Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Dehainaut v. Pena

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Supreme Court, U.s.

FILED

(94113 4 DEC 27 I994

No.

“CFCE“OP “TNE “CLERK

Aupreme Court of the Huited tate

October Term, 1994

JEAN DEHAINAUT, as widow and representative of LEONARD

DEHAINAUT, Deceased, PATRICK WEST, RAY BOZYCH, and

RICHARD ANDREWSon behalf of themselves, and a class of others

similarly situated,

Petitioners,

Vv.

FEDERICO PENA, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, JAMES BB.

BUSSEY, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION

ADMINISTRATION AND CONSTANCE NEWMAN,

DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

MANAGEMENT,

Respondents.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PHILLIP S. WOOD

Counsel of Record

RICHARD J. JOHNSON

WOOD & JOHNSON, P.C.

Attorneys for Petitioners

: 220 East Galena Boulevard

P.O. Box 1717

Aurora, Illinois 60507-1717

(708) 844-2560

(708) 844-1521 (Facsimile)

9 (800) 3 APPEAL + (800) 5 APPEAL » (800) BRIEF 21

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the appellate court having found that petitioners’

Complaint sufficently stated a prima facie Bill of Attainder

violation for purposes of withstanding a Motion to Dismiss,

improperly then affirmed dismissal of this count based on

petitioners’ failure to provide evidentiary support for this claim on

appeal.

2. Whether the President has the authority to ignore or

override validly promulgated laws enacted for the benefit of

federal employees under the Civil Service Reform Act.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented for Review ...............0000: i

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Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Regulations

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A. Basis for Federal Jurisdiction ................ 2

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Reasons for Grantingthe Writ ................2.005. 5

I. The petitioners were improperly required to

provide evidentiary support for the Bill of

Attainder claim in opposition to a motion to

Pe err Re 5

II. The appellate court erred in finding President

Reagan had the authority to override the

controlling regulation limiting debarment to no

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iii

Contents

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Cited:

American Federation of Government Employees v.

Hoffman, 543 F.2d 930 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,

ET)

EE ee ee

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341

ee shan ok sod eu ceecnnnc,

Korte v. Office of Personnel Management, 797 F.2d 967

5a ids chins ned és be cceeccaccec:,,

Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1991) ......

Rodriguez v. United States Parole Commission, 594 F.2d

Lo | es

Scott v. O’Brady, 760 F. Supp. 1288, aff’d, 975 F.2d 366

SG Ua

Selective Services System v. Minnesota Public Interest

Research, 468 U.S. 841(1984) ...................

Wagner v. Office of Personnel Management, 783 F.2d 1042

(Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906 ( 1986) .

Page

10

10

10

10

iv

Contents

Page

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72

fee 8 me eh | re 11

Statutes Cited:

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PEE 5 ind ba 0s 0ecad ehban aces tiacewedeas 2

SEED ahh oehnden4hshese505 Olea ]

EE EEE 6555 5-44-0564 54%00 wares teen 2

EE kk. 0s 5 cab ceed uowescsewseawonsens 2

Bee EE Sikh ahnin bunks Wad 045004 d BENS e ERO 2

United States Constitution Cited: )

PEG, OR 5g ice cence snecessaeucs 1,4

Other Authority Cited:

ee) 8 | eer ere errr 1,2, 8,9, 11

APPENDIX

Appendix A — Order of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit Dated September 28, 1994 .... la

Vv

Contents

Page

: Appendix B — Order of the United States Court of Appeals

| for the Seventh Circuit Dated August 29,1994 ....... 3a

Appendix C — Opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dated Au gust 9, 1994 . 6a

Appendix D — Memorandum, Opinion and Order of the

United States District Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division

1

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported as Jean

Dehainaut et al. v. Federico Pejfia. et al., 32 F.3d 1066 (Seventh

Circuit, 1994), and appears in Appendix A, B and C to this

Petition. The unpublished District Court opinion is attached as

Appendix D.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The judgment under review by the Seventh Circuit Court of

Appeals was decided August 9, 1994. Plaintiff’s Petition for

Rehearing was denied September 28, 1994. This Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND

REGULATIONS INVOLVED

1. United States Constitution, Article I Section 9, Clause 3:

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall

be passed.

2. SC.F.R. § 731.303:

When a person is disqualified for any reason

named in § 731.202, OPM, in its discretion,

may deny that person examination for and

appointment to a competitive position for a

period of not more than 3 years from the date

of determination of disqualification. On

expiration of the period of debarment, the

person who has been debarred may not be

appointed to any position in the competitive

service until his fitness for appointment has

been redetermined by OPM.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Basis for Federal Jurisdiction

The plaintiffs claimed initial federal jurisdiction based on 28

U.S.C. §§ 1361, 2201 and 2202.

B. Facts of the Case

The petitioners are all former Air Traffic Control Specialists

fired by the Federal Aviation Admmistration (“FAA”) for alleged

participation in the 1981 strike. At the time petitioners were

terminated, the applicable statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7311, provided a

bar to continued federal employment but set for striking federal

workers no minimum or maximum period of debarment.

However, a regulation did exist, 5 C.F.R. § 731.303, which

provided the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”)

discretion to deny employment to strikers for a period of not more

than three (3) years from the date of disqualification. (App. 7a,

8a).'

This regulation further provided that, at the expiration of the

three year period, OPM was to redetermine the suitability of the

fired employee under procedure as defined by regulation on a

case-by-case basis. Id.

During the first week of August, 1981, OPM Director

Donald Devine announced his office’s intention to apply the

maximum three year debarment to members of plaintiffs’ class.

(App. 8a).

On December 9, 1981, President Ronald Reagan wrote to the

Director of OPM, directing a modification of the debarment

policy so as to allow reemployment of the controllers fired in

1. App. refers to Petitioner’s attached Appendix.

3

positions outside of the FAA. This letter further confirmed the

debarment policy as to reemployment within the FAA. ( App. 8a-

9a).

Subsequently, pursuant to the President’s letter, OPM issued

a memorandum removing the per se debarment as to the positions

outside the FAA. ( App. 9a-10a). Neither the President’s letter nor

the OPM memorandum suggested any extension or modification

of the three year ban as to reemployment within the FAA.

Between the date of the OPM memorandum in January of

1982, and March of 1984, various members of plaintiffs’ class

inquired of OPM as to the date they would be deemed eligible for

reemployment with the FAA. OPM responded it would be three

years from the date of termination. (App. 10a).

However, in the wake of re-election years polls as to the

manner in which the President had handled the strike Situation, in

March of 1984, the OPM Director issued a Bulletin reinterpreting

the President’s December 1981 letter by providing that

the debarment period imposed by the

President against reemployment of

discharged controllers within the scope of the

FAA is indefinite in duration and extends to

positions in the FAA and Closely related

facilities.

(App. 11a).

This Bulletin was issued with «in expiration date and, when it

expired it was reissued as FPM Bulletin 731 -9, which had an

expiration date of October 20, 1986. Jd.

At the expiration of the three year debarment period, the

4

OPM, in response to employment applications from various fired

controllers, refused to perform suitability determinations in

accordance to its own regulations, instead applying its per se

indefinite debarment policy. Id.

