Reply Brief — American Bankers Ass'n v. Kelley

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No. 94-752 DEC 7 194

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IN THE eee

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1994

AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION

AMERICAN COLLEGE OF REAL ESTATE LAWYERS,

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE,

COMMERCIAL FINANCE ASSOCIATION,

EQUIPMENT LEASING ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,

Petitioners,

v.

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL

OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals

For the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

JOHN J. GILL III EDWIN E. HUDDLESON, III*

THOMAS J. GRECO VOLPE, BOSKEY AND LYONS

MICHAEL F. CROTTY 918 16th Street, N.W.

AMERICAN BANKERS Washington, D.C. 20006

ASSOCIATION (202) 737-6580

1120 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 663-5026

Counsel for Petitioner Counsel for Petitioner

American Bankers Association Equipment Leasing Association

*Counsel of Record

{additional counsel listed on inside front cover]

ROGER D. SCHWENKE

CARLTON, FIELDS, WARD,

EMMANUEL, SMITH &

CUTLER

One Harbour Place

P.O. Box 3239

Tampa, Florida 33601

(813) 223-7000

Counsel for Petitioner

American College of Real

Estate Lawyers

MARGARET V. HATHAWAY

LAW OFFICES OF

MARGARET V. HATHAWAY

5322 Forty-first Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20015

(202) 244-8160

Counsel for Petitioner

American Council of Life

Insurance

PHILLIP E. STANO

ROBERT S. MCCONNAUGHEY

DAVID LEIFER

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE

INSURANCE

1001 Pennylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 624-2183

Counsel for Petitioner

American Council of Life

Insurance

DAVID T. BUENTE, JR.

CARTER G. PHILLIPS

SIDLEY & AUSTIN

1722 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 736-8111

Counsel for Petitioner

Commercial Finance

Association

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Denice Net te,

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Adams Fruit v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990)

American Hospital Association v. NLRB,

ee rs Lk kw da wee Os

Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

ee a ee COED kk ee ks eee a

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979)

Citizens to Save Spenser County v. EPA,

600 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1979) .........

Dico v. Diamond, 35 F.3d 348 (8th Cir. 1994)

Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F.2d 1299

we er re

Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.,

ae Se DP RUTOE ne ek KS kee ee ten

Touche Ross & Co v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570

NE i Se es

United States v. Fleet Factors, 821 F. Supp. 707

I Ee ab 6 bw sw ak eas

United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co..,

eR re

ii

Page

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v. NRDC,

ee es OE ea ean heehee eae 6

Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918

(D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1584

ka bed ewes be PER Ue ak Re ge es 8

STATUTES:

Oe Sen BED oak er eset ue bbnees 6

ie Shs EE Sa bo ee eRe RR eee 8

Oe Sa SO. 6 8 oe he Sais Ce eee ee 5

Ce Ain OEOEE b 0 8 vos KK SO ee ORAM 2, 8

Ce oe ll Ere Terr ee ee Pr 6

Ce Sc EE Oi ee ON ee owes os he ee 8

ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIAL:

37 Fed. Reg. 16,344 (April 29, 1992)... 0. ese 4

LEGISLATIVE MATERIAL:

126 Cong. Rec. 30,932 (1980) ... : a's Wek ae ees 7

H.R. Rep. 253(1), 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) ..... 7

ili

Page

MISCELLANEOUS:

1 Davis & Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise

chapter 3 (3d ed. 1994) ........-..2---. 4,7,9

Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation,

99 Hlarv.L.Rev. 1456 (1I9GG) ww eet ce cece 7

Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit,

and the Supreme Court, 1978 Supreme Court

EP re Se ar ren hare ee a 8

R. Stern, et al., Supreme Court Practice (7th ed.

Sa ne ae r er ear a eka tr ar ewe a a 2

Superfund Reform Unlikely Until 1998, EPA Official

Says, BNA Daily Tax Report (November 21, 1994) . 3

Supreme Court Rule 10.1(c) .... 2... eee eee eee 2

The Use of Legislative History: A Debate Between

Justice Scalia and Judge Breyer, 16 Admin.L.News

FE: Seen rae er ee ar et 8

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1994

No. 94-752

AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION,

AAMERICAN COLLEGE OF REAL ESTATE LAWYERS,

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE,

COMMERCIAL FINANCE ASSOCIATION,

EQUIPMENT LEASING ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,

Petitioners,

Vv.

FRANK J. KELLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL

OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, ET AL.,

Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

The oppositions to certiorari by the Chemical

Manufacturers Association (CMA) and the State of Michigan

(Michigan) warrant a brief response. We note that the

Solicitor General vigorously supports the EPA Rule and does

not oppose certiorari.

