Appendix — Felix v. United States

Supreme Court brief1995

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

No. 93-0861

CMR No. 828476

UNITED STATES, APPELLEE,

V.

CHRISTOPHER A. FELIX, AIRMAN

U.S. AiR FORCE, APPELLANT.

Argued April 19, 1994.

Decided Sep. 16, 1994.

Counsel

For Appellant: Colonel Jay L. Cohen (argued); Captain

Robert I. Smith (on brief); Lieutenant Colonel Frank L.

Spinner.

For Appellee: Colonel Jeffery T. Infelise (argued); Cap-

tain Jules D. Silberberg (on brief); Major Barnard N.

Madsen.

Military Judge: Kenneth D. Randall

Opinion of the Court

Cox, Judge:

In the case at bar we are asked to decide the providence

of appellant’s guilty pleas to two specifications of escaping

(la)

2a

from correctional custody, and whether the Court of Mili-

tary Review erred in deciding to review that issue, en

banc.' We first consider the issue of en banc review.

Appellant was tried by special court-martial composed

of officer members. Pursuant to his conditional pleas, he

was convicted of failure to obey an order not to consume

alcohol, and of escaping from correctional custody (two

specifications), in violation of Articles 92 and 134, Uni-

form Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 892 and 934,

respectively. He was sentenced to a bad-conduct dis-

charge, confinement for 5 months, and reduction to the

lowest enlisted pay grade. The convening authority ap-

proved the sentence.

On appeal, appellant’s case was originally heard by a

panel of three Court of Military Review judges (Senior

Judge Leonard and Judges James and Johnson), who

agreed to set aside all findings of guilty. 36 MJ 903, 913

' The granted issues are:

I

WHETHER THE PLEAS TO CHARGE II, BOTH SPECI-

FICATIONS, ARE IMPROVIDENT BECAUSE THE

FACTS INDICATE THE RESTRAINT IMPOSED ON

APPELLANT IN CORRECTIONAL CUSTODY WAS

MORAL, NOT PHYSICAL.

WHETHER THE AIR FORCE COURT OF MILITARY

REVIEW, A MAJORITY OF WHICH DISAGREED

WITH THE ORIGINAL PANEL’S DECISION, ERRED

BY DECIDING THE CASE AT BAR EN BANC, AP-

PARENTLY UNDER THE GUISE THAT THE PROVI-

DENCY OF APPELLANT’S PLEAS WAS A “QUESTION

OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE” WITHIN THE

MEANING OF RULE 17 OF THE COURTS OF MILI-

TARY REVIEW RULES OF PRACTICE AND PRO-

CEDURE.

3a

n.11 (AFCMR 1993) (en banc) (James, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part). During “off-panel” circula-

tion, a Court of Military Review judge who did not sit on

the panel suggested en banc consideration of appellant’s

case, and a majority of the court agreed. /d. The en banc

court heard appellant’s case and produced four opinions.?

2 The opinion of Judge James, with whom Senior Judge Leonard

and Judge Johnson joined, concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part,

attacks the propriety of en banc reconsideration of appellant’s case

following a hearing before a three-judge panel. Judge James opined:

Rule 17 of the Courts of Military Review Rules of Practice

and Procedure, 22 MJ CXXVII, CXXXIII, provides that

such reconsideration “ordinarily will not be ordered except

(1) when consideration by the full Court is necessary to

secure or maintain uniformity of decision, or (2) when the

proceedings involve a question of exceptional importance, or

(3) when a sentence being reviewed . . . extends to death.”

There was no conflict among decisions of different panels on

any issue in this case, and the punishment obviously does not

extend to death.

One might question whether such a subjective standard as

“exceptional importance” is so devoid of discernible criteria

as really to constitute mo rule. Were that the case, such a

judicial mugging as this one would be in violation of the

statute’s “in accordance with rules” clause. [Art. 66(a), Uni-

form Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 866(a).]... .

The decision of the majority to reconsider this case en

banc can be justified only on the basis that this is a case of

exceptional importance, and it demonstrates that the stand-

ard in the rules is interpreted by this Court as broad enough

to cover any situation where the majority disagrees with a

panel’s decision. The question of how to properly charge of-

fenses against correctional custody meets no plausible stand-

ard of “exceptional importance.” Surely this excursion into a

seldom visited back alley of military justice is not what the

Congress and the Judge Advocates General had in mind

when they gave us permission to shoot our toes off. . . .

Id. at 913 n.11.

da

The majority set aside the findings of guilty of failure to

obey a lawful order not to consume alcohol; affirmed the

remaining findings; and reassessed appellant’s sentence to

include a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 4

months, and reduction to the lowest enlisted level. 36 MJ

at 910-11.

Article 66(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 866(a), provides that

“fajny decision of a panel may be reconsidered by the

court sitting as a whole in accordance with such rules” as

are prescribed by the Judge Advocates General. Rule 17(a)

of the Courts of Military Review Rules of Practice and

Procedure sets guidelines for en banc proceedings:

A majority of the judges present for duty may

order that any appeal or other proceeding be

considered or reconsidered, except as indicated

in section (c) below, by the Court sitting as a

whole. Such consideration or reconsideration or-

dinarily will not be ordered except (1) when con-

sideration by the full Court is necessary to secure

Or maintain uniformity of decision, or (2) when

the proceedings involve a question of exceptional

importance, or (3) when a sentence being re-

viewed pursuant to Article 66 extends to death.

22 MJ CXXXIII (emphasis added).

The first category of circumstances under which en banc

review is usually appropriate is where it is necessary for

uniformity. While en banc review is obviously helpful

where panels have reached inconsistent results, it might

also be deemed necessary by the courts where there is dis-

agreement among the judges and a panel might reach a

result that would make what is considered to be bad law or

law contrary to the majority view. In either case, review by —

the court sitting as a whole is entirely appropriate.

Sa

The second category where en banc consideration is

warranted is where a question of “exceptional importance”

is involved. What is of exceptional importance is a ques-

tion for the majority of the Court of Military Review to

determine. Deciding whether defining a crime, preventing

bad precedent, or preventing future inconsistencies is of

exceptional importance is within the court’s domain.

Additionally, we note that Rule 17 does not provide an

exclusive list of appropriate circumstances for en banc

review, but mereiy suggests when Courts of Military

Review should probably review cases en banc. The term

“ordinarily” precedes the list of circumstances where

review seems appropriate, and again, defining what is or-

dinary, out of the ordinary, or exceptional, is within the

province of the Court of Military Review. As we stated in

United States v. Flowers, 26 MJ 463, 465 (CMA 1988),

“we are confident that the court is cognizant of its own

rules and complies therewith.” We will not disturb the

court’s decision to reconsider appellant’s case en banc.

Next, we turn to the providence of appellant’s guilty

pleas. Appellant pleaded guilty to two specifications of

escaping correctional custody, but on appeal, he chal-

lenges the providence of those pleas, claiming he was

under moral, rather than physical, restraint. The offense

of escaping from correctional custody is “the act of a per-

son undergoing the punishment of correctional custody

pursuant to Article 15, [UCMJ, 10 USC § 815,] who,

before being set at liberty by proper authority, casts off

any physical restraint imposed by the custodian or by the

3 The issue as framed by appellant asks whether his case was one of

“exceptional importance” warranting en banc reconsideration. The

court’s rationale for reviewing appellant’s case en banc was never ar-

ticulated, and we will not limit our discussion of reconsideration en

banc to that on the basis of “exceptional importance.”

6a

place or conditions of custody.” Para. 70(c)(1), Part IV,

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984. The ele-

ments of that offense are as follows:

(a) That the accused was placed in correctional

custody by a person authorized to do so;

(b) That, while in such correctional custody, the

accused was under physical restraint;

(c) That the accused freed himself or herself

from the physical restraint of this correctional

custody before being released therefrom by prop-

er authority; and

(d) That, under the circumstances, the conduct

of the accused was to the prejudice of good order

and discipline in the armed forces or was of a

nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

Para. 70(b)(1).

Appellant was put into correctional custody by his

squadron commander who was authorized to place him in

custody [see Art. 15(b)(2)(H)(ii)], and appellant knew he

was not allowed to leave the correctional custody facility

without the permission of a Correctional Custody Monitor

unless he was assigned to a work detail outside the facility.

He admitted that on February 9, 1991, he “snuck out” of

the facility without proper authorization and went to the

Slots-of-Fun Casino where he had a couple of beers before

returning to the facility. He was the only one in correc-

tional custody, “was bored,” and “went out through the

back door.” Appellant stated there was “no security in that

place whatsoever.” He was gone approximateiy 3'2 to 4

hours. He left the facility again on February 13, 1991,

without authorization. He went out through the back door

while the monitor was in his office and went to an apart-

7a

ment to place a phone call to his girlfriend; he returned to

the facility after being gone about an hour.

The military judge explained the elements of the offense

to appellant twice. Appellant said he understood the ele-

ments and said, specifically, that he was “under physical

restraint” imposed by correctional custody. Following the

providence inquiry, United States v. Care, 18 USCMA

535, 40 CMR 247 (1969), appellant reaffirmed his desire to

plead guilty.

Article 15 describes correctional custody as “the physi-

cal restraint of a person during duty or nonduty hours and

may include extra duties, fatigue duties, or hard labor.”*

The Manual for Courts-Martial discusses two different of-

fenses against correctional custody: escape from correc-

tional custody and breach of correctional custody. Para.

70(b), Part IV.

Although there are two degrees of offenses described in

the Manual, by definition there is only one form of correc-

tional custody. “Correctional custody” equals physical re-

straint. If the conditions of a facility designated by the ser-

4 The Court of Military Review noted:

The President defines correctional custody as “the physical

restraint of a person during duty or non-duty hours, or both,

imposed as a punishment under Article 15... .” [PJara-

graph S(c)(4) [Part V, Manual for Courts-Martial, United

States, 1984]. This definition is taken almost verbatim from

the Senate Report explaining the 1962 amendment to Article

15. Prior to defining correctional custody, the Senate Armed

Services Committee stated as follows: “The bill contains a

form of physical restraint not authorized in existing law, and

termed ‘correctional custody.’” S.Rep.No. 1911, 87th

Cong., ist Sess. 7 (1962) (emphasis added).

