Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Salazar v. Whink Products Co.

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Supreme Court, U.8.

FILED

\\ 941228 JAN 1 35 1995

No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1994

SANDRA SALAZAR,

Petitioner,

WHINK PRODUCTS CO., an Iowa corporation,

Respondent.

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Colorado Supreme Court

¢

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

F. JaMes DonneLLy, Esq.

Dyer DONNELLY & LILLEY

825 Logan Street

Denver, CO 80203-3114

(303) 861-3003

Attorney of Record

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the limited preemption provision contained in

the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §1261 et

seq. bars petitioner’s state common law tort claim.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ...........

TABLS OF} All TPs ee s+ 60h eee a kee eeueeaeeas

REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL

REPORTS OF OPINIONS DELIVERED IN THE

CASE 2k nn dccsassscckne sees Hane

CCC SCSECH4CCECHEREEHOROAHCHEBSO SOA ASRAAM 62 EO 2E ae 6.24 6 Oe ee es eS

PURE, BRIN 6 6 6s dns ble eae a ee

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC.............

SIATEMENT OF} TPR. CAG 6 5 xs cesicisusukesensnss

STAGE AT PROCEEDINGS FEDERAL QUESTIONS

WERE RARSE. . «+ <kin cugenis eae ees

ARGUMENT AMPLIFYING REASONS FOR WRIT..

A. BACKCsCAIING? FUG Bees ceeds euaweecavesses

B. LAW REGARDING BREADTH OF FEDERAL

PRRENGE CURIE 6 00 46a0 aca eee eee et

C. THE FEDERAL HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

WR Ri Oe te rs re ge eee

D. THE APPLICATION OF THE CIPOLLONE

CASE TO SALAZAR HEREIN IS PARTIC-

ULARES CPUS 305055 beaker hae aee eee eas

COIGCAARIIIN o05.0ks0000 seu ee eee,

10

APY DIUUses «vnc k0euk sateen see eee App. 1

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations

Board, 330 U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 91 L.Ed. 1234

5 orn r rr rrr Trt eet ete ol eee 7

Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579 (Colo.

| NSP TTT eer eet ee ee 18

Burke v. Dow Chemical Co., 797 F.Supp. 1128 (E.D.

Be PN iin vc itw ences vence sess cntevesssucees 15, 16

Chemical Specialties Manufacturers v. Allenby, 958

F.2d 942 (1992)... .. cc ccc cece cece cece cee reeeeees 17

Cipollone v. Liggett, __ U.S. __, 112 $.Ct. 2608, 120

L.B.2d 407 (1992)... 2.2... ccccerccccsecccees passim

Coutre v. Dow Chemical U.S.A., 804 F.Supp. 1298

(D. Mont. 1992) ........c cece cece cece renee eecees 15

CSX Transp. Inc. v. Easterwood, __ U.S. __ 113

S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993) ......---+-+-+5- 10

DeHaun v. Whink Products Company, 1994 WL

24322 (N.D. Ill. No. 91C0014).........-----+--- 20, 21

Duplin v. Whink Products Co., 1994 WL 197612

(Conn. Super. 1994)...... 0... e cece eee eee teen es 21

Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la

Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L.Ed.2d

OG TPM oon cc cece cece ccc ececceescccntteceneseees 7

Hawkinson v. A.H. Robbins Co. Inc., 595 F.Supp.

1290 (D. Colo. 1984)........ 6. cece eee eee teen eens 18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laborato-

ries, 471 U.S. 707, 104 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714

CREE 06.0 5k Nua tbe Nees eee wer eae rer tae ss tees 7

Jenkins v. James B. Day & Company, 634 N.E.2d 998

or erry ee re re errr e ee apy 12

Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 97 S.Ct.

i we ee Rs ere eer eer er ree 6

Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 837 P.2d 1273

so ot vor o's 5G Wd eS Re ee os 17

Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 101 S.Ct. 2114,

Gide DO SEI 84455 Cav eee canceehie veers 8

M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4

ee 2S Perr err recere rT re er rere 6

Moss v. Parks Corporation, 985 F.2d 736 (4th Cir.

Ee a ree PP ees Senne 12, 20, 21

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conserva-

tion and Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 103

SN. TEES, Fo Ce Fak EAN 8S ce scceres Gas cee 7

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 104

SC. GES, 7B Lute ae OES Coons ccd ctigcnsccess. 7

Tafoya v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 884 F.2d 1330 (10th

ee Pere ere ere ee ere Perr ere 18

Toy Mfrs. of America, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 806 F.Supp.

Dae Te GP BOD 6a 50% cbc eee ecsaeeeeose es sca’ 17

Union Ins. Co. v. RCA, 724 P.2d 89 (Colo.App.

ROR nnn 4 40ky 4 des chad cue dae a deeanes tae eeae er Gl 18

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Uptain v. Huntington Labs, 723 P.2d 1322 (Colo.

i.) ern rrr rrr ee ete 14

Wisconsin Public Intervenors v. Mortier, 501 U.S.

597, 111 S.Ct. 2476, 115 L.Ed.2d 532 i) ee 7

AUTHORITIES

Article VI, Clause 2, United States Constitution. . . 2, 6, 22

CRD VED oo kd ik cos von eewne ase Cee ene Ceres 18

Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act

(1965) 15 U.S.C. §1340...... 6. eee eee eee eens 8, 9

Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 USC.

GUIGL na ons cc ccanscdnnacddecneseg sd ye eee erre® passim

Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 oe. ae

Se: Preeti rere tr fe. 2: 44 33 Uh, Se

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide

Act (FIFRA) 7 U.S.C. §136 et seq. ..------+++eeeee: 15

Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C.

ey RON errie cree re tee 10

House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-

merce, H.R. Rep. No. 861, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. 2

(1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S. Code Cong. &

Admin. News, 2833......--cecceeeee cee eeereeseees 10

H.R. Rep. No. 2166, 89th Cong.2d Sess. 6,

reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

News, 4095 at 4097. .......-. ccc cece reece cere eens 11

Ohio Code, Section R.C. 2307.76(A)(1)....-----+-- 13, 14

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued

Page

Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act (1969), 15

es Ses 65 6H KA nas Cad aoa 1450S EE 9

Restatement (2nd) of Torts §402A................... 14

Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law

a OR PS 66 vc cievccseiddedsti sees 8

REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL

REPORTS OF OPINIONS DELIVERED IN THE CASE.

1. Trial court’s opinion upon defendant's

motion for summary judgment (Appendix

E)

2. Colorado Court of Appeals decision found

at Salazar v. Whink Products Co., 881 P.2d 431

(Colo.App. 1994) (Appendix C)

a Y *

GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION IS SOUGHT

Jurisdiction is sought for review by this court in

that the Colorado Supreme Court has decided

an important question of federal law which has

not, but should be, settled by this court.

Judgment was entered by the trial court on Sep-

tember 14, 1992.

The Colorado Court of Appeals decision was

issued April 7, 1994.

The Petition for Rehearing was denied by the

Colorado Court of Appeals on June 27, 1994.

The Petition for Certiorari was denied by the

Colorado Supreme Court on October 17, 1994.

¢

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court to

review the judgment by writ of certiorari pur-

suant to 28 U.S.C. §2104 and Rule 10(c) of the

Supreme Court Rules.

ore

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC.

See Appendix for following pertinent texts.

1. U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2

(Appendix F)

2. 15 U.S.C. §1261 (Appendix G)

3. 15 U.S.C. §1262 (Appendix H)

4. 15 U.S.C. §1261 (Historical Note) (Appendix

I)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves a personal injury action brought

by Sandra Salazar for injuries which occurred while Ms.

Salazar was using a household cleaning product manu-

factured by defendant, Whink Rust Stain Remover.

Ms. Salazar purchased the product from a grocery

store in order to wash her windows. She took the product

home and diluted it in water. She then wrapped a towel

around her finger, dipped that finger in the Whink/ water

mixture, and began washing her windows.

Whink contains a substance termed hydrofluoric acid

which does incipient damage to the human body. By the

time Ms. Salazar felt pain, it was too late. After a series of

operations, all uninsured, Ms. Salazar’s right index finger

had to be amputated. She continues to suffer reflex sym-

pathetic dystrophy as a result of the loss of the finger.

The trial court erroneously entered summary judg-

ment against plaintiff entirely upon state law grounds.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s

ruling. The Colorado Court of Appeals, however, did not

reach the issues relied upon by the trial court. Instead,

relying upon the recently decided case of Cipollone v.

Liggett, __ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407

(1992), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that plaintiff's

claims were preempted by the Federal Hazardous Sub-

stances Act, 15 U.S.C. §1261 et seq. It is with this holding,

and its unfair application, that appellant takes issue. Cer-

tiorari was denied by the Colorado Supreme Court on

October 17, 1994.

+

STAGE AT PROCEEDINGS FEDERAL

QUESTIONS WERE RAISED

The issue of preemption was first raised by defen-

dant Whink in its motion for summary judgment filed

January 7, 1992. In essence, Whink claimed that peti-

tioner’s claim was preempted by 15 U.S.C. §1261 et seq.

The trial court never reached the preemption issue.

The issue of preemption was next raised on appeal by

defendant Whink in their Reply Brief before the Court of

Appeals. The issue was briefed fully by both sides before

the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals ruled in Whink’s favor on the

Federal preemption issue. (Appendix C) The entire opin-

ion concerned the preemption issue.

The Colorado Supreme Court denied petitioner's

writ of Certiorari on the issue of Federal preemption.

(Appendix A)

ARGUMENT AMPLIFYING REASONS FOR WRIT

A. BACKGROUND FACTS

Plaintiff is a woman born in 1962, who resides in

Monte Vista, Colorado (R. p. 461, ll. 6-7). She has two

children who at the time of the accident were 14 and 7 (R.

p. 465, ll. 7-14).

At the time of the incident in question, plaintiff was

employed as an assistant manager at a Yellow Front store (R.

p. 472, ll. 10-19). In addition, she performed part-time work

as a cleaning lady (R. p. 463, ll. 6-11). Plaintiff did not

complete high school, and at the time of the incident she was

working to complete her GED (R. p. 462, |. 25 to p. 463, 1. 1).

On July 17, 1989 (R. p. 472, ll. 20-24) plaintiff was in

the process of doing some general house cleaning work

around her home (R. p. 474, ll. 8-10). Towards that pur-

pose, plaintiff visited Monte Vista Super Foods in order

to pick up some window cleaner (R. p. 474, ll. 11-21). Ms.

Salazar asked the store attendant if he knew of any prod-

uct that would clean water stains (R. p. 478, ll. 9-17). The

employee was unable to help her, but as Ms. Salazar was

leaving, another store employee recommended “Whink

Rust Stain Remover” (R. p. 479, 1. 25 to p. 480, 1. 1). On

that employee’s recommendation, Ms. Salazar purchased

a bottle of Whink (R. p. 480, Il. 2-9). The product was

purchased for the sum of $2.49 (R. p. 481, 1. 1). It

‘

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a

;

'

rs

appeared in the cleaning section of the store with other

household cleaners (R. p. 480, ll. 3-10).

