cleaner (R. p. 474, ll. 11-21). Ms.
Salazar asked the store attendant if he knew of any prod-
uct that would clean water stains (R. p. 478, ll. 9-17). The
employee was unable to help her, but as Ms. Salazar was
leaving, another store employee recommended “Whink
Rust Stain Remover” (R. p. 479, 1. 25 to p. 480, 1. 1). On
that employee’s recommendation, Ms. Salazar purchased
a bottle of Whink (R. p. 480, Il. 2-9). The product was
purchased for the sum of $2.49 (R. p. 481, 1. 1). It
‘
&
a
;
'
rs
appeared in the cleaning section of the store with other
household cleaners (R. p. 480, ll. 3-10).
A full copy of the bottle purchased by plaintiff is
found in the record on pages 289 and 290, page 289 being
the front and 290 the back. Plaintiff admits she read the
front of the bottle, but denies that she read the back (R. p.
481, ll. 18-22). The front of the bottle states:
DANGER - MAY BE FATAL OR CAUSE PER-
MANENT DAMAGE CAUSES SEVERE
BURNS WHICH MAY NOT BE IMME-
DIATELY PAINFUL OR VISIBLE VAPOR
HARMFUL CONTAINS HYDROFLUORIC
ACID KEEP OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN
Use only with heavy duty household rubber
gloves. Read back panel for additional precau-
tions and directions.
When she returned home, plaintiff proceeded upon
the task of washing her windows. She first washed her
windows with a wet sponge without Whink (R. p. 485, ll.
16-21). She then diluted the Whink she had purchased in
the water, wrapped a towel around her hand, and pro-
ceeded to rub the windows with the towel which had
been doused in the Whink-water mixture (R. p. 485, 1. 22
to p. 486, 1. 4). This seemingly innocent action cost plain-
tiff the use of her index finger on her dominant hand (R.
p. 488, ll. 19-22, and p. 486, ll. 5-7). All totaled, plaintiff
spent about three hours cleaning her windows (R. p. 486,
Il. 8-10).
Plaintiff at first noticed nothing unusual concerning
her hand. Towards the later afternoon, however, she felt a
tightness in her hand (R. p. 488, ll. 15-18). Soon thereafter,
she experienced a burning sensation (R. p. 490, ll. 1-4). In
order to alleviate the pain, plaintiff flushed her hands
with soap and water (R. p. 491, Il. 9-16). Unable to stop
the pain, plaintiff was then rushed to a local physician,
Dr. Robert Splettstoesser (R. p. 492, Il. 10-20).
The court’s ruling concerning summary judgment
upon liability made the remainder of the case moot.
Plaintiff, in her Disclosure Certificate (R. p. 47-56) and its
five supplements (R. pp. 208-210, 223-224, 228-229,
389-394, and 395-396), designated numerous medical
experts who were prepared to establish that as a result of
this single use of Whink, plaintiff suffered infection of
her right index finger, esteomyelitis of the right index
finger, amputation of the right index finger (R. p. 49),
reflex sympathetic dystrophy (R. pp. 208-209), and over
$100,000 in medical bills which were largely uninsured
(R. p. 554, ll. 9-23). In addition, plaintiff designated one
Mark Litvin, Ph.D., a rehabilitation counselor, who was
prepared to testify that plaintiff is virtually unemployable
(R. p. 208).
B. LAW REGARDING BREADTH OF FEDERAL
PREEMPTION
Article VI, Cl. 2 of the United States Constitution
states that the Constitution and laws of the United States
“shall be the supreme law of the land.” Any state law
which conflicts with federal law is thus “without effect.”
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427, 4 L.Ed.
579 (1819).
In general, Congress may preempt state law explic-
itly by so stating; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 97
S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977); by passing a law
7,
which directly conflicts with state law, Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation and Development
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1722, 75 L.Ed.2d
752 (1983); or may do so by thoroughly occupying a field
so that there is no room left for the states to supplement
it. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 153, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982).
Where Congress has not spoken, there is a presumption
against preemption in that Congress is free to speak with
drastic clarity whenever it chooses to assure full federal
authority. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Rela-
tions Board, 330 U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 91 L.Ed. 1234
(1947). In addition, there is a strong presumption against
preemption if preemption means superseding a state's
historical police power; Wisconsin Public Intervenors v.
Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 111 S.Ct. 2476, 115 L.Ed.2d 532
(1991); particularly when the regulation in question
relates to health and safety. Hillsborough County v. Auto-
mated Medical Laboratories, 471 U.S. 707, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85
L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed. 443 (1984), for example,
this court upheld an award of punitive damages to the
estate of a deceased lab analyst injured by a plutonium
release, despite federal regulatory control of nuclear facil-
ities by the Nuclear Regulations Commission.
The defendant in Silkwood, supra, argued that since
the Federal Government had regulated the entire field of
nuclear safety, an award of punitive damages sanctioned
by state law but not federal law, was in violation of
Federal Preemption. This court, however, distinguished
between Federal Preemption of state Safety Regulations
and preemption of state common law tort claims. Since
Congress was silent concerning state tort law, the court
stated that Congress did not intend to preclude the use of
state law remedies.
Recent decisions of this court have demonstrated a
restrictive view of the preemption doctrine in deference
to state’s rights. LAureENce H. Trise, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL Law §6-25 at 479. The court has stated this reluc-
tance as a presumption that Congress did not intend to
preempt state law. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 101
S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981).
In 1992, this court decided Cipollone v. Liggett, __
U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992). Cipollone
involved a claim by the estate of a person who had died
from smoking cigarettes. The cigarette companies claimed
immunity from suit based upon two federal statutes; the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act enacted
in 1965, and the Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. Both Acts
had preemption provisions. Section 5 of the 1965 Act was
captioned “Preemption,” and stated:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and
health, other than the statement required by §4
of this Act, shall be required on any cigarette
package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and
health shall be required in the advertising of any
cigarettes, the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this Act.
The 1969 Act, however, modified the preemption pro-
vision stating:
No requirement or prohibition based on
smoking and health shall be imposed under
state law with respect to the advertising or pro-
motion of any cigarettes, the packages of which
are labeled in conformity with the provisions of
this Act.
The court’s analysis began by rejecting defendant's
argument that either the 1965 or 1969 Act impliedly pre-
empted state law. When Congress considers preemption
through a specific preemption clause, it can be inferred
that that clause solely governs preemption or Congress
would have stated otherwise (Cipollone, supra, 112 S.Ct. at
2618). The court next turned its attention to the narrow
wording of the preemption clause in the 1965 Act. The
court found the clause: “No statement . . . shall be
required in the advertising of [properly labeled] ciga-
rettes,” merely prohibited state and federal rule-making
bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements
on cigarette labels or cigarette advertisements, and did
not prohibit state common law failure to warn claims.
In contrast, the 1965 Act utilized much broader lan-
guage that prohibited states from imposing “require-
ment[s] or prohibition[s] based on smoking and health
with respect to the advertising or promotion of any ciga-
rettes.” This emphasis on “requirements and prohibi-
tions” swept broadly and suggested no distinction
between positive enactments and common law. Thus, the
common law claims for failure to warn after the 1969 Act
were barred. The court did not, however, bar any com-
mon law claims which were not related to inadequate
warnings.
Thus, in the wake of Cipollone, whenever Congress
addresses the issue of preemption, the question becomes
10
largely a question of statutory construction, with a pre-
sumption mandated against preemption.
In a critical opinion by Justice Blackmun, concurring
in part and dissenting in part, Justice Blackmun predicted
a “hodge-podge” of lower court decisions. This predic-
tion has, at least in part, come true. Since Cipollone was
decided in June of 1992, it has been cited over 120 times
and the decisions are far from uniform. This court most
recently distinguished Cipollone in CSX Transp. Inc. v.
Easterwood, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387
(1993), holding that state common law claims for negli-
gence were not preempted by regulations passed pur-
suant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970.
C. THE FEDERAL HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
LABELING ACT
In 1960, Congress enacted the Federal Hazardous
Substances Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §1261 et seq. The pur-
pose of the law was to “provide nationally uniform
requirements for adequate cautionary labeling of pack-
ages of hazardous substances which are sold at interstate
commerce and intended or suitable for household use”
and to “provide a pattern which states may follow in
enacting similar legislation.” House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, H.R. Rep. No. 861, 86th Cong.2d
Sess. 2 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News, 2833, at 2833.
In 1966, the Federal Hazardous Substances Act was
amended as the Child Protection Act of 1966. As stated in
the bill’s legislative history:
11
It is impractical, unnecessary and undesir-
able for each such product to be labeled spe-
cially for those states and cities which have
developed their own standards for years during
which there was no federal law. The committee
now recommends a limited preemption amendment
which would encourage and permit states to adopt
requirements identical with the Federal requirements
for substances subject to the Federal Act, and to
enforce them to complement Federal enforcement,
but at the same time would free marketers of
products sold interstate from varying or added
labeling requirements. H.R. Rep. No. 2166, 89th
Cong. 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News, 4095, at 4097. (emphasis
added)
The above statement on preemption would indicate
Congress’s sole concern of direct state regulation of
labels. The “limited preemption amendment” Congress
resultantly drafted is as follows:
(b)(1)(A) Except as provided in paragraphs (2)
and (3), if a hazardous substance or its packag-
ing is subject to a cautionary labeling require-
ment under §2(p) or 3(b) [15 U.S.C. §1261(p) or
§1262(p)] designed to prevent against a risk of
illness or injury associated with the substance,
no State or political subdivision of a State may
establish or continue in effect a cautionary labeling
requirement applicable to said substance or packag-
ing and designed to protect against the same risk of
illness or injury unless such cautionary labeling
requirement is identical to the labeling requirement
under 2(p) or 3(b).
