Respondents Brief — North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas

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NORTH STAR STEEL COMPANY,

Petitioner,

Vv.

CHARLES A. THOMAS, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

Paul Alan Levy

(Counsel of Record)

Alan B. Morrison

Public Citizen Litigation Group

Suite 700

2000 P Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 833-3000

Attorneys for Respondents

March 27, 1995

QUESTION PRESENTED

In actions brought under the Worker Adjustment and

Retraining Notification Act, should courts borrow the

limitations period from the National Labor Relations Act, as

opposed to state law or another federal statute, such as the

Fair Labor Standards Act?

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Us ay 5 i

Deemee PAA www te eee Vv

EE Ee l

EE a ea

a 3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................ 5

EEE 8

I. UNDER DELCOSTELLO AND ITS PROGENY,

THE GENERAL RULE, “IN LABOR LAW

AND ELSEWHERE,” REQUIRES THE BOR-

ROWING OF STATE LIMITATIONS PERIODS,

SUBJECT TO A “NARROW EXCEPTION”

WHEN A “COMPELLING” CASE CAN BE

MADE TO BORROW A FEDERAL PERIOD

EE Ea 8

II. NORTH STAR HAS NOT MADE THE ‘COM-

PELLING DEMONSTRATION” NEEDED TO

SUPPORT BORROWING A _ LIMITATIONS

PERIOD FROM FEDERAL RATHER THAN

EE 17

A. Petitioners’ Arguments Would Eviscerate

the Presumption in Favor.of Borrowing

Limitations Periods from State Law. ..... 18

B. The NLRA Is Not Analogous to WARN. .. 23

iV

1. Upepeoee Peers... 2 6 ee

a

2. Different Procedures ........... 27

3. Different Causes of Action. ....... 27

&. (Wooo Bete... ... 6c a cet ee ews 30

The Six-Month Limitations Period Is Not

Needed to Protect Federal Labor Policies,

and Its Adoption Could Easily Frustrate

WARN’s Own Policies. ............. 32

1. Section 10(b) Is Not Needed to Effec-

tuate Federal Policies. .......... 32

Adoption of Section 10(b) Would

Make It Difficult to Enforce WARN. . 36

III. THIS ACTION WOULD BE TIMELY BASED

ON ANY OF THE ANALOGOUS STATE OR

FEDERAL LIMITATIONS PERIODS. ...... 38

IV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT REVERSE 165

YEARS OF PRECEDENT BY CREATING A

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF BORROWING

PRES EE. Goa ee ee ale eee 43

CONCLUSION

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page:

Adams v. Gould, Inc.,

739 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1984) ............. 15

Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc’s,

se On, | a passim

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,

WO Bie Os 5 oss hs ho vv eine eae 14

Allgood v. Elyria United Methodist Home,

904 F.2d 373,

reh. granted and app. dism. in part on other

grounds,

913 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1990) ............ 16

Aluminum Workers Local 674 v. A.P. Green Refractories,

895 F.2d 1053 (Sth Cir. 1990) ............ 16

Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Lines,

dei | 30

Bowdry v. United Air Lines,

956 F.2d 999 (10th Cir. 1992) ............ 16

Brenner v. Carpenters Local 514,

927 F.2d 1283 (3d Cir. 1991) ............ 16

Campbell v. City of Haverhill,

BoP Wats UM EUMD cw ec cc cace 8

Carpenters Dist. Cuuncil v. Dillard Dep’t Stores,

i> P.28 izro OO Cir. 19908) 2. kw wk 31

vi

Carruthers Ready-Mix v. Cement Masons Local 520,

TPS F.26 S20 Ge Gas se ws et ee 15

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,

404 U.S. Fir Go Cae a ee es 19

Clift v. UAW,

881 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1969) ............ 16

Connors v. Consolidation Coal Co.,

366 F.26 SOP Ce es ee ee eee oe 40

Cope v. Anderson,

331 U.S. QO) Glee oe en a ee ee ee 8

Corsicana Nat’l Bank v. Johnson,

251 U.S. GB Ce a se ks 40

Damron v. Rob Fork Mining Corp.,

945 F.2d 123 GUUS R Pee ha os ee ee we 37

Dantagnan v. ILA Local 1418,

496 F.2d 400 (Sth Cir. 1974) ............ 39

DelCostello v. Teamsters,

462 U.S. TSE GO 6 ace eeeea ewe passim

Doty v. Sewall,

TOA F.28 1 (ist Cae, Fi es ee we we a 30

Edwards v. Wilkes-Barre Pub. Co. Pension Trust,

757 F.28 S2 GOR GA, Ge eee ea ese es 15

Elevator Constructors v. Home Elevator Co.,

T98 F.2d 222 CFR BD sw ter ee wes 17

Vii

Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Add’n Cmnty. Org.,

Me PT 6 ge oc ke ke KS Ke ew 23

Felton v. Unisource Corp.,

940 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1991) .......005.. 15

First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,

re 28

Florida-Texas Freight. Corp.,

203 N.L.R.B. 509 (1973),

enf’d mem., 489 F.2d 1275 (6th Cir. 1974) .... 31

Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,

a 24

Frymire v. Ampex Corp.,

821 F. Supp. 651 (D. Colo. 1993) ...... 17, 39

Gar Wood-Detroit Truck Equipment,

EE 28

Gavalik v. Continental Can Co. .,

812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987) .......... 15, 42

Gonzalez v. Aloha Airlines,

940 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1991) ............ 16

Goodman vy. Lukens Steel Co..,

RO 14, 29

H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,

eR A): | 23

Haggerty v. USAir,

woe women pee Cb Cir. 1992)... . we es 16

Vill

Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp.,

31 F.3d 224,

rehearing en banc granted,

3h Pie oe Ce Gas Fe nee 8 cs a eee 18

Held v. Manufacturers Hanover Leas. Corp.,

Sid Fide Teer CCM. Te gee eed wes 15

Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm.,

Dae Gls OPE Ee 8 ke hn 6 ee as eR 43

Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,

ee | re re 10

Holmberg v. Ambrecht,

ar Shee ee vn i oe ee 8

Howard v. Roadway Express,

726 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1984) ........... 14

ILA Local 953 v. Cataneo, Inc.,

990 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1993) ............ 16

Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,

ie ef) a ere 8, 14

Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind v. Gilbertson,

Se rie Be NE ha ne 8 at ee ws 13, 21

Machinists Local 701 v. Santa Fe Terminal Serv. ,

8 IER Cases 897, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5859

ee es SN a ss 4 ae 2 ere a a ee 17

Machinists Lodge 702 v. Loudermilk,

444 F.26 719 (St) Cis. W971) www ce ee 27

ix

Marshall v. Brewers Local 6,

960 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1992) ........., passim

McDonald v. Piedmont Airlines,

930 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1991) ............. 16

McDonald v. Thompson,

eS ae oe 39

McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co.,

Be U8. THO oo cn cc ve cen 42

M’Cluny v. Silliman,

@ Peters 270, 277 (199). wk ww ce 8

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,

ee as Ss.) 23

Milwaukee Spring,

268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984),

enf’d sub nom. UAW Local 547 v. NLRB,

VOD F.20 175 CC. Cir. 1988) 2... LL. 28

Monarch Long Beach Corp. v. Teamsters Local 812,

762 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1985) ............. 15

North Carolina Coastal Motor Lines,

219 N.L.R.B. 1009 (1975),

enf’d, 542 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1976) ........ 30

O'Hare v. General Marine Transp. Corp.,

740 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1984) .........22.., 15

O'Sullivan v. Felix,

508 OB. OTe Cok 6 6 ok eee HAR 8

X

Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC,

ae St ee ee ee ee eS 9

Owens v. Okure,

eee i re CE % 2 ee ok ee ee eS 40

Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard,

999 F.26 51 (20 Cir. 1999) . ww ees 17, 24, 39

Paperworkers Local 395 v. ITT Rayonier,

951 Fae Bae CE Ce. TPP) ck ie ee eh 17

Prater v. UMW,

793 F.2d 1201 (11th Cir. 1986) ........... 15

Pruitt v. Carpenters Local 225,

Os F208 1206 Gi Ut. TD 2k cg vt ce ee 16

Rawlings v. Ray,

Pee hs PE RN we oe eee ee eee 8

Reed v. UTU,

Cee a Pe Rte se kh eS a passim

Republic Steel v. Maddox,

FOP US SC oe 6 HELE ERS 9

Royal Norton Mfg. Co.,

ee Ce ee ITD 65-6 8S ee 30

Runyon v. McCrary,

Ge? 2). SNe 6 oe ea 3 8

SEIU Local 36 v. City Cleaning Co..,

962 F.20 89 (0 Cir. 1992) 2... oe ces 16, 40

4

Shell Oil Co. v. lowa Dep’t of Revenue,

a thes SUD oro 5 86S ose kee wee 26

Sisco v. Conrail,

732 F.2d 1188 (3d Cir. 1984) ............ 12

Smith v. Evening News Ass’n,

DA Wels SUMO ek ewe eee ev edeane 9

Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,

ee Ps I iss 6 6 es bk ewe es 10

Steelworkers v. North Star Steel,

809 F. Supp. 5 (M.D. Pa. 1992),

aff'd, 5 F.3d 39 (3d Cir. 1993) ............, 2

Steelworkers v. North Star Steel Co..,

> F.3d 39 (Gd Cir. 1993) ..... ccc cece z, an

Stevens Pontiac-GMC,

295 N.L.R.B. 599 (1989) ............... 30

Teamsters Local 315 v. Great Western Chem. Co..,

781 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1986) ............, 17

Teamsters Local 63 v. Santa Fe Terminal Serv.,

8 IER Cases 778, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8923

ee yy Gb ws ee es we we 17

Teumer v. General Motors Corp..,

34 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 1994) .........0... 40

Thomas v. North Star Steel Co.,

32 F.3d 53 (3d Cir. 1994) ............, 4,17

XI

Times Herald Printing Co..,

315 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 147 L.R.R.M. 1281

SN is a eed soe 8 Ae ee 31

Transmarine Navig. Corp.,

EA? Se OF). re ee ee 3]

UAW vy. Hoosier Cardinal Corp..,

Pee Ces Se so 6 6 aS es 8, 16, 20

UMW vy. Peabody Coal Co.,

36 F308 GSO (Gta Cir. 1998) 0 wc ccc cc ees 18

UPS v. Mitchell,

ee ers CUED Go os wee ee see eee es 10

Vaca v. Sipes,

See es AE ED 66k 2 oe eee whe ees 10

Wallace v. Detroit Coke Corp..,

818 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Mich. 1993) ........ 39

West v. Conrail,

ee Oe ee OE 6 ok oe ke ae ee 12

Wilson v. Garcia,

ee Ae 8. err a we passim

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY MATERIALS

Federal Statutes

an EM i 0 6 6 6 eee eee es a 44

ee 6 i OG Tae eee ee 44, 45

EE db hk oe 6 0 oad eo 2 eek 35

Age Discrimination in Employment Act,

29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seg. «2.2... ee 27

Airline Deregulation Act,

CES: 16

Civil Rights Acts,

LE 6, 14, 29

42 U.S.C. § 1963.............. 5,6, 21, 29

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ........ 6, 14, 29

Davis-Bacon Act,

40 U.S.C. §§ 276a et seg. ........... 33, 42

Employee Retirement Income Security Act,

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.