36 MJ at 906-07. We do not consider ihe President's description of

correctional custody inclusive of all possible conditions of correc-

tional custody punishment. In other words, we do not consider correc-

tional custody, by definition, to include physical restraint.

8a

vicemember’s commander as the “correctional custody”

facility do not provide for physical restraint, then the

facility is something other than a “correctional custody”

facility. A servicemember ordered to such a facility simply

is not in “correctional custody”; rather, he or she is “re-

stricted.”° The majority opinion of the Court of Military

Review described it this way:

[I]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, a

correctee is under physical restraint whenever he

or she has been committed to a designated cor-

rectional custody setting (a centralized base

facility or designated area within a facility) under

the supervision of a monitor, and with knowl-

edge he or she is not to leave except under speci-

fied conditions.

36 MJ at 908.

In this case, appellant admitted to being in correctional

custody. The Government, by virtue of appellant’s admis-

sions, stipulations of fact, and pleas of guilty, was relieved

from proving this fact by actual testimony. In light of the

clear and unambiguous response by the accused, we will

not speculate as to the true condition of the correctional

custody facility at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. See

United States v. Prater, 32 MJ 433 (CMA 1991); United

States v. Harrison, 26 MJ 474 (CMA 1988).

Two other observations are called for in light of the

distinction made in the Manual for Courts-Martial be-

tween “breaches” of and “escapes” from correctional

custody. First, both offenses flow from the same fountain-

head—the lawful imposition of Article 15 nonjudicial

punishment. The lawful imposition of the punishment is

no more or less than a lawful order of the commanding

’ This is analogous to being “pregnant.” Either one is or one isn’t.

9a

officer requiring a servicemember to perform a lawfully

imposed duty. If a servicemember refuses to do that duty,

the offense could be punished under Article 90, UCMJ, 10

UCMJ § 890, as a willful disobedience offense. Thus, the

Article 134 offenses are in reality redundant and most like-

ly are there for sentencing considerations rather than to

create new offenses under the rubric of general disorders.

Why the President chose to treat breaches of correctional

custody as less serious offenses (for to some they appear

more serious than many other Article 90 offenses) than

other disobedience cases escapes us, but there they are.

The second observation is that breaches of correctional

custody and escapes are distinguishable only if there is cor-

rectional custody in the first instance. The question of

whether a particular facility or situation constitutes “cor-

rectional custody” is a question of fact and, as stated

earlier, there can be no correctional custody without

physical restraint. Once that fact is established, the next

question is whether the accused “escaped” or whether he

was lawfully free of the physical restraints (for example,

authorized to report for duty elsewhere during duty

hours), and “breached” the custody by not returning there-

to as duly required.

Notwithstanding these distinctions, in this case we are

convinced appellant knowingly and voluntarily admitted

guilt, gave up trial rights, and gave up defenses to the

charges. United States v. Penister, 25 MJ 148, 153 (CMA

1987) (Cox, J., concurring). While arguably appellant’s

unsworn statement casts some doubt on the effectiveness of

the physical restraints employed in this correctional custody

facility, they do not render appellant’s pleas improvident.°®

® Article 45(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 845(a),

States:

If an accused after arraignment makes an irregular pleading,

or after a plea of guilty sets up matter inconsistent with the

10a

At no time did he dispute the fact that he was duly re-

quired to be in the “designated correctional custody set-

ting.”

The decision of the United States Air Force Court of

Military Review is affirmed.

Chief Judge SULLIVAN and Judges CRAWFORD, GIERKE,

and Wiss concur.

plea, or if it appears that he has entered the plea of guilty im-

providently or through lack of understanding of its meaning

and effect, or if he fails or refuses to plead, a plea of not

guilty shall be entered in the record, and the court shall pro-

ceed as though he had pleaded not guilty.

See RCM 910(h)(2), Manual, supra.

lla

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT

OF MILITARY REVIEW

ACM S828476

UNITED STATES

Vv.

AIRMAN CHRISTOPHER A. FELIX, FR566-11-8921

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

10 February 1993

paren) | Serene

Sentence adjudged 25 February 1991 by SPCM con-

vened at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. Military Judge;

Kenneth D. Randall.

Approved sentence: Bad-conduct discharge, confine-

ment for 5 months, and reduction to E-1.

Appellate Counsel for the Appellant: Colonel Jeffrey R.

Owens, Lieutenant Colonel Terry J. Woodhouse, Major

George P. Clark, Captain Michael D. Burt, and Captain

Rovert I. Smith.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Major Paul H.

Blackwell, Jr., Major Jeffrey C. Lindquist, and Captain

James B. Wager, Jr.

l2a

En Banc

Dixon, O’HAIR, LEONARD, SNYDER, MCLAUTHLIN,

JAMES, GRUNICK, JOHNSON, and HEIMBURG Appellate

Military Judges.

Opinion of the Court

SNYDER, Judge:

Pursuant to conditional pleas of guilty,' appellant was

convicted by special court-martial of failure to obey a

lawful order, and two specifications of escape from cor-

rectional custody. He was sentenced to a bad-conduct

discharge, 5 months confinement, and reduction to E-1.

Appellant raises five assignments of error, of which three

merit extensive discussion. We granted partial relief on the

findings and sentence.

Appellant now claims his pleas to the specifications and

charge, Charge II, are improvident. The basis for his

assertion is that comments in his unsworn statement dur-

ing sentencing raised matter inconsistent with his plea.

Specifically, he suggests the restraint he breached was

moral, rather than physical.’ Because of the salient facts

of the instant case, for appellant’s contention to prevail,

we must accept the premise that a person placed in a

designated, supervised correctional custody facility is not

thereby under physical restraint. Indeed, appellant’s sup-

emental brief argues as much. We disagree. Absent some

' R.C.M. 910(a)(2). We continue to remind staff judge advocates

that, if the issue preserved by a cunditional guilty plea is not case

dispositive, it should not be accepted.

2 Articles 92 and 134, UCMJ (10 U.S. §§ 992, 934, (1988)).

> As is usually the case, this issue would have been avoided with a

more thorough providence inquiry, as well as a more comprehensive

stipulation of fact.

l3a

evidence contradicting appellant’s concession that he was

under physical restraint in a centralized, monitored correc-

tional custody facility, we decline to hold that his unsworn

statement raising the possibility that the physical restraint

was ineffective was a matter inconsistent with his pleas of

guilty to escape from correctional custody.

Absent evidence demonstrating appellant was being

controlled by moral restraint at the time of the offense, we

find provident, his pleas that he escaped by casting off the

restraint of a monitored, centralized correctional custody

facility, regardless of the means by which he did so.

I. FACTS

The following dialogue transpired between appellant

and the military judge:

MJ: And are you, were there in fact limits on where

you could go, within correctional custody,

without the permission of the correctional

custody monitor?

J ;

Acc: Was there an outline, you mean —

MJ: Yes.

Acc: —as far as I could go?

MJ: Um-hum.

Acc: I don’t remember seeing anything like that.

MJ: No, but I mean—

Ace: No, I —

MJ: —did you understand that you were under

physical restraint

Acc: —yes, sir.

MJ: —imposed by this correctional custody?

Acc: Yes, sir.

MJ: And that you would need the permission of the

correctional custody monitor in order to go

Acc:

MJ:

Acc:

MJ:

Acc:

MJ:

Acc:

MJ:

Acc:

MJ:

Acc:

MJ:

Acc:

MJ:

Acc:

l4a

out of the correctional custody facility unless

you were out on some kind of a work detail or

something like that?

Yes, sir.

And you knew of the limits, the limitations

placed on you with, in terms of physical

restraint, by this, —

Yes, sir.

—by your status of being in correctional

custody?

Yes, sir.

Okay. Now did you, on the 9th of February,

free yourself from the physical restraint that

had been imposed upon you?

Yes, sir.

What'd you do? Did you go downtown?

Went downtown, sir.

” + * * *

Now, on the 13th of February, was your status

still the same as it was on the 9th of

February, —

Yes, it was.

—as being in correctional custody?

Yes, sir.

And again, you were aware of that status, is

that correct?

Yes, sir.

*x * * * -

Okay. What did you do on the 13th of

February to escape from correctional custody?

1 needed to go use the phone, sir. . . and I left

through the back door.

lSa

MJ: And did you in fact surreptitiously leave the

correctional custody facility without permis-

sion from anyone who could give you permis-

sion to leave?

Acc: Yes, sir.

A stipulation of fact entered into by all parties at trial

reflects the appellant left the correctional custody facility

and went to a Las Vegas casino where he consumed beer.

While there, he remarked to a noncommissioned officer

working part-time at the casino that “I just snuck out of

CC.” Regarding the 13 February offense, the stipulation

of fact reflects the appellant departed the facility “out the

back door while the CC monitor was in his office.”

Il. CORRECTIONAL CUSTODY

Appellant argues that finding physical restraint on the

facts of the instant case renders paragraph 70, MCM,

redundant. His argument refers to the second element of

the offense, which requires tue correctee to be under

physical restraint while in correctional custody. MCM,

Part IV, paragraph 70(b)(1)(b) (1984). The essence of this

argument is that the trial judge should have inquired into

what extent, if any, the facility deterred or hampered ap-

pellant’s freedom of movement. This argument fails to ac-

count for the essence of correctional custody.

Correctional custody is an authorized nonjudicial

punishment pursuant to Article 15, UCMJ (10 U.S.C.

§ 815). The President defines correctional custody as “the

physical restraint of a person during duty or nonduty

hours, or both, imposed as a punishment under Article 15.

4 Appellant completes his logical circle by concluding that, if so,

then that element would require the instructions to state, “while in

such correctional custody, the accused was in correctional custody.”

l6a

...” MCM, 1984, Part V, paragraph 5(c)(4) (1984). This

definition is taken almost verbatim from the Senate

Report explaining the 1962 amendment to Article 15.

