Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Hirai v. Ito

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Supreme Court, U.S.

sae FILED

94 705 CI 19 199%

OPICE OF THE Cutan

In the

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1994

Nobuo Hirai, Petitioner,

V.

Ryoko Ito, as Personal Representatives of the

heirs of Akinobu Ito, Deceased, Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

HAROLD A. STONE

(Counsel of Record)

FRANCIS M. MCKEOWN

GUDMUNDSON, SIGGINS, STONE & SKINNER

One Embarcadero Center, Suite 1350

San Francisco, California 9411 1

Telephone (415) 391-4200

Facsimile (415) 989-4739

Counsel for Petitioner

NOBUO HIRAI

October, 1994

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1) Whether Federal Question Jurisdiction arises under the due

process clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments when the trial court, for

docket convenience, refused to hear, but denied, defendant Hirai’s motion

to enforce a written settlement agreement.

2) Whether Federal Question Jurisdiction arises under the due

process clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments where the CNMI

Supreme Court directed a judgment against defendant Macro for the first

time on appeal, although it had been dismissed earlier, and was not present

at triai.

3) Whether Federal Question Jurisdiction arises under the due

process clauses of the Sth and 14th Amendments where defendant Hirai

has not been granted a new trial despite the fact that another party

defendant, Macro, is entitled to a new trial.

The parties to the proceedings below were:

Plaintiffs:

Defendants:

Ryoko Ito, as Personal Representative of the heirs of

Akinobu Ito, Deceased. (Hereinafter “Ito.”)

Macro Energy, Inc., (herinafter “Macro”), Marianas

Ocean Enterprises, (hereinafter “MOE”), Nobuo Hirai,

(hereinafter “Hirai”), Shigemi Yamagishi, (hereinafter

“Y amagishi”), and American Home Assurance Company,

(hereinafter “American Home.”)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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DT BUI E NT si5 5 iiscd seco diiccscdinseiccesebsdesssecsedssoreovecsessccsees vi, Vii

ALE ss ss cacancennasnesesnsecanonsnnensenesancasenenaenersceseos 2

PRs AIT Wietsiiibiboidcininsesniadesnnesttibhnrorsserece Scent aTNi ds Ardeithttincercenseoeees 2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND TREATIES.......2

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I. a ichicssnnitsenscesavnivetecetvesieoessevevessestconsocssseese 3

Il. a st sca chcenmtncddbdeseccnnccescoescessencees 3

Il. How Federal Questions Were Raised in the Courts Below............ 7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION. .............c:cscsssssssesesseeseeeees 1]

I. TRRIORERINCO OF TD CNITIOI isso sds nedasscessccsciccccccccccccccrscceees 11

Il. Federal Question Jurisdiction Arises from Hirai’s Colorable

Appeal on the Grounds of Denial of a Hearing on a Written

saa sss cacacannasetncssesacdsctyecstceccececsece 13

Ill. Federal Questions Jurisdiction Arises from Petitioners’

Colorable Appeal on the Grounds that Macro is entitled to

a Trial on the Merits EN GEST: SECS 5 1S 17

IV. Federal Question Jurisdiction Arises from Hirai’s Colorable

Appeal on the Grounds that Hirai has not been Granted a

ee en nome Fenty Defendant fs

Entitled to a New Trial..............-.-.cscscssesscccosseersessnstecssscessessensersces 19

CONCLUSION 21

APPENDICES

A.

B.

i iiiicsciessarsncesissieensnniesctenincitianiiiiiaimaamiaia Lae A-|

Answer (Macro Energy, Inc., Shigemi Yamagishi and

| | ne aa shee 28 Soe me B-1

Summary Judgment (Honorable Robert A. Hefner,

PU I sncciccccmretintsinntedhitaentdtiinebiieitibiiictiotiins: C-]

Memorandum Decision (Honorable Robert A.

Hefner, Presitiing Judge).......:scessseccssscesceosesscocssecsecsseese D-1

Amended Summary Judgment (Honorable Robert A.

PEOEIN,, FOORITIIN UIE Docccsiceticesccsscrcesnsscnninoniensninuniaines E-1

Affidavit of Thomas L. Roberts...............cccccseeseeeeerseeees F-]

Judgment (Honorable Pedro M. Atalig,

PUCOIR FRI ccctctesereenvintlbbnliniistieintadidiciiidecssaseni G-1

Amended Judgment (Honorable Pedro M.

pt_BR ene AO OREO H-1

Excerpt of Reporter’s Transcript of Trial (Honorable

Pedro M. Atalig, Presiding Judge)..................:ccscsscesseees I-1

Hiria’s Opening Brief to Commonwealth of the

Northern Mariana Island’s Supreme Coutt..................... J-1

Judgment and Opinion (CNMI Supreme Court)............ K-]