Section 413, 29 U.S.C. § 1113 ........... 33

Section 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 ........... 4]

Fair Labor Standards Act,

29 U.S.C. §§ 201 ef seq. ........... 7, 33, 42

Federal Employers’ Liability Act,

45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq.

mecmon 6, 45 U.3.C.956 ........ccece. 33

Jones Act,

ee.

Labor-Management Relations Act,

29 U.S.C. §§ 141 er seq.

Section 1(b), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) .. 2.2.2.2... 23

XIV

Section 301, Z9 U.S.C. $15 2... ceca passim

sectton 305, 29 U.S.C. $167 2. ccc cans 14

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,

Fo ie Some 8 gS 16, 27

Title I, 29 U.S.C. $§ 411 ef seg. 2... 2s. 13, 29

National Labor Relations Act,

29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.

a Or Oe kk we es ee 23

ee 8 oa >) 28

Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) ... 2... 29

Section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) . . . . 27, 28,

29, 36

Section 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) ...... passim

Portal-to-Portal Pay Act

meee ©, oe US. OB 2oe ke et ws 33, 42

Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act,

18 U.S.C. §§ 1861 et seq. ..... ee ear 20, 42

Railway Labor Act,

45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.

Section 3, First (r), 45 U.S.C. § 153,

I sees a a ho oe a 12, 33

Rules of Decision Act,

Es yy ks Od ee ee ee . 8

Walsh-Healey Act,

eS a Se 33, 42

XV

Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act,

29 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.

Section 2(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(ay(1) .. 2... 36

Section 2(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2) ... 24, 36

Section 2(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3) ... 24, 36

Section 2(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(4) .. 2... 27

Section 2(a)(8), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(8) ...... 36

Section 2(b), 29 U.S.C. §2101(b) ......... 36

Section 3(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(2) ...... 24

Section 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b) ......... 37

Section 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 2102(d) ......... 36

Section 4(1), 29 U.S.C. § 2103(1) ......... 37

Section 4(2), 29 U.S.C. § 2103(2) ......... 26

Section 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1) .. 2... 31

Section 5(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(2) ... 31, 41

Section 5(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(3) ...... 24

Section 5(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(4) .. 2... 41

Section 5(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) .. 2... 24

Section 5(b), 29 U.S.C. § 2104(b) ......... 31

Section 6, 29 U.S.C. § 2105 ............. 30

Section 9, 29 U.S.C. § 2108 ............. 27

Legislative History

134 Congressional Record (1988) .......... 24, 26

136 Congressional Record (1990) ............. 44

1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6870...... 45

H.R. Rep. 285, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 7) 26

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-576, 100th Cong., 2d

eB ae ae ee 31

S. 538, Section 333, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) .. 26

XVi

Rules

7 CLR, 8 Pe on oe eh ese 35

pie St AE: rere a ey 23, 24

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

| a Amer 33, 37

State Statutes

42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(5).......... 35, 40

42 Pa, Com. Diet: Age. & Fee) ss ewe ee een 39

42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5525(4)............. 39

re, @> © © © Ss eee. 40, 41

43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 260.9a(g).............. 7, 39

MISCELLANEOUS

Bureau of National Affairs, Proportion of Union Member-

ship Hits 15.8%,

142 Labor Relations Reporter 180 (February 15,

POU asic eks te tus ee eee 28

McHugh, Fair Warning or Foul? An Analysis of the

[WARN] Act in Practice,

14 Berkeley J. Emp. & Labor Law | (1993) ... 36

XVii

Siegel, Practice Commentary,

U.S.C.A., Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial

Procedure, §§ 1653 to 1960, Supplementary

ee ny 6 hee ee 8 es

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term 1994

No. 94-834

NORTH STAR STEEL COMPAN , -

Petitioner,

V.

CHARLES A. THOMAS, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT

A. Facts

Until 1991, petitioner North Star Steel Corporation

(“North Star”) operated a production facility in Milton,

Pennsylvania, producing hot rolled steel bars and other steel

products. The production employees, who were paid by the

hour, were represented in collective bargaining by the United

Steelworkers of America (“USWA”). The respondents in

this case, by contrast, were salaried employees who were not

represented by any union. Joint Appendix (“JA”) 15.

2

On February 25, 1991, petitioner announced that all of

its employees would be laid off, effective immediately, for

an indefinite period. JA 15-16. None of the employees,

hourly or salaried, was given any advance notice of this

action. Appendix to the Petition (“Pet. App.”) 17a. Peti-

tioner refused to state how long the plant would be closed,

or even whether the closure was permanent. JA 16. Asa

consequence, it did not give respondents the accumulated

vacation and severance pay to which they would have been

entitled if their lay-offs were permanent. JA 16, 18-19.

Respondent Thomas, who was the purchasing manager at the

Milton plant, made numerous inquiries about petitioner’s

plans, but received only vague and inconclusive answers. /d.

The USWA did not accept petitioner’s claim that it was

unsure how long the layoff would last, and so, on September

9, 1991, it sued in the United States District Court for the

Western District of Pennsylvania, claiming that petitioner’s

failure to provide advance notice violated the Worker

Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN”).

USWA v. North Star Steel, 809 F. Supp. 5, 6 (M.D. Pa.

1992), aff'd, 5 F.3d 39 (3d Cir. 1993). Because USWA

only sued on behalf of its own members, it sought no relief

for respondents. Jd. at 7. Although that suit was filed more

than six months after the unannounced closing of the plant,

petitioner did not raise the statute of limitations as a defense.

Eventually, respondent Thomas began to put his

inquiries in writing. JA 16-17. Meanwhile, petitioner

conceded in the USWA suit that it had committed what it

called a “technical” violation of WARN, and on April 9,

1992, the district court granted summary judgment against

petitioner, and later determined the number of days for which

it was required to pay the USWA’s members. USWA vy.

North Star Steel Co., supra. By letter dated May 21, 1992,

petitioner promised respondent Thomas that it would make

the same payments to its non-union employees as the district

court decided had to be made to employees represented by

the USWA. JA 19. Although petitioner continued to make

3

such promises, JA 20, it ultimately provided the respondents

only with their accumulated vacation and severance pay. JA

13, 17. As late as August, 1992, petitioner was claiming

that it had originally anticipated that the lay-off would be

only temporary, and that only in that month had it decided to

make the-closure permanent. JA 13.

B. Proceedings Below.

Two months later, on October 23, 1992, respondents

filed this action against petitioner in the Middle District of

Pennsylvania, alleging that petitioner’s failure to notify them

violated WARN. Petitioner’s answer did not deny that it had

violated WARN, but did raise the statute of limitations as an

affirmative defense, arguing that the six-month period of

section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)

should be borrowed. !

On April 1, 1993, respondents moved for summary

judgment on the merits, and petitioner cross-moved for

summary judgment based on its statute of limitations defense.

On May 25, 1993, the district court granted petitioner’s

motion for summary judgment. 838 F. Supp. 970. Respon-

dents appealed to the Third Circuit, which consolidated their

appeal with USWA v. Crown, Cork & Seal Corp., a case

presenting the same issue. Respondents argued that the court

should follow the normal rule of borrowing a limitations

period from state law, that the NLRA was not closely

analogous to WARN, and that federal policies and the

practicalities of litigation did not require a federal limitations

period for WARN any more than they do for most federal

' Respondents argued that petitioner’s misleading statements in

response to Thomas’ inquiries about its plans should estop peti-

tioner from raising a limitations defense. The district court re-

jected this argument, Pet. App. 24a, which was not pressed on

appeal.

4

Statutes. To the contrary, respondents pointed out, the argu-

ments advanced by petitioner for borrowing from federal law

would apply equally to most federal statutes, and so adopting

petitioner’s analysis would make borrowing from federal law

the normal rule, rather than the exception.

In arguing against the adoption of section 10(b),

respondents pointed to several more analogous limitations

periods, both state and federal, under which their claims

would have been timely. They argued, however, that it was

unnecessary for the court to pick one of these alternatives,

because the choice would not affect the outcome of the

appeal, and thus would be mere dictum.

The court of appeals reversed. 32 F.3d 53 (3d Cir.

1994). It began by noting this Court’s repeated holdings

that, if a federal statute contains no statute of limitations, the

normal rule is that courts should borrow the most closely

analogous state law limitations period. E.g., Reed v. UTU,

488 U.S. 319 (1989); DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S.

151 (1983). Aithough there is an exception for cases where

a federal limitations period “clearly provides a closer anal-

ogy” and the federal policies at stake make that rule “signif-

icantly more appropriate,” DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172

(emphasis added), this exception is “closely circumscribed.”

Reed, 488 U.S. at 324, quoted Pet. App. 6a. The court also

noted this Court’s expression of distress in Reed that many

lower federal courts had failed “to take seriously our

admonition” that borrowing from state law is the norm, and

that using a federal statute is the rare exception, “in labor

law as elsewhere.” /d.

Based on that standard, the court found no sound

argument for borrowing from federal law. Although WARN

cases and NLRA claims have some features in common, the

purposes, procedures, rights and remedies of the two statutes

are quite different. /d. 7a-l1la. Nor were there serious

reasons to believe that the interest in uniform characterization

of federal statutes that encompass a broad variety of claims

5

and legal theories provided a basis for borrowing from

federal law, as in the case of RICO claims. Agency Holding

Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc’s, 483 U.S. 143 (1987). See

also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (borrowing the

same state period to govern all section 1983 claims). Pet.

App. 12a-13a. Finally, the court noted that an unduly short

limitations period might well frustrate the ability of affected

workers to bring claims. Jd. 14a-15a.

For all these reasons, the court of appeals held that a

state limitations period, rather than section 10(b), should be

borrowed, and accordingly it reversed the dismissal of

respondents’ claims. In rejecting petitioner’s contention that

section 10(b) ought to be borrowed to govern WARN, the

court of appeals declined to decide which limitations period

should be borrowed, because the actions would be timely

under any of the possibilities that had been brought to its

attention, and because petitioner had not identified any other

limitations period under which the action would be untimely.

Id. 15a.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

As a general rule, the limitations period for a federal

cause of action is borrowed from the most closely analogous

state law. In DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151

(1983), this Court applied what it characterized as a “narrow

exception” to this general rule for the federal “hybrid” action

to enforce rights under collective bargaining agreements

(“CBAs”) when a union violates its duty of fair representa-

tion (“DFR”), which is implied by the NLRA. The Court

decided that, because the prompt resolution of disputes invol-

ving CBAs helps maintain labor peace, a short limitations

period was required to allow the bargaining parties to be

certain that their resolutions of such disputes were, in fact,

final. Accordingly, it ruled that the six months allowed by

section 10(b) of the NLRA for filing unfair labor practice

(“ULP”) charges would be borrowed for DFR suits. The

6

Court emphasized, however, both in De/Costello and in later

cases, such as Reed v. UTU, 488 U.S. 319 (1989), that the

borrowing of state limitations period was to remain the norm,

for labor law as well as other federal claims.