Prior to defining correctional custody, the Senate Armed

Services Committee stated as follows: “The bill contains a

form of physical restraint not authorized in existing law,

and termed ‘correctional custody’.” S. Rep. No. 1991, 87th

Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1962) (emphasis added).

Although there is a paucity of decisions involving cor-

rectional custody, the few in existence do not contradict

the crystal clear intent of Congress and the President to

make correctional custody a form of physical restraint,

especially when the issue actually before the Court is

separated from the collateral aspects. In United States v.

Carson, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 407, 35 C.M.R. 379 (1965), atten-

tion might be diverted to the fact the correctee was locked

in a barracks room. The issue before the Court, however,

was whether the members had to find the correctional

custody was legally imposed as an element of the offense

of escape from correctional custody. The Court held that

was a question of law and not an element of the offense

for the factfinders. The decision placed no emphasis what-

soever on the fact the accused was actually locked up while

undergoing correctional custody. In fact, the instructed

elements required the members only to find the accused

was in correctional custody and he freed himself from the

restraint of that custody before proper release.

In United States v. Mackie, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 14, 36

C.M.R. 170 (1966), a case involving breach of correctional

custody, appellate defense counsel argued to the Court

that, because correctional custody and confinement dif-

fered only in semantics, correctional custody should be

imposed only by sentence of court-martial. 36 C.M.R. at

174. The Court disposed of the issue by emphasizing the

correctee’s right to demand trial by court-martial in lieu

17a

of Article 15 proceedings. There was no effort by the

Court to articulate a position that correctional custody is

not physical restraint.

This same issue was revisited during the United States

Court of Military Appeals’ decisions applying Argersinger

v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), to UCMJ practice.’ The

argument was, because of the absence of a real distinction

between correctional custody and confinement, Article 15

punishments which imposed correctional custody without

representation by counsel should be inadmissible in a

subsequent trial by court-martial as are summary courts-

martial convictions which impose confinement without the

accused being represented by counsel.® United States v.

Shamel, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 362, 47 C.M.R. 116 (1973). To

Judge Quinn, correctional custody resembled restriction

more than confinement, but only because of the dif-

ferences in treatment accorded correcteees vis a vis

prisoners, not on the absence of physical restraint. His

final comparison was to detention after school. 47 C.M.R.

at 117. Although they differed on the disposition of the

ultimate issue, the other two judges could not discern a

substantive difference between correctional custody and

confinement. Shamel, 47 C.M.R. at 118, 119 (dincan, J.,

dissenting); United States v. Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A.

’ Argersinger held that, even in misdemeanor actions, one cannot

be sentenced to confinement, unless represented by counsel. This deci-

sion impacted the manner by which the armed forces administer trials

by summary courts-martial. See Article 20, UCMJ (10 U.S.C. § 820

(1988)); R.C.M. 1301. Because Article 15 provides for correctional

custody as an authorized punishment, the issue spilled over to Article

15 actions.

6 Argensinger impacts admissibility under R.C.M. 1001(b)(3) for

aggravation purposes, and under R.C.M. 1003(d)(1) and (2) for

sentence enhancement purposes. It does not impact admissibility for

impeachment under Mil. R. Evid. 609.

18a

298, 46 C.M.R. 298, 308 at n.1 (1973) (Darden, C.J.,

dissenting).

In short, there is nothing in those decisions to indicate

correctional custody is not physical restraint.

Appellant’s resort to comparisons with the offense of

escape from confinement is persuasive, but in a manner

contrary to his position.’ Appellant mistakenly interprets

our decision in United States v. Hodge, 50 C.M.R. 445

(1975), to mean that more than a casting off of confine-

ment status must be shown to constitute an escape, and,

from that interpretation concludes the same holds for cor-

rectional custody. In fact, the part of Hodge appellant

relies upon provides that evidence which shows the pro-

cedural requirements for confinement were accomplished

is not proof, per se, that a person actually was placed in

confinement. We held that, although Hodge had not been

physically placed in the confinement facility, because the

procedural steps were properly completed, and he was

committed to the corrections supervisor who could not

refuse to accept him, he was in confinement. Hodge’s con-

finement status having attached, his flight from his guards

en route to the facility constituted an escape from confine-

ment, not an escape from custody. 50 C.M.R. at 448.

Any doubt in this regard should have been eliminated by

our decision in United States v. Cornell, 19 M.J. 735

(A.F.C.M.R. 1984), which reemphasized our holding in

United States v. Maslanich, 13 M.J. 611 (A.F.C.M.R.

1982). Once confinement status attaches, the throwing off

of that status by any means, whether by physically over-

powering a guard, picking a lock, or by simply walking

away, constitutes an escape. See United States v. Felty,

’ Although correctional custody is physical restraint, it is not con-

finement. Consequently, the comparison of decisions on the two be

read in that light.

19a

12 M.J. 438 (C.M.A. 1982). In Cornell we affirmed an

escape from confinement where a minimum custody

prisoner (who did not require an escort, etc.) left the in-

Stallation without permission, rather than going to his

stated destination.

The fact that correctional custody anticipates and man-

dates periods when the correctee is subject to moral

restraint does not cancel the inherent status of physical

restraint.’ This factor is reflected in the Secretary of the

Air Force’s (SAF) implementation of the correctional

custody provisions of Article 15. The Air Force concept

States, in part, “[T]he deprivation of liberty is a severe

punishment to be carefully considered and imposed only

when it is necessary to closely hold the offender in a treat-

ment setting.” Air Force Regulation 125-35, Correctional

Custody, para. 2 (4 September 1981). AFR 125-35 does

not reflect any intent on the part of SAF to prosecute cor-

rectional custody offenses solely by charging breach of

correctional custody, as the Secretary of the Army ap-

parently has done. See United States v. Kellner, 16 M.J.

524 (A.C.M.R. 1983). We note this is a policy decision by

the Army which has no effect upon the essence of a cor- .

rectee’s status while in custody.

Comprehensive analysis of correctional custody reveals

that moral restraint is present when the correctee is outside

or beyond the designated, monitored correctional

® To help the factfinders focus on whether a correctee has actualiy

committed a breach of correctional custody as opposed to an escape,

the instruction on breach cautions as follows:

Although a person in correctional custody is a/ways under

physical restraint, this offense involves the breach of other

specific limitations upon a person’s freedom of movement while

under the physical restraint (emphasis added).

Department of The Army Pamphlet 27-9, Military Judges’

Benchbook, Change 1, para. 3-136 (18 February 1985).

ne

20a

custody setting, e.g., when performing one’s normal duties

or when on unsupervised details, and when following

designated routes to and from the correctional custody

facility. When this standard is applied, the language of

MCM, Part IV, para. 70(b)(1)(b)(1984) is not redundant.

Therefore, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a

correctee is under physical restraint whenever he or she has

been committed to a designated correctional custody set-

ting (a centralized base facility or designated area within a

facility or designated area within a facility) under supervi-

sion of a monitor, and with knowledge he or she is not to

leave except under specified circumstances.

Il. PROVIDENCY OF PLEAS

A. Pleas to Escape From Correctional Custody

With these salient legal principles in mind, we now turn

to appellant’s pleas. Although appellant pleaded guilty, it

is axiomatic that if he set up matters inconsistent with that

plea at trial, or pleaded improvidently, his guilty pleas

cannot stand. Article 45(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 845(a).

More than a possible ingenious conflict is required. There

must be evidence of a substantial conflict with the

accused’s plea. United States v. Logan, 22 U.S.C.M.A.

349, 47 C.N.R. 1 (1973). However, we also must bear in

mind appelant’s pleas precluded the Government from

putting on a more detailed case and developing the facts.

United States v. Burnette, 35 M.J. 58 (C.M.A. 1992). Ac-

cordingly, for us to set aside appellant’s pleas, the record

must show a substantive basis in law and fact for question-

ing his guilty pleas. United States v. Prater, 32M.J. 433

(1991). Further, an inconsistency is not generated by the

absence of evidence from the record, but from the record’s

entirety. The same holds true for providency. Although

additional evidence may be desirable, if the record in its

2la

entirety reflects appellant knew the elements of the offense

to which he pleaded guilty and admitted freely, even if the

trial judge did not fully explain them, and there is a factual

basis for his pleas, the pleas will stand. United States vy.

Jones, 34 M.J. 270 (C.M.A. 1992).

The Stipulation of Fact reflects appellant was commit-

ted to Nellis AFB’s Correctional Custody Facility. As in-

dicated above, appellant admitted he knew he was under

physical restraint by virtue of his status of being in correc-

tional custody and that he could not leave the facility

without permission. Nowhere in the record is there an in-

dication the facility was viewed as moral restraint during

evening hours. In fact, appellant avoided a monitor to

depart on the second occasion. We may reasonably infer

the monitor also was on duty during his first departure.

During the providency inquiry into the second escape, the

trial judge specifically referred appellant back to his

responses on the first escape to ensure appellant was

following him.

The MCM defines escape from correctional custody as:

The act of a person undergoing the punishment of

correctional custody pursuant to Article 15, who.

before being set at liberty by proper authority, casts

off any physical restraint imposed b y the custodian or

by the place or conditions of custody (emphasis

added).

MCM, Part IV, paragraph 70c(1) (1984). Appellant’s

responses to the trial judge clearly reflect acts which fall

within that definition. His leaving without permission cast

off a restraint imposed by the custodian, in the form of the

monitor, as well as the place of his custody, the designated

facility. It was not essential for the trial judge to ascertain

how appellant cast off the physical restraint and his status

imposed upon him. Appellant’s status while in the moni-

22a

tored facility transcended whether the back door was

locked, or whether the facility even had locks and bars.

Appellant knowingly and freely admitted to his status of

physical restraint by being in correctional custody and

escaping thereform. His pleas were provident. United

States v. Burnetter, 35 M.J. 58 (C.M.A. 1992); United

States v. Jones, 34 M.J. 270 (C.M.A. 1992); United States

v. Prater, 32 M.J. 433 (C.M.A. 1991).