Hiria’s Petition for Re-Hearing

(CNMI Supreme Coust)scicscieisssciicscescisccitiieeibdesossecccesee L-1

Order Denying Re-Hearing

(CNMI Supreme Court) : sdb ictbUssduvecees M-1

Notice of Appeal (Ninth Circuit) Nel

Opening Brief of Defendant and Appellant

Hirai (Ninth Circuit)...............0.ccccsccssrecsessrsssrseseresceseseres O-1

Opening Brief of Defendants and Appellants, Macro

Energy, Inc. and Shigemi Yamagishi (Ninth Circuit)....P-1

Appellee Ryoko Ito’s Brief (Ninth Circuit)..............-.-.. Q-1

Reply Brief of Defendant and Appellant Nobuo Hirai

(Ninth Circuit)...............ccccsccssssesecesessecssscescnenssesssessrsrees R-]

Reply Brief of Defendant and Appellants, Macro

Energy, Inc. and Shigemi Yamagishi

(Ninth Circuit)..........cccccccceceressecsnesersssseesessanseeseneneneneees S-1

Order and Judgment of Dismissal (Ninth Circuit)......... T-1

vi

TABLE OF AUTORITIES

CASES

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458 (1938); .....ccccscccceseeseeseeesees iiiiisemeuavinins 10

Avcojet v. Asteae (TOTS) SUG Fae CO iy UW cnscterereenceiacststenteecssseeseinveeveeen 19

Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 764 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1985), corrected

by, 773 9.26 19D ...cnnieviecsttiemuinaiaamaaaaaanaannnairit 8, 15, 16

Drier v. Tarpon S22 F 26 TSO COGe Cae. BF ai vevrepcsevntcesienqnecevsesitivensenovenes 19

Edwards v. Cass County, Tex, 919 F.2d 273 (Sth Cir. 1990). ......... 8, 15, 16

H.J. Hines Co. v. Beack-nut Lifesavers, Inc., 181 F.Supp. 452, 459

(D.C.N.Y. 1968). ....cllliensseialahannieiinibnintitantlerdenens 9

Lassiter v. Department of Social Services 452 US 18 (1981).)..........s000 17

Lytle v. Household Manufacturing (1990) 494 US 545 .....cceecseeeseeeeeeees 19

Ochoa v. Hasmamdas: 250 UG TIP CIDE ccceiecsatescessvsevsticesctsincinestitiidicnescvens 16

Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Com, 301 US 292, 304-305

(1937). ..caccovcvenvevsennnettprtSaTalcetelseeceann uno iieiin ett tersceicibibaiesdabemmaadtalieeeiiin 17

Oliva v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1992). ......cccsssssssssseesesees 8, 15, 16

Sablan v, Manglona, 938 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1991).......cssssssssssessseseeeeesees 12

Ryoko Ito v. Macro Energy, Inc. et al., No. 92-022 CNMI, (October 26,

1993...) ..ccccesecccvediissisiscenissasidensp tuisdaiadieesticianiianicitaniiisiiabpaiatiadapnieyias 2

Thrift v. Bell Lines, Inc., 296 F.Supp. 214, 217 (D.C.N.Y. 1967))..........000 9

United States v. Williamson, 803 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1986)............. 10

_ Whittler v. Seibel (1982) 675 F.2d 245 sess 19

oo tne maar eee tebe

Vii

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

i sesutudocsssccnssnebonecdanens 12

Sth Amendment, Due Process Clause................ccccccccssssseseceeeseees 2, 6, 16, 17

14th Amendment, Due Process Clause.................cccccccseee seeseeeeee 2, 6, 16, 17

STATUTES

ATE EE EE 2

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ci daaleaaiehinidciidipnasoneenivenevetnosesnintecoresecnecens 2, 12, 20

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Ee 3

Restatement of Judgments, 2d §39 ...................sscccsssccsssscssssssscscessesconsssscses 19

TREATISES

Vol. 13B J. Moore, A. Vestal & P.Kurland, Moore’s Manual Federal

Practice and Proceedure, §3562, pp. 18-19 (1994) ........ceeceeeeeeeeeeeees 13

TREATIES

The Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana

Islands (CNMI) in Political Union with the United States of America

(The Covenant), Article Five, §501(a)....................cscccsesssesscsscccsscceeseses 2

cee ne, een

No,

In the

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1994

Nobuo Hirai, Petitioner

v.

Ryoko Ito, as Personal Representatives of the

heirs of Akinobu Ito, Deceased, Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, first

entered in this case on July 21, 1994 based solely upon a finding that no

federal question jurisdiction arose, where the trial court refused petitioner

Hirai a hearing on Hirai’s defense of a written settlement agreement, and

the Supreme Court for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana

Islands (CNMI) sustained the trial court’s ruling, holding that the a trial

court can refuse to hear a defense at trial which would be more

conveniently heard before trial.