A full copy of the bottle purchased by plaintiff is

found in the record on pages 289 and 290, page 289 being

the front and 290 the back. Plaintiff admits she read the

front of the bottle, but denies that she read the back (R. p.

481, ll. 18-22). The front of the bottle states:

DANGER - MAY BE FATAL OR CAUSE PER-

MANENT DAMAGE CAUSES SEVERE

BURNS WHICH MAY NOT BE IMME-

DIATELY PAINFUL OR VISIBLE VAPOR

HARMFUL CONTAINS HYDROFLUORIC

ACID KEEP OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN

Use only with heavy duty household rubber

gloves. Read back panel for additional precau-

tions and directions.

When she returned home, plaintiff proceeded upon

the task of washing her windows. She first washed her

windows with a wet sponge without Whink (R. p. 485, ll.

16-21). She then diluted the Whink she had purchased in

the water, wrapped a towel around her hand, and pro-

ceeded to rub the windows with the towel which had

been doused in the Whink-water mixture (R. p. 485, 1. 22

to p. 486, 1. 4). This seemingly innocent action cost plain-

tiff the use of her index finger on her dominant hand (R.

p. 488, ll. 19-22, and p. 486, ll. 5-7). All totaled, plaintiff

spent about three hours cleaning her windows (R. p. 486,

Il. 8-10).

Plaintiff at first noticed nothing unusual concerning

her hand. Towards the later afternoon, however, she felt a

tightness in her hand (R. p. 488, ll. 15-18). Soon thereafter,

she experienced a burning sensation (R. p. 490, ll. 1-4). In

order to alleviate the pain, plaintiff flushed her hands

with soap and water (R. p. 491, Il. 9-16). Unable to stop

the pain, plaintiff was then rushed to a local physician,

Dr. Robert Splettstoesser (R. p. 492, Il. 10-20).

The court’s ruling concerning summary judgment

upon liability made the remainder of the case moot.

Plaintiff, in her Disclosure Certificate (R. p. 47-56) and its

five supplements (R. pp. 208-210, 223-224, 228-229,

389-394, and 395-396), designated numerous medical

experts who were prepared to establish that as a result of

this single use of Whink, plaintiff suffered infection of

her right index finger, esteomyelitis of the right index

finger, amputation of the right index finger (R. p. 49),

reflex sympathetic dystrophy (R. pp. 208-209), and over

$100,000 in medical bills which were largely uninsured

(R. p. 554, ll. 9-23). In addition, plaintiff designated one

Mark Litvin, Ph.D., a rehabilitation counselor, who was

prepared to testify that plaintiff is virtually unemployable

(R. p. 208).

B. LAW REGARDING BREADTH OF FEDERAL

PREEMPTION

Article VI, Cl. 2 of the United States Constitution

states that the Constitution and laws of the United States

“shall be the supreme law of the land.” Any state law

which conflicts with federal law is thus “without effect.”

M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427, 4 L.Ed.

579 (1819).

In general, Congress may preempt state law explic-

itly by so stating; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 97

S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977); by passing a law

7,

which directly conflicts with state law, Pacific Gas & Elec.

Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation and Development

Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1722, 75 L.Ed.2d

752 (1983); or may do so by thoroughly occupying a field

so that there is no room left for the states to supplement

it. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458

U.S. 141, 153, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982).

Where Congress has not spoken, there is a presumption

against preemption in that Congress is free to speak with

drastic clarity whenever it chooses to assure full federal

authority. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Rela-

tions Board, 330 U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 91 L.Ed. 1234

(1947). In addition, there is a strong presumption against

preemption if preemption means superseding a state's

historical police power; Wisconsin Public Intervenors v.

Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 111 S.Ct. 2476, 115 L.Ed.2d 532

(1991); particularly when the regulation in question

relates to health and safety. Hillsborough County v. Auto-

mated Medical Laboratories, 471 U.S. 707, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85

L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464

U.S. 238, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed. 443 (1984), for example,

this court upheld an award of punitive damages to the

estate of a deceased lab analyst injured by a plutonium

release, despite federal regulatory control of nuclear facil-

ities by the Nuclear Regulations Commission.

The defendant in Silkwood, supra, argued that since

the Federal Government had regulated the entire field of

nuclear safety, an award of punitive damages sanctioned

by state law but not federal law, was in violation of

Federal Preemption. This court, however, distinguished

between Federal Preemption of state Safety Regulations

and preemption of state common law tort claims. Since

Congress was silent concerning state tort law, the court

stated that Congress did not intend to preclude the use of

state law remedies.

Recent decisions of this court have demonstrated a

restrictive view of the preemption doctrine in deference

to state’s rights. LAureENce H. Trise, AMERICAN CONSTITU-

TIONAL Law §6-25 at 479. The court has stated this reluc-

tance as a presumption that Congress did not intend to

preempt state law. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 101

S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981).

In 1992, this court decided Cipollone v. Liggett, __

U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992). Cipollone

involved a claim by the estate of a person who had died

from smoking cigarettes. The cigarette companies claimed

immunity from suit based upon two federal statutes; the

Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act enacted

in 1965, and the Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. Both Acts

had preemption provisions. Section 5 of the 1965 Act was

captioned “Preemption,” and stated:

(a) No statement relating to smoking and

health, other than the statement required by §4

of this Act, shall be required on any cigarette

package.

(b) No statement relating to smoking and

health shall be required in the advertising of any

cigarettes, the packages of which are labeled in

conformity with the provisions of this Act.

The 1969 Act, however, modified the preemption pro-

vision stating:

No requirement or prohibition based on

smoking and health shall be imposed under

state law with respect to the advertising or pro-

motion of any cigarettes, the packages of which

are labeled in conformity with the provisions of

this Act.

The court’s analysis began by rejecting defendant's

argument that either the 1965 or 1969 Act impliedly pre-

empted state law. When Congress considers preemption

through a specific preemption clause, it can be inferred

that that clause solely governs preemption or Congress

would have stated otherwise (Cipollone, supra, 112 S.Ct. at

2618). The court next turned its attention to the narrow

wording of the preemption clause in the 1965 Act. The

court found the clause: “No statement . . . shall be

required in the advertising of [properly labeled] ciga-

rettes,” merely prohibited state and federal rule-making

bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements

on cigarette labels or cigarette advertisements, and did

not prohibit state common law failure to warn claims.

In contrast, the 1965 Act utilized much broader lan-

guage that prohibited states from imposing “require-

ment[s] or prohibition[s] based on smoking and health

with respect to the advertising or promotion of any ciga-

rettes.” This emphasis on “requirements and prohibi-

tions” swept broadly and suggested no distinction

between positive enactments and common law. Thus, the

common law claims for failure to warn after the 1969 Act

were barred. The court did not, however, bar any com-

mon law claims which were not related to inadequate

warnings.

Thus, in the wake of Cipollone, whenever Congress

addresses the issue of preemption, the question becomes

10

largely a question of statutory construction, with a pre-

sumption mandated against preemption.

In a critical opinion by Justice Blackmun, concurring

in part and dissenting in part, Justice Blackmun predicted

a “hodge-podge” of lower court decisions. This predic-

tion has, at least in part, come true. Since Cipollone was

decided in June of 1992, it has been cited over 120 times

and the decisions are far from uniform. This court most

recently distinguished Cipollone in CSX Transp. Inc. v.

Easterwood, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387

(1993), holding that state common law claims for negli-

gence were not preempted by regulations passed pur-

suant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970.

C. THE FEDERAL HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

LABELING ACT

In 1960, Congress enacted the Federal Hazardous

Substances Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §1261 et seq. The pur-

pose of the law was to “provide nationally uniform

requirements for adequate cautionary labeling of pack-

ages of hazardous substances which are sold at interstate

commerce and intended or suitable for household use”

and to “provide a pattern which states may follow in

enacting similar legislation.” House Comm. on Interstate

and Foreign Commerce, H.R. Rep. No. 861, 86th Cong.2d

Sess. 2 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S. Code Cong. &

Admin. News, 2833, at 2833.

In 1966, the Federal Hazardous Substances Act was

amended as the Child Protection Act of 1966. As stated in

the bill’s legislative history:

11

It is impractical, unnecessary and undesir-

able for each such product to be labeled spe-

cially for those states and cities which have

developed their own standards for years during

which there was no federal law. The committee

now recommends a limited preemption amendment

which would encourage and permit states to adopt

requirements identical with the Federal requirements

for substances subject to the Federal Act, and to

enforce them to complement Federal enforcement,

but at the same time would free marketers of

products sold interstate from varying or added

labeling requirements. H.R. Rep. No. 2166, 89th

Cong. 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code

Cong. & Admin. News, 4095, at 4097. (emphasis

added)

The above statement on preemption would indicate

Congress’s sole concern of direct state regulation of

labels. The “limited preemption amendment” Congress

resultantly drafted is as follows:

(b)(1)(A) Except as provided in paragraphs (2)

and (3), if a hazardous substance or its packag-

ing is subject to a cautionary labeling require-

ment under §2(p) or 3(b) [15 U.S.C. §1261(p) or

§1262(p)] designed to prevent against a risk of

illness or injury associated with the substance,

no State or political subdivision of a State may

establish or continue in effect a cautionary labeling

requirement applicable to said substance or packag-

ing and designed to protect against the same risk of

illness or injury unless such cautionary labeling

requirement is identical to the labeling requirement

under 2(p) or 3(b).

(B) Except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3),

and (4), if under regulations of the Commission

12

promulgated under or for the enforcement of

section 2(g) [subsec. (g) of this section] a

requirement is established to protect against a

risk of illness or injury associated with a hazard-

ous substance, no State or political subdivision or a

state may establish or continue in effect a require-

ment applicable to such substance and designed to

protect against the same risk of illness or injury

unless such requirement is identical to the require-

ment established under such regulations.

15 U.S.C. §1261, Historical Note - Effect upon

Federal and State Law - Pub.L. 86-613, §18, for-

merly 17, July 12, 1960, 74 Stat. 380, as amended

Pub.L. 89-756, §4(a), Nov. 3, 1966, 80 Stat. 1305;

renumbered and amended Pub.L. 91-113, §4(a),

(b)(1), Nov. 6, 1969, 83 Stat. 189, 190; Pub.L.

94-284, §17(a), May 11, 1976, 90 Stat. 510.

(emphasis added)

Whether the above provision in fact preempts state

common law tort claims is a question that has not been

decided by this court. As stated previously, there is a split of

authority in jurisdictions throughout the country. In Moss v.

Parks Corporation, 985 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1993), for example,

the Fourth Circuit applied the preemption doctrine to all of

the plaintiffs’ failure to warn claims. However, even in that

extreme case, Plaintiff was allowed to bring claims which

argued that the defendants violated FHSA. Other jurisdic-

tions have adopted different approaches.

Jenkins v. James B. Day & Company, 634 N.E.2d 998

(1994), an Ohio Supreme Court case, involved a wrongful

death action from a death caused by inhalation of meth-

ylene chloride, a substance contained in a certain type of

paint stripper called “Marine Strip.” The decedent used

the Marine Strip while in her attic stripping paint from

13

furniture. The manufacturer defended the claim on the

grounds of Federal preemption through compliance with

FHSA. The trial court dismissed the case upon a sum-

mary judgment motion.