This general rule, and not the narrow exception, applies

to WARN claims. To be sure, most labor law claims could

be said to have some connection to bargaining disputes. But

if the result in DelCostello is to remain an exception rather

than become the rule, the application of section 10(b) must

be confined to claims which carry the same direct and

immediate threat to the finality of bargaining compromises

that DFR claims do.

WARN claims are not analogous to the NLRA; they are

even less analogous to the NLRA than, say, claims under 42

U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 are to claims under the Civil

Rights Act of 1964. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261

(1985). And WARN claims are just as analogous to state

law claims in contract, to Pennsylvania’s Wage Collection

Statute, or to its residual limitations period as are claims

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 to general personal

injury claims. Thus, WARN does not qualify for federal

borrowing under the first prong of the De/Costello test.

Nor do WARN claims threaten the finality of grievance

decisions, as do DFR claims, which are based on workers’

economic rights as members of a bargaining unit represented

by aunion. WARN claims, by contrast, are founded on em-

ployees’ statutory rights, independent of any contract, even

a CBA. Indeed, only 10% of all employees protected by

WARN are even represented by unions; most such employees

are unrepresented, as are respondents here. Moreover, the

adoption of a short statute of limitations threatens the

remedial objectives of WARN, and, given the tenuous

connection between WARN claims and bargaining compromi-

ses, there is no countervailing justification for endangering

the ability of workers to protect their rights, unlike the need

for finality in DFR actions.

7

Instead of trying to argue that WARN requires the

borrowing of a federal limitations period under the standard

set in DelCostello, Reed and elsewhere, petitioners ask for

the adoption of a different standard. Petitioner North Star

does this openly in the last section of its brief, but both

petitioners do so throughout their briefs by recasting the

DelCostello test as one that gives federal limitations periods

at least an equal status with state periods. Indeed, petitioners

place so much emphasis on the need for a limitations period

whose duration is the same in every state, that their test

covertly creates a strong presumption in favor of federal bor-

rowing. But the arguments that petitioners advance for

reversing 165 years of precedent favoring state law bor-

rowing are unconvincing, and adoption of their proposed test

would effectively reopen the question of the proper limita-

tions period for every federal statute. The litigation over this

question would produce the very unpredictability and

increased litigation costs that petitioners advance as the

reason for adopting their proposed rule.

Under the general rule of borrowing from state law,

either the three-year limitations period for enforcing claims

under Pennsylvania’s Wage Payment Collection Law, or the

four-year period for suing under either an express contract,

not in writing, or a contract implied in law, is the most

analogous state period. Even if the Court chooses to borrow

a federal limitations period, the two and three year limit-

ations period for filing wage claims under the Fair Labor

Standards Act provides a better balance between employers’

interest in repose and workers’ interest in protecting rights

that Congress has granted them. Indeed, if the Court is

persuaded by petitioner North Star’s appeal to the supposed

Congressional intent behind the new four-year residual

limitations period as a reason to abandon the traditional

preference for state law borrowing, it should borrow that

new limitations period to govern WARN.

8

ARGUMENT

I. UNDER DELCOSTELLO AND ITS PROGE-

NY, THE GENERAL RULE, “IN LABOR

LAW AND ELSEWHERE,” REQUIRES THE

BORROWING OF STATE LIMITATIONS

_ PERIODS, SUBJECT TO A “NARROW EX-

CEPTION” WHEN A “COMPELLING”

CASE CAN BE MADE TO BORROW A

FEDERAL PERIOD INSTEAD.

With some exceptions, federal statutes do not contain

their own limitations periods; rather, they must be borrowed

from other sources. At least since M’Cluny v. Silliman, 3

Peters 270, 277 (1830), this Court has repeatedly declared

that, as a general rule, courts should apply the most closely

analogous state statute of limitations. Some of the early

decisions indicated that this rule was compelled by the Rules

of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652. See id. at 277; see also

Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 615 (1895)

(Rules of Decision Act gives courts discretion to refuse to

apply state limitations periods that allow insufficient time to

sue). However, at least since Holmberg v. Ambrecht, 327

U.S. 392, 395 (1946), the Court has treated “the implied

absorption of State statutes of limitation within the interstices

of federal enactments [as] a phase of fashioning remedial

details where Congress has not spoken but left matters for

> Johnson vy. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462

(1975); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 (1976), UAW v.

Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701-705 (1966); Cope v.

-Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463-464 (1947); Rawlings v. Ray, 312

U.S. 96, 97-98 (1941); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322

(1914); Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 619-620

(1895).

9

judicial determination within the general framework of

familiar legal principles.” .

The selection of which state statute of limitations to

borrow sometimes presents a difficult issue of characteriza-

tion, because federal statutes frequently create rights for

which there is no exact state parallel. The Court has made

clear, however, that mere difficulty of characterizing the

federal law is not a sufficient reason to abandon the effort.

DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171 (1983); Wilson

v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985).

There is a narrow exception to the general rule where

the use of analogous state statutes would frustrate the

implementation of national policies. Occidental Life Ins. Co.

v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977). As the Court held in

DelCostello, the “hybrid” action against a union and an

employer is one example. In order to place in context the

reasons why the Court found it necessary to make an

exception in such cases, it is important to explain the precise

role which “hybrid” actions play in federal labor law, and

then how they differ from WARN cases.

Individual employees, as well as their unions, may sue

under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act

(“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, to enforce rights conferred on

them by CBAs between their employers and their unions.

Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962).

But the Court has erected a significant procedural barrier to

prevent the courts from being inundated with suits to enforce

CBAs — the plaintiff must exhaust contractual grievance

procedures, including arbitration, before suit is filed.

Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). It has also

erected a major substantive barrier to such suits — the courts

* Petitioner North Star thus errs in asserting that this analytic

development is “recent”, Br. at 10, citing DelCostello, and

implying that, because the change is so recent, it warrants further

changes in the governing standard. /d. 32-33.

10

will not overturn arbitral awards unless the award cannot be

justified as having drawn its essence from the CBA.

Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.

593 (1960).

The Court has also recognized, however, that employ-

ees may be prevented from exhausting the contractual

procedures, or may be unable to obtain a fair hearing in

arbitration, if the union breaches its DFR either in deciding

not to pursue the contractual procedures or in the way it

conducts them. Accordingly, the Court has ruled that

individual employees seeking to enforce their rights under a

CBA will be excused from the exhaustion requirement, and

from the highly deferential standard of review under Enter-

prise Wheel, if, but only if, they can show that the union

breached its DFR in handling the grievance. Vaca v. Sipes,

386 U.S. 171 (1967); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424

U.S. 554 (1976). A lawsuit in which employees seek to

enforce both the CBA against the employer, and the DFR

against the union, is known as a “hybrid” DFR action.

The issue of the proper limitation period for hybrid

actions first reached the Court in UPS v. Mitchell, 451 U.S.

56 (1981). In Mitchell, the narrow question on which

certiorari was granted was which state statute was the most

analogous for post-arbitration hybrid suits against employers

alone. /d. at 61-62. In choosing to borrow the limitations

period for suits to vacate arbitration awards, the Court relied

on the fact that, absent a fairly short limitations period, the

parties to the CBA could not be sure that an arbitrator’s

resolution of a dispute under the agreement was finai.

Therefore, the Court rejected state limitations periods for

enforcing contractual rights because they allowed too long a

period in which the arbitrator’s disposition of a grievance

was in question, and their use would frustrate federal policy

favoring prompt resolution of collective bargaining disputes.

Id. at 63-64.

1]

Two years later, in DelCostello, the issue was whether

to apply a federal limitations period, instead of any of the

State alternatives, in hybrid suits against both an employer

and a union. The Court reiterated its concern that several of

the analogous state limitations periods, such as actions for

tortious injury or for professional malpractice, were so

lengthy that employer-union disputes, and the compromises

by which they were resolved (including negotiated terms,

settled grievances, or even arbitral adjudications), could

remain in limbo for years, and thus could endanger stability

in labor relations and, in the long run, labor peace. 462

U.S. at 168-169. The other most analogous state statutes,

such as those governing actions to vacate arbitration awards,

were so short — generally three months — that aggrieved

employees would not have enough time to file suit. Jd. at

165-168 (undue brevity was “most serious objection” to

State-law borrowing). Moreover, the Court recognized that

the most analogous state statutes were different for the

employer and for the union, and if each were applied to their

respective defendant, the result would be the application of

different limitations periods to two parties to the same suit,

which would clearly have been undesirable. Jd. at 169 n.19.

Still, the Court said, “[t]hese objections to the resort to

State law might have to be tolerated if state law were the

only source reasonably available for borrowing, as it often

is.” Id. at 169. However, it found that section 10(b) of the

NLRA was significantly more appropriate than any of the

State analogies, both because Congress had designed it to

accommodate a “very similar balance of interests”, i.e.,

employee rights versus the stability of private adjustment of

labor disputes, and because the DFR cause of action was

itself implied from the NLRA. Jd. at 169-171.

The Court carefully emphasized the narrowness of its

holding, however, and admonished that courts should not

decline to adopt state limitation periods simply because state

law fails to provide a perfect analogy:

12

We stress that our holding today should not be

taken as a departure from prior practice in bor-

rowing limitations periods for federal causes of

action, in labor law or elsewhere. . . . [R]esort

to state law remains the norm for borrowing of

limitations periods [unless] a rule from elsewhere

in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy

than available state statutes, and . . . the federal

policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation

make the rule a significantly more appropriate

vehicle... ..

Id. at 171-172 (emphasis added).

As a result of these limits, the only other labor law

Suits to which lower courts consistently agree to extend

section 10(b) are DFR suits against unions and employers

who are covered by the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) rather

than the NLRA. According to these courts, such cases are

so similar to NLRA hybrid actions that DelCostello’s

reasoning requires the borrowing of a federal limitations

period in such cases as well. E.g., Sisco v. Conrail, 732

F.2d 1188 (3d Cir. 1984).4

The predominant trend for non-DFR labor cases,

however, is illustrated by Reed v. UTU, 488 U.S. 319

(1989), where the Court borrowed state limitations periods

to govern claims under the Union Members’ Bill of Rights,

* This Court has not yet decided whether it is appropriate to

borrow a federal limitations period for hybrid suits under the RLA,

and, if so, whether the proper federal period for borrowing is the

NLRA’s six-month limitations period or the RLA’s own two-year

limitations period, 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (r). Contrary to the im-

plication in petitioner North Star’s brief, at 11, this Court did not

decide that question in West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35 (1987). Both

parties assumed the applicability of section 10(b), as did the

Question Presented, and this Court found it unnecessary to address

that issue. /d. at 38 n.2.