Petitioner further prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review

the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, that

no federal question jurisdiction arose on the due process issue of a right to

a hearing and trial, where the CNMI Supreme Court imposed a 2.4 million

dollar judgment against Macro, a party previously dismissed and therefore

not present at trial, on the stated and patently inadequate grounds of

respondeat superior. —

»» Petitioner further prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review

the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, that

no federal question jurisdiction is created by the fact that a new trial for

2

Macro, to which it is entitled, necessitates a new trial for all parties to

avoid the threat of inconsistent judgments within the very same action

OPINIONS BELOW

The Order and Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

(App., infra, T1-T3)is unreported. The opinion of the Supreme Court of

the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, (App., infra, K1-

K50), is reported as Ryoko Ito v. Macro Energy, Inc. et al., No. 92-022

CNMI, (October 26, 1993.)

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals entered its judgment on July

21, 1994. (App., infra, T1-T3.) The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 USC §1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND TREATIES

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides,

in pertinent part that “no person may be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law.”

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution

provides, in pertinent part, that “ no state may deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law.”

48 USC §1694c(a) provides that the 9th Circuit has jurisdiction of

appeals from the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Northern

Mariana Islands “involving the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United

States.”

The Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern

Mariana Islands (CNMI) in Political Union with the United States of

America (The Covenant), Article Five, §501(a) provides in pertinent part,

“to the extent that they are not applicable of their own force, the following

provisions of the Constitution of the United States will be applicable

within the Northern Mariana Islands as if the Northern Mariana Islands

were one of the several states....Amendments I through IX,

inclusive;....Amendment XIV....”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Nature Of The Case

This is a wrongful death lawsuit filed by Ryoko Ito, as personal

representative of the heirs of Akinobu Ito, (Ito), who died in a September

24, 1988 scuba diving accident at a popular Saipan dive site known as the

“Grotto”. (App., infra, Al-A3.) Plaintiffs’ claims were originally brought

against five (5) defendants: Macro, a dive shop, Hirai, an assistant

instructor employed by Macro, Yamagishi, a scuba diving instructor and

Macro’s president, Marianas Ocean Enterprises (MOE), alleged to be the

alter ego of Macro, and American Home Assurance Company (hereinafter

“American Home”) Macro and Yamagishi’s insurer. (App., infra,A\-A7.)

Il. Course Of Proceedings

On November 7, 1990, Macro, Hirai, Yamagishi, and American

Home moved for summary judgment under §496B of the Restatement of

Torts, 2d on the basis of an “Agreement for Exemption from Obligation”

(i.e., a release agreement sometimes called a “covenant not to sue” or a

“waiver of liability”) signed by Ito on the morning of his accident (ER 1;

71; CR 11/7/90, 00:00:00).

On December 17, 1990, Judge Robert A Hefner in the CNMI

Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Macro, Hirai,

Yamagishi, and American Home. (App., infra, C-1.) The court did not

address MOE in the judgment, or its Memorandum Decision, but the

implication was that it too was dismissed. (App., infra, D1-D10.)

On December 27, 1990, plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the

order granting summary judgment arguing that Ito’s assumption of risk

was not sufficiently “expressed” under §496B of the Restatement of Torts,

2d (App., infra, E1.)

On January 28, 1991, the Court entered an “Amended Summary

Judgment” and “Memorandum Decision.” (App., infra, El.) Judge

Hefner held, upon further review that although the agreement effectively

operated to release Macro from liability, it did not release Yamagishi or

Hirai, Macro’s employees, since they were not named in the express

assumption of risk. Since MOE was alleged to be the alter ego of Macro,

MOE along with Macro was dismissed. Although the status of American

Home was unclear, the case was reinstated against it as well.

On June 21, 1991, plaintiff's counsel sent a written

settlement offer to Hirai. The proposal was simple and short:

This will constitute plaintiff's offer to the

defendant Nobuo Hirai to dismiss the case

with prejudice against him under the

following conditions:

a) Hirai will meet with a [sic] expert

of plaintiff's choosing to discuss the

events surrounding this case and his

employment in Saipan.

b) Hirai agrees to testify at the trial.

[App., infra, F-5.]

Four days later, Hirai’s counsel sent plaintiff's counsel a written

acceptance, signed by both counsel and Hirai, that was similarly simple

and short:

My client, NOBUO HIRAI,

unconditionally accepts the offer to settle

the case against him contained in your

letter of June 21, 1991 under the terms

specified therein. (App., infra, F-6.)

On June 26, 1991, the following day, plaintiff's counsel purported

to orally revoke the offer, and a day later, on June 23, 1991, sent a letter

purporting to withdraw it. (App., infra, F-7.)

Despite their executed settlement agreement, plaintiff did not file

a dismissal of Hirai. Accordingly, on September 12, 1991, Hirai filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of the settlement agreement.