(B) Except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3),
and (4), if under regulations of the Commission
12
promulgated under or for the enforcement of
section 2(g) [subsec. (g) of this section] a
requirement is established to protect against a
risk of illness or injury associated with a hazard-
ous substance, no State or political subdivision or a
state may establish or continue in effect a require-
ment applicable to such substance and designed to
protect against the same risk of illness or injury
unless such requirement is identical to the require-
ment established under such regulations.
15 U.S.C. §1261, Historical Note - Effect upon
Federal and State Law - Pub.L. 86-613, §18, for-
merly 17, July 12, 1960, 74 Stat. 380, as amended
Pub.L. 89-756, §4(a), Nov. 3, 1966, 80 Stat. 1305;
renumbered and amended Pub.L. 91-113, §4(a),
(b)(1), Nov. 6, 1969, 83 Stat. 189, 190; Pub.L.
94-284, §17(a), May 11, 1976, 90 Stat. 510.
(emphasis added)
Whether the above provision in fact preempts state
common law tort claims is a question that has not been
decided by this court. As stated previously, there is a split of
authority in jurisdictions throughout the country. In Moss v.
Parks Corporation, 985 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1993), for example,
the Fourth Circuit applied the preemption doctrine to all of
the plaintiffs’ failure to warn claims. However, even in that
extreme case, Plaintiff was allowed to bring claims which
argued that the defendants violated FHSA. Other jurisdic-
tions have adopted different approaches.
Jenkins v. James B. Day & Company, 634 N.E.2d 998
(1994), an Ohio Supreme Court case, involved a wrongful
death action from a death caused by inhalation of meth-
ylene chloride, a substance contained in a certain type of
paint stripper called “Marine Strip.” The decedent used
the Marine Strip while in her attic stripping paint from
13
furniture. The manufacturer defended the claim on the
grounds of Federal preemption through compliance with
FHSA. The trial court dismissed the case upon a sum-
mary judgment motion.
On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court first stated that
FHSA’s preemption clause preempted labeling require-
ments:
Unless such cautionary labeling require-
ment is identical to the labeling requirement
under Section 2(p) or 3(b) of Section 18(b)(1)(A)
of the FHSA, as amended by Pub. L. 94-284,
Section 17(a), 90 Stat. 510, reprinted in 15 U.S.C.
§1261 (quoted at page 1002 of the Opinion).
The court then next examined the language of FHSA
which required that the product affirmatively state the
principal hazard, the appropriate precautionary measure,
the appropriate first aid treatment, and the word “poi-
son” (15 U.S.C. §1261(p) and §1262, as cited by the court
at 1002). Next, the court turned its attention to the Ohio
Code, Section R.C. 2307.76(A)(1). That section provides
that a product is defective if, when it leaves control of the
manufacturer:
(a) The manufacturer knew or, in the exer-
cise of reasonable care, should have known
about a risk that is associated with the product
and that allegedly caused harm for which the
claimant seeks to recover compensatory dam-
ages;
(b) The manufacturer failed to provide the
warning or instruction that a manufacturer exer-
cising reasonable care would have provided
concerning that risk, in light of the likelihood
that the product would cause harm of the type
14
for which the claimant seeks to recover compen-
satory damages and in light of the likely seri-
ousness of that harm. §RC 2307.76(A)(1) Ohio
Code.
Comparing plaintiff's state law tort claims to the
requirements of FHSA, the court concluded that the tort
claims were, in essence, no different from the FHSA
requirements. Thus, the state did not mandate labeling
requirements which were not identical to FHSA’s require-
ments, and by the plain reading of the statute, preemp-
tion was inapplicable.
The court stated that the fact that the Consumer
Product Safety Division had not restrained dissemination
of the product, was not controlling. FHSA does not spec-
ify all the language required on a product’s warning
label. The manufacturer formulates his own warning lan-
guage, but the language is not reviewed for adequacy by
any federal agency. 15 U.S.C. §1262(b) grants the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission authority to promul-
gate label requirements and §1262(c) allows it to exempt
substances from compliance. No section, however, calls
for final label approval of a product.
Just as Ohio state law did not pose requirements
upon the defendant outside of what was required by
FHSA, Sandra Salazar does not seek to impose additional
requirements herein. Colorado Products Liability law fol-
lows the Restatement (2nd) of Torts §402A. Uptain v. Hunt-
ington Labs, 723 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1986). Under Colorado
law, Salazar must prove that the Whink substance was
“unreasonably dangerous,” a requirement which adds
nothing to the dictates of 15 U.S.C. §§1261 and 1262.
15
In a Montana Federal District Court case, Coutre v.
Dow Chemical U.S.A., 804 F.Supp. 1298 (D. Mont. 1992),
the court took a slightly different approach. Coutre
involved a claim by a rancher who had contracted cancer
through the use of a herbicide. The substance in question
was governed by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) 7 U.S.C. §136 et seqg., which
had a preemption clause similar to FHSA, which stated as
follows:
Such states shall not impose or continue in
effect any requirements for labeling or packag-
ing in addition to or different from those
required under this subchapter. 7 U.S.C.
§136V(a)(b)
The defendant moved for summary judgment upon
grounds of compliance with FIFRA. Relying upon the
narrow construction mandate of Cipollone, however, the
court denied the motion stating:
The language of Section 136V(b) can hardly
be interpreted as providing “unambiguous evi-
dence of a clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress to displace state sovereignty ... ”
This court remains circumspect in applying a
broad preemption analysis which would dis-
place state law and would extinguish an indi-
vidual’s rights under state law to pursue a
common law damages action. (Jd. at 1302)
Burke v. Dow Chemical Co., 797 F.Supp. 1128 (E.D. N.Y.
1992) also involves a claim brought under FIFRA. In
Burke, two unborn children contacted brain cancer due to
their mother’s exposure to a household insecticide manu-
factured by Dow Chemical Company. The court first
16
reviewed toxic liability from a historical prospective. Tra-
ditionally, the states have performed that function
through statutory and common-law tort rules. In contrast,
the federal government only entered the field recently,
with an emphasis more in terms of protecting the flow of
commerce than in protecting the public. No federal
agency, stated the court, tests products for the dangers of
pregnant women. Individuals are still largely protected
through state tort law (Id. at 1132).
The court then turned its attention to FIFRA regula-
tions. While administered by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, most of the information concerning a
product is derived from the manufacturer. The EPA does
not conduct independent testing. Much of the informa-
tion which is placed before the EPA is withheld from the
public (Id. at 1134). On the basis of information provided
by the registrant, the EPA must register the product if it
determines that (a) its composition is such to warrant the
product claims of success; (b) its labeling complies with
FIFRA; (c) it will perform as intended; and (d) when used
in accordance with widespread and commonly recog-
nized practices, it will not generally cause unreasonable
adverse effects on the ertvironment. While there is room
for public input in the process, there is no watchdog over
the EPA, and the Ralph Naders of the world are limited
(Id. at 1135).
With this backdrop, the court reviewed the FIFRA
preemption clause (similar to the FHSA), and found it
read somewhere between the 1965 and 1969 cigarette
laws discussed in Cipollone. The court thus ruled that if
the EPA approved labels were affixed to the containers,
plaintiffs could not claim the defendant’s products were
17
mislabeled. However, if plaintiffs claimed that defendant
should have taken other steps to protect the public, such
as a limitation upon sales only to professionals, or more
general warnings to users other than on the label, such an
argument survives the preemption clause. The motion for
summary judgment was then denied in total. See also, Toy
Mfrs. of America, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 806 F.Supp. 336 (D.
Conn. 1992); Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 837 P.2d
1273 (Hawaii 1992); and Chemical Specialties Manufacturers
v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 942 (1992).
Salazar submits that there are valid reasons why this
court should hold that FHSA does not preempt her claim.
First of all, FHSA’s preemption clause, as stated in the
legislative history, is a “limited” preemption clause. The
word “limited” can only mean that legislators anticipated
that some state claims could be brought along with FHSA
claims. As applied by the Colorado Court of Appeals, it is
difficult to understand what that limitation would be.
Secondly, the preemption provision of FHSA specifically
mandates that the states are only “encouraged to adopt
requirements identical to the federal requirements” and
to “compliment” federal enforcement. This language
reflects a clear intent not to preempt state law claims.
Thirdly, the wording of FHSA’s preemption provision is
more akin to the 1965 Cigarette Act than the 1969 Act,
,
which speaks of “requirements and prohibitions,” rather
than simply “requirements.” Fourthly, despite the man-
date of Cipollone, the Colorado Court of Appeals applied
preemption too broadly. The plaintiff was left without a
case after the Court of Appeals’ ruling. The ruling
ignored plaintiff’s repeated pleadings that Whink was
18
negligent in the design of the product and that the prod-
uct should not have been sold, regardless of the adequacy
of the warnings (R. Vol. I, pp. 13-14, Vol. II, pp. 338-339,
Vol. V, p. 21, 1. 17 to p. 23, 1. 4). Finally, as stated by the
Ohio Supreme Court, the relief requested by Salazar sad-
dles Whink with no requirements additional to those
mandated by FHSA.
D. THE APPLICATION OF THE CIPOLLONE
CASE TO SALAZAR HEREIN IS PARTIC-
ULARLY UNFAIR.
This matter was filed on July 19, 1990, well prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone. At the time the
case was filed, Colorado law was clear that compliance
with federal law merely created a presumption that the
product was not defective, which could be overcome by
competent evidence. As stated in C.R.S. 13-21-403:
In any product liability action, it shall be
rebuttably presumed that the product which
caused an injury, death, or property damage,
was not defective and that the manufacturer or
seller thereof was not negligent if the product:
(b) Complied with, at the time of the sale
by the manufacturer, any applicable code, stan-
dard, or regulation adopted or promulgated by
the United States or by this state, or by any
agency of the United States or of this state.