13

Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure

Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”). The Court refused to borrow the

six-month period of section 10(b), even though intra-union

disputes will sometimes affect collective bargaining disputes,

because the latter sort of disputes were often not involved at

all, and even when they were involved, LMRDA cases would

have

substantially less immediate and less significant an

impact on bargaining and private dispute settle-

ment than that which led us to apply the § 10(b)

Statute to hybrid § 301/fair representation claims,

which directly challenge both the employer’s

adherence to the collective bargaining agreement

and the union’s representation of the employee in

grievance-and-arbitration procedures.

Id. at 331.

Moreover, the Court noted, the LMRDA was enacted

because Congress was dissatisfied with the NLRA’s protec-

tion of the union member interests that the LMRDA was

intended to safeguard. And, most important, the lower court

in Reed had “fail{ed] to take seriously our admonition that

analogous state statutes of limitations are to be used unless

they frustrate or significantly interfere with federal policies,”

id. at 327, for which a “compelling demonstration” is re-

quired. Id. See also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind v. Gilbertson,

501 U.S. 350, 356 (1991) (stressing that “state-borrowing

doctrine may not be lightly abandoned [and] federal borrow-

ing [i]s ‘a closely circumscribed exception’”). As the Court

further emphasized,

This is a narrow exception to the general rule.

As we made clear in De/lCostello, “in labor law

or elsewhere,” application of a federal statute will

be unusual, and “resort to state law remains the

norm for borrowing of limitations periods.”

14

Reed, 488 U.S. at 324, quoting DelCostello, 462

U.S. at 171.

Remarkably, even though Reed is this Court’s only decision

since DelCostello to address the propriety of borrowing

section 10(b) to govern a federal labor claim, and although

it is the only decision of this Court containing an extended

discussion of the meaning of DelCostello, neither petitioner

discusses Reed, nor even cites it for more than a general

proposition or for its narrow holding.

Moreover, the limitations periods in employment

discrimination cases have been borrowed from state law, |

Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462

(1975), despite the fact that such suits frequently call into

question matters which had been resolved between unions

and employers. Id.; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415

U.S. 36 (1974) (Title VII case). The lower courts continue

to apply state limitations periods in suits under 42 U.S.C. §

1981, even against unionized employers, relying on the

general rule discussed in DelCostello. E.g., Howard v.

Roadway Express, 726 F.2d 1529, 1531 (11th Cir. 1984);

see also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661-

662 (1987) (suit against union alleging discriminatory

grievance handling).

North Star asserts in its brief that section 10(b) “has

been applied to claims under other federal labor laws,” North

Star Br. 11, apparently seeking to convey the sense that

courts have generally abandoned the rule of borrowing from

State law in labor law cases. This proposition is supported

by a highly selective citation of precedent, because the vast

majority of appellate cases in the labor law area, particularly

since Reed, have continued to borrow limitations periods

from state law outside the DFR area.

For example, in suits to enforce the NLRA’s secondary

boycott provisions under section 303 of the LMRA, 29

U.S.C. § 187, no court of appeals applies the six-month

period of section 10(b). Instead, all apply longer state

15

limitations periods, even though labor-management relations

are directly affected by such suits, and a secondary boycott,

like a breach of the DFR, is a ULP that is governed by the

express six-month limitations period for filing charges with

the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”). Even though

the case for borrowing section 10(b) is far more compelling

for cases under section 303 than for WARN cases, these

courts conclude that the effect of such litigation on stable

labor-management relations, and consequently on labor

peace, is insufficient to warrant a departure from the normal

rule of borrowing analogous state limitations periods. °

Similarly, courts of appeals generally hold that claims

under ERISA are governed by state limitations periods, not

by section 10(b).° They apply this rule even when the claim

implicates collective-bargaining disputes.’ And suits to en-

force union constitutions under section 301 of the LMRA are

usually governed by state limitations periods, although courts

sometimes borrow section 10(b) if the claim is parallel to a

* Monarch Long Beach Corp. v. Teamsters Local 812, 762

F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1985); Carruthers Ready-Mix v. Cement

Masons Local 520, 779 F.2d 320, 325-328 (6th Cir. 1985); Prater

v. UMW, 793 F.2d 1201, 1209-1210 (11th Cir. 1986). ~

° E.g., Felton v. Unisource Corp., 940 F.2d 503, 510-513 (9th

Cir. 1991); Held v. Manufacturers Hanover Leas. Corp., 912 F.2d

1197, 1200-1202 (10th Cir. 1990).

” E.g., Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1984)

(enforcing collectively bargained pension rights); O’Hare vy.

General Marine Transp. Corp., 740 F.2d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 1984)

(enforcing plan against employer that sought to withdraw from

multi-employer unit); Edwards v. Wilkes-Barre Pub. Co. Pension

Trust, 757 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1985) (seeking pension benefits for

strikers); Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.

1987) (claim that plant closing was intended to prevent union

members from exercising pension rights).

16

DFR claim.* Even LMRDA cases challenging the ratifica-

tion of CBAs, the one type of claim on which this Court

reserved judgment in Reed, 488 U.S. at 331-332 n.6, are

now held to be governed by state limitations periods.’

Indeed, even the two non-DFR examples chosen by petitioner

North Star to support its assertion that section 10(b) “has

been borrowed” do not represent the majority view of the

lower courts with respect to the statutes involved in those

cases. '°

* E.g., Brenner v. Carpenters Local 514, 927 F.2d 1283,

1292-1295 (3d Cir. 1991); Pruitt v. Carpenters Local 225, 893

F.2d 1216, 1219-1221 (11th Cir. 1990).

” Since Reed, the courts of appeals have unanimously applied

State limitations periods in that situation, even those that had held

to the contrary before Reed. Marshall v. Brewers Local 6, 960

F.2d 1360, 1366-1367 (8th Cir. 1992); Allgood v. Elyria United

Methodist Home, 904 F.2d 373, 377-378, reh. granted and app.

dism. in part on other grounds, 913 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1990)

(overruiing circuit precedent); Clift v. UAW, 881 F.2d 408, 412

(7th Cir. 1989) (overruling circuit precedent).

'° Thus, unlike Haggerty v. USAir, 952 F.2d 781 (3d Cir.

1992), most courts borrow state limitations periods to govern the

Employee Protection Program of the Airline Deregulation Act.

Bowdry vy. United Air Lines, 956 F.2d 999, 1005 (10th Cir. 1992);

Gonzalez v. Aloha Airlines, 940 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1991);

McDonald v. Piedmont Airlines, 930 F.2d 220, 224-225 (2d Cir.

1991). And although Aluminum Workers Local 674 v. A.P. Green

Refractories, 895 F.2d 1053 (Sth Cir. 1990), applied section 10(b)

to a “pure” action under section 301 of the LMRA between a

union and an employer, this Court, in a pre-DelCostello decision,

borrowed state law to govern such an action in UAW v. Hoosier

Cardinal Corp. , 383 U.S. 696 (1966), as many lower courts have

done, especially in their post-Reed decisions. E.g., ILA Local 953

v. Cataneo, Inc. , 990 F.2d 794, 800 (4th Cir. 1993); SEJU Local

(continued...)

17

Thus, the lower courts continue to follow this Court’s

mandate, in labor law and elsewhere, by borrowing state

limitations periods to govern most claims, and federal

borrowing remains the rare exception.

Il. NORTH STAR HAS NOT MADE THE

“COMPELLING DEMONSTRATION” NEED-

ED TO SUPPORT BORROWING A LIMITA-

TIONS PERIOD FROM FEDERAL RATHER

THAN STATE LAW.

Petitioners contend that WARN warrants an exception

to the general rule because, they say, the NLRA is more

analogous to WARN than any state statute, and the failure to

adopt a uniform federal limitations period may harm

WARN’s policy objectives. Two courts of appeals, joined

by all district courts in circuits where the issue remains open,

have borrowed state law.'!' The Sixth Circuit adopted

'°(...continued)

36 v. City Cleaning Co., 982 F.2d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 1992):

Paperworkers Local 395 v. ITT Rayonier, 931 F.2d 832, 838 (11th

Cir. 1991); Elevator Constructors v. Home Elevator Co., 798 F.2d

222, 224-229 (7th Cir. 1986). Courts are more likely to apply

section 10(b) where the section 301 action is brought to compel

arbitration. E.g., Teamsters Local 315 v. Great Western Chem.

Co., 781 F.2d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 1986).

‘' Thomas v. North Star Steel Co., 32 F.3d 53 (3d Cir. 1994);

Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, 999 F.2d 51 (2d

Cir. 1993); Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 821 F. Supp. 651 (D. Colo.

1993); Machinists Local 701 v. Santa Fe Terminal Serv., 8 IER

Cases 897, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5859 (N.D. Ill. 1993);

Teamsters Local 63 v. Santa Fe Terminal Serv. , 8 IER Cases 778.

1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8923 (C.D. Calif. 1993).

18

section 10(b), as did a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit,

which then, sua sponte, granted rehearing en banc.”

As we now show, the reasons given by petitioners do

not warrant a departure from the general rule of borrowing

from state law. Indeed, petitioners are able to argue for the

result they favor only by so distorting the test as to create a

preference for borrowing from federal law that would govern

virtually every federal statute.

A. Petitioners’ Arguments Would Eviscerate

the Presumption in Favor of Borrowing

Limitations Periods from State Law.

Petitioners can mount a superficially cohesive assault on

the decision below only by failing to take seriously this

Court’s admonitions in DelCostello and Reed that state law

borrowing remains the norm, and that federal borrowing is

the “closely circumscribed” exception, 488 U.S. at 324, that

must be justified by a “compelling demonstration” that

federal policies so require. Jd. at 627.

For example, on the first prong of the exception,

petitioners characterize state law borrowing as only a “fall-

back” position, and repeatedly assert that section 10(b)

provides a “closer” analogy than various state limitation

periods, or is “closest” or “most analogous.” North Star Br.

25, 26, see also caption 18; Crown, Cork Br. 5, 7, 11, 25,

see also captions 8, 11; Chamber Br. 8, 9, 12, see also

caption 6. Petitioners never try to show, as they must, that

the NLRA provides a claim that is “clearly” closer to the

WARN cause of action than any state law category of claims.

At most, they simply place all of the possible analogies in a

pot and try to show that none of the state analogies is perfect

'? UMW v. Peabody Coal Co., 38 F.3d 850 (6th Cir. 1994);

Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224, reh. granted,

31 F.3d 248 (Sth Cir. 1994).

19

and that the NLRA is closer than any alternative. Crown,

Cork Br. 21-25. But if this were the test, there would no

longer be any presumption in favor of borrowing from state

law, let alone the strong one established by this Court.'?

Similarly, in applying the second prong of the test,

petitioners’ arguments would, if accepted, obliterate the

general rule and require that limitations period always be

borrowed from federal law. For example, they argue that,

unless a single limitations period is used, employers that

operate in several different states could be inconvenienced in

making nationwide decisions that could lead to layoffs in

several different states. North Star Br. 15-18; Crown, Cork

Br. at 30-32; Chamber Br. 12-15. As North Star concedes,

Br. 13 n.4, this aspect of uniformity would require federal

borrowing in all but the most “limited circumstances”

because federal laws almost always apply to national entities

that operate in different states. The states regularly differ in

the amount of time they allow for bringing the same type of

claim, and yet state statutes of limitations are routinely

borrowed for federal claims against defendants that operate

in more than one jurisdiction.

