Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Hirai v. Ito
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Supreme Court, U.S.
sae FILED
94 705 CI 19 199%
OPICE OF THE Cutan
In the
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1994
Nobuo Hirai, Petitioner,
V.
Ryoko Ito, as Personal Representatives of the
heirs of Akinobu Ito, Deceased, Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
HAROLD A. STONE
(Counsel of Record)
FRANCIS M. MCKEOWN
GUDMUNDSON, SIGGINS, STONE & SKINNER
One Embarcadero Center, Suite 1350
San Francisco, California 9411 1
Telephone (415) 391-4200
Facsimile (415) 989-4739
Counsel for Petitioner
NOBUO HIRAI
October, 1994
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1) Whether Federal Question Jurisdiction arises under the due
process clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments when the trial court, for
docket convenience, refused to hear, but denied, defendant Hirai’s motion
to enforce a written settlement agreement.
2) Whether Federal Question Jurisdiction arises under the due
process clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments where the CNMI
Supreme Court directed a judgment against defendant Macro for the first
time on appeal, although it had been dismissed earlier, and was not present
at triai.
3) Whether Federal Question Jurisdiction arises under the due
process clauses of the Sth and 14th Amendments where defendant Hirai
has not been granted a new trial despite the fact that another party
defendant, Macro, is entitled to a new trial.
The parties to the proceedings below were:
Plaintiffs:
Defendants:
Ryoko Ito, as Personal Representative of the heirs of
Akinobu Ito, Deceased. (Hereinafter “Ito.”)
Macro Energy, Inc., (herinafter “Macro”), Marianas
Ocean Enterprises, (hereinafter “MOE”), Nobuo Hirai,
(hereinafter “Hirai”), Shigemi Yamagishi, (hereinafter
“Y amagishi”), and American Home Assurance Company,
(hereinafter “American Home.”)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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DT BUI E NT si5 5 iiscd seco diiccscdinseiccesebsdesssecsedssoreovecsessccsees vi, Vii
ALE ss ss cacancennasnesesnsecanonsnnensenesancasenenaenersceseos 2
PRs AIT Wietsiiibiboidcininsesniadesnnesttibhnrorsserece Scent aTNi ds Ardeithttincercenseoeees 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND TREATIES.......2
ee A tah ib cceccohscvnncécundneereverentencsncsorsssentvoreoseoeesescs 3
I. a ichicssnnitsenscesavnivetecetvesieoessevevessestconsocssseese 3
Il. a st sca chcenmtncddbdeseccnnccescoescessencees 3
Il. How Federal Questions Were Raised in the Courts Below............ 7
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION. .............c:cscsssssssesesseeseeeees 1]
I. TRRIORERINCO OF TD CNITIOI isso sds nedasscessccsciccccccccccccccrscceees 11
Il. Federal Question Jurisdiction Arises from Hirai’s Colorable
Appeal on the Grounds of Denial of a Hearing on a Written
saa sss cacacannasetncssesacdsctyecstceccececsece 13
Ill. Federal Questions Jurisdiction Arises from Petitioners’
Colorable Appeal on the Grounds that Macro is entitled to
a Trial on the Merits EN GEST: SECS 5 1S 17
IV. Federal Question Jurisdiction Arises from Hirai’s Colorable
Appeal on the Grounds that Hirai has not been Granted a
ee en nome Fenty Defendant fs
Entitled to a New Trial..............-.-.cscscssesscccosseersessnstecssscessessensersces 19
CONCLUSION 21
APPENDICES
A.
B.
i iiiicsciessarsncesissieensnniesctenincitianiiiiiaimaamiaia Lae A-|
Answer (Macro Energy, Inc., Shigemi Yamagishi and
| | ne aa shee 28 Soe me B-1
Summary Judgment (Honorable Robert A. Hefner,
PU I sncciccccmretintsinntedhitaentdtiinebiieitibiiictiotiins: C-]
Memorandum Decision (Honorable Robert A.
Hefner, Presitiing Judge).......:scessseccssscesceosesscocssecsecsseese D-1
Amended Summary Judgment (Honorable Robert A.
PEOEIN,, FOORITIIN UIE Docccsiceticesccsscrcesnsscnninoniensninuniaines E-1
Affidavit of Thomas L. Roberts...............cccccseeseeeeerseeees F-]
Judgment (Honorable Pedro M. Atalig,
PUCOIR FRI ccctctesereenvintlbbnliniistieintadidiciiidecssaseni G-1
Amended Judgment (Honorable Pedro M.
pt_BR ene AO OREO H-1
Excerpt of Reporter’s Transcript of Trial (Honorable
Pedro M. Atalig, Presiding Judge)..................:ccscsscesseees I-1
Hiria’s Opening Brief to Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Island’s Supreme Coutt..................... J-1
Judgment and Opinion (CNMI Supreme Court)............ K-]
Hiria’s Petition for Re-Hearing
(CNMI Supreme Coust)scicscieisssciicscescisccitiieeibdesossecccesee L-1
Order Denying Re-Hearing
(CNMI Supreme Court) : sdb ictbUssduvecees M-1
Notice of Appeal (Ninth Circuit) Nel
Opening Brief of Defendant and Appellant
Hirai (Ninth Circuit)...............0.ccccsccssrecsessrsssrseseresceseseres O-1
Opening Brief of Defendants and Appellants, Macro
Energy, Inc. and Shigemi Yamagishi (Ninth Circuit)....P-1
Appellee Ryoko Ito’s Brief (Ninth Circuit)..............-.-.. Q-1
Reply Brief of Defendant and Appellant Nobuo Hirai
(Ninth Circuit)...............ccccsccssssesecesessecssscescnenssesssessrsrees R-]
Reply Brief of Defendant and Appellants, Macro
Energy, Inc. and Shigemi Yamagishi
(Ninth Circuit)..........cccccccceceressecsnesersssseesessanseeseneneneneees S-1
Order and Judgment of Dismissal (Ninth Circuit)......... T-1
vi
TABLE OF AUTORITIES
CASES
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458 (1938); .....ccccscccceseeseeseeesees iiiiisemeuavinins 10
Avcojet v. Asteae (TOTS) SUG Fae CO iy UW cnscterereenceiacststenteecssseeseinveeveeen 19
Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 764 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1985), corrected
by, 773 9.26 19D ...cnnieviecsttiemuinaiaamaaaaaanaannnairit 8, 15, 16
Drier v. Tarpon S22 F 26 TSO COGe Cae. BF ai vevrepcsevntcesienqnecevsesitivensenovenes 19
Edwards v. Cass County, Tex, 919 F.2d 273 (Sth Cir. 1990). ......... 8, 15, 16
H.J. Hines Co. v. Beack-nut Lifesavers, Inc., 181 F.Supp. 452, 459
(D.C.N.Y. 1968). ....cllliensseialahannieiinibnintitantlerdenens 9
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services 452 US 18 (1981).)..........s000 17
Lytle v. Household Manufacturing (1990) 494 US 545 .....cceecseeeseeeeeeees 19
Ochoa v. Hasmamdas: 250 UG TIP CIDE ccceiecsatescessvsevsticesctsincinestitiidicnescvens 16
Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Com, 301 US 292, 304-305
(1937). ..caccovcvenvevsennnettprtSaTalcetelseeceann uno iieiin ett tersceicibibaiesdabemmaadtalieeeiiin 17
Oliva v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1992). ......cccsssssssssseesesees 8, 15, 16
Sablan v, Manglona, 938 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1991).......cssssssssssessseseeeeesees 12
Ryoko Ito v. Macro Energy, Inc. et al., No. 92-022 CNMI, (October 26,
1993...) ..ccccesecccvediissisiscenissasidensp tuisdaiadieesticianiianicitaniiisiiabpaiatiadapnieyias 2
Thrift v. Bell Lines, Inc., 296 F.Supp. 214, 217 (D.C.N.Y. 1967))..........000 9
United States v. Williamson, 803 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1986)............. 10
_ Whittler v. Seibel (1982) 675 F.2d 245 sess 19
oo tne maar eee tebe
Vii
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
i sesutudocsssccnssnebonecdanens 12
Sth Amendment, Due Process Clause................ccccccccssssseseceeeseees 2, 6, 16, 17
14th Amendment, Due Process Clause.................cccccccseee seeseeeeee 2, 6, 16, 17
STATUTES
ATE EE EE 2
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ci daaleaaiehinidciidipnasoneenivenevetnosesnintecoresecnecens 2, 12, 20
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Ee 3
Restatement of Judgments, 2d §39 ...................sscccsssccsssscssssssscscessesconsssscses 19
TREATISES
Vol. 13B J. Moore, A. Vestal & P.Kurland, Moore’s Manual Federal
Practice and Proceedure, §3562, pp. 18-19 (1994) ........ceeceeeeeeeeeeeees 13
TREATIES
The Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands (CNMI) in Political Union with the United States of America
(The Covenant), Article Five, §501(a)....................cscccsesssesscsscccsscceeseses 2
cee ne, een
No,
In the
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1994
Nobuo Hirai, Petitioner
v.
Ryoko Ito, as Personal Representatives of the
heirs of Akinobu Ito, Deceased, Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, first
entered in this case on July 21, 1994 based solely upon a finding that no
federal question jurisdiction arose, where the trial court refused petitioner
Hirai a hearing on Hirai’s defense of a written settlement agreement, and
the Supreme Court for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands (CNMI) sustained the trial court’s ruling, holding that the a trial
court can refuse to hear a defense at trial which would be more
conveniently heard before trial.
Petitioner further prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, that
no federal question jurisdiction arose on the due process issue of a right to
a hearing and trial, where the CNMI Supreme Court imposed a 2.4 million
dollar judgment against Macro, a party previously dismissed and therefore
not present at trial, on the stated and patently inadequate grounds of
respondeat superior. —
»» Petitioner further prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, that
no federal question jurisdiction is created by the fact that a new trial for
2
Macro, to which it is entitled, necessitates a new trial for all parties to
avoid the threat of inconsistent judgments within the very same action
OPINIONS BELOW
The Order and Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
(App., infra, T1-T3)is unreported. The opinion of the Supreme Court of
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, (App., infra, K1-
K50), is reported as Ryoko Ito v. Macro Energy, Inc. et al., No. 92-022
CNMI, (October 26, 1993.)
JURISDICTION
The United States Court of Appeals entered its judgment on July
21, 1994. (App., infra, T1-T3.) The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 USC §1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND TREATIES
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides,
in pertinent part that “no person may be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.”
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides, in pertinent part, that “ no state may deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.”
48 USC §1694c(a) provides that the 9th Circuit has jurisdiction of
appeals from the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands “involving the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United
States.”
The Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands (CNMI) in Political Union with the United States of
America (The Covenant), Article Five, §501(a) provides in pertinent part,
“to the extent that they are not applicable of their own force, the following
provisions of the Constitution of the United States will be applicable
within the Northern Mariana Islands as if the Northern Mariana Islands
were one of the several states....Amendments I through IX,
inclusive;....Amendment XIV....”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature Of The Case
This is a wrongful death lawsuit filed by Ryoko Ito, as personal
representative of the heirs of Akinobu Ito, (Ito), who died in a September
24, 1988 scuba diving accident at a popular Saipan dive site known as the
“Grotto”. (App., infra, Al-A3.) Plaintiffs’ claims were originally brought
against five (5) defendants: Macro, a dive shop, Hirai, an assistant
instructor employed by Macro, Yamagishi, a scuba diving instructor and
Macro’s president, Marianas Ocean Enterprises (MOE), alleged to be the
alter ego of Macro, and American Home Assurance Company (hereinafter
“American Home”) Macro and Yamagishi’s insurer. (App., infra,A\-A7.)
Il. Course Of Proceedings
On November 7, 1990, Macro, Hirai, Yamagishi, and American
Home moved for summary judgment under §496B of the Restatement of
Torts, 2d on the basis of an “Agreement for Exemption from Obligation”
(i.e., a release agreement sometimes called a “covenant not to sue” or a
“waiver of liability”) signed by Ito on the morning of his accident (ER 1;
71; CR 11/7/90, 00:00:00).
On December 17, 1990, Judge Robert A Hefner in the CNMI
Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Macro, Hirai,
Yamagishi, and American Home. (App., infra, C-1.) The court did not
address MOE in the judgment, or its Memorandum Decision, but the
implication was that it too was dismissed. (App., infra, D1-D10.)
On December 27, 1990, plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the
order granting summary judgment arguing that Ito’s assumption of risk
was not sufficiently “expressed” under §496B of the Restatement of Torts,
2d (App., infra, E1.)
On January 28, 1991, the Court entered an “Amended Summary
Judgment” and “Memorandum Decision.” (App., infra, El.) Judge
Hefner held, upon further review that although the agreement effectively
operated to release Macro from liability, it did not release Yamagishi or
Hirai, Macro’s employees, since they were not named in the express
assumption of risk. Since MOE was alleged to be the alter ego of Macro,
MOE along with Macro was dismissed. Although the status of American
Home was unclear, the case was reinstated against it as well.
On June 21, 1991, plaintiff's counsel sent a written
settlement offer to Hirai. The proposal was simple and short:
This will constitute plaintiff's offer to the
defendant Nobuo Hirai to dismiss the case
with prejudice against him under the
following conditions:
a) Hirai will meet with a [sic] expert
of plaintiff's choosing to discuss the
events surrounding this case and his
employment in Saipan.
b) Hirai agrees to testify at the trial.
[App., infra, F-5.]
Four days later, Hirai’s counsel sent plaintiff's counsel a written
acceptance, signed by both counsel and Hirai, that was similarly simple
and short:
My client, NOBUO HIRAI,
unconditionally accepts the offer to settle
the case against him contained in your
letter of June 21, 1991 under the terms
specified therein. (App., infra, F-6.)
On June 26, 1991, the following day, plaintiff's counsel purported
to orally revoke the offer, and a day later, on June 23, 1991, sent a letter
purporting to withdraw it. (App., infra, F-7.)
Despite their executed settlement agreement, plaintiff did not file
a dismissal of Hirai. Accordingly, on September 12, 1991, Hirai filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of the settlement agreement.
No opposition was ever filed. However, the parties stipulated to a stay of
the hearing until the matter was finally brought up for hearing on the firct
day of trial on May 26, 1992. (App., infra, 12-14.) At that time, the court
stated that this matter should have been taken up before trial and rather
than hear the Motion, the court denied the Motion. (App., infra, 1-4.)
5
On September 9, 1991, American Home moved, pursuant to Rule
54(b) of the CNMI Rules of Civil Procedure, (adopted from the Federal
Rules) for certification of the Superior Court’s January 28, 1991 Amended
Summary Judgment on the “release issue”, and for certification of the
court’s April 16, 1991 order on the policy limits issue.
On September 12, 1991, Hirai filed a motion to enforce the
settlement agreement.
On October 7, 1991, the trial court certified for appeal Judge
Hefner’s order of January 28, 1991 on the release issue and Judge
Hefner’s order of April 16, 1991 on the policy limits.
The notices of appeal which followed the Rule 54(b) certification
had the effect of staying all proceedings in the Superior Court, including
Hirai’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement. On November 6,
1991, the parties formally stipulated to such a stay.
On February 3, 1992, the CNMI Supreme Court dismissed all of
the appeals on the grounds that the orders sought to be reviewed were
insufficiently final within the meaning of Rule 54(b).
On February 7, 1992, plaintiff scheduled Hirai’s second deposition
for March 5, 1992.' Hirai was re-deposed by plaintiff two days later on
April 9, 1992. On February 17, 1992, the parties stipulated to a May 26,
1992 trial date.
On April 7, 1992, a hearing was held on various pretrial motions
defendants. Judge Castro declined to entertain the motions on their merits,
denying them on the grounds that they had been filed too close to trial,
then over a month and a half away. (App., /ra, 11-15.) No motion cut
off date had ever been set by the court.
was still pending. Defendant Hirai requested that the motion be heard
prior to trial or on the day of trial prior to testimony. (App.. infra, 13-14.)
Shortly after the motion to enforce the settlement had been filed, plaintiff's
counsel and counsel for Mr. Hirai agreed that the hearing on the motion would be
until plaintiff’ s counsel could re-depose Mr. Hara: (CR 10/9/92 8:2:42, RT
$/26/92 11:13-24)
6
The motion memorandum and affidavit in support of Motion to Enforce
the Settlement were filed with the Pretrial Memorandum.
On May 26, 1992, on the first day of trial, just before opening
statements, the trial court refused to hear Hirai’s motion on his settlement
agreement and denied it without a hearing on the grounds that it should
have been raised prior to trial. (App., infra, 11-14.)
On June 22, 1992, after a two week trial between May 26, 1992
and June 5, 1992, the court entered judgment in the approximate amount
of $2.4 million against Hirai, Yamagishi and American Home. (App.,
infra, G1.) On August 10, 1992, after American Home’s June 29, 1992
Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment was entered which limited
American Homes’ liability to $100,000. (App., infra, H1-H2.)
Yamagishi and Hirai’s Joint Notice of Appeal to the CNMI
Supreme Court was timely filed on August 14, 1992. On September 22,
1992, the CNMI Supreme Court consolidated the appeals and set the
briefing schedule. The CNMI Supreme Court heard argument on the
island of Saipan on March 12, 1993.