We also find appellant’s pleas were consistent

throughout the entire trial. During appellant’s unsworn

statement, defense counsel asked, “how’d you actually get

out?” Appellant responded, “there’s no security in that

place whatsoever. It’s just, | went out through the back

door.” We do not view this remark as matter inconsistent

with an admission of escape, but mere rationalization by

appellant to justify his behavior.’ United States v.

Penister, 25 M.J. 148 (C.M.A. 1987). To state, in essence,

had he been chained to his bed, or locked in his room, he

would not have left, is to state the obvious. The absence of

security devices does not convert appellant’s restraint to

moral restraint. Neither does his rationalization render his

comment substantively inconsistent with his plea.

Penister, 25 M.J. at 153 (Cox, J., concurring).

B. Plea to Failure To Obey An Order

As a result of appellant taking the pleasure of a beer

during his first sojourn from correctional custody, he was

charged with failure to obey a lawful order. The act was

alleged as a violation of Correctional Custody Operating

* Unlike our dissenting brethren, we do not believe it necessary to

look beyond appellant’s pleas to ascertain “how much” physical

restraint was imposed upon him while in the facility. Appellant’s quip

while at the casino reflects his knowledge he had to bypass more than

his personal moral recognizance to leave the facility.

23a

Instruction 39-6, para. 2e. Its specific title, “Correctee

Honor System.”

We find this “order” to be so broad and vague that it

amounts to no order at all. Although the Instruction cau-

tions the reader that, “Violations of the honor system...

may be cause for disciplinary action,” it falls short of be-

ing sufficiently clear and definite to place one on notice of

the prohibited conduct. See generally United States y.

Benway, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 345, 41 C.M.R. 345 (1970);

United States v. Baker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 504, 40 C.M.R.

216 (1969); United States v. Hogsett, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 681,

25 C.M.R. 185 (1958). For example, the provision sup-

posedly forbidding the consumption of alcohol is under

the heading of: “The following will not be condoned: .. .

consumption of alcohol.” Also not to be condoned are:

quibbling and evasiveness, profanity (not defined), at-

titudes (non-specified), alterations, infringements upon

privacy, and the refusal to render assistance to those in

need. On balance, the Instruction reads more like a civics

lesson than a militry order. Consequently, the Instruction,

as a whole, fails to state a military order enforceable under

Article 92, UCMJ. United States v. Scott, 22 U.S.C.M.A.

25, 46 C.M.R. 25 (1972).

There remains the issue of our possibly approving a

finding of the lesser offense of dereliction of duty. Where

a providence inquiry fully aprises an accused of the

elements of an included offense as part of the elements of

the charged offense, and an accused’s responses knowingly

and clearly admits the included offense, we may approve

an included offense on appeal. See United States y.

Sassaman, 32 M.J. 687 (A.F.C.M.R. 1991); Cf. United

States v. Brown, 18 M.J. 360 (C.M.A. 1984).

During his providency inquiry, appellant admitted he

had a duty to obey the Correctional Custody Instruction,

and he knowingly consumed alcohol contrary to the

24a

Instruction. On their face, these admissions appear to con-

stitute the offense of dereliction of duty.'® The Instruc-

tion’s inherent deficiencies, however, constrain us to

decline to approve a conviction of the lesser offense of

dereliction of duty, appellant’s admissions, notwith-

standing.

In addition to the Instruction’s broad hortatory provi-

sions noted above, the Instruction essentially incorporates

all the UCM/J’s punitive articles (Articles 77 through 134)

under items which are not condoned. Obviously, this In-

struction is not needed to prevent thefts or assaults, for

Articles 121 and 128 prohibit such misconduct. This in-

struction, in essence, merely encourages Nellis AFB Cor-

rectional Custody correctees to be good citizens and obey

the law, a duty to which they are subject at all times

without the help of the Instruction. Therefore, we disap-

prove entirely on Charge I and its specification.

IV. IMPROPER POST-TRIAL PROCESSING

The final assignment of error we discuss in detail is the

improper preparation of the Staff Judge Advocate’s

Recommendations to the convening authority (SJA

Recommendations) by the assistant trial counsei, Major

D. This was contrary to Article 6(c) and R.C.M. 1106(b).

Under the circumstances of the instant case, we find this

statutory violation to have been waived, and we find no

plain error.

The allied papers of the record of trial reflect the SJA

Recommendations were duly served on trial defense

counsel as required. R.C.M. 1106(f). In the post-trial sub-

missions, trial defense counsel did not assert the existence

of any errors in the SJA Recommendations. He limited

'© See Article 92(3), UMCJ (10 U.S.C. § 992 (3) (1988).

25a

his submissions to a clemency request on behalf of ap-

pellant. Failure to specifically note patent errors in the

SJA Recommendations constitutes a waiver of those er-

rors. R.C.M. 1106(f)(6). R.C.M. 1106(f)(6) does not ex-

empt any particular errors from its waiver provision.

Although the post-trial processing with which we are in-

volved is deemed part of an accused’s military due process

rights, such rights are not immune to waiver. We previous-

ly have held that constitutional rights may be waived just

as statutory rights and other benefits. United States y.

Lucas, 19 M.J. 773 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984), aff'd. 25 M.J.9

(C.M.A. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988) (failure

to object at trial to improper use of immunized testimony

held waived on appeal).

Having deemed the error waived, we test for plain error

and find none. First, Major D’s handiwork did not go

directly to the convening authority. The staff judge ad-

vocate also signed the SJA Reccommendations and cer-

tified he had reviewed the record of trial and recommenda-

tion, and concurred. See United States v. Grinder, 28 M.J.

840, 843 (A.F.C.M.R. 1989). Second, the SJA personally

prepared and signed the Addendum to the SJA Recom-

mendations, which was the response to trial defense

counsel’s R.C.M. 1106(f) response. Thus, we conclude the

interests of justice do not require a new SJA Recommen-

dation and convening authority action.

it begs the issue to state these type errors are very easily

avoided. No one should be more aware of a statutory dis-

qualification than the disqualified person him or herself.

In the instant case, Major D should have been aware of

and voiced his disqualification when asked to prepare the

SJA Recommendations. Failure to detect and avoid such

rudimentary errors contributes to the many instances of

the Courts of Military Review having to remand otherwise

valid convictions.

26a

V. REMAINING ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

We have considered the other assignments of error and

resolved them adversely to appellant. McNeil v. Wiscon-

sin, ___. U.S. ____, 111 S. Ct 2204 (1991); United States

v. Lewis, 33 M.J. 758 (A.C.M.R. 1991); R.C.M.

1001(a)(1)(a); Mil. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); United States v.

Martin, M.J. ___A.F.C.M.R. 1993).

VI. CORRECTIVE ACTION

In view of Part IV-B, ante, we must determine whether

remand for a rehearing on sentence only, or sentence

reassessment is appropriate. Our review of the record con-

vinces us that we can reassess the sentence to reflect what

sentence appellant would have received had he not been

charged with the failure to obey a lawful order not to con-

sume alcohol. United Siates v. Peoples, 29 M.J. 426

(C.M.A. 1990). We believe the members viewed the two

escapes from correctional custody as the gravamen of ap-

pellant’s misconduct. Reassessing on that basis, we find

appropriate only so much of the sentence as provides for a

bad-conduct discharge, 4 months confinement, and reduc-

tion to E-1.

VII. DECRETAL

The findings on Charge I and its specification are disap-

proved, and Charge I and its specification are dismissed.

The findings and sentence, as modified, are correct in law

and fact, Article 66(c), UCMJ, and are hereby,

AFFIRMED

Chief Judge Dixon, Senior Judges O’HAIR and

McLAUTHLIN, and Judges GRUNICK and HEIMBURG con-

cur.

27a

HEIMBURG, Judge (concurring):

I concur in the opinion of Judge Snyder, and write

separately only because I believe it necessary to mark out

more clearly the boundary between the majority and the

dissent concerning Charge II.

The opinions in this case have revealed Significant differ-

ences of opinion on the nature of “physical restraint” in

correctional custody. Without minimizing these differ-

ences, it is important to note that the Court’s decision does

not require adoption of one of the conflicting views. The

Court does not today decide whether correctional custody

automatically includes physical restraint or authorizes

physical restraint to be imposed by competent authority.

Nor does it define what physical restraint may be required

if not automatically included — whether it requires some

physical means of restricting the correctee’s movements or

may be assumed to exist when proper limits are defined in a

designated building or other facility. Mos: importantly, this

case does not decide that the status of being in correctional

custody equates to the fact of being under physical

restraint.

The issue we addressed was whether a guilty plea was

provident. What most divides the majority and minority on

that issue are the assumptions each brings to a review of the

providency of a guilty plea to escape from correctional

custody. One of the “assumptions” of which | speak con-

cerns the meaning of the term “correctional custody.” Each

of us carries mental images which color and give meaning

to the words we see when we read a record of trial. If ap-

pellent had been confined rather than in correctional

custody, his offhand -or flippant remarks to the court,

“there’s no security in that place whatsoever. . . . | went

out through the back door” would not kave been viewed as

contradicting his plea of guilty. It is because judges know

of Air Force correctional Custody facilities which have

“no security . .. whatsoever” that these words immedi-

28a

ately raise questions: What kind of facility was he talking

about? Was there any real security? Having such questions

does not equate to “matters inconsistent” with a guilty

plea. Unless something an accused says raises a defense or

undercuts an element of the offense, we should not con-

sider the plea improvement just because we would like to

know more facts which, were the case litigated, would be

necessary to proof. United States v. Logan, 22

U.S.C.M.A. 349, 47 C.M.R. 1 (1973); United States v.

Berinette, 35 M.J. 58 (C.M.A. 1992); United States v.

Prater, 32 M.J. 433 (C.M.A. 1991). Otherwise, we will be

in danger of nullifying the stern warning each trial judge

gives a person about to plead guilty:

A plea of guilty is equivalent to a conviction and is the

strongest form of proof known to the law. On the

basis of your plea alone, and without receiving any

evidence, this court could find you guilty of the of-

fense(s) to which you plead guilty.

Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-9, para. 2-9. See

also, Article 45, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 845.

An objective look at what appellant told the court about

the escape shows the providency of his pleas. He first

acknowledged that he understood the elements, including

the element that, “while in correctional custody, you were

under physical restraint.” Appellant told the court there

was a “monitor” in the correctional custody facility whose

permission he needed to leave. The presence of a monitor

who has the duty and means to prevent departure can

equate to physical restraint, for the monitor equates to the

“custodian.” Manual for Courts-Martial, 1984, Part IV,

para. 70c({1). Appellant told the military judge he left the

correctional custody facility on both occasions without

obtaining permission to do so: the first time he “snuck

out” and the second time he “left through the back door”

while the monitor was otherwise occupied.

29a

At that point, appellant had given the court sufficient

information to support his guilty pleas, but my dissenting

brothers find inconsistency in subsequent statements he

made during his unsworn statement. Let’s examine them,

also. In a colloquy with his defense counsel, appellant was

explaining his actions in escaping from correctional

custody. Concerning the first incident, appellant explained

that it was “bad, being in there” all alone, and he was

bored, he “needed just to, to explode.” How did he get

out? “—[T]here’s no, there’s no security in that place

whatsoever. It’s just, I went out through the back door.”

He came back several hours later, and “nobody knew

anything about it.” This is the same incident in which, ac-

cording to the stipulation of fact appellant agreed to, ap-

pellant told a NCO he saw at a casino downtown, “be-

tween me and you I just snuck out of CC.”

Apart from one’s assumptions regarding what sort of

correctional custody facility this must have been, ap-

pellant’s comments during his unsworn statement raised

no inconsistency whatever with his guilty plea. Sneaking

away from a guard, custodian, or “monitor” is not incon-

sistent with the presence of physical restraint; indeed, were

there no physical restraint sneaking would be unnecessary.

Another assumption that divides this Court is the weight

to give to an accused person’s assent to the terms used by

the military judge to explain the elements of the offense. |

am prepared to assume that appellant understood the term

“physical restraint;” this term is not a legal term of art re-

quiring advanced education to understand. Thus, despite

the conclusory nature of the military judge’s inquiry, it

established a factual basis for appellant’s plea. See,

R.C.M. 910(e); United States v. Care, 18 U.S.C.M.A.

535, 40 C.M.R. 247 (1969).

By his pleas, agreement to a Stipulation of fact, and

response to questions by the military judge, appellant

30a

gave this Court an adequate basis for upholding his con-

viction of escape from correctional custody. We should

not require proof of facts in a guilty plea case when no fac-

tual dispute exists. Believing appellant’s pleas to Charge II

provident, I join the majority in upholding his conviction

and sentence.

Judge JAMES, with whom Senior Judge LEONARD and

Judge JOHNSON join (concurring in part and dissenting in

part):

We dissent from the majority’s disposition of the con-

viction for escape from correctional custody.''

'! This case was originally decided by panel 3 of this Court, con-

sisting of Senior Judge Leonard, Judge Johnson, and me. The panel

voted and agreed on an opinion that set aside all the findings of guilty.

During “off panel” circulation, an “off panel” judge suggested en banc

consideration. The majority of the Court agreed, and the Court en

banc the formed a majority for the current disposition.

There was a time when a panel’s decision in an individual case could

not legally be overturned by the Court sitting en banc. United States v.

Chilcotte, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 283, 43 C.M.R. 123 (1971); see, e.g., Cole-

man v. United States, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 171, 44 C.M.R. 225 (1971);

Maze v. Army Court of Military review, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 599, 44

C.M.R. 29 (1971); United States v. Wheeler, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 595, 44

C.M.R. 25 (1971). This result, based on statutory construction, was

changed by the Military Justice Act of 1983, 97 Stat. 1402, which

amended Article 66 (a) to provide for en banc reconsideration of any

panel decision in accordance with the Court’s rules. S. Rep. No. 53,

98th Cong. Ist Sess. 28 (1983), as quoted at United States v. Flowers,

26 M.J. 463, 465 (C.M.A. 1988) (q.v.).

Rule 17 of the Courts of Military Review Rules of Practice and Pro-

cedure, 22 M.J. CXXVIII, provides _that such reconsideration “or-

dinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consideration by the full

Court is Necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of decision, or (2)

when the proceedings involve a question of exceptional importance, or

(3)_when a sentence being reviewed . . . extends to death.” There was

no conflict among decisions of different panels on any issue in this

case, and the punishment obviously does not extend to death.

3la

The Court divides on the requirement for “physical

restraint” to sustain a conviction for escape frm correc-

tional custody. The majority’s lexicographical highjinks

assume away an element of proof. The majority is willing

to infer the presence of physical restraint simple from the

Status of custody. Its theory for its disposition avoids any

analysis of the extent to which there were replies given by

Airman Felix during the “providency inquiry” that were

inconsistent with his concession that he was unde:

“physical restraint.” The majority lives in an Aristotelian

world of pure, symbolic logic in which it assumes a state of

the legal universe without bothering to look out the win-

dow to see whether its belief has any real connection with

reality.

Now it is, regrettably, our job to throw bricks through

its window. To establish our view, we first review the re-

quirement that a military judge inquire into matters incon-

One might question whether such a subjective standard as “excep-

tional importance” is so devoid of discernible criteria as really to con-

Stitute no rule. Were that the case, such a judicial mugging as this one

would be in violation of the statute’s “in accordance with rules” clause.

Presumably the Chilcotte result would follow necessarily.

The decision of the majority to reconsider this case en banc can be

justified only on the basis that this is a case of exceptional importance,

and it demonstrates that the standard in the rules is interpreted by this

Court as broad enough to cover any situation where the majority

disagrees with a panel’s decision. The question of how to properly

charge offenses against correctional custody meets no plausible stand-

ard of “exceptional importance.”

Surely this excursion into a seldom visited back alley of military

justice is not what the Congress and the Judge Advocates General had

in mind when they gave us permission to shoot our toes off. The Court

of Military Appeals indicated in Flowers that it was concerned with

proper compliance by the Courts of Military Review with Rule 17. The

extent to which such concern may be the basis for relief to an ap-

peilant remains an open question.

32a

sistent with a plea of guilty, for that is the legal turning

point in this case. Next we note the diversity in the use of

correctional custody, for it accounts for much of the

dispute. Then we look at the elements of the offense to

highlight the pivotal difference between infractions

against moral restraint and infractions against physical

restraint. Finally, we review very briefly the law relating to

escapes from confinement, for it explains how the majori-

ty could possibly come to such a result.

I. MATTERS INCONSISTENT WITH PLEA OF GUILTY

Whenever a plea of guilty is offered, the military judge

must “inform the accused of ... the nature of the

offense.” R.C.M. 910(c)(1). The elements of that offense

should be described. /d., Discussion. The military judge

must then determine the accuracy of the plea by inquiring

into the underlying facts. R.C.M. 910(e). When the ac-

cused makes statements inconsistent with the offered plea

of guilty, the military judge must resolve the inconsistency

or enter a plea of not guilty for the accused. Article 45(a),

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 845(a) (1988); R.C.M. 910(h){2); see

generally United States v. Logan, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 349, 47

C.M.R. 1 (1973). Logan corrects the mistaken view in

some prior decisions that a “mere possibility” of incon-

sistency required that the plea be rejected and substitutes

the “substantial conflict” test which now prevails. See,

e.q., United States v. Prater, 32 M.J. 433 (C.M.A. 1991).

Nonetheless, we emphasize that the “inconsistency” rule is

statutory, not something cooked up in the wild imagina-

tion of soft-hearted appellate judges. It deserves to be ap-

plied as it was intended to be applied, not subverted.

Momentarily we conclude that such a substantial conflict

occurred in this case, but first we address the nature of of-

fenses against correctional custody so that the occurrence

of the conflict can be understood in its context.

el

33a

il. WHAT DOES CORRECTIONAL CUSTODY LOOK LIKE?

The central disagreement in this Case arises because the

majority views correctional custody as necessarily in-

cluding physical restraint. Just as the majority says, cor-

rectional custody is defined by the President as “physical

restraint of a person.” Manual For Courts-Martial, United

States, 1984 (MCM), Part V, paragraph Sc(4). The majori-

ty stops there—thus it is defined and thus it must have

been —and lets its dictionary of common military justice

terms govern reality. Conversely, we take notice that the

implementing practices vary.

Thus, Judge Quinn once remarked, “As I assess correc-

tional custody it resembles restriction so much more than

confinement that it . . . does not . . . fall within Argen-

singer’ '? prescription of the right to appointed counsel.”

United States y. Shamel, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 361, 362, 47

C.M.R. 116, 117 (1973). He compared it “to the practice

of ‘detention’ after school.” Jd.. In the 1960s our Army

brethren imposed correctional custody on a particularly

slippery soldier:

Various moderate restraints of the accused’s freedom

of movement were ineffectual and, eventually, he was

placed in a locked room on the third floor of the com-

pany barracks. He escaped.

United States v. Carson, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 407, 35 C.M.R.

379, 380 (1965) (emphasis). What is notable is not that the

miscreant was eventually locked up in correctional custody

but is instead that he was not locked up until less severe

restraints failed successively. More recently, at least, the

Army’s regulation “mandate[d] the use of moral, rather

than physical, restraint in correctional custody facilities.”

'? Argesinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel when

confinement results).

34a

United States v. Kellner, 16 M.J. 524, 525 (A.C.M.R.

1983). Cf. United States v. Shamel, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 361,

47 C.M.R. 116 (1973).

The Air Force implementing regulation does not state

the required circumstances of correctional custody, but it

provides, “Normal troop housing may be adapted to cor-

rectional custody use by physically defining an area for

such custody.” Air Force Regulation 125-35, Correctional

Custody, paragraph 4a (4 Septembet 1981). Of course, the

physical definition could be a line painted on the floor.

The same provision also contemplates use of jails, but we

take notice that there are Air Force correctional custody

programs which do not feature the jail-like setting that the

Manual’s definition implies.