See also Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579
(Colo. 1984); Hawkinson v. A.H. Robbins Co. Inc., 595
F.Supp. 1290 (D. Colo. 1984); Union Ins. Co. v. RCA, 724
P.2d 80 (Colo.App. 1986); Tafoya v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
884 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1989).
a
19
Plaintiff has never in this action admitted that
Whink’s product complied with FHSA. To the contrary,
plaintiff simply planned to allow Whink to present its
evidence and then argue to the jury that, at best, any
compliance found by the jury only created a rebuttable
presumption.
On January 7, 1992, Whink moved for summary judg-
ment based both upon the preemption grounds and
plaintiff’s failure to heed warnings on the bottle. While
Whink’s motion was pending, in late June 1992, the court
decided Cipollone. On August 4, 1992, before Cipollone
even made the reporters, the court entered an order set-
ting Whink’s motion for summary judgment for hearing
(R. p. 435). In that order, the court specifically limited its
inquiry to the “misuse” defense, and not the issue of
preemption. On September 14, 1992, Judge Hoffman, in
an order which was in error according to Colorado law,
dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims (R. pp. 235-243). Judge
Hoffman specifically did not reach the preemption issue.
On January 13, 1993, plaintiff filed her appeal. After
reviewing briefs and oral arguments, the Colorado Court
of Appeals did not reach the issue decided by Judge
Hoffman. Instead, the court held that plaintiff’s action
was barred by the Cipollone case.
The point of the above chronology is that plaintiff
never conducted adequate discovery concerning Whink’s
compliance with FHSA. This was because when plaintiff
prepared her case, the law was that compliance with a
federal regulation concerning a warning was only one
item of evidence which a jury may consider. Shortly after
the law changed, however, Judge Hoffman dismissed the
20
case on other grounds, and plaintiff was unable to obtain
discovery concerning compliance with federal statutes
and regulations.
The case of DeHaun v. Whink Products Company, 1994
WL 24322 (N.D. Ill. No. 91C0014), decided in the North-
ern District of Illinois on January 26, 1994, is applicable to
the situation at hand. In DeHaun, the plaintiff used the
same product as used by plaintiff herein. In order to
“derust” the family clothing, she sat cross-legged on the
floor, wearing rubber gloves, and followed her usual
derusting procedure as follows:
1. She held the article of clothing in her left
hand;
2. She sprayed the rust stain on the clothing
with water from the spray bottle;
3. She applied the product to the stain;
4. She placed the open bottle of product on the
floor; and
5. She rolled the article of clothing so that the
treated stain was surrounded by the rest of
the garment.
_ While applying the product on the day in question, Mrs.
DeHaun spilled some of the product on her leg. As a
result, she suffered a very severe burn to her leg, which
required a lengthy hospital stay.
Upon a motion for summary judgment by Whink, the
court applied Cipollone to dismiss the failure to warn
claims. The court then, however, relying upon Moss v.
Parks Corporation, 985 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1993), allowed
plaintiff to amend her complaint alleging violations of
21
FHSA. As the DeHaun court pointed out, the Moss v. Parks
Corporation decision, supra, sanctioned a private right of
action for violations of FHSA. The plaintiff was allowed
to amend her complaint, and proceed under that amend-
ment. Plaintiff in DeHaun was subsequently able to pre-
sent evidence which lead to the conclusion that the same
substance which is in issue in this matter violated FHSA.
See also Duplin v. Whink Products Co., 1994 WL 197612
(Conn. Super. 1994).
At a minimum, should this court disagree with plain-
tiff’s other contentions, the manifest injustice caused by
the timing of the Cipollone decision in this matter should
warrant a remand so that plaintiff can be allowed to
argue Whink’s failure to comply with FHSA.
+
CONCLUSION
For each of the reasons stated above, plaintiff Sandra
Salazar hereby petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari
reviewing the decisions of the Colorado Court of Appeals
and the denial of certiorari by the Colorado Supreme
Court.
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of January, 1995.
Dyer DONNELLY & LILLEY
F. JaMes DONNELLY #12243
825 Logan Street
Denver, CO 80203-3114
(303) 861-3003
a naan aR Aenrat
APPENDIX
A. Colorado Supreme Court denial of
Pe, | re ee ee App.
B. Colorado Court of Appeals denial of
Petition for Rehearing ......----++++++++ App.
C. Colorado Court of Appeals Opinion ..... App.
D. Colorado trial court’s denial of Motion
eS”. | eee ree App.
E. Colorado trial court’s Opinion........--- App.
F US. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2 ...App.
CH UE os css oe cee eerste App.
H. 25 U.S.C. GI262. 2.265 eee ccccerewcrescens App.
I. 15 U.S.C. §1261 (Historical Note) ......-. App.
App. 1
App. 1
APPENDIX A
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO
CASE NO. 945C381
CERTIORARI TO THE COLORADO COURT OF
APPEALS, 93CA0055
DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER,
90CV7830
ORDER OF COURT
SANDRA SALAZAR,
Petitioner,
v.
WHINK PRODUCTS CO., an Iowa corporation,
Respondent.
Upon consideration of the Petition for Writ of Cer-
tiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, and after review
of the record, the briefs, and the judgment of said Court
of Appeals,
IT IS THIS DAY ORDERED that said Petition for Writ
of Certiorari shall be, and same hereby is, DENIED.
BY THE COURT, EN BANC, OCTOBER 17, 1994.
cc: F. James Donnelly
DYER DONNELLY & LILLEY
825 Logan Street
Denver, CO 80203-3114
J. Ronald Voss
Amelia L. Klemme
RETHERFORD, MULLEN, JOHNSON & BRUCE
App. 2
P.O. Box 1580
Colorado Springs, CO 80901-1580
Honorable’ Morris B. Hoffman
Denver District Court
City and County Building
1437 Bannock Street
Denver, CO 80202
Clerk of the District Court Denver District Court
City and County Building
1437 Bannock Street
Denver, CO 80202
Patrick H. Stanford, Clerk
Colorado Court of Appeals
[SEAL]
Supreme Court
State of Colorado
Certified to be a full, true and correct copy
OCT. 18, 1994
MAC V. DANFORD
Clerk of the Supreme Court
By /s/ Illegible
Deputy Clerk
App. 3
APPENDIX B
THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF COLORADO
Case Number 93CA0055
ORDER
SANDRA SALAZAR V WHINK PRODUCTS COMPANY
Upon consideration of the Petition for Rehearing filed by
the Appellant herein, the Petition is hereby DENIED. It is
ordered that issuance of the Mandate is stayed to and
including June 27, 1994 provided that if a Petition for
Writ of Certiorari is timely filed with the Supreme Court
of the State of Colorado, the stay shall remain in effect
until disposition of the cause by the Supreme Court.
BY THE COURT:
Sternberg, C.J.
Briggs, J.
Tursi, J.
DATED: May 26, 1994
[SEAL]
App. 4
APPENDIX C
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS April 7, 1994
No. 93CA0055
Sandra Salazar,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
Whink Products Company, an Iowa corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the District Court of the City and County of
Denver
Honorable Morris B. Hoffman, Judge
No. 90CV7830
Division I JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE STERNBERG
Briggs and Tursi*, JJ., concur
Dyer Donnelly & Lilley, F. James Donnelly, Denver, Colo-
rado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Retherford, Mullen, Johnson & Bruce, J. Ronald Voss,
Amelia L. Klemme, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellee
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provi-
sions of the Colo. Const. art. VI, Sec. 5(3), and
§ 24-51-1105, C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 10B).
eo
App. 5
In this products liability action, plaintiff, Sandra
Salazar, appeals the summary judgment entered in favor
of defendant, Whink Products Co., which determined
that Whink was not liable for plaintiff's injuries resulting
from her use of its product, Whink Rust Stain Remover.
We affirm.
Plaintiff asserts that genuine issues of material fact
remain as to the adequacy of the warnings on the product
and the foreseeability of her failure to heed those warn-
ings. Whink contends that the trial court properly dis-
missed plaintiff’s claims on the basis of her unforeseeable
misuse of the product, but also argues that her claims are
preempted by the Federal Hazardous Substances Act
(FHSA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1277 (1988). It is undisputed
that the label on the product at issue complies with the
FHSA, and we conclude that the FHSA preempts plain-
tiff’s duty to warn claims. Thus, we affirm the summary
judgment, but on grounds different from those relied
upon by the trial court.
Under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., art. VI, cl.
2, state laws which “interfere with or are contrary to the
laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution,”
are invalid. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L.Ed.
23 (1824). Whether a federal statute preempts a state law
or claim turns on Congressional intent, and that intent
may be explicit in the statute itself. Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.,___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407
(1992).
In its most recent pronouncement on federal preemp-
tion, the United States Supreme Court held that a broad
statement in a federal law prohibiting state regulation
App. 6
also bars common law tort claims. Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., supra.
The federal laws at issue in Cipollone were the Fed-
eral Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (1965 Ciga-
rette Act) and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969 (1969 Cigarette Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1988).
The preemption provision in the 1965 Cigarette Act was
narrow and stated: “No statement relating to smoking and
health shall be required in the advertising of [properly
labeled] cigarettes.” Cipollone, supra, __ U.S. at __, 112
S.Ct. at 2618, 120 L.Ed.2d at 421 (emphasis in original).
Congress’ emphasis on the words “statement” and
“advertising” led the Court to conclude that the 1965
Cigarette Act preempted only state and federal regula-
tions requiring additional warnings, but did not affect
state law damages actions.
