Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Dehainaut v. Pena
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Supreme Court, U.s.
FILED
(94113 4 DEC 27 I994
No.
“CFCE“OP “TNE “CLERK
Aupreme Court of the Huited tate
October Term, 1994
JEAN DEHAINAUT, as widow and representative of LEONARD
DEHAINAUT, Deceased, PATRICK WEST, RAY BOZYCH, and
RICHARD ANDREWSon behalf of themselves, and a class of others
similarly situated,
Petitioners,
Vv.
FEDERICO PENA, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, JAMES BB.
BUSSEY, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION AND CONSTANCE NEWMAN,
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT,
Respondents.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
PHILLIP S. WOOD
Counsel of Record
RICHARD J. JOHNSON
WOOD & JOHNSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioners
: 220 East Galena Boulevard
P.O. Box 1717
Aurora, Illinois 60507-1717
(708) 844-2560
(708) 844-1521 (Facsimile)
9 (800) 3 APPEAL + (800) 5 APPEAL » (800) BRIEF 21
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the appellate court having found that petitioners’
Complaint sufficently stated a prima facie Bill of Attainder
violation for purposes of withstanding a Motion to Dismiss,
improperly then affirmed dismissal of this count based on
petitioners’ failure to provide evidentiary support for this claim on
appeal.
2. Whether the President has the authority to ignore or
override validly promulgated laws enacted for the benefit of
federal employees under the Civil Service Reform Act.
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Questions Presented for Review ...............0000: i
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Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Regulations
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A. Basis for Federal Jurisdiction ................ 2
wD. FOC OTT oii ov kcncedcccnseuauaeuee 2
Reasons for Grantingthe Writ ................2.005. 5
I. The petitioners were improperly required to
provide evidentiary support for the Bill of
Attainder claim in opposition to a motion to
Pe err Re 5
II. The appellate court erred in finding President
Reagan had the authority to override the
controlling regulation limiting debarment to no
ek Perrrrrrrrerere Tire 8
COON ng sc cc ceed ca b6asbk eee 12
iii
Contents
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases Cited:
American Federation of Government Employees v.
Hoffman, 543 F.2d 930 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
ET)
EE ee ee
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
ee shan ok sod eu ceecnnnc,
Korte v. Office of Personnel Management, 797 F.2d 967
5a ids chins ned és be cceeccaccec:,,
Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1991) ......
Rodriguez v. United States Parole Commission, 594 F.2d
Lo | es
Scott v. O’Brady, 760 F. Supp. 1288, aff’d, 975 F.2d 366
SG Ua
Selective Services System v. Minnesota Public Interest
Research, 468 U.S. 841(1984) ...................
Wagner v. Office of Personnel Management, 783 F.2d 1042
(Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906 ( 1986) .
Page
10
10
10
10
iv
Contents
Page
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72
fee 8 me eh | re 11
Statutes Cited:
SEE: 6 hbo onan cee henadycteeeeneeh earn 9,10
PEE 5 ind ba 0s 0ecad ehban aces tiacewedeas 2
SEED ahh oehnden4hshese505 Olea ]
EE EEE 6555 5-44-0564 54%00 wares teen 2
EE kk. 0s 5 cab ceed uowescsewseawonsens 2
Bee EE Sikh ahnin bunks Wad 045004 d BENS e ERO 2
United States Constitution Cited: )
PEG, OR 5g ice cence snecessaeucs 1,4
Other Authority Cited:
ee) 8 | eer ere errr 1,2, 8,9, 11
APPENDIX
Appendix A — Order of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit Dated September 28, 1994 .... la
Vv
Contents
Page
: Appendix B — Order of the United States Court of Appeals
| for the Seventh Circuit Dated August 29,1994 ....... 3a
Appendix C — Opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dated Au gust 9, 1994 . 6a
Appendix D — Memorandum, Opinion and Order of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division
1
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported as Jean
Dehainaut et al. v. Federico Pejfia. et al., 32 F.3d 1066 (Seventh
Circuit, 1994), and appears in Appendix A, B and C to this
Petition. The unpublished District Court opinion is attached as
Appendix D.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The judgment under review by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals was decided August 9, 1994. Plaintiff’s Petition for
Rehearing was denied September 28, 1994. This Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS INVOLVED
1. United States Constitution, Article I Section 9, Clause 3:
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall
be passed.
2. SC.F.R. § 731.303:
When a person is disqualified for any reason
named in § 731.202, OPM, in its discretion,
may deny that person examination for and
appointment to a competitive position for a
period of not more than 3 years from the date
of determination of disqualification. On
expiration of the period of debarment, the
person who has been debarred may not be
appointed to any position in the competitive
service until his fitness for appointment has
been redetermined by OPM.
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Basis for Federal Jurisdiction
The plaintiffs claimed initial federal jurisdiction based on 28
U.S.C. §§ 1361, 2201 and 2202.
B. Facts of the Case
The petitioners are all former Air Traffic Control Specialists
fired by the Federal Aviation Admmistration (“FAA”) for alleged
participation in the 1981 strike. At the time petitioners were
terminated, the applicable statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7311, provided a
bar to continued federal employment but set for striking federal
workers no minimum or maximum period of debarment.
However, a regulation did exist, 5 C.F.R. § 731.303, which
provided the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”)
discretion to deny employment to strikers for a period of not more
than three (3) years from the date of disqualification. (App. 7a,
8a).'
This regulation further provided that, at the expiration of the
three year period, OPM was to redetermine the suitability of the
fired employee under procedure as defined by regulation on a
case-by-case basis. Id.
During the first week of August, 1981, OPM Director
Donald Devine announced his office’s intention to apply the
maximum three year debarment to members of plaintiffs’ class.
(App. 8a).
On December 9, 1981, President Ronald Reagan wrote to the
Director of OPM, directing a modification of the debarment
policy so as to allow reemployment of the controllers fired in
1. App. refers to Petitioner’s attached Appendix.
3
positions outside of the FAA. This letter further confirmed the
debarment policy as to reemployment within the FAA. ( App. 8a-
9a).
Subsequently, pursuant to the President’s letter, OPM issued
a memorandum removing the per se debarment as to the positions
outside the FAA. ( App. 9a-10a). Neither the President’s letter nor
the OPM memorandum suggested any extension or modification
of the three year ban as to reemployment within the FAA.
Between the date of the OPM memorandum in January of
1982, and March of 1984, various members of plaintiffs’ class
inquired of OPM as to the date they would be deemed eligible for
reemployment with the FAA. OPM responded it would be three
years from the date of termination. (App. 10a).
However, in the wake of re-election years polls as to the
manner in which the President had handled the strike Situation, in
March of 1984, the OPM Director issued a Bulletin reinterpreting
the President’s December 1981 letter by providing that
the debarment period imposed by the
President against reemployment of
discharged controllers within the scope of the
FAA is indefinite in duration and extends to
positions in the FAA and Closely related
facilities.
(App. 11a).
This Bulletin was issued with «in expiration date and, when it
expired it was reissued as FPM Bulletin 731 -9, which had an
expiration date of October 20, 1986. Jd.
At the expiration of the three year debarment period, the
4
OPM, in response to employment applications from various fired
controllers, refused to perform suitability determinations in
accordance to its own regulations, instead applying its per se
indefinite debarment policy. Id.