On October 26, 1993 the CNMI Supreme Court issued its written
Opinion wherein it decided, inter alia:
Hearing the motion [to enforce a written settlement
agreement] would have entailed continuing the trial to
another day. A continuance would have required a shifting
of the court’s docket. (App., infra, K32.)
Thus, quite surprisingly, the CNMI Supreme Court elevated the
importance of docket control above the right to a hearing, guaranteed by
the due process clauses of the Sth and 14th Amendments.
The CNMI Supreme Court also made a decision to impose the
judgment against Macro, a party which had previously been dismissed
from the case months before trial. The CNMI Supreme Court’s only
reason for imposing judgment against a previously dismissed party
without a trial was “respondeat superior.” (App., infra, K22; M1-M2.)
On November 3, 1993, Hirai filed a motion for rehearing with the
CNMI Supreme Court, explaining that docket control may not supersede
7
the right to a hearing. Hirai also noted that the doctrine of respondeat
superior does not substitute for the right to a trial. (App., infra, L1-L3.)
The CNMI Supreme Court denied a rehearing on November 23,
1993 on the grounds that Hirai had not raised the due process problems
with the CNMI Supreme Court decision until after the decision was
written. (App., infra, M1-M2)
The CNMI Supreme Court also denied a rehearing on the issue of
entering judgment against the previously dismissed Macro without trial.
The Court based its ruling on the grounds that Macro failed to set forth
facts (at the appellate level and without a trial) to show that its employee
Yamagishi acted outside the scope of employment. (App., infra, M1-M2.)
On December 22, 1993, Hirai filed a Notice of Appeal with the
United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. Hirai fully briefed the
issues set forth above. (App., infra, O, P, Q, R and S.)
On July 21, 1994 the United States Court of Appeal for the 9th
Circuit entered judgment against Hirai. The Court of Appeals based its
ruling on the sole grounds that the above proceedings failed to raise an
issue of Constitutional Due Process such as to create Federal Question
Jurisdiction. (App., infra, T1-T3.)
Ill. How Federal Questions Were Raised In The Courts Below
Hirai first requested a hearing on his defense of a written
settlement agreement at the trial. (App., infra,\1-14.) Hirai then argued
before the CNMI Supreme Court (the only appellate court in the CNMI)
that he had a right to a hearing on this defense. (App., infra, J2-J5.)
Surprised by the CNMI Supreme Court’s decision that he had no right to a
hearing, Hirai filed a motion for rehearing in the CNMI Supreme Court.
- (App., infra, L6-L13.) The Court denied Hirai’s motion on the grounds
that Hirai had not pointed out to the CNMI Supreme Court before that the
right to a hearing is guaranteed by due process clauses of the Constitution.
(App., infra, M-2.)
In its’ Order Denying a Rehearing, the CNMI Supreme Court
dismissed Hirai’s due process rights in two sentences:
Hirai’s due process argument regarding
the issue of the settlement agreement is
being raised for the first time in his
Petition for Rehearing. We shall not
address this issue which was not raised
below or earlier with us. [App., infra,M-
2.)
This statement is incorrect. Hirai requested a hearing. The trial
court denied that request. Hirai then appealed to the CNMI Supreme
Court on the grounds that he had been denied a right to a hearing during
the trial. These facts constitute raising the due process issue.
The CNMI Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had a right to
deny Hirai a hearing on his settlement agreement at trial in the interest of
“docket control.”
The trial court possesses inherent power
to police its docket, Oliva v. Sullivan, 958
F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1992); Edwards v. Cass
County, Tex, 919 F.2d 273 (Sth Cir.
1990). The timing of trials and docket
control are matters best left to the
discretion of the trial court. Coursen v.
A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 764 F.2d 1329 (9th
Cir. 1985), corrected by, 773 F.2d 1049.
[App., infra, K31-K32.]
Then the CNMI Supreme Court refused to even consider that this
ruling amounted to a denial of the constitutional due process right to a
hearing. (/bid.) This amounts to a violation of due process in its most
basic form: fairness and substantial justice.
At the trial court, as stated above, Hirai asked:
if we can just have five minutes on that
motion. because we thought the offer had
If your Honor is willing to hear it today or
at some point during the trial, we would
like to argue it. If your Honor would
9
prefer that it be a matter of proof at
sometime during the trial, then that would
be acceptable to us, too. [App., infra, 13.]
Hirai clearly requested a hearing and the court clearly denied him
that right. One need not yell “due process” to raise the constitutional
issue. When one asks for a hearing, one is requesting due process and
raising the issue. Hirai did not waive the right to a hearing;. Hirai raised
the issue by making the request.
At the appeal stage, Hirai’s Opening Brief before the CNMI
Supreme Court argued that Hirai’s settlement agreement should have been
heard and enforced. Hirai argued that the trial court committed error both
procedurally in refusing to hear the issue at trial and substantively because
the settlement agreement was valid.
First, procedurally, a motion for summary
judgment may be made at any time,
including on the eve of, or even during
trial. (Rule 56 Commonwealth Rules of
Civil Procedure;” Thrift v. Bell Lines, Inc.,
296 F.Supp. 214, 217 (D.C.N.Y. 1967);
HJ. Hines Co. v. Beach-nut Lifesavers,
Inc., 181 F.Supp. 452, 459 (D.C.N.Y.
1960). Hirai’s written settlement
agreement entitled him to dismissal.
Whether defendant sought dismissal
based upon that contract before or during
trial has no bearing on Hirai’s rights
under the contract. He certainly did not
waive his rights under the settlement
contract by failing to enforce it before the
trial. Obviously, if settlement agreement
can only be enforced by pretrial motion,
no settlements would ever be entered into
during a trial. Accordingly, the basis for
the [trial] court’s refusal to entertain
defendant’s Motion is unsound. [App.,
infra, 32-35.)
: The Commonwealth Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 56,
are based upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
10
Clearly, Hirai raised this issue “involving” due process in the.
initial stages of the appeal to the CNMI Supreme Court. The CNMI
Supreme Court’s ruling appears particularly disingenuous when one sees
that the cases relied upon by the Supreme Court in its Opinion were never
cited by the parties. Furthermore, those cases specifically address the due
process problems inherent in elevating a trial court’s power to control its
own docket over a right to a hearing. (See discussion distinguishing cases
cited by the CNMI Supreme Court at pp.19-21, infra.)
The CNMI’s Supreme Court’s conclusion that Hirai waived his
due process right to a hearing or to raise the issue on appeal is incorrect
and fundamentally unfair. “Court’s indulge every presumption against the
waiver or fundamental constitutional rights.” (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US
458 (1938); United States v. Williamson, 803 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir.
1986).)
In sum, Hirai did raise this due process issue of a hearing in the
trial court and in the initial stages of the CNMI appeal, despite the CNMI
Supreme Court’s conclusory statement to the contrary. Furthermore, even
if there were any question as to whether Hirai waived his due process
rights, there is a strong presumption against such a waiver (Johnson,
supra).
Hirai first raised the issue of the right of Macro, previously
dismissed from the case, to a trial on the merits in his Respondent’s Brief
to Ito’s Cross-Appeal in the CNMI Supreme Court. At that time Hirai
specifically cited the due process clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments.
Hirai first raised the issue of the right of Hirai to a new trial, to
avoid the resulting threat of multiple judgments within the same action, in
his Respondent’s Brief to Ito’s Cross-Appeal in the CNMI Supreme Court.
At that time Hirai specifically cited the due process clause of the 5th and
14th Amendments.
Hirai appealed to the United States Court of Appeals based upon
the constitutional due process violations discussed herein. The Court of
Appeal committed error when it dismissed this appeal on the grounds that
no federal issues were raised.
11
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
1 Importance Of The Question
The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit decided
that Hirai’s colorable appeal, based upon a denial of a hearing on his best
defense, the denial of a trial to a previously dismissed defendant, and the
question of a right to a new trial as to the remaining parties, to avoid
inconsistent judgments within the same action, did not raise a federal due
process issue, such as would create federal question jurisdiction.
The citizens of the CNMI will understand this decision as a
declaration by their own courts and the United States Court of Appeals
that they do not have the right to due process guaranteed by the
constitution of the United States.. The need for guidance from this Court
is acute.
The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit and the
citizens and courts of the CNMI should be advised by this Court that due
process guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the
Covenant will be enforced by the courts of the CNMI, and, if necessary,
by the United States Court of Appeals.
Here there were clear violations of due process by both the
Superior Court and Supreme Court of the CNMI. When the Superior
Court of the CNMI denied defendant Hirai the right to be heard on his
motion to enforce a fully executed settlement agreement, it was a clear
denial of due process. When the CNMI Supreme Court sustained that
decision, and further decided to impose the judgment upon Macro without
a trial, and denied a new trial as to all parties to avoid inconsistent
judgments within the same action, it also denied Hirai due process of law.
This issue of due process is a matter of importance to the people,
courts and government of the CNMI, including Saipan. This decision, if
not corrected, can create uncertainty within the citizenry, courts and
government of the CNMI as to all constitutional rights. Uncertainty as to
equal application of such fundamental rights threatens to create a climate
which inhibits commerce, tourism and communication. Such uncertain
and inconsistent application of the United States Constitution is also
12
certain to open the floodgates to the federal court system by those seeking
clarification of their rights.
This case is a timely and rare opportunity for this Court to
provide guidance to the citizens and courts of the CNMI and to bring
much needed certainty and uniformity to the enforcement of these basic
constitutional rights.
Whatever the resolution of these questions, they are federal
questions involving the Constitution of the United States. The United
States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit dismissed Hirai’s appeal on the
grounds that “this is not a case ‘involving the Constitution, treaties, or
laws of the United States...’.” (App., infra, T-1, citing 48 USC §1694c(a)
and Sablan v Manglona, 938 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1991.)) Thus, the 9th
Circuit decision is based solely upon a finding that the above enumerated
issues are not federal questions.
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution provides that the judicial
power of the United States extends to cases “arising under the
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their authority.” The statutory grant of federal
question jurisdiction also uses the phrase “arises under.” (28 USC §1331.)
Similarly, 48 USC §1694c(a) provides that the United States Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit will have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the highest court of the Northern Mariana Islands from which
a decision could be had in all cases “involving the Constitution, Treaties
or laws of the United States.”
The issue of when the relation of federal law to a case is such that
the action may be said to “arise under” that law has historically been
deceptively difficult.
As noted by Moore’s Federal Practice and Procedure:
The meaning of this phrase has attracted
the interest of such giants of the bench as
Marshall, Waite, Bradley, the first Harlan,
Holmes, Cardozo, and Frankfurter--to
name only the dead. It has been the
subject of voluminous scholarly writing.
Even so it cannot be said that any clear
13
test has been developed to determine
which cases “arise under” federal law.
There is no single rational principle that
will explain all of the decisions on this
point. The problem has been aggravated
by the tendency of courts to repeat
uncritically language from earlier
decisions as a substitute for analysis of
the case that is actually before them.
[Vol. 13B, J.Moore, A. Vestal & P.
Kurland, Moore’s Manual Federal
Practice and Proceedure, §3562, pp.18-19
(1994.).]
This case represents a rare opportunity for this Court to establish
clear guidelines as to when a case “arises under” federal law. It also
represents an opportunity for this Court to remedy the clear error of the
United States Court of Appeals.
Il. Federal Question Jurisdiction Arises From Hirai’s Colorable
Appeal On The Grounds Of Denial Of A Hearing On A
Written Settlement Agreement
On the first day of trial, counsel for Hirai asked to be heard on the
plaintiff-Hirai settlement agreement stating:
If we can just have five minutes on that
motion, because we thought the offer had
been made and accepted. [App., infra, I-
3.]
The court repeatedly complained that a motion on the settlement
agreement had not been heard before and that:
Before you bring [this] up before the
court, you have to notice this thing, and
set it for hearing. (App., infra, I-4.)
Counsel for Hirai responded with a reasonable explanation for the
delay of the hearing in light of the fact that certain issues on summary
judgment had been certified under Rule 54(b). The certification and stay
was made after the motion for summary judgment on the settlement
14
agreement was noticed but before the hearing. Thus, the action was stayed
between the time Hirai’s motion for summary judgment was originally
filed and the date set for hearing. When the case was remanded back to
the trial court after the CNMI Supreme Court dismissed the interlocutory
appeal, the trial court instructed that it did not want to hear any more law
and motion matters before trial. (App., infra, 13-14. ¥. Thus, Hirai waited
until the pretrial briefs and the first day of trial to raise this issue.
Counsel for Hirai simply requested a hearing of this very
important defense, if not on the first day of trial then at some time;
If your Honor is willing to hear it today or
at some point during the trial, we’d like to
argue it. If your Honor would prefer that
it be a matter of proof at some time during
the trial, then that would be acceptable to
us, too. But there is a reason for why it
hasn’t been heard yet, and that was
scheduling difficulties, and an agreement
of counsel that the hearing wouldn’t go
forward until Mr. Hirai’s deposition could
be retaken. (/bid.)
The Court responded:
We have about seven files this thick here,
and these are matters that should have
been taken up before trial. That’s why I
asked the parties, ‘are you ready for trial?’
Now, at this point, to entertain this
motion, the court will not. . .will deny the
motion. (App., infra, 1-4.)
The trial court did not simply put off a hearing on this issue to a
more convenient time. It “denied” enforcing the settlement agreement on
the grounds that hearing the matter at trial was inccavenient. The court
refused to hear Hirai’s defense because it believed the matter should have
been resolved in pretrial proceedings.
3
There was no law and motion cut-off, cither by local rule or court order in this
matter, other than Judge Castro’s instruction that the court did not want to hear any more
law and motion matters prior to trial. (App., infra, 13-14.)
15
In the Supreme Court’s opinion regarding the plaintiff-Hirai
settlement agreement at pp. 34-35, the Supreme Court cited three cases for
the proposition that the trial court possessed inherent power to police its
docket and that the timing of trials and docket control are matters best left
to the discretion of the trial court: Oliva v. Sullivan 958 F.2d 272 (9th Cir.
1992); Edwards v. Cass County, Texas 919 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1990;
Coursen v. A.H. Robbins Co., Inc. 764 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1985) corrected
by 773 F.2d 1049.
However, these cases in no way support the trial court’s refusal to
allow a hearing of Hirai’s strongest defense, a written settlement
agreement. In Oliva v., Sullivan, supra, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion when it put its
inherent power to control its docket ahead of the rights of the parties to be
heard on the merits. In that case, the local rules and the trial court’s
instructions provided that plaintiff should have filed a motion for
summary judgment by August 6, 1987. Plaintiff did not do so.
Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal
held that plaintiff was entitled to a hearing and reversed, holding:
...the public policy favoring disposition
on the merits weighs against dismissal.
(Oliva at p. 274.)
Oliva certainly does not stand for the proposition that parties such
as Hirai may not have their defenses heard on the merits at the whim of
the trial court.
In Edwards v. Cass County, Texas, supra, once again, the holding
does not support the trial court’s decision to deny a motion on the grounds
that it refused to hear it. In Edwards, the trial court refused to hear an
untimely motion for summary judgment. The defendant and moving party
filed an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeal held, simply, that an
interlocutory appeal was not proper, and that the defense should properly
be raised as Hirai’s defense was raised: at trial. The court held:
Having failed to take the appropriate
measures to test the legal issue of
immunity [the basis of the motion for
summary judgment] prior to trial, these
defendants must stand trial, unless on
_
16
remand the district court should elect to
consider their motion for summary
judgment and should determine that
qualified immunity is present.
Out of an abundance of caution,
however, we note that the defendants
still may assert qualified immunity at
trial, (Edwards at p.277; emphasis
added.)
In the case at bench, the defense was presented at.trial. This is not
an interlocutory appeal. This is an appeal after a trial in which the trial
court refused to hear petitioner Hirai’s defense.
The third case cited by the Supreme Court on this issue is Coursen
v. A.H. Robbins, Co., Inc., 764 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1985) corrected by 773
F.2d 1049. The appellant there contended that she was prejudiced because
the trial court rescheduled her trial from February 14, 1984 to February 10,
1984. The court stated broadly that:
The timing of trials and control of the
docket are matters left to the discretion of
the trial court. (Coursen at p. 1340)
That case stands for the proposition that a trial court may control
the timing of its trials and control the docket. It does not stand for the
proposition that if a party presents a defense at an inconvenient time, the
defense may simply be “denied”. Once again, the Coursen_case, like
Edwards, supra and Oliva, supra cited by the CNMI Supreme Court, does
not support the trial court’s summary denial of petitioner Hirai’s best
defense.
Due process of law under the 5th and 14th Amendments to the
United States Constitution requires that parties have an opportunity to
defend, enforce, and protect their rights. The guarantee of due process of
law is one of the most important to be found in the Constitution, and it has
been said that without such guarantee, the right of private property could
not be said to exist in the sense in which it is known to our laws. (Ochoa
v. Hernandez 230 US 139 (1913).) Due process is not interested in mere
technical formalism. It is, rather, the substance that is determinative of
whether due process has been afforded. It is not a technical conception
M22 taser ts nai ED ADT NN cast tN a ANON set Oat ines BI wie =:
17
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances, but rather
expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness. (Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services 452 US 18 (1981).)