The 1969 Cigarette Act, however, used much broader
language; it barred not merely “statements,” but any
“requirement[s] or prohibition[s] . . . imposed under state
law.” Cipollone, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2619, 120
L.Ed.2d at 422. This language, the Court held, indicated
legislative intent to ban state common law labeling and
duty to warn claims along with direct state regulation of
labels.
The court noted that: “[T]he phrase ‘[n]o requirement
or prohibition’ sweeps broadly and suggests no distinc-
tion between positive enactments and common law; to
the contrary, those words easily encompass obligations
that take the form of common law rules.” Cipollone, supra,
__ U.S. at __, 112 S.Ct. at 2620, 120 L.Ed.2d at 426.
OL GAR EERIE Ae EAS
App. 7
In order to succeed in the wake of Cipollone, then, the
plaintiff would have to show that FHSA’s preemption
language is less sweeping than the language of the 1969
Cigarette Act; however, we can discern no significant
difference between the two.
The FHSA was enacted in 1960 to mandate labeling
of certain “hazardous” consumer products intended for
use in the household or by children. Chemical Specialties
Manufacturers Ass‘n v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1992).
The purpose of the Act was to “provide nationally uni-
form requirements for adequate cautionary labeling.”
House Committee On Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, H.R. Rep.
No. 1861, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960), reprinted in 1960
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 2833. The scope of the
Act’s coverage as to these products is extremely broad.
Toy Manufacturers of America, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 986 F.2d
615 (2d Cir. 1992). Thus, the central requirement of the
Act is that manufacturers of hazardous products provide
cautionary labels clearly indicating the hazards and pro-
viding consumers with directions for use. The parties do
not dispute that the label on Whink Rust Stain Remover
comports with the FHSA’s labeling requirements.
As enacted, the FHSA did not contain a preemption
section. However, when the Act was amended in 1966,
the legislative history discussed the impracticality of hav-
ing the states produce potentially fifty different labels for
a particular hazardous substance. House Committee On
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Child Protection Act of
1966, H.R.Rep. No. 2166, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966),
reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4095,
App. 8
4097. The 1966 amendments added a limited preemption
provision which provides as follows:
It is hereby expressly declared that it is the
intent of the Congress to supersede any and all
laws of the States and political subdivisions
thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter
provide for the precautionary labeling of any
substance or article intended or suitable for
household use (except for those substances
defined in sections 2(f) (2) and (3) of this Act)
which differs from the requirements or exemp-
tions of this Act or the regulations or interpreta-
tions promulgated pursuant thereto. Any law,
regulation, or ordinance purporting to establish
such a labeling requirement shall be null and
void.
Child Protection Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-756, 80 Stat.
1303 (1966) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (1988)); see
also § 13-21-403 (1)(b) C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 6A)
(emphasis added).
In our view, the language prohibiting a state from
imposing “a requirement” for labeling that is not identi-
cal to the labeling requirements under the Act is as inclu-
sive as the language of the 1969 Cigarette Act stating that
“no requirement or prohibition” shall be imposed under
state law. The prohibition of “a requirement” is the func-
tional equivalent of “no requirement.” See Arkansas-Platte
& Gulf v. Van Waters & Rogers, 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir.
1993).
We find persuasive the reasoning of the court in Moss
v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1993), which held that
the FHSA preempted common law failure to warn claims
when the plaintiff seeks additional or more clearly stated
App. 9
warnings than those required by the FHSA. In determin-
ing that the FHSA applied to common law tort actions as
well as state labeling regulations, the court stated that:
“{I]f federal law mandates a specific label and permits
nothing additional or different, it can hardly be urged
that a state tort duty based on a warning requirement that
is more elaborate and different does not conflict. The
manufacturer in that case cannot comply with both.”
Moss v. Parks Corp., supra, at 739-740.
Moreover, the purposes underlying both legislative
regulation of labeling and a state common law duty to
warn are the same. Indeed, a state common law duty to
warn is nothing more than a duty to label a product to
provide information. In that sense, the common law duty
is no less “a requirement” in the preemption scheme than
a state statute imposing the same burden. The objective of
the common law duty and a regulatory statute are the
same. Both address a manufacturer’s duty to convey
information about a product through the medium of a
label.
That a common law action can result in an award of
damages to an injured party does not detract from the
ultimate purpose of imposing a duty to warn the users of
a product about its potential dangers or other properties.
Therefore, we find it only logical to hold that the common
law duty to warn is subjected to the same federal pre-
emptive constraints as a state statute.
Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff seeks addi-
tional, different, or more clearly stated warnings, her -
claim is expressly preempted by the FHSA.
App. 10
Because of our disposition of this issue, it is unneces-
sary to address the remaining issues.
Judgment affirmed.
JUDGE BRIGGS and JUDGE TURSI concur.
App. 11
APPENDIX D
DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER,
COLORADO
Case No 90CV7830 Courtroom 21
ORDER
SANDRA SALAZAR,
Plaintiff,
VS.
WHINK PRODUCTS, CO., et al,
Defendants.
Plaintiff’s “Motion For New Trial with Accompany-
ing Brief (Rule 59 C.R.C.P.),” filed October 14, 1992, as
amended by Plaintiff's “Amendment To Motion For New
Trial,” filed October 15, 1992, is DENIED.
DATED this 30th day of November, 1992.
BY THE COURT
/s/ Morris B. Hoffman
Morris B. Hoffman
District Judge
cc: F. James Donnelly
Arthur B. Walsh
J. Ronald Voss
12/1/92
aa
App. 12
APPENDIX E |
DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, |
COLORADO
Case No. 90-CV-7830 Courtroom 21
cninicieeuhansinicaintenaishaeatitanistiiaibainaniniananiamamnaiatisanainpstii |
ORDER
SANDRA SALAZAR,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
WHINK PRODUCTS CO., an lowa corporation and
MONTE VISTA ARAPAHOE, INC., dba MONTE VISTA
SUPER FOODS, a Colorado Corporation, ROBERT W.
SPLETTSTOESSER, M.D., and MONTE VISTA PROFES-
SIONAL ASSOCIATES,
Defendants.
THIS MATTER is before me on a Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment filed by Defendant Whink Products Com-
pany (“Whink”) on January 8, 1992, joined by Defendants
Monte Vista Arapahoe, Inc. (“Super Foods”), Robert W. }
Splettstoesser (“Splettstoesser”) and Monte Vista Profes-
sional Associates (“Monte Vista”). Based on my review of
the Motion and briefs, the affidavits, and the case file,
and the hearing held on the Motion on September 10,
1992, I rule as follows.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motions for summary judgment are disfavored, and
the allegations of the non-movant must be taken as true
App. 13
unless they are clearly disproved by unrebutted affidavits
or products of discovery. Continental Air Lines. Inc. v.
Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987). With this standard in
mind, the material facts of this case are as follows.
The case arises out of Plaintiff’s allegations that she
was injured while using Whink Rust Stain Remover, and
that she was thereafter negligently treated for her inju-
ries. At the time of her injuries, Plaintiff had been in the
professional cleaning business for 11 years. She cleaned
offices as well as private residences. In July 1989, Plaintiff
visited Defendant Super Foods for the purpose of pur-
chasing a window cleaner, apparently to use on some
water stained windows in Plaintiff's own home. In
reliance on a specific recommendation of the owner of the
Super Foods store, Plaintiff purchased a bottle of Whink
Rust Stain Remover. Whink Rust Stain Remover is a
cleaning fluid designed to remove rust stains from fabrics
and well as sinks and toilet bowls. It is 8% hydrofluoric
acid.
The bottle which Plaintiff purchased contained the
following warnings on the front of the bottle (emphasis in
original):
Not a general purpose rust remover.
Read precautions and directions before using.
DANGER: MAY BE FATAL OR CAUSE PERMA-
NENT DAMAGE. CAUSES SEVERE BURNS
WHICH MAY NOT BE IMMEDIATELY PAIN-
FUL OR VISIBLE. VAPORS HARMFUL. CON-
TAINS HYDROFLUORIC ACID. KEEP OUT OF
REACH OF CHILDREN. Use Only With Heavy
Duty Household Rubber Gloves. Read back
panel for additional pre-cautions and directions.
App. 14
The back of the bottle was marked at the top with
skulls and crossbones and the following warning
(emphasis in original):
DANGER-POISON
AVOID CONTACT WITH SKIN OR EYES.
DO NOT TASTE, SWALLOW OR BREATHE.
The back also contained certain general instructions on
use, as well as medical instructions should the product be
swallowed or come in contact with the skin or eyes.
Plaintiff read the warnings on the front of the bottle,
including the directions to wear rubber gloves, but did
not read the warnings on the back until after she sus-
tained her injuries.
Plaintiff spent three hours washing her windows
with a Whink-soaked towel wrapped around her
unprotected right hand. Later that afternoon, Plaintiff's
hand began to burn, she was unable to stop the pain with
water, and she was rushed to Dr. Splettstoesser’s clinic.
Plaintiff claims Splettstoesser negligently misdiagnosed
her chemical burns as an allergic reaction, resulting in
significant delays in appropriate treatment.
Plaintiff suffered second and third degree burns on
her right thumb and forefinger, and underwent two |
amputative surgeries to her right index finger. Plaintiff
has a permanent disability rating, and also suffers from
reflex sympathetic dystrophy.
App. 15
Il. CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
Plaintiff asserts the following claims against the fol-
lowing Defendants:
CLAIM TYPE DEFENDANT
First Negligence Whink
Second Products liability Whink
Third _ Negligence Super Foods
Fourth Breach of implied warranty Super Foods
Fifth Exemplary damages All
Sixth Medical malpractice Splettstoesser
Monte Vista
At oral argument, Plaintiff's counsel announced that
Plaintiff has settled the case with all Defendants except
Whink, and that documents reflecting that settlement
have been prepared and are in the process of being exe-
cuted.