Since the expiration of the latest OPM Bulletin announcing

the indefinite debarment policy, the FAA has refused to process

any applications for reemployment submitted by members of

plaintiffs’ class, instead referring the applicants to the President's

letter or the expired Bulletin, which documents the FAA, treated-

at the time relevant to the complaint — as still mandating an

indefinite disbarment against petitioners’ class. /d.

Count I of petitioners’ complaint alleges, in addition to the

above general allegations, that prior to the 1981 strike, there have

been, since 1962, a total of at least 39 strikes by federal sector

employees, including three work stoppages by air traffic

controllers against the FAA. In none of these other instances had a

per se indefinite policy against future federal employment been

implemented. (App. 22a). The imposition of this policy to an

identifiable class of persons, — i.e., all those fired for

participating in the 1981 strike — while not similarly punishing

those involving in the other 39 strikes, thus created a Bill of

Attainder, impermissible under Article I, Section 9 of the United

States Constitution when analyzed under Supreme Court doctrine

and the case law of this Circuit.

Count II alleges that, through modifying and increasing the

maximum three year debarment period to one of indefinite

duration, the defendants have in effect increased the penalty for a

prior action, thereby violating the proscription against ex post

facto laws contained in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution.

(App. 11a).

Count III alleges that, at the end of the three year debarment

5

period, the respondents were obliged by regulation to afford each

member of petitioners’ class applying for reemployment a

suitability determination on a case-by-case basis, based on

criteria as provided by the applicable regulations. In violation of

petitioners’ constitutional right to due process under the law, the

respondents have denied and continue to deny petitioners the

procedural provided by these regulations resulting in the

deprivation of petitioners’ right to pursue their profession. Jd.

Count IV alleges that, by singling out petitioners’ class for

per se indefinite debarment, while at the same time finding

individuals with records of far more serious offenses suitable for

employment within the FAA, the respondents have denied

petitioners their right to equal protection under the law. Id.

The respondents filed a Rule 12 (b) Motion to Dismiss for

failure to state a cause of action which was ultimately granted by

the trial court on September 29, 1993. On August 9, 1994, the

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and on

August 9, 1994 issued an amendment to its initial opinion. On

September 28, 1994, the court denied petitioners’ Petition for

Reconsideration.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

THE PETITIONERS WERE IMPROPERLY

REQUIRED TO PROVIDE EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT

FOR THE BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAIM IN

OPPOSITION TOA MOTION TO DISMISS.

The District Court originally granted respondents’ Motion to

Dismiss Count I of petitioners’ Complaint—alleging a violation

of the constitutional prohibition on Bills of Attainder—on the

6

basis that the indefinite disbarment policy was an executive, not a

legislative, action and thus the clause did not apply. (App. 13a).

The appellate court disagreed with this reasoning. It found

precedent for the proposition that an agency policy implementing

a presidential directive may be the functional equivalent of a

legislative enactment for purposes of the Bill of Attainder clause

in the case of Rodriquez v. United States Parole Commission, 594

F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1979). Id.

In so doing, the court found it inconceivable that the authors

of the Constitution would have inadvertently allowed the

Executive Branch to “engage in the same tyrannical practices that

had made the bill such an odious institution” Joint Anti-Fascist

Refugee Committee v. McGrath. 341 U.S. 123, 143 (1950)

(Black, J. concurring). Jd.

The court, having thus invalidated the linchpin of the district

judge’s decision dismissing Count I, should have simply

remanded the case for further consideration. Instead, the court

gratuitously assumes the task of determining issues related to the

Bill of Attainder claim that were never argued or decided below.

Specifically, the court sets out to decide — in the first instance —

whether the indefinite debarment policy constitutes

“punishment’”’ for purposes of the Bill of Attainder clause. (App.

14a).

The court enunciates a three pronged test for determination

as to whether a particular enactment constitutes punishment

derived from Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public

Interest Research, 468 U.S. 841 (1984).

Using this test, the court finds that, indeed, the barring of

designated individuals or groups from specified employment

constitutes “punishment” and further finds that “plaintiffs

7

allegations fit comfortably within this description.” Incredibly,

though, the court still refuses to remand the case and states its

intent to begin the dubious exercise of determining whether the

debarment policy was the “product of punitive intent.” (App.

15a).

This clearly goes well beyond the function of a court of

review. By its own admission, the court has found that at least a

prima facie violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause has been

made. To further review whether punitive intent has been proven

clearly either assumes that petitioners have already introduced

evidence on this subject into the record or that they are under an

obligation to introduce such evidence on appeal.

This, however, directly violates the well established

standards governing Motions to Dismiss, i.é., the court must

accept all well pleaded facts as true, Perkins v. Silverstein, 939

F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1991) and, in defending against a Motion to

Dismiss, the plaintiff is under absolutely no obligation to provide

evidentiary support for the allegations of the Complaint. Scott v.

O’Brady, 760 F. Supp. 1288, aff’d, 975 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1991).

Indeed, the court makes it clear in its decision that it is

requiring the appellate record as a whole toevince “unmistakable

evidence of punitive intent” before it will reverse. (App. 16a).

Yet, because this came before the court on the granting of a

Motion to Dismiss, it is axiomatic that the “record as a whole”’

will consist of nothing more than bare pleadings. Where, one may

legitimately ask, is this evidentiary record to be found?

The simple answer is nowhere. There is no administrative

nor legislative record in the court file and, obviously, no

testimony was taken on this issue. Impliedly conceding the

evidentiary vacuum presented it, the court then takes the

astonishing step of penalizing the petitioners for not having

8

somehow presented evidence on an issue that was never even

addressed below. Indeed, the original decision unmistakably

places the evidentiary burden on petitioners by concluding: “the

evidence (plaintiffs) present constitutes far too thin a reed to form

the basis of . . . punitive intent.” Jd.

It is telling that, upon review of petitioners’ Petition for

Reconsideration, the court revised this sentence to reflect that the

administrative record” was insufficient to form the basis of

punitive intent. (App. 4a). Again, a review of the record and

pleadings of the parties reveals no “administrative” nor any other

record that would lead to the court’s conclusions and the court

conveniently neglects to cite to where this “record” was found.

In this case, it is beyond question that the appellate court first

found that petitioners had pled a prima facie case of a Bill of

Attainder violation, but then proceeded to try the evidentiary

issues in the case. The petitioners lost this “trial” because they did

not produce sufficient evidence to rebut an “administrative

record” that did not exist. The court violated petitioners’ basic

due process rights to a fair attempt to prove their case and its

decision must be reversed.

II.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN FINDING

PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD THE AUTHORITY TO

OVERRIDE THE CONTROLLING REGULATION

LIMITING DEBARMENT TO NO LONGER THAN

THREE YEARS.

Petitioners’ complaint alleged the existence of a validly

promulgated regulation—S5 C.F.R § 731.303—which provided

for a maximum period of debarment for striking federal

employees of three years. The Complaint further alleged that the

9

indefinite debarment policy violated petitioners’ due process

right to a suitability determination for federal employment at the

expiration of the three years as mandated by 5C.F.R. § 731.303.

The appellate court agreed that the regulation in question did

indeed mandate a maximum three year debarment but that the

President had authority to issue a directive Overriding the

regulation (App. 20a).

The court found that the President’s authority to do so ina

statute never before argued by any party to extend such authority

—5 U.S.C. § 3301—which states the President may

(1) prescribe such regulations for the

admission of individuals into the civil service

in the executive branch as will best promote

the efficiency of that service;

(2) ascertain the fitness of applicants as to

age, health, character, knowledge, and ability

for the employment, sought; and

(3) appoint and prescribe the duties of

individuals to make inquiries for the purposes

of this section.