One of the essential elements of procedural due process is an
opportunity for hearing. It is a cardinal principal of due process that no
one may be bound by a judgment, either in respect to his or her person or
property unless that person has had his or her day in court. In other words,
a person may not be so bound until he or she has been afforded an
opportunity to be heard. As the United States Supreme Court has stated:
The right to a hearing ...is one of the
‘rudiments of fair play’...assured...by the
14th Amendment ... There can be no
compromise on the footing of
convenience or expediency...when that
minimal requirement has been neglected
or ignored. (Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v.
Public Utilities Com. 301 US 292, 304-
305 (1937).
In the case at bench, the trial court denied Hirai’s right to a
hearing on his strongest defense “on the footing of convenience or
expediency”. (Ohio Bell, supra.) It is difficult to imagine a clearer case
of denial of due process and abuse of discretion. Yet the United States
Court of Appeals dismissed on the grounds that no federal issue of due
process was involved.
Ill. Federal Question Jurisdiction Arises From Petitioners’
Colorable Appeal On The Grounds That Macro Is Entitled To
A Trial On The Merits
In this case, Macro was dismissed by summary judgment and
therefore was not present at trial. Nevertheless, the CNMI Supreme Court
entered judgment for the first time on appeal against Macro on the theory —
of “respondeat superior.” \n a Motion for rehearing Hirai and Macro
pointed out that it was a denial of due process for CNMI Supreme Court to
act as a fact finding body and impose a judgment upon a previously
dismissed party, without a trial.
The CNMI Supreme Court denied the motion for Rehearing
stating:
18
In particular, Macro’s contention that its
due process rights were violated is
without merit. While it is true that a
corporation is a distinct ‘jural entity,’ we
disagree with the assertion that Macro is
entitled to a full trial on the issues of
negligent conduct, liability and damages
before judgment may be entered against
it, for here, it was being sued on
respondeat superior grounds. (App.,
infra, M-1.)
Defendant has found no cases where the doctrine of respondeat
superior has been extended to impose a judgment upon a party without a
hearing. Using this reasoning parties could simply prosecute an action
against employees and then impose judgments thus obtained upon
employers who are not parties to the trial, on a respondeat superior theory.
It is fundamental that a judgment does not apply to one who is not
a party at trial. In her brief before the CNMI Supreme Court, plaintiff
argued that the doctrines of coliateral estoppel and privity should be
applied to this novel situation.
Of course, the typical situation for application of these doctrines is
a case in which plaintiff has obtained a judgment against a defendant, and
then sues on that judgment in a second action against the defendant’s
insurance company who paid for and controlled the defense in the first
action. In those cases, the trial court has the discretion to apply the
principals of collateral estoppel and privity so as to prevent re-litigation of
the same issues.
in this case, however, plaintiffs are not attempting to sue
defendant’s insurance company on the judgment against its insured.
Instead, plaintiffs are attempting to impose a judgment obtained against
employees upon an employer who was previously dismissed and not a —
party at trial. Macro and MOE certainly cannot be said to have controlled
this action or to have reasonably expected to be bound by this judgment as
they had already been adjudicated to have no liability and were dismissed.
The question of whether the doctrines of privity and collateral
estoppel apply to # case are questions of fact for the trial court (Areajet v.
19
Askew (1975) 511 F.2d 710, 719). It was not appropriate for the CNMI
Supreme Court to usurp the trial court’s power to decide these issues of
fact and summarily deny Macro its right to a trial on the merits.
The CNMI Supreme Court does not indicate whether it adopted
plaintiffs arguments regarding privity and collateral estoppel. However, if
it did so, it did so in error. (1) Collateral estoppel is not applicable where
a case involves only one action. (Lytle v. Household Manufacturing
(1990) 494 US 545). The threat of multiple lawsuits, prevention of which
is the purpose of collateral estoppel, is not a danger here. (2) Collateral
estoppel should not be imposed offensively against on who is not a party
to the original trial. (Whittler v. Seibel (1982) 675 F.2d 245). (3) Privity
in the collateral estoppel context can only be found where the party in
privity reasonably expected to be bound by the earlier decision
(Restatement of Judgments, 2d §39) and controlled the earlier lawsuit
(Drier v. Tarpon 522 F.2d 199 (Sth Cir. 1975). In this case, on the
contrary, Macro was specifically adjudicated to have no liability and it
cannot be said to have controlled the earlier lawsuit from which they were
dismissed; it was not present at trial.
The United States Court of Appeal committed error in failing to
recognize that imposing a $2.4 million judgment against a party dismissed
months before trial raises an issue of constitutional due process.
IV. Federal Question Jurisdiction Arises From Hirai’s Colorable
Appeal On The Grounds That Hirai Has Not Been Granted A
New Trial Despite The Fact That Another Party Defendant Is
Entitled To A New Trial
It is fundamental that a judgment is not final with respect to any
defendant if it is not final with respect to all defendants. Commonwealth
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) which is adopted from Rule 54(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
...Any order or other form of decision,
however it is designated, which
adjudicates fewer than all claims or the
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to
any of the claims or parties, and the order
or other form of decision is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of
20
judgment adjudicating all the claims or
rights and liabilities of the parties.
Accordingly, a new trial against Macro necessitates a new trial for
Hirai also. This is the only way to prevent inconsistent findings of fact
and conclusions of law in a single judgment. Since the judgment is joint
and several, it cannot be based upon inconsistent findings with respect to
different parties within the same judgment.
The threat of inconsistent judgments within the same action not
only violates the Rules of Civil Procedure, it also violates due process.
The effect of inconsistent judgments is different treatment for different
defendants within the same action. This would include the threat of
different findings of fact with regard to negligence, liability, and damages,
with respect to different defendants. Such a scenario is, of course, unheard
of in the case law since it would be such a patent violation of due process.
As such, the threat herein of inconsistent judgments within the
same action, should Macro receive the trial to which it is entitled, clearly
raises a federal question. Thus the United states Court of Appeals
committed error in not taking jurisdiction of this issue.
21
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, petitioner, appellant and defendant
Nobuo Hirai respectfully requests that this honorable Court issue a writ of
certiorari and direct the United States Court of Appeals to take jurisdiction
of this matter on the grounds that the issues raised herein involve the
Constitution; treaties, or laws of the United States under 48 USC
§1694c(a).
DATED: October 15, 1994
Respectfully submitted,
Harold A. Stone
Counsel of Record
Francis M. McKeown
Gudmundson, Siggins Stone & Skinner
One Embarcadero Center, Suite 1350
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 391-4200
Counsel for Petitioner
APPENDIX A
Law Offices
Fitzgerald, Herald & Bergsma
Post Office Box 909
lst Floor, Macaranas Building
Garapen Beach Road
Saipan, MP 96950
Telephone: (670) 234-724 1/7680
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
RYOKO ITO, as Personal CIVIL ACTION NO.
Represenatative of the heirs of
AKINOBU ITO, Deceased,
Plaintiff,
vs.
OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO
HIRAI, SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI,
AND AMERICAN HOME
INSURANCE CoO.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS)
)
)
)
)
)
Defendants. )
)
JURISDICTION
1. This Court has jurisdiction persuant to the Commonwealth
Judicial Reorganization Act of 1989.
2. This is an action for the wrongful death of Akinobu Ito
hereinafter referred to as “Ito” brought by Ryoko Ito as the personal
representative hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff, that occurred while Ito
was on a scuba diving tour organized, supervised and under the complete
control o Marianas Ocean Enterprises Inc., acting through its alter ego
A-2
Macro Energy, Inc. and employees and or offecers Shigemi Yamagishi
and Nobuo Hirai.
i Plaintiff Ryoko Ito is of age and the widow of the
deceased and the mother of the two children of the deceased.
4. At all times relevant hereto defendant Macro Energy, Inc.
(MEI) was a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, acting as the alter ego of
defendant Marianas Ocean Enterprises, Inc.
5. At all times relevant hereto defendant Marianas Ocean
Enterprises, Inc. (MOE) was a corporation organixzed and existing under
the laws of the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas.
6. At all times relevant hereto defendant Nobuo Hirai (Hirai)
was employed by either MOE or MEI or both as a diving instructor and
guide.
cf At all times relevant hereto, defendants Shigemi
Yamagishi was an officer, director and/or employee of MOE and or MEI.
8. In June, 1989, the decedent Aki9nobu Ito enrolled in a
scuba diving class conducted by the defendatns for the purpose of
obtaining a license or certification as a scuba diver.
9. Defendants MOE and or MEI accepted compensation for
and undertook to train Ito as a scuba diver.
10. Despite receiving compensation for and undertakin to
train Ito as a scuba diver, the defendants were grossly deficient in the
instruction which fell far below the standard accepted in the scuba diving
industry as adequate for certification as a scuba diver.
11. In September, 1988, Ito, in the company of fellow
employees returned to Saipan for the purpose of engaging in scuba diving.
12. _ Despite the fact that defendants were aware the Ito had
had only the most rudimentary instruction in scuba diving, they accepted
compensation te guide hin cngatthe Ging ier of ngeies amine es
the Grotto, 9 lees any OO
A-3
13. Defendants also accepted compensation for the rental of
scuba diving equipment which they warranted to be fit for its intended use.
14. The dive commenced and the divers all descended into
theGrotto and proceeded through an underwater tunnel to the ocean
outside.
15. Shortly thereafter, Yasuharu Fuj itomi (Fujitomi) the dive
partner of Ito signaled that he was out of air and rose to the surface. Ito
and Hirai followed him up.
16. At the surface, Hirai found no air coming out of
Fujitomi’s rugulator and instructed him to descend breathing from Hirai’s
alternate air source known as an octopus.
ay. The three descended and proceeded to the tunnel entrance
to return to the Grotto pool.
18. At the entrance to the tunnel, Hirai checked Ito’s air
pressure gauge to determine how much air he had and the gauge read less
than 500 pounds.
19. The three proceeded into the tunnel and shortly therafter
Ito signaled thayt he had no air.
20. Hirai and Fujitomi proceeded through the tennel and
emerged safely at the surface without Ito. Hirai then returned underwater
and brough Ito to the surface and out of the water.
21. Cardio pulmonary resuscitation and mouth to mouth
resuscitation was initiated to no avail and Ito was pronounced dead at the
Commonwealth Health Center.
22. Plaintiff realleges and repeats each sand every allegation
of paragraphs | through 21 of the complaint.
23. In June, 1988, Ito enrolled in a scuba diving instruction
course and for a fee duly paoid to the defendants, the defendants agreed to
furnish Ito with scuba diving instruction to enable him to obtain a scuba
diving license and safely engage in the sport of scuba diving. Defendants
had a duty to adequately instruct Ito so that he could safely engage in the
sport of scuba diving.
A-4
24. In June, 1988, the defendants instructed Ito in scuba
diving and awarded him a certification card assuring him that he was now
adequately trained to safely engage in the sport of scuba diving.
25. Defendants failed to give the time and attention necessary
to adequately train the decedemt and failed to give sufficient instruction or
adhere to the standards of scuba diving instruction which would inhsure
that Ito could safely engage in the sport of scuba diving.
26. Defendants’ negligence included but is not limited to the
followig:
(1) failing to hire competent instructors;
(2) failing to instruct Ito in emergency procedures;
(3) failing to instruct Ito in alternate air source
breathing techniques;
(4) failing to provide sufficient classroom instruction;
and
(5) failing to provide sufficient proctical instruction.
27. The above described negligence was a proximate cause of
the death of Akinobu Ito and he was not contributory negligent.
28. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the
defendants described herein, plaintiff Ryoko Ito, wife of desedent and the
minor children of decedent Ito and Ryoko, all of whom were being
supported by the decedent prior to the time of the injury, were deprived of
the decedent’s financial support and the children who lived with the
decedent prior to the time of the injury were deprived of the help,
company, love, affection and consortium of the decedent.
29. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation of
paragraphs | through 28.
A-5
30. Defendant Shigemi Yamagishi at all times relevant was an
officer and or a director of defendant’s MEI and/or MOE, defendant Hirai
was at all times relevant an employee of MEI and/or MOE, at the time and
place of the events relevant hereto the defendants and each of them, were
members and engaged in a joint venture or common enterprise.
31. On September 22, 1988, Ito went to the dive shop of MEI
and/or MOE for the purpose of obtaining a guide for a scuba diving tour
and renting scuba diving equipment and for menetary consideration, duly
paid by Ito, defendants agreed to rent him scuba diving equipment, and
suggested that he join a scuba diving tour that was diving the Grotto,
promising to provide a guide who would give his time and attention to
insure a safe dive.
32. The defendants each and all of them were negligent in
discharging their duty to the decedent in the following respects:
(1) in recommending a scuba dive that was suitable only for
advanced divers and far above the ability of the decedent, which was
known to them.
(2) providing incompetent guides.
(3) failing to provide adequate safety instructions.
(4) providing defective equipment which both leaked air and
provided the decedent with a false reading of the amount of air left
remaining to him.
(5) failingto follow proper safety and emergency procedures
during the dive.
33. The above described negligence was a proximate cause of
the death of Akinobu Ito, and he was not contributory negligent.
34, As a direct and proximate result of the negloigence of the
defendants described herein, plaintiff Ryoko Ito, wife of decedent and the
minor children of decedent Ito and Ryoko, all of whom were being
suppoprted by the decedent prior to the time of the injury, were deprived
of the decedent’s financial support and the children who lived with the
decedent prior tothe time of injury were deprdived of the care, guidance,
support, love, and affection of the decedent and plaintiff Ryoko Ito, the
A-6
wife of the decedent was deprived of the help, company, love, affection
and consortium of the decedent.
Ill
35. Plaintiff realleges and repeats each and every allegation of
paragraphs | through 34 of the complaint.
36. On or about September 22, 1988, defendnts were each and
all of them insured by a public liability insurance policy issued by
American Home Insurance Company covering liability and damages
caused during the operation of their scuba diving instruction and tours.
37. Pursuant to the coverage contained in the said insurance
policy and pursuant to the laws of the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, plaintiff is entitledj to maintain a direct action against
defendants American Home Insurance Company and to recover against
said insurance carrier in an amount equal to any judgment recovered
against defendants.
IV
38. Plaintiff realleges and repeats each and every allegation of
paragraphs | through 37 of the complaint.
39. Defendant MEI is and at all times mentioned was the alter
ego of defendant MOE, and there exists and at all times herein mentioned
had existed, a unity of interest and ownership between defendants such
that any separateness between them has ceased to exist,in that defendant
MOE completely controlled, dominated, managed, and operated both
corporate defendants and intermingled the assets of each to suit the
convenience of MOE by intermingling the funds of both companies and
failing to observe any corporate formalities or have any separate accounts
or meetings.
40. Defendant MOE operated its business through its alter ego
MEI in order to avoid potential liability and to avoid creditors, and all
claims of corporate separateness are a sham.
41. Defendants MEI and MOE are both responsible for the
acts alleged herein. wired
A-7
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants
individually, jointly and severally as follows;
l. For general damages according to proof.
2. For damages as alleged above by the widow for loss of
maintenance, support, counsel and affection in an amount to be
determined at trial;
3. For damages and loss as described above for the two
children, in an amount to be determined at trial;
4. For costs and attorney’s fees due to the gross and
negligent conduct of the Defendants in causing the death of the Akinobu
Ito.
3. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem
proper.
Dated this 14the day of September, 1989.
FITGERALD, HERALD & BERGSMA
Attorneys at Law
William M. Fitgerald
APPENDIX B
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANAS
RYOKO ITO, as Personal ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 89-918
Representative of the heirs of )
AKINOBU ITO, Deceased, )
)
Plaintiff, )
vs. ) ANSWER
)
MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS _)
OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO HIRAI,)
SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI, and AMERICAN)
HOME INSURANCE CO., )
)
Defendants. )
p19
COMES NOW Defendants, Macro Energy, Inc., Nobuo Hirai, Shigemi
Yamagishi, and American Home Assurance Co., severing themselves from
the other Defendant named herein and answer that Complaint filed against
then an follows:
1. Deny each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 10, 12, 13,
15, 16, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 40 and 41.
2. State, with respect to those allegations contained in paragraphs 2, 3,
4, 5, 8, 9 and 11, that answering Defendants do not have sufficient
information and belief with which to admit or deny the allegations
contained in said numbered paragraphs and based thereon deny each and
every allegation contained in said paragraphs.
3. Answering Defendants hereby answer the allegations incorporated
by reference by paragraphs 22, 29, 35 and 38 by incorporating the answers
previously furnished herein to those incorporated paragraphs as their
answer to those paragraphs.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief may
se be granted and therefore should be dismissed.