No opposition was ever filed. However, the parties stipulated to a stay of

the hearing until the matter was finally brought up for hearing on the firct

day of trial on May 26, 1992. (App., infra, 12-14.) At that time, the court

stated that this matter should have been taken up before trial and rather

than hear the Motion, the court denied the Motion. (App., infra, 1-4.)

5

On September 9, 1991, American Home moved, pursuant to Rule

54(b) of the CNMI Rules of Civil Procedure, (adopted from the Federal

Rules) for certification of the Superior Court’s January 28, 1991 Amended

Summary Judgment on the “release issue”, and for certification of the

court’s April 16, 1991 order on the policy limits issue.

On September 12, 1991, Hirai filed a motion to enforce the

settlement agreement.

On October 7, 1991, the trial court certified for appeal Judge

Hefner’s order of January 28, 1991 on the release issue and Judge

Hefner’s order of April 16, 1991 on the policy limits.

The notices of appeal which followed the Rule 54(b) certification

had the effect of staying all proceedings in the Superior Court, including

Hirai’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement. On November 6,

1991, the parties formally stipulated to such a stay.

On February 3, 1992, the CNMI Supreme Court dismissed all of

the appeals on the grounds that the orders sought to be reviewed were

insufficiently final within the meaning of Rule 54(b).

On February 7, 1992, plaintiff scheduled Hirai’s second deposition

for March 5, 1992.' Hirai was re-deposed by plaintiff two days later on

April 9, 1992. On February 17, 1992, the parties stipulated to a May 26,

1992 trial date.

On April 7, 1992, a hearing was held on various pretrial motions

defendants. Judge Castro declined to entertain the motions on their merits,

denying them on the grounds that they had been filed too close to trial,

then over a month and a half away. (App., /ra, 11-15.) No motion cut

off date had ever been set by the court.

was still pending. Defendant Hirai requested that the motion be heard

prior to trial or on the day of trial prior to testimony. (App.. infra, 13-14.)

Shortly after the motion to enforce the settlement had been filed, plaintiff's

counsel and counsel for Mr. Hirai agreed that the hearing on the motion would be

until plaintiff’ s counsel could re-depose Mr. Hara: (CR 10/9/92 8:2:42, RT

$/26/92 11:13-24)

6

The motion memorandum and affidavit in support of Motion to Enforce

the Settlement were filed with the Pretrial Memorandum.

On May 26, 1992, on the first day of trial, just before opening

statements, the trial court refused to hear Hirai’s motion on his settlement

agreement and denied it without a hearing on the grounds that it should

have been raised prior to trial. (App., infra, 11-14.)

On June 22, 1992, after a two week trial between May 26, 1992

and June 5, 1992, the court entered judgment in the approximate amount

of $2.4 million against Hirai, Yamagishi and American Home. (App.,

infra, G1.) On August 10, 1992, after American Home’s June 29, 1992

Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment was entered which limited

American Homes’ liability to $100,000. (App., infra, H1-H2.)

Yamagishi and Hirai’s Joint Notice of Appeal to the CNMI

Supreme Court was timely filed on August 14, 1992. On September 22,

1992, the CNMI Supreme Court consolidated the appeals and set the

briefing schedule. The CNMI Supreme Court heard argument on the

island of Saipan on March 12, 1993.

On October 26, 1993 the CNMI Supreme Court issued its written

Opinion wherein it decided, inter alia:

Hearing the motion [to enforce a written settlement

agreement] would have entailed continuing the trial to

another day. A continuance would have required a shifting

of the court’s docket. (App., infra, K32.)

Thus, quite surprisingly, the CNMI Supreme Court elevated the

importance of docket control above the right to a hearing, guaranteed by

the due process clauses of the Sth and 14th Amendments.

The CNMI Supreme Court also made a decision to impose the

judgment against Macro, a party which had previously been dismissed

from the case months before trial. The CNMI Supreme Court’s only

reason for imposing judgment against a previously dismissed party

without a trial was “respondeat superior.” (App., infra, K22; M1-M2.)

On November 3, 1993, Hirai filed a motion for rehearing with the

CNMI Supreme Court, explaining that docket control may not supersede

7

the right to a hearing. Hirai also noted that the doctrine of respondeat

superior does not substitute for the right to a trial. (App., infra, L1-L3.)

The CNMI Supreme Court denied a rehearing on November 23,

1993 on the grounds that Hirai had not raised the due process problems

with the CNMI Supreme Court decision until after the decision was

written. (App., infra, M1-M2)

The CNMI Supreme Court also denied a rehearing on the issue of

entering judgment against the previously dismissed Macro without trial.

The Court based its ruling on the grounds that Macro failed to set forth

facts (at the appellate level and without a trial) to show that its employee

Yamagishi acted outside the scope of employment. (App., infra, M1-M2.)