Only federal limitations periods can ensure that claims

under a particular federal statute always expire in the same

amount of time regardless of the jurisdiction in which the

violation was committed or in which the parties live. But

such a strong presumption in the direction of borrowing from

federal law would stand on its head the repeated statements

by this Court, in labor law as in other areas of the law, that

borrowing from state law is the norm, and borrowing from

federal law the rare exception. See Chevron Oil Co. v.

Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 104 (1971) (federal limitations period

justified “only when the need for uniformity is particularly

' Petitioner North Star’s brief does not even bother to analyze

State law alternatives; it simply states that their lack of appropriate-

ness is “self-evident.” Br. 26.

20

great”). Petitioners’ “uniformity” argument does not serve

to distinguish the WARN cause of action from most federal

causes of action, or to show why this case warrants the

application of the exception rather than the general rule. It

is, at best, an argument for changing the presumption, which

should be presented to Congress. See also pages 43 to 46,

infra (replying to argument that Court should overrule

presumption).

In addition, the statutes at issue in Reed and Hoosier

Cardinal — the LMRDA and section 301 of the LMRA —

applied to many defendants that operated in more than one

State, but that did not prevent the Court from following the

normal federal rule by borrowing from state law. In this day

and age, large companies that operate in multiple locations

have learned to adapt to the different substantive and proce-

dural requirements of the jurisdictions in which they do

business.

To the extent that some companies regulated by WARN

may have to take different limitations periods into account in

assessing their contingent liabilities and deciding how long to

keep their records, it is hard to imagine that the application

of the normal rule of borrowing state limitations periods will

have any significant impact on those companies’ operations,

especially because plant closings are not a daily occurrence

in any business.

To support their argument that “uniformity” is a central

consideration in borrowing decisions, petitioners rely largely

on the majority opinion in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-

Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987). But the “uniformity”

with which the Court was concerned there was not uniformi-

ty in length of time, but uniformity in characterization of the

cause of action. Thus, in Malley-Duff, the Court was

impelled to use a federal limitations period for RICO because

RICO “encompass[es] numerous and diverse topics and

subtopics,” which, depending on the precise claim, might be

analogous to at least nine different state causes of action. /d.

21

at 149. In that situation, so much time and energy might be

spent litigating limitations questions, with the Court unable

to answer such questions for all RICO cases with a single

ruling, that the practicalities of litigation required the

adoption of a single federal period to govern all possible

actions under that statute. Jd. at 150. Accord, Wilson v.

Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985) (choosing a uniform

characterization under state law, but not a uniform amount of

time, for section 1983 claims). That argument does not

apply to WARN because it contains only one type of claim

— for damages for failure to provide sufficient notification.

Petitioners also cite Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind v.

Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), to support their argument

giving primacy to borrowing statutes that make the amount

of time in which to sue the same in every state. But the part

of the Lampf opinion containing such language, 501 U.S. at

357, drew the support of only a minority of the Court."

Lampf s holding is that, when a cause of action is inferred

from a federal statute that also contains an express cause of

action and an express limitations period, the courts must look

first to that statute and, indeed, the inquiry should normally

end there. Id. at 359. Because this is the part of Lampf that

was joined by a majority of the Court, because this analysis

would explain DelCostello as well (the DFR having been

inferred from the NLRA), and because under petitioners’

reading Lampf would sub silentio have overruled 165 years

of precedent making state statutes the primary source for

borrowing, Lampf should be read as limited to statutes, like

the securities laws and the NLRA, that create both inferred

and express causes of action.

In addition, petitioners’ “practicalities of litigation”

argument is replete with lamentations about the possibility

~ 4 Contrary to North Star’s brief, at 12, the dissenting opinions

of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy do not suggest that they agreed

with this part of the opinion. —

22

that, under a two or three year statute of limitations, evi-

dence may disappear, potential plaintiffs may be harder to

find to pay them their damages, parties may be harder to

serve, and the like. Again, even assuming that this is a

serious problem — and we explain below why it is not — it

affects most federal causes of action to which the De/Costello

presumption nevertheless applies. No doubt, all defendants

would like to have the benefit of a six-month limitations pe-

_ riod because it protects them sooner against allegations of un-

lawful conduct and reduces their record-keeping needs, but

invocation of this concern does not help distinguish between

those federal causes of action that ought to follow the normal

rule of borrowing from state law, and those which ought to

be brought within the exception.

Indeed, only two “practicalities” have been held by this

Court to warrant departure from the normal rule of bor-

rowing from state law — the prospect of lengthy wrangling

over the proper limitations periods for federal statutes that in-

clude a wide variety of causes of action (as in the case of

RICO), and the danger of interference with the administra-

tion of CBAs (as in the case of hybrid DFR actions).

Because petitioners do not, and cannot, contend that either

danger is present here, that is sufficient to warrant rejection

of their arguments for borrowing from federal law.

Finally, petitioners suggest that the Court should

borrow the six-month limitations period because some federal

labor statutes have express six-month periods. North Star

Br. 27-28; Crown Cork Br. 27-28. See also Chamber Br.

16. As we explain infra at 32-33, this argument is predicat-

ed on a highly selective and unrepresentative citation of

express limitations periods among federal employment

Statutes. But the biggest flaw in the argument is that it ig-

nores this Court’s admonition that the principle of borrowing

from state law remains the norm, “in-labor law as else-

where.” If petitioners desire a uniform six-month statute of

limitations for labor cases, they must ask Congress, not this

Court, to create one.

23

B. The NLRA Is Not Analogous to WARN.

1. Different Purposes. Petitioners contend that

WARN ’s purpose is comparable to that of the NLRA, thus

warranting the borrowing of the NLRA’s six-month limita-

tions period. In fact, the purposes of the two laws are quite

different. The purposes of the NLRA are well-described in

its preamble: to achieve long-term industrial peace, and

prevent disputes between labor and management from be-

coming so serious as to cause constant industrial warfare, by

encouraging workers to choose unions to represent them in

collective bargaining, and by requiring employers to bargain

in good faith with the workers’ chosen representative. 29

U.S.C. §§ 141(b), 151. The method chosen by Congress

was not to set minimum employment standards, Metropolitan

Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 753-756

(1985); indeed, the NLRB is forbidden to require the parties

to agree to any particular set of terms and conditions of

employment. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99

(1970). Instead, Congress’ strategy in the NLRA was to

encourage the practice of collective bargaining, id., and to

prevent all parties from acting in ways that are inconsistent

with such bargaining. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western

Add’n Cmnty. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).

WARN, by contrast, promulgates a substantive standard

of conduct for employers, and grants rights to all employees,

regardless of whether they join a union or engage in collec-

tive bargaining. Under the Act, before employees suffer an

employment loss from the closing of an entire plant, or the

layoff of a substantial number of workers at a plant, they are

entitled to notice of the proposed action. As explained in the

Labor Department’s implementing regulations, WARN

provides protection to workers, their families and

communities by requiring employers to provide

notification 60 calendar days in advance of plant

closing and mass layoffs.

24

20 C.F.R. § 639.1 (1993).

Because it is a minimum labor standard, rather than a pro-

collective bargaining statute, it makes no sense to borrow a

limitations period that was intended to govern claims relating

to the bargaining process and labor relations.

This Court has specifically invoked that difference in

recognizing the distinction between the purposes of plant

closing statutes and of the NLRA. In Fort Halifax Packing

Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987), the issue was whether the

NLRA preempted a Maine statute, comparable to WARN,

that required employers to give prior notice of plant closings.

The Court ruled that “the NLRA is concerned with ensuring

an equitable bargaining process, not with the substantive

terms that may emerge from such bargaining,” id. at 20, and

thus held that the NLRA, being directed at a different pur-

pose than the state law, did not preempt the Maine statute.

Moreover, as the court pointed out in Paperworkers

Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, 999 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.

1993), far from being solely a labor statute, as the NLRA is,

WARN protects communities as well as workers. As the

Act’s sponsors recognized, both communities and workers

pay a heavy price for the dislocation that follows a surprise

plant closing, as taxpayer expenses for unemployment

compensation and welfare mount, and workers lose their

ability to spend money at community businesses and to pay

their mortgages to community financial institutions. See 134

Cong. Rec. 15514 (Sen. Byrd), 16690-16691 (Sen. Warner).

That is why WARN requires employers to give notice to the

chief officer of the affected unit of local government, as well

as to the state’s dislocated worker agency, 29 U.S.C. §

2102(a)(2), and gives local governments a right to receive

$500 for each day that notice is withheld. 29 U.S.C. §

2104(a)(3). Indeed, the statutory provision under which

respondents sued here is the very one that entitles local

governments to sue, 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5). It is evident

that the cause of action for local governments bears no

25

resemblance to the NLRA, so that there would be no

justification for making them sue within six months. Nor is

it likely that Congress intended the same cause of action to

have one limitations period borrowed from federal law, and

another from state law, depending on whether the plaintiff

was a worker or a municipality. Cf DelCostello v. Team-

sters, 462 U.S. 151, 169 n.19 (1983) (refusing to use

analogies that would result in different limitations periods

against different defendants). For this reason as well, the

NLRA is not an analogous statute from which the statute of

limitations should be borrowed."®

Petitioner Crown, Cork also quotes from committee

reports to support its argument that WARN’s notification

requirement was intended to affect collective bargaining over

plant closings. Br. 17. This legislative history analysis is

highly distorted. As Crown, Cork acknowledges, a bargain-

ing requirement was included in an early bill, but was

deleted in order to secure passage. When the House Report

was written, the bill still required employers both to bargain

with unions over plant-closings and to provide unions with

detailed information about the reasons for the closing (which,

in turn, the union might have used to bargain for alternatives

'S In arguing that WARN and the NLRA have the same

purpose, petitioners invoke a reference in the NLRA’s preamble

to benefits that the community receives from the proscription of

certain managerial practices. E.g., North Star Br. at 19. We do

not doubt that every labor statute is intended by Congress to

benefit the community as a whole, but to compare purposes at that

level of generality is simply to trivialize this aspect of the test.

Similarly, North Star’s assertion, Br. at 22-23, that the purposes

of the statutes are similar in that both affect labor-management

relations, shows only that both are labor laws. This argument does

not serve to distinguish WARN from most federal labor laws (such

as those in Reed), and so is inconsistent with this Court’s insis-

tence that state law borrowing is the norm “in labor law as

elsewhere.”

26

to the closing). Crown, Cork’s blocked quotation, supposed-

ly about the purpose of “prenotification,” actually begins the

section of the House Report captioned “THE DUTY TO

CONSULT,” H.R. Rep. 285, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 32

(1987), which, as noted, was never enacted.

Similarly, the Senate Report quoted by Crown, Cork

supported a version of the bill from which the duty to consult

had been eliminated, but which still contained the duty to

provide information to the union. S. 538, Section 333, 100th

Cong., Ist Sess. (1987). But this section was also deleted

from the bill in order to secure passage, and the Act that

remained had neither of the provisions to which these reports

referred as encouraging bargaining.'®

In further support of its argument that WARN is analo-

gous to the NLRA, petitioners rely on the fact that some

WARN provisions make express reference to the NLRA.