An earlier example of such an Air Force facility was

described in United States v. Blosser, 35 C.M.R. 902

(A.F.B.R. 1965):

When accused was first placed in the . . . correctional

custody facility he was informed by the NCOIC

thereof he must not leave the building without per-

mission, and whenever he did leave he was to “sign

out” in the logbook on the first sergeant’s desk, and

when he returned he was to “sign in.” He received and

acknowledged reading and understanding a copy of

the “Correctional Custody Rules & Regulations”

which, among other things, purported to require him

to sign out or in whenever he departed or entered the

building (confinement facility) and to prohibit his

consumption of alcoholic beverages.

Id. at 906. Blosser left the facility with permission to serve

as a firewatch and failed to return. Instead, like Airman

Felix, he went into town to drink. Blosser was correctly

charged with and convicted of breach, not escape. Though

his departure is different from that of Airman Felix, we

eee

35a

do not know how the majority would avoid calling the

Blosser episode an escape, relying as it does on literal ap-

plication of the President’s definition, and yet it is clear

that no physical impediment governed Blosser’s

movements after he left the facility.

In such facilities, the offender may still be obliged to

Stay unless permitted to leave, but the obligation is im-

posed by an order, and it is a moral obligation, not a

physical restraint. See, e.g., Kellner, 16 M.J. at 525."3

Physical restraint is required to constitute escape, as we

see below.

iil. ELEMENTS

The Manual describes two approaches to pleading the

offense involved in unauthorized flight from correctional

custody.'* One not acquainted with variations in the con-

ditions of correctional custody might overlook the distinc-

tion between physical and moral restraint and select the

wrong approach. One is escape from physical restraint,

appropriate for instances like that in Carson, and the

other is breach of any other form of restraint, e.g., the

moral duty to remain in custody unless released.'5 MCM,

Part IV, paragraph 70b, c (1984).

'? Neither stone walls nor iron bars are required to make a correc-

tional custody facility, though they are not inconsistent with the idea.

However, their functional equivalents are required to make an escape

possible. Cf. United States v. Ellsey, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 455,37 C.M.R.

75, 79 (1966) (prisoner ordered into confinement escaped from escort

while in route to facility did not escape from confinement but

breached custody).

'* See generally United States v. Riedel, 37 C.M.R. 801 (A.F.B.R.

1966).

'S See, e.g., Mackie, 36 C.M.R. 171-72; United States v. Blosser, 35

C.M.R. 902, 906 (A.F.B.R. 1965); United States v. Baker, 35 C.M.R.

916 (A.F.B.R. 1965).

36a

Breach and escape are different. Each includes as an ele-

ment of proof the nature of the restraint imposed and

violated. Jd. The maximum confinement which may be ad-

judged for an escape is double that which may be imposed

for a breach. 7d. at 70e. Perhaps for that reason the

elements of proof of an escape require the prosecution to

prove that “while in such correctional custody, the accused

was under physical restraint” and that “the accused freed

himself. . . from the physical restraint.” Jd. at 70(1)(b)-(c)

(emphasis added). In contrast, the elements of a breach

are satisfied simply by proof of “a certain restraint.” Jd. at

70b(2)(b). We are happy that we are not obliged to ac-

count for the mysterious presence of the breach specifica-

tion if, as the majority contends, one who is put into the |

status of correctional custody is necessarily, ipso facto,

thereafter under physical restraint. There is no explana-

tion. If one follows the majority’s definitional logic, cor-

rectional custody always entails physical restraint, and the

breach specification has no use.

We would have thought that the Manual’s statement of

the elements would have been enough to dispose of this

case: Some proof is required that there was physical

restraint, and, in a guilty plea case, some inquiry is re-

quired when the accused gives replies inconsistent with the

existence of physical restraint. Moral suasion is not

enough to prove an escape, though it is satisfactory for

proof of a breach.

Given the diversity in implementing correctional

custody, the President’s definition (correctional custody is

physical restraint) does not substitute for facts. After all,

it is perfectly possible that his subordinates deviated from

his expectations when they implemented the authority to

impose correctional custody. That is not in the least a sur-

prise, for one must be careful about confining citizens

TORE ee ee

37a

without trials. While the constitutional and military due

process aspects were touched in United States v. Mackie,

16 U.S.C.M.A. 14, 36 C.M.R. 170 (1966) and United

States v. Shamel, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 361, 47 C.M.R. 116

(1973), there is always the threat of legislative responses if

correctional custody is too often too strenuous. Thus, it is

easily understood and perhaps commendable that the

President’s subordinates have not uniformily instituted

correctional custody with all the rigor that he seems to

have believed lawful. With Congress ever watchful,

sometimes authority lawfully had is best not exercised to

its limits, lest perceptions of abuse result in the authority

being taken away.

Despite our discussion of what we believe to be a differ-

ing perception of the world of correctional custody, the

majority assumes that physical restraint follows in proof

by logical tautology. In contrast, we would hold that

assumptions are not good enough to satisfy an element of

proof that doubles the maximum punishment. Not all cor-

rectional custody necessarily involves physical restraint, :

regardless of the Manual’s definition. Where the offender

is not shown to have been behind locked doors or similar

physical restraint, as is sometimes the case in Air Force

facilities, there may still be an offense committed when the

offender leaves the facility, but the offense is breach, not

escape.

IV. THE ESCAPE PRECEDENTS

One must ask how the majority—reasonable judges

all—could possibly get this so wrong as we in the minority

contend. We should avoid speculation about the major-

ity’s thought process, but in this case it has been fairly

overt. The majority analogizes from some of the cases in-

volving escapes from confinement under Article 95,

38a

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 895 (1988). We think that is unwise,

for those cases are treacherous, too, badly in need of

careful reconsideration. When the touchstone for an

analogy is faulty, one should do without.

There is an oft-repeated doctrine that a prisoner remains

in “physical restraint” even when outside the jail if accom-

panied by an escort who—even unarmed — has the means

and duty to oppose flight. See, e.g., United Stares v.

Hodge, 50 C.M.R. 445 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975). We have no

fight to pick with the general idea that an escort can supply

the physical restraint that is otherwise lacking outside a

jailhouse, but, as one might expect, prior cases have of-

fered many an opportunity to find the limits of that doc-

trine. For example, in United States vy. Cornell, 19 M.J.

735 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984), our predeccesors affirmed a con-

viction of escape from confinement where the

prisoner --in minimum custody — was permitted to go out

of the jail unescorted to a gym, from whence he fled

without authority. Cornell was based on United States v.

Maslanich, 13 M.J. 611 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982), pet. denied,

14 M.J. 236 (C.M.A. 1982), in which a panel of this Court

explicitly overruled with only momentary analysis the

precedent inconsistent with its view of the law relative to

“physical restraint.”

One might well criticize Cornell and Maslanich as con-

fusing the status of confinement with the fact of physical

restraint, both of which appear to be required in an escape

from confinement. That is exactly the flaw in the

majority’s approach in this case, explicitly stated in its

opening. As the clarity of the distinction between the two

has been reduced, we seem in Cornell to have gotten to the

point that proof of one element (physical restraint) may be

inferred from proof of the other (status of confinement),

regardless whether the facts of the prisoner’s life were con-

gruent with that inference. To put it even more bluntly,

39a

Cornell and Maslanich lure one seductively into assuming

away a distinct requirement for proof of “physical

restraint.” Such a flawed approach warrants reconsidera-

tion.

Regrettably, neither Cornel// nor Maslanich make a per-

suasive brief for such a position.'® Lacking sound

'© Maslanich joined the assessment of some sister-service decisions

that the precedents are not consistent. 13 M.J. at 613 n.1, 614 n.3. It is

certainly true that the prior decisions offered an interesting variety of

outcomes, but ii seems something of an exagerration to view them as

too hopelessiy splintered ever to be reconciled. See generally United

States v. Hodge, 50 C.M.R. 445 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975) (physical

restraint Outside the facility depends on a guard who has the “means

and the duty ... to oppose” escape); United States v. Seelke, 45

C.M.R. 631 (A.C.M.R. 1972), pet. denied, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 648, 45

C.M.R. 929 (1972) (record silent about instructions to unarmed

escort, instructions to call “halt” are not enough); United States v.

Dees, 45 C.M.R. 891 (N.C.M.R. 1972) (proof of physical restraint

adequate where guard had a duty to oppose escape, but left priscners

unsupervised momemtarily); United States \. Roberts, 43 C.M.R. 998

(A.F.C.M.R. 1971) (plea to escape not improvident where prisoner on

work detail hopped off truck); United States v. Hahn, 42 C.M.R. 623

(A.C.M.R. 1970) (no escape where no evidence that guard has means

or duty to do more than cry “halt”); United States v. Hamilton, 41

C.M.R. 724 (A.C.M.R. 1970) (mere requirement that a guard cry

“halt” does not constitute physical restraint); United States v. Faist, 41

C.M.R. 720 (A.C.M.R. 1970) (escape set aside where parolee on work

detail given permission to go unsupervised to a latrine, the left);

United States vy. Connor, 40 C.M.R. 614 (A.C.M.R. 1969) (physical

restraint adequately shown where jumped out a window while

momentarily out of sight of a guard who had orders to shoot); United

States v. Laurie, 37 C.M.R. 663 (A.B.R. 1967) (guilty plea to escape

set aside where prisoner was released without supervision for detail);

United States v. Silk, 37 C.M.R. 523 (A.B.R. 1966) (physical restraint

continues outside prison if guard has means and duty: no restraint

where prisoners at work in dining hall could not all be watched at

once); United States v. Sines, 34 C.M.R. 716 (N.B.R. 1964), pet.

denied, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 697, _.. C.M.R. ____. (1964) (unarmed

guard with instructions to refrain from chasing was not “physical

40a

restraint”); United States v. Morrison, 33 C.M.R. 899 (A.F.B.R.