— jh A NE
B-2
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ,
The deceased, Mr. Ito, prior to participating in the dive which is
the subject matter of Plaintiff's complaint, executed and delivered to
Defendant Macro Energy Incorporated a release in writing whereby the
deceased Ito, released the Defendants and forever discharged then from
the claims set forth in tire Complaint and from any and all claims against
Defendants.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
If Plaintiffs’ suffered any of the damages alleged in their
complaint, the decedent assumed the risk of such injuries and damages are
decadent's own voluntary assumption of the risk was the proximate cause
of Plaintiffs’ damages.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
If Plaintiffs’ suffered any of the damages alleged in their
complaint, such damages were proximately caused by decadent’s own
negligence and Plaintiffs’ cannot recover against Defendants for such
damages.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
If Piaintiffs' suffered any of the damages alleged in their
complaint, such damages were proximately caused by decedent's own
negligence which was greater than or equal to any allege negligence of
Defendants (which negligence in hereby denied) which requires the
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint or the reduction of any recovery by
Plaintiffs’ by the percentage of cause negligence attributable to decedent.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
If Plaintiffs’ suffered any of the damages alleged in their
complaint, such were caused and resulted from natural at unavoidable
causes beyond the control of Defendants. —
WHEREFORE, answering Defendants pray for relief as follows:
1. That the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
2. That Defendants recover their costs.
3. For such other and future relief as the Court may deem just and
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of October, 1989.
e PT wr ‘a tp out “x
IST ey > PP a Le a hee) att a
END B
B-3
MOORE, CHING, BOERTZEL & LAWLOR
A Professional Corporation
Counsel for Defendants Mack
Energy, Inc. , Nobuo Hirai
Shigemi Yamagishi and American
Home Insurance Co.,
By PAUL A. LAWLOR
A Licensed Employee
APPENDIX C
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
RYOKO ITO, as Personal ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 89-918
Representative of the heirs
of AKINOBU ITO, Deceased,
Plaintiff,
v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS)
OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO )
HIRAI, SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI, and)
AMERICAN HOME INSURANCE CO,)
)
Defendants. )
)
Pursuant to the Memorandum Decision entered this date;
IT IS ADJUDGED the plaintiff take nothing by her complaint against
Macro Energy, Inc., Nobuo Hirai, Shigemi Yamagishil and American
Home Insurance Co. Defendants are entitled to their court costs.
Dated at Saipan, MP, 17th day of December, 1990.
Robert A. Hefner, Presiding Judge
END C
APPENDIX D
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
RYOKO ITO, as Personal ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 89-918
Representative of the heirs
Of AKINOBU ITO, Deceased,
Plaintiff,
v. MEMORANDUM DECISION
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS)
OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO )
HIRAI, SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI, and)
AMERICAN HOME INSURANCE CO,)
)
Defendants. )
met
FACTS /1/
In June of 1988, the decedent, Akinobu Ito became a certified
scuba diver after successfully completing an instruction course sponsored
by a Japanese scuba diving sanctioning organization know as "A.D.S.
Japan” and taught by defendant Shigemi Yamagishi, president of
defendant Macro Energy, Inc. (Macro) in Saipan. Ito's instruction included
10
/i/
These facts (except for those relating to Ito's initial visit to Saipan)
are taken from defendants’ memorandum in support of their motion for
summary judgment, pp. 6-11. The plaintiff does not dispute these facts.
See, plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendants’ motion.
D-2
hours of classroom instruction, a minimum of 3 hours in the water with
scuba gear and a written test. In the first session of the course, students
are taught how to fit their masks and regulators and how to clear their ears
and masks while wearing full scuba gear. The second session consists of
diving, underwater stabilization, ascension, proper wearing of the gear and
"buddy breathing." Ito was also taught how to make an "emergency
ascent" in an "out-of-air" situation. The A. D. S. certification contains no
restriction preventing certified divers from diving in caves or tunnels.
Upon completion of the certification course, Ito and his friend,
Yosuhiro Fujitomi went on a guided dive of Saipan's Grotto without
incident./2/
Several months later on September 24, 1988, Ito, and several of his
friends including Fujitomi returned to Saipan and went to Macro to sign-
up for a guided dive of Saipan's Grotto taking place that day. Macro's
professional dive instructors, defendants Yamagishi and Nabuo Hirai,
were to act as guides and supervise the dive.
While at Macro, Ito was asked to read and sign an "Agreement for
Exemption from Obligation" (Exemption Agreement) included in an
Application for Scuba Diving and Invoice
/2/
The Grotto is a popular Saipan dive spot which is essentially a small
pool surrounded by natural rock formations. Those diving the Grotto enter
the pool and descend approximately 30 meters to the bottom and enter any
of three tunnels leading to the open ocean.
\
prepared by Macro. Ito signed and dated the Exemption Agreement. The
terms of the Exemption Agreement were printed in both Japanese and
English. The terms, as printed in English are reprinted verbatim as
follows:
I submitted an application for participating
in the diving tour and or training program
D-3
to be conducted by your agency, I fully
accept and understand that such a diving
tour and training involves basic risk and
danger. if we fail to abide by the rules
and regulations set by the guides and
instructors and, if we neglect the diving
rules, we realize that we may risk our
lives. All the risks that we may have
during the period of stay here belong to
each of us personally. In case of accident,
causing injury or death to myself, I myself,
my family, or inherited organization and
other related personnel shall have no right
to protest against nor to claim for
damages. we hereby swear to abide by and
act at the rules and instructions set by the
guides and instructors. Also I am fully a
grown up at law and I acknowledge the fact
that I am fully qualified to sign this
agreement, to verify the exemptions from all
the claims for damages. All the items in
this application are to be decided by the
agreement, and I personally sign this
document at my own will rather than someone
directing me to sign this paper.
There were 15 divers, including Ito and his friends who were to be
guided by Yamagishi, and Hirai at this particular dive at the Grotto. Ito
rented his scuba gear from Macro. All of the divers assembled and
inspected their scuba gear at Macro's shop before leaving for the Grotto.
The equipment inspection included an air check of the tanks. Ito and his
dive "buddy" Fujitomi complained about a noise coming from Ito's gear
but this noise was determined not to be a problem by Hirai.
Upon arriving at the Grotto and after a briefing by Yamagishi, ito and
the other divers entered the Grotto's pool accompanied by Hirai and
Yamagishi. At the surface of the pool, one of the group could not clear
her ears and was told to remain on the surface. The remaining group
members then descended to the bottom of the Grotto with Yamagishi in
the lead and Hirai in the rear. The group entered the center tunnel of the
Grotto, exited at the other end and proveeded to an area approximately 20
D-4
meters deep whereupon Yamagishi checked the group's air gauges. After
the air check, the group proceeded back to the tunnel.
At this point, Hirai noticed Fujitomi having problems with his regulator
and went to assist him. Fujitomi headed for the surface followed by Ito,
despite Hirai's signals to remain below.
Upon reaching Fujitomi, Hirai gave him his main regulator and used
one of the two spare regulators included in his gear for his own air
supply./3/ At the surface, Hirai tested Fujitomi's regulator and found it
difficult to breathe from. Hirai then gave Fujitomi the spare regulator and
took
/3/
Although it is unclear from the deposition testimony, at some point
during the ascent to the surface, Hirai signalled to Yamagishi that things
were "O.K." Upon receiving this signal from Hirai, Yamagishi took the
remaining 12 divers back through the tunnel and up to the pool's surface.
his Gwn regulator back from Fujitomi The three divers then descended and
headed back to the tunnel entrance. At this point Ito had between 400 to
500 pounds of air remaining in his tank while Hirai's own tank had
approximately 1,500 pounds of air remaining. According to Hirai, Ito had,
"plenty of air to return by.”
Upon entering the tunnel with Fujitomi and Ito, Hirai began to pull
himself along the tunnel wall with his right arm while holding Fujitomi
with his left arm. At this point Ito was moving along the wall with Hirai
and ‘Fujitomi. Approximately midway through the tunnel, Ito signalled
Hirai that he was out of air whereupon Hirai gave Ito his main regulator.
After ensuring that Ito was breathing through the regulator, Hirai, now
using the second spare regulator, continued along the wall. Hirai last
confirmed Ito's presence at about 10 feet from the pool's surface. At the
surface, Hirai discovered that Ito was not with him. Looking underwater,
Hirai saw Ito hovering approximately 10 feet below. Hirai descended and
brought Ito to the surface where efforts to revive him failed, The
D-5
Certificate of Death states the cause of death as "asphyxia due to
drowning."
PLEADINGS
The plaintiff, Ryoko Ito, decedent Ito's wife, subsequently filed this
wrongful death action as personal representative of the deceased. The
complaint 3 lleged negligence on the part of Macro in two counts. The
first count alleges that Macro failed to provide adequate instruction and
train the decedent in the sport of scuba diving while the second count
alleges a breach of Macro's duty to recommend a safe place to dive,
provide competent guides and properly working equipment, and follow
proper safety and emergency procedures during the dive. The third and
fourth counts are drafted to extend liability to Marianas Ocean Enterprises
(MOE) as the alter ego of Macro and American Home Assurance Co. as
the insurer of Macro and MOE.
Defendants Macro, Hirai, Yamagishi and American Home Assurance
Co. now move for summary judgment against the plaintiff maintaining
that, as a matter of law, the Exemption Agreement bars the plaintiff's
claim for all damages against the defendants, including those proximately
caused by any negligence on their part.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A summary judgment will be granted only if there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Com.R.Civ.Pro. Rule 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). To withstand a motion for summary
judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are genuine factual
issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they
may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. 106 S.Ct. at 2511.
The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of a plaintiff's
DISCUSSION
D-6
At common law there was no cause of action for wrongful death; the
right to bring such an action is strictly statutory. Flowers v. Hyatt, 1 CR
693 (C.T.C. 1983). The Commonwealth's wrongful death statute (7 CMC
QQQQ 2101 - 2103 creates a cause of action for wrongful death in the
Commonwealth. Pursuant to 7 CMC QQ 2101(a), the plaintiff, as personal
representative of the decedent, is entitled to maintain this action and
recover any damages to the extent that the decedent would have been
entitled to maintain an action and recover damages for injuries had he not
died.
Conceding the truth of the allegations of negligence contained in the
plaintiff's complaint for purposes of this motion only, the defendants argue
that the Exemption Agreement's language includes any acts of negligence
by the defendants and thus operates as a bar to the plaintiff's cause of
action.
In her opposition to the defendants' motion, the plaintiff first contends
that the defendants misconstrue the waiver provisions of the Application
of Scuba Diving and Invoice. She points cut that under the section entitled
"Invoice" which appears at the bottom of the Application for Scuba Diving
and Invoice, there is another waiver provision that is unsigned. This
provision which is printed in English only, reads as follows:
1, (sic) fully check the equipment and
everything are (sic) confirmed. I, the
undersigned not (sic) hold the Macro Energy,
Inc. responsible nor liable any (sic)
diving, fishing boating (sic) accidents. I
will return the equipment ....
The plaintiff argues that the Exemption Agreement released the
defendants from liability for inherent risks of diving generally, while the
second, unsigned waiver specifically waives liability for defective
equipment. Relying on the general rule of contracts holding that when a
contract has two provisions, one general and one specific, the specific
provision controls over the general provision, the plaintiff concludes that
the second unsigned waiver provision operates to limit the scope of the
Exemption Agreement, thus denying the defendants insulation from
liability for negligent issuance of defective scuba diving equipment. This
argument is without merit.
D-7
Assuming arguendo that the Application for Scuba Diving and Invoice
is a contract between Ito and Macro,/4/
/4/
The court makes no finding on this issue.
since Ito never signed the second waiver provision, it never became part of
the "contract." As such, the plaintiff's cited contract rule is inapplicable.
/5/
The plaintiff next attacks the Exemption Agreement itself, claiming
that unless an agreement clearly and unequivocally provides for the
release of another's negligence, that obligation will not be inferred.
Charles Poe Masonry, Inc. V. Spring Lock Scaffolding Rental Equipment
Co., 374 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1979). Citing Madison v. Superior Court, 250
Cal.Rptr. 299 (1988), the plaintiff maintains that the Exemption
Agreement must specifically refer to the defendants’ negligence in order to
include such negligence within its waiver terms. The plaintiff has cited
other cases which she claims support the above rule of law. See, O’Connel
v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1982); Sivaslian v.
Rawlins, 451 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1987). The defendants, on the other hand.
have cited cases wherein it was held that 2 release did not have to
specifically waive liability for negligence in order to bar claims based on
negligence. See, Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Sumkin, 784 P.2d 781 (Cole.
1989); Hewitt v.
/5/
The court notes that the Application for Scuba Diving and Invoice is
distinctly divided into two parts, the first being the scuba application and
the second being the invoice. At the hearing on the motion, defendants
counsel explained that the waiver provision in the invoice section would
only be signed if the customer were renting equipment and diving oa bis
own rather than as a member of a dive supervised by Macro, im which case
the Exemption Agreement would be signed by the customer, as Ito did.
D-8
Miller 521 P.2d 244 (Wash. Ct.App. 1974); Trainer v. Azatlan Cycle
Club, Inc., 442 N. W. 2d 626 (Wis. 1988).
While none of the above cited cases are controlling in the
Commonwealth, they are instructive and, at the very least, indicate a split
of authority on the issue of whether a release must specifically refer to
negligent conduct in order to act as a bar to claims based upon negligence.
At the very most, all of the cases are in agreement that a waiver of liability
must be clear and unambiguous. In any event, Section 496 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) is dispostive and controlling on this
issue./6/ Section 496 B provides:
A plaintiff who by contract or otherwise
expressly agrees to accept a risk of harm
arising from the defendant's negligent or
reckless conduct cannot recover for such
harm, unless the agreement is invalid as
contrary to public policy.
By signing the Exemption Agreement, Ito acknowledged that "all the
risks" that he would be exposed to on the dive were his alone. Moreover,
Ito expressly agreed to forego all claims for damages in the event of a
diving accident causing
6/
In all proceedings, the rules of the common law, as expressed in the
restatement of the law approved by the American Law Institute and, to the
extent not so expressed as Generally understood and applied in the United
States, shall be the rules of decision in the courts of the Commonwealth, in
the absence of written law or local customary law to the contrary;
provided, that no person shall be subject to criminal prosecution except
under the written law of the Commonwealth. See 7 CMC QQ 3401.
D-9
his injury or death. Clearly, the unambiguously expressed intent of the
parties to the Exemption Agreement was to extinguish liability. In signing
the Exemption Agreement, Ito also acknowledged that he had read and
fully understood its terms. Moreover, Ito understood that equipment
failure was an obvious risk of scuba diving inasmuch as his training
included what to do in "out-of-air" situations. Under these circumstances,
it is reasonable to conclude, as a matter of law, that Ito expressly agreed to
accept a risk of harm arising from the defendants’ negligent conduct.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any claim that Ito, or in this case, the
plaintiff, could have brought that would not have been based on
negligence. To construe the Exemption Agreement in any other manner
would render it essentially meaningless.
The plaintiff begins her next argument by erroneously asserting that the
defendants’ motion rests on Hirai's belief that Ito died of a ruptured lung
caused by holding his breath while surfacing, a violation of a basic diving
rule. Proceeding on the false premise that the Exemption Agreement
operates to relieve the defendants of liability only if Ito violated a diving
rule the plaintiff asserts that Hirai is unqualified to assert a medical
opinion of Ito's death. The plaintiff then concludes that the defendants
have failed to show that Ito violated a diving rule, thus precluding the
Exemption Agreement from serving as a basis for summary judgment.
While the defendants’ statement of facts did include Hirai's hypothesis
as to the cause of Ito's death, the defendants also stated that for our poses
of their motion, it made no difference how Ito died (Defendants’ Memo. at
p. 12). The defendants further slate that their motion rests upon Ito's
knowing, voluntary and express waiver of his right to sue for damages in
the event of his injury., Since the court's interpretation of the Exemption
Agreement necessarily compels its rejection of the plaintiff's interpretation
of the Exemption Agreement that is a premise of plaintiff's argument now
under discussion, there is no need to consider the argument further.
Finally, the plaintiff argues that even if the Exemption Agreement
applies to the defendants’ negligent acts, it does not release them from
those acts constituting willful and wanton misconduct. willful or wanton
misconduct falls between simple negligence and an intentional tort and is
sufficient where an actor knows, or has reason to know, of circumstances
which would bring home to the realization of the ordinary reasonable
person the highly dangerous character of his conduct. Liberty Furniture v.
Sonitrol of Spokane, 770 P.2d 1086 (Wash. Ct.App. 1989).
D-10
Because a determination of whether conduct in a particular case .
constitutes willful and wanton misconduct is greatly dependent upon the
particular facts of each case, it is generally within the peculiar province of
the jury to consider whether the actor's conduct can be so designated. 57A
Am.Jur.2d, Negligence, QQ 307. Where, however, there is insufficient
evidence regarding an element of the pertinent type of conduct, the issue
should not be submitted to the jury. Id.
The plaintiff relies, to a large extent, on the statement of Robert
Campbell, who tested Ito's equipment after the accident (see, Campbell
Statement attached to Hirai's dep.) and Hirai's deposition testimony to
raise the issue of the defendants’ willful and wanton misconduct. Since
Campbell's statement is not in affidavit form as required by Rule 56, its
contents will not be considered by the court. Colan v. Cutler-Hammer,
Inc., 812 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1987). Moreover, even if the Campbell
statement were admissible and considered with plaintiff's cited Hirai
deposition testimony in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, this
evidence would be, as a matter of law, far short of that which would
require its submission to a jury on the issue of willful and wanton
misconduct.
In summary, the court concludes as a matter of law that under any fact
scenario plaintiff advocates as a basis for her wrongful death action
against the movants, the Exemption Agreement signed by Ito bars
recovery.
Dated at Saipan, MP, this 17th day of December, 1990.
Robert A. Hefner, Presiding Judge
END D
ne Tia th a
wee TARE ad
APPENDIX E
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
RYOTO ITO, as Personal ) CIVIL ACTION NO.
Representative of the heirs )
of AKINOBU TIO, Deceased, )
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS _)
OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO HIRAI,)
SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI,and AMERICAN)
HOME INSURANCE CO., )
Defendant.