But many of the provisions they cite simply confirm how

disparate the two laws are, because they show the lengths to

which Congress went to keep WARN from having any

impact on the collective bargaining process that the NLRA is

intended to foster. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2103(2) (WARN does

not cover economic action protected by NLRA); 29 U.S.C.

'© Petitioner North Star cites Senator Hatch’s assertion that

WARN was, in effect, an amendment to the NLRA, to show that

WARN is analogous to the NLRA. Br. at 21, citing 134 Cong.

Rec. 15923, 15924 (1988). North Star neglects to mention that

Senator Hatch voted against WARN, see 134 Cong. Rec. 16691

(1988), and that the speech that North Star quotes was given in

support of the unsuccessful Kassebaum amendment, which would

have eliminated its application to layoffs. 134 Cong. Rec. 16020-

16021. The theme that WARN amended the NLRA was a constant

one in Senator Hatch’s arguments against the bill, see 134 Cong.

Rec. 15763, 15764 (1988), but he failed to persuade a majority of

the Senate of this point. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construc-

tion that statements by a bill’s opponents are accorded little weight.

Shell Oil Co. v. lowa Dep’t of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 29 (1988).

27

§ 2108 (giving notice under WARN cannot violate NLRA).

Other provisions simply incorporate into WARN the defini-

tions used by the NLRA for basic terms. E.g., 29 U.S.C.

§ 2101(a)(4).

Moreover, as amicus Chamber of Commerce concedes,

Br. 9-10 n.8, many labor statutes, including the LMRDA and

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, incorporate

NLRA definitions and are to some extent interpreted in pari

materia with it. E.g., Machinists Lodge 702 v. Loudermilk,

444 F.2d 719, 722 (Sth Cir. 1971) (invoking NLRB prece-

dents to decide whether LMRDA lets union impose fines for

dual unionism). And yet in Reed, the Court applied the nor-

mal rule of borrowing from state law to the LMRDA,

expressly rejecting borrowing from the NLRA. Thus, the

fact that some WARN provisions refer to the NLRA does not

support the conclusion that the NLRA is clearly more

analogous to WARN than any state cause of action.

2. Different Procedures. In Malley-Duff, the Court

relied in part on the strong similarity between the enforce-

ment procedures of RICO and the Clayton Act in ruling that

the two were closely analogous. WARN, of course, must be

enforced by a private lawsuit in district court, unlike the

NLRA where a private party need only file a charge form,

in very general language, asking the NLRB’s General

Counsel to pursue an administrative complaint on his behalf.

Although this difference was not enough to preclude borrow-

ing section 10(b) in DelCostello, where ‘he other reasons for

borrowing federal law were so compelling, this difference in

procedures surely militates against the conclusion that the

two claims are so analogous that Congress must have

intended that the Court depart from the normal rule of

borrowing state law.

3. Different Causes of Action. Petitioners argue that

WARN is analogous to section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, which

requires employers to bargain in good faith with the union

representing its employees. Although WARN does not

28

include any duty to bargain, petitioners seize on the fact that

one item about which employers must sometimes bargain is

the effects of a plant closure (or, depending on the text of the

collective bargaining agreement, over the closure decision

itself). First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452

U.S. 666, 681 (1981); Milwaukee Spring, 268 NLRB 601

(1984), enf’d sub nom. UAW Local 547 v. NLRB, 765 F.2d

175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). This duty, in turn, requires the

employer to inform the union of its plans in sufficient time

to permit meaningful bargaining. Gar Wood-Detroit Truck

Equipment, 274 NLRB 113 (1985).

What this argument ignores — apart from the major dif-

ferences between the NLRA duty and WARN’s requirements

— is that such a duty exists only when the workers are

represented by a union and the duty has not been waived by

the union. The reason for this limitation is that the duty to

bargain is owed only to a union, and not to ind vidual

employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). But only 11.5% of all

private sector employees are union members. Bureau of

National Affairs, Proportion of Union Membership Hits

15.8% [including public employees], 142 Labor Relations

Reporter 180, 181 (February 15, 1993). Thus, if the NLRA

is analogous to WARN for limitations purposes, just because

a small fraction of all possible WARN employee-plaintiffs

(not including respondents here) enjoy limited protection

under the NLRA, then the tail would indeed be wagging the

dog.

Petitioners attempt to rebut this point by asserting that

the NLRA protects both represented and unrepresented

employees. Crown, Cork Br. 19-21; North Star Br. 24-25.

In fact, however, the vast bulk of the NLRA is concerned

solely with the certification of union representatives for

bargaining units and the supervision of the process of

collective bargaining. In practical terms, only one aspect of

the NLRA applies to union and non-union employees alike —

the section 7 right to engage in “concerted activities . . . for

mutual aid and protection,” retaliation for which is a ULP

29

under section 8(a)(1). For this reason, it is not surprising

that every one of the cases cited by petitioners for the

proposition that the NLRA applies whether or not there is a

union involves this particular ULP.

Significantly, petitioners do not contend that WARN

bears any resemblance to section 8(a)(1)’s protection of

concerted action, the only ULP that they cite as applying to

union and non-union employees alike. Rather, they draw an

analogy only with section 8(a)(5)’s duty to bargain with the

union. Petitioners do not pretend that this ULP applies to

nonunion employees, and we know of no precedent that so

holds. Accordingly, our argument that the section 8(a)(5)

ULP not only fails to resemble the WARN cause of action,

but also applies to only a small fraction of all WARN plain-

tiffs, stands unrefuted.

The argument that this one limited parallel with the

NLRA suffices to make the two statutes “closely analogous”

for borrowing purposes is completely inconsistent with this

Court’s precedents. For example, in Reed, the Court

acknowledged that one small class of suits under Title I of

the LMRDA might directly implicate challenges to collective

bargaining agreements, and thus closely resemble DFR

actions; but that was not sufficient reason to extend the

application of section 10(b) to actions under the LMRDA

generally. 488 U.S. at 331-332 n.6. Similarly, when this

Court decided Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), and

Goodman vy. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987), one

small fraction of the claims that could be brought under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, and a larger fragment of claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1981, could be brought under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964. Yet that was no reason for this Court

to borrow Title VII’s 180-day limitations period to govern

claims under these civil rights statutes. So, too, the fact that

some WARN plaintiffs may have NLRA protection should

not affect the selection of the limitations period.

There is another respect in which North Star’s NLRA

analogy is inconsistent with precedent: this Court has held

30

that a mere “family resemblance” between a federal statutory

claim and some aspect of the NLRA is insufficient to warrant

adoption of section 10(b). Rather, there is sufficient similari-

ty between the NLRA and the federal claim only when the

claim directly challenges the private resolution of a dispute

between a union and an employer, and thus implicates the

long-term bargaining relationship between the two. Reed v.

UTU, 488 U.S. 319, 331 and n.6 (1989); Doty v. Sewall,

784 F.2d 1, 9, 10 (1st Cir. 1986).

As we more fully discuss below, that is surely not the

case here. Not only does WARN apply regardless of

whether there is a union involved, and regardless of whether

the union and employer have tried to resolve any dispute

about the plant closing, but any rights that even union

members may enjoy under the NLRA are in addition to their

WARN rights, as WARN expressly provides. 29 U.S.C. §

2105. Consequently, even if a union and employer reach an

agreement about the closing, and employees nevertheless

mount an attack on the employer’s compliance with WARN,

they are enforcing independent rights, not attacking the

dispute resolution itself. Cf Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best

Freight Lines, 450 U.S. 728 (1981).

4. Different Relief. Not only the purposes, proce-

dures, and cause of action, but also the relief available under

the NLRA, is very different from WARN. If the NLRA is

violated in connection with a plant closing or layoff, the

NLRB may issue an order requiring the company to bargain

with the union. Stevens Pontiac-GMC, 295 NLRB 599, 603

(1989). Employees who have been laid off may be entitled

to reinstatement to their positions. North Carolina Coastal

Motor Lines, 219 NLRB 1009, 1009-1010, 1015 (1975),

enf’d, 542 F.2d 637, 638 (4th Cir. 1976). The NLRB may

require the employer to offer the affected workers positions

at other plants, Royal Norton Mfg. Co., 189 NLRB 489,

489, 495 (1971), or even, in some cases, to reopen an opera-

tion pending the completion of the required bargaining with

the union. Florida-Texas Freight. Corp., 203 NLRB 509,

31

511 (1973), enf’d mem., 489 F.2d 1275 (6th Cir. 1974). In

theory, preliminary relief may be granted under section 10(),

ordering an employer not to close the plant in the first place.

The employees are also awarded back pay, but not from the

date of the closing; rather, a formula has been developed that

is intended to encourage an employer to bargain in good faith

once the Board has ruled, although interim earnings and

various other sums may be deducted. Transmarine Navig.

Corp., 170 NLRB 389 (1968).

WARN relief is quite different. First, WARN express-

ly forbids injunctions against a plant closing or layoff, 29

U.S.C. § 2104(b), a bar which, a fortiori, prevents an order

that a plant be reopened. There is no role for collective

bargaining of WARN rights, and so that relief, as well as

reinstatement to employment, is unavailable. The only relief

for employees is an award of damages, which are calculated

very differently than under the NLRA. Thus, although the

employees’ wages and benefits provide the measure of the

damages for each day on which required notice was not

given, 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1), there are no offsets for

unemployment compensation, wages from other employers,

or payments otherwise owing to employees at the time of

shutdown. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(2); H.R. Conf. Rep. No.

100-576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1053 (1988). The NLRB

has unanimously distinguished WARN payments from the

backpay obligations that an employer may owe under its

Transmarine doctrine, precisely because the two kinds of

payments have such different purposes under the statute.

Times Herald Printing Co. , 315 NLRB No. 100, 147 LRRM

1281, 1283-1284 (1994). There is also authority that

employees need not show on which days during the period of

withheld notice they would in fact have worked, as the

NLRA would require. USWA v. North Star Steel Co., 5

F.3d 39 (3d Cir. 1993). Contra, Carpenters Dist. Council

v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 15 F.3d 1275, 1286 (Sth Cir. 1994).

32

C. The Six-Month Limitations Period Is Not

Needed to Protect Federal Labor Policies,

and Its Adoption Could Easily Frustrate

WARN’s Own Policies.

Petitioners’ argument also fails because they cannot

show that “the federal policies at stake and the practicalities

of litigation make [section 10(b)] a significantly more

appropriate vehicle.” De/Costello, supra, 462 U.S. at

171-172 (emphasis added).

1. Section 10(b) Is Not Needed to Effec-

tuate Federai Policies.

Petitioners invoke two federal policies which, they say,

are imperiled unless a federal limitations period is borrowed.