1. The validity of EPA’s “Lender Liability Rule” is

a matter of national public importance that should be

reviewed by this Court. There will never be a “square”

conflict in the circuits, since only the D.C. Circuit can

2

review EPA’s CERCLA rules. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a).

Yet settled principles support this Court’s review of the

decision below, because of the vital importance of the EPA

Rule for commercial lending and borrowing. See, e.g., R.

Stern, et al., Supreme Court Practice § 4.13, pp.187-188

(7th ed. 1993) (importance of federal statutory and

regulatory issues, with or without conflict among lower

courts, frequently warrants review by this Court); Supreme

Court Rule 10.1(c).

The court of appeals’ decision, if left standing, will

cripple commercial lending for years. As both the court of

appeals and the Solicitor General recognized, this makes the

EPA Rule a matter of national public importance. What

matters is not the number of CERCLA suits brought against

lenders (see CMA Opp. 1, 7 & nn.10,11; Mich Opp. 15),

but the chilling effect on lending throughout the country that

results from unclear CERCLA liability rules threatening to

impose catastrophic liability on ordinary commercial lending

practices.' The impact of the decision below extends far

beyond commercial lenders and their "pecuniary interest"

(Mich Opp. 14). Without the EPA Rule, many borrowers

(including small businesses, inner city development projects,

and businesses needing funds for hazardous waste clean-up)

will suffer by being denied access to needed loans. The

slow case-by-case rulings of the lower courts on the status of

' Moreover, the court of appeals recognized that the

EPA Rule would be robbed of effect if it were viewed

simply as "policy guidance" for EPA enforcement proceed-

ings: “[L]enders would still face potentially staggering

liability because of the generality of the statutory language

and the prospect of private suits. That potential liability

would force lenders to behave cautiously even if EPA were

to adhere to the regulation as its policy." App. 15a.

3

secured lenders under CERCLA may never provide the

clear, uniform “safe harbor" rules that make the EPA Rule

effective. This is why EPA issued the Rule in the first

place.

Though both the Federal! Government and CMA

mention the possibility of Congressional relief (Gov’t Br.9;

CMA Opp. 5-6), such relief may be years away, if it ever

materializes. See Superfund Reform Unlikely Until 1998,

EPA Official Says, BNA Daily Tax Report at G6 (November

21, 1994) ("While not everyone is predicting that reform will

stall in the 104th Congress, nearly all sources involved in the

reform effort during the 103rd Congress predicted that the

chances are slimmer than before.") The issue of lender

liability under CERCLA has bounced through the Judicial,

Executive and Legislative branches for a decade, consuming

vast amounts of intellectual and financial resources. The

EPA Rule is a much-needed clarification of the law. It was

wrongly struck down by the court of appeals. This Court

should grant review.

2. Over-reading Adams Fruit v. Barrett, 494 U.S.

638 (1990), the court of appeals struck down the EPA Rule

on its face, finding that the availability of private suits under

CERCLA strips EPA of statutory rulemaking power on

"liability" issues and deprives the EPA Rule of the deference

on judicial review to which it is entitled under Chevron v.

NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).2 App.12a-13a. = This

? CMA’s complaints about the merits of particular parts

of the EPA Rule are not at issue before this Court.

Moreover, CMA misdescribes the EPA Rule. (1) Limited

post-foreclosure protection. Overlooked by CMA (CMA

Opp.4, 5 n.6) is the fact that the EPA Rule only protects

lenders when they act "consistent with accepted commercial

4

misreading of Adams Fruit converts it into an engine of

destruction of agency rulemaking powers.

One of the provisions that the court below nullified

is EPA’s statutory authority

to promulgate any regulations necessary to

carry out the provisions of this subchapter

42 U.S.C. § 9615. If this is not a statutory delegation of

agency rulemaking authority, supporting Chevron deference

to the EPA Rule, nothing is. See 1 Davis & Pierce,

Administrative Law Treatise § 6.3 p. 236 (3d ed. 1994)

(statutory delegation of agency rulemaking power is

"implicit" and triggers Chevron deference "if, for instance,

Congress used ambiguous language in the statute and

conferred upon the agency a general grant of power to

promulgate legislative rules to implement the statute.")

The statutory delegation of rulemaking authority in 42

U.S.C. section 9615 gives EPA wide authority to "fill in the

gaps" and to clarify CERCLA’s statutory terms defining

lending practices in the post-foreclosure context." 57 Fed.