Since the expiration of the latest OPM Bulletin announcing
the indefinite debarment policy, the FAA has refused to process
any applications for reemployment submitted by members of
plaintiffs’ class, instead referring the applicants to the President's
letter or the expired Bulletin, which documents the FAA, treated-
at the time relevant to the complaint — as still mandating an
indefinite disbarment against petitioners’ class. /d.
Count I of petitioners’ complaint alleges, in addition to the
above general allegations, that prior to the 1981 strike, there have
been, since 1962, a total of at least 39 strikes by federal sector
employees, including three work stoppages by air traffic
controllers against the FAA. In none of these other instances had a
per se indefinite policy against future federal employment been
implemented. (App. 22a). The imposition of this policy to an
identifiable class of persons, — i.e., all those fired for
participating in the 1981 strike — while not similarly punishing
those involving in the other 39 strikes, thus created a Bill of
Attainder, impermissible under Article I, Section 9 of the United
States Constitution when analyzed under Supreme Court doctrine
and the case law of this Circuit.
Count II alleges that, through modifying and increasing the
maximum three year debarment period to one of indefinite
duration, the defendants have in effect increased the penalty for a
prior action, thereby violating the proscription against ex post
facto laws contained in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution.
(App. 11a).
Count III alleges that, at the end of the three year debarment
5
period, the respondents were obliged by regulation to afford each
member of petitioners’ class applying for reemployment a
suitability determination on a case-by-case basis, based on
criteria as provided by the applicable regulations. In violation of
petitioners’ constitutional right to due process under the law, the
respondents have denied and continue to deny petitioners the
procedural provided by these regulations resulting in the
deprivation of petitioners’ right to pursue their profession. Jd.
Count IV alleges that, by singling out petitioners’ class for
per se indefinite debarment, while at the same time finding
individuals with records of far more serious offenses suitable for
employment within the FAA, the respondents have denied
petitioners their right to equal protection under the law. Id.
The respondents filed a Rule 12 (b) Motion to Dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action which was ultimately granted by
the trial court on September 29, 1993. On August 9, 1994, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and on
August 9, 1994 issued an amendment to its initial opinion. On
September 28, 1994, the court denied petitioners’ Petition for
Reconsideration.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I.
THE PETITIONERS WERE IMPROPERLY
REQUIRED TO PROVIDE EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT
FOR THE BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAIM IN
OPPOSITION TOA MOTION TO DISMISS.
The District Court originally granted respondents’ Motion to
Dismiss Count I of petitioners’ Complaint—alleging a violation
of the constitutional prohibition on Bills of Attainder—on the
6
basis that the indefinite disbarment policy was an executive, not a
legislative, action and thus the clause did not apply. (App. 13a).
The appellate court disagreed with this reasoning. It found
precedent for the proposition that an agency policy implementing
a presidential directive may be the functional equivalent of a
legislative enactment for purposes of the Bill of Attainder clause
in the case of Rodriquez v. United States Parole Commission, 594
F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1979). Id.
In so doing, the court found it inconceivable that the authors
of the Constitution would have inadvertently allowed the
Executive Branch to “engage in the same tyrannical practices that
had made the bill such an odious institution” Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath. 341 U.S. 123, 143 (1950)
(Black, J. concurring). Jd.
The court, having thus invalidated the linchpin of the district
judge’s decision dismissing Count I, should have simply
remanded the case for further consideration. Instead, the court
gratuitously assumes the task of determining issues related to the
Bill of Attainder claim that were never argued or decided below.
Specifically, the court sets out to decide — in the first instance —
whether the indefinite debarment policy constitutes
“punishment’”’ for purposes of the Bill of Attainder clause. (App.
14a).
The court enunciates a three pronged test for determination
as to whether a particular enactment constitutes punishment
derived from Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public
Interest Research, 468 U.S. 841 (1984).
Using this test, the court finds that, indeed, the barring of
designated individuals or groups from specified employment
constitutes “punishment” and further finds that “plaintiffs
7
allegations fit comfortably within this description.” Incredibly,
though, the court still refuses to remand the case and states its
intent to begin the dubious exercise of determining whether the
debarment policy was the “product of punitive intent.” (App.
15a).
This clearly goes well beyond the function of a court of
review. By its own admission, the court has found that at least a
prima facie violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause has been
made. To further review whether punitive intent has been proven
clearly either assumes that petitioners have already introduced
evidence on this subject into the record or that they are under an
obligation to introduce such evidence on appeal.
This, however, directly violates the well established
standards governing Motions to Dismiss, i.é., the court must
accept all well pleaded facts as true, Perkins v. Silverstein, 939
F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1991) and, in defending against a Motion to
Dismiss, the plaintiff is under absolutely no obligation to provide
evidentiary support for the allegations of the Complaint. Scott v.
O’Brady, 760 F. Supp. 1288, aff’d, 975 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1991).
Indeed, the court makes it clear in its decision that it is
requiring the appellate record as a whole toevince “unmistakable
evidence of punitive intent” before it will reverse. (App. 16a).
Yet, because this came before the court on the granting of a
Motion to Dismiss, it is axiomatic that the “record as a whole”’
will consist of nothing more than bare pleadings. Where, one may
legitimately ask, is this evidentiary record to be found?
The simple answer is nowhere. There is no administrative
nor legislative record in the court file and, obviously, no
testimony was taken on this issue. Impliedly conceding the
evidentiary vacuum presented it, the court then takes the
astonishing step of penalizing the petitioners for not having
8
somehow presented evidence on an issue that was never even
addressed below. Indeed, the original decision unmistakably
places the evidentiary burden on petitioners by concluding: “the
evidence (plaintiffs) present constitutes far too thin a reed to form
the basis of . . . punitive intent.” Jd.
It is telling that, upon review of petitioners’ Petition for
Reconsideration, the court revised this sentence to reflect that the
administrative record” was insufficient to form the basis of
punitive intent. (App. 4a). Again, a review of the record and
pleadings of the parties reveals no “administrative” nor any other
record that would lead to the court’s conclusions and the court
conveniently neglects to cite to where this “record” was found.
In this case, it is beyond question that the appellate court first
found that petitioners had pled a prima facie case of a Bill of
Attainder violation, but then proceeded to try the evidentiary
issues in the case. The petitioners lost this “trial” because they did
not produce sufficient evidence to rebut an “administrative
record” that did not exist. The court violated petitioners’ basic
due process rights to a fair attempt to prove their case and its
decision must be reversed.
II.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN FINDING
PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD THE AUTHORITY TO
OVERRIDE THE CONTROLLING REGULATION
LIMITING DEBARMENT TO NO LONGER THAN
THREE YEARS.
Petitioners’ complaint alleged the existence of a validly
promulgated regulation—S5 C.F.R § 731.303—which provided
for a maximum period of debarment for striking federal
employees of three years. The Complaint further alleged that the
9
indefinite debarment policy violated petitioners’ due process
right to a suitability determination for federal employment at the
expiration of the three years as mandated by 5C.F.R. § 731.303.
The appellate court agreed that the regulation in question did
indeed mandate a maximum three year debarment but that the
President had authority to issue a directive Overriding the
regulation (App. 20a).