On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court first stated that

FHSA’s preemption clause preempted labeling require-

ments:

Unless such cautionary labeling require-

ment is identical to the labeling requirement

under Section 2(p) or 3(b) of Section 18(b)(1)(A)

of the FHSA, as amended by Pub. L. 94-284,

Section 17(a), 90 Stat. 510, reprinted in 15 U.S.C.

§1261 (quoted at page 1002 of the Opinion).

The court then next examined the language of FHSA

which required that the product affirmatively state the

principal hazard, the appropriate precautionary measure,

the appropriate first aid treatment, and the word “poi-

son” (15 U.S.C. §1261(p) and §1262, as cited by the court

at 1002). Next, the court turned its attention to the Ohio

Code, Section R.C. 2307.76(A)(1). That section provides

that a product is defective if, when it leaves control of the

manufacturer:

(a) The manufacturer knew or, in the exer-

cise of reasonable care, should have known

about a risk that is associated with the product

and that allegedly caused harm for which the

claimant seeks to recover compensatory dam-

ages;

(b) The manufacturer failed to provide the

warning or instruction that a manufacturer exer-

cising reasonable care would have provided

concerning that risk, in light of the likelihood

that the product would cause harm of the type

14

for which the claimant seeks to recover compen-

satory damages and in light of the likely seri-

ousness of that harm. §RC 2307.76(A)(1) Ohio

Code.

Comparing plaintiff's state law tort claims to the

requirements of FHSA, the court concluded that the tort

claims were, in essence, no different from the FHSA

requirements. Thus, the state did not mandate labeling

requirements which were not identical to FHSA’s require-

ments, and by the plain reading of the statute, preemp-

tion was inapplicable.

The court stated that the fact that the Consumer

Product Safety Division had not restrained dissemination

of the product, was not controlling. FHSA does not spec-

ify all the language required on a product’s warning

label. The manufacturer formulates his own warning lan-

guage, but the language is not reviewed for adequacy by

any federal agency. 15 U.S.C. §1262(b) grants the Con-

sumer Product Safety Commission authority to promul-

gate label requirements and §1262(c) allows it to exempt

substances from compliance. No section, however, calls

for final label approval of a product.

Just as Ohio state law did not pose requirements

upon the defendant outside of what was required by

FHSA, Sandra Salazar does not seek to impose additional

requirements herein. Colorado Products Liability law fol-

lows the Restatement (2nd) of Torts §402A. Uptain v. Hunt-

ington Labs, 723 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1986). Under Colorado

law, Salazar must prove that the Whink substance was

“unreasonably dangerous,” a requirement which adds

nothing to the dictates of 15 U.S.C. §§1261 and 1262.

15

In a Montana Federal District Court case, Coutre v.

Dow Chemical U.S.A., 804 F.Supp. 1298 (D. Mont. 1992),

the court took a slightly different approach. Coutre

involved a claim by a rancher who had contracted cancer

through the use of a herbicide. The substance in question

was governed by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and

Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) 7 U.S.C. §136 et seqg., which

had a preemption clause similar to FHSA, which stated as

follows:

Such states shall not impose or continue in

effect any requirements for labeling or packag-

ing in addition to or different from those

required under this subchapter. 7 U.S.C.

§136V(a)(b)

The defendant moved for summary judgment upon

grounds of compliance with FIFRA. Relying upon the

narrow construction mandate of Cipollone, however, the

court denied the motion stating:

The language of Section 136V(b) can hardly

be interpreted as providing “unambiguous evi-

dence of a clear and manifest purpose of Con-

gress to displace state sovereignty ... ”

This court remains circumspect in applying a

broad preemption analysis which would dis-

place state law and would extinguish an indi-

vidual’s rights under state law to pursue a

common law damages action. (Jd. at 1302)

Burke v. Dow Chemical Co., 797 F.Supp. 1128 (E.D. N.Y.

1992) also involves a claim brought under FIFRA. In

Burke, two unborn children contacted brain cancer due to

their mother’s exposure to a household insecticide manu-

factured by Dow Chemical Company. The court first

16

reviewed toxic liability from a historical prospective. Tra-

ditionally, the states have performed that function

through statutory and common-law tort rules. In contrast,

the federal government only entered the field recently,

with an emphasis more in terms of protecting the flow of

commerce than in protecting the public. No federal

agency, stated the court, tests products for the dangers of

pregnant women. Individuals are still largely protected

through state tort law (Id. at 1132).

The court then turned its attention to FIFRA regula-

tions. While administered by the Environmental Protec-

tion Agency, most of the information concerning a

product is derived from the manufacturer. The EPA does

not conduct independent testing. Much of the informa-

tion which is placed before the EPA is withheld from the

public (Id. at 1134). On the basis of information provided

by the registrant, the EPA must register the product if it

determines that (a) its composition is such to warrant the

product claims of success; (b) its labeling complies with

FIFRA; (c) it will perform as intended; and (d) when used

in accordance with widespread and commonly recog-

nized practices, it will not generally cause unreasonable

adverse effects on the ertvironment. While there is room

for public input in the process, there is no watchdog over

the EPA, and the Ralph Naders of the world are limited

(Id. at 1135).

With this backdrop, the court reviewed the FIFRA

preemption clause (similar to the FHSA), and found it

read somewhere between the 1965 and 1969 cigarette

laws discussed in Cipollone. The court thus ruled that if

the EPA approved labels were affixed to the containers,

plaintiffs could not claim the defendant’s products were

17

mislabeled. However, if plaintiffs claimed that defendant

should have taken other steps to protect the public, such

as a limitation upon sales only to professionals, or more

general warnings to users other than on the label, such an

argument survives the preemption clause. The motion for

summary judgment was then denied in total. See also, Toy

Mfrs. of America, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 806 F.Supp. 336 (D.

Conn. 1992); Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 837 P.2d

1273 (Hawaii 1992); and Chemical Specialties Manufacturers

v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 942 (1992).

Salazar submits that there are valid reasons why this

court should hold that FHSA does not preempt her claim.

First of all, FHSA’s preemption clause, as stated in the

legislative history, is a “limited” preemption clause. The

word “limited” can only mean that legislators anticipated

that some state claims could be brought along with FHSA

claims. As applied by the Colorado Court of Appeals, it is

difficult to understand what that limitation would be.

Secondly, the preemption provision of FHSA specifically

mandates that the states are only “encouraged to adopt

requirements identical to the federal requirements” and

to “compliment” federal enforcement. This language

reflects a clear intent not to preempt state law claims.

Thirdly, the wording of FHSA’s preemption provision is

more akin to the 1965 Cigarette Act than the 1969 Act,

,

which speaks of “requirements and prohibitions,” rather

than simply “requirements.” Fourthly, despite the man-

date of Cipollone, the Colorado Court of Appeals applied

preemption too broadly. The plaintiff was left without a

case after the Court of Appeals’ ruling. The ruling

ignored plaintiff’s repeated pleadings that Whink was

18

negligent in the design of the product and that the prod-

uct should not have been sold, regardless of the adequacy

of the warnings (R. Vol. I, pp. 13-14, Vol. II, pp. 338-339,

Vol. V, p. 21, 1. 17 to p. 23, 1. 4). Finally, as stated by the

Ohio Supreme Court, the relief requested by Salazar sad-

dles Whink with no requirements additional to those

mandated by FHSA.

D. THE APPLICATION OF THE CIPOLLONE

CASE TO SALAZAR HEREIN IS PARTIC-

ULARLY UNFAIR.

This matter was filed on July 19, 1990, well prior to

the Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone. At the time the

case was filed, Colorado law was clear that compliance

with federal law merely created a presumption that the

product was not defective, which could be overcome by

competent evidence. As stated in C.R.S. 13-21-403:

In any product liability action, it shall be

rebuttably presumed that the product which

caused an injury, death, or property damage,

was not defective and that the manufacturer or

seller thereof was not negligent if the product:

(b) Complied with, at the time of the sale

by the manufacturer, any applicable code, stan-

dard, or regulation adopted or promulgated by

the United States or by this state, or by any

agency of the United States or of this state.

See also Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579

(Colo. 1984); Hawkinson v. A.H. Robbins Co. Inc., 595

F.Supp. 1290 (D. Colo. 1984); Union Ins. Co. v. RCA, 724

P.2d 80 (Colo.App. 1986); Tafoya v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,

884 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1989).

a

19

Plaintiff has never in this action admitted that

Whink’s product complied with FHSA. To the contrary,

plaintiff simply planned to allow Whink to present its

evidence and then argue to the jury that, at best, any

compliance found by the jury only created a rebuttable

presumption.

On January 7, 1992, Whink moved for summary judg-

ment based both upon the preemption grounds and

plaintiff’s failure to heed warnings on the bottle. While

Whink’s motion was pending, in late June 1992, the court

decided Cipollone. On August 4, 1992, before Cipollone

even made the reporters, the court entered an order set-

ting Whink’s motion for summary judgment for hearing

(R. p. 435). In that order, the court specifically limited its

inquiry to the “misuse” defense, and not the issue of

preemption. On September 14, 1992, Judge Hoffman, in

an order which was in error according to Colorado law,

dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims (R. pp. 235-243). Judge

Hoffman specifically did not reach the preemption issue.

On January 13, 1993, plaintiff filed her appeal. After

reviewing briefs and oral arguments, the Colorado Court

of Appeals did not reach the issue decided by Judge

Hoffman. Instead, the court held that plaintiff’s action

was barred by the Cipollone case.

The point of the above chronology is that plaintiff

never conducted adequate discovery concerning Whink’s

compliance with FHSA. This was because when plaintiff

prepared her case, the law was that compliance with a

federal regulation concerning a warning was only one

item of evidence which a jury may consider. Shortly after

the law changed, however, Judge Hoffman dismissed the

20

case on other grounds, and plaintiff was unable to obtain

discovery concerning compliance with federal statutes

and regulations.

The case of DeHaun v. Whink Products Company, 1994

WL 24322 (N.D. Ill. No. 91C0014), decided in the North-

ern District of Illinois on January 26, 1994, is applicable to

the situation at hand. In DeHaun, the plaintiff used the

same product as used by plaintiff herein. In order to

“derust” the family clothing, she sat cross-legged on the

floor, wearing rubber gloves, and followed her usual

derusting procedure as follows:

1. She held the article of clothing in her left

hand;

2. She sprayed the rust stain on the clothing

with water from the spray bottle;

3. She applied the product to the stain;

4. She placed the open bottle of product on the

floor; and

5. She rolled the article of clothing so that the

treated stain was surrounded by the rest of

the garment.

_ While applying the product on the day in question, Mrs.

DeHaun spilled some of the product on her leg. As a

result, she suffered a very severe burn to her leg, which

required a lengthy hospital stay.

Upon a motion for summary judgment by Whink, the

court applied Cipollone to dismiss the failure to warn

claims. The court then, however, relying upon Moss v.