Id.

While the court declined to specify exactly which subsection

it found controlling, it is clear that (3) has no relevance to this

case and (2) deals with the exact Suitability determinations the

directive purported to withhold. Therefore, only (1) could have

any bearing on the President’s authority to debar a class of

individuals from federal employment and it specifically delimits

that authority to the promulgation of regulations — not

10

Presidential fiat. The Complaint, however, makes clear that

whatever the Presidential letter of December 9, 1981 was, it was

not a regulation. There was no notice or comment period nor any

of the other procedural safeguards mandated by the

Administrative Procedure Act. Thus 5 U.S.C. § 3301 is

inapplicable to the facts of this case.

The court finds further authority in Wagner v. Officer of

Personnel Management, 783 F.2d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.

denied, 477 U.S. 906 (1986). A reading of Wagner will reveal,

however, that it contains absolutely no analysis whatsoever for

the President’s ability to supersede the law, the Federal Circuit

merely declares that the power to do so exists. The court also

relies on Korte v. Office of Personnel Management, 797 F.2d 967

(Fed. Cir. 1986). Korte again gives the issue no independent

analysis and relies for authority solely on Wagner. Perhaps

beginning to realize the frailty of its position, the court next cites

a case never before cited nor relied upon by any party, American

Federation of Gov’t Employees v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d 930 (D.C.

Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 430 U.S. 965 (1977).

The Hoffman decision, though, is inopposite. The plaintiffs

in Hoffman were challenging the statutory authority of the

executive branch Civil Service Commission to enact certain

regulations requiring federal personnel in army and air force

reserve technician programs to maintain membership in the army

and air force reserves. The Hoffman court explicitly premised its

decision on the recent Supreme Court ruling in Hampton v. Mon

Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 86S. Ct. 1895 (1976) which dealt with

the Civil Service Commission’s statutory authority to issue

regulations barring non-citizens from federal employment. The

government’s defense in both cases rested on the broad authority

given the President to issue regulations under 5 U.S.C. § 3301.

The respondents in the instant case have never argued and

11

could not argue that the indefinite debarment policy was

promulgated by regulation. Indeed, implicit in the finding that the

Presidential directive “superseded” the regulation is a finding

that 5 C.F.R § 731.303 was the controlling law at the time of the

events complained of by the petitioners. Therefore, the cases

cited by the court in support of its decision are simply irrelevant.

In this case, a regulation tantamount to a statute existed

which specifically applied to the petitioners in this action. In that

Situation, the only power the President had — short of

promulgating a superseding regulation —- was to see to it that the

law was faithfully executed. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.

Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72S. Ct. 863, 966 L. Ed. 1153 (1952).

If this court’s opinion is allowed to Stand, it is an open

invitation to the partial or complete gutting of the civil service

system at the President’s discretion. There is no principled way to

distinguish the President’s right to “supersede”’ the regulation in

question here from the right in the future to “supersede”

regulations governing discovery or trial of Merit System

Protection Board (“MPSB”) appeals, or, if the Seventh Circuit is

serious about the regulation in question being tantamount to a

Statute, to simply “supersede” one or all of the panoply of

statutory rights granted federal employees under the Civil

Service Reform Act.

12

CONCLUSION

For all the above mentioned reasons, a Writ of Certiorari

should issue to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals in

this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

PHILLIP S. WOOD

Counsel of Record

RICHARD J. JOHNSON

WOOD & JOHNSON, P.C.

Attorneys for Petitioners

220 East Galena Boulevard

P.O. Box 1717

Aurora, Illinois 60507-1717

(708) 844-2560

(708) 844-1521 (Facsimile)

la

APPENDIX A — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

DATED SEPTEMBER 28, 1994

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

September 28, 1994

HON. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

HON. JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

HON. ROBERT A. GRANT, District Judge*

No. 93-3649

JEAN DEHAINAUT, as widow and representative of

LEONARD DEHAINAUT, Deceased, PATRICK WEST, RAY

SOZYCH, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

V.

FEDERICO PENA, Secretary, United States Department of

Transportation, JAMES B. BUSSEY, Administrator, Federal

Aviation Administration and CONSTANCE NEWMAN,

Director, United States Office of Personnel Management,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

* The Honorable Robert A. Grant of the Northern District of Indiana is

sitting by designation.

2a

Appendix A

No. 91C7910

Wayne R. Andersen, Judge.

ORDER

On consideration of the petition for rehearing and suggestion

for rehearing in banc filed in the above-entitled cause on August

22, 1994, by plaintiffs-appellants, no judge in active service has

requested a vote thereon, and all of the judges on the original

panel have voted to deny arehearing. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the aforesaid petition for rehearing

and suggestion for rehearing in banc be, and the same is hereby

DENIED.

3a

APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

DATED AUGUST 29, 1994

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

August 29, 1994

HON. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit J udge

HON. JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

HON. ROBERTA. GRANT, District Judge*

No. 93-3649

JEAN DEHAINAUT, as widow and representative of

LEONARD DEHAINAUT, Deceased, PATRICK WEST, RAY

SOZYCH, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Vv.

FEDERICO PENA, Secretary, United States Department of

Transportation, JAMES B. BUSSEY, Administrator, Federal

Aviation Administration and CONSTANCE NEWMAN,

Director, United States Office of Personnel Management,

Defendants- Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the N orthern

District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

* The Honorable Robert A. Grant of the Northern District of Indiana is sitting

by designation.

4a

Appendix B

No. 91 C7910

Wayne R. Andersen, Judge.

ORDER

The opinion issued in the above-entitled case on August 9,

1994 is hereby amended as follows:

On Page 8, last clause of sentence carried over from page 7 should

read as follows:

(3) does the legislative (or, here, administrative) record evince

an intent to punish? Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 852; Nixon, 433

U.S. at 473, 475-476.

On Page 9, first sentence of the last paragraph should read as

follows:

Our final inquiry into whether the challenged enactment inflicts

punishment is whether the legislative (or, here, administrative)

record as a whole evinces an intent to punish: See Nixon, 433 U.S.

at 478-484 (examining the terms of the enactment and related

committee reports and legislative history to determine the issue

of intent); see also Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 855 n.15 (same).

On Page 10, last sentence before subsection B. should read as

follows:

Sa

Appendix B

We decline plaintiffs’ invitation; the administrative record does

not permit even a reasonable inference, let alone “unmistakabie

evidence,” of punitive intent.‘ See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 484 (noting

that an enactment may not be struck down “based upon inferences

that we may be asked to draw from our personalized reading of

the contemporary scene or recent history. In judging the

constitutionality of the Act, we may only look to its terms, to the

intent expressed by Members of Congress who voted its passage,

and to the existence or non existence of legitimate explanations

for its apparent effect.”’).

6a

APPENDIX C — OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

DATED AUGUST 9, 1994

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 93-3649

JEAN DEHAINAUT, etal.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

FEDERICO PENA, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 91 C 7910-Wayne R. Andersen, Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 22, 1994—-DECIDED AUGUST 9, 1994

Before BAUER and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and GRANT,

District Judge.*

* The Honorable Robert A. Grant of the Northem District of Indiana is sitting

by designation.