The court found that the President’s authority to do so ina
statute never before argued by any party to extend such authority
—5 U.S.C. § 3301—which states the President may
(1) prescribe such regulations for the
admission of individuals into the civil service
in the executive branch as will best promote
the efficiency of that service;
(2) ascertain the fitness of applicants as to
age, health, character, knowledge, and ability
for the employment, sought; and
(3) appoint and prescribe the duties of
individuals to make inquiries for the purposes
of this section.
Id.
While the court declined to specify exactly which subsection
it found controlling, it is clear that (3) has no relevance to this
case and (2) deals with the exact Suitability determinations the
directive purported to withhold. Therefore, only (1) could have
any bearing on the President’s authority to debar a class of
individuals from federal employment and it specifically delimits
that authority to the promulgation of regulations — not
10
Presidential fiat. The Complaint, however, makes clear that
whatever the Presidential letter of December 9, 1981 was, it was
not a regulation. There was no notice or comment period nor any
of the other procedural safeguards mandated by the
Administrative Procedure Act. Thus 5 U.S.C. § 3301 is
inapplicable to the facts of this case.
The court finds further authority in Wagner v. Officer of
Personnel Management, 783 F.2d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 477 U.S. 906 (1986). A reading of Wagner will reveal,
however, that it contains absolutely no analysis whatsoever for
the President’s ability to supersede the law, the Federal Circuit
merely declares that the power to do so exists. The court also
relies on Korte v. Office of Personnel Management, 797 F.2d 967
(Fed. Cir. 1986). Korte again gives the issue no independent
analysis and relies for authority solely on Wagner. Perhaps
beginning to realize the frailty of its position, the court next cites
a case never before cited nor relied upon by any party, American
Federation of Gov’t Employees v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d 930 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 430 U.S. 965 (1977).
The Hoffman decision, though, is inopposite. The plaintiffs
in Hoffman were challenging the statutory authority of the
executive branch Civil Service Commission to enact certain
regulations requiring federal personnel in army and air force
reserve technician programs to maintain membership in the army
and air force reserves. The Hoffman court explicitly premised its
decision on the recent Supreme Court ruling in Hampton v. Mon
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 86S. Ct. 1895 (1976) which dealt with
the Civil Service Commission’s statutory authority to issue
regulations barring non-citizens from federal employment. The
government’s defense in both cases rested on the broad authority
given the President to issue regulations under 5 U.S.C. § 3301.
The respondents in the instant case have never argued and
11
could not argue that the indefinite debarment policy was
promulgated by regulation. Indeed, implicit in the finding that the
Presidential directive “superseded” the regulation is a finding
that 5 C.F.R § 731.303 was the controlling law at the time of the
events complained of by the petitioners. Therefore, the cases
cited by the court in support of its decision are simply irrelevant.
In this case, a regulation tantamount to a statute existed
which specifically applied to the petitioners in this action. In that
Situation, the only power the President had — short of
promulgating a superseding regulation —- was to see to it that the
law was faithfully executed. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72S. Ct. 863, 966 L. Ed. 1153 (1952).
If this court’s opinion is allowed to Stand, it is an open
invitation to the partial or complete gutting of the civil service
system at the President’s discretion. There is no principled way to
distinguish the President’s right to “supersede”’ the regulation in
question here from the right in the future to “supersede”
regulations governing discovery or trial of Merit System
Protection Board (“MPSB”) appeals, or, if the Seventh Circuit is
serious about the regulation in question being tantamount to a
Statute, to simply “supersede” one or all of the panoply of
statutory rights granted federal employees under the Civil
Service Reform Act.
12
CONCLUSION
For all the above mentioned reasons, a Writ of Certiorari
should issue to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals in
this matter.
Respectfully submitted,
PHILLIP S. WOOD
Counsel of Record
RICHARD J. JOHNSON
WOOD & JOHNSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioners
220 East Galena Boulevard
P.O. Box 1717
Aurora, Illinois 60507-1717
(708) 844-2560
(708) 844-1521 (Facsimile)
la
APPENDIX A — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
DATED SEPTEMBER 28, 1994
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
September 28, 1994
HON. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
HON. JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
HON. ROBERT A. GRANT, District Judge*
No. 93-3649
JEAN DEHAINAUT, as widow and representative of
LEONARD DEHAINAUT, Deceased, PATRICK WEST, RAY
SOZYCH, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
FEDERICO PENA, Secretary, United States Department of
Transportation, JAMES B. BUSSEY, Administrator, Federal
Aviation Administration and CONSTANCE NEWMAN,
Director, United States Office of Personnel Management,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
* The Honorable Robert A. Grant of the Northern District of Indiana is
sitting by designation.
2a
Appendix A
No. 91C7910
Wayne R. Andersen, Judge.
ORDER
On consideration of the petition for rehearing and suggestion
for rehearing in banc filed in the above-entitled cause on August
22, 1994, by plaintiffs-appellants, no judge in active service has
requested a vote thereon, and all of the judges on the original
panel have voted to deny arehearing. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the aforesaid petition for rehearing
and suggestion for rehearing in banc be, and the same is hereby
DENIED.
3a
APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
DATED AUGUST 29, 1994
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
August 29, 1994
HON. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit J udge
HON. JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
HON. ROBERTA. GRANT, District Judge*
No. 93-3649
JEAN DEHAINAUT, as widow and representative of
LEONARD DEHAINAUT, Deceased, PATRICK WEST, RAY
SOZYCH, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Vv.
FEDERICO PENA, Secretary, United States Department of
Transportation, JAMES B. BUSSEY, Administrator, Federal
Aviation Administration and CONSTANCE NEWMAN,
Director, United States Office of Personnel Management,
Defendants- Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the N orthern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
* The Honorable Robert A. Grant of the Northern District of Indiana is sitting
by designation.
4a
Appendix B
No. 91 C7910
Wayne R. Andersen, Judge.
ORDER
The opinion issued in the above-entitled case on August 9,
1994 is hereby amended as follows:
On Page 8, last clause of sentence carried over from page 7 should
read as follows:
(3) does the legislative (or, here, administrative) record evince
an intent to punish? Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 852; Nixon, 433
U.S. at 473, 475-476.
On Page 9, first sentence of the last paragraph should read as
follows:
Our final inquiry into whether the challenged enactment inflicts
punishment is whether the legislative (or, here, administrative)
record as a whole evinces an intent to punish: See Nixon, 433 U.S.
at 478-484 (examining the terms of the enactment and related
committee reports and legislative history to determine the issue
of intent); see also Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 855 n.15 (same).
On Page 10, last sentence before subsection B. should read as
follows:
Sa
Appendix B
We decline plaintiffs’ invitation; the administrative record does
not permit even a reasonable inference, let alone “unmistakabie
evidence,” of punitive intent.‘ See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 484 (noting
that an enactment may not be struck down “based upon inferences
that we may be asked to draw from our personalized reading of
the contemporary scene or recent history. In judging the
constitutionality of the Act, we may only look to its terms, to the
intent expressed by Members of Congress who voted its passage,
and to the existence or non existence of legitimate explanations
for its apparent effect.”’).
6a
APPENDIX C — OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
DATED AUGUST 9, 1994
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 93-3649
JEAN DEHAINAUT, etal.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
FEDERICO PENA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 91 C 7910-Wayne R. Andersen, Judge.