1963), pet. denied, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 681, 33 C.M.R. 436 (1963) (escape

affirmed where guard had means and duty; ineffectiveness im-

material); United States v. Ramsey, 33 C.M.R. 566 (A.B.R. 1963) (no

escape where minimum custody prisoner walks away with permission

of KP supervisor but does not return, supervisor has no duty to do

more than "try to talk him out of it” and trail); United States v.

Morgan, 32 C.M.R. 665 (A.B.R. 1963 (escape affirmed where

prisoner under loose supervision of cook went outside to clean grease

racks, the left unimpeded, because cook had means and duty, even

though ineffective); United States v. Vincent, 24 C.M.R. 506

(N.M.B.R. 1957) (escape affirmed, physical restraint continued where

prisoners taken outside prison were left unsupervised in a lounge first

for 30 minutes, then a few more); United States v. Block, 18 C.M.R.

458 (C.G.B.R. 1955) (escape affirmed, physical restraint found where

prisoners detailed to boiler room of brig were not always in sight of

unarmed supervisor who has means and duty, because relaxed

vigilance was still enough given that the site was on a base); United

States v. Hunker, 18 C.M.R. 703 (A.F.B.R. 1954) (custody & confine-

ment distinguished: where commander ordered accused into confine-

ment, accused escaped while en route, held to be an escape from con-

finement!); United States v. Stewart, 17 C.M.R. 805 (A.F.B.R. 1954)

(escape affirmed, physical restraint found where unarmed guard

escorted prisoners to chapel, left them outside to look in, whereupon

they ran away) (some physical restraint is required, but how much is

immaterial); United States v. English, 17 C.M.R. 693 (A.F.B.R. 1954)

(escape affirmed, physical restraint found where unarmed escort

believed he was responsible for prisoners, searched inunediately;

Holcomb distinguished); United States v. Holcomb, 16 C.M.R. 537

(A.F.B.R. 1954) (no escape, no physical restraint where unarmed

escort had been ordered to touch prisoners, only to call halt: “Moral

restraint will not suffice. .. .” at 541); United States v. Wolfrey, 15

C.M.R. 768 (A.F.B.R. 1954) escape affirmed where prisoner on detail

was left behind when supervisor drove away, but record does not show

how far, etc.) (B.R. deferred to trial court’s view of the evidence);

United States v. Freeman, 15 C.M.R. 639 (A.F.B.R. 1954), pet.

denied, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 734, 16 C.M.R. 292 (1954) (escape affirmed

where escorted prisoner was allowed to go unescorted to water foun-

tain, then left: momentary laxity of the guard is a matter of ineffec-

4la

tiveness); United States v. Lorey, 14 C.M.R. 393 (A.B.R. 1954)

(escape affirmed, physical restraint found where guard armed with

shotgun went to sleep: inattentiveness was a matter of ineffectiveness);

United States v. Travis, 13 C.M.R. 780 (A.F.B.R. 1953) (escape set

aside where prisoner given permission to go unsupervised to a latrine

the kept going); United States v. Haddox, 12 C.M.R. 675 (A.F.B.R.

1953), pet. denied, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 838, 13 C.M.R. 142 (1953) (escape

affirmed where prisoner was under armed guard but escort was

distracted by conversation with hostess); United States v. Fritts, 12

C.M.R. 232 (A.B.R. 1953), Pet. denied, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 835, 12

C.M.R. 204 (1953) (no fatal variance where accused charged with

escape from custody, but evidence showed escape from confinement:

accused had been apprehended, then confined, and proof of the con-

finement included proof of the custody); United States v. Wesson, 9

C.M.R. 839 (A.F.B.R. 1953) (no escape where prisoner was left un-

supervised to wash car, stole it and drove away: last of the physical

restraint abated when car wash supervisor went away for rags); United

States v. Farley, 9 C.M.R. 753 (A.F.B.R. 1953) (escape set aside

where escorted prisoner was told to go alone to x-ray room because

escort had too many prisoners, prisoner was the under no physical

restraint when he left x-ray room); United States v. Conner, 7 C.M.R.

477, 481-82, 482 n.1 (A.F.B.R. 1952) (how restraint continues even

where lax so long as not permitted freedom by one with authority);

United States v. Garner, 7 C.M.R. 446 (N.B.R. 1952) (guilty plea to

escape from confinement provident where accused left when working

outside supervision of escort outside jail); United States v. Urquhart,

6 C.M.R. 445 (A..B.R. 1952) (no physical restraint, therefore no

escape where parolee left jail on “trusty pass,” went on errand, then

fled: only moral resiraint involved); United States v. Wildman, €

C.M.R. 406 (A.B.R. 1952) (escape from confinement affirmed where

prisoner escaped from armed escort en route to jail after approval of

adjudged confinement) (“at most an immaterial variance” anyway);

United States v. Fabrizzio, 6 C.M.R. 623 (A.F.B.R. 1952) (no

restraint and no escape where minimum security prisoner signed out,

left with permission but without supervision, did not return); United

States v. Owens, 6 C.M.R. 515 (A.F.B.R. 1952) (minimum custody

prisoner left place of work where he was unsupervised: no “physical

restraint”); United States v. Sanches, 2 C.M.R. 278 (A.B.R. 1951)

(physical restraint continued where prisoner on detail outside jail was

under guard’s supervision); United States v. Trimble, 2 C.M.R. 718

42a

arguments, we find it wiser to insist on proof of the ele-

ment as the law requires than to infer it by such flimsy

logic.

(A.F.B.R. 1951) (cannot “suffer escape” when the prisoner has been

permitted—even without authority—to go about without guard);

United States v. Noeil, 79 B.R. 117 (1948) (no restraint and no escape

where parolee allowed to sign out from jail to duty did so, did not

return: moral suasion not equivalent to physical restraint); United

States v. Van Breeman, 8 B.R. (E.T.O.) 405 (A.B.R. 1944) (escape af-

firmed where lenient escort let prisoner go to bathroom unescorted:

temporary relaxation of vigilance was no “abrogation of status as a

retrainer”); United States v. Humphrey, 28 B.R. 327 (1943) (moral not

substitute for physical) (fence around installation enclosed 28 square

miles, was not eqivalent to physical confinement); United States v.

Medlock, 14 B.R. 69 (1942) (no escape where prisoner was sent out of

jail unescorted and unobserved to wash pails in lake, did not return);

United States v. Lowry, 12 B.R. 309, 311 (1942) (requirement for

physical restraint is intended to exclude conviction for escape of

prisoner who is paroled to work, does not return) (prisoner in hospital

was, according to “very common understanding,” not supposed to

leave. Not good enough.); United States v. Smith, § B.R. 155 (1934)

(no escape where prisoner did not return when detailed to work out-

side the jail without supervision) (no “break away from any physical

restraint”): United States v. Gilchrest, 1 B.R. 297 (A.B.R. 1930) (no

“breaking away from physical restraint” where prisoner was sent

unescorted outside the jail to fetch ice, did not return). Maslanich

threw out the baby with the batch of water. It simply assumed away

the proof requirement as to physical custody because it found it too

difficult to follow the precedent about prisoners who were outside the

jail. It would have been better simply to require proof. Instead, the

Maslanich court changed the doctrine to conform to its taste for

simplicity and streamlined orderliness. That is exactly where we are in

Airman Felix’ case. The Court of Military Appeals has not visited the

extremes to which the law of escape have been taken, but the present

majority’s insistence on taking the same view of escape from correc-

tional custody gives it another chance.

= a ae ahh leads e, a5) de

43a

V. THE RECORD

We now turn to the colloquy during the inquiry into the

providence of the pleas of guilty. Before we begin, we

must set aside what is not relevant: It is not relevant that

Airman Felix knew of the local regulation or that it im-

posed limits on his liberty. The regulation and _ his

knowledge of it tend to prove only that he was in custody

imposed by the moral suasion resulting from a duty to

obey. The fact that Airman Felix was induced to agree

with the military judge’s characterization of his state as

“physical restraint” only helps keep this controversy in the

majority’s Aristotelian world. While this element can be

confessed away, the central need in the providency inquiry

is to assure that the accused knows what he’s talking about

when he does so. The inconsistent replies suggest that he

didn’t, and the military judge should have inquired fur-

ther."

The inquiries in this case focused on escape because that

is what was alleged. However, the record does not make

clear the circumstances of the correctional custody from

which Airman Felix departed. We might not have ques-

tioned it, had Airman Felix not made these statements sug-

gesting that the required “physical restraint” in that facility

'? This teapot-sized temptest is a superb example of the ripple ef-

fects of a trial judge’s use during the providency inquiry of leading

questions in which legal conclusions were embedded, calling upon the

accused to subscribe to each. That style makes for a fast inquiry and a

thin record, but it also seduces the participants into an assuredly false

and obviously dangerous sense of security. If we may be excused a lit-

tle speculation, we think it likely that if this trial judge had simply had

a brief conversation with Airman Felix about life in this facility, we

would never have had any cause to become so embroiled in such an

unproductive controversy as such a great expense. Either the incon-

sistency would have been dispelled or, at the very worst, the prosecu-

tion would have been put to the test.

44a

might have been absent. At one fleeting passage as to one

of his two absences, he explains that he went out the facili-

ty’s back door. There is no hint that any force or deception

or a locksmith’s skill was required, and so we cannot infer

that Airman Felix was then under physical restraint. There

is nothing to explain how he got out on the other occasion

or the circumstances of the custody on that occasion.

While Airman Felix gave the needed “yes, sir” responses to

the military judge’s questions, it is clear that neither the

military judge nor Airman Felix were discriminating be-

tween physical and moral restraint. Yet, in the one brief

reference to the conditions of custody, Airman Felix said

that he just walked out the door. Later, during sentencing,

he told us that there was no security in the facility at all.

Those replies are inconsistent with his agreement that he

was under physical restraint. Such an inconsistency left

unclarified causes a substantial conflict between the plea

(guilty of escape from physical restraint) and Airman

Felix’ description of the circumstances of the correctional

custody in his case (just walked out the door).

The participants at trial did not notice the distinctions

between offenses against correctional custody and,

naturally, did not notice the inconsistency and therefore

did not resolve it. The plea was not shown to have been

provident. The findings under Charge II should have been

set aside.'® Article 45(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 845(a)

(1988).