7a

Appendix C

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. A group of former air traffic

controllers who had been fired for their participation in a 1981

strike against the federal government filed a class action suit

against the United States Department of Transportation

(“DOT”), the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), and the

Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”), seeking mandamus

and injunctive relief (including back pay) and a declaratory

judgment that OPM’s policy indefinitely barring them from

employment with the FAA and related agencies was

unconstitutional. In their four-count complaint, the plaintiffs

alleged that the policy violated the Constitution as (1) a bill of

attainder, (2) an ex post facto law, (3) a denial of due process, and

(4) a denial of equal protection. The district court granted the

defendants’ motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b). We

affirm.

I.

This case has its genesis in the Professional Air Traffic

Controllers Organization (“PATCO”) strike of August, 1981. See

generally Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization v.

Federal Relations Authority, 685 F.2d 547, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

At the time of the strike (and still today), a federal statute

provided that “[a]n individual may not accept or hold a position

in the Government of the United States” if he “participates in a

strike, or asserts the right to strike against the Government of the

United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 7311. Though the statute was phrased

in absolute terms, a regulation provided:

When a person is disqualified for any reason

named in § 731.202, OPM, in its discretion,

may deny that person examination for and

appointment to a competitive position for a

8a

Appendix C

period of not more than 3 years from the date

of determination of disqualification. On

expiration of the period of debarment, the

person who has been debarred may not be

appointed to any position in the competitive

service until his fitness for appointment has

been redetermined by OPM.

5 C.F.R. § 731.308. Among the many reasons for disqualification

listed in 5 C.F.R. § 731.202(b) was “[a]ny statutory

disqualification which makes the individual unfit for the

service”—such as that provided by 5 U.S.C. § 7311.

On the first day of the strike, President Reagan issued an

ultimatum to the striking controllers: return to work within forty-

eight hours or forfeit your job. See 17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.

845 (Aug. 3, 1981). Plaintiffs were among those discharged for

failing to return to work. Shortly thereafter, the OPM announced

that it intended to apply the maximum three-year debarment to

the controllers. On December 9, 1981, however, President

Reagan issued a directive modifying the debarment policy. The

President’s letter read as follows:

The Office of Personnel Management has

established the position that the former air

traffic controllers who were discharged for

participating in a strike against the

government initiated on August 3, 1981 shall

be debarred from federal employment for a

period of three years. Upon deliberation I

have concluded that such individuals, despite

their strike participation, should be permitted

to apply for federal employment outside the

scope of their former employing agency.

9a

Appendix C

Therefore, pursuant to my authority to

regulate federal employment, I have

determined that the Office of Personnel

Management should permit federal agencies

to receive applications for employment from

these individuals and process them according

to established civil service procedures. Your

office should perform suitability

determinations with respect to all such

applicants according to established standards

and procedures under 5 CFR, Part 731.

After reviewing reports from the Secretary of

Transportation and the Administrator of the

Federal Aviation Administration, I have

further determined that it would be

detrimental to the efficiency of operations at

the Federal Aviation Administration and to

the safe and effective performance of our

national air traffic control system to permit

the discharged air traffic controllers to return

to employment with that agency. Therefore,

these former federal employees should not be

deemed suitable for employment with the

Federal Aviation Administration.

I direct you to process their applications for

reemployment with the federal government

accordingly.

17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1364 (Dec. 9, 1981). On January 6,

1982, OPM issued Federal Personnel Manual (FPM) Bulletin

731-6 which implemented the policy announced in the December

presidential directive. Bulletin 731-6 stated in relevant part:

10a

Appendix C

All persons whose employment was

terminated on account of the strike by air

traffic controllers, which began on or about

August 3, 1981, shall be determined not to be

suitable for reinstatement or appointment in

any position in the FAA, because it would be

detrimental to the efficiency of that agency by

interfacing with or preventing its effective

performance of its duties and responsibilities

(5 CFR 731.202(a)(2)).

The Office of Personnel Management shall

consider, on a_ case-by-case basis,

applications for Federal employment, other

than in the FAA from air traffic controllers

whose employment was terminated on

account of striking, and shall appropriate

determinations of their suitability for the

particular department for which they

apply....

Even after the issuance of Bulletin 731-6, plaintiffs allege

that the FAA, in response to inquiries, continued to inform fired

strikers that they still would be eligible for reemployment with

the FAA three years after the date of their termination. This

apparent contradiction was resolved, however, by the March

1984 publication of a new bulletin,’ which, according to the

plaintiffs, reinterpreted the December 1981 presidential directive

in the wake of election-year polls indicating approval of the

1. The new bulletin expired on January 20, 1985, at which time it was

reissued (contents unchanged) as FPM Bulletin 731-9, with an expiration date of

October 20, 1986.

lla

Appendix C

President’s handling of the PATCO strike. The new bulletin stated

that “the debarment period imposed by the President against

reemployment of discharged controllers within the scope of the

FAA is indefinite in duration and extends to Positions in the FAA

and closely related facilities.” (emphasis added).

After the three-year anniversary of their termination, the

OPM received employment applications from various fired

controllers, but declined to perform suitability determinations.

Instead, the OPM applied the indefinite debarment policy

articulated in the aforementioned FPM Bulletins. Plaintiffs filed

suit, alleging that OPM’s policy violated the Constitution as (1)a

bill of attainder; (2) an ex post facto law; (3) a denial of due

Process; and (4) a denial of equal protection. In essence, plaintiffs

claim that OPM misinterpreted and misapplied President

Reagan’s directive by failing to reevaluate the suitability for

reemployment with the FAA at the end of the three-year

maximum period of debarment.? The district court dismissed

plaintiffs’ complaint in its entirety, apparently under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6).? Our review of a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is de

novo, Northwest Tissue Center v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 522, 527 (7th

Cir. 1993), and we must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the

complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most

2. While President Clinton’s lifting of the indefinite debarment policy has

mooted plaintiffs’ prayer for injunctive relief, their additional claims for back pay

and attorney’s fees remain before this court.

3. Defendants raised a number of arguments for dismissal, including lack of

jurisdiction, res judicata, and failure to state aclaim. The district court referred to

the defendants’ motion simply as a “Rule 12(b) motion”, but did not find the suit

barred by either jurisdictional defects or res judicata. Accordingly, we treat the

dismissal as having been for failure to state aclaim.

12a

Appendix C

favorable to the plaintiffs. Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463,

466 (7th Cir. 1991). For the reasons stated below, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

Il.

A.

Article I, § 9, clause 3 of the United States Constitution

prohibits Congress from passing bills of attainder. The Supreme

Court has defined a bill of attainder as “a law that legislatively

determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable

individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial.”

Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research,

468 U.S. 841, 846-847 (1984); see also Schellong v. I.N.S., 805

F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987).

Thus, it is apparent that a bill of attainder consists of three

elements: (1) specification of the affected persons; (2)

punishment; and (3) lack of a judicial trial.

As the Supreme Court has noted on numerous occasions, the

Bill of Attainder Clause “is an important ingredient of the

doctrine of separation of powers,” see e.g., United States v.

Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442-443 (1965), that historically was

viewed as a limitation on the power of the legislature alone. See

generally, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S.