Reg. at 18,367 (April 29, 1992). Under the EPA Rule,

lenders can be held liable if they cause post-foreclosure

spills. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 18,357 (April 29, 1992); United

States v. Fleet Factors, 821 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.Ga. 1993).

(2) No "windfall." Contrary to CMA’s assertions (CMA

Opp.8), the EPA Rule states that "the United States will seek

to recover any windfall or excess amount by which a person

is unjustly enriched by means of a taxpayer-funded cleanup."

57 Fed. Reg. at 18,365. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 18,368

(Equitable Reimbursement of the Agency for Taxpayer-

Financed Cleanups).

5

liability. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications

Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369-370 (1973) (Truth in

Lending Act disclosure requirements); Touche Ross & Co v.

SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 577-582 (2d Cir. 1979) (SEC liability

rules). As Chief Judge Mikva noted, in administering the

CERCLA sstatute EPA routinely interprets CERCLA’s

liability provisions including CERCLA’s “secured creditor

exception,” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). See App.25a and

contrast Mich Opp. 19, 22-23.

There is nothing in the CERCLA statute that purports

to deprive EPA of rulemaking authority on "liability"

issues. Furthermore, CMA’s and Michigan’s claim that

> The cases cited by CMA and Michigan are inapposite.

See Citizens to Save Spenser County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844

(D.C. Cir. 1979) (CMA Opp. 10) (court upholds the validity

of EPA Rules issued under the Clean Air Act’s general grant

of rulemaking authority); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.

281, 301-308 (1979) (Mich Opp. 24) (statute authorizing

collection of information does not authorize public

disclosure); Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F.2d

1299, 1303-1305 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Mich Opp.24) (court

upholds EPA’s authority to add waste sites to CERCLA’s

"National Priorities List" even after statutory deadline,

though court denies Chevron deference to EPA’s view as to

the consequences of its delay, finding no congressional intent

to delegate to EPA "the authority to devise a remedy for its

own untimeliness.")

* Nothing in CERCLA’s general civil liability provis-

ions, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), cited by CMA (CMA Opp. 9),

cuts back EPA’s rulemaking authority on CERCLA "“liabil-

ity” issues. Similarly, the obscure "structural" argument

made by CMA (CMA Opp.9 n.12) falls far short of limiting

6

EPA is powerless to issue a Rule clarifying CERCLA’s

"secured creditor exemption” (42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)) is

refuted by well-settled principles of administrative law’ and

"good sense” Citizens to Save Spenser County v. EPA, 600

F.2d 844, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Leventhal, J., concurring):

Though courts have jurisdiction to decide the final outcome

of CERCLA suits (see 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b), cited in Mich

Opp. 22,26), they should welcome the expert policy

guidance of the EPA Rule on the meaning of CERCLA’s

"secured creditor exemption" (42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)).

The sweeping oppositions of CMA and Michigan

underline the need for this Court to grant review to clarify

the relationship between Adams Fruit and Chevron.

Essentially, CMA and Michigan claim that the EPA Rule is

invalid because courts have jurisdiction to make the final

or "overruling" EPA's explicit statutory rulemaking authori-

ty.

* The court of appeals ruling bars EPA from utilizing

rulemaking (as opposed to case-by-case adjudication) to

establish the metes and bounds of CERCLA "liability." This

conflicts with well-settled principles of administrative law

recognizing wide agency discretion to choose between

rulemaking and adjudication. See, e.g., American Hospital

Association v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 611-614 (1991) ("even

if a statutory scheme requires individualized determinations,

the [agency] decisionmaker has the authority to rely on

rulemaking to resolve certain issues of general applicability

unless Congress clearly expresses an intent to withhold that

authority"); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v. NRDC, 435

U.S. 519, 543-545 (1978); United States v. Storer

Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 201-205 (1956).

7

decision about CERCLA liability issues.° But the courts’

final authority to determine "the law" is in no way

inconsistent with Chevron deference to agency rules. See |

Davis & Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise Chapter 3,

especially § 3.3 (reconciling Marbury and Chevron).

Nor is there anything in the legislative history of

CERCLA that trumps Chevron deference to the EPA Rule.

The legislative history cited by CMA and Michigan (CMA

Opp. 9 & n.13; Mich Opp. 27-30) indicates only that courts

should look to common law principles to decide how to

apportion, or divide, the total amount of CERCLA clean-up

costs among liable defendants.’ See Developments in the

Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv.L.Rev. 1458, 1524-

1539 (1986). The same point--that courts should determine

how joint-and-several CERCLA liability is to be allocated--is

reflected in 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), cited by CMA (CMA Opp.

9).