Plaintiff seeks in excess of $70,000.00 in medical
expenses, damages for past and future lost wages, pain
and suffering, and exemplary damages.
Defendants raise two arguments in their Motion: (1)
Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the Federal Hazard-
ous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261 et seq., and (2)
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Plaintiff’s misuse. Because
I agree that Plaintiff’s claims are barred as a matter of law
by her own misuse, I do not reach Defendants’ preemp-
tion argument.
App. 16
Hl. THE UNCONTRADICTED FACTS REQUIRE DIS-
MISSAL OF THE FAILURE TO WARN ASPECTS OF
PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS
The strict liability concepts set out in § 402A of the
Restatement (2d) of Torts, as adopted in Colorado in
Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983
(1975), recognize two general categories of product lia-
bility actions - one where the product is claimed to be
organically defective, or, in the language of the Restate-
ment, “unreasonably dangerous,” and another where the
claimed defect is a failure to warn. See Jackson v. Harsco
Corp., 673 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1983).
Here, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint confuses these
two basic concepts with each other, and also confuses
strict liability with negligence, and unreasonable danger-
ousness with ultrahazardousness.'! Despite these short-
comings, it is clear that the focus of Plaintiff’s strict
liability and negligence claims is an alleged failure to
warn. See Amended Complaint {4 12(b) and 15. At oral
argument, Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that the gravamen
of Plaintiff’s failure to warn case is that Whink failed to
give the latent nature of the danger — the fact that the
product doesn’t burn until long after coming in contact
with the skin - adequate prominence, and that Plaintiff’s
expert would so testify. There are several problems with
this argument.
First, Plaintiff has not supported this argument with
her expert’s report or with transcripts from the expert’s
1 See Part IV below.
App. 17
deposition. Counsel's mere representations at this stage
are insufficient to create a triable issue of fact, in the face
of the undisputed presence of just such a warning in
what appears to me to be a fairly prominent place on the
front of the Whink bottle. See Sullivan v. Davis, 172 Colo.
49(), 474 P.2d 218 (1970).
More importantly, Plaintiff has admitted not only
that she read the warnings contained on the front of the
bottle, but that she understood them. See excerpts of
Plaintiff’s Deposition set forth in Part V.B below. Thus,
the warnings, however inadequate, managed to find their
way into Plaintiff’s consciousness. Any inadequacy could
therefore not, as a matter of law, have caused any of
Plaintiff's injuries. See Schultz v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 734
P.2d 146 (Colo. App. 1986).
This is really just a different way of describing the
conclusion reached in Part V.B below; namely, that Plain-
tiff misused the product by failing to heed the warnings
which she admittedly read and appreciated.
IV. WHINK STAIN REMOVER IS NOT “ULTRAHAZ-
ARDOUS”
At oral argument, Plaintiff's counsel indicated that
his use of the term “ultrahazardous” in his First and
Second Claims for Relief was not inartful, but rather that
Plaintiff is taking the position that Whink Rust Stain
Remover is indeed ultrahazardous in the sense that it
triggers absolute liable [sic]. Plaintiff’s argument in this
regard is wholly unsupportable.
App. 18
Our appellate courts have recognized only two speci-
fic activities as being so “ultrahazardous” as to render the
performers of these activities absolutely liable for all
damages arising therefrom. Those specific activities are
dynamite blasting (Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman,
133 Colo. 286, 294 P.2d 597 (1956)) and the impoundment
of water (Garnet Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Sampson, 48 Colo.
285, 110 P. 79 (1910)). Indeed, on every occasion since
1956 in which our appellate courts have been asked to
expand this doctrine into other areas, they have expressly
refused to do so. Liber v. Flor, 160 Colo. 7, 415 P.2d 332
(1960) (storage of dynamite is not ultrahazardous); Forrest
v. Imperial Distr. Serv. Inc., 712 P.2d 488 (Colo. App. 1987),
rev d on other grds., 741 P.2d 1251 (Colo. 1987) (storage and
handling of caustic chemicals is not ultrahazardous); and
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Public Serv. Co., 676 P.2d 25 (Colo.
App. 1983) (transmission of natural gas not ultrahazard-
ous). Cf. City of Northglenn v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 519 F.
Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1981), in which Judge Carrigan indi-
cated his belief that the Colorado courts would extend
the doctrine of ultrahazardousness to the storage of
underground gasoline tanks. I note, however, that when
Judge Carrigan decided Northglenn, he did not have the
benefit of either of the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme
Court’s opinions in Forrest. See generally Restatement (2d)
of Torts §§ 519 and 520 (recognizing the concept of ultra-
hazardousness but calling it “abnormally dangerous
activities”).
Plaintiff’s argument that Whink Rust Stain Remover
is ultrahazardous, and therefore that Whink is an abso-
lute insurer of any and all damage caused by its sale of its
App. 19
product, would, if adopted, represent an entirely unwar-
ranted and unprecedented expansion of the doctrine of
ultrahazardousness.
V. THE UNCONTRADICTED FACTS ESTABLISH MIS-
USE AS A MATTER OF LAW
A. General
The defense of misuse in a products case was first
expressly articulated by our Supreme Court in Jackson v.
Harsco Corp., supra. The Jackson Court described the
defense this way:
Misuse by an injured party which cannot rea-
sonably be anticipated by the manufacturer can
be utilized as a defense in a products liability
case by showing that the conduct of the user,
and not the alleged defect in the product, actu-
ally caused the accident.
673 P.2d at 367. See also Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse
Automotive Air Brake Co., 33 Colo. App. 99, 517 P.2d 406
(1973). There are thus two elements which must be
proved to establish the misuse defense: (1) the misuse
must be unforeseeable from the manufacturer’s point of
view, and (2) the misuse must have caused the injuries.
One kind of misuse arises when an injured party uses
a product for a purpose for which the product was not
intended. But our appellate courts have come to recog-
nize that it may also be misuse to use a product to
accomplish its intended purpose, but to do so in an
unforeseeably improper manner. See, e.g., Uptain v. Hut-
tington Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1986) Patterson v.
Magna American Corp., 754 P.2d 1385 (Colo. App. 1988).
App. 20
When the user is notified of the proper manner of use,
“the seller may reasonably assume that [such notice] will
be read and heeded.” Uptain, 723 P.2d at 1327, citing
Comment J to the Restatement (2d) of Torts § 402A.
B. It Is Uncontroverted That Plaintiff Read And
Understood The Warnings, And Unforeseeably
Misused The Product By Failing To Heed The
Warnings.
It is certainly true that the foreseeability of any mis-
use is a question of fact, generally inappropriate for reso-
lution by summary judgment. Uptain, supra.
On the other hand, where, as here, a plaintiff admits
to reading a warning, and to consciously choosing to
disregard the warning, and when heeding that warning
would have avoided all of a plaintiff’s injuries, then I do
not believe there is anything left for a jury to decide.
Plaintiff testified as follows regarding her reading
and appreciation of the front label warnings:
Q: Did you read the bottle before you opened it?
A: lI read the front part of it. Plaintiff’s Deposition,
p. 25, lines 18-20.
Q: Why didn’t you go get some gloves?
A: Because I didn’t have any gloves. Id. at 28, lines
23-24. |
Q: Before you used the product, did you read the
words “causes severe burns,” before you used
the product?
PO > DO >
App. 21
I read the front of that bottle.
All of it?
Yes.
Before you used the bottle?
Yes.
Id. p. at 45, lines 2-9.
Q.
A.
You didn’t have any questions about what [the
label] meant?
No.
Id. p. at 47, lines 11-13.
QO.
All right. We get down to the sentence that
‘reads: “Use only with heavy duty household
rubber gloves.” If I understand what you told
Mr. Cooper, the reason that you didn’t use
household rubber gloves was because you didn’t
have any there?
Right.
Any [sic] you didn’t want to spend the time to
go back to the store to get some?
Right. And by using the rag, I felt it was the
same way of not getting contact to my skin. I felt
it was thick enough, that there was no way it
could reach my skin.
Id. at 152, lines 21-25; 153, lines 1-5.
Q:
Did you think about going back to the store to
get rubber gloves?
A:
Q:
App. 22
I thought in my head: What harm could it do,
I’m not using it straight on my hand.
When you read that sentence, did you under-
stand that it was important to protect yourself
from this product contacting your skin?
Yes, I did.
Did you think about going back to the grocery
store to get rubber gloves so that that wouldn’t
happen?
No. Id. at 153, lines 14-25.
Even though you started out thinking that the
heavy rag would be sufficient to keep the prod-
uct away from your skin, at some point during
the cleaning process, you realized that it wasn’t
because you felt wetness on your skin, is that
right?
Yes.
At that time did you consider going back to the
grocery store to get some rubber gloves so you
wouldn’t have any additional contact on your
skin from the product?
No, because I didn’t feel nothing that would
indicate that something was wrong.
You did read the sentence that says: “Causes
severe burns which may not be immediately
painful or visible”?
When I was reading it as a paragraph, yes. Id. at
154, lines 8-25.
TG an iB Ae
App. 23
It is clear to me from this deposition transcript not
only that Plaintiff read and appreciated the warnings
placed on the front of the bottle, but also that there was
nothing on earth that Whink could have done to make
these warnings sink in.? This is one of those extreme
misuse cases, like Schultz v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 734 P.2d
146 (Colo. 1986), in which a manufacturer places warn-
ings on a product, the warnings are sufficient to be
understood and appreciated by the plaintiff, but the
plaintiff simply and plainly chooses to ignore the warn-
ings.