On December 22, 1993, Hirai filed a Notice of Appeal with the

United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. Hirai fully briefed the

issues set forth above. (App., infra, O, P, Q, R and S.)

On July 21, 1994 the United States Court of Appeal for the 9th

Circuit entered judgment against Hirai. The Court of Appeals based its

ruling on the sole grounds that the above proceedings failed to raise an

issue of Constitutional Due Process such as to create Federal Question

Jurisdiction. (App., infra, T1-T3.)

Ill. How Federal Questions Were Raised In The Courts Below

Hirai first requested a hearing on his defense of a written

settlement agreement at the trial. (App., infra,\1-14.) Hirai then argued

before the CNMI Supreme Court (the only appellate court in the CNMI)

that he had a right to a hearing on this defense. (App., infra, J2-J5.)

Surprised by the CNMI Supreme Court’s decision that he had no right to a

hearing, Hirai filed a motion for rehearing in the CNMI Supreme Court.

- (App., infra, L6-L13.) The Court denied Hirai’s motion on the grounds

that Hirai had not pointed out to the CNMI Supreme Court before that the

right to a hearing is guaranteed by due process clauses of the Constitution.

(App., infra, M-2.)

In its’ Order Denying a Rehearing, the CNMI Supreme Court

dismissed Hirai’s due process rights in two sentences:

Hirai’s due process argument regarding

the issue of the settlement agreement is

being raised for the first time in his

Petition for Rehearing. We shall not

address this issue which was not raised

below or earlier with us. [App., infra,M-

2.)

This statement is incorrect. Hirai requested a hearing. The trial

court denied that request. Hirai then appealed to the CNMI Supreme

Court on the grounds that he had been denied a right to a hearing during

the trial. These facts constitute raising the due process issue.

The CNMI Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had a right to

deny Hirai a hearing on his settlement agreement at trial in the interest of

“docket control.”

The trial court possesses inherent power

to police its docket, Oliva v. Sullivan, 958

F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1992); Edwards v. Cass

County, Tex, 919 F.2d 273 (Sth Cir.

1990). The timing of trials and docket

control are matters best left to the

discretion of the trial court. Coursen v.

A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 764 F.2d 1329 (9th

Cir. 1985), corrected by, 773 F.2d 1049.

[App., infra, K31-K32.]

Then the CNMI Supreme Court refused to even consider that this

ruling amounted to a denial of the constitutional due process right to a

hearing. (/bid.) This amounts to a violation of due process in its most

basic form: fairness and substantial justice.

At the trial court, as stated above, Hirai asked:

if we can just have five minutes on that

motion. because we thought the offer had

If your Honor is willing to hear it today or

at some point during the trial, we would

like to argue it. If your Honor would

9

prefer that it be a matter of proof at

sometime during the trial, then that would

be acceptable to us, too. [App., infra, 13.]

Hirai clearly requested a hearing and the court clearly denied him

that right. One need not yell “due process” to raise the constitutional

issue. When one asks for a hearing, one is requesting due process and

raising the issue. Hirai did not waive the right to a hearing;. Hirai raised

the issue by making the request.

At the appeal stage, Hirai’s Opening Brief before the CNMI

Supreme Court argued that Hirai’s settlement agreement should have been

heard and enforced. Hirai argued that the trial court committed error both

procedurally in refusing to hear the issue at trial and substantively because

the settlement agreement was valid.

First, procedurally, a motion for summary

judgment may be made at any time,

including on the eve of, or even during

trial. (Rule 56 Commonwealth Rules of

Civil Procedure;” Thrift v. Bell Lines, Inc.,

296 F.Supp. 214, 217 (D.C.N.Y. 1967);

HJ. Hines Co. v. Beach-nut Lifesavers,

Inc., 181 F.Supp. 452, 459 (D.C.N.Y.

1960). Hirai’s written settlement

agreement entitled him to dismissal.

Whether defendant sought dismissal

based upon that contract before or during

trial has no bearing on Hirai’s rights

under the contract. He certainly did not

waive his rights under the settlement

contract by failing to enforce it before the

trial. Obviously, if settlement agreement

can only be enforced by pretrial motion,

no settlements would ever be entered into

during a trial. Accordingly, the basis for

the [trial] court’s refusal to entertain

defendant’s Motion is unsound. [App.,

infra, 32-35.)

: The Commonwealth Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 56,

are based upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

10

Clearly, Hirai raised this issue “involving” due process in the.

initial stages of the appeal to the CNMI Supreme Court. The CNMI

Supreme Court’s ruling appears particularly disingenuous when one sees

that the cases relied upon by the Supreme Court in its Opinion were never

cited by the parties. Furthermore, those cases specifically address the due

process problems inherent in elevating a trial court’s power to control its

own docket over a right to a hearing. (See discussion distinguishing cases

cited by the CNMI Supreme Court at pp.19-21, infra.)