ARGUED APRIL 22, 1994—-DECIDED AUGUST 9, 1994
Before BAUER and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and GRANT,
District Judge.*
* The Honorable Robert A. Grant of the Northem District of Indiana is sitting
by designation.
7a
Appendix C
FLAUM, Circuit Judge. A group of former air traffic
controllers who had been fired for their participation in a 1981
strike against the federal government filed a class action suit
against the United States Department of Transportation
(“DOT”), the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), and the
Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”), seeking mandamus
and injunctive relief (including back pay) and a declaratory
judgment that OPM’s policy indefinitely barring them from
employment with the FAA and related agencies was
unconstitutional. In their four-count complaint, the plaintiffs
alleged that the policy violated the Constitution as (1) a bill of
attainder, (2) an ex post facto law, (3) a denial of due process, and
(4) a denial of equal protection. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b). We
affirm.
I.
This case has its genesis in the Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Organization (“PATCO”) strike of August, 1981. See
generally Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization v.
Federal Relations Authority, 685 F.2d 547, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
At the time of the strike (and still today), a federal statute
provided that “[a]n individual may not accept or hold a position
in the Government of the United States” if he “participates in a
strike, or asserts the right to strike against the Government of the
United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 7311. Though the statute was phrased
in absolute terms, a regulation provided:
When a person is disqualified for any reason
named in § 731.202, OPM, in its discretion,
may deny that person examination for and
appointment to a competitive position for a
8a
Appendix C
period of not more than 3 years from the date
of determination of disqualification. On
expiration of the period of debarment, the
person who has been debarred may not be
appointed to any position in the competitive
service until his fitness for appointment has
been redetermined by OPM.
5 C.F.R. § 731.308. Among the many reasons for disqualification
listed in 5 C.F.R. § 731.202(b) was “[a]ny statutory
disqualification which makes the individual unfit for the
service”—such as that provided by 5 U.S.C. § 7311.
On the first day of the strike, President Reagan issued an
ultimatum to the striking controllers: return to work within forty-
eight hours or forfeit your job. See 17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.
845 (Aug. 3, 1981). Plaintiffs were among those discharged for
failing to return to work. Shortly thereafter, the OPM announced
that it intended to apply the maximum three-year debarment to
the controllers. On December 9, 1981, however, President
Reagan issued a directive modifying the debarment policy. The
President’s letter read as follows:
The Office of Personnel Management has
established the position that the former air
traffic controllers who were discharged for
participating in a strike against the
government initiated on August 3, 1981 shall
be debarred from federal employment for a
period of three years. Upon deliberation I
have concluded that such individuals, despite
their strike participation, should be permitted
to apply for federal employment outside the
scope of their former employing agency.
9a
Appendix C
Therefore, pursuant to my authority to
regulate federal employment, I have
determined that the Office of Personnel
Management should permit federal agencies
to receive applications for employment from
these individuals and process them according
to established civil service procedures. Your
office should perform suitability
determinations with respect to all such
applicants according to established standards
and procedures under 5 CFR, Part 731.
After reviewing reports from the Secretary of
Transportation and the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration, I have
further determined that it would be
detrimental to the efficiency of operations at
the Federal Aviation Administration and to
the safe and effective performance of our
national air traffic control system to permit
the discharged air traffic controllers to return
to employment with that agency. Therefore,
these former federal employees should not be
deemed suitable for employment with the
Federal Aviation Administration.
I direct you to process their applications for
reemployment with the federal government
accordingly.
17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1364 (Dec. 9, 1981). On January 6,
1982, OPM issued Federal Personnel Manual (FPM) Bulletin
731-6 which implemented the policy announced in the December
presidential directive. Bulletin 731-6 stated in relevant part:
10a
Appendix C
All persons whose employment was
terminated on account of the strike by air
traffic controllers, which began on or about
August 3, 1981, shall be determined not to be
suitable for reinstatement or appointment in
any position in the FAA, because it would be
detrimental to the efficiency of that agency by
interfacing with or preventing its effective
performance of its duties and responsibilities
(5 CFR 731.202(a)(2)).
The Office of Personnel Management shall
consider, on a_ case-by-case basis,
applications for Federal employment, other
than in the FAA from air traffic controllers
whose employment was terminated on
account of striking, and shall appropriate
determinations of their suitability for the
particular department for which they
apply....
Even after the issuance of Bulletin 731-6, plaintiffs allege
that the FAA, in response to inquiries, continued to inform fired
strikers that they still would be eligible for reemployment with
the FAA three years after the date of their termination. This
apparent contradiction was resolved, however, by the March
1984 publication of a new bulletin,’ which, according to the
plaintiffs, reinterpreted the December 1981 presidential directive
in the wake of election-year polls indicating approval of the
1. The new bulletin expired on January 20, 1985, at which time it was
reissued (contents unchanged) as FPM Bulletin 731-9, with an expiration date of
October 20, 1986.
lla
Appendix C
President’s handling of the PATCO strike. The new bulletin stated
that “the debarment period imposed by the President against
reemployment of discharged controllers within the scope of the
FAA is indefinite in duration and extends to Positions in the FAA
and closely related facilities.” (emphasis added).
After the three-year anniversary of their termination, the
OPM received employment applications from various fired
controllers, but declined to perform suitability determinations.
Instead, the OPM applied the indefinite debarment policy
articulated in the aforementioned FPM Bulletins. Plaintiffs filed
suit, alleging that OPM’s policy violated the Constitution as (1)a
bill of attainder; (2) an ex post facto law; (3) a denial of due
Process; and (4) a denial of equal protection. In essence, plaintiffs
claim that OPM misinterpreted and misapplied President
Reagan’s directive by failing to reevaluate the suitability for
reemployment with the FAA at the end of the three-year
maximum period of debarment.? The district court dismissed
plaintiffs’ complaint in its entirety, apparently under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6).? Our review of a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is de
novo, Northwest Tissue Center v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 522, 527 (7th
Cir. 1993), and we must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most
2. While President Clinton’s lifting of the indefinite debarment policy has
mooted plaintiffs’ prayer for injunctive relief, their additional claims for back pay
and attorney’s fees remain before this court.
3. Defendants raised a number of arguments for dismissal, including lack of
jurisdiction, res judicata, and failure to state aclaim. The district court referred to
the defendants’ motion simply as a “Rule 12(b) motion”, but did not find the suit
barred by either jurisdictional defects or res judicata. Accordingly, we treat the
dismissal as having been for failure to state aclaim.
12a
Appendix C
favorable to the plaintiffs. Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463,
466 (7th Cir. 1991). For the reasons stated below, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
Il.
A.
Article I, § 9, clause 3 of the United States Constitution
prohibits Congress from passing bills of attainder. The Supreme
Court has defined a bill of attainder as “a law that legislatively
determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable
individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial.”
Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research,
468 U.S. 841, 846-847 (1984); see also Schellong v. I.N.S., 805
F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987).
Thus, it is apparent that a bill of attainder consists of three
elements: (1) specification of the affected persons; (2)
punishment; and (3) lack of a judicial trial.
As the Supreme Court has noted on numerous occasions, the
Bill of Attainder Clause “is an important ingredient of the
doctrine of separation of powers,” see e.g., United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442-443 (1965), that historically was
viewed as a limitation on the power of the legislature alone. See
generally, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S.