Uptain, which also involved injuries to a plaintiff
who used a cleaning product without rubber gloves, is
quite instructive. In affirming the trial court’s conclusion
that misuse was a question of fact for the jury, the
Supreme Court made much of the fact that the warnings
in that case did not contain explicit directions to wear
rubber gloves. Moreover, it was the plaintiff in Uptain
arguing that her misuse was foreseeable as a matter of
law, rather than the defendant arguing it was unforesee-
able. Finally, the plaintiff in Uptain used a swab to apply
the product; she came in contact with the product directly
only when periodically wringing the swab out during
rinses.
Here, the evidence is also undisputed, as it was in
Schultz, that had Plaintiff not ignored the warnings — that
is, had Plaintiff worn rubber gloves as directed - she
2 I have reviewed not only the portion of Plaintiff’s tran-
script which Defendants submitted with their briefs, but the
entire transcript, which I directed Defendants to submit prior to
the September 10, 1992 hearing.
App. 24
would have avoided her injuries entirely. Report of Dr.
Daniel A. Goldstein, dated May 28, 1991, attached as
Exhibit F to Whink’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Thus, it was Plaintiff’s own volitional act of using the
product contrary to the warnings which caused her inju-
ries, not any product defect or failure to warn.
VI. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons discussed above, Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to all of
Plaintiff’s claims against Whink, and all of those claims
are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This dismissal
will become a final judgment when Plaintiff’s claims
against the non-Whink Defendants are dismissed pur-
suant to the settlement.
Plaintiff and the non-Whink Defendants are directed
to file a stipulated motion for dismissal and draft order
reflecting their settlement within 30 days of the date of
this Order.
Dated this 14th day of September, 1992.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Morris B. Hoffman
Morris B. Hoffman
District Court Judge
cc: A. Walsh
F. James Donnelly
J. Ronald Voss
L. Heintz
D. Smith
SS Ms» ae
App. 25
APPENDIX F
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
ARTICLE VI
Paragraph 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
App. 26
APPENDIX G
15 USC § 1261,
s 1261. Definitions
For the purposes of this chapter -
(a) The term “territory” means any territory or pos-
session of the United States, including the District of
Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico but
excluding the Canal Zone.
(b) The term “interstate commerce” means (1) com-
merce between any State or territory and any place out-
side thereof, and (2) commerce within the District of
Columbia or within any territory not organized with a
legislative body.
(c) Omitted.
(d) The term “Commission” means the Consumer
Product Safety Commission.
(e) The term “person” includes an individual, part-
nership, corporation, and association.
(f) The term “hazardous substance” means:
(1) (A) Any substance or mixture of substances
which (i) is toxic, (ii) is corrosive, (iii) is an irritant, (iv) is
a strong sensitizer, (v) is flammable or combustible, or
(vi) generates pressure through decomposition, heat, or
other means, if such substance or mixture of substances
may cause substantial personal injury or substantial ill-
ness during or as a proximate result of any customary or
reasonably foreseeable handling or use, including reason-
ably foreseeable ingestion by children.
ovate? Soage
App. 27
(B) Any substances which the Commission by
regulation finds, pursuant to the provisions of section
1262(a) of this title, meet the requirements of subpara-
graph (1)(A) of this paragraph.
(C) Any radioactive substance, if, with respect
to such substance as used in a particular class of article or
as packaged, the Commission determines by regulation
that the substance is sufficiently hazardous to require
labeling in accordance with this chapter in order to pro-
tect the public health.
(D) Any toy or other article intended for use by
children which the Commission by regulation deter-
mines, in accordance with section 1262(e) of this title,
presents an electrical, mechanical, or thermal hazard.
(E) Any solder which has a lead content in
excess of 0.2 percent.
(2) The term “hazardous substance” shall not apply
to pesticides subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act, nor to foods, drugs and cosmetics
subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, nor
to substances intended for use as fuels when stored in
containers and used in the heating, cooking, or refrigera-
tion system of a house, nor to tobacco and tobacco prod-
ucts, but such term shall apply to any article which is not
itself a pesticide within the meaning of the Federal Insec-
ticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act but which is a
hazardous substance within the meaning of paragraph (1)
of this subsection by reason of bearing or containing such
a pesticide.
App. 28
(3) The term “hazardous substance” shall not
include any source material, special nuclear material, or
byproduct material as defined in the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended, and regulations issued pursuant
thereto by the Atomic Energy Commission.
(g) The term “toxic” shall apply to any substance
(other than a radioactive substance) which has the capac-
ity to produce personal injury or illness to man through
ingestion, inhalation, or absorption through any body
surface.
(h) (1) The term “highly toxic” means any substance
which falls within any of the following categories: (a)
Produces death within fourteen days in half or more than
half of a group of ten or more laboratory white rats each
weighing between two hundred and three hundred
grams, at a single dose of fifty milligrams or less per
kilogram of body weight, when orally administered; or
(b) produces death within fourteen days in half or more
than half of a group of ten or more laboratory white rats
each weighing between two hundred and three hundred
grams, when inhaled continuously for a period of one
hour or less at an atmospheric concentration of two hun-
dred parts per million by volume or less of gas or vapor
or two milligrams per liter by volume or less of mist or
dust, provided such concentration is likely to be encoun-
tered by man when the substance is used in any reason-
ably foreseeable manner; or (c) produces death within
fourteen days in half or more than half of a group of ten
or more rabbits tested in a dosage of two hundred milli-
grams or less per kilogram of body weight, when admin-
istered by continuous contact with the bare skin for
twenty-four hours or less.
dari sit aia
App. 29
(2) If the Commission finds that available data on
human experience with any substance indicate results
different from those obtained on animals in the above-
named dosages or concentrations, the human data shall
take precedence.
(i) The term “corrosive” means any substance
which in contact with living tissue will cause destruction
of tissue by chemical action; but shall not refer to action
on inanimate surfaces.
(j) The term “irritant” means any substance not cor-
rosive within the meaning of subparagraph (i) of this
section which on immediate, prolonged, or repeated con-
tact with normal living tissue will induce a local inflam-
matory reaction.
(k) The term “strong sensitizer” means a substance
which will cause on normal living tissue through an
allergic or photodynamic process a hypersensitivity
which becomes evident on reapplication of the same sub-
stance and which is designated as such by the Commis-
sion. Before designating any substance as a strong
sensitizer, the Commission, upon consideration of the
frequency of occurrence and severity of the reaction, shall
find that the substance has a significant potential for
causing hypersensitivity.
(1) (1) The terms “extremely flammable”, “flamma-
ble”, and “combustible” as applied to any substance,
liquid, solid, or the content of a self-pressurized container
shall be defined by regulations issued by the Commis-
sion.
App. 30
(2) The test methods found by the Commission to
be generally applicable for defining the flammability or
combustibility characteristics of any such substance shall
also be specified in such regulations.
(3) In establishing definitions and test methods
related to flammability and combustibility, the Commis-
sion shall consider the existing definitions and test
methods of other Federal agencies involved in the regula-
tion of flammable and combustible substances in storage,
transportation and use; and to the extent possible, shall
establish compatible definitions and test methods.
(4) Until such time as the Commission issues a reg-
ulation under paragraph (1) defining the term “combusti-
ble” as applied to liquids, such term shall apply to any
liquid which has a flash point above eighty degrees Fahr-
enheit to and including one hundred and fifty degrees, as
determined by the Tagliabue Open Cup Tester.
(m) The term “radioactive substance” means a sub-
stance which emits ionizing radiation.
(n) The term “label” means a display of written,
printed, or graphic matter upon the immediate container
of any substance or, in the case of an article which is
unpackaged or is not packaged in an immediate container
intended or suitable for delivery to the ultimate con-
sumer, a display of such matter directly upon the article
involved or upon a tag or other suitable material affixed
thereto; and a requirement made by or under authority of
this chapter that any word, statement, or other informa-
tion appear on the label shall not be considered to be
complied with unless such word, statement, or other
information also appears (1) on the outside container or
shi cr Sg. Mix tn yale asa iT NECA ce tak LOLS i WE tabi sae
SN al a) i PEIN co Ri Ss ALE
App. 31
wrapper, if any there be, unless it is easily legible through
the outside container or wrapper and (2) on all accom-
panying literature where there are directions for use,
written or otherwise.
(o) The term “immediate container” does not
include package liners.
(p) The term “misbranded hazardous substance”
means a hazardous substance (including a toy, or other
article intended for use by children, which is a hazardous
substance, or which bears or contains a hazardous sub-
stance in such manner as to be susceptible of access by a
child to whom such toy or other article is entrusted)
intended, or packaged in a form suitable, for use in the
household or by children, if the packaging or labeling of
such substance is in violation of an applicable regulation
issued pursuant to section 1472 or 1473 of this title or if
such substance, except as otherwise provided by or pur-
suant to section 1262 of this title, fails to bear a label -
(1) which states conspicuously (A) the
name and place of business of the manufacturer,
packer, distributor or seller; (B) the common or
usual name or the chemical name (if there be no
common or usual name) of the hazardous sub-
stance or of each component which contributes
substantially to its hazard, unless the Commis-
sion by regulation permits or requires the use of
a recognized generic name; (C) the signal word
“DANGER” on substances which are extremely
flammable, corrosive, or highly toxic; (D) the
signal word “WARNING” or “CAUTION” on all
other hazardous substances; (E) an affirmative
statement of the principal hazard or hazards,
such as “Flammable”, “Combustible”, “Vapor
App. 32
Harmful”, “Causes Burns”, “Absorbed Through
Skin”, or similar wording descriptive of the haz-
ard; (F) precautionary measures describing the
action to be followed or avoided, except when
modified by regulation of the Commission pur-
suant to section 1262 of this title; (G) instruction,
when necessary or appropriate, for first-aid
treatment; (H) the word “poison” for any haz-
ardous substance which is defined as “highly
toxic” by subsection (h) of this section; (I)
instructions for handling and storage of pack-
ages which require special care in handling or
storage; and (J) the statement (i) “Keep out of
the reach of children” or its practical equivalent,
or, (ii) if the article is intended for use by chil-
dren and is not a banned hazardous substance,
adequate directions for the protection of chil-
dren from the hazard, and
(2) on which any statements required
under subparagraph (1) of this paragraph are
located prominently and are in the English lan-
guage in conspicuous and legible type in con-
trast by typography, layout, or color with other
printed matter on the label.