The CNMI’s Supreme Court’s conclusion that Hirai waived his

due process right to a hearing or to raise the issue on appeal is incorrect

and fundamentally unfair. “Court’s indulge every presumption against the

waiver or fundamental constitutional rights.” (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US

458 (1938); United States v. Williamson, 803 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir.

1986).)

In sum, Hirai did raise this due process issue of a hearing in the

trial court and in the initial stages of the CNMI appeal, despite the CNMI

Supreme Court’s conclusory statement to the contrary. Furthermore, even

if there were any question as to whether Hirai waived his due process

rights, there is a strong presumption against such a waiver (Johnson,

supra).

Hirai first raised the issue of the right of Macro, previously

dismissed from the case, to a trial on the merits in his Respondent’s Brief

to Ito’s Cross-Appeal in the CNMI Supreme Court. At that time Hirai

specifically cited the due process clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments.

Hirai first raised the issue of the right of Hirai to a new trial, to

avoid the resulting threat of multiple judgments within the same action, in

his Respondent’s Brief to Ito’s Cross-Appeal in the CNMI Supreme Court.

At that time Hirai specifically cited the due process clause of the 5th and

14th Amendments.

Hirai appealed to the United States Court of Appeals based upon

the constitutional due process violations discussed herein. The Court of

Appeal committed error when it dismissed this appeal on the grounds that

no federal issues were raised.

11

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

1 Importance Of The Question

The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit decided

that Hirai’s colorable appeal, based upon a denial of a hearing on his best

defense, the denial of a trial to a previously dismissed defendant, and the

question of a right to a new trial as to the remaining parties, to avoid

inconsistent judgments within the same action, did not raise a federal due

process issue, such as would create federal question jurisdiction.

The citizens of the CNMI will understand this decision as a

declaration by their own courts and the United States Court of Appeals

that they do not have the right to due process guaranteed by the

constitution of the United States.. The need for guidance from this Court

is acute.

The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit and the

citizens and courts of the CNMI should be advised by this Court that due

process guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the

Covenant will be enforced by the courts of the CNMI, and, if necessary,

by the United States Court of Appeals.

Here there were clear violations of due process by both the

Superior Court and Supreme Court of the CNMI. When the Superior

Court of the CNMI denied defendant Hirai the right to be heard on his

motion to enforce a fully executed settlement agreement, it was a clear

denial of due process. When the CNMI Supreme Court sustained that

decision, and further decided to impose the judgment upon Macro without

a trial, and denied a new trial as to all parties to avoid inconsistent

judgments within the same action, it also denied Hirai due process of law.

This issue of due process is a matter of importance to the people,

courts and government of the CNMI, including Saipan. This decision, if

not corrected, can create uncertainty within the citizenry, courts and

government of the CNMI as to all constitutional rights. Uncertainty as to

equal application of such fundamental rights threatens to create a climate

which inhibits commerce, tourism and communication. Such uncertain

and inconsistent application of the United States Constitution is also

12

certain to open the floodgates to the federal court system by those seeking

clarification of their rights.

This case is a timely and rare opportunity for this Court to

provide guidance to the citizens and courts of the CNMI and to bring

much needed certainty and uniformity to the enforcement of these basic

constitutional rights.

Whatever the resolution of these questions, they are federal

questions involving the Constitution of the United States. The United

States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit dismissed Hirai’s appeal on the

grounds that “this is not a case ‘involving the Constitution, treaties, or

laws of the United States...’.” (App., infra, T-1, citing 48 USC §1694c(a)

and Sablan v Manglona, 938 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1991.)) Thus, the 9th

Circuit decision is based solely upon a finding that the above enumerated

issues are not federal questions.

Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution provides that the judicial

power of the United States extends to cases “arising under the

Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which

shall be made, under their authority.” The statutory grant of federal

question jurisdiction also uses the phrase “arises under.” (28 USC §1331.)

Similarly, 48 USC §1694c(a) provides that the United States Court of

Appeals for the 9th Circuit will have jurisdiction of appeals from all final

decisions of the highest court of the Northern Mariana Islands from which

a decision could be had in all cases “involving the Constitution, Treaties

or laws of the United States.”

The issue of when the relation of federal law to a case is such that

the action may be said to “arise under” that law has historically been

deceptively difficult.

As noted by Moore’s Federal Practice and Procedure:

The meaning of this phrase has attracted

the interest of such giants of the bench as

Marshall, Waite, Bradley, the first Harlan,

Holmes, Cardozo, and Frankfurter--to

name only the dead. It has been the

subject of voluminous scholarly writing.

Even so it cannot be said that any clear

13

test has been developed to determine

which cases “arise under” federal law.