Upon the motion of the plaintiff to amend the summary judgment
entered December 17, 1990 and for the reasons state in the Memorandum
Decision entered this date;
The summary judgment is amended to read:
IT IS ADJUDGED the plaintiff take nothing by the complaint
against Macro Energy, Inc., and Marianas Ocean Enterprises. Those
defendants are entitled to court costs.
Dated at Saipan, MP, this 28 day of January, 1991.
Robert A. Hefner, Presiding Judge
END E
OT te, eae eee ee
APPENDIX F
MOORE, CHING, BOERTZEL & LAWLOR,
A Professional Corporation
Suits 400, GCIC Building
414 West Soledad Avenue
Agana, Guam 96910
Telephone: (671) 477-9708
Of Counsel:
CARLSMITH BALL WICHMAN MURRAY
CASE MUKAI & ICHIKI
Carlsmith Building
Capitol Hill
Saipan, MP 96950
Telephone: (670) 322-3455/6
Attorneys for Defendants
‘Nobuo Hirai and Shigemi Yamagishi
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
: COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
RYOKO ITO, as Personal yCIVIL CASE NO. 89-918
Representative of the heirs )
: of AKINOBU ITO, Deceased, )
:
)
Plaintiff, )
) )
vs. ) AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS
) L. ROBERTS
MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS)
OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO )
HIRAI, SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI )
and AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE)
Z
F-2
I, THOMAS L. ROBERTS, being first duly sworn, do hereby depose
and state upon my oath:
1. That I am a Director and Shareholder in the law firm of Moore,
Ching, Boertzel & Lawlor, P.C., the attorneys of record for Shigemi
Yamagishi and Nobuo Hirai in the above-referenced action;
2. That at approximately 3:31 p.m. during the afternoon of June 21,
1991, this office received via facsimile a June 21, 1991 settlement offer
made by Plaintiff, wherein the case was to be dismissed against Nobuo
Hirai on the condition that "Mr. Hirai will meet with a (sic) expert of
Plaintiff's choosing to discuss the events surrounding this case and his
employment in Saipan" and on the condition that 'Mr. Hirai agrees to
testify at the trial". A true and correct copy of the facsimile copy of this
settlement offer and the facsimile transmittal page are attached hereto as
Exhibits "A" and "B";
3. That at approximately 4:19 p.m. that same day, I caused Plaintiff's
settlement offer to be sent via facsimile to Mr. Hirai, in care of Macro
Energy, Inc. in Saipan, along with a cover letter. True and correct copies
of our firm's facsimile confirmation slip and the confirmation copy of the
cover letter are attached hereto as Exhibits "C" and "D";
4. That in the late afternoon of June 21, or June 22, 1991, Mr.
Fitzgerald telephoned me to confirm that I had transmitted Plaintiff's
settlement offer to Mr. Hirai;
5. That on June 25, 1991 at the Macro Energy dive shop in Saipan, I
met with Shigemi Yamagishi and Nobuo Hirai, both together and
separately, for several hours, discussing Mr. Fitzgerald's settlement offer.
A true and correct copy of Mr. Fitzgerald's offer, bearing Mr. Hirai's
signature and evidencing his receipt of the same, is attached hereto as
Exhibit "E";
6. That at the conclusion of our meetings at approximately 2:30 p.m.
on June 25, 1991, at Macro Energy's dive shop, a Macro Energy employee
typed an unconditional written acceptance of Mr. Fitzgerald's offer with
signature spaces for both Mr. Hirai and myself, which we executed at that
time. A true and correct copy of this executed acceptance is attached
hereto as Exhibit "F";
F-3
7. That after Mr. Hirai and I executed the acceptance, I told Mr. Hirai
to take three hours to think about our discussions by himself, and that if he
still wanted to accept the settlement offer, he should telephone me at the
Hyatt Regency Saipan just prior to 5:30 p.m. that evening, whereupon |
would fax our written acceptance to Mr. Fitzgerald's office;
8. That sometime between 5:00 and 5:15 p.m. on June 25, 199l,a
Macro Energy employee telephoned me at the Hyatt Regency Saipan to
inform me that Mr. Hirai wanted to accept the settlement offer, and that I
should go ahead and fax our acceptance, at which time Mr. Hirai came on
the line and reconfirmed his desire to accept the settlement offer;
9. That commencing at exactly 5:30 p.m. on June 25, 1991, I caused
Hyatt Regency Saipan employees to send via facsimile to Mr. Fitzgerald's
office both Mr. Hirai's written acceptance of Plaintiffs settlement offer
and a copy of the offer itself bearing Mr. Hirai’s signature. True and
correct copies of the facsimile confirmation pages for both the acceptance
as well as the offer bearing Mr. Hirai's signature are attached hereto as
Exhibits "G" and "H";
10. That the next day, shortly after heated arguments in the morning in
Saipan's Superior Court on Mr. Fitzgerald's renoticed motion for summary}
judgment on the "air’ issue, but prior to the afternoon arguments on the
"Judicial admission" issue, just outside the door of Courtroom A and
within earshot of Mr. Hirai, and within the presence of Mr. Horiguchi, Mr.
Fitzgerald told me the settlement was off,
11. That at that time I informed Mr. Fitzgerald that as far as | was
concerned, we had a binding agreement and I did not accept his
repudiation, whereupon Mr. Fitzgerald told me that the deal was
“contingent’ or ‘conditioned™ on Mr. Hirai testifying consistently with his
deposition testimony, which was an apparent reference to an Affidavit
executed by Mr. Hirai and filed on his behalf at 10:07 a.m. earlier that
day;
12. That at no time during that conversation did Mr. Fitzgerald refer to
any written materials or oral communications other than Mr. Hirar's
deposition testimony;
13. That one day later, I received a June 27, 1991 facsimile
transmission from Mr. Fitzgerald formally withdrawing the settlement
F-4
offer, which had been unconditionally accepted two days earlier, a true
and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "I";
14. That I have personal knowledge of the matters attested to herein,
and if called, could testify competently thereto; and Further your Affiant
sayeth naught.
THOMAS L. ROBERTS
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1 1th day of September,
1991.
Notary Public |
Hole boom peakpc Ef :
poet Yate ‘it Bhs igen Bes ask: romelase 2
> ee re
LAW OFFICES
WILLIAM M. FITZGERALD
June 21, 1991
John E. Moore, Esq.
Moore, Ching, Boertzel & Lswlor
Suite 400, GCIC Building
414 West Sledad Avenue
Agana, Guam 96910
Re: Ito v. MOE, et al.
Dear Mr. Moore:
This will constitute Plaintiff's offer to defendant Nobuo Hirai to
dismiss the case with prejudice against him under the following
conditions:
a) Mr. Hirai will meet with a expert of Plaintiff's choosing to
discuss the events surrounding this case and his employment in Saipan.
b) Mr. Hirai agrees to testify at the trial.
There is a treaty between the United States and Japan which
allows execution in Japan and if a judgment is obtained against Mr. Hirai
we intend to pursue all avenues open to us to execute on any of his assests.
This offer therefore provides a very significant benefit to your client and j
hope that you will communicate it to him as expeditiously as possible.
Sincerely yours,
WILLIAM M. FITGERALD
F-6
June 25, 1991
William M. Fitzgerald, Esq.
P.O. Box 909
ist Fir., Macaranas Bldg.,
Garapan, Saipan MP 96950
Re: Ito vs. Macro Energy, Inc.
Civil Action 918-89
Dear Mr. Fitzgerald:
My client, NOBUO HIRAI, unconditionally accepts the offer to settle
the case against him contained in your letter of June 21, 1991 under the |
terms specified therein.
THOMAS L. ROBERTS
NOBUO HIRAI
pee og oR ae
F-7
LAW OFFICES
WILLIAM M. FITZGERALD
June 27, 1991
Thomas L. Roberts, Esq.
Moore, Ching, Boertzel & Lawlor
Suite 400, GCIC Building
414 West Soledad Avenue
Agana, Guam 96910
Re: Ito v. MOE, et al.
Dear Mr. Roberts:
The offer to setle with Nobuo Hirai was made in the good faith
belief that while e might not agree with everything that he had to say, he
would testify consistently with previous testimony and admissions. The
patently perjurious affidavit submitted at 10:07 a.m. yesterday makes a
mockery of that and our offer is hereby withdrawn.
We sincerely would like to settle this matter with Mr. Hirai but
feel that your continued representation of both these defendants prevents
this since Mr. Hirai is being used to protect Yamagishi.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM M. FITGERALD
END F (including Exhibits)
APPENDIX G
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE .
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
RYOKO ITO, as Personal CIVIL ACTION No. 89-918
Representative of the heirs
of AKINOBU ITO, Deceased,
Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)
)
. )
VS. )
: )
MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS)
OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO )
HIRAI, SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI, )
and AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE)
)
)
Defendants. )
)
This matter came before the Court for trial on May 26, 1992 Based on
the matters adduced at trial good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED and DECREED that:
1. Plaintiff shall have judgment over and against defendants for
general damages in the amount of $2,434,857.55.
2. Plaintiff is entitled to costs as may be taxed by the Clerk of Court.
SO ORDERED this 22nd day of June, 1992.
PEDRO M. ATALIG
Presiding Judge
APPENDIX H
MAIR, MAIR, SPADE & THOMPSON
A Professional Corporation.
Attorneys at Law Suite 807, GCIC Building
414 West Soledad Avenue
Agana, Guam 96910
Telephone: (671) 472-2089/2090
Attorneys for Defendant
American Home Assurance Co.
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
RYOKO ITO, as Personal CIVIL ACTION No. 89-918
Representative of the heirs
of AKINOBU ITO, Deceased,
vs. AMENDED JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
)
MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS)
OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO )
HIRAI, SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI, )
and AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE)
)
)
Defendants. )
)
This matter came before the Court for trial on May 26, 1992.
Based on the matters addressed at trial and good cause appearing, it is
hereby ADJUDGED and DECREED that:
1, Plaintiff shall have judgment over and against defendants
Yamagishi and Hirai for general damages in the amount of $2,434,857.5>.
2. _ Plaintiff shall have judgment over and against defendant
American Home Assurance Co. for general damages in the amount of
$100,000 ofthe sbove stated sum, pareuant to the Commonweal Dees
H-2
Action Statute and the terms and limits of the applicable policy of
insurance.
3. Plaintiff is entitled to costs as may be taxed by the Clerk
of Court.
SO ORDERED this 10the day of August, 1992.
PEDRO M. ATALIG
Presiding Judge
APPENDIX I
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
RYOKO ITO, as Personal
Representative of the heirs
of AKINOBU ITO, Deceased,
CIVIL ACTION No. 89-918
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
)
)
)
VS. )
)
MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS)
OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO )
HIRAI, SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI, )
and AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE)
)
Defendants.
—~—" ~~
REPORTERS TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL
The Honorable Pedro Atalig, Judge
May 26, 1992-June 5, 1992
Tuesday, May 26, 1992
Vol I of XIV
Pages 1-108
Appearances:
For the Plaintiff: William M. Fitzgerald, Esq.
For the Defendants:
Nobuo Hirai, Shigemi Yamagishi Law Offices of
Moore, Ching & Boertzel
by: H. Thomas Evans, Esq.
Thomas L. Roberts, Esq.
American Home Assurance Co. Law Offices of
Mair, Mair & Spade
by: Randall Todd Thompson. Esq
]-2
THE COURT: We're at trial.
MR. FITZGERALD: _ In the evening? I mean, to put him on the witness
stand without any opportunity for me to...
THE COURT: Are the parties ready for trial, or not/
MR. FITZGERALD: We’re ready, your Honor.
THE COURT; But I...taking a deposition of the witness during
trial is...anything else?
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, your Honor, there is one further point. Well,
just the...the question of the...there’s another motion outstanding. The
defendants have filed amotion to enforce a setlement, and this had never
been set, and one of the points of the settlement was that the person who
was Offered the settlement, who agreed tothe settlement, was to cooperate
to the plaintiff prior to the trial. So, I think the whole thing is pretty much
moot at this point, and I would just request, or ask the court that this
motion be denied or deemed untimely, orwhatever, so we don’t have to be
bothered with it.
THE COURT; I think there’s another motion...a motionfor
summary judgment?
MR. FITZGERALD: That’s right.
THE COURT; And these were not heard, were they?
MR. FITZGERALD: _ Right, that’s...I should have clar...I think we both
should have clarified that in our pretrial statements. My position and
understanding on that motion for summary judgment is that when we went
in to that motion we were operating on the...with the understanding that
the defendants had admitted that Mr. Ito. the decedent, had run out of air.
And this also had something to do with the settlement offer. And then, I
believe this was last June, the response came back that in fact Mr. Ito had
not run out of air, that he had...and Mr. Hirai, the defendant, came up with
a new affidavit. We filed a motion in front of Judge Hefner, requesting
that the defendants be held to their judicial admission, and a hearing was
had on that in which Judge Hefner stated that he felt that either Mr. Hirai
1-3
had misled his counsel, or his counsel had misled me, the plaintiff, but that
he would allow them to basically withdraw their admission. So with
withdrawal of the admission, basically, whether or not he ran out ofair
became a factual issue, and I think that the summary judgment motion that
we filed probably should be withdrawn at this point. And then...so, but the
other issue is the settlement motion. | think it’s kind of moot at this point
and I just ask that it be denied.
MR. EVANS: I think Mr. Roberts would like to argue that
motion, oif we can have just five minutes on that motion, because we
thought the offer had been made and accepted. So, that would not make it
moot.
THE COURT: But the motion was never heard.
MR. EVANS: That’s right, you Honor. But, I mean, our position
was that an offer of settlement had been made and that it was accepted,
and I...
THE COURT: Yes, but before you could bring up before the
court, you have to notice this thing, and set it for hearing.
MR. ROBERTS: If I can explain, your Honor. My name is Thomas
Roaberts. I’m with the same firm as Mr. Evans. Mr. Evans will be trying
the case. I’m along for logistical support. The motion was filed initially
last September, for the reasons stated in my affidavit filed that date. In
October the Superior Court certified certain decisions under Rule 54(b)
and the whole case went up to the Supreme Court. It didn’t return the
Superior Court until January. In the intervening months, there was an
agreement entered between counsel that the motion wouldn’t be heard
until Mr. Fitzgerald had a chance to take Mr. Hirai’s deposition a second
time, to ask him about the offending affidavit that purportedly caused Mr.
Fitzgerald to repudiate his settlement offer. Through a series of
scheduling difficulties, Mr. Hirai’s deposition wasn’t taken again until
April 9the, only a month and a half ago. On April 7, Mr. Thompson and I
appeared here on a defferent motion...two different motions in the same
case, and basically, Judge Castro let us know he didn’t want to hear any
more motions. So, I’m just doing the best I can for Mr. Hirai, you Honor.
I’ve raised it. If your Honor is willing to hear it today or at some point
during the trial, we’d like to argue it. If your Honor would prefer that it be
a matter of proof at some time during the trial, then that would be
acceptable to us, too. But there is a reason for why it hasn’t been heard
1-4
yet, and that was scheduling difficulties, and an agreement of counsel that
the hearing would’t go forward until Mr. Hirai’s deposition could be
retaken.
MR. FITZGERALD: _ I would take some issue with that. This point,
again, goes back to last summer, and the settlement offer was revoked
after Mr. Hirai filed his affidavit, changing what we had perceived as a
judicial admission. Subsefquent to that,the motion to enforce the
settlement was filed, and my position was, fine. I want to take Hirai’s
deposition. This was proabably in August or September. Counsel for the
other side agreed. Mr. Hirai was off in Tokido, various times were
discussed, and I believe agreed to, in early October, and Mr. Roberts is
right that the case was certified, but actually, now as I recall it, it was up
in...I think more importantly though, between October and February, when
the Supreme Court dismissed the 54(b) certification...dismissed the appeal,
the case came back down to this court. I believe it was the early part of
February, the middle part of February. At that time I set a deposition,
noticed a deposition for Mr. Hirai in Saporo, Japan. I got the permission
signed and reserved the room in Saporo, went through all the cumbersome
procedure to do his deposition in Japan. Mr. Evans suggested to me that it
could be done cheaper if they brought Mr. Hirai to Guam. So | said, fine.
So the deposition was set for March Ist...or the first week of March. Mr.
Evans suggested that we do it in Guam. I said, fine, anytime in March we
can do the deposition in Guam. I was then informed that Mr. Hirai would
not be able to come to Guam until some time after April 8. So, I had set
up the deposition for March first, it would have been done at that point,
except for the request of the defendants and their representation that they
would have him in Guam. After making that representation, they had to
withdraw it because he had to work and couldn’t come to Guam, so his
deposition wasn’t taken until April 8, or April 9, but it was taken then, and
they still haven’t filed the motion. Just because Judge Castro gave them a
hard time about some other motions, that’s no excuse for them not filing
or resetting this motion. And like I said, the time is over. I mean, the part
of the settlement was that he’d cooperate, and now once again we’re ready
to start trial, so the failure to have that issue resolved is clearly on the
doorstep of the defendant.
THE COURT: We have about seven files this thick here, and
these are matters that should have been taken up before trial. That’s why I
asked the parties, “are you ready for trial?” Now, at this point, to entertain
this motion, the court will not...will deny the motion.
I-5
MR. FITZGERALD: Your Honor, I have agreed to admit all of the
exhibits of the defendant. I submitted to them this morning, a marked
copy of our exhibits and asked if we have an agreement on these exhibits.