This is a far cry from the court of appeals’ ruling that

* The opposition submitted by Michigan--which consis-

tently overreads Adams Fruit (Mich Opp. 19-22)--at one

point challenges the validity of all agency rules on "liability"

by claiming that “civil and criminal statutes are not

‘administered by any agency but by the courts’" (Mich Opp.

30-31).

? See H.R. Rep. 253(1), 99th Cong., ist Sess. at 74

(1985) ("Explicit mention of joint and several liability was

deleted from CERCLA in 1980 to allow courts to establish

the scope of liability through a case-by-case application of

‘traditional and evolving principles of common law’ and pre-

existing statutory law."); 126 Cong. Rec. 30,932 (1980)

(statement of Senator Rardolph).

8

Congress intended that only the courts (not EPA) would

determine all CERCLA “liability” issues de novo. Whatever

one thinks of “textualism" (see The Use of Legislative

History: A Debate Between Justice Scalia and Judge Breyer,

16 Admin.L.News No. 4 (Summer 1991)), these snippets

from CERCLA’s legislative history provide no basis for

nullifying the plain statutory text of CERCLA giving EPA

wide rulemaking authority that is binding on private parties.

42 U.S.C. §§ 9615, 9605, 9613(a).

3. This case presents important and recurring

questions about administrative law, and the EPA’s powers

under CERCLA, that warrant this Court’s review.

Understandably, the Federal Government hopes that the

lower courts will ignore (or sharply limit) the court of

appeals’ decision misinterpreting Adams Fruit to undercut

EPA’s administrative powers. See Gov’t Br.9-11 & nn.

6,7,8. But the rulings of the D.C.Circuit carry special

weight on administrative law issues. See Scalia, Vermont

Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court,

1978 Supreme Court Review 345, 371-375. And the lower

courts are in fact in conflict on the meaning of Adams Fruit

and the scope of EPA’s administrative powers under

CERCLA. See Dico v. Diamond, 35 F.3d 348 (8th Cir.

1994) (relying on court of appeals’ decision in Kelley to cut

back EPA authority under CERCLA section 106(b), creating

an explicit conflict in the circuits between Dico and Wagner

Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert.

denied, 112 S. Ct. 1584 (1992)).

The court of appeals’ reliance on Adams Fruit to

“overrule” the plain text of several CERCLA. statutory

provisions (42 U.S.C. § 9615, § 9605, § 9613(a), all relied

upon by EPA in issuing the Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. at 18,368-

18,369) makes it clear that this Court “should restate step

9

one of Chevron in simple, common sense terms” that explain

the scope of Adams Fruit and clarify what does (and does

not) trump Chevron deference to an agency’s views. 1

Davis & Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 3.6 at p.130

(3d ed. 1994).

The validity of EPA’s "Lender Liability Rule” is an

issue of vital national importance that should be reviewed by

this Court. This case also vividly illustrates the recurring

confusion and conflict in the lower courts on Chevron "step

one" and the proper interrelationship between Adams Fruit

and Chevron. Review by this Court is imperative.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons stated in

our petition, certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

EDWIN E. HUDDLESON, III *

VOLPE, BOSKEY AND LYONS

918 16th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 737-6580

Counsel for Petitioner

Equipment Leasing Association

* Counsel of Record

10

JOHN J. GILL III ROGER D. SCHWENKE

THOMAS J. GRECO CARLTON, FIELDS, WARD,

MICHAEL F. CROTTY EMMANUEL, SMITH &

AMERICAN BANKERS Cutler

ASSOCIATION One Harbour Place

1120 Connecticut Ave., N.W. P.O. Box 3239

Washington, D.C. 20036 Tampa, Florida 33601

(202) 663-5026 (813) 223-7000

Counsel for Petitioner Counsel for Petitioner

American Bankers American College of Real

Association Estate Lawyers

MARGARET V. HATHAWAY DAVID T. BUENTE, JR.

LAW OFFICES OF CARTER G. PHILLIPS

MARGARET V. HATHAWAY SIDLEY & AUSTIN

5322 Forty-first Street, N.W. 1722 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20015 Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 244-8160 (202) 736-8111

Counsel for Petitioner Counsel for Petitioner

American Council Commercial Finance

of Life Insurance Association

PHILLIP E. STANO

ROBERT S. MCCONNAUGHEY

DAVID LEIFER

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF

LIFE INSURANCE

1001 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 624-2183

Counsel for Petitioner

American Council

of Life Insurance

December 1994.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Reply Brief — American Bankers Ass'n v. Kelley · 513 U.S. 1110 | Frix