There is no single rational principle that

will explain all of the decisions on this

point. The problem has been aggravated

by the tendency of courts to repeat

uncritically language from earlier

decisions as a substitute for analysis of

the case that is actually before them.

[Vol. 13B, J.Moore, A. Vestal & P.

Kurland, Moore’s Manual Federal

Practice and Proceedure, §3562, pp.18-19

(1994.).]

This case represents a rare opportunity for this Court to establish

clear guidelines as to when a case “arises under” federal law. It also

represents an opportunity for this Court to remedy the clear error of the

United States Court of Appeals.

Il. Federal Question Jurisdiction Arises From Hirai’s Colorable

Appeal On The Grounds Of Denial Of A Hearing On A

Written Settlement Agreement

On the first day of trial, counsel for Hirai asked to be heard on the

plaintiff-Hirai settlement agreement stating:

If we can just have five minutes on that

motion, because we thought the offer had

been made and accepted. [App., infra, I-

3.]

The court repeatedly complained that a motion on the settlement

agreement had not been heard before and that:

Before you bring [this] up before the

court, you have to notice this thing, and

set it for hearing. (App., infra, I-4.)

Counsel for Hirai responded with a reasonable explanation for the

delay of the hearing in light of the fact that certain issues on summary

judgment had been certified under Rule 54(b). The certification and stay

was made after the motion for summary judgment on the settlement

14

agreement was noticed but before the hearing. Thus, the action was stayed

between the time Hirai’s motion for summary judgment was originally

filed and the date set for hearing. When the case was remanded back to

the trial court after the CNMI Supreme Court dismissed the interlocutory

appeal, the trial court instructed that it did not want to hear any more law

and motion matters before trial. (App., infra, 13-14. ¥. Thus, Hirai waited

until the pretrial briefs and the first day of trial to raise this issue.

Counsel for Hirai simply requested a hearing of this very

important defense, if not on the first day of trial then at some time;

If your Honor is willing to hear it today or

at some point during the trial, we’d like to

argue it. If your Honor would prefer that

it be a matter of proof at some time during

the trial, then that would be acceptable to

us, too. But there is a reason for why it

hasn’t been heard yet, and that was

scheduling difficulties, and an agreement

of counsel that the hearing wouldn’t go

forward until Mr. Hirai’s deposition could

be retaken. (/bid.)

The Court responded:

We have about seven files this thick here,

and these are matters that should have

been taken up before trial. That’s why I

asked the parties, ‘are you ready for trial?’

Now, at this point, to entertain this

motion, the court will not. . .will deny the

motion. (App., infra, 1-4.)

The trial court did not simply put off a hearing on this issue to a

more convenient time. It “denied” enforcing the settlement agreement on

the grounds that hearing the matter at trial was inccavenient. The court

refused to hear Hirai’s defense because it believed the matter should have

been resolved in pretrial proceedings.

3

There was no law and motion cut-off, cither by local rule or court order in this

matter, other than Judge Castro’s instruction that the court did not want to hear any more

law and motion matters prior to trial. (App., infra, 13-14.)

15

In the Supreme Court’s opinion regarding the plaintiff-Hirai

settlement agreement at pp. 34-35, the Supreme Court cited three cases for

the proposition that the trial court possessed inherent power to police its

docket and that the timing of trials and docket control are matters best left

to the discretion of the trial court: Oliva v. Sullivan 958 F.2d 272 (9th Cir.

1992); Edwards v. Cass County, Texas 919 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1990;

Coursen v. A.H. Robbins Co., Inc. 764 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1985) corrected

by 773 F.2d 1049.

However, these cases in no way support the trial court’s refusal to

allow a hearing of Hirai’s strongest defense, a written settlement

agreement. In Oliva v., Sullivan, supra, the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion when it put its

inherent power to control its docket ahead of the rights of the parties to be

heard on the merits. In that case, the local rules and the trial court’s

instructions provided that plaintiff should have filed a motion for

summary judgment by August 6, 1987. Plaintiff did not do so.

Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal

held that plaintiff was entitled to a hearing and reversed, holding:

...the public policy favoring disposition

on the merits weighs against dismissal.

(Oliva at p. 274.)

Oliva certainly does not stand for the proposition that parties such

as Hirai may not have their defenses heard on the merits at the whim of

the trial court.

In Edwards v. Cass County, Texas, supra, once again, the holding

does not support the trial court’s decision to deny a motion on the grounds

that it refused to hear it. In Edwards, the trial court refused to hear an

untimely motion for summary judgment. The defendant and moving party

filed an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeal held, simply, that an

interlocutory appeal was not proper, and that the defense should properly

be raised as Hirai’s defense was raised: at trial. The court held:

Having failed to take the appropriate

measures to test the legal issue of

immunity [the basis of the motion for

summary judgment] prior to trial, these

defendants must stand trial, unless on

_

16

remand the district court should elect to

consider their motion for summary

judgment and should determine that

qualified immunity is present.