Parks Corporation, 985 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1993), allowed

plaintiff to amend her complaint alleging violations of

21

FHSA. As the DeHaun court pointed out, the Moss v. Parks

Corporation decision, supra, sanctioned a private right of

action for violations of FHSA. The plaintiff was allowed

to amend her complaint, and proceed under that amend-

ment. Plaintiff in DeHaun was subsequently able to pre-

sent evidence which lead to the conclusion that the same

substance which is in issue in this matter violated FHSA.

See also Duplin v. Whink Products Co., 1994 WL 197612

(Conn. Super. 1994).

At a minimum, should this court disagree with plain-

tiff’s other contentions, the manifest injustice caused by

the timing of the Cipollone decision in this matter should

warrant a remand so that plaintiff can be allowed to

argue Whink’s failure to comply with FHSA.

+

CONCLUSION

For each of the reasons stated above, plaintiff Sandra

Salazar hereby petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari

reviewing the decisions of the Colorado Court of Appeals

and the denial of certiorari by the Colorado Supreme

Court.

Respectfully submitted this 13th day of January, 1995.

Dyer DONNELLY & LILLEY

F. JaMes DONNELLY #12243

825 Logan Street

Denver, CO 80203-3114

(303) 861-3003

a naan aR Aenrat

APPENDIX

A. Colorado Supreme Court denial of

Pe, | re ee ee App.

B. Colorado Court of Appeals denial of

Petition for Rehearing ......----++++++++ App.

C. Colorado Court of Appeals Opinion ..... App.

D. Colorado trial court’s denial of Motion

eS”. | eee ree App.

E. Colorado trial court’s Opinion........--- App.

F US. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2 ...App.

CH UE os css oe cee eerste App.

H. 25 U.S.C. GI262. 2.265 eee ccccerewcrescens App.

I. 15 U.S.C. §1261 (Historical Note) ......-. App.

App. 1

App. 1

APPENDIX A

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO

CASE NO. 945C381

CERTIORARI TO THE COLORADO COURT OF

APPEALS, 93CA0055

DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER,

90CV7830

ORDER OF COURT

SANDRA SALAZAR,

Petitioner,

v.

WHINK PRODUCTS CO., an Iowa corporation,

Respondent.

Upon consideration of the Petition for Writ of Cer-

tiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, and after review

of the record, the briefs, and the judgment of said Court

of Appeals,

IT IS THIS DAY ORDERED that said Petition for Writ

of Certiorari shall be, and same hereby is, DENIED.

BY THE COURT, EN BANC, OCTOBER 17, 1994.

cc: F. James Donnelly

DYER DONNELLY & LILLEY

825 Logan Street

Denver, CO 80203-3114

J. Ronald Voss

Amelia L. Klemme

RETHERFORD, MULLEN, JOHNSON & BRUCE

App. 2

P.O. Box 1580

Colorado Springs, CO 80901-1580

Honorable’ Morris B. Hoffman

Denver District Court

City and County Building

1437 Bannock Street

Denver, CO 80202

Clerk of the District Court Denver District Court

City and County Building

1437 Bannock Street

Denver, CO 80202

Patrick H. Stanford, Clerk

Colorado Court of Appeals

[SEAL]

Supreme Court

State of Colorado

Certified to be a full, true and correct copy

OCT. 18, 1994

MAC V. DANFORD

Clerk of the Supreme Court

By /s/ Illegible

Deputy Clerk

App. 3

APPENDIX B

THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF COLORADO

Case Number 93CA0055

ORDER

SANDRA SALAZAR V WHINK PRODUCTS COMPANY

Upon consideration of the Petition for Rehearing filed by

the Appellant herein, the Petition is hereby DENIED. It is

ordered that issuance of the Mandate is stayed to and

including June 27, 1994 provided that if a Petition for

Writ of Certiorari is timely filed with the Supreme Court

of the State of Colorado, the stay shall remain in effect

until disposition of the cause by the Supreme Court.

BY THE COURT:

Sternberg, C.J.

Briggs, J.

Tursi, J.

DATED: May 26, 1994

[SEAL]

App. 4

APPENDIX C

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS April 7, 1994

No. 93CA0055

Sandra Salazar,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

Whink Products Company, an Iowa corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the District Court of the City and County of

Denver

Honorable Morris B. Hoffman, Judge

No. 90CV7830

Division I JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE STERNBERG

Briggs and Tursi*, JJ., concur

Dyer Donnelly & Lilley, F. James Donnelly, Denver, Colo-

rado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Retherford, Mullen, Johnson & Bruce, J. Ronald Voss,

Amelia L. Klemme, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for

Defendant-Appellee

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provi-

sions of the Colo. Const. art. VI, Sec. 5(3), and

§ 24-51-1105, C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 10B).

eo

App. 5

In this products liability action, plaintiff, Sandra

Salazar, appeals the summary judgment entered in favor

of defendant, Whink Products Co., which determined

that Whink was not liable for plaintiff's injuries resulting

from her use of its product, Whink Rust Stain Remover.

We affirm.

Plaintiff asserts that genuine issues of material fact

remain as to the adequacy of the warnings on the product

and the foreseeability of her failure to heed those warn-

ings. Whink contends that the trial court properly dis-

missed plaintiff’s claims on the basis of her unforeseeable

misuse of the product, but also argues that her claims are

preempted by the Federal Hazardous Substances Act

(FHSA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1277 (1988). It is undisputed

that the label on the product at issue complies with the

FHSA, and we conclude that the FHSA preempts plain-

tiff’s duty to warn claims. Thus, we affirm the summary

judgment, but on grounds different from those relied

upon by the trial court.

Under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., art. VI, cl.

2, state laws which “interfere with or are contrary to the

laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution,”

are invalid. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L.Ed.

23 (1824). Whether a federal statute preempts a state law

or claim turns on Congressional intent, and that intent

may be explicit in the statute itself. Cipollone v. Liggett

Group, Inc.,___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407

(1992).

In its most recent pronouncement on federal preemp-

tion, the United States Supreme Court held that a broad

statement in a federal law prohibiting state regulation

App. 6

also bars common law tort claims. Cipollone v. Liggett

Group, Inc., supra.

The federal laws at issue in Cipollone were the Fed-

eral Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (1965 Ciga-

rette Act) and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of

1969 (1969 Cigarette Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1988).

The preemption provision in the 1965 Cigarette Act was

narrow and stated: “No statement relating to smoking and

health shall be required in the advertising of [properly

labeled] cigarettes.” Cipollone, supra, __ U.S. at __, 112

S.Ct. at 2618, 120 L.Ed.2d at 421 (emphasis in original).

Congress’ emphasis on the words “statement” and

“advertising” led the Court to conclude that the 1965

Cigarette Act preempted only state and federal regula-

tions requiring additional warnings, but did not affect

state law damages actions.

The 1969 Cigarette Act, however, used much broader

language; it barred not merely “statements,” but any

“requirement[s] or prohibition[s] . . . imposed under state

law.” Cipollone, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2619, 120

L.Ed.2d at 422. This language, the Court held, indicated

legislative intent to ban state common law labeling and

duty to warn claims along with direct state regulation of

labels.

The court noted that: “[T]he phrase ‘[n]o requirement

or prohibition’ sweeps broadly and suggests no distinc-

tion between positive enactments and common law; to

the contrary, those words easily encompass obligations

that take the form of common law rules.” Cipollone, supra,

__ U.S. at __, 112 S.Ct. at 2620, 120 L.Ed.2d at 426.

OL GAR EERIE Ae EAS

App. 7

In order to succeed in the wake of Cipollone, then, the

plaintiff would have to show that FHSA’s preemption

language is less sweeping than the language of the 1969

Cigarette Act; however, we can discern no significant

difference between the two.

The FHSA was enacted in 1960 to mandate labeling

of certain “hazardous” consumer products intended for

use in the household or by children. Chemical Specialties

Manufacturers Ass‘n v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1992).

The purpose of the Act was to “provide nationally uni-

form requirements for adequate cautionary labeling.”

House Committee On Interstate and Foreign Commerce,

Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, H.R. Rep.

No. 1861, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960), reprinted in 1960

U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 2833. The scope of the

Act’s coverage as to these products is extremely broad.

Toy Manufacturers of America, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 986 F.2d

615 (2d Cir. 1992). Thus, the central requirement of the

Act is that manufacturers of hazardous products provide

cautionary labels clearly indicating the hazards and pro-

viding consumers with directions for use. The parties do

not dispute that the label on Whink Rust Stain Remover

comports with the FHSA’s labeling requirements.

As enacted, the FHSA did not contain a preemption

section. However, when the Act was amended in 1966,

the legislative history discussed the impracticality of hav-

ing the states produce potentially fifty different labels for

a particular hazardous substance. House Committee On

Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Child Protection Act of

1966, H.R.Rep. No. 2166, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966),

reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4095,

App. 8

4097. The 1966 amendments added a limited preemption

provision which provides as follows:

It is hereby expressly declared that it is the

intent of the Congress to supersede any and all

laws of the States and political subdivisions

thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter

provide for the precautionary labeling of any

substance or article intended or suitable for

household use (except for those substances

defined in sections 2(f) (2) and (3) of this Act)

which differs from the requirements or exemp-

tions of this Act or the regulations or interpreta-

tions promulgated pursuant thereto. Any law,

regulation, or ordinance purporting to establish

such a labeling requirement shall be null and

void.

Child Protection Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-756, 80 Stat.

1303 (1966) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (1988)); see

also § 13-21-403 (1)(b) C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 6A)

(emphasis added).

In our view, the language prohibiting a state from

imposing “a requirement” for labeling that is not identi-

cal to the labeling requirements under the Act is as inclu-

sive as the language of the 1969 Cigarette Act stating that

“no requirement or prohibition” shall be imposed under

state law. The prohibition of “a requirement” is the func-

tional equivalent of “no requirement.” See Arkansas-Platte

& Gulf v. Van Waters & Rogers, 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir.

1993).

We find persuasive the reasoning of the court in Moss

v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1993), which held that

the FHSA preempted common law failure to warn claims

when the plaintiff seeks additional or more clearly stated

App. 9

warnings than those required by the FHSA. In determin-

ing that the FHSA applied to common law tort actions as

well as state labeling regulations, the court stated that:

“{I]f federal law mandates a specific label and permits

nothing additional or different, it can hardly be urged

that a state tort duty based on a warning requirement that

is more elaborate and different does not conflict. The

manufacturer in that case cannot comply with both.”

Moss v. Parks Corp., supra, at 739-740.

Moreover, the purposes underlying both legislative

regulation of labeling and a state common law duty to

warn are the same. Indeed, a state common law duty to

warn is nothing more than a duty to label a product to

provide information. In that sense, the common law duty

is no less “a requirement” in the preemption scheme than

a state statute imposing the same burden. The objective of

the common law duty and a regulatory statute are the

same. Both address a manufacturer’s duty to convey

information about a product through the medium of a

label.

That a common law action can result in an award of

damages to an injured party does not detract from the

ultimate purpose of imposing a duty to warn the users of

a product about its potential dangers or other properties.

Therefore, we find it only logical to hold that the common

law duty to warn is subjected to the same federal pre-

emptive constraints as a state statute.

Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff seeks addi-

tional, different, or more clearly stated warnings, her -

claim is expressly preempted by the FHSA.