425, 473-475 (1977); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 660

(1988). “Just as Art. III confines the Judiciary to the task of

adjudicating concrete ‘cases or controversies,’ so too the Bill of

Attainder Clause was found to ‘reflect. . . the Framers’ belief that

the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as politically

independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the

blameworthiness of, and levying appropriate punishment upon,

specific persons.’ ” Nixon, 433 U.S. 469 (quoting Brown, 381

U.S. at 445). Thus, our first inquiry is whether the very nature of

13a

Appendix C

the action challenged here—an executive agency’s interpretation

of a presidential directive—places it outside the reach of the ban

on bills of attainder.

The district court thought so, concluding that the clause did

not apply “[bJecause OPM’s indefinite disbarment policy is an

executive action.” Mem. Op. at 8 (citations omitted). Although

the district court may be correct, the Supreme Court has not

directly ruled either way on the applicability of the attainder ban

to actions of executive and administrative agencies, and an

argument can be made for analyzing each case functionally rather

than structurally. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee vy.

McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 143 (1950) (Black, J., concurring) (“It is

true that the classic bill of attainder was a condemnation by the

legislature following investigations by that body, . . . while in the

present case the Attorney General performed the official tasks.

But I cannot believe that the authors of the Constitution, who

outlawed the bill of attainder, inadvertently endowed the

executive with power to engage in the same tyrannical practices

that had made the bill such an odious institution.”). In Rodriguez

v. United States Parole Com’n, 594 F.2d 170, 174 (7th Cir. 1979),

we stated that an administrative rule adopted pursuant to

Congressionally delegated authority must be viewed as

tantamount to a statute for the purpose of determinating whether

it runs afoul of the ex post facto clause, a constitutional provision

that, like the ban on bills of attainder, protects settled

expectations against subsequent shifts in political winds. Having

gone this far, it is a conceivable step to also view an agency policy

interpreting the language of a presidential directive issued

pursuant to statutory authority, see 5 U.S.C. § 3301, as the

functional equivalent of a legislative enactment for bill of

attainder purposes. We need not decide today whether we ought

to take such a step because assuming, without deciding, that the

l4a

Appendix C

clause applies to this case, we find that OPM’s action is not

“punishment” as that term has been defined in the context of bills

of attainder.

In testing for bills of attainder, the Court has not applied a

generic definition of the term “punishment”. As Justice

Frankfurter explained in Lovett v. United States:

The fact that harm is inflicted by

governmental authority does not make it

punishment. Figuratively speaking all

discomforting action may be deemed

punishment because it deprives of what

otherwise might be enjoyed But there may be

reasons other than punitive for such

deprivation.

328 U.S. 303, 324 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Thus, in

view of the complexity inherent in characterizing governmental

action and the multiple purposes of “punishment”, the Court has

employed a three-pronged test for determining whether a

particular enactment inflicts punishment: (1) does it fall within

the historical meaning of legislative punishment? (2) when

viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, can

it reasonably be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes?

and (3) does the record evince an intent to punish? Selectives

Service, 468 U.S. at 852; Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473, 475-476.

As the Nixon Court recognized, “{oJur country’s own

experience with bills of attainder” has resulted in the addition of

“a legislative enactment barring designated individuals or groups

from participation in specified employments or vocations” to the

list of historically impermissible punishments. 433 U.S. at 474

15a

Appendix C

(citing Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867); United States

v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 304 (1946); Brown, supra) (parentheticals

omitted). Because plaintiffs allegations fit comfortably within

this description, we find the first prong of the test satisfied.

This is not nearly enough, however. Even where a fixed

identifiable group—such as the fired controllers—is singled out

and a burden traditionally associated with punishment—such as

permanent exclusion from an occupation—is imposed, the

enactment may pass scrutiny under bill of attainder analysis if its

seeks to achieve legitimate and non-punitive ends and was not

clearly the product of punitive intent. See Tribe, supra. at 654

n.13,655 & 656n.18. Put differently, “[t]he question in each case

where unpleasant consequences are brought to bear upon an

individual for prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to

punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction

of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a

regulation of a present situation, such as the proper qualifications

for a profession.” DeVeau v, Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960)

(Frankfurter, J.). In De Veau, the Court upheld a New York statute

which disqualified convicted felons from serving in any office in

a waterfront labor organization, noting that the statute’s purpose

was “not to punish ex-felons, but to devise what was felt to be a

much-needed scheme of regulation of the waterfront, and for the

effectuation of that scheme it became important whether

individuals had previously been convicted of a felony.” Jd.

Similarly, in Schellong, this court upheld two statutory

provisions—one requiring that persons who participated in Nazi

persecution be deported and the other eliminating the Attorney

General’s discretionary power to grant such persons relief from

deportation—against a bill of attainder challenge. 805 F.2d at

662. We concluded that “[t]he purpose of these statutes is not to

punish individuals for actions previously taken, but to ensure that

16a

Appendix C

the United States is not a haven for individuals who assisted the

Nazis in the brutal persecution and murder of millions of people.”

Id. Here, as in DeVeau and Schellong, President Reagan’s

directive, as interpreted and applied by OPM, was explained as a

nonpunitive, prophylactic measure “to protect the efficiency of

the FAA’s operations” and “the safe and effective performance of

the nation’s air traffic control system.” 17 Weekly Comp. Pres.

Doc. 1364 (Dec. 9, 1981). Acomparison of the instant case with

Cummings v. Missouri illustrates this point. In Cummings, the

Supreme Court struck down a provision of the post-Civil War

Missouri Constitution that barred persons from certain

professions unless they stated under oath that the never had been

associated with the Confederacy. See 4 Wall. at 324-325. As the

Cummings Court noted, the required oath had no connection to

the determination of a person’s qualifications for a particular

profession. /d. at 319-320. Here, by contrast, we find an adequate

nexus between the restriction imposed and the legitimate

governmental purpose. President Reagan determined that the

intermingling of controllers who had been fired for striking with

those who had replaced them would interfere with the safety and

efficiency of the FAA’s operations.

Our final inquiry into whether the challenged enactment

inflicts punishment is whether the record as a whole evinces an

intent to punish. The Court has narrowly construed this prong of

the test, requiring “unmistakable evidence of punitive intent”

before an enactment may be invalidated on this basis. Selective

Service, 468 U.S. 855 n.15; Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,

619 (1960). In Selective Service, for example, the Court found no

punitive intent despite “several isolated statements” by

legislators “expressing understandable indignation over the

decision of some nonregistrants to show their defiance of the

law.” 468 U.S. at 855 n.15. Here plaintiffs draw upon public

17a

Appendix C

opinion polls published early in 1984 showing voter approval of

President Reagan’s handling of the PATCO strike in support of

their allegation that OPM’s indefinite disbarment policy “worked

a partisan political advantage for the President.” Cmplt. { 22. Of

course, these polls cannot be evidence of punitive intent either on

the part of President Reagan in issuing the directive or OPM in its

initial implementation thereof because both events took place

Over two years prior to the release of the polling data. Plaintiffs

ask this court to infer punitive intent from OPM’s reinterpretation

of the scope of the debarment policy—to include not only the

FAA itself but also “closely related facilities” —“in the aftermath

of the publication of said polls.” We decline plaintiffs invitation;

the evidence they present constitutes far too thin a reed to form

the basis of even a reasonable inference, let alone “unmistakable

evidence,” of punitive intent.‘

B.