If not, which ones are...
THE COURT: Counsel?
MR. EVANS: I didn’t hear the question, your Honor.
APPENDIX J
Consolidated Appeal Nos. 92-020 and 92-022
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
RYOKO ITO, as Personal Representative
of the heirs of AKINOBU ITO, Deceased
Plaintiff,
V.
MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS OCEAN
ENTERPRISES, NOBUO HIRAI, SHIGEMI
YAMAGISHI AND AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO.
Defendants.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA | SLANDS
OPENING BRIEF
OF
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT NOBUO HIRAI
VINCENTE T. SALAS, ESQ. HAROLD A. STONE, ESQ.
SALAS & MANIBUSAN FRANCIS M. McKEOWN, ESQ.
Torres Building GUDMUNDSON SIGGINS STONE &
SKINNER
Second Floor One Embarcadero Center, Ste. 1350
San Jose, Saipan 96950
Telephone: (670) 234-7455
Facsimile: (670) 234-7256
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 391-4200
Facsimile: (415) 989-4739
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
NOBUO HIRAI
his heirs should not have been able to recover in the court below. The
Judgment should be reversed.
J-2
In Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296; Cal.Rptr.2d ,
the Court applied the doctrine of reasonable implied assumption of risk to
recreational activity such as the one at bench. The Court stated:
In the sports setting, however, conditions or
conduct that might otherwise integral might be
viewed as dangerous often are an part of the sport
itself. Thus, although moguls on a ski run pose a
risk of harm to skiers that might not exist were
these configurations removed, the challenge and
risks posed by the moguls are part of the sport of
skiing, and a ski resort has no duty to eliminate
them...in this respect, that nature of a sport is
highly irrelevant in defining the duty of care owed
by the particular defendant. (Knight at p. 315.)
Clearly, it is in the nature of scuba diving that there is an inherent risk
associated with the possibility of drowning. Defendants have no legal
duty to eliminate those risks inherent in the recreational activity.
F. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Hirai's Notion to
Enforce Settlement
During the course of this litigation, Plaintiff and Defendant Hirai
entered into a written settlement agreement.
On June 21, 1991, Plaintiff's counsel sent a written settlement offer to
Hirai. The proposal was simple and short:
This will constitute Plaintiff's offer to the
defendant Nobuo Hirai to dismiss the case with
prejudice against him under the following
conditions:
a) Hirai will meet with a [sic] expert of
Plaintiff's choosing to discuss the events
surrounding this case and his employment in Saipan.
b) Hirai agrees to testify at the trial. (C.R.
9/12/91 11:46:13; 11:45:48; Excepts of Record, p. 54
et sec..)
J-3
Four days later,Hirai's counsel sent Plaintiff's counsel a written
acceptance, signed by both counsel and the defendant, that was similarly
simple and short:
My client, NOBUO HIRAI, unconditionally accepts the
offer to settle the case against him contained in
your letter of June 21, 1991 under the terms
specified therein. (C.R. 9/12/91 11:46:13; Excerpts
of Record, p. 54, et sec..)
The following day, Plaintiff's counsel purported to orally revoke the
offer, and a day later sent a letter purporting to withdraw it. (C.R. 9/12/91
11:46:13; Excerpts of Record, p. 67.)
Despite their executed settlement agreement, Plaintiff did not file a
dismissal of Defendant Hirai. Accordingly, on September 12, 1992, Hirai
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of the settlement
agreement. No opposition was ever filed. However, the parties stipulated
to a stay of the hearing until the matter was finally heard on the first day of
trial on May 26, 1992. At that time, the court stated that this matter should
have been taken up before trial and rather than entertain the Motion, the
Court denied the Motion. (Excerpt of Record, p. 53.)
The trial court committed error in two fundamental respects. First,
procedurally, a Motion for Summary Judgment may be made at any time,
including on the eve of, or even during trial. (Rule 56, Commonwealth
Rules of Civil Procedure; Thrift v. Bell Lines, Inc. 296 F.Supp.214, 217
(D.C.S.C. 1967); H.J. Heinz Co. v. Beech-Nut Lifesavers, Inc. 181 F.Supp.
452, 459 (D.C.N.Y. 1960). Hirai's written settlement agreement entitled
him to dismissal. Whether Plaintiff sought dismissal based upon that
contract before or during trial has no bearing uponHirai's rights under the
contract. He certainly did not waive his rights under the settlement
contract by failing to enforce it before the trial. Obviously, if settlement
agreement can only be enforced by Pretrial Motion, no settlements would
ever be entered into during a trial. Accordingly, the basis for the court's,
refusal to entertain Defendant's Motion is unsound.
Second, substantively, Defendant Hirai is entitled to enforcement of the
settlement agreement. In Del Rosario v. Camacho, Civ. Action No. 88-
868, a slip opinion entered on February 7, 1990, this court enforced John
B. Camacho's oral agreement to settle a case after the plaintiff tried to
repudiate the agreement, holding that "[o]nce a valid compromise and
J-4
settlement is reached, a court's primary object is to effectuate the
intentions of the party,” citing 15 A. ANJUR 2d, Compromise and
Settlement, §§23. In the case at bench, the subject settlement agreement is
not an oral agreement but a written settlement agreement.
According to the authors of 15 A. AMJUR 2d, §§25 (Bancroft Whitney
1976):
A valid compromise in settlement is final,
conclusive, and binding upon the parties and upon
those who knowingly accept its benefit. It is as
binding as any contract the parties could make, and
as binding as if its terms were embodied in a
judgment; and regardless of the actual merits of the
antecedent claim may have been, they will not
afterward be inquired into and examined.
A settlement is simply a contract. Once Plaintiff's offer was accepted,
a contract was formed, and Plaintiff lacked power to revoke the original
offer:
[O]nly where there is cause sufficient to invalidate
a contract, such as fraud, collusion, mistake or
accident, will a party be relieved from the
consequences of a stipulation made during
litigation. State v. Hallock, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 230,
485 N.Y.S.2d 510, 512, 474 N.E.2d 1178, 1180 (N.Y.
1984).
The written settlement agreement is, without doubt, a binding bilateral
contract. Furthermore, Defendant Hirai performed under the contract.
Specifically, he appeared and testified at trial, and made himself available
to meet with Plaintiff's expert. CR 5/22/92 11:17:50.
Accordingly, Defendant Hirai was and is entitled to dismissal based
upon the irrefutable written settlement agreement which is fully
enforceable and was properly the basis for dismissal at the time of trial.
G. The Court Erred in Failing to Explain the basis For
Its Conclusion That the Income Ito Could Have Been
acted to Earn over His Working Life, Reduced To
Its Present Value, Was $2,389,857.55.
J-5
§§913A of the Restatement of Torts, 2d, provides that "[t]he measure
of a lump sum award for future pecuniary losses arising from a tort is the
present worth of the full amount of the loss of what would have been
received at the later time."
JOR ie nals terial Mik, GER.
END J
APPENDIX K
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
Aaa
WA) tris Rhe RIOLT n dertee J 5 Di Lael patna tata
| RYOKO ITO, as Personal )APPEAL NOS. 92-020 & 92-022
Representative of the Heirs ) (Consolidated)
of AKINOBU ITO, Deceased, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 89-918
)
Plaintiff/Appellee/ )
Cross-Appellant, )
) OPINION
V. )
)
MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS)
OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO )
if HIRAI, SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI, )
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE _ )
COMPANY, )
)
Defendants/Appellants/ )
Cross-Appellees. )
)
Argued and submitted March 15, 1993
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee William M. Fitzgerald
Cross-Appellant Ryoko Ito: P.O. Box 909
Saipan, MP 96950
; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Harold A. Stone
and Cross-Appellee Nobuo Hirai: Francis M. McKeown
Gudmundson Siggins Stone
& Skinner
One Embarcadero Center
Suite 1350
San Francisco, CA 94111
ata nsedt ted Memes nie 28 wo ‘aaheat:
Vicente T. Salas
Salas & Manibusan
Torres Building, 2nd FI.
San Jose, Saipan 96950
K-2
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellant
and Cross-Appellees Macro
Energy, Inc. and Shigemi
Yamagishi:
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
and Cross-Appellee
Shigemi Yamagishi for insurance
matters:
Attorneys for Defendant/Cross-
Appellee
Marianas Ocean Enterprises:
Attorneys for Defendant/Cross-
Appellee
American Home Assurance
Company:
Charles A. Lynberg
Randall J. Peters
Lynberg & Watkins
888 South Figueroa Street
16th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017
James E. Hollman
P.O. Box 2628
Saipan, MP 96950
James H. Grizzard
Macaranas Bldg.
2nd Floor
Saipan, MP 96950
Lecia M. Eason
Wiseman, Eason & Halsell
P.O. Box 2607
Saipan, MP 96950
Randall Todd Thompson
Mair, Mair, Spade
& Thompson
GCIC Bldg., Suite 807
414 Soledad Avenue
Agana, Guam 96910
Michael A. White
White, Novo-Gradac
& Manglona
P.O. Box 222 CHRB
Saipan, MP 96950
BEFORE: DELA CRUZ, Chief Justice; VILLAGOMEZ, Associate
Justice;
and CRUZ, Special Judge
DELA CRUZ, Chief Justice:
eee ae oe
K-3
This consolidated appeal involves several issues arising from plaintiff's
wrongful death suit as personal representative for the heirs of the
decedent, Mr. Akinobu Ito. Ito drowned while on a scuba diving trip
supervised by defendants. On the day of his death, Ito signed an
"AGREEMENT FOR EXEMPTION FROM OBLIGATION."
The trial court ruled on a pre-trial motion that the release exonerated
defendant Macro Energy, Inc. ("Macro") and Marianas Ocean Enterprises
("MOE"), but not defendants Yamagishi and Hirai. After a two-week trial,
the trial court found that Yamagishi and Hirai's negligence was a
proximate cause of Ito's death, and entered judgment for plaintiff. The
threshold issue on this appeal is whether the release exonerates any of the
defendants for their negligence. Plaintiff and defendants also raise several
other issues on appeal, including one involving the coverage liability of
defendant American Home Assurance Company.
We hold that the release does not exonerate any defendant because, as
drafted, it does not comply with Restatement (Second) of Torts Section
496B, the applicable rule in the Commonwealth governing express
assumption of risk. We therefore go on to address the other issues raised
by the parties.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
This lawsuit was filed by Ryoko Ito ("plaintiff") as personal
representative of the heirs of her deceased husband, Akinobu Ito ("Ito")./1/
Ito drowned on September 24, 1988, during a scuba diving accident at
Saipan's "Grotto."
The other parties in this lawsuit are as follows:
Macro Energy, Inc. ("Macro"), the Saipan-based scuba diving company
that trained Ito to dive in June of 1988 and to which he returned on
September 24, 1988.
Marianas Ocean Enterprises ("MOE") -- alleged to be the "alter ego" of
Macro.
/1/
K-4
The CNMI's wrongful death statute is found at 7 CMC Section 2101.
Subsection (a) provides, in part:
When the death of a person is caused by [a] wrongful act, neglect or
default such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action
and recover damages in respect thereof if death had not ensued, the person
or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued, . . .
is liable to an action for damages notwithstanding the death of the person
injured ....
Shigemi Yamagishi ("Yamagishi") -- diving instructor and Macro's
president.
Nobuo Hirai ("Hirai") -- assistant instructor employed by Macro.
American Home Assurance Company ("American Home")
Macro and Yamagishi's insurer during all relevant dates./2/
Plaintiff's complaint contained four causes of action relating to (1)
negligent instruction by defendants in the June 1988 scuba diving course;
(2) negligence of defendants on the day of Ito's death, September 24,
1988; (3) coverage under the American Home insurance policy/3/ and (4)
MOE's alter-ego relationship with Macro.
On November 7, 1990, Macro, American Home, Yamagishi, and Hirai
moved for summary judgment under Section 496B of the Restatement of
Torts (Second), based on the "AGREEMENT FOR EXEMPTION FROM
OBLIGATION" (herein referred to as the "release agreement” or the
"release") which Ito signed on the morning of his accident. The trial court
granted the motion as to all four movants on December 17, 1990. On
December 27, 1990, plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the order
granting summary judgment.
On January 21, 1991, the trial court heard oral argument on plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration, and, on January 28, 1991, entered an
"Amended Summary Judgment" and "Memorandum Decision" which held
that Yamagishi and Hirai were not released from
K-5
/2/ American Home Assurance Company was named as "American
Home Insurance Company" in plaintiff's complaint. American Home
Assurance Company appeared and litigated this action despite the defect.
Accordingly. we have corrected its name in this caption.
/3/ Plaintiff brings this suit against American Home pursuant to the
Commonwealth's "direct action” statute. 4 CMC §7502(e).
liability./4/ The trial court also ruled that, although MOE was not a
movant, "[s]ince the complaint included MOE as a defendant based upon
the theory that it was the alter ego of Macro, the grant of summary
judgment does run in favor of MOE." Memorandum Decision of January
28, 1991 at 4. Therefore, after January 28, 1990, plaintiff's case stood
only against defendants American Home, Yamagishi and Hirai.
On April 16, 1991, after a hearing on a motion for summary judgment
brought by American Home, the trial court ruled that American Home's
liability coverage was limited to $100,000. it
also ruled that plaintiff had waived her claim for loss of consortium. See
Memorandum opinion dated April 16, 1991.
Thereafter, in September 1991, American Home, Yamagishi and Hirai
moved, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Commonwealth Rules Civil Procedure, for
certification of (1) the trial court's January 28, 1991 judgment regarding
the release and (2) the trial court's April 16, 1991 order regarding the
policy limits and plaintiff's claim for loss of consortium. We dismissed
these appeals because they were not final within the meaning of Rule
54(b). See Ito v. Macro Energy, Inc., Nos. 91-032, 91-033, 91-034 & 9I-
037 (Consolidated) (N.M.I. Feb. 3, 1992).
A two-week trial was held between May 26, 1992 and June 5, 1992,
after which the trial court entered judgment in the amount of
$2,434,857.55 against Hirai, Yamagishi and American Home.
On August 10, 1992, after motion by American Home, the court issued
an
/4/ The trial court's Amended Summary Judgment does not state why
the trial court changed course. The court wrote: "upon further review of
the Exemption Agreement, the court finds that its coverage does not
extend to defendants Hirai and Yamagishi individually." Memorandum
Decision of January 28, 1991 at 4. Defendants Yamagishi and Hirai
contend on appeal that the trial court amended its order because they were
not specifically mentioned in the release.
Amended Judgment limiting American Home's liability for damages to
$100,000.
Yamagishi and Hirai timely filed a joint notice of appeal on August 14,
1992. Plaintiff also timely appealed on August 21, 1992. We
consolidated the two appeals on September 22, 1992. Other procedural
matters of this case are set forth where pertinent, below.
II. FACTS.
The following 73 points of fact are taken verbatim from the trial court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated
June 22, 1992 (hereafter, "Findings of Fact")./5/
1. In June of 1988, the decedent, Akinobu Ito ("Ito") with Yosuhiro
Fujitomi ("Fujitomi") enrolled in a scuba diving course offered by
MACRO Energy, Inc. ["Macro"] in Saipan.
2. Shige Yamagishi ("Yamagishi") is a shareholder and a director of
[Macro].
3. Yamagishi is the diving instructor of [Macro].
4. Ito enrolled in the scuba diving course so that he [could] obtain[]
certification as an open water diver.
K-7
5. The course [Macro] offered Ito, require[d] minimal pre-dive
instruction and training. There was no pool or confined water training.
Written student testing consisted of requests for student/volunteers to
answer questions orally whether the students answered the questions
correctly or not the instructor revealed the answer to the students who.
filled in the answers on their book.
/S/ Defendants do not directly challenge the trial court's factual findings
except to argue that (1) the trial court applied a wrong standard of care in
evaluating their dive course and supervision, and (2) the trial court's
damage award was excessive and clearly erroneous. These issues are
discussed below.
Water instructions took place inside the Grotto./6/
6. Upon the completion of Ito's scuba diving course, Yamagishi signed
a certification card certifying Ito as an ADS open water diver. ADS is a
Japanese scuba diving agency that issues a card certifying a diver as an
open water diver.
7. Yamagishi signed a certification card certifying Ito as a CMAS one-
star diver. CMAS is a French agency which is internationally recognized
around the world and issues a card certifying a diver as a CMAS one-star
diver.
8. Although Yamagishi signed the ADS and CMAS certification for
Ito, he never personally instructed Ito in the class or in the water
instruction in the Grotto.
9. Open water diver is a term recognized as being required in any
certification course issued by various agencies.
Various agencies around the world certify people as scuba divers under
standards established for their respective agencies.
10. The course that Ito and Fujitomi attended to receive their open
water diver certification did not meet the minimum standards.
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11. CMAS has specific standards which describe the knowledge and
skills required in order for a diver to be granted a CMAS one-star diver
certificate.
/6/ The Grotto is a sometimes turbulent pool of water surrounded on
three sides by a natural rock formation. It contains three underwater
outlets through which a diver can swim into the Pacific ocean. These
outlets differ in length and width. The north entrance requires a diver to
go 15 feet underwater and swim under an overhead rock formation for
another 10 to 15 feet. This outlet is very simple to dive. It was revealed at
trial that on a calm day, a strong swimmer can "free dive" under the rock
formation and out to the ocean quickly without the assistance of an
underwater breathing apparatus. This was not the hole used by the divers
in this case. The hole that was used was the center hole. This hole is
approximately 20 meters [65.6 feet] underwater and is approximately 120
feet in length.