App. 10

Because of our disposition of this issue, it is unneces-

sary to address the remaining issues.

Judgment affirmed.

JUDGE BRIGGS and JUDGE TURSI concur.

App. 11

APPENDIX D

DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER,

COLORADO

Case No 90CV7830 Courtroom 21

ORDER

SANDRA SALAZAR,

Plaintiff,

VS.

WHINK PRODUCTS, CO., et al,

Defendants.

Plaintiff’s “Motion For New Trial with Accompany-

ing Brief (Rule 59 C.R.C.P.),” filed October 14, 1992, as

amended by Plaintiff's “Amendment To Motion For New

Trial,” filed October 15, 1992, is DENIED.

DATED this 30th day of November, 1992.

BY THE COURT

/s/ Morris B. Hoffman

Morris B. Hoffman

District Judge

cc: F. James Donnelly

Arthur B. Walsh

J. Ronald Voss

12/1/92

aa

App. 12

APPENDIX E |

DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, |

COLORADO

Case No. 90-CV-7830 Courtroom 21

cninicieeuhansinicaintenaishaeatitanistiiaibainaniniananiamamnaiatisanainpstii |

ORDER

SANDRA SALAZAR,

Plaintiff,

Vv.

WHINK PRODUCTS CO., an lowa corporation and

MONTE VISTA ARAPAHOE, INC., dba MONTE VISTA

SUPER FOODS, a Colorado Corporation, ROBERT W.

SPLETTSTOESSER, M.D., and MONTE VISTA PROFES-

SIONAL ASSOCIATES,

Defendants.

THIS MATTER is before me on a Motion for Sum-

mary Judgment filed by Defendant Whink Products Com-

pany (“Whink”) on January 8, 1992, joined by Defendants

Monte Vista Arapahoe, Inc. (“Super Foods”), Robert W. }

Splettstoesser (“Splettstoesser”) and Monte Vista Profes-

sional Associates (“Monte Vista”). Based on my review of

the Motion and briefs, the affidavits, and the case file,

and the hearing held on the Motion on September 10,

1992, I rule as follows.

I. INTRODUCTION

Motions for summary judgment are disfavored, and

the allegations of the non-movant must be taken as true

App. 13

unless they are clearly disproved by unrebutted affidavits

or products of discovery. Continental Air Lines. Inc. v.

Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987). With this standard in

mind, the material facts of this case are as follows.

The case arises out of Plaintiff’s allegations that she

was injured while using Whink Rust Stain Remover, and

that she was thereafter negligently treated for her inju-

ries. At the time of her injuries, Plaintiff had been in the

professional cleaning business for 11 years. She cleaned

offices as well as private residences. In July 1989, Plaintiff

visited Defendant Super Foods for the purpose of pur-

chasing a window cleaner, apparently to use on some

water stained windows in Plaintiff's own home. In

reliance on a specific recommendation of the owner of the

Super Foods store, Plaintiff purchased a bottle of Whink

Rust Stain Remover. Whink Rust Stain Remover is a

cleaning fluid designed to remove rust stains from fabrics

and well as sinks and toilet bowls. It is 8% hydrofluoric

acid.

The bottle which Plaintiff purchased contained the

following warnings on the front of the bottle (emphasis in

original):

Not a general purpose rust remover.

Read precautions and directions before using.

DANGER: MAY BE FATAL OR CAUSE PERMA-

NENT DAMAGE. CAUSES SEVERE BURNS

WHICH MAY NOT BE IMMEDIATELY PAIN-

FUL OR VISIBLE. VAPORS HARMFUL. CON-

TAINS HYDROFLUORIC ACID. KEEP OUT OF

REACH OF CHILDREN. Use Only With Heavy

Duty Household Rubber Gloves. Read back

panel for additional pre-cautions and directions.

App. 14

The back of the bottle was marked at the top with

skulls and crossbones and the following warning

(emphasis in original):

DANGER-POISON

AVOID CONTACT WITH SKIN OR EYES.

DO NOT TASTE, SWALLOW OR BREATHE.

The back also contained certain general instructions on

use, as well as medical instructions should the product be

swallowed or come in contact with the skin or eyes.

Plaintiff read the warnings on the front of the bottle,

including the directions to wear rubber gloves, but did

not read the warnings on the back until after she sus-

tained her injuries.

Plaintiff spent three hours washing her windows

with a Whink-soaked towel wrapped around her

unprotected right hand. Later that afternoon, Plaintiff's

hand began to burn, she was unable to stop the pain with

water, and she was rushed to Dr. Splettstoesser’s clinic.

Plaintiff claims Splettstoesser negligently misdiagnosed

her chemical burns as an allergic reaction, resulting in

significant delays in appropriate treatment.

Plaintiff suffered second and third degree burns on

her right thumb and forefinger, and underwent two |

amputative surgeries to her right index finger. Plaintiff

has a permanent disability rating, and also suffers from

reflex sympathetic dystrophy.

App. 15

Il. CLAIMS AND DEFENSES

Plaintiff asserts the following claims against the fol-

lowing Defendants:

CLAIM TYPE DEFENDANT

First Negligence Whink

Second Products liability Whink

Third _ Negligence Super Foods

Fourth Breach of implied warranty Super Foods

Fifth Exemplary damages All

Sixth Medical malpractice Splettstoesser

Monte Vista

At oral argument, Plaintiff's counsel announced that

Plaintiff has settled the case with all Defendants except

Whink, and that documents reflecting that settlement

have been prepared and are in the process of being exe-

cuted.

Plaintiff seeks in excess of $70,000.00 in medical

expenses, damages for past and future lost wages, pain

and suffering, and exemplary damages.

Defendants raise two arguments in their Motion: (1)

Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the Federal Hazard-

ous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261 et seq., and (2)

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Plaintiff’s misuse. Because

I agree that Plaintiff’s claims are barred as a matter of law

by her own misuse, I do not reach Defendants’ preemp-

tion argument.

App. 16

Hl. THE UNCONTRADICTED FACTS REQUIRE DIS-

MISSAL OF THE FAILURE TO WARN ASPECTS OF

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

The strict liability concepts set out in § 402A of the

Restatement (2d) of Torts, as adopted in Colorado in

Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983

(1975), recognize two general categories of product lia-

bility actions - one where the product is claimed to be

organically defective, or, in the language of the Restate-

ment, “unreasonably dangerous,” and another where the

claimed defect is a failure to warn. See Jackson v. Harsco

Corp., 673 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1983).

Here, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint confuses these

two basic concepts with each other, and also confuses

strict liability with negligence, and unreasonable danger-

ousness with ultrahazardousness.'! Despite these short-

comings, it is clear that the focus of Plaintiff’s strict

liability and negligence claims is an alleged failure to

warn. See Amended Complaint {4 12(b) and 15. At oral

argument, Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that the gravamen

of Plaintiff’s failure to warn case is that Whink failed to

give the latent nature of the danger — the fact that the

product doesn’t burn until long after coming in contact

with the skin - adequate prominence, and that Plaintiff’s

expert would so testify. There are several problems with

this argument.

First, Plaintiff has not supported this argument with

her expert’s report or with transcripts from the expert’s

1 See Part IV below.

App. 17

deposition. Counsel's mere representations at this stage

are insufficient to create a triable issue of fact, in the face

of the undisputed presence of just such a warning in

what appears to me to be a fairly prominent place on the

front of the Whink bottle. See Sullivan v. Davis, 172 Colo.

49(), 474 P.2d 218 (1970).

More importantly, Plaintiff has admitted not only

that she read the warnings contained on the front of the

bottle, but that she understood them. See excerpts of

Plaintiff’s Deposition set forth in Part V.B below. Thus,

the warnings, however inadequate, managed to find their

way into Plaintiff’s consciousness. Any inadequacy could

therefore not, as a matter of law, have caused any of

Plaintiff's injuries. See Schultz v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 734

P.2d 146 (Colo. App. 1986).

This is really just a different way of describing the

conclusion reached in Part V.B below; namely, that Plain-

tiff misused the product by failing to heed the warnings

which she admittedly read and appreciated.

IV. WHINK STAIN REMOVER IS NOT “ULTRAHAZ-

ARDOUS”

At oral argument, Plaintiff's counsel indicated that

his use of the term “ultrahazardous” in his First and

Second Claims for Relief was not inartful, but rather that

Plaintiff is taking the position that Whink Rust Stain

Remover is indeed ultrahazardous in the sense that it

triggers absolute liable [sic]. Plaintiff’s argument in this

regard is wholly unsupportable.

App. 18

Our appellate courts have recognized only two speci-

fic activities as being so “ultrahazardous” as to render the

performers of these activities absolutely liable for all

damages arising therefrom. Those specific activities are

dynamite blasting (Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman,

133 Colo. 286, 294 P.2d 597 (1956)) and the impoundment

of water (Garnet Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Sampson, 48 Colo.

285, 110 P. 79 (1910)). Indeed, on every occasion since

1956 in which our appellate courts have been asked to

expand this doctrine into other areas, they have expressly

refused to do so. Liber v. Flor, 160 Colo. 7, 415 P.2d 332

(1960) (storage of dynamite is not ultrahazardous); Forrest

v. Imperial Distr. Serv. Inc., 712 P.2d 488 (Colo. App. 1987),

rev d on other grds., 741 P.2d 1251 (Colo. 1987) (storage and

handling of caustic chemicals is not ultrahazardous); and

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Public Serv. Co., 676 P.2d 25 (Colo.

App. 1983) (transmission of natural gas not ultrahazard-

ous). Cf. City of Northglenn v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 519 F.

Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1981), in which Judge Carrigan indi-

cated his belief that the Colorado courts would extend

the doctrine of ultrahazardousness to the storage of

underground gasoline tanks. I note, however, that when

Judge Carrigan decided Northglenn, he did not have the

benefit of either of the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme

Court’s opinions in Forrest. See generally Restatement (2d)

of Torts §§ 519 and 520 (recognizing the concept of ultra-

hazardousness but calling it “abnormally dangerous

activities”).

Plaintiff’s argument that Whink Rust Stain Remover

is ultrahazardous, and therefore that Whink is an abso-

lute insurer of any and all damage caused by its sale of its

App. 19

product, would, if adopted, represent an entirely unwar-

ranted and unprecedented expansion of the doctrine of

ultrahazardousness.

V. THE UNCONTRADICTED FACTS ESTABLISH MIS-

USE AS A MATTER OF LAW

A. General

The defense of misuse in a products case was first

expressly articulated by our Supreme Court in Jackson v.

Harsco Corp., supra. The Jackson Court described the

defense this way:

Misuse by an injured party which cannot rea-

sonably be anticipated by the manufacturer can

be utilized as a defense in a products liability

case by showing that the conduct of the user,

and not the alleged defect in the product, actu-

ally caused the accident.

673 P.2d at 367. See also Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse

Automotive Air Brake Co., 33 Colo. App. 99, 517 P.2d 406

(1973). There are thus two elements which must be

proved to establish the misuse defense: (1) the misuse

must be unforeseeable from the manufacturer’s point of

view, and (2) the misuse must have caused the injuries.