Plaintiffs also submit that OPM’s policy violated the Ex Post

Facto Clause because it extended the debarment period from

three years to an indefinite length after plaintiffs struck and were

terminated for having done so. The ex post facto provision of the

U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 9, clause 8, forbids Congress to

enact any law “which imposes a punishment for an act which was

not punishable at the time it was committed, or imposes

additional punishment to that then prescribed.” Inglese v. United

States Parole Com’n, 768 F.2d 932, 934 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing

Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981)). As noted above,

supra at 7, “regulations adopted by an agency pursuant to rule-

4. Because we conclude that OPM’s policy is not punishment under the Bill

of Attainder Clause, we need not analyze whether the policy satisfies the third

element of the test.

18a

Appendix C

making authority delegated to it by Congress can ‘have the force

and effect of law’ in the context of the ex post facto prohibitions.”

Inglese, 768 F.2d at 935 (citing Rodriguez, 594 F.2d at 173). In the

circumstances presented here, however, we need not decide

whether OPM’s policy is tantamount to the United States Parole

Commission rule at issue in Rodriguez (or whether the definition

of punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause is distinct from

that under the Bill of Attainder Clause) because the policy would

not violate the ban on ex post facto laws even if it did impose a

new or additional sanction on plaintiffs. The sanction levied

here—ineligibility for certain federal jobs—is civil, not criminal,

and from “earliest times,” the Supreme Court has construed the ex

post facto provision to apply only to criminal laws. See

Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (upholding

the deportation of legally resident aliens because of their

membership in the Communist Party, though that membership

terminated before the enactment of a federal statute making such

an affiliation a basis for deportation). As Justice Jackson

explained,

It has always been considered that that which

[the Ex Post Facto Clause] forbids is penal

legislation which imposes or increases

criminal punishment for conduct lawful prior

to its enactment. Deportation, however

severe its consequences, has_ been

consistently classified as a civil rather than a

criminal procedure. Both of these doctrine as

original proposals might be debatable, but

both have been considered closed for many

years and a body of statute and decisional law

has been built upon them.

19a

Appendix C

Id. Plaintiffs reliance on Rodriguez is inapposite because that

case clearly imposed a criminal sanction—the retroactive

application of a Parole Commission rule setting parole hearings

every eighteen months—on a prisoner serving only a two-year

term, thereby depriving him of any meaningful opportunity for

parole. See 594 F.2d at 173-175.

c.

Plaintiffs next claim that OPM’s refusal to determine their

Suitability for reemployment with the FAA after the three-year

maximum period of debarment violates their due process right to

“pursue their professions.” Cmplt. { 32. They point to 5 C.ER.

§ 731.303 as the source of the three-year limitation and allege that

the presidential directive “did not Suggest or direct that the

debarment be extended beyond the maximum period set by

regulation.” Cmplt. 4 17. We disagree with both their

characterization of the presidential directive and their conclusion

that OPM failed to provide them with all the process that was due.

The Director of OPM has abroad discretion in interpreting a

presidential directive relating to federal personnel matters.

Wagner v. Office of Personnel Management, 783 F.2d 1042, 1045

(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 477 US. 906 (1986); Kester v.

Campbell, 652 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.

1146 (1982). To be sustained the agency’s interpretation must be

“reasonable,” meaning that it cannot be plainly erroneous or

inconsistent with the President’s order. See Kester, 652 F.2d at 15-

16. In addition, “[a]n agency changing its course must apply a

reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and standards are

being deliberately changed, not casually ignored.” Greater

Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).

20a

Appendix C

As we observed above, supra at 2, 5 U.S.C. § 7311 expressly

bars from federal employment any person who strikes against the

United States government. In our view, this statute, written

without condition or limitation, contemplates an indefinite ban.

Even if an existing regulation, such as 5 C.F.R. § 731.303, applies

a more lenient policy than that allowed by statute, the President,

acting under his statutory authority to regulete federal

employment, see e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 3301,° may issue a directive

overriding that regulation. See Korte v. Office of Personnel

Management, 797 F.2d 967, 970 (Fed. Cir. 1986); American

Federation of Gov't Emp. v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d 930, 938 (D.2.

Cir. 1976) (“Under 5 U.S.C. § 3301, Congress has delegated

broad authority to the President to establish the qualifications and

conditions of employment for civil servants within the executive

branch.”), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 965 (1977). Here the President

did just that, and OPM’s subsequent role was limited to executing

the President’s instructions.

In our view, OPM reasonably interpreted the language of the

presidential directive to impose an indefinite ban upon the

5. Pursuantto 5 U.S.C. § 3301, the President may:

(1) prescribe such regulations for the admission of

individuals into the civil service in the executive

branch as will best promote the efficiency of that

service;

(2) ascertain the fitness of applicants as to age, health,

character, knowledge, and ability for the employment

sought; and

(3) appoint and prescribe the duties of individuals to

make inquiries for the purpose of this section.

2la

Appendix C

employment of controllers removed for striking, not only from all

FAA positions, but also from positions which interface with FAA.

We note that our colleagues on the Federal Circuit have reached

essentially the same conclusion on at least two occasions. See

Wagner, 783 F.2d at 1044; Meyer vy. Office of Personnel

Management, 767 F.2d 868, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Moreover, the

fact that OPM appears to have determined the length of the ban

(indefinite) prior to ruling on its breadth (the FAA and all

interfacing agencies) does not undermine the reasonableness of

its conclusions; in our view, both decisions flow naturally from

the language of the President’s order. The only remaining

question is whether plaintiffs received the benefits of all of the

due process protections to which they were entitled.

The Supreme Court has “never held that applicants for

benefits, as distinct from those already receiving them, have a

legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due Process

Clause.” Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986). However, as

this case presents somewhat of a hybrid situation in that plaintiffs

once had the benefit (employment with the FAA) that they sought

to regain, we find it at least arguable that plaintiffs have asserted a

protected liberty or property interest. An essential principle of

due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property “be

preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the

nature of the case.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470

U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &

Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)). Assuming, again without

deciding, that OPM’s refusal to determine plaintiffs’ suitability

for employment with the FAA implicates a constitutionally

protected interest, we find that a judicial determination of

whether each plaintiff actually participated in the PATCO strike

provided all the process that was due in this instance. The district

court found that “[p]laintiffs, like Korte, were found to be strike

participants through an adjudicative proceeding where they were

22a

Appendix C

afforded ‘safeguards of a judicial trial.” ”" Mem. Op. at 10 (citing

Korte, 797 F.2d at 971). Plaintiffs do not argue otherwise. Once

that determination was made, there was no need for further

judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings because the presidential

directive, as rationally interpreted by OPM, clearly, explicitly,

and without exception imposed an indefinite ban on employment

with the FAA and related agencies.

D.

Plaintiffs final contention is that they have been denied equal

protection under OPM’s indefinite debarment policy. In cases

where a classification burdens neither a suspect group nor a

fundamental interest, “courts are quite reluctant to overturn

governmental action on the ground that it denies equal protection

of the laws.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2406 (1991)

(citations omitted). Here, because the right to government

employment is not fundamental, see Massachusetts Board of

Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-314 (1976), and

plaintiffs’ status as discharged air traffic controllers does not

place them in a suspect class, plaintiffs concede, as they must,

that OPM’s policy need only withstand rational basis review.

Under this standard, a provision will not be overturned “unless

the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so

unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legislative

purposes that we can only conclude that the [people’s] actions

were irrational.” Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2406 (citations omitted).