The term “misbranded hazardous substance” also
includes a household substance as defined in section
1471(2)(C) of this title if it is a substance described in
paragraph (1) of subsection (f) of this section and its
packaging or labeling is in violation of an applicable
regulation issued pursuant to section 1472 or 1473 of this
title.
(q) (1) The term “banned hazardous sub-
stance” means (A) any toy, or other article
intended for use by children, which is a hazard-
ous substance, or which bears or contains a
App. 33
hazardous substance in such manner as to be
susceptible of access by a child to whom such
toy or other article is entrusted; or (B) any haz-
ardous substance intended, or packaged in a
form suitable, for use in the household, which
the Commission by regulation classifies as a
“banned hazardous substance” on the basis of a
finding that, notwithstanding such cautionary
labeling as is or may be required under this
chapter for that substance, the degree or nature
of the hazard involved in the presence or use of
such substance in households is such that the
objective of the protection of the public health
and safety can be adequately served only by
keeping such substance, when so intended or
packaged, out of the channels of interstate com-
merce: Provided, That the Commission, by regu-
lation, (i) shall exempt from clause (A) of this
paragraph articles, such as chemical sets, which
by reason of their functional purpose require the
inclusion of the hazardous substance involved
or necessarily present an electrical, mechanical,
or thermal hazard, and which bear labeling giv-
ing adequate directions and warnings for safe
use and are intended for use by children who
have attained sufficient maturity, and may rea-
sonably be expected, to read and heed such
directions and warnings, and (ii) shall exempt
from clause (A), and provide for the labeling of,
common fireworks (including toy paper caps,
cone fountains, cylinder fountains, whistles
without report, and sparklers) to the extent that
it determines that such articles can be ade-
quately labeled to protect the purchasers and
users thereof.
(2) Proceedings for the issuance, amend-
ment, or repeal of regulations pursuant to clause
App. 34
(B) of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be
governed by the provisions of sections 371(e),
(f), and (g) of Title 21: Provided, That if the
Commission finds that the distribution for
household use of the hazardous substance
involved presents an imminent hazard to the
public health, it may by order published in the
Federal Register give notice of such finding, and
thereupon such substance when intended or
offered for household use, or when so packaged
as to be suitable for such use, shall be deemed to
be a “banned hazardous substance” pending the
completion of proceedings relating to the issu-
ance of such regulations.
(r) An article may be determined to present an elec-
trical hazard if, in normal use or when subjected to
reasonably foreseeable damage or abuse, its design or
manufacture may cause personal injury or illness by elec-
tric shock.
(s) An article may be determined to present a
mechanical hazard if, in normal use or when subjected to
reasonably foreseeable damage or abuse, its design or
manufacture presents an unreasonable risk of personal
injury or illness (1) from fracture, fragmentation, or disas-
sembly of the article, (2) from propulsion of the article (or
any part or accessory thereof), (3) from points or other
protrusions, surfaces, edges, openings, or closures, (4)
from moving parts, (5) from lack or insufficiency of con-
trols to reduce or stop motion, (6) as a result of self-
adhering characteristics of the article, (7) because the
article (or any part or accessory thereof) may be aspirated
or ingested, (8) because of instability, or (9) because of
any other aspect of the article’s design or manufacture.
App. 35
(t) An article may be determined to present a ther-
mal hazard if, in normal use or when subjected to reason-
ably foreseeable damage or abuse, its design or
manufacture presents an unreasonably [sic] risk of per-
sonal injury or illness because of heat as from heated
parts, substances or surfaces.
App. 36
APPENDIX H
s 1262. Declaration of hazardous substances
(a) Declaration of hazardous substances by regulation;
review
(1) Whenever in the judgment of the Commis-
sion such action will promote the objectives of this
chapter by avoiding or resolving uncertainty as to its
application, the Commission may by regulation
declare to be a hazardous substance, for the pur-
poses of this chapter, any substance or mixture of
substances which it finds meets the requirements of
subparagraph (1) (A) of section 1261(f) of this title.
(2) Proceedings for the issuance, amendment, or
repeal of regulations under this subsection and the
admissibility of the record of such proceedings in other
proceedings, shall in all respects be governed by the
provisions of section 371(e), (f), and (g) of Title 21, except
that -
(A) the Commission’s order after public hear-
ing (acting upon objections filed to an order made prior
to hearing) shall be subject to the requirements of section
348(f) (2) of Title 21; and
(B) the scope of judicial review of such order
shall be in accordance with the fourth sentence of para-
graph (2), and with the provisions of paragraph (3) of
section 348(g) of Title 21.
App. 37
(b) Reasonable variations or additional label require-
ments
If the Commission finds that the requirements of
section 1261(p) (1) of this title are not adequate for the
protection of the public health and safety in view of the
special hazard presented by any particular hazardous
substance, it may by regulation establish such reasonable
variations or additional label requirements as it finds
necessary for the protection of the public health and
safety; and any such hazardous substance intended, or
packaged in a form suitable, for use in the household or
by children, which fails to bear a label in accordance with
such regulations shall be deemed to be a misbranded
hazardous substance.
(c) Exemption from requirements by regulation
If the Commission finds that, because of the size of
the package involved or because of the minor hazard
presented by the substance contained therein, or for other
good and sufficient reasons, full compliance with the
labeling requirements otherwise applicable under this
chapter is impracticable or is not necessary for the ade-
quate protection of the public health and safety, the Com-
mission shall promulgate regulations exempting such
substance from these requirements to the extent it deter-
mines to be consistent with adequate protection of the
public health and safety.
App. 38
(d) Exemption from requirements of this chapter of sub-
(e)
stances or containers adequately regulated by other
provisions of law
The Commission may exempt from the require-
ments established by or pursuant to this chapter any
hazardous substance or container of a hazardous
substance with respect to which it finds that ade-
quate requirements satisfying the purposes of this
chapter have been established by or pursuant to any
other Act of Congress.
Regulation of toys or articles intended for use by
children
(1) A determination by the Commission that a
toy or other article intended for use by children
presents an electrical, mechanical, or thermal hazard
shall be made by regulation in accordance with the
procedures prescribed by section 553 (other than
clause (B) of the last sentence of subsection (b) of
such section) of Title 5 unless the Commission elects
the procedures prescribed by subsection (e) of sec-
tion 371 of Title 21, in which event such subsection
and subsections (f) and (g) of such section 371 of
Title 21 shall apply to the making of such determina-
tion. If the Commission makes such election, it shall
publish that fact with the proposal required to be
published under paragraph (1) of such subsection
(e).
(2) If, before or during a proceeding pursuant to
paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Commission finds
App. 39
that, because of an electrical, mechanical, or thermal haz-
ard, distribution of the toy or other article involved pre-
sents an imminent hazard to the public health and it, by
order published in the Federal Register, gives notice of
such finding, such toy or other article shall be deemed to
be a banned hazardous substance for purposes of this
chapter until the proceeding has been completed. If not
yet initiated when such order is published, such a pro-
ceeding shall be initiated as promptly as possible.
(3)(A) In the case of any toy or other article
intended for use by children which is determined by the
Commission, in accordance with section 553 of Title 5, to
present an electrical, mechanical, or thermal hazard, any
person who will be adversely affected by such a deter-
mination may, at any time prior to the 60th day after the
regulation making such determination is issued by the
Commission, file a petition with the United States Court
of Appeals for the circuit in which such person resides or
has his principal place of business for a judicial review of
such determination. A copy of the petition shall be forth-
with transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Commis-
sion or other officer designated by it for that purpose.
The Commission shall file in the court the record of the
proceedings on which the Commission based its deter-
mination, as provided in section 2112 of Title 28.
(B) If the petitioner applies to the court for leave to
adduce additional evidence, and shows to the satisfaction
of the court that such additional evidence is material and
that there was no opportunity to adduce such evidence in
the proceeding before the Commission, the court may
order such additional evidence (and evidence in rebuttal
thereof) to be taken before the Commission in a hearing
App. 40
or in such other manner, and upon such terms and condi-
tions, as to the court may seem proper. The Commission
may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new
findings, by reason of the additional evidence_so taken,
and it shall file such modified or new findings, and its
recommendation, if any, for the modification or setting
aside of its original determination, with the return of
such additional evidence.
(C) Upon the filing of the petition under this para-
graph, the court shall have jurisdiction to review the
determination of the Commission in accordance with sub-
paragraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D) of paragraph (2) of the
second sentence of section 706 of Title 5. If the court
ordered additional evidence to be taken under subpara-
graph (B) of this paragraph, the court shall also review
the Commission’s determination to determine if, on the
basis of the entire record before the court pursuant to
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph, it is sup-
ported by substantial evidence. If the court finds the
determination is not so supported, the court may set it
aside. With respect to any determination reviewed under
this paragraph, the court may grant appropriate reliet
pending conclusion of the review proceedings, as pro-
vided in section 705 of Title 5.