One kind of misuse arises when an injured party uses

a product for a purpose for which the product was not

intended. But our appellate courts have come to recog-

nize that it may also be misuse to use a product to

accomplish its intended purpose, but to do so in an

unforeseeably improper manner. See, e.g., Uptain v. Hut-

tington Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1986) Patterson v.

Magna American Corp., 754 P.2d 1385 (Colo. App. 1988).

App. 20

When the user is notified of the proper manner of use,

“the seller may reasonably assume that [such notice] will

be read and heeded.” Uptain, 723 P.2d at 1327, citing

Comment J to the Restatement (2d) of Torts § 402A.

B. It Is Uncontroverted That Plaintiff Read And

Understood The Warnings, And Unforeseeably

Misused The Product By Failing To Heed The

Warnings.

It is certainly true that the foreseeability of any mis-

use is a question of fact, generally inappropriate for reso-

lution by summary judgment. Uptain, supra.

On the other hand, where, as here, a plaintiff admits

to reading a warning, and to consciously choosing to

disregard the warning, and when heeding that warning

would have avoided all of a plaintiff’s injuries, then I do

not believe there is anything left for a jury to decide.

Plaintiff testified as follows regarding her reading

and appreciation of the front label warnings:

Q: Did you read the bottle before you opened it?

A: lI read the front part of it. Plaintiff’s Deposition,

p. 25, lines 18-20.

Q: Why didn’t you go get some gloves?

A: Because I didn’t have any gloves. Id. at 28, lines

23-24. |

Q: Before you used the product, did you read the

words “causes severe burns,” before you used

the product?

PO > DO >

App. 21

I read the front of that bottle.

All of it?

Yes.

Before you used the bottle?

Yes.

Id. p. at 45, lines 2-9.

Q.

A.

You didn’t have any questions about what [the

label] meant?

No.

Id. p. at 47, lines 11-13.

QO.

All right. We get down to the sentence that

‘reads: “Use only with heavy duty household

rubber gloves.” If I understand what you told

Mr. Cooper, the reason that you didn’t use

household rubber gloves was because you didn’t

have any there?

Right.

Any [sic] you didn’t want to spend the time to

go back to the store to get some?

Right. And by using the rag, I felt it was the

same way of not getting contact to my skin. I felt

it was thick enough, that there was no way it

could reach my skin.

Id. at 152, lines 21-25; 153, lines 1-5.

Q:

Did you think about going back to the store to

get rubber gloves?

A:

Q:

App. 22

I thought in my head: What harm could it do,

I’m not using it straight on my hand.

When you read that sentence, did you under-

stand that it was important to protect yourself

from this product contacting your skin?

Yes, I did.

Did you think about going back to the grocery

store to get rubber gloves so that that wouldn’t

happen?

No. Id. at 153, lines 14-25.

Even though you started out thinking that the

heavy rag would be sufficient to keep the prod-

uct away from your skin, at some point during

the cleaning process, you realized that it wasn’t

because you felt wetness on your skin, is that

right?

Yes.

At that time did you consider going back to the

grocery store to get some rubber gloves so you

wouldn’t have any additional contact on your

skin from the product?

No, because I didn’t feel nothing that would

indicate that something was wrong.

You did read the sentence that says: “Causes

severe burns which may not be immediately

painful or visible”?

When I was reading it as a paragraph, yes. Id. at

154, lines 8-25.

TG an iB Ae

App. 23

It is clear to me from this deposition transcript not

only that Plaintiff read and appreciated the warnings

placed on the front of the bottle, but also that there was

nothing on earth that Whink could have done to make

these warnings sink in.? This is one of those extreme

misuse cases, like Schultz v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 734 P.2d

146 (Colo. 1986), in which a manufacturer places warn-

ings on a product, the warnings are sufficient to be

understood and appreciated by the plaintiff, but the

plaintiff simply and plainly chooses to ignore the warn-

ings.

Uptain, which also involved injuries to a plaintiff

who used a cleaning product without rubber gloves, is

quite instructive. In affirming the trial court’s conclusion

that misuse was a question of fact for the jury, the

Supreme Court made much of the fact that the warnings

in that case did not contain explicit directions to wear

rubber gloves. Moreover, it was the plaintiff in Uptain

arguing that her misuse was foreseeable as a matter of

law, rather than the defendant arguing it was unforesee-

able. Finally, the plaintiff in Uptain used a swab to apply

the product; she came in contact with the product directly

only when periodically wringing the swab out during

rinses.

Here, the evidence is also undisputed, as it was in

Schultz, that had Plaintiff not ignored the warnings — that

is, had Plaintiff worn rubber gloves as directed - she

2 I have reviewed not only the portion of Plaintiff’s tran-

script which Defendants submitted with their briefs, but the

entire transcript, which I directed Defendants to submit prior to

the September 10, 1992 hearing.

App. 24

would have avoided her injuries entirely. Report of Dr.

Daniel A. Goldstein, dated May 28, 1991, attached as

Exhibit F to Whink’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Thus, it was Plaintiff’s own volitional act of using the

product contrary to the warnings which caused her inju-

ries, not any product defect or failure to warn.

VI. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons discussed above, Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to all of

Plaintiff’s claims against Whink, and all of those claims

are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This dismissal

will become a final judgment when Plaintiff’s claims

against the non-Whink Defendants are dismissed pur-

suant to the settlement.

Plaintiff and the non-Whink Defendants are directed

to file a stipulated motion for dismissal and draft order

reflecting their settlement within 30 days of the date of

this Order.

Dated this 14th day of September, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Morris B. Hoffman

Morris B. Hoffman

District Court Judge

cc: A. Walsh

F. James Donnelly

J. Ronald Voss

L. Heintz

D. Smith

SS Ms» ae

App. 25

APPENDIX F

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

ARTICLE VI

Paragraph 2:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the

United States which shall be made in Pursuance

thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be

made under the Authority of the United States,

shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the

Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,

any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any

State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

App. 26

APPENDIX G

15 USC § 1261,

s 1261. Definitions

For the purposes of this chapter -

(a) The term “territory” means any territory or pos-

session of the United States, including the District of

Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico but

excluding the Canal Zone.

(b) The term “interstate commerce” means (1) com-

merce between any State or territory and any place out-

side thereof, and (2) commerce within the District of

Columbia or within any territory not organized with a

legislative body.

(c) Omitted.

(d) The term “Commission” means the Consumer

Product Safety Commission.

(e) The term “person” includes an individual, part-

nership, corporation, and association.

(f) The term “hazardous substance” means:

(1) (A) Any substance or mixture of substances

which (i) is toxic, (ii) is corrosive, (iii) is an irritant, (iv) is

a strong sensitizer, (v) is flammable or combustible, or

(vi) generates pressure through decomposition, heat, or

other means, if such substance or mixture of substances

may cause substantial personal injury or substantial ill-

ness during or as a proximate result of any customary or

reasonably foreseeable handling or use, including reason-

ably foreseeable ingestion by children.

ovate? Soage

App. 27

(B) Any substances which the Commission by

regulation finds, pursuant to the provisions of section

1262(a) of this title, meet the requirements of subpara-

graph (1)(A) of this paragraph.

(C) Any radioactive substance, if, with respect

to such substance as used in a particular class of article or

as packaged, the Commission determines by regulation

that the substance is sufficiently hazardous to require

labeling in accordance with this chapter in order to pro-

tect the public health.

(D) Any toy or other article intended for use by

children which the Commission by regulation deter-

mines, in accordance with section 1262(e) of this title,

presents an electrical, mechanical, or thermal hazard.

(E) Any solder which has a lead content in

excess of 0.2 percent.

(2) The term “hazardous substance” shall not apply

to pesticides subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,

and Rodenticide Act, nor to foods, drugs and cosmetics

subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, nor

to substances intended for use as fuels when stored in

containers and used in the heating, cooking, or refrigera-

tion system of a house, nor to tobacco and tobacco prod-

ucts, but such term shall apply to any article which is not

itself a pesticide within the meaning of the Federal Insec-

ticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act but which is a

hazardous substance within the meaning of paragraph (1)

of this subsection by reason of bearing or containing such

a pesticide.

App. 28

(3) The term “hazardous substance” shall not

include any source material, special nuclear material, or

byproduct material as defined in the Atomic Energy Act

of 1954, as amended, and regulations issued pursuant

thereto by the Atomic Energy Commission.

(g) The term “toxic” shall apply to any substance

(other than a radioactive substance) which has the capac-

ity to produce personal injury or illness to man through

ingestion, inhalation, or absorption through any body

surface.

(h) (1) The term “highly toxic” means any substance

which falls within any of the following categories: (a)

Produces death within fourteen days in half or more than

half of a group of ten or more laboratory white rats each

weighing between two hundred and three hundred

grams, at a single dose of fifty milligrams or less per

kilogram of body weight, when orally administered; or

(b) produces death within fourteen days in half or more

than half of a group of ten or more laboratory white rats

each weighing between two hundred and three hundred

grams, when inhaled continuously for a period of one

hour or less at an atmospheric concentration of two hun-

dred parts per million by volume or less of gas or vapor

or two milligrams per liter by volume or less of mist or

dust, provided such concentration is likely to be encoun-

tered by man when the substance is used in any reason-

ably foreseeable manner; or (c) produces death within

fourteen days in half or more than half of a group of ten

or more rabbits tested in a dosage of two hundred milli-

grams or less per kilogram of body weight, when admin-

istered by continuous contact with the bare skin for

twenty-four hours or less.

dari sit aia

App. 29

(2) If the Commission finds that available data on

human experience with any substance indicate results

different from those obtained on animals in the above-

named dosages or concentrations, the human data shall

take precedence.

(i) The term “corrosive” means any substance

which in contact with living tissue will cause destruction

of tissue by chemical action; but shall not refer to action

on inanimate surfaces.

(j) The term “irritant” means any substance not cor-

rosive within the meaning of subparagraph (i) of this

section which on immediate, prolonged, or repeated con-

tact with normal living tissue will induce a local inflam-

matory reaction.

(k) The term “strong sensitizer” means a substance

which will cause on normal living tissue through an

allergic or photodynamic process a hypersensitivity

which becomes evident on reapplication of the same sub-

stance and which is designated as such by the Commis-

sion. Before designating any substance as a strong

sensitizer, the Commission, upon consideration of the

frequency of occurrence and severity of the reaction, shall

find that the substance has a significant potential for

causing hypersensitivity.

(1) (1) The terms “extremely flammable”, “flamma-

ble”, and “combustible” as applied to any substance,

liquid, solid, or the content of a self-pressurized container

shall be defined by regulations issued by the Commis-

sion.

App. 30

(2) The test methods found by the Commission to

be generally applicable for defining the flammability or

combustibility characteristics of any such substance shall

also be specified in such regulations.

(3) In establishing definitions and test methods

related to flammability and combustibility, the Commis-

sion shall consider the existing definitions and test

methods of other Federal agencies involved in the regula-

tion of flammable and combustible substances in storage,

transportation and use; and to the extent possible, shall

establish compatible definitions and test methods.