The gravamen of plaintiffs’ equal protection claim is that the

policy is not rational because it denies to them the opportunity to

undergo a suitability determination that was available to the

thirty-eight previous classes of striking federal employees and

would be available to convicted drug felons seeking federal

employment. While plaintiffs description of the consequences of

23a

Appendix C

OPM’s policy may be factually correct, such a state of affairs

does not necessarily make an enactment infirm under the Equal

Protection Clause. As the relevant Supreme Court precedents

make clear, the government need not “deal alike with all . .

classes, or to strike at all evils at the same time and in the same

way,” Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935), “[e]vils

in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions,

requiring different remedies. Or so the legislative may think.”

Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). In our view,

the explanations offered in the presidential directive advanced

the legitimate governmental objectives of safety and efficiency in

the administration of our nation’s air traffic and suffice to rebut

the claim that the policies enacted in furtherance of the directive

are irrational.

Ill.

By imposing an indefinite period of debarment from

employment with the FAA and related agencies, the Office of

Personnel Management reasonably interpreted President

Reagan’s order regarding air traffic controllers who violated

federal law by striking against the United States. OPM’s policies

implementing the presidential directive did not violate either the

Bill of Attainder Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause and also did

not deny plaintiffs due process or equal protection of the law.

Accordingly, the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’

complaint in its entirety is

AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

24a

APPENDIX D — MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND

ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

No. 91C 7910

JUDGE WAYNE R. ANDERSEN

JEAN DEHAINAUT, as widow and representative of

LEONARD DEHAINAUT, deceased, PATRICK WEST, RAY

SOZYCH, and RICHARD ANDREWS, on behalf of themselves,

and a class of others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

¥.

FEDERICO PENA, Secretary, U.S. Department of

Transportation, JAMES B. BUSSEY, Administrator, Federal

Aviation Administration, CONSTANCE NEWMAN, Director,

U.S. Office of Personnel Management,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM, OPINION & ORDER

This case involves the claims of former air traffic controllers

who were discharged by the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA) in 1981 because of their involvement in an illegal strike

against the Government of the United States. This matter is

before the court on the defendants’ Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ complaint. For the reasons stated below, the motion is

granted and plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

25a

Appendix D

BACKGROUND

On August 3, 1981, after several months of unsuccessful

efforts to reach an agreement with the FAA on a collective

bargaining agreement, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers

Organization (“PATCO”) called on its members to strike. Over 70

percent of the nation’s air traffic controllers answered the call,

causing a significant disruption to private and commercial

aviation in the United States. Professional Air Traffic Controllers

Organization v. Federal Relations Authority, 685 F.2d 547, 551

(D.C. Cir. 1982).

On the first day of the strike, President Reagan issued an

ultimatum to the striking air traffic controllers to return to work

within 48 hours or forfeit their jobs. See 17 Weekly Comp. Pres.

Doc. 845 (Aug. 3, 1981). Plaintiffs were among those discharged,

pursuant to the procedures required by 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512-14, for

failing to return to work.

Shortly after the strike, the Office of Personnel Management

(“OPM”) determined that the PATCO strikers would be debarred

from any federal employment for three years. On December 9,

1981, President Reagan issued a directive to the Director of OPM

Stating that the discharged PATCO strikers “should not be

deemed suitable for employment with the Federal Aviation

Administration.” 17 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1364 (Dec. 9,

1981). OPM subsequently interpreted this directive as

indefinitely barring the PATCO strikers from reemployment with

the FAA and interfacing agencies. Based on that interpretation,

OPM denied favorable suitability determinations for plaintiffs

and the class they seek to represent.

Plaintiffs allege that OPM’s interpretation of President

26a

Appendix D

Reagan’s directive is erroneous and that the maximum period of

debarment is three years, that OPM is required to apply certain

administrative procedures in reevaluating their suitability after

that three year period expires, and that OPM’s failure to follow

those procedures is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs seek an order of

mandamus directing the OPM to apply those administrative

procedures for reassessing their suitability for reemployment

with the FAA.

It is worth noting that President Clinton has announced that

he had lifted the indefinite disbarment policy as to the PATCO

strikers. Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent are now

free to apply for reemployment with the FAA. Because the

President’s action does not resolve completely the issues raised in

plaintiffs’ complaint, the court must consider whether it states a

claim.

DISCUSSION

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as

true all well-pleaded material facts in the complaint and must

draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiffs. Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463,

466 (7th Cir. 1991). Further, the complaint should not be

dismissed unless it appears, beyond a doubt, that the plaintiffs can

prove no set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle

them to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

Plaintiffs’ complaint is not the first challenge to the

indefinite disbarment policy. To the contrary, the claims

presented here already have been squarely considered and

rejected by the Federal Circuit. See Wagner v. Office of Personnel

Management, 783 F.2d 1042 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S.

27a

Appendix D

906 (1986); Korte v. Office of Personnel Management, 797 F.2d

967 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Indeed, plaintiffs seek to represent a class

that is virtually indistinguishable from the class certified in

Wagner — that is, all PATCO strikers who were denied fa\ orable

suitability determinations by OPM after their discharge. Wagner,

783 F.2d at 1044.

To avoid the effect of Korte, plaintiffs argue that the Federal

Circuit had no jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the

indefinite disbarment policy. Plaintiffs fail to recognize that it is

this court, not the Federal Circuit, which has limited jurisdiction

over these types of controversies. The Civil Service Reform Act

of 1978 provides the exclusive remedy for federal employees

with nonconstitutional employment-related claims and

constitutional claims seeking monetary relief. See, e.g., Bush v.

Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1983); Arakawa v. Reagan, 666 F.

Supp. 254, 258-60 (D.D.C. 1987). This court’s jurisdiction, on

the other hand, is only over constitutional claims seeking

injunctive relief and is concurrent with the MSPB’s jurisdiction.

Arakawa, 666 F. Supp. at 259-60. Accordingly, plaintiffs’

arguments concerning the appropriateness of jurisdiction in

Korte are not well founded.

For that reason, plaintiffs’ Motion to Supplement the

Pleadings filed on September 9, 1993 is beside the point. Under

Arkawa federal courts share concurrent jurisdiction with the

MSPB over constitutional claims for injunctive relief. Whether

the defendants have argued that proposition in the past is

irrelevant.

Turning to the merits, the factual predicate of plaintiffs’

complaint was squarely rejected in Wagner. The gravamen of

plaintiffs’ complaint is that the debarment period is not indefinite

28a

Appendix D

but is limited to three years. Plaintiffs point to 5 C.F.R. § 731.303

as the source of the three year limitation and allege that the

presidential directive “did not suggest or direct that the

debarment be extended beyond the maximum period set by

regulation.” (Cmplt. { 17.)

The Presidential directive, which plaintiffs have attached to

their complaint, first states that President Reagan had concluded

that the PATCO strikers “despite their strike participation, should

be permitted to apply for federal employment outside the scope of

their former employing agency.” It continues:

I have further determined that it would be

detrimental to the efficiency of operations at

the Federal Aviation Administration and to

the safe and effective performance of our

nations air traffic control system to permit the

discharged air traffic controllers to return to

employment with that agency. Therefore,

these former federal employees should not be

deemed suitable for employment with the

Federal Aviation Administration.

Finding it “difficult to imagine more precise or explicit

language,” the Wagner court upheld OPM’s interpretation of the

directive over plaintiffs’ interpretation: “The Presidential

directive explicitly imposed an indefinite ban upon the

employment of striking controllers by the Administration.”