425, 473-475 (1977); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 660
(1988). “Just as Art. III confines the Judiciary to the task of
adjudicating concrete ‘cases or controversies,’ so too the Bill of
Attainder Clause was found to ‘reflect. . . the Framers’ belief that
the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as politically
independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the
blameworthiness of, and levying appropriate punishment upon,
specific persons.’ ” Nixon, 433 U.S. 469 (quoting Brown, 381
U.S. at 445). Thus, our first inquiry is whether the very nature of
13a
Appendix C
the action challenged here—an executive agency’s interpretation
of a presidential directive—places it outside the reach of the ban
on bills of attainder.
The district court thought so, concluding that the clause did
not apply “[bJecause OPM’s indefinite disbarment policy is an
executive action.” Mem. Op. at 8 (citations omitted). Although
the district court may be correct, the Supreme Court has not
directly ruled either way on the applicability of the attainder ban
to actions of executive and administrative agencies, and an
argument can be made for analyzing each case functionally rather
than structurally. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee vy.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 143 (1950) (Black, J., concurring) (“It is
true that the classic bill of attainder was a condemnation by the
legislature following investigations by that body, . . . while in the
present case the Attorney General performed the official tasks.
But I cannot believe that the authors of the Constitution, who
outlawed the bill of attainder, inadvertently endowed the
executive with power to engage in the same tyrannical practices
that had made the bill such an odious institution.”). In Rodriguez
v. United States Parole Com’n, 594 F.2d 170, 174 (7th Cir. 1979),
we stated that an administrative rule adopted pursuant to
Congressionally delegated authority must be viewed as
tantamount to a statute for the purpose of determinating whether
it runs afoul of the ex post facto clause, a constitutional provision
that, like the ban on bills of attainder, protects settled
expectations against subsequent shifts in political winds. Having
gone this far, it is a conceivable step to also view an agency policy
interpreting the language of a presidential directive issued
pursuant to statutory authority, see 5 U.S.C. § 3301, as the
functional equivalent of a legislative enactment for bill of
attainder purposes. We need not decide today whether we ought
to take such a step because assuming, without deciding, that the
l4a
Appendix C
clause applies to this case, we find that OPM’s action is not
“punishment” as that term has been defined in the context of bills
of attainder.
In testing for bills of attainder, the Court has not applied a
generic definition of the term “punishment”. As Justice
Frankfurter explained in Lovett v. United States:
The fact that harm is inflicted by
governmental authority does not make it
punishment. Figuratively speaking all
discomforting action may be deemed
punishment because it deprives of what
otherwise might be enjoyed But there may be
reasons other than punitive for such
deprivation.
328 U.S. 303, 324 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Thus, in
view of the complexity inherent in characterizing governmental
action and the multiple purposes of “punishment”, the Court has
employed a three-pronged test for determining whether a
particular enactment inflicts punishment: (1) does it fall within
the historical meaning of legislative punishment? (2) when
viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, can
it reasonably be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes?
and (3) does the record evince an intent to punish? Selectives
Service, 468 U.S. at 852; Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473, 475-476.
As the Nixon Court recognized, “{oJur country’s own
experience with bills of attainder” has resulted in the addition of
“a legislative enactment barring designated individuals or groups
from participation in specified employments or vocations” to the
list of historically impermissible punishments. 433 U.S. at 474
15a
Appendix C
(citing Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867); United States
v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 304 (1946); Brown, supra) (parentheticals
omitted). Because plaintiffs allegations fit comfortably within
this description, we find the first prong of the test satisfied.
This is not nearly enough, however. Even where a fixed
identifiable group—such as the fired controllers—is singled out
and a burden traditionally associated with punishment—such as
permanent exclusion from an occupation—is imposed, the
enactment may pass scrutiny under bill of attainder analysis if its
seeks to achieve legitimate and non-punitive ends and was not
clearly the product of punitive intent. See Tribe, supra. at 654
n.13,655 & 656n.18. Put differently, “[t]he question in each case
where unpleasant consequences are brought to bear upon an
individual for prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to
punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction
of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a
regulation of a present situation, such as the proper qualifications
for a profession.” DeVeau v, Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960)
(Frankfurter, J.). In De Veau, the Court upheld a New York statute
which disqualified convicted felons from serving in any office in
a waterfront labor organization, noting that the statute’s purpose
was “not to punish ex-felons, but to devise what was felt to be a
much-needed scheme of regulation of the waterfront, and for the
effectuation of that scheme it became important whether
individuals had previously been convicted of a felony.” Jd.
Similarly, in Schellong, this court upheld two statutory
provisions—one requiring that persons who participated in Nazi
persecution be deported and the other eliminating the Attorney
General’s discretionary power to grant such persons relief from
deportation—against a bill of attainder challenge. 805 F.2d at
662. We concluded that “[t]he purpose of these statutes is not to
punish individuals for actions previously taken, but to ensure that
16a
Appendix C
the United States is not a haven for individuals who assisted the
Nazis in the brutal persecution and murder of millions of people.”
Id. Here, as in DeVeau and Schellong, President Reagan’s
directive, as interpreted and applied by OPM, was explained as a
nonpunitive, prophylactic measure “to protect the efficiency of
the FAA’s operations” and “the safe and effective performance of
the nation’s air traffic control system.” 17 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 1364 (Dec. 9, 1981). Acomparison of the instant case with
Cummings v. Missouri illustrates this point. In Cummings, the
Supreme Court struck down a provision of the post-Civil War
Missouri Constitution that barred persons from certain
professions unless they stated under oath that the never had been
associated with the Confederacy. See 4 Wall. at 324-325. As the
Cummings Court noted, the required oath had no connection to
the determination of a person’s qualifications for a particular
profession. /d. at 319-320. Here, by contrast, we find an adequate
nexus between the restriction imposed and the legitimate
governmental purpose. President Reagan determined that the
intermingling of controllers who had been fired for striking with
those who had replaced them would interfere with the safety and
efficiency of the FAA’s operations.
Our final inquiry into whether the challenged enactment
inflicts punishment is whether the record as a whole evinces an
intent to punish. The Court has narrowly construed this prong of
the test, requiring “unmistakable evidence of punitive intent”
before an enactment may be invalidated on this basis. Selective
Service, 468 U.S. 855 n.15; Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,
619 (1960). In Selective Service, for example, the Court found no
punitive intent despite “several isolated statements” by
legislators “expressing understandable indignation over the
decision of some nonregistrants to show their defiance of the
law.” 468 U.S. at 855 n.15. Here plaintiffs draw upon public
17a
Appendix C
opinion polls published early in 1984 showing voter approval of
President Reagan’s handling of the PATCO strike in support of
their allegation that OPM’s indefinite disbarment policy “worked
a partisan political advantage for the President.” Cmplt. { 22. Of
course, these polls cannot be evidence of punitive intent either on
the part of President Reagan in issuing the directive or OPM in its
initial implementation thereof because both events took place
Over two years prior to the release of the polling data. Plaintiffs
ask this court to infer punitive intent from OPM’s reinterpretation
of the scope of the debarment policy—to include not only the
FAA itself but also “closely related facilities” —“in the aftermath
of the publication of said polls.” We decline plaintiffs invitation;
the evidence they present constitutes far too thin a reed to form
the basis of even a reasonable inference, let alone “unmistakable
evidence,” of punitive intent.‘
B.