(4) Until such time as the Commission issues a reg-

ulation under paragraph (1) defining the term “combusti-

ble” as applied to liquids, such term shall apply to any

liquid which has a flash point above eighty degrees Fahr-

enheit to and including one hundred and fifty degrees, as

determined by the Tagliabue Open Cup Tester.

(m) The term “radioactive substance” means a sub-

stance which emits ionizing radiation.

(n) The term “label” means a display of written,

printed, or graphic matter upon the immediate container

of any substance or, in the case of an article which is

unpackaged or is not packaged in an immediate container

intended or suitable for delivery to the ultimate con-

sumer, a display of such matter directly upon the article

involved or upon a tag or other suitable material affixed

thereto; and a requirement made by or under authority of

this chapter that any word, statement, or other informa-

tion appear on the label shall not be considered to be

complied with unless such word, statement, or other

information also appears (1) on the outside container or

shi cr Sg. Mix tn yale asa iT NECA ce tak LOLS i WE tabi sae

SN al a) i PEIN co Ri Ss ALE

App. 31

wrapper, if any there be, unless it is easily legible through

the outside container or wrapper and (2) on all accom-

panying literature where there are directions for use,

written or otherwise.

(o) The term “immediate container” does not

include package liners.

(p) The term “misbranded hazardous substance”

means a hazardous substance (including a toy, or other

article intended for use by children, which is a hazardous

substance, or which bears or contains a hazardous sub-

stance in such manner as to be susceptible of access by a

child to whom such toy or other article is entrusted)

intended, or packaged in a form suitable, for use in the

household or by children, if the packaging or labeling of

such substance is in violation of an applicable regulation

issued pursuant to section 1472 or 1473 of this title or if

such substance, except as otherwise provided by or pur-

suant to section 1262 of this title, fails to bear a label -

(1) which states conspicuously (A) the

name and place of business of the manufacturer,

packer, distributor or seller; (B) the common or

usual name or the chemical name (if there be no

common or usual name) of the hazardous sub-

stance or of each component which contributes

substantially to its hazard, unless the Commis-

sion by regulation permits or requires the use of

a recognized generic name; (C) the signal word

“DANGER” on substances which are extremely

flammable, corrosive, or highly toxic; (D) the

signal word “WARNING” or “CAUTION” on all

other hazardous substances; (E) an affirmative

statement of the principal hazard or hazards,

such as “Flammable”, “Combustible”, “Vapor

App. 32

Harmful”, “Causes Burns”, “Absorbed Through

Skin”, or similar wording descriptive of the haz-

ard; (F) precautionary measures describing the

action to be followed or avoided, except when

modified by regulation of the Commission pur-

suant to section 1262 of this title; (G) instruction,

when necessary or appropriate, for first-aid

treatment; (H) the word “poison” for any haz-

ardous substance which is defined as “highly

toxic” by subsection (h) of this section; (I)

instructions for handling and storage of pack-

ages which require special care in handling or

storage; and (J) the statement (i) “Keep out of

the reach of children” or its practical equivalent,

or, (ii) if the article is intended for use by chil-

dren and is not a banned hazardous substance,

adequate directions for the protection of chil-

dren from the hazard, and

(2) on which any statements required

under subparagraph (1) of this paragraph are

located prominently and are in the English lan-

guage in conspicuous and legible type in con-

trast by typography, layout, or color with other

printed matter on the label.

The term “misbranded hazardous substance” also

includes a household substance as defined in section

1471(2)(C) of this title if it is a substance described in

paragraph (1) of subsection (f) of this section and its

packaging or labeling is in violation of an applicable

regulation issued pursuant to section 1472 or 1473 of this

title.

(q) (1) The term “banned hazardous sub-

stance” means (A) any toy, or other article

intended for use by children, which is a hazard-

ous substance, or which bears or contains a

App. 33

hazardous substance in such manner as to be

susceptible of access by a child to whom such

toy or other article is entrusted; or (B) any haz-

ardous substance intended, or packaged in a

form suitable, for use in the household, which

the Commission by regulation classifies as a

“banned hazardous substance” on the basis of a

finding that, notwithstanding such cautionary

labeling as is or may be required under this

chapter for that substance, the degree or nature

of the hazard involved in the presence or use of

such substance in households is such that the

objective of the protection of the public health

and safety can be adequately served only by

keeping such substance, when so intended or

packaged, out of the channels of interstate com-

merce: Provided, That the Commission, by regu-

lation, (i) shall exempt from clause (A) of this

paragraph articles, such as chemical sets, which

by reason of their functional purpose require the

inclusion of the hazardous substance involved

or necessarily present an electrical, mechanical,

or thermal hazard, and which bear labeling giv-

ing adequate directions and warnings for safe

use and are intended for use by children who

have attained sufficient maturity, and may rea-

sonably be expected, to read and heed such

directions and warnings, and (ii) shall exempt

from clause (A), and provide for the labeling of,

common fireworks (including toy paper caps,

cone fountains, cylinder fountains, whistles

without report, and sparklers) to the extent that

it determines that such articles can be ade-

quately labeled to protect the purchasers and

users thereof.

(2) Proceedings for the issuance, amend-

ment, or repeal of regulations pursuant to clause

App. 34

(B) of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be

governed by the provisions of sections 371(e),

(f), and (g) of Title 21: Provided, That if the

Commission finds that the distribution for

household use of the hazardous substance

involved presents an imminent hazard to the

public health, it may by order published in the

Federal Register give notice of such finding, and

thereupon such substance when intended or

offered for household use, or when so packaged

as to be suitable for such use, shall be deemed to

be a “banned hazardous substance” pending the

completion of proceedings relating to the issu-

ance of such regulations.

(r) An article may be determined to present an elec-

trical hazard if, in normal use or when subjected to

reasonably foreseeable damage or abuse, its design or

manufacture may cause personal injury or illness by elec-

tric shock.

(s) An article may be determined to present a

mechanical hazard if, in normal use or when subjected to

reasonably foreseeable damage or abuse, its design or

manufacture presents an unreasonable risk of personal

injury or illness (1) from fracture, fragmentation, or disas-

sembly of the article, (2) from propulsion of the article (or

any part or accessory thereof), (3) from points or other

protrusions, surfaces, edges, openings, or closures, (4)

from moving parts, (5) from lack or insufficiency of con-

trols to reduce or stop motion, (6) as a result of self-

adhering characteristics of the article, (7) because the

article (or any part or accessory thereof) may be aspirated

or ingested, (8) because of instability, or (9) because of

any other aspect of the article’s design or manufacture.

App. 35

(t) An article may be determined to present a ther-

mal hazard if, in normal use or when subjected to reason-

ably foreseeable damage or abuse, its design or

manufacture presents an unreasonably [sic] risk of per-

sonal injury or illness because of heat as from heated

parts, substances or surfaces.

App. 36

APPENDIX H

s 1262. Declaration of hazardous substances

(a) Declaration of hazardous substances by regulation;

review

(1) Whenever in the judgment of the Commis-

sion such action will promote the objectives of this

chapter by avoiding or resolving uncertainty as to its

application, the Commission may by regulation

declare to be a hazardous substance, for the pur-

poses of this chapter, any substance or mixture of

substances which it finds meets the requirements of

subparagraph (1) (A) of section 1261(f) of this title.

(2) Proceedings for the issuance, amendment, or

repeal of regulations under this subsection and the

admissibility of the record of such proceedings in other

proceedings, shall in all respects be governed by the

provisions of section 371(e), (f), and (g) of Title 21, except

that -

(A) the Commission’s order after public hear-

ing (acting upon objections filed to an order made prior

to hearing) shall be subject to the requirements of section

348(f) (2) of Title 21; and

(B) the scope of judicial review of such order

shall be in accordance with the fourth sentence of para-

graph (2), and with the provisions of paragraph (3) of

section 348(g) of Title 21.

App. 37

(b) Reasonable variations or additional label require-

ments

If the Commission finds that the requirements of

section 1261(p) (1) of this title are not adequate for the

protection of the public health and safety in view of the

special hazard presented by any particular hazardous

substance, it may by regulation establish such reasonable

variations or additional label requirements as it finds

necessary for the protection of the public health and

safety; and any such hazardous substance intended, or

packaged in a form suitable, for use in the household or

by children, which fails to bear a label in accordance with

such regulations shall be deemed to be a misbranded

hazardous substance.

(c) Exemption from requirements by regulation

If the Commission finds that, because of the size of

the package involved or because of the minor hazard

presented by the substance contained therein, or for other

good and sufficient reasons, full compliance with the

labeling requirements otherwise applicable under this

chapter is impracticable or is not necessary for the ade-

quate protection of the public health and safety, the Com-

mission shall promulgate regulations exempting such

substance from these requirements to the extent it deter-

mines to be consistent with adequate protection of the

public health and safety.

App. 38

(d) Exemption from requirements of this chapter of sub-

(e)

stances or containers adequately regulated by other

provisions of law

The Commission may exempt from the require-

ments established by or pursuant to this chapter any

hazardous substance or container of a hazardous

substance with respect to which it finds that ade-

quate requirements satisfying the purposes of this

chapter have been established by or pursuant to any

other Act of Congress.

Regulation of toys or articles intended for use by

children

(1) A determination by the Commission that a

toy or other article intended for use by children

presents an electrical, mechanical, or thermal hazard

shall be made by regulation in accordance with the

procedures prescribed by section 553 (other than

clause (B) of the last sentence of subsection (b) of

such section) of Title 5 unless the Commission elects

the procedures prescribed by subsection (e) of sec-

tion 371 of Title 21, in which event such subsection

and subsections (f) and (g) of such section 371 of

Title 21 shall apply to the making of such determina-

tion. If the Commission makes such election, it shall

publish that fact with the proposal required to be

published under paragraph (1) of such subsection

(e).

(2) If, before or during a proceeding pursuant to

paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Commission finds

App. 39

that, because of an electrical, mechanical, or thermal haz-

ard, distribution of the toy or other article involved pre-

sents an imminent hazard to the public health and it, by

order published in the Federal Register, gives notice of

such finding, such toy or other article shall be deemed to

be a banned hazardous substance for purposes of this

chapter until the proceeding has been completed. If not

yet initiated when such order is published, such a pro-

ceeding shall be initiated as promptly as possible.

(3)(A) In the case of any toy or other article

intended for use by children which is determined by the

Commission, in accordance with section 553 of Title 5, to

present an electrical, mechanical, or thermal hazard, any

person who will be adversely affected by such a deter-

mination may, at any time prior to the 60th day after the

regulation making such determination is issued by the

Commission, file a petition with the United States Court

of Appeals for the circuit in which such person resides or

has his principal place of business for a judicial review of

such determination. A copy of the petition shall be forth-

with transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Commis-

sion or other officer designated by it for that purpose.

The Commission shall file in the court the record of the

proceedings on which the Commission based its deter-

mination, as provided in section 2112 of Title 28.