12. CMAS has a diver training program which indicates the current
standard of training necessary in order to reach the minimum level of
proficiency required for the award of a CMAS one-star diver certificate.
13. The course that Ito attended to receive his open water certification
did not meet the standards or follow the training program required by
CMAS.
14. Yamagishi did not exercise reasonable care as a scuba instructor in
certifying Ito as an open water diver and a CMAS one star diver.
15. The following is a partial list of the deficiencies of the course that
Ito took before Yamagishi issued the two certification cards:
(a) Unqualified persons were employed as instructors.
(b) Students were not given text books.
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(c) Ito was not given time to study for a theory test.
(d) Ito was not given a formal test that would require him to prove
mastery of scuba diving theory.
(e) No accurate records exist of by whom or what Ito was taught.
(f) No accurate records exist to prove that Ito demonstrated his
mastery of the required scuba diving skills to a qualified instructor.
(g) No record exists to prove that Ito was taught scuba diving theory
by a qualified instructor.
(h) Ito was taught a major part of the course by Aline Bouhey who
was nota qualified instructor at the time.
(i) The only records that do exist were fabricated by Shige
Yamagishi after Akinobu Ito was dead.
(j) The confined water training was done at the Grotto which is not
an appropriate place to learn the necessary skills.
(k) open water dive training was virtually non-existent and provided
no opportunity to practice skills during supervised ocean dives.
(1) Octopus breathing was not taught.
(m) The number of exposures to each skill was not enough to learn
the skill.
(n) Ito was not taught rescue techniques.
16. Yamagishi deceived Ito into believing that he was receiving the
legitimate CMAS one star course and a legitimate open water diver
course.
17. It was not aware of all the risks of scuba diving as a legitimate
CMAS one star diver and an open water diver would be because he had
not been properly trained.
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18. Failure to receive the proper training in the scuba diving course
that Ito took in June, 1988 was a proximate cause of Ito's death in
September 24, 1988.
19. In September, Ito returned to Saipan to go scuba diving.
20. On September 24, 1988, Ito paid for the services of a dive guide
because he did not want to dive unsupervised.
21. Shige Yamagishi and Nobuo Hirai were aware that Akinobu Ito
was a CMAS one star diver, and that he had had only one ocean dive
outside of the inner pool of the Grotto.
22. Yamagishi and Hirai knew that the dive that they planned to take
Ito, along with fourteen other people, on[] that day was a deep dive and
that Ito had never dove deeper than 30 feet.
23. Yamagishi and Hirai knew that divers must be closely supervised
on their first deep dive.
24. A dive of more than 100 feet is a deep dive.
25. Yamagishi and Hirai undertook to render the service of dive guide
and dive supervisor of Akinobu Ito.
26. Yamagishi and Hirai failed to exercise reasonable care in the
performance of supervising the dive.
27. Yamagishi was a shareholder and officer of the company that
provided the scuba diving equipment and was responsible for its proper
maintenance.
28. The regulator given to Ito leaked air which may have caused air to
be used faster than normal.
29. The pressure gauge of the regulator given to Ito read 130 psi higher
than was actually in the tank, so if the gauge read 400 psi, it actually only
had 270 psi in the tank.
30. Yamagishi and Hirai failed prior to the dive to familiarize
themselves with the divers under their charge and their respective abilities.
K-11
31. Yamagishi and Hirai failed to discuss with Ito the special
circumstances of a dive to more than 100 feet, including the more rapid
exhaustion of air and nitrogen narcosis.
32. At the site of the Grotto, Yamagishi and Hirai failed to give an
adequate dive briefing and failed to check Ito's equipment.
33. During the first half of the dive, Yamagishi was the only guide
with fourteen divers.
34. Yamagishi led the dive to a depth of more than 100 feet far beyond
the training capabilities of Ito.
35. Scuba divers are required to dive with a partner termed a buddy;
Fujitomi and Ito were buddies.
36. Fujitomi developed a problem with his air source and was assisted
by Hirai and the two rose to the surface.
37. At the time that Fujitomi rose to the surface, Ito followed the
correct procedure that he had been taught and followed his buddy Fujitomi
to the surface.
38. At the time Ito, Fujitomi and Hirai rose to the surface, Yamagishi
was at the mouth of the central entrance to the Grotto, with all the other
divers between them.
39. At the time that Fujitomi rose to the -surface Hirai failed to signal
Yamagishi to halt the dive and Yamagishi failed to wait to resolve the
problem.
40. With two divers on what he claims is the dangerous surface,
Yamagishi, without determining their problem, turned and led the other
divers back through the Grotto entrance and at no time after that did
Yamagishi ever search for them.
41. At the time that Ito rose to the surface Hirai did not instruct him to
immediately descend and join the other divers.
42. At the time that Ito rose to the surface Hirai did not check Ito's
remaining air supply.
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43. Hirai directed Ito to follow him down and then chose the longest
and deepest way to return to the surface inside the Grotto.
44. A much easier and safe alternative was available to Hirai by
snorkeling on the surface with inflated BCD and then returning through
the much more shallow and shorter northern entrance.
45. At the entrance to the tunnel to return to the inner Grotto, Hirai had
1500 psi of air, a very comfortable supply even for two people.
46. At the same point Ito had only between 400-500 psi, a questionable
amount, particularly because at readings of less than 500 the pressure
gauges are not as accurate as they are at higher readings.
47. Instead of swimming normally holding on to Fujitomi and Ito,
Hirai turned upside down and pulled himself along the roof of the center
tunnel of the Grotto, with Fujitomi clutching his tank and he using his
hands to pull himself along the roof.
48. Hirai's goal seemed to be to arrive at the surface in the fastest time
rather than in the safest way, yet there was noreason for his haste, since he
had ample air.
49. Hirai's decision to pull himself along tie roof prevented him from
maintaining a clear view of Ito and keeping Ito close by holding onto Ito's
vest.
50. At some point in the tunnel, Ito gave Firai an out of air sign and
Hirai gave him his octopus regulator.
51. Hirai did not hold Ito's vest while Ito was using his regulator in
violation of the standard procedure that he hac learned in his training.
52. Hirai continued his unreasonable craw along the roof upside
down, instead of swimming normally to the surface while holding onto Ito
and Fujitomi.
53. After discovering that Ito was not togeher with him when he
surfaced, Hirai dove and brought Ito to the surface.
54. The most important thing to do for a submersion incident victim is
to get the victim out of the water as quickly aspossible.
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55. Hirai and Yamagishi did not take Ito directly out of the water but
attempted for fifteen to twenty minutes to resuscitate him in the water.
56. At this time one of the members of the dive group, a Dr. Takagi,
surfaced and observed that Hirai and Yamagishi were supporting Ito on
the surface and giving mouth to mouth resuscitation to him; he noted the
time as 10:46.
57. Takagi watched for three or four minutes and then went over to
help, Yamagishi told him to take Ito's pulse, and he did noting that the
pulse was 60 and beating normally. Yamagishi told Takagi to make sure
in taking the pulse. Ito vomited water a number of times.
58. Thereafter at two to three minute intervals Takagi continued to
take Ito's pulse and it continued to beat at rate of about 40/50 per minute.
59. Shortly after 11:00 the pulse rate became drastically weak and
pinkish water started coming out of Ito's mouth.
60. At 11:03 the pulse became 0, and Yamagishi said to get him up,
and other people then helped to get him up and out of the water, where
heart massage was commenced and mouth to mouth resuscitation
continued.
61. At about 11:10 the ambulance arrived and they carried Ito away
and he was pronounced dead on arrival at the Commonwealth Health
Center.
62. The appropriate treatment for either drowning or air embolism is
oxygen. Yamagishi and Hirai did not have oxygen at the Grotto.
63. Akinobu Ito's cause of death was drowning.
64. Yamagishi and Hirai made statements to the police and other
agencies immediately after the incident but did not mention seeing blood
in the water.
65. Blood is a potential symptom of air embolism but is seldom seen.
66. Air embolisms occur because of a change in pressure upon ascent,
and descent.
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67. Pink froth is indicative of pulmonary edema which results from the
inhalation of water or other foreign matter to the lung.
68. The blood found in Ito's stomach resulted from his stomach ulcer.
69. Hirai stated in a memorandum to the Japanese Consulate that at
11:05 Ito had a weak pulse.
70. At the time of his death Akinobu Ito was 46 years old, gainfully
employed by a major Japanese company, earning more than $60, 000 a
year. He expected to work for that same company or one of its
subsidiaries until he was seventy years old.
71. Akinobu Ito is survived by a loving wife Ryoko and two children,
Chiyo and Masteru.
72. The income that Akinobu Ito could have been expected to provide
to his wife and children over his working life reduced to present value at
an exchange rate of Y126.78/$ is $2,389,857.55.
73. Funeral and burial expenses total $45,000.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
1. The threshold issue on this appeal is whether Ito expressly assumed
the risk of harm arising from defendants’ negligence by sighing the
release, and, if so, which defendants are exonerated by operation of the
release. The trial court interpreted the release as exonerating defendants
Macro Energy and MOE and entered summary judgment in their favor.
We review de novo the effect of the release on the question of liability.
Rios
v. MPLC, No. 92-019 (N.M.I. Feb. 19, 1993)./7/
2. Whether Ito impliedly assumed the risks which led to the accident.
3. Whether Ito was contributorily negligent.
4. Whether the trial court applied an incorrect standard with respect to
defendants, duty of care.
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Issues no. 2 through 4 involve mixed questions of law and fact and
therefore are rev‘zwed de novo. Id.
5. Whether the trial court erred in failing to consider defendant Hirai's
motion for summary judgment to enforce a settlement agreement on the
date set for trial. A trial court's failure to rule on a motion is a denial
thereof by operation of law and, in this case, implicates the trial court's
power to control its docket. We therefore review its ruling for abuse of
discretion. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Parr, 391 P.2d 575
(Ariz. 1964); Edwards v. Cass County, Tex., 919 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1990).
6. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff had waived her
loss of consortium claim. The trial court found that plaintiff's counsel
"admitted" that plaintiff had no claim for consortium on summary
judgment. Such ruling is a conclusion of law
/7/ \n the trial court, plaintiff and MOE briefed the issue of whether
MOE is the "alter-ego" of Macro. However, "the issue was not resolved in
the trial court. [Footnote omitted.] Instead, summary judgment
proceedings commenced on the issue of the express release agreement."
See Brief of appellee MOE at x. We do not decide the alter-ego issue
because it has not been raised on this appeal.
and is reviewable de novo. Rios v. MPLC, No. 92-019 (N.M.I. Feb. 19,
1993).
7. Whether the trial court erred in its calculation of damages, and in
not revealing its calculations in determining damages. Damage awards are
reviewed under a "clearly erroneous standard." Reyes v. Ebetuer, No. 90-
017 (N.M.I. Jan. 29, 1992).
8. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that American Home's
coverage under the policy is limited to $100,000. The trial court's
interpretation of language in an insurance policy involves a question of
law which is subject to de novo review. Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., Ltd.
v. Marianas Ocean Enterprises, Inc., 3 CR 748, 753 (D.C.N.M.I. App.
Div. 1989).
K-16
IV. ANALYSIS.
. Ito's Express Assumption of the Risk.
The release which Ito signed before the diving accident and which is
critical to this litigation states as follows:
MACRO ENERGY, INC.
APPLICATION FOR PARTICIPATING IN SCUBA DIVING &
INVOICE
* * *
(AGREEMENT FOR EXEMPTION FROM OBLIGATION)
I SUBMITTED AN APPLICATION FOR
PARTICIPATING IN THE
DIVING TOUR AND OR TRAINING PROGRAM TO
BE CONDUCTED BY YOUR AGENCY. I FULLY
ACCEPT AND UNDERSTAND THAT SUCH A
DIVING TOUR AND TRAINING INVOLVES BASIC
RISK AND DANGER.IF WE FAIL TO ABIDE BY THE
RULES AND REGULATION SET BY THE GUIDES
AND INSTRUCTORS AND IF WE NEGLECT THE
DIVING RULES, WE REALIZE THAT WE MAY RISK
OUR LIVES. ALL THE RISKS THAT WE MAY HAVE
DURING THE PERIOD OF STAY HERE
BELONG TO EACH OF US PERSONALLY. IN CASE
OF ACCIDENT,
CAUSING INJURY OR DEATH TO MYSELF, |
MYSELF, MY FAMILY, OR INHERITED
ORGANIZATION AND OTHER RELATED
PERSONNEL SHALL HAVE NO RIGHT TO PROTEST
AGAINST NOR TO CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. WE
HEREBY SWEAR TO ABIDE BY AND ACT AT THE
RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS SET BY THE GUIDES
AND INSTRUCTORS. ALSO I AM FULLY A GROWN
UP AT LAW AND I ACKNOWLEDGE THE FACT
THAT I AM FULLY QUALIFIED TO SIGN THIS
AGREEMENT, TO VERIFY THE EXEMPTIONS
FROM ALL THE CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES. ALL THE
ITEMS IN THIS APPLICATION ARE TO BE DECIDED
‘
‘
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BY THE AGREEMENT, AND I PERSONALLY SIGN
THIS DOCUMENT AT MY OWN WILL RATHER
THAN SOMEONE DIRECTING ME TO SIGN THIS
PAPER.
The release also contains the above paragraph in Japanese./8/ The
release was signed by Ito and dated "9/24/88." The trial court initially
ruled that the release exonerated all defendants, but subsequently amended
its summary judgment and ruled that the release did not exonerate
defendants Yamagishi, the president of Macro Energy, and Hirai, an
employee of Macro Energy.
In the Commonwealth, the rules of the common law as expressed in the
Restatements of the law as approved by the American Law Institute serve
as the applicable rules of decision, in the absence of written or local
customary law to the contrary. 7 CMC §3401. Because we have no statute
or local customary law regarding express releases, Restatement (Second)
of Torts Section 496B (hereafter referred to as "Section 496B") is
applicable. That section provides:
A plaintiff who by contract or otherwise expressly agrees
to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant's
negligent or reckless conduct cannot recover for such
harm, unless the agreement is invalid as contrary to
public policy.
There is no dispute that the release is either a "contract" or a document
by which Ito may have "otherwise expressly agree [d]" to assume certain
risks. There also is no dispute that Ito read and executed the release. The
issue on appeal concerns the language of
/8/ The decedent rentty was proficient only in Japanese, and read the
inse language version of the release before signing it. At oral argument,
counsel for plaintiff stated that only the English language version of the
release has been the subject of dispute in this lawsuit. Defendants do not
contend otherwise, nor do they assert that the Japanese version of the
release contains language which in legal effect differs from the English
version. Therefore, our decision is based solely on the English language
version.
the release instrument, and whether that language, as a matter of law,
exonerates defendants from their negligence. We conclude that it does
not
A. The Requirements of Section 496B
In order for a release to be valid and binding, it must comply with the
requirements of Section 496B. In determining whether the release meets
the requirements of Section 496B, we shall strictly construe the language
of the release, Schutkowski v. Carey, 725 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Wyo. 1986),
especially where, as in this case, it is drafted by defendants and purports to
exonerate them. Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo.
1989); see also, Section 496B cmt. d.
By signing the release, Ito must have "expressly agree[d] to accept a
risk of harm arising from the defendant{s'] negligent or reckless conduct."
(Emphasis supplied.) We turn to the language of the release to determine
what risks Ito "expressly" agreed to assume.
In doing so, we find no mention of Ito accepting a risk of harm arising
from the "defendant[s'] negligent conduct.” The release contains no
language that the risk of harm which Ito agreed to assume was that harm
which may arise due to defendants' negligence. Although the release
states that "ALL THE RISKS THAT WE MAY HAVE DURING THE
PERIOD OF STAY HERE BELONG TO EACH OF US PERSONALLY"
and that Ito (or his heirs) will not file suit "INCASE OF ACCIDENT,
CAUSING INJURY OR DEATH TO MYSELF," it fails to mention that
the risks encompass defendants’ negligence.
The language of the release does not "expressly" warn or alert Ito that
the risk of harm he was assuming is one that may arise from defendants,
negligence. Absent clear language in the release itself, we are not
persuaded, as a matter of law, that the release meets the requirements of
Section 496B: that Ito "expressly agree[d] to accept a risk of harm arising
from the defendant(s'] negligent or reckless conduct."
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"[A |ithough uniformly agreeing that exculpatory agreements must be
strictly construed against the drafter, [courts] are split on whether
‘negligence’ must be specifically mentioned [in a release], or whether more
inclusive and general terms may be employed." Heil Valley Ranch, Inc.,
784 P.2d at 784 (footnote omitted). This split in authority regarding such
a requirement appears to be based on the various jurisdictions, public
policy views pertaining to these types of releases, and how each views the
importance of the language of the release itself, ie. whether the language
is sufficiently clear so that the one signing it knows what is being given
up. In the absence of legislation, the common law is developed, based on
the application of general notions of justice and fair play, taking into
account the circumstances and experiences unique to a particular
jurisdiction.