(D) The judgment of the court affirming or setting
aside, in whole or in part, any such determination of the
Commission shall be final, subject to review by the
Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari or
certification, as provided in section 1254 of Title 28.
j
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7
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SE LPARAM RIL TREES INT A I:
App. 41
(f) Proceeding for promulgation of regulations
A proceeding for the promulgation of a regulation
under section 1261(q)(1) of this title classifying an article
or substance as a banned hazardous substance or a regu-
lation under subsection (e) of this section shall be com-
menced by the publication in the Federal Register of an
advance notice of proposed rulemaking which shall -
(1) identify the article or substance and the
nature of the risk of injury associated with the
article or substance;
) (2) include a summary of each of the regu-
latory alternatives under consideration by the
Commission (including voluntary standards);
(3) include information with respect to any
existing standard known to the Commission
4 which may be relevant to the proceedings,
4 together with a summary of the reasons why the
j Commission believes preliminarily that such
7 standard does not eliminate or adequately
reduce the risk of injury identified in paragraph
; (1);
(4) invite interested persons to submit to
the Commission, within such period as the
Commission shall specify in the notice (which
period shall not be less than 30 days or more
than 60 days after the date of publication of the
notice), comments with respect to the risk of
injury identified by the Commission, the regula-
tory alternatives being considered, and other
possible alternatives for addressing the risk;
Pe aa Oe ee eae ea
(5) invite any person (other than the Com-
mission) to submit to the Commission, within
ii such period as the Commission shall specify in
the notice (which period shall not be less than
App. 42
30 days after the date of publication of the
notice), an existing standard or a portion of a
standard as a proposed regulation under section
1261(q)(1) of this title or subsection (e) of this
section; and
(6) invite any person (other than the Com-
mission) to submit to the Commission, within
such period as the Commission shall specify in
the notice (which period shall not be less than
30 days after the date of publication of the
notice), a statement of intention to modify or
develop a voluntary standard to address the risk
of injury identified in paragraph (1) together
with a description of a plan to modify or
develop the standard.
The Commission shall transmit such notice within 10
calendar days to the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on
Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
(g) Publication of submitted standard as proposed regu-
lation
(1) If the Commission determines that any
standard submitted to it in response to an invitation
in a notice published under subsection (f)(5) of this
section if promulgated (in whole, in part, or in com-
bination with any other standard submitted to the
Commission or any part of such a standard) as a
regulation under section 1261(q)(1) of this title or
subsection (e) of this section, as the case may be,
would eliminate or adequately reduce the risk of
injury identified in the notice provided under sub-
section (f)(1) of this section, the Commission may
» .., 4
App. 43
publish such standard, in whole, in part, or in such
combination and with nonmaterial modifications, as
a proposed regulation under such section or subsec-
tion.
(2) If the Commission determines that -
(A) compliance with any standard submitted
to it in response to an invitation in a notice
published under subsection (f)(6) of this section
is likely to result in the elimination or adequate
reduction of the risk of injury identified in the
notice, and
(B) it is likely that there will be substantial
compliance with such standard, the Commission
shall terminate any proceeding to promulgate a
regulation under section 1261(q)(1) of this title
or subsection (e) of this section, respecting such
risk of injury and shall publish in the Federal
Register a notice which includes the determina-
tion of the Commission and which notifies the
public that the Commission will rely on the
voluntary standard to eliminate or reduce the
risk of injury, except that the Commission shall
terminate any such proceeding and rely on a
voluntary standard only if such voluntary stan-
dard is in existence. For purposes of this section,
a voluntary standard shall be considered to be
in existence when it is finally approved by the
organization or other person which developed
such standard, irrespective of the effective date
of the standard. Before relying upon any volun-
tary standard, the Commission shall afford
interested persons (including manufacturers,
consumers and consumer organizations) a rea-
sonable opportunity to submit written com-
ments regarding such standard. The
App. 44
Commission shall consider such comments in
making any determination regarding reliance on
the involved voluntary standard under this sub-
section.
(3) The Commission shall devise procedures to
monitor compliance with any voluntary standards -
(h)
(A) upon which the Commission has relied
under paragraph (2) of this subsection;
(B) which were developed with the partici-
pation of the Commission; or
(C) whose development the Commission
has monitored.
Publication of proposed rule with preliminary regu-
latory anal ysis
No regulation under section 1261(q)(1) of this
title classifying an article or substance as a banned
hazardous substance and no regulation under sub-
section (e) of this section may be proposed by the
Commission unless, not less than 60 days after pub-
lication of the notice required in subsection (f) of this
section, the Commission publishes in the Federal
Register the text of the proposed rule, including any
alternatives, which the Commission proposes to pro-
mulgate, together with a preliminary regulatory
analysis containing -
(1) a preliminary description of the poten-
tial benefits and potential costs of the proposed
regulation, including any benefits or costs that
cannot be quantified in monetary terms, and an
identification of those likely to receive the bene-
fits and bear the costs;
Sa we eee
App. 45
(2) a discussion of the reasons any stan-
dard or portion of a standard submitted to the
Commission under subsection (f)(5) of this sec-
tion was not published by the Commission as
the proposed regulation or part of the proposed
regulation;
(3) a discussion of the reasons for the
Commission’s preliminary determination that
efforts proposed under subsection (f)(6) of this
section and assisted by the Commission as
required by section 2054(a)(3) of this title would
not, within a reasonable period of time, be likely
to result in the development of a voluntary stan-
dard that would eliminate or adequately reduce
the risk of injury identified in the notice pro-
vided under subsection (f)(1) of this title; and
(4) a description of any reasonable alterna-
tives to the proposed regulation, together with a
summary description of their potentiai costs and
benefits, and a brief explanation of why such
alternatives should not be published as a pro-
posed regulation.
The Commission shall transmit such notice within 10
calendar days to the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on
Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
(i) Final regulatory analysis; publication; review
(1) The Commission shall not promulgate a regula-
tion under section 1261(q)(1) of this title classifying an
article or substance as a banned hazardous substance or a
regulation under subsection (e) of this section unless it
App. 46
has prepared a final regulatory analysis of the regulation
containing the following information:
(A) A description of the potential benefits and
potential costs of the regulation, including costs
and benefits that cannot be quantified in mone-
tary terms, and the identification of those likely
to receive the benefits and bear the costs.
(B) A description of any alternatives to the
final regulation which were considered by the
Commission, together with a summary descrip-
tion of their potential benefits and costs and a
brief explanation of the reasons why these alter-
natives were not chosen.
(C) A summary of any significant issues
raised by the comments submitted during the
public comment period in response to the pre-
liminary regulatory analysis, and a summary of
the assessment by the Commission of such
issues.
The Commission shall publish its final regulatory anal-
ysis with the regulation.
(2) The Commission shall not promulgate a regula-
tion under section 1261(q)(1) of this title classifying an
article or substance as a banned hazardous substance or a
regulation under subsection (e) of this section unless it
finds (and includes such finding in the regulation) -
(A) in the case of a regulation which
relates to a risk of injury with respect to which
persons who would be subject to such regula-
tion have adopted and implemented a voluntary
standard, that -
(i) compliance with such volun-
tary standard is not likely to result in
Lies 0p. pw id
App. 47
the elimination or adequate reduction
of such risk of injury; or
(ii) it is unlikely that there will be
substantial compliance with such vol-
untary standard;
(B) that the benefits expected from the reg-
ulation bear a reasonable relationship to its
costs; and
(C) that the regulation imposes the least
burdensome requirement which prevents or
adequately reduces the risk of injury for which
the regulation is being promulgated.
(3) (A) Any regulatory analysis prepared under
subsection (h) of this section or paragraph (1) shall not be
subject to independent judicial review, except that when
an action for judicial review of a regulation is instituted,
the contents of any such regulatory analysis shall consti-
tute part of the whole rulemaking record of agency action
in connection with such review.
(B) The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not be
construed to alter the substantive or procedural stan-
dards otherwise applicable to judicia! review of any
action by the Commission.
(j) Petition to initiate rulemaking
The Commission shall grant, in whole or in part, or
deny any petition under section 553(e) of Title 5, request-
ing the Commission to initiate a rulemaking, within a
reasonable time after the date on which such petition is
filed. The Commission shall state the reasons for granting
or denying such petition. The Commission may not deny
App. 48
any such petition on the basis of a voluntary standard
unless the voluntary standard is in existence at the time
of the denial of the petition, the Commission has deter-
mined that the voluntary standard is likely to result in
the elimination or adequate reduction of the risk of injury
identified in the petition, and it is likely that there will be
substantial compliance with the standard.
ee
ihe MO A Neda
App. 49
APPENDIX I
15 U.S.C. §1261, HISTORICAL NOTE
(b) (1) (A) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3),
if a hazardous substance or its packaging is subject to a
cautionary labeling requirement under § 2(p) or 3(b) [15
U.S.C. § 1261(p) or § 1262(p)] designed to prevent against
a risk of illness or injury associated with the substance,
no State or political subdivision of a State may establish
or continue in effect a cautionary labeling requirement
applicable to said substance or packaging and designed
to protect against the same risk of illness or injury unless
such cautionary labeling requirement is identical to the
labeling requirement under 2(p) or 3(b).
(B) Except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), if
under regulations of the Commission promulgated under
or for the enforcement of section 2(g) [subsec. (g) of this
section] a requirement is established to protect against a
risk of illness or injury associated with a hazardous sub-
stance, no State or political subdivision or a state may
establish or continue in effect a requirement applicable to
such substance and designed to protect against the same
risk of illness or injury unless such requirement is identi-
cal to the requirement established under such regula-
tions.
15 US.C. § 1261, Historical Note - Effect upon Federal
and State Law — Pub.L. 86-613, §18, formerly 17, July 12,
1960, 74 Stat. 380, as amended Pub.L. 89-756, §4 (a), Nov.
3, 1966, 80 Stat. 1305; renumbered and amended Pub.L.
91-113, §4(a), (b) (1), Nov. 6, 1969, 83 Stat. 189, 190; Pub.L.
94-284, §17(a), May 11, 1976, 90 Stat. 510.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.