Wagner, 783 F.2d at 1044. It further held that the indefinite

disbarment policy was expressly authorized under 5 U.S.C.

§ 7311: “Congress meant exactly what it said — that persons who

participated in a strike against the government are barred

indefinitely from employment in the government.” Wagner, 783

F.2d at 1046.

29a

Appendix D

The Korte court held that if 5 C.E.R. § 731.303 placed a

three-year limit on the disbarment policy, it was “superseded” by

the Presidential directive. Korte, 797 F.2d at 970. The Federal

Circuit found Korte’s argument, like plaintiffs’ argument here,

that “OPM’s action was contrary to its own regulation” to be

“beside the point.” Jd. The court emphasized:

OPM was not acting on its own authority and

exercising its own discretion; rather it was

acting under the express direction of the

President. Even assuming, arguendo, that the

indefinite statutory bar was limited to three

years by the regulation, the President’s

directive overrode or superseded that

regulation and imposed an indefinite ban on

the class of which Korte was a member. As the

government properly argues, OPM’s role in

the suitability determination was limited to

executing the President’s instructions.

Id.

Plaintiffs suggest that their case is different from Wagner

and Korte because only they have alleged that the indefinite

disbarment policy “had worked a partisan political advantage for

the President.” (Cmplt. { 22.) However, this general allegation of

political partisanship is irrelevant for two reasons. First, the

complaint notably does not allege that President Reagan’s

motivation in issuing his directive — which orders the indefinite

disbarment — was partisan political advantage. Rather, the

complaint alleges simply that polls taken two years later showed

voter approval of the President’s actions in dealing with the

PATCO strikers.

30a

Appendix D

Second, the complaint fails to allege that the indefinite

disbarment policy had any connection to the political affiliation,

political candidacy, or political beliefs of the PATCO strikers. See

Correa v. Fischer, 982 F.2d 931, 934-35 (Sth Cir. 1993). Without

that causal connection, plaintiffs’ blanket invocation of partisan

politics is without merit.

With respect to the individual counts of plaintiffs’

complaint, Federal Circuit already has considered and ruled

adversely to plaintiffs on each of them.

Count I

Plaintiffs claim the OPM has violated the Bill of Attainder

Clause by applying the indefinite disbarment policy to the

PATCO strikers and not to participants of federal strikes that

occurred prior to the 1981 PATCO strike.

In Korte, the Federal Circuit found that the indefinite

disbarment policy was not a violation of the Bill of Attainder

Clause for two reasons. First, a bill of attainder is “a law that

legislatively decides guilt and inflicts punishment upon an

indentifiable individual without provision of the protections of a

judicial trial.” Korte, 797 F.2d at 972 (quoting Selective Service v.

Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 846-47

(1984)). Neither OPM’s indefinite disbarment policy nor the

Presidential directive establishes “guilt.” As Korte makes clear,

“guilt” was established upon a finding that plaintiffs participated

in the PATCO strike, a finding that plaintiffs do not contest here.

Once plaintiffs were determined to be PATCO strike participants,

they were necessarily subject to the indefinite disbarment policy.

Second, the Bill of Attainder Clause “is a limitation on the

authority of the legislative branch.” Korte, 797 F.2d at 972 (citing

3la

Appendix D

United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965)). Because

OPM’s indefinite disbarment policy is an executive action, the

clause does not apply here. Korte, 797 F.2d at 972.

Count I

Plaintiffs argue that because the period of disbarment was

changed from a period of three years to an indefinite period after

their strike participation and termination, the policy is an ex post

facto law.

This issue was also disposed of by the Federal Circuit in

Korte:

[W]e note that even if the President’s

directive imposed a new or additional

sanction, the directive would not violate the

constitutional proscription against ex post

facto laws. The sanction imposed is civil, not

criminal, and from “earliest times,” the

Supreme Court has construed the ex post

facto provision to apply only to criminal laws.

Harrisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,

594 (1952).

Korte, 797 F.2d at 972.

Count II

Plaintiffs claim that OPM’s failure to follow its regulations

and apply certain administrative procedures to determine their

suitability after the three year maximum period of disbarment

violates their due process right to “pursue their profession.”

(Cmplt. { 35.)

32a

Appendix D

As discussed above, the disbarment period was indefinite

and that OPM’s role in determining the suitability of the PATCO

strikers was limited to executing the President’s instructions. For

those reasons, the Federal Circuit rejected Korte’s due process

challenge. In Korte, the court assumed that a constitutionally

protected liberty or property interest was implicated and

terminated but held that Korte was afforded “the essential

requirements of due process.” Korte, 797 F.2d at 971 (quoting

Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532

(1985)).

In reaching that conclusion, the court emphasized that OPM

did not have to apply certain procedures before finding him

unsuitable:

[O]nce it was determined that Korte was

removed from his air traffic controller

position for strike participation, “there was

no need for further investigation and the

President’s directive was then controlling.

This court has held that the Presidential

directive “explicitly imposed an indefinite

ban upon the employment of striking

controllers by the [FAA].” Wagner, 783 F.2d

at 1044.

Id. Likewise, this court rejects plaintiffs’ due process challenge.

Plaintiffs, like Korte, were found to be strike participants through

an adjudicative proceeding where they were afforded “the

safeguards of a judicial trial.” Korte, 797 F.2d at 971.

Count IV

Finally, plaintiffs claim that they have been denied equal

33a

Appendix D

protection under OPM’s indefinite disbarment policy. They

contend that the policy has no rational basis because it applies

only to the PATCO strikers and not to convicted drug dealers and

other felons.

As a preliminary matter, plaintiffs correctly perceive that the

indefinite disbarment policy is subject to review under the

rational basis test, not strict scrutiny. The right to government

employment is not fundamental, Massachusetts Board of

Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976), and

plaintiffs’ status as discharged air traffic controllers do not place

them in a suspect class.

However, the Federal Circuit has found a rational basis for

the indefinite disbarment policy. Korte, 797 F.2d at 971-72. The

court observed that the indefinite disbarment policy is

“authorized” under 5 U.S.C. § 7311, the statute which makes ita

crime to strike against the government. Jd.

In amemorandum opinion, the Supreme Court has affirmed

a judgment that 5 U.S.C. § 7311 is constitutionally sound. United

Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 404 U.S. 802, aff’g, 325 F.

Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971). Under the statute, a person who

participates in a strike against the United States “may not accept

or hold a position” with the United States Government. The

Wagner court found the “unambiguous” statute to mean “that

persons who participated in a strike against the government are

barred indefinitely from employment in the government.”

Wagner, 783 F.2d at 1046. The Korte court added that “it is not

irrational or arbitrary for the government to prohibit

reemployment of discharged employees who Participated in a

strike against the government.” Korte, 797 F.2d at 970.

34a

Appendix D

The Korte court found that the President’s stated rationale

for the indefinite disbarment policy — that permitting discharged

controllers to return to the FAA would be detrimental both to the

efficiency of the FAA’s operations and to the safe and effective

performance of the nation’s air traffic control system — was

rationally related to the statutory bar. Korte, 797 F.2d at 971-72.

This court agrees.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed

with prejudice.

ENTERED:

s/ Wayne R. Andersen

Wayne R. Andersen

United States District Judge

DATE: SEP 29 1993

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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