Our jurisdiction is not vested with a similar degree of freedom in
formulating our own common law as that exercised by courts in other
jurisdictions, because of the statutory dictate that we apply the
Restatement. 7 CMC §3401. Thus, we must acknowledge the doctrine of
express assumption of risk as set forth
in Section 496B, which is part of our "rules of decision” in the
Commonwealth. Id.
In interpreting Section 496B, however, we shall side with those
jurisdictions which take the more cautious approach with respect to
express assumption of risk. In doing so, we interpret Section 496B as
requiring that a release must expressly mention that the risks of harm
being assumed by a releasor include those arising from a releasee's
negligence or reckless conduct. Certain notable jurisdictions have taken
this approach to releases. See Saenz v. Whitewater Voyages, Inc., 276
Cal.Rptr. 672 (Ct. App. 1990); Madison v. Superior Court, 250 Cal.Rptr.
299 (Ct. App. 1988); O'Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d
444 (Fla. App. 1982); Goyings v. Jack and Ruth Eckerd Foundation, 403
So.2d 1144 (Fla. App. 1981).
In Madison v. Superior Court, 250 Cal.Rptr. 299 (Ct. App. 1988),
review denied, the court held that the release barred plaintiff's wrongful
death action, which was premised on defendants, negligence during a
scuba-diving course. The release at issue in Madison, however, clearly
stated that the releasor agreed not to sue if he suffered injury caused "by
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the negligence of" the releasees, and that the releasor agreed to "exempt
and relieve [releasees] from liability for personal injury, property damage
or wrongful death caused by negligence." Id. at 302 (quote in lower case).
In upholding the release, the court wrote that "[a]s long as the release
constitutes a clear and unequivocal waiver with specific reference to a
defendant's negligence, it will be sufficient." Id. at 304 (emphasis
supplied).
Florida agrees with the California analysis. In Goyings v. Jack and
Ruth Eckerd Foundation, 403 So.2d 1144, for example, the court wrote,
"an exculpatory clause, while not favored, may operate to absolve a
defendant from liability arising out of his own negligent acts. For such a
clause to be effective, however it must clearly state that it releases the
party from liability for his own negligence." Id. at 1146.
Under the language of the release signed by Ito, we are not satisfied
that, in signing the release, he "expressly agree[d]" to accept the risks,
arising from defendants, negiigence Or reckless conduct, which caused his
death. The release fails to set forth any express language as to defendants,
negligence.
B. Applying a Less-Restrictive Standard under §496B.
Some state jurisdictions have held that a release need not contain
specific reference that the releasor is to assume the risk of harm arising
from the releasee's negligent or reckless conduct. Heil Valley Ranch, Inc,
784 P.2d at 784; Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc., 636 P.2d 492, 493
(Wash. App. 1981), review denied, 96 Wash.2d 1027 (1982);
Schutkowski, 725 P.2d at 1061. Where that is the case, however, the
release must be "clear that the parties’ intent was to release [defendants]
from liability for negligence." Schutkowski, 725 P.2d at 1061.
If we were to disregard a strict interpretation of the requirements of
Section 496B and apply Schutkowski's less-restrictive standard to the
release signed by Ito, the release would still not meet that standard
because the only risk of harm which the release covers are those arising
from Ito's conduct, not the risk of harm arising from defendants,
negligence. The release alerted Ito that he could be injured if he failed
"TO ABIDE BY THE RULES AND REGULATION SET BY THE
GUIDES AND INSTRUCTORS," or if he were to "NEGLECT THE
DIVING RULES."/9/
K-21]
We fail to see how these warnings regarding injury arising from Ito's
failure to follow diving rules and regulations could be satisfactorily
construed to mean that he intended "to release [defendants] from liability
for [their] negligence." Schutkowski, 725 P.2d at 1061. The release as
drafted and signed by Ito simply was not "clear" regarding the parties’
intent. Thus, even if we read the release broadly, we still have difficulty
construing the language of the release as containing an intent to absolve
the releasees from their negligence.
C. The Effect of Comment d.
Yamagishi and Hirai contend that Comment d to Section 496B supports
a ruling that the release exonerates them from liability. However, we are
not convinced that if we apply the test implicit in Comment d, we would
reach a different result.
Comment d provides that a "general clause[] . . . will not be construed
to include loss or damage resulting from [a defendant's] intentional,
negligent, or reckless misconduct unless the circumstances clearly indicate
that such was the plaintiff's
/9/ The trial court found that it was defendants who did not abide by the
rules of proper training, supervision and rescue. See, Findings of Fact
Nos. 13-18.
understanding and intention." (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, where a general
clause is used in the release, as in this case, the rule is that courts may not
construe it to release a defendant from liability unless "the circumstances
clearly indicate that such was the plaintiff's understanding and intention."
Here, again, the general clause releases the defendants from liability if
Ito's death was caused by Ito's (1) failure to abide by the rules and
regulations set by the guides and instructors, and (2) neglect of diving
rules.
The general clause of the release reads:
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IN CASE OF ACCIDENT, CAUSING INJURY OR D,
TO MYSELF, | MYSELF, MY FAMILY, OR INHERITED
ORGANIZATION AND OTHER RELATED PERSONNEL
SHALL HAVE NO RIGHT TO PROTEST AGAINST NOR TO
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.
This clause, when read together with the preceding sentences, does not
"clearly indicate" that Ito understood or intended to release defendants
from their negligence. For the reasons stated, even under Comment d, we
do not read the releases "general clause" as exempting the negligent
defendants from liability.
D. The Release Fails to Exonerate the Defendants.
The release at issue in this case does not meet the requirements of
Restatement (Second) Torts Section 496B. We hold that a release, in
order to be valid, at the very least must expressly mention that the releasor
is assuming the risk of harm that may arise from the releasee's negligence
or reckless conduct. Because the release which Ito signed did not comply
with this requirement, we conclude as a matter of law that Ito did not
"expressly agree[] to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant(s']
negligent or reckless conduct." Section 496B. The trial court thus erred in
ruling that the release exonerated defendants Macro Energy, Inc. (the
named releasee) and its alleged alter-ego MOE. Both Macro and MOE, as
well as their agents/employees Yamagishi and Hirai, are not exempted
from liability by operation of the release.
Plaintiff asserted liability against Macro on the theory of respondeat
superior. Ito's Supplemental Brief at 3. Macro is liable for the negligence
of its employees and/or agents, Hirai and Yamagishi, unless they were
"acting outside the a of their employment" during the course of events
that caused Ito's death. Restatement (Second) of Agency §219.
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that Hirai was employed by and
Yamagishi was "an officer, director and/or employee" of Macro at the
time the incident took place. Complaint ZZZZ 6 and 7. Macro, Hirai and
Yamagishi filed a joint Answer and did not deny these allegations.
Moreover, their joint Answer did not set forth an affirmative defense that
Hirai and Yamagishi "acted outside the scope of their employment." And,
Marcro's briefs on appeal do not assert such a defense, only the same
defenses of Hirai and Yamagishi which were resolved against them by the
K-23
trial court and, as set forth below, by this court. Thus, we hold. as a matter
of law, that Macro is subject to joint and several liability on the judgment.
We shall therefore remand the matter to the trial court for the limited
purposes of (1) entering judgment against Macro, Yamagishi and Hirai,
jointly and severally, in the amount of $2,434,857.55 and (2) determining
whether MOE should also be held jointly and severally liable to plaintiff
for the same monetary judgment, based on the theory that MOE is the
"alter ego" of Macro.
2. Ito's Implied Assumption of Risk.
Defendants alternatively argue that if the release is not valid, Ito
impliedly assumed the risk of harm arising from defendants, conduct.
They contend that the risk of drowning is so inherent in the sport of scuba
diving, that Ito must have impliedly assumed that risk by participating in
the diving excursion with defendants.
The doctrine of implied assumption of risk, as contained in
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 496C (hereafter, "Section 496C a"
States, in pertinent part:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), a plaintiff who
fully understands a risk of harm to himself. . . caused
by the defendant's conduct . . . and who nevertheless
voluntarily chooses to enter or remain. . . .under
circumstances that manifest his willingness to accept it,
is not entitled to recover for harm within that risk.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) does not apply in
any situation in which an express agreement to accept the
risk would be invalid as contrary to public policy.
Plaintiff argues that Section 496C(1) is inapplicable because the release
is "invalid as contrary to public policy" under Section 496C(2). In support,
she points to the trial court's finding that "Yamagishi deceived Ito into
believing that he was receiving the legitimate CMAS one star course and a
legitimate open water diver course." Finding of Fact No. 16. We have
already ruled that the release failed because it did not comply with the
express requirements of Section 496B, not because accepting such risk
would be contrary to public policy. We shall therefore address the issue of
whether Ito impliedly assumed the risk of harm arising from defendants,
conduct.
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Under Section 496C (1), Ito's implied assumption of the risk must have
been voluntarily made, with his full understanding of the risk of harm
resulting from defendants' conduct. There is no dispute that Ito
voluntarily chose to go diving. The issue, however, is whether Ito had
knowledge of, and understood the risk of harm caused by defendants,
conduct. Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 496D ("Section 496D")
provides guidance in determining what level of knowledge a person must
possess in order to impliedly assume the risk of harm arising from
defendants, conduct. See, Restatement (Second) of Torts 5496C cmt. a.
Section 496D states:
Except where he expressly so agrees, a plaintiff does not
assume a risk of harm arising from the defendant's
conduct unless he then knows of the existence of the risk
and appreciates its unreasonable character./10/
Defendants argue that Ito knew he could drown in water if he were to
go scuba diving. See Section 496D cmt. d. That is true. However, the
"risk of harm" which we must examine is that "arising from the
defendant([s'] conduct." Section 496D. We need not examine any and all
risks which could occur on a dive, such as drowning, a
/10/ Again we note that, because the release used by defendants was
invalid, Ito did not "expressly agree" to assume the risk of harm arising
from the defendant's conduct.
shark bite, or jellyfish sting.
Under Section 496D, Ito must have known of the existence of the risk
and appreciated its unreasonable character to have impliedly assumed the
risk. This means Ito "must not only be aware of the facts which create the
danger, but must also appreciate the danger itself and the nature, character,
and extent which make it unreasonable." Section 496D cmt. b. Whether Ito
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was aware of and appreciated the dangers are questions of fact. See
Section 496D cmt. e.
After a two week trial, the court found as a matter of fact that "Ito was
r ot aware of all the risks of scuba diving . . . because he had not been
properly trained." It also found that Ito's poor training "was a proximate
cause of [his] death." (See Finding of Facts Nos. 17 and 18).
Although the trial court found that Ito "was not aware of all the risks of
scuba diving," we cannot say with certainty whether he was likewise not
aware of the specific risks which could arise from defendants, conduct.
Nothing in the facts of this case indicates that Ito had any warning that
defendants may be negligent in performing their duties.
There are no facts to indicate that Ito knew of the existence of the risk
arising from defendants’ conduct or that he "appreciate[d] its unreasonable
character." Section 496D. Therefore, we hold that Ito did not impliedly
assume the risk arising from defendants, conduct because he did not
"fully" understand the "risk of harm to himself... caused by the
defendant[s'] conduct" as required under Section 496C.
3. Ito's Contributory Negligence.
Defendants also argue that Ito was contributorily negligent as a matter
of law because he failed to take reasonable precautions before
encountering the risks of diving. According to Hirai, Ito failed to ask how
long the dive would take and to find out what he should do if he and his
dive buddy became separated. Defendants Macro and Yamagishi allege
that Ito's death was caused by his violation of basic scuba diving rules and
that Ito had the "last clear chance" to prevent his own death.
Contributory negligence is defined in Section 463 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts ("Section 463") as follows:
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he
should conform for his own protection, and which is a
legally contributing cause co-operating with the
negligence of the defendant in bringing about the
plaintiff's harm.
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To conclude that Ito was contributorily negligent under Section 463,
we conduct a two-step test. First, we must find that Ito did not observe the
proper standard of conduct for his own safety. According to Restatement
(Second) of Torts Section 464 (1), the standard of conduct "to which [Ito]
must conform for his own protection is that of a reasonable man under like
circumstances."
Only if we find that Ito's conduct did not meet this 'reasonable man’
standard may we move on to the second part of the test which is whether
Ito's conduct legally contributed to his death. In conducting this analysis,
we may find that Ito's own negligence "is a legally contributing cause of
his harm if, but only if, it is a substantial factor in bringing about his harm
and there is no rule restricting his responsibility for it." Restatement
(Second) of Torts §465(1).
We do not reach the second part of the test, however, because the facts
show that Ito's conduct conformed to that of "a reasonable [person] under
like circumstances." Section 464 (1). Ito took defendants’ diving course.
The trial court did not find irom the evidence that Ito was negligent in the
manner he conducted himself.
Defendants’ assertion that Ito was negligent in failing to ask questions
about the dive's depth, duration, course, and emergency procedures does
not have merit. See Hirai's Opening Brief at 41. Defendants had the duty
to provide this information to Ito and the other divers, not the other way
around: "Yamagishi and Hirai failed to discuss with Ito the special
circumstances of a dive to more than 100 feet, including the more rapid
exhaustion of air and nitrogen narcosis." Also, "[a]t the site of the Grotto,
Yamagishi and Hirai failed to give an adequate dive briefing and failed to
check Ito's equipment." See Findings of Fact Nos. 31 and 32./11/
Defendants held themselves out to be professional dive instructors and
supervisors. Ito reasonably relied on their representation of
professionalism when he registered to learn how to dive from defendants,
and subsequently when he decided to dive at the Grotto under defendants'
professional supervision. Ito paid
/11/ The trial court also found that "Yamagishi led the dive to a depth
of more than 100 [feet] far beyond the training capabilities of Ito."
Findings of fact No. 34.
for defendants’ expert services. He had a right to expect that defendants
would provide him with all important pre-dive information and conduct
any last minute equipment checks that would be necessary. Defendants
failed to do so.
It was the defendants who failed in their duty to Ito. Ito acted as a
reasonable person would have under the circumstances. We, therefore,
hold that Ito was not contributorily negligent under Section 463.
4. The Standard of Care for Diving.
Defendants argue that the trial court applied an incorrect standard of
care in evaluating their conduct. They argue that the trial court erred
because it measured their conduct "against a foreign standard of care
rather than the prevailing standard of care in the Commonwealth." See
Hirai's Opening Brief at 32; Yamagishi's Opening Brief at 34 (quote in
lower case).
The trial court heard testimony by plaintiff and defendants, dive
experts, and subsequently found that Marcro's diving course "did not meet
the minimum standards" and "did not meet the standards or follow the
training program required by CMAS." Findings of Fact Nos. 10 and 13.
The trial court, therefore, applied a standard premised upon the CMAS
requirements for dive certification. Defendants contend, however, that
their conduct should be "adjudged according to the ADS/12/ standard
adhered to by scuba diving shops throughout the community of Saipan.”
See
/12/ ADS is a Japanese dive organization and is a member of CMAS,
an internationally recognized French dive agency. Reporter's Transcript
("R.T.") Vol. Ill, pp. 225-226.
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Yamagishi's Reply Brief at 20 (quote in lower case).
We reject defendants’ contention for three reasons. First, defendants
purported to certify Ito under the ADS and CMAS standards. The trial
court found that defendant Yamagishi had "signed a certification card
certifying Ito as an ADS open water diver" and "signed a certification card
certifying Ito as a CMAS one-star diver."/13/ Findings of Fact Nos. 6 and
7.
Defendants may not now contend that, although they purported to
certify Ito under the CMAS standard, the trial court should have adjudged
Marcro's training course under a different "Saipan-only" standard.
Defendants may not purport to offer one standard of dive instruction to its
students, and subsequently argue that the trial court erred by not applying
an apparently lower level standard in evaluating their dive course. The
trial court correctly applied the standard which defendants themselves
purported to offer Ito: CMAS.
Second, there apparently is no ADS "standard" for dive courses or
other diving requirements. Defendants’ own dive expert testified that he is
"not familiar with any [ADS standard]" and that ADS "refer[s] to the
CMAS standard."/14/ In light of this, we cannot say that the trial court
erred in applying the CMAS standard.
/13/ In fact, "(t]he course that Ito attended to receive his open water
certification did not meet the standards or follow the training program
required by CMAS." Findings of Fact No. 13.
/14/ See R.T. Vol. XIII, pp. 1006-1007, quoted in Plaintiff's response
Brief at 31-32. Yamagishi, on the other hand, states that the alleged ADS
standard is "based in part on the CMAS standard" as "established and
adhered to by the dive shops throughout Saipan." Yamagishi's Reply Brief
at 22-23.
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Lastly, we disagree with defendants' contention that there is, or should
be, a unique standard for Saipan dive shops and professionals. Defendants
argue that -- although there is no ADS standard -- there exists an "ADS
standard adhered to by scuba diving shops throughout the community of
Saipan." Yamagishi's Reply Brief at 20 (quote in lower case). Defendants,
however, fail to state what sort of diving requirements and skills do or
should comprise such a Saipan-only standard, even though their expert
arguably "was and is intimately familiar with the standards of the scuba
diving industry in the Commonwealth and throughout Micronesia." Hirai's
Opening Brief at 39.
Defendants rely on Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 299A
("Section 299A"), which provides:
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or
knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the
practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise
the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of
that profession or trade in good standing in similar
communities.
For some professions, an "[a]llowance must be made . . . for the type of
community in which the actor carries on his practice." Section 299A cmt.
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