Plaintiffs also submit that OPM’s policy violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause because it extended the debarment period from
three years to an indefinite length after plaintiffs struck and were
terminated for having done so. The ex post facto provision of the
U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 9, clause 8, forbids Congress to
enact any law “which imposes a punishment for an act which was
not punishable at the time it was committed, or imposes
additional punishment to that then prescribed.” Inglese v. United
States Parole Com’n, 768 F.2d 932, 934 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981)). As noted above,
supra at 7, “regulations adopted by an agency pursuant to rule-
4. Because we conclude that OPM’s policy is not punishment under the Bill
of Attainder Clause, we need not analyze whether the policy satisfies the third
element of the test.
18a
Appendix C
making authority delegated to it by Congress can ‘have the force
and effect of law’ in the context of the ex post facto prohibitions.”
Inglese, 768 F.2d at 935 (citing Rodriguez, 594 F.2d at 173). In the
circumstances presented here, however, we need not decide
whether OPM’s policy is tantamount to the United States Parole
Commission rule at issue in Rodriguez (or whether the definition
of punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause is distinct from
that under the Bill of Attainder Clause) because the policy would
not violate the ban on ex post facto laws even if it did impose a
new or additional sanction on plaintiffs. The sanction levied
here—ineligibility for certain federal jobs—is civil, not criminal,
and from “earliest times,” the Supreme Court has construed the ex
post facto provision to apply only to criminal laws. See
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (upholding
the deportation of legally resident aliens because of their
membership in the Communist Party, though that membership
terminated before the enactment of a federal statute making such
an affiliation a basis for deportation). As Justice Jackson
explained,
It has always been considered that that which
[the Ex Post Facto Clause] forbids is penal
legislation which imposes or increases
criminal punishment for conduct lawful prior
to its enactment. Deportation, however
severe its consequences, has_ been
consistently classified as a civil rather than a
criminal procedure. Both of these doctrine as
original proposals might be debatable, but
both have been considered closed for many
years and a body of statute and decisional law
has been built upon them.
19a
Appendix C
Id. Plaintiffs reliance on Rodriguez is inapposite because that
case clearly imposed a criminal sanction—the retroactive
application of a Parole Commission rule setting parole hearings
every eighteen months—on a prisoner serving only a two-year
term, thereby depriving him of any meaningful opportunity for
parole. See 594 F.2d at 173-175.
c.
Plaintiffs next claim that OPM’s refusal to determine their
Suitability for reemployment with the FAA after the three-year
maximum period of debarment violates their due process right to
“pursue their professions.” Cmplt. { 32. They point to 5 C.ER.
§ 731.303 as the source of the three-year limitation and allege that
the presidential directive “did not Suggest or direct that the
debarment be extended beyond the maximum period set by
regulation.” Cmplt. 4 17. We disagree with both their
characterization of the presidential directive and their conclusion
that OPM failed to provide them with all the process that was due.
The Director of OPM has abroad discretion in interpreting a
presidential directive relating to federal personnel matters.
Wagner v. Office of Personnel Management, 783 F.2d 1042, 1045
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 477 US. 906 (1986); Kester v.
Campbell, 652 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1146 (1982). To be sustained the agency’s interpretation must be
“reasonable,” meaning that it cannot be plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the President’s order. See Kester, 652 F.2d at 15-
16. In addition, “[a]n agency changing its course must apply a
reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and standards are
being deliberately changed, not casually ignored.” Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
20a
Appendix C
As we observed above, supra at 2, 5 U.S.C. § 7311 expressly
bars from federal employment any person who strikes against the
United States government. In our view, this statute, written
without condition or limitation, contemplates an indefinite ban.
Even if an existing regulation, such as 5 C.F.R. § 731.303, applies
a more lenient policy than that allowed by statute, the President,
acting under his statutory authority to regulete federal
employment, see e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 3301,° may issue a directive
overriding that regulation. See Korte v. Office of Personnel
Management, 797 F.2d 967, 970 (Fed. Cir. 1986); American
Federation of Gov't Emp. v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d 930, 938 (D.2.
Cir. 1976) (“Under 5 U.S.C. § 3301, Congress has delegated
broad authority to the President to establish the qualifications and
conditions of employment for civil servants within the executive
branch.”), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 965 (1977). Here the President
did just that, and OPM’s subsequent role was limited to executing
the President’s instructions.
In our view, OPM reasonably interpreted the language of the
presidential directive to impose an indefinite ban upon the
5. Pursuantto 5 U.S.C. § 3301, the President may:
(1) prescribe such regulations for the admission of
individuals into the civil service in the executive
branch as will best promote the efficiency of that
service;
(2) ascertain the fitness of applicants as to age, health,
character, knowledge, and ability for the employment
sought; and
(3) appoint and prescribe the duties of individuals to
make inquiries for the purpose of this section.
2la
Appendix C
employment of controllers removed for striking, not only from all
FAA positions, but also from positions which interface with FAA.
We note that our colleagues on the Federal Circuit have reached
essentially the same conclusion on at least two occasions. See
Wagner, 783 F.2d at 1044; Meyer vy. Office of Personnel
Management, 767 F.2d 868, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Moreover, the
fact that OPM appears to have determined the length of the ban
(indefinite) prior to ruling on its breadth (the FAA and all
interfacing agencies) does not undermine the reasonableness of
its conclusions; in our view, both decisions flow naturally from
the language of the President’s order. The only remaining
question is whether plaintiffs received the benefits of all of the
due process protections to which they were entitled.
The Supreme Court has “never held that applicants for
benefits, as distinct from those already receiving them, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due Process
Clause.” Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986). However, as
this case presents somewhat of a hybrid situation in that plaintiffs
once had the benefit (employment with the FAA) that they sought
to regain, we find it at least arguable that plaintiffs have asserted a
protected liberty or property interest. An essential principle of
due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property “be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)). Assuming, again without
deciding, that OPM’s refusal to determine plaintiffs’ suitability
for employment with the FAA implicates a constitutionally
protected interest, we find that a judicial determination of
whether each plaintiff actually participated in the PATCO strike
provided all the process that was due in this instance. The district
court found that “[p]laintiffs, like Korte, were found to be strike
participants through an adjudicative proceeding where they were
22a
Appendix C
afforded ‘safeguards of a judicial trial.” ”" Mem. Op. at 10 (citing
Korte, 797 F.2d at 971). Plaintiffs do not argue otherwise. Once
that determination was made, there was no need for further
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings because the presidential
directive, as rationally interpreted by OPM, clearly, explicitly,
and without exception imposed an indefinite ban on employment
with the FAA and related agencies.
D.
Plaintiffs final contention is that they have been denied equal
protection under OPM’s indefinite debarment policy. In cases
where a classification burdens neither a suspect group nor a
fundamental interest, “courts are quite reluctant to overturn
governmental action on the ground that it denies equal protection
of the laws.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2406 (1991)
(citations omitted). Here, because the right to government
employment is not fundamental, see Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-314 (1976), and
plaintiffs’ status as discharged air traffic controllers does not
place them in a suspect class, plaintiffs concede, as they must,
that OPM’s policy need only withstand rational basis review.
Under this standard, a provision will not be overturned “unless
the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so
unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legislative
purposes that we can only conclude that the [people’s] actions
were irrational.” Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2406 (citations omitted).