'® We have no opportunity to rescue this charge by approving a

finding of guilty to a breach as if it were a lesser included offense, even

though it is fairly apparent that, had breach been pleaded, the plea

would likely have been provident. While moral suasion is less onerous

than physical imprisonment, a breach of custody is not necessarily a

lesser included offense of an escape. United States v. Greene, 42

C.M.R. 953, 959 (A.F.C.M.R. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 20

U.S.C.M.A. 232, 43 C.M.R. 72 (1970). But cf. Kellner, 16 M.J. 524)

a

45a

VI. THE MAJORITY’S REMEDY

Even if we were somehow disposed to accept the majori-

ty’s view of escapes from correctional custody, we could

not join its disingenuous disposition of this case. Airman

Felix, though hardly a model airman, was convicted only

of the escape which the majority now affirms and the

disobedience of the local correctional custody regulation,

which we all agree must be set aside. For those two convic-

tions he was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, con-

finement for 5 months, and reduction to E-1 from E-2. To

remedy a wrongful conviction of half the charges in this

case, the majority proposes now to reduce the confine-

ment 20 percent to 4 months.

Holding as we do the view that the other conviction

must also be aside, we are not obliged to set down our view

of what would constitute an appropriate remedy for the

majority to decree, for we would necessarily set aside the

whole sentence. Still, we can record the dire straits in

which the majority finds itself. It can’t bring itself to give

meaningful relief for what all agree was a wrongful con-

viction. It ran out of remedial options that it finds accep-

table.

Restoring the reduction would result in back pay, yet we

cannot calculate the money value of such relief because we

have no idea how long such a poorly disciplined airman

might have remained in pay status on active duty. See

(plea to escape found improvident in breach situation, breach af-

firmed where military judge’s inquiry included breach); United States

v. Whitmire, 13 M.J. 587 (N.M.C.M.R. 1982) (specification of escape

amended at trial to allege breach). The two elements are different, not

inclusive of one another. Unlike the military judge in Kel/ner, the

military judge in this case did not advise Airman Felix about the

elements of breach except superficially and did not inquire into facts

about breach. Thus, the inquiry requirement would remain unsatisfied

in either case.

46a

Article 76a, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 876a (1988) (required

leave). In short, we can’t tell how much relief would result

from setting aside the reduction. Furthermore, reduction

in grade is an appealing and somehow just punishment for

the irresponsibility shown in this case, if like the majority

one can find a sound conviction resulting from it. Setting

aside the punitive discharge would certainly be adequate

(perhaps even excessive) compensation for the error and

for whatever loss of liberty was attributable to it, but the

majority has, for whatever reason, found that to be inap-

propriate.

Most trying in the whole process is the mandate of the

Court of Military Appeals that, when reassessing a

sentence to correct an error, we must first determine

whether we can determine what the trial court “would

probably have adjudged’ had the error not occurred.

United States v. Peoples, 29 M.J. 426, 427 (C.M.A. 1990).

See also United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305, 307-308

(C.M.A. 1986); United States v. Suzuki, 20 M.J. 248, 249

(C.M.A. 1985). See Generally, United States v. Waits, 32

M.J. 274, 276-77 (C.M.A. 1991). When we can’t tell, we

are not supposed to guess, as we think the majority does.

We are supposed to remand.

That is a tricky bit of mind-reading in any case, but in

some it is sound logic than speculation. For example, we

know that an officer-accused stands a very good chance of

being dismissed from the service upon conviction of any

substantial crime, and we are not surprised when we see

dismissal alone adjudged and then approved even when

only one of several convictions can be sustained on appeal.

When we must reassess in such a case, we can often con-

clude, to the satisfaction of our conscience, that the

dismissal was inevitable even had the affected specifica-

tions never been referred. In other cases a particular com-

ponent of the sentence can be directly tied to a specifica-

ee

—s

47a

tion, as when the court-martial adjudges a fine in exactly

the amount the accused was convicted of stealing. If the

larceny conviction must be disapproved but others remain,

we can tell at least that the fine should go.

This is not such a case. One cannot say reliably enough

to satisfy my conscience that the escape alone produced

the punitive discharge, the reduction, and 4 of the 5 mon-

ths of confinement. The majority is simply guessing, and,

to make it much worse, their guesswork is deplorably par-

simonious.

The majority’s remedy is neither adequate nor effective,

because the appellant served all the confinement long ago

and has presumably been released. The sentence was ad-

judged on 25 February 1991, now nearly 2 years ago, and

only truly extraordinary circumstances would have

prevented the confinement from being served. None of it

should remain to be abated by the majority’s ungenerous

treatment. Thus, our appellate inefficiency gave the ma-

jority a Hobson’s choice, and it chose nothing.

One might argue that there are collateral consequences

to disapproving confinement already served, but we are

unacquainted with them, they are not in the record, and

we can only speculate what they might be and how reliable

the government might be in delivering them up to the ap-

pellant. Ignoring them as we must, we can only conclude

that the majority has tried to give back the one thing that

can never be given back in a non-capital case: liberty

deprived. It is a futile and tight-fisted gesture, inadequate

to the purpose, and born of speculation. This case should

be remanded for a rehearing on the sentence, even if one

agrees with the majority’s disposition of the convictions. !®

'? We refrain from detailing our disagreement with the majority’s

treatment of the identity of the staff judge advocate’s ghostwriter. In

our view, all that should matter is that the staff judge advocate signed

48a

JOHNSON, Judge, with whom Judge JAMEs joins (concur-

ring in part and dissenting in part):

I concur with the majority’s decision to set aside appel-

lant’s conviction for failure to obey a lawful order. I join

Judge James in dissenting from the majority’s decision to

affirm appellant’s convictions for escape from correc-

tional custody, and from the majority’s remedial action.?°

Correctional custody is listed in Article 15(b)(2), UC-

MJ, as an authorized punishment for nonjudicial punish-

ment actions, and it is there defined as “the physical re-

straint of a person during duty or nonduty hours... .”

This language can either be interpreted as meaning that a

person ordered into correctional custody is therefore auto-

matically under physical restraint, at least when he is in a

designated correctional custody facility, or it can be read

as an authorization for physical restraint to be imposed by

competent authority. The majority has apparently taken

the former view, with which I disagree.

Further, the term “physical restraint” may be taken to

mean either physical means limiting one’s movements

(such as locked doors, fences, or the presence of an escort

or monitor with the duty and means of limiting one’s liber-

ty), or it may be taken to mean the declaration of limits

beyond which one may not go. The majority in this case

seems to have adopted the latter view, with which I dis-

agree.

the post-trial recommendations in such a way as to make clear that

they were his own advice to the convening authority. Who served as

scrivener or draftsman should be of no real significance.

2° | also agree that this was not an appropriate case for considera-

tion en banc by this Court. Now that the majority of the Court has

voted to consider appellant’s case en banc, however, the merits of that

question are not dispositive of our action on the findings and sentence

in appellant’s case.

Pe ee ee

Ms be —_—

ee 3,

re. ee

wp

49a

The explanation of the offense of escape from correc-

tional custody in MCM, Part IV, paragraph 70c(1) (1984)

defines it as the casting off of “any physical restraint im-

posed by the custodian or by the place or conditions of

custody.” The words “conditions of custody” can be inter-

preted either as physical barriers to movement, or as

orders not to depart from certain limits. The majority in

this case seems to have adopted the latter view. I disagree.

In MCM, Part V, paragraph 5(c)(4) (1984), the Presi-

dent has authorized the Secretaries of the service depart-

ments to prescribe the conditions under which correctional

custody is to be administered in each service. The Secre-

tary of the Air Force, in Air Force Regulation 125-35,

Correctional Custody (4 September 1981), has given major

commands and installation commanders wide discretion in

establishing and operating correctional custody programs.

Some Air Force installations have no correctional custody

program, or send participants to other installations for

correctional custody. Those installations that do have cor-

rectional custody programs vary considerably in the way

they conduct their programs. Some have correctional

custody facilities in separate buildings with locked doors,

security fences, and monitors on duty around the clock.

Others are simply portions of normal barracks marked off

with tape or signs. The result is that some persons serving

correctional custody have physical barriers to their free-

dom of movement, while others do not.

MCM, Part IV, paragraph 70b (1984), provides for two

separate offenses against correctional custody. Escape

from correctional custody anplies when the offender has

cast off physical restraint. Breach of correctional custody

applies when an offender “went beyond the limits of the

restraint imposed” without casting off a physical restraint.

Escape carries a much heavier maximum punishment (dis-

honorable discharge, total forfeitures, and confinement

50a

for 1 year) than does breach of correction custody (bad-

conduct discharge, total forfeitures, and confinement for

6 months).

The majority has decided that any offender who leaves a

correctional custody facility without authority can be con-

victed of escape, even when the evidence indicates there

was no phyiscal barrier to movement. I believe this conclu-

sion is contrary to law. If an accused has breached a moral

restraint imposed by his placement into correctional

custody, he can be convicted of breach of correctional

custody. Before he can be convicted of the more serious

offense of escape from correctional custody, he must have

cast off some physical limit on his movement. If the

government charges the more serious offense, it should

plead and prove the aggravating facts. When a military

judge conducts a providency inquiry for a proposed plea

of guilty to escape from correctional custody, he should

inquire into the factual basis for the conclusion that

physical restraint was present. When an accused says there

was no security at all in the correctional custody facility,

and that he just walked out the back door, as in this case,

the military judge should recognize that the accused has

raised matters inconsistent with a plea of guilty to escape.

No amount of leading and conclusory questions will sub-

stitute for putting the facts on the record.

I would set aside all the findings of guilty in this case

and authorize a rehearing on the two specifications of

escape from correctional custody.

[SEAL OMITTED]

OFFICIAL

/s/ Naomi D. Allen

Naomi D. AALLEN

TSgt, USAF

Chief Court Administrator, AFCMR

* US. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1994-— 384-508/24006

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.