(B) If the petitioner applies to the court for leave to

adduce additional evidence, and shows to the satisfaction

of the court that such additional evidence is material and

that there was no opportunity to adduce such evidence in

the proceeding before the Commission, the court may

order such additional evidence (and evidence in rebuttal

thereof) to be taken before the Commission in a hearing

App. 40

or in such other manner, and upon such terms and condi-

tions, as to the court may seem proper. The Commission

may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new

findings, by reason of the additional evidence_so taken,

and it shall file such modified or new findings, and its

recommendation, if any, for the modification or setting

aside of its original determination, with the return of

such additional evidence.

(C) Upon the filing of the petition under this para-

graph, the court shall have jurisdiction to review the

determination of the Commission in accordance with sub-

paragraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D) of paragraph (2) of the

second sentence of section 706 of Title 5. If the court

ordered additional evidence to be taken under subpara-

graph (B) of this paragraph, the court shall also review

the Commission’s determination to determine if, on the

basis of the entire record before the court pursuant to

subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph, it is sup-

ported by substantial evidence. If the court finds the

determination is not so supported, the court may set it

aside. With respect to any determination reviewed under

this paragraph, the court may grant appropriate reliet

pending conclusion of the review proceedings, as pro-

vided in section 705 of Title 5.

(D) The judgment of the court affirming or setting

aside, in whole or in part, any such determination of the

Commission shall be final, subject to review by the

Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari or

certification, as provided in section 1254 of Title 28.

j

&

;

&

7

+

SE LPARAM RIL TREES INT A I:

App. 41

(f) Proceeding for promulgation of regulations

A proceeding for the promulgation of a regulation

under section 1261(q)(1) of this title classifying an article

or substance as a banned hazardous substance or a regu-

lation under subsection (e) of this section shall be com-

menced by the publication in the Federal Register of an

advance notice of proposed rulemaking which shall -

(1) identify the article or substance and the

nature of the risk of injury associated with the

article or substance;

) (2) include a summary of each of the regu-

latory alternatives under consideration by the

Commission (including voluntary standards);

(3) include information with respect to any

existing standard known to the Commission

4 which may be relevant to the proceedings,

4 together with a summary of the reasons why the

j Commission believes preliminarily that such

7 standard does not eliminate or adequately

reduce the risk of injury identified in paragraph

; (1);

(4) invite interested persons to submit to

the Commission, within such period as the

Commission shall specify in the notice (which

period shall not be less than 30 days or more

than 60 days after the date of publication of the

notice), comments with respect to the risk of

injury identified by the Commission, the regula-

tory alternatives being considered, and other

possible alternatives for addressing the risk;

Pe aa Oe ee eae ea

(5) invite any person (other than the Com-

mission) to submit to the Commission, within

ii such period as the Commission shall specify in

the notice (which period shall not be less than

App. 42

30 days after the date of publication of the

notice), an existing standard or a portion of a

standard as a proposed regulation under section

1261(q)(1) of this title or subsection (e) of this

section; and

(6) invite any person (other than the Com-

mission) to submit to the Commission, within

such period as the Commission shall specify in

the notice (which period shall not be less than

30 days after the date of publication of the

notice), a statement of intention to modify or

develop a voluntary standard to address the risk

of injury identified in paragraph (1) together

with a description of a plan to modify or

develop the standard.

The Commission shall transmit such notice within 10

calendar days to the Committee on Commerce, Science,

and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on

Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

(g) Publication of submitted standard as proposed regu-

lation

(1) If the Commission determines that any

standard submitted to it in response to an invitation

in a notice published under subsection (f)(5) of this

section if promulgated (in whole, in part, or in com-

bination with any other standard submitted to the

Commission or any part of such a standard) as a

regulation under section 1261(q)(1) of this title or

subsection (e) of this section, as the case may be,

would eliminate or adequately reduce the risk of

injury identified in the notice provided under sub-

section (f)(1) of this section, the Commission may

» .., 4

App. 43

publish such standard, in whole, in part, or in such

combination and with nonmaterial modifications, as

a proposed regulation under such section or subsec-

tion.

(2) If the Commission determines that -

(A) compliance with any standard submitted

to it in response to an invitation in a notice

published under subsection (f)(6) of this section

is likely to result in the elimination or adequate

reduction of the risk of injury identified in the

notice, and

(B) it is likely that there will be substantial

compliance with such standard, the Commission

shall terminate any proceeding to promulgate a

regulation under section 1261(q)(1) of this title

or subsection (e) of this section, respecting such

risk of injury and shall publish in the Federal

Register a notice which includes the determina-

tion of the Commission and which notifies the

public that the Commission will rely on the

voluntary standard to eliminate or reduce the

risk of injury, except that the Commission shall

terminate any such proceeding and rely on a

voluntary standard only if such voluntary stan-

dard is in existence. For purposes of this section,

a voluntary standard shall be considered to be

in existence when it is finally approved by the

organization or other person which developed

such standard, irrespective of the effective date

of the standard. Before relying upon any volun-

tary standard, the Commission shall afford

interested persons (including manufacturers,

consumers and consumer organizations) a rea-

sonable opportunity to submit written com-

ments regarding such standard. The

App. 44

Commission shall consider such comments in

making any determination regarding reliance on

the involved voluntary standard under this sub-

section.

(3) The Commission shall devise procedures to

monitor compliance with any voluntary standards -

(h)

(A) upon which the Commission has relied

under paragraph (2) of this subsection;

(B) which were developed with the partici-

pation of the Commission; or

(C) whose development the Commission

has monitored.

Publication of proposed rule with preliminary regu-

latory anal ysis

No regulation under section 1261(q)(1) of this

title classifying an article or substance as a banned

hazardous substance and no regulation under sub-

section (e) of this section may be proposed by the

Commission unless, not less than 60 days after pub-

lication of the notice required in subsection (f) of this

section, the Commission publishes in the Federal

Register the text of the proposed rule, including any

alternatives, which the Commission proposes to pro-

mulgate, together with a preliminary regulatory

analysis containing -

(1) a preliminary description of the poten-

tial benefits and potential costs of the proposed

regulation, including any benefits or costs that

cannot be quantified in monetary terms, and an

identification of those likely to receive the bene-

fits and bear the costs;

Sa we eee

App. 45

(2) a discussion of the reasons any stan-

dard or portion of a standard submitted to the

Commission under subsection (f)(5) of this sec-

tion was not published by the Commission as

the proposed regulation or part of the proposed

regulation;

(3) a discussion of the reasons for the

Commission’s preliminary determination that

efforts proposed under subsection (f)(6) of this

section and assisted by the Commission as

required by section 2054(a)(3) of this title would

not, within a reasonable period of time, be likely

to result in the development of a voluntary stan-

dard that would eliminate or adequately reduce

the risk of injury identified in the notice pro-

vided under subsection (f)(1) of this title; and

(4) a description of any reasonable alterna-

tives to the proposed regulation, together with a

summary description of their potentiai costs and

benefits, and a brief explanation of why such

alternatives should not be published as a pro-

posed regulation.

The Commission shall transmit such notice within 10

calendar days to the Committee on Commerce, Science,

and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on

Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

(i) Final regulatory analysis; publication; review

(1) The Commission shall not promulgate a regula-

tion under section 1261(q)(1) of this title classifying an

article or substance as a banned hazardous substance or a

regulation under subsection (e) of this section unless it

App. 46

has prepared a final regulatory analysis of the regulation

containing the following information:

(A) A description of the potential benefits and

potential costs of the regulation, including costs

and benefits that cannot be quantified in mone-

tary terms, and the identification of those likely

to receive the benefits and bear the costs.

(B) A description of any alternatives to the

final regulation which were considered by the

Commission, together with a summary descrip-

tion of their potential benefits and costs and a

brief explanation of the reasons why these alter-

natives were not chosen.

(C) A summary of any significant issues

raised by the comments submitted during the

public comment period in response to the pre-

liminary regulatory analysis, and a summary of

the assessment by the Commission of such

issues.

The Commission shall publish its final regulatory anal-

ysis with the regulation.

(2) The Commission shall not promulgate a regula-

tion under section 1261(q)(1) of this title classifying an

article or substance as a banned hazardous substance or a

regulation under subsection (e) of this section unless it

finds (and includes such finding in the regulation) -

(A) in the case of a regulation which

relates to a risk of injury with respect to which

persons who would be subject to such regula-

tion have adopted and implemented a voluntary

standard, that -

(i) compliance with such volun-

tary standard is not likely to result in

Lies 0p. pw id

App. 47

the elimination or adequate reduction

of such risk of injury; or

(ii) it is unlikely that there will be

substantial compliance with such vol-

untary standard;

(B) that the benefits expected from the reg-

ulation bear a reasonable relationship to its

costs; and

(C) that the regulation imposes the least

burdensome requirement which prevents or

adequately reduces the risk of injury for which

the regulation is being promulgated.

(3) (A) Any regulatory analysis prepared under

subsection (h) of this section or paragraph (1) shall not be

subject to independent judicial review, except that when

an action for judicial review of a regulation is instituted,

the contents of any such regulatory analysis shall consti-

tute part of the whole rulemaking record of agency action

in connection with such review.

(B) The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not be

construed to alter the substantive or procedural stan-

dards otherwise applicable to judicia! review of any

action by the Commission.

(j) Petition to initiate rulemaking

The Commission shall grant, in whole or in part, or

deny any petition under section 553(e) of Title 5, request-

ing the Commission to initiate a rulemaking, within a

reasonable time after the date on which such petition is

filed. The Commission shall state the reasons for granting

or denying such petition. The Commission may not deny

App. 48

any such petition on the basis of a voluntary standard

unless the voluntary standard is in existence at the time

of the denial of the petition, the Commission has deter-

mined that the voluntary standard is likely to result in

the elimination or adequate reduction of the risk of injury

identified in the petition, and it is likely that there will be

substantial compliance with the standard.

ee

ihe MO A Neda

App. 49

APPENDIX I

15 U.S.C. §1261, HISTORICAL NOTE

(b) (1) (A) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3),

if a hazardous substance or its packaging is subject to a

cautionary labeling requirement under § 2(p) or 3(b) [15

U.S.C. § 1261(p) or § 1262(p)] designed to prevent against

a risk of illness or injury associated with the substance,

no State or political subdivision of a State may establish

or continue in effect a cautionary labeling requirement

applicable to said substance or packaging and designed

to protect against the same risk of illness or injury unless

such cautionary labeling requirement is identical to the

labeling requirement under 2(p) or 3(b).

(B) Except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), if

under regulations of the Commission promulgated under

or for the enforcement of section 2(g) [subsec. (g) of this

section] a requirement is established to protect against a

risk of illness or injury associated with a hazardous sub-

stance, no State or political subdivision or a state may

establish or continue in effect a requirement applicable to

such substance and designed to protect against the same

risk of illness or injury unless such requirement is identi-

cal to the requirement established under such regula-

tions.

15 US.C. § 1261, Historical Note - Effect upon Federal

and State Law — Pub.L. 86-613, §18, formerly 17, July 12,

1960, 74 Stat. 380, as amended Pub.L. 89-756, §4 (a), Nov.

3, 1966, 80 Stat. 1305; renumbered and amended Pub.L.

91-113, §4(a), (b) (1), Nov. 6, 1969, 83 Stat. 189, 190; Pub.L.

94-284, §17(a), May 11, 1976, 90 Stat. 510.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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