The gravamen of plaintiffs’ equal protection claim is that the
policy is not rational because it denies to them the opportunity to
undergo a suitability determination that was available to the
thirty-eight previous classes of striking federal employees and
would be available to convicted drug felons seeking federal
employment. While plaintiffs description of the consequences of
23a
Appendix C
OPM’s policy may be factually correct, such a state of affairs
does not necessarily make an enactment infirm under the Equal
Protection Clause. As the relevant Supreme Court precedents
make clear, the government need not “deal alike with all . .
classes, or to strike at all evils at the same time and in the same
way,” Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935), “[e]vils
in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions,
requiring different remedies. Or so the legislative may think.”
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). In our view,
the explanations offered in the presidential directive advanced
the legitimate governmental objectives of safety and efficiency in
the administration of our nation’s air traffic and suffice to rebut
the claim that the policies enacted in furtherance of the directive
are irrational.
Ill.
By imposing an indefinite period of debarment from
employment with the FAA and related agencies, the Office of
Personnel Management reasonably interpreted President
Reagan’s order regarding air traffic controllers who violated
federal law by striking against the United States. OPM’s policies
implementing the presidential directive did not violate either the
Bill of Attainder Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause and also did
not deny plaintiffs due process or equal protection of the law.
Accordingly, the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’
complaint in its entirety is
AFFIRMED.
A true Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
24a
APPENDIX D — MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND
ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 91C 7910
JUDGE WAYNE R. ANDERSEN
JEAN DEHAINAUT, as widow and representative of
LEONARD DEHAINAUT, deceased, PATRICK WEST, RAY
SOZYCH, and RICHARD ANDREWS, on behalf of themselves,
and a class of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
¥.
FEDERICO PENA, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Transportation, JAMES B. BUSSEY, Administrator, Federal
Aviation Administration, CONSTANCE NEWMAN, Director,
U.S. Office of Personnel Management,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM, OPINION & ORDER
This case involves the claims of former air traffic controllers
who were discharged by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) in 1981 because of their involvement in an illegal strike
against the Government of the United States. This matter is
before the court on the defendants’ Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss
plaintiffs’ complaint. For the reasons stated below, the motion is
granted and plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
25a
Appendix D
BACKGROUND
On August 3, 1981, after several months of unsuccessful
efforts to reach an agreement with the FAA on a collective
bargaining agreement, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Organization (“PATCO”) called on its members to strike. Over 70
percent of the nation’s air traffic controllers answered the call,
causing a significant disruption to private and commercial
aviation in the United States. Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Organization v. Federal Relations Authority, 685 F.2d 547, 551
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
On the first day of the strike, President Reagan issued an
ultimatum to the striking air traffic controllers to return to work
within 48 hours or forfeit their jobs. See 17 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 845 (Aug. 3, 1981). Plaintiffs were among those discharged,
pursuant to the procedures required by 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512-14, for
failing to return to work.
Shortly after the strike, the Office of Personnel Management
(“OPM”) determined that the PATCO strikers would be debarred
from any federal employment for three years. On December 9,
1981, President Reagan issued a directive to the Director of OPM
Stating that the discharged PATCO strikers “should not be
deemed suitable for employment with the Federal Aviation
Administration.” 17 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1364 (Dec. 9,
1981). OPM subsequently interpreted this directive as
indefinitely barring the PATCO strikers from reemployment with
the FAA and interfacing agencies. Based on that interpretation,
OPM denied favorable suitability determinations for plaintiffs
and the class they seek to represent.
Plaintiffs allege that OPM’s interpretation of President
26a
Appendix D
Reagan’s directive is erroneous and that the maximum period of
debarment is three years, that OPM is required to apply certain
administrative procedures in reevaluating their suitability after
that three year period expires, and that OPM’s failure to follow
those procedures is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs seek an order of
mandamus directing the OPM to apply those administrative
procedures for reassessing their suitability for reemployment
with the FAA.
It is worth noting that President Clinton has announced that
he had lifted the indefinite disbarment policy as to the PATCO
strikers. Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent are now
free to apply for reemployment with the FAA. Because the
President’s action does not resolve completely the issues raised in
plaintiffs’ complaint, the court must consider whether it states a
claim.
DISCUSSION
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as
true all well-pleaded material facts in the complaint and must
draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs. Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463,
466 (7th Cir. 1991). Further, the complaint should not be
dismissed unless it appears, beyond a doubt, that the plaintiffs can
prove no set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle
them to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Plaintiffs’ complaint is not the first challenge to the
indefinite disbarment policy. To the contrary, the claims
presented here already have been squarely considered and
rejected by the Federal Circuit. See Wagner v. Office of Personnel
Management, 783 F.2d 1042 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S.
27a
Appendix D
906 (1986); Korte v. Office of Personnel Management, 797 F.2d
967 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Indeed, plaintiffs seek to represent a class
that is virtually indistinguishable from the class certified in
Wagner — that is, all PATCO strikers who were denied fa\ orable
suitability determinations by OPM after their discharge. Wagner,
783 F.2d at 1044.
To avoid the effect of Korte, plaintiffs argue that the Federal
Circuit had no jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the
indefinite disbarment policy. Plaintiffs fail to recognize that it is
this court, not the Federal Circuit, which has limited jurisdiction
over these types of controversies. The Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978 provides the exclusive remedy for federal employees
with nonconstitutional employment-related claims and
constitutional claims seeking monetary relief. See, e.g., Bush v.
Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1983); Arakawa v. Reagan, 666 F.
Supp. 254, 258-60 (D.D.C. 1987). This court’s jurisdiction, on
the other hand, is only over constitutional claims seeking
injunctive relief and is concurrent with the MSPB’s jurisdiction.
Arakawa, 666 F. Supp. at 259-60. Accordingly, plaintiffs’
arguments concerning the appropriateness of jurisdiction in
Korte are not well founded.
For that reason, plaintiffs’ Motion to Supplement the
Pleadings filed on September 9, 1993 is beside the point. Under
Arkawa federal courts share concurrent jurisdiction with the
MSPB over constitutional claims for injunctive relief. Whether
the defendants have argued that proposition in the past is
irrelevant.
Turning to the merits, the factual predicate of plaintiffs’
complaint was squarely rejected in Wagner. The gravamen of
plaintiffs’ complaint is that the debarment period is not indefinite
28a
Appendix D
but is limited to three years. Plaintiffs point to 5 C.F.R. § 731.303
as the source of the three year limitation and allege that the
presidential directive “did not suggest or direct that the
debarment be extended beyond the maximum period set by
regulation.” (Cmplt. { 17.)
The Presidential directive, which plaintiffs have attached to
their complaint, first states that President Reagan had concluded
that the PATCO strikers “despite their strike participation, should
be permitted to apply for federal employment outside the scope of
their former employing agency.” It continues:
I have further determined that it would be
detrimental to the efficiency of operations at
the Federal Aviation Administration and to
the safe and effective performance of our
nations air traffic control system to permit the
discharged air traffic controllers to return to
employment with that agency. Therefore,
these former federal employees should not be
deemed suitable for employment with the
Federal Aviation Administration.
Finding it “difficult to imagine more precise or explicit
language,” the Wagner court upheld OPM’s interpretation of the
directive over plaintiffs’ interpretation: “The Presidential
directive explicitly imposed an indefinite ban upon the
employment of striking controllers by the Administration.”