The first is the interest in avoiding the forum-shopping and

needless litigation which, they assert, would necessarily

result from borrowing state limitations periods. However, as

Part II(A) of this brief explains, this argument, if accepted,

would always forbid the borrowing of state limitations

periods. Rather than distinguishing WARN from most other

federal statutes, it emphasizes what most federal laws have

in common — they apply to defendants that operate in many

different states, each of which has its own limitations

periods. The argument thus amounts to a request that the

presumption in favor of state borrowing be overruled. See

infra 43 to 46.

Petitioners also argue that borrowing state limitations

periods would harm a supposed federal policy favoring

prompt resolution of employment-related disputes. To the

extent that this supposed policy applies to all federal labor

statutes, it cannot support borrowing from federal law

because it proves too much — it always requires borrowing

section 10(b). See pages 19 to 22, supra.

But petitioners also err in asserting that Congress has

generally imposed extremely short limitations periods in

wT -

ee eee ne te ee

33

labor cases. In this regard, their citation of the limitations

periods for employment discrimination and federal employee

claims scarcely exhausts the express limitations periods that

Congress has enacted to govern claims by employees against

their employers. Indeed, other federal employment statutes

have substantially longer express limitations periods. For

example, the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 255,

provides a two-year limitations period for seeking unpaid

wages under the Fair Labor Standards, Walsh-Healey, or

Davis-Bacon Acts (or three years for willful violations).

Similarly, the Railway Labor Act allows two years for suits

to vacate NRAB awards, section 3, First (r), 45 U.S.C. §

153, First (r), and six years are allowed to sue fiduciaries

under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29

U.S.C. § 1113. Moreover, railroad and maritime workers

are given three years to sue their employers over on-the-job

injuries, 45 U.S.C. § 56; 46 U.S.C. § 688.

The one thing that all federal six-month limitations

periods have in common is that they define the time in which

an employee must file a charge with an agency, which the

agency then investigates on the employee’s behalf. The

longer statutes set forth the time in which an employee must

find a lawyer, do the necessary investigation to satisfy Rule

11, and file suit in court.’’

Nor, indeed, do this Court’s precedents support the

proposition that six-month limitations periods are generally

desirable for cases involving the rights of employees, or even

generally for cases that may have an effect on the collective

bargaining process. After all, it was not mere interference

with collective bargaining in some general sense that motivat-

'’ Similarly, almost every one of the short state limitations

periods for employment discrimination claims cited in Crown,

Cork’s brief at 28 n.13, sets the time for filing a charge with a

State agency, not for filing suit.

34

ed the Court in De/Costello, but rather the overturning of

union-employer dispute resolutions:

the grievance and arbitration procedure often

processes disputes involving interpretation of

critical terms in the collective-bargaining agree-

ment affecting the entire relationship between

company and union... This system, with its

heavy emphasis on grievance, arbitration, and the

“law of the shop,” could easily become unwork-

able if a decision which has given “meaning and

content” to the terms of an agreement, and even

affected subsequent modifications of the agree-

ment, could suddenly be called into question as

much as [three] years later.

462 U.S. at 169, quoting UPS v. Mitchell, 451

U.S. 56, 63-64 (1981).

But, as shown in the previous section of this brief, WARN

claims do not attack arbitral awards nor otherwise challenge

union-employer agreements, and hence this rationale is

inapplicable.

Petitioners also assert that WARN itself expresses a

policy in favor of rapid enforcement, primarily in a provision

that exempts employers from paying the $500 per day

penalty to local government units if they make their WARN

payments within three weeks of a plant closing. We certain-

ly agree that it is better if employers meet their obligations

promptly after failing to give notice, and we assume both

that Congress wanted employers to do so and that, in most

cases, employees will promptly sue as soon as it is clear that

a WARN violation occurred.

But the statute of limitations does not determine the

time within which employers will give notice of a plant

closing; it only determines, once an employer has failed to

meet its obligations in a timely manner, the amount of time

its employees have to sue for redress. Once an employer has

35

failed to honor its obligations under WARN, there is nothing

in the statute or in the underlying policies that favors the

speedy resolution of disputes that is at all comparable to the

need for industrial peace on which DelCostello relied.

Indeed, an unduly short limitations period would make it far

more difficult for employees, especially unrepresented

employees who do not have a union with experienced officers

and counsel looking out for their interests, to secure en-

forcement of the duties that WARN imposes on employers.

The ultimate result will be less compliance with WARN, not

more timely compliance.

Finally, petitioners contend that, because WARN may

involve companies that are going out of business, there is a

particular danger that records and witnesses may disappear

if suit has not been brought within six months. However,

the evidence that will be needed to defend a case will largely

be records that are in the company’s possession already, and

it is not every company that closes a plant or lays off many

employees that must keep records for WARN purposes —

only those that fail to give notice at least sixty days before-

hand must do so. Moreover, companies must still maintain

their financial records at least for the limitations period of

the tax laws and, probably, the securities laws, inasmuch as

a company in financial difficulty causing plant closures may

have exposure to suits under Rule 10b-5. And, as North Star

concedes, federal wage and equal employment laws require

employers to keep detailed payroll records for at least three

years. Br. 32 n.15.

What is more, even if the NLRA’s six-month limita-

tions period were borrowed to govern claims by employees,

it is inconceivable that the same period would be held most

analogous to claims brought by local governments to collect

the statutory $500 per day civil penalty. The claim may well

be governed by the express five-year limitations period for

civil penalties under 28 U.S.C. § 2462; it is also closely

analogous to Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period for

actions under a civil penalty statute. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.

36

§ 5524(5). In either case, employers would have to retain

their relevant records for well over six months, and thus pe-

titioners’ final argument fails to justify a six-month limita-

tions period for WARN actions by employees.

2. Adoption of Section 10(b) Would

Make It Difficult to Enforce WARN.

Far from being needed to effectuate federal policy, the

use of section 10(b) would harm the policies underlying

WARN, because a six-month limitations period is too short

to permit many WARN claims to be brought. There are two

reasons for such concern.

First, workers, unions and communities that consider

bringing a WARN action must confront a number of issues.

See generally McHugh, Fair Warning or Foul? An Analysis

of the [WARN] Act in Practice, 14 Berkeley J. Emp. &

Labor Law 1 (1993). If an entire plant has been permanently

closed, their task is relativeiy simple: they must only

ascertain the original number of employees, 29 U.S.C. §§

2101(a)(1) and (2), with due regard for the number of hours

worked by part-time employees, § 2101(a)(8). But if the

plant continues in operation, potential plaintiffs also must

assess the number and percentage of employees laid off over

any thirty or ninety day period, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101(a)(3),

2102(d), taking into account the number of employees who

have been offered transfers to other locations. 29 U.S.C. §

2101(b). Even assuming that a union could use its rights

under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA to obtain such information

soon enough to decide within six months whether a suit is

warranted, unrepresented employees are unlikely to have any

access to it. Moreover, WARN affords a variety of defenses

related to considerations of reasonable business and legal

- judgment, as well as, in the case of partial closures, the

employer's foresight about the likelihood of future layoffs at

the time an initial layoff is imposed, as well as concerning

37

the likely duration of the initial layoff. E.g., 29 U.S.C. §§

2102(b), 2103(1).

Second, if the employer does not announce at the outset

that the layoff or closing is permanent, prospective plaintiffs

must make the judgment whether the layoff is likely to last

more than six months. Moreover, workers who are hopeful

that, if the plant does reopen, they will be among the group

selected to go back to work, may be leery of suing their

employer until they are sure that their jobs have, in fact,

been eliminated. In this case, for example, North Star

initially took the position that its layoff was indefinite, and

hopefully temporary, and it steadfastly refused to clarify the

matter despite repeated inquiries from respondent Thomas.

Employees put in this position should not be required to be

mind-readers in deciding whether to rush into court before

the expiration of six months after the layoff began. The

borrowing of section i10(b) would require the employees and

their counsel to obtain the necessary information, make such

calculations, and file a complaint in compliance with Rule |!

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within a mere six

months.

Petitioners make light of this issue, North Star Br. 29,

arguing that a number of plaintiffs have been able to sue

within six months, and that the only questions are whether

there was a lay-off, when notice was given, and how many

employees were involved. But there are also a large number

of cases in which plaintiffs have not sued that soon, because,

as we showed above, there are a number of questions that

may not be as easy for individual employees to answer as it

presumably is for sophisticated labor counsel retained by

larger employers. Even petitioners’ own briefs make clear

that far more may be involved. For example, they are at

pains to show that WARN courts have adopted NLRB stan-

dards, applied in election eligibility cases, for deciding

whether particular employees have a reasonable expectation

of recall and therefore are on only temporary layoff. North

Star Br. 21, citing Damron v. Rob Fork Mining Corp. , 945

38

F.2d 121, 124 (6th Cir. 1991). As this case makes clear,

that determination turns on a variety of criteria that them-

selves depend on data to which individual employees are not

likely to have access. There is a real danger that adoption of

a-six-month limitations period within which workers would

have to ascertain such information, find counsel, and file suit

could cripple enforcement of WARN, which provides yet

another reason why the judgment below should be affirmed.

* * x

In DelCostello, the Court was troubled that a limitations

period of a few months might be too short a time to bring

suit. However, impelled to choose between time periods

even shorter than six months that would endanger the

enforceability of the DFR, or lengthy periods that might

seriously threaten federal labor policies favoring the finality

of grievance settlements, it opted for section 10(b) because

the analogy between the NLRA and the DFR was so close.

462 U.S. at 169. Here, by contrast, as we showed supra at

23 to 31, the analogy to the NLRA is tenuous at best, and as

we showed supra at 32 to 36, federal labor policies will not

be endangered by a limitations period measured in years

rather than months, but adoption of a six-month period would

endanger WARN’s own policies. Supra 36 to 38. Accord-

ingly, the “exceptional” case for borrowing federal rather

than state law simply has not been made. Indeed, even if

there were no strong presumption, the analogies and equities

still favor borrowing from state law.

Iii. THIS ACTION WOULD BE TIMELY BASED

ON ANY OF THE ANALOGOUS STATE OR

FEDERAL LIMITATIONS PERIODS.

If the Court chooses to decide in this case what the

proper state limitations period for WARN actions, despite the

fact that petitioners deliberately did not present that question,

just as they avoided that question below, the best choice

among state limitations periods is the one chosen by a

39

number of federal courts for WARN — state law statutes

governing actions on contract." In Pennsylvania, this

would allow four years if the contract is deemed either

implied in law or based on an agreement not in writing. See

42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5525(3) or (4).

The reason for borrowing a contract limitations period

is not that WARN arises from an actual agreement between

the parties; petitioners are clearly correct that the duty is

imposed by statute. Nevertheless, employees and employers

have a contractual relationship, whether under a CBA

governed by federal law or by the state’s common law, and

WARN imposes a additional duty on the parties’ contractual

relationship. Cf. McDonald v. Thompson, 184 U.S. 71, 74

(1902) (liability imposed on contractual relationship by

federal law should be characterized as either implied contract

or obligation imposed by statute).