Wagner, 783 F.2d at 1044. It further held that the indefinite
disbarment policy was expressly authorized under 5 U.S.C.
§ 7311: “Congress meant exactly what it said — that persons who
participated in a strike against the government are barred
indefinitely from employment in the government.” Wagner, 783
F.2d at 1046.
29a
Appendix D
The Korte court held that if 5 C.E.R. § 731.303 placed a
three-year limit on the disbarment policy, it was “superseded” by
the Presidential directive. Korte, 797 F.2d at 970. The Federal
Circuit found Korte’s argument, like plaintiffs’ argument here,
that “OPM’s action was contrary to its own regulation” to be
“beside the point.” Jd. The court emphasized:
OPM was not acting on its own authority and
exercising its own discretion; rather it was
acting under the express direction of the
President. Even assuming, arguendo, that the
indefinite statutory bar was limited to three
years by the regulation, the President’s
directive overrode or superseded that
regulation and imposed an indefinite ban on
the class of which Korte was a member. As the
government properly argues, OPM’s role in
the suitability determination was limited to
executing the President’s instructions.
Id.
Plaintiffs suggest that their case is different from Wagner
and Korte because only they have alleged that the indefinite
disbarment policy “had worked a partisan political advantage for
the President.” (Cmplt. { 22.) However, this general allegation of
political partisanship is irrelevant for two reasons. First, the
complaint notably does not allege that President Reagan’s
motivation in issuing his directive — which orders the indefinite
disbarment — was partisan political advantage. Rather, the
complaint alleges simply that polls taken two years later showed
voter approval of the President’s actions in dealing with the
PATCO strikers.
30a
Appendix D
Second, the complaint fails to allege that the indefinite
disbarment policy had any connection to the political affiliation,
political candidacy, or political beliefs of the PATCO strikers. See
Correa v. Fischer, 982 F.2d 931, 934-35 (Sth Cir. 1993). Without
that causal connection, plaintiffs’ blanket invocation of partisan
politics is without merit.
With respect to the individual counts of plaintiffs’
complaint, Federal Circuit already has considered and ruled
adversely to plaintiffs on each of them.
Count I
Plaintiffs claim the OPM has violated the Bill of Attainder
Clause by applying the indefinite disbarment policy to the
PATCO strikers and not to participants of federal strikes that
occurred prior to the 1981 PATCO strike.
In Korte, the Federal Circuit found that the indefinite
disbarment policy was not a violation of the Bill of Attainder
Clause for two reasons. First, a bill of attainder is “a law that
legislatively decides guilt and inflicts punishment upon an
indentifiable individual without provision of the protections of a
judicial trial.” Korte, 797 F.2d at 972 (quoting Selective Service v.
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 846-47
(1984)). Neither OPM’s indefinite disbarment policy nor the
Presidential directive establishes “guilt.” As Korte makes clear,
“guilt” was established upon a finding that plaintiffs participated
in the PATCO strike, a finding that plaintiffs do not contest here.
Once plaintiffs were determined to be PATCO strike participants,
they were necessarily subject to the indefinite disbarment policy.
Second, the Bill of Attainder Clause “is a limitation on the
authority of the legislative branch.” Korte, 797 F.2d at 972 (citing
3la
Appendix D
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965)). Because
OPM’s indefinite disbarment policy is an executive action, the
clause does not apply here. Korte, 797 F.2d at 972.
Count I
Plaintiffs argue that because the period of disbarment was
changed from a period of three years to an indefinite period after
their strike participation and termination, the policy is an ex post
facto law.
This issue was also disposed of by the Federal Circuit in
Korte:
[W]e note that even if the President’s
directive imposed a new or additional
sanction, the directive would not violate the
constitutional proscription against ex post
facto laws. The sanction imposed is civil, not
criminal, and from “earliest times,” the
Supreme Court has construed the ex post
facto provision to apply only to criminal laws.
Harrisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
594 (1952).
Korte, 797 F.2d at 972.
Count II
Plaintiffs claim that OPM’s failure to follow its regulations
and apply certain administrative procedures to determine their
suitability after the three year maximum period of disbarment
violates their due process right to “pursue their profession.”
(Cmplt. { 35.)
32a
Appendix D
As discussed above, the disbarment period was indefinite
and that OPM’s role in determining the suitability of the PATCO
strikers was limited to executing the President’s instructions. For
those reasons, the Federal Circuit rejected Korte’s due process
challenge. In Korte, the court assumed that a constitutionally
protected liberty or property interest was implicated and
terminated but held that Korte was afforded “the essential
requirements of due process.” Korte, 797 F.2d at 971 (quoting
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532
(1985)).
In reaching that conclusion, the court emphasized that OPM
did not have to apply certain procedures before finding him
unsuitable:
[O]nce it was determined that Korte was
removed from his air traffic controller
position for strike participation, “there was
no need for further investigation and the
President’s directive was then controlling.
This court has held that the Presidential
directive “explicitly imposed an indefinite
ban upon the employment of striking
controllers by the [FAA].” Wagner, 783 F.2d
at 1044.
Id. Likewise, this court rejects plaintiffs’ due process challenge.
Plaintiffs, like Korte, were found to be strike participants through
an adjudicative proceeding where they were afforded “the
safeguards of a judicial trial.” Korte, 797 F.2d at 971.
Count IV
Finally, plaintiffs claim that they have been denied equal
33a
Appendix D
protection under OPM’s indefinite disbarment policy. They
contend that the policy has no rational basis because it applies
only to the PATCO strikers and not to convicted drug dealers and
other felons.
As a preliminary matter, plaintiffs correctly perceive that the
indefinite disbarment policy is subject to review under the
rational basis test, not strict scrutiny. The right to government
employment is not fundamental, Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976), and
plaintiffs’ status as discharged air traffic controllers do not place
them in a suspect class.
However, the Federal Circuit has found a rational basis for
the indefinite disbarment policy. Korte, 797 F.2d at 971-72. The
court observed that the indefinite disbarment policy is
“authorized” under 5 U.S.C. § 7311, the statute which makes ita
crime to strike against the government. Jd.
In amemorandum opinion, the Supreme Court has affirmed
a judgment that 5 U.S.C. § 7311 is constitutionally sound. United
Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 404 U.S. 802, aff’g, 325 F.
Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971). Under the statute, a person who
participates in a strike against the United States “may not accept
or hold a position” with the United States Government. The
Wagner court found the “unambiguous” statute to mean “that
persons who participated in a strike against the government are
barred indefinitely from employment in the government.”
Wagner, 783 F.2d at 1046. The Korte court added that “it is not
irrational or arbitrary for the government to prohibit
reemployment of discharged employees who Participated in a
strike against the government.” Korte, 797 F.2d at 970.
34a
Appendix D
The Korte court found that the President’s stated rationale
for the indefinite disbarment policy — that permitting discharged
controllers to return to the FAA would be detrimental both to the
efficiency of the FAA’s operations and to the safe and effective
performance of the nation’s air traffic control system — was
rationally related to the statutory bar. Korte, 797 F.2d at 971-72.
This court agrees.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed
with prejudice.
ENTERED:
s/ Wayne R. Andersen
Wayne R. Andersen
United States District Judge
DATE: SEP 29 1993
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