Courts have sometimes borrowed contractual limitations

periods to govern other federal statutes that govern a contrac-

tual relationship. E.g., Dantagnan v. ILA Local 1418, 496

F.2d 400 (Sth Cir. 1974). Moreover, the statutory remedy

limits the employees to damages measured by the contractual

wage rate, and excludes the sort of damages that are com-

monly available in tort, such as emotional or punitive

damages.

Another possible choice is the three years allowed by

43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 260.9a(g) for suing under the Penns} lva-

nia Wage Payment and Collection Law (“WPCL”). Because

employees’ wage rates provide the measure of damages for

claims under WARN, the WPCL provides a sound analogy

to the WARN cause of action. The Third Circuit has

previously adopted that limitations period for the enforcement

'* Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, 999 F.2d

51, 57 (2d Cir. 1993); Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 821 F. Supp.

651, 655 (D. Colo. 1993); Wallace v. Detroit Coke Corp., 818 F.

Supp. 192, 196-197 (E.D. Mich. 1993).

40

of claims for unpaid pension contributions under a CBA.

Connors v. Consolidation Coal Co. , 866 F.2d 599, 603-604

(1989).

A third alternative is the six-year period aliowed by the

Pennsylvania residual statute of limitations, which applies “to

any civil action or proceeding which is [not] subject to anoth-

er limitation specified in this subchapter.” 42 Pa. Cons.

Stat. Ann. § 5527. Crown, Cork argues that Agency Holding

Corp. bars the borrowing of such a limitations period, but

given Congress’ subsequent enactment of a four-year residual

limitations period for federal statutes, it is hard to understand

why there should be any presumption that Congress disfavors

residual state limitations periods. Moreover, this Court has

borrowed such statutes in other cases, Corsicana Nat’l Bank

v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 85-86 (1919), including, most

recently, in Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). And the

lower courts have continued to borrow residual limitations

periods when other state analogies have been inappropriate.

E.g., Teumer v. General Motors Corp., 34 F.3d 542, 548

(7th Cir. 1994); SEIU v. City Cleaning Co. , 982 F.2d 89, 95

(3d Cir. 1992) (“it encompasses any cause of action — either

federal or state — for which a limitation has not been

expressly created by the legislature or by Congress”). Thus,

if no other state limitations period will do, the Court should

borrow section 5527.

A final possible state analogy is with Pennsylvania’s

two-year limitations period for enforcing civil penalties. 42

Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(5). WARN damages operate,

at least in part, as a civil penalty. This is especially true for

communities, which are entitled to $500 per day regardless

of the amount of wages involved; indeed, the most analogous

limitations period for this cause of action is either the state

or the federal limitations period for civil penalties. But the

employees’ cause of action also has an aspect of both

deterrence and punishment of employers who fail to provide

60 days’ notice of a shut-down. Thus, although WARN

damages have a compensatory aspect, they are not entirely

41

compensatory, because Congress made a considered decision

not to impose any duty to mitigate on employees, or to

reduce their recovery according to whether and to what

extent they sustained “actual damages” because they might

not have worked on some of the sixty days in question, or

because they actually found employment for part of the sixty

days. Instead, the only way for employers to limit their

exposure to WARN damages is through a demonstration of

good faith, either in the commission of the violation itself, or

the provision of unconditional and voluntary benefits to

employees denied notice. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2104(a)(2) and (4).

These factors are related more to deterrence than to compen-

sation of employees for actual harm.

The fact that none of these possible limitations periods

may provide a perfect analogy is not surprising, because

states rarely enact their limitations periods with federal

statutes in mind. As the Third Circuit said in explaining its

decision to borrow the six-year residuai limitations period in

section 5527(6) to govern retaliation claims under section 510

of ERISA,

the DelCostello Court emphasized that “federal

courts should [not] eschew use of state limitations

periods anytime state law fails to provide a per-

fect analogy.” 462 U.S. at 171 (emphasis add-

ed). The Court recognized that “there is not

always an obvious state-law choice for application

to a given federal cause of action.” Jd. Nev-

ertheless, the Court concluded that “resort to state

law remains the norm for borrowing of limitations

periods.” Jd. Thus, only if “a rule from else-

where in federal law clearly provides a closer

anabgy,” id. at 172 (emphasis added), may we

“tum away from state law.” Jd.

42

Gavalik v. Continental Can Co. , 812 F.2d 834, 847 (3d

Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original; parallel citations

deleted).

However, if the Court finds that none of the available

State law analogies is adequate, there remain federal limita-

tions periods that are far more appropriate for borrowing

than section 10(b). The best alternative is section 6 of the

Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 255, that allows two

years to seek unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards,

Walsh-Healey, and Davis-Bacon Acts.

Like the WARN Act, the statutes governed by section

255 provide minimum labor standards, rather than being

directed to the encouragement of collective bargaining. Like

WARN, the FLSA and other statutes provide almost exclu-

sively for monetary relief (the FLSA does prohibit retaliation

against employees who enforce their FLSA rights, but that

aspect of the statute is clearly ancillary to the main subject of

the law). Like WARN, the overtime provisions of the FLSA

impose monetary obligations measured by whatever wage

rates are agreed between the employer and its employees

(i.e., 150% of the wage rate for the first 40 hours worked in

each week), even though the statute requires payments that

are excused by the contractual relationship itself. Like

WARN, section 255 provides reduced financial exposure —

a two-year limitations period, rather than three years — for

employers whose mental state is less culpable. See

McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co. , 486 U.S. 128 (1986). As

in Agency Holding Corp., where similarities in the remedial

structure of RICO and the antitrust laws provided a reason to

borrow the Clayton Act’s limitation period to govern RICO,

these remedial similarities support borrowing section 6 to

govern WARN, if any federal limitations period is borrowed.

Perhaps most important, section 6, like WARN, was

designed as an appropriate time for employees to find a

lawyer and file a complaint in federal court, not just to file

a simple charge form with a federal agency whose employees

APTOS Vi i Tate I OS

43

are charged with helping employees and investigating their

charges for them. Although this Court found it appropriate

in DelCostello to borrow section 10(b) where there was no

other federal law alternative, and where its six-month period

actually represented a longer time than the existing state law

analogue, that does not make section 10(b) the best choice

when other state and federal limitations periods are available.

IV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT REVERSE 165

YEARS OF PRECEDENT BY CREATING A

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF BORROW-

ING FEDERAL LAW.

Presumably because it recognizes that the case cannot

be made for borrowing section 10(b) under prevailing

standards, petitioner North Star asks the Court to overturn

those precedents. It asserts that Congress has expressed its

desire to abandon state law borrowing, and that such borrow-

ing both foments litigation over possible state limitations

periods, and creates uncertainty among potential litigants who

may be sued in different forums. However, “[t]ime and

again this Court has recognized that ‘the doctrine of stare

decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law,’”

Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm., 502 U.S. 197,

202 (1991), which has “special force in the area of statutory

interpretation,” id., Neither of petitioner's arguments

provides the “compelling justification” that is needed to

reverse such longstanding precedent. Jd.

We acknowledge that a presumption in favor of

borrowing from federal law does have the advantage of

creating uniform limitations periods for suits filed in every

state under any given federal statute. On the other hand,

because many federal claims have state law analogues, a

given litigant may have parallel claims under both state and

federal law, and it is desirable for both sets of claims to

expire at the same time. Under North Star’s proposal, that

result would not occur, thereby causing a problem of

44

increased significance given Congress recent enactment of the

supplemental jurisdiction provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Even if North Star’s arguments might have force if the Court

were writing on a Clean slate, that is not the situation.

Thus, when WARN was enacted in 1988, the Court had

held for almost 160 years that borrowing from state law is

the rule, and choosing a federal limitations period the very

narrow exception. The Court had also said, as recently as

1987, that it was fair to assume that Congress intended by its

silence to have the Court borrow from state law. Agency

Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff Assoc., 483 U.S. at 147.

Against this background, it is fair to assume that Congress

intended the limitation period for WARN to be developed

according to the same standard.

Nor is there any merit in North Star’s argument that

Congress’ intent in enacting a four-year residual limitations

period for statutes taking effect after 1990, 28 U.S.C. §

1658, frees the Court to rewrite 165 years of precedent and

apply a six-month limitations period to WARN. North Star

relies on an analysis that was placed in the Congressional

Record by Senator Grassley, 136 Cong. Rec. 17581 (1990),

which explained that, under existing doctrine, “federal courts

‘borrow’ the most analogous state law limitations period”;

according to the analysis, this rule has the disadvantage of

obligating courts to determine the applicable period, produc-

ing disagreements among the federal courts, and leaving

litigants uncertain until consensus is reached. This excerpt

not only shows Congress’ belief that it was state law periods

that were being borrowed, but Congress’ failure to alter this

approval shows that it recognized and was willing to accept

the fact that it is state law that is being borrowed. It is the

very need to borrow that Congress wanted to fix, and then

only for newly created causes of action.

In this regard, there is a great irony in North Star’s

proposal that the Court rewrite precedent based on the intent

underlying 28 U.S.C. § 1658. Normally, courts consider

legislative history in trying to construe the statute that was

45

being discussed, although there is controversy within the

Court about the extent to which such materials should be

considered. But North Star has no interest in having section

1658’s four-year limitations period applied to WARN.

Even more important, North Star ignores the reason

why Congress decided not to apply the law that was the

product of this analysis to existing statutes. According to the

House Report No. 101-734, the limitations periods for many

statutes had already been resolved by the Courts, and

imposing a new limitations period for all these laws “would

threaten to disrupt the settled expectations of a great many

parties.” 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6870. If

this Court overturned the many years of precedent on which

lower courts and parties have relied in reaching the general

consensus that prevails with respect to the limitations periods

for most federal statutes, the result would be to produce the

very disruption that Congress sought to avoid.

To be sure, there are some federal causes of action —

WARN among them — on which this Court has not pro-

nounced judgment and for which no consensus has yet

emerged among the lower courts. But the minor benefits that

would allegedly be produced in reducing the amount of

limitations litigation under those statutes by the adoption of

a federal borrowing presumption is far outweighed by the

strife that would be caused under the great majority of pre-

1991 laws whose limitations periods are now generally

accepted.

Indeed, if section 1658 is relevant at all, it shows that

the speedy resolution of controversies on which petitioners

seek to rely was obviously much less significant than they

have suggested, and that Congress is not disturbed by the

application of a limitations period four years in length. 28

U.S.C. § 1658. Although this statute applies only to laws

enacted without an express statute of limitations after

December 1, 1990, it has been argued that this four-year

period may be borrowed by analogy. Siegel, Practice Com-

mentary, United States Code Annotated, Title 28, Judiciary

46

and Judicial Procedure, §§ 1653 to 1960 at 243 (1994).

Indeed, if petitioner North Star is serious in urging the

enactment of section 1658 as a reason to apply federal law,

then it surely makes sense to adopt the four-year limitations

period adopted by Congress in section 1658 in choosing

among federal law alternatives.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be af-

firmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Paul Alan Levy

(Counsel of Record)

Alan B. Morrison

Public Citizen Litigation Group

Suite 700

2000 P Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 833-3000

Attorneys for Respondents

March 27, 1995

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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