Out of an abundance of caution,

however, we note that the defendants

still may assert qualified immunity at

trial, (Edwards at p.277; emphasis

added.)

In the case at bench, the defense was presented at.trial. This is not

an interlocutory appeal. This is an appeal after a trial in which the trial

court refused to hear petitioner Hirai’s defense.

The third case cited by the Supreme Court on this issue is Coursen

v. A.H. Robbins, Co., Inc., 764 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1985) corrected by 773

F.2d 1049. The appellant there contended that she was prejudiced because

the trial court rescheduled her trial from February 14, 1984 to February 10,

1984. The court stated broadly that:

The timing of trials and control of the

docket are matters left to the discretion of

the trial court. (Coursen at p. 1340)

That case stands for the proposition that a trial court may control

the timing of its trials and control the docket. It does not stand for the

proposition that if a party presents a defense at an inconvenient time, the

defense may simply be “denied”. Once again, the Coursen_case, like

Edwards, supra and Oliva, supra cited by the CNMI Supreme Court, does

not support the trial court’s summary denial of petitioner Hirai’s best

defense.

Due process of law under the 5th and 14th Amendments to the

United States Constitution requires that parties have an opportunity to

defend, enforce, and protect their rights. The guarantee of due process of

law is one of the most important to be found in the Constitution, and it has

been said that without such guarantee, the right of private property could

not be said to exist in the sense in which it is known to our laws. (Ochoa

v. Hernandez 230 US 139 (1913).) Due process is not interested in mere

technical formalism. It is, rather, the substance that is determinative of

whether due process has been afforded. It is not a technical conception

M22 taser ts nai ED ADT NN cast tN a ANON set Oat ines BI wie =:

17

with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances, but rather

expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness. (Lassiter v.

Department of Social Services 452 US 18 (1981).)

One of the essential elements of procedural due process is an

opportunity for hearing. It is a cardinal principal of due process that no

one may be bound by a judgment, either in respect to his or her person or

property unless that person has had his or her day in court. In other words,

a person may not be so bound until he or she has been afforded an

opportunity to be heard. As the United States Supreme Court has stated:

The right to a hearing ...is one of the

‘rudiments of fair play’...assured...by the

14th Amendment ... There can be no

compromise on the footing of

convenience or expediency...when that

minimal requirement has been neglected

or ignored. (Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v.

Public Utilities Com. 301 US 292, 304-

305 (1937).

In the case at bench, the trial court denied Hirai’s right to a

hearing on his strongest defense “on the footing of convenience or

expediency”. (Ohio Bell, supra.) It is difficult to imagine a clearer case

of denial of due process and abuse of discretion. Yet the United States

Court of Appeals dismissed on the grounds that no federal issue of due

process was involved.

Ill. Federal Question Jurisdiction Arises From Petitioners’

Colorable Appeal On The Grounds That Macro Is Entitled To

A Trial On The Merits

In this case, Macro was dismissed by summary judgment and

therefore was not present at trial. Nevertheless, the CNMI Supreme Court

entered judgment for the first time on appeal against Macro on the theory —

of “respondeat superior.” \n a Motion for rehearing Hirai and Macro

pointed out that it was a denial of due process for CNMI Supreme Court to

act as a fact finding body and impose a judgment upon a previously

dismissed party, without a trial.

The CNMI Supreme Court denied the motion for Rehearing

stating:

18

In particular, Macro’s contention that its

due process rights were violated is

without merit. While it is true that a

corporation is a distinct ‘jural entity,’ we

disagree with the assertion that Macro is

entitled to a full trial on the issues of

negligent conduct, liability and damages

before judgment may be entered against

it, for here, it was being sued on

respondeat superior grounds. (App.,

infra, M-1.)

Defendant has found no cases where the doctrine of respondeat

superior has been extended to impose a judgment upon a party without a

hearing. Using this reasoning parties could simply prosecute an action

against employees and then impose judgments thus obtained upon

employers who are not parties to the trial, on a respondeat superior theory.

It is fundamental that a judgment does not apply to one who is not

a party at trial. In her brief before the CNMI Supreme Court, plaintiff

argued that the doctrines of coliateral estoppel and privity should be

applied to this novel situation.

Of course, the typical situation for application of these doctrines is

a case in which plaintiff has obtained a judgment against a defendant, and

then sues on that judgment in a second action against the defendant’s

insurance company who paid for and controlled the defense in the first

action. In those cases, the trial court has the discretion to apply the

principals of collateral estoppel and privity so as to prevent re-litigation of

the same issues.

in this case, however, plaintiffs are not attempting to sue

defendant’s insurance company on the judgment against its insured.

Instead, plaintiffs are attempting to impose a judgment obtained against

employees upon an employer who was previously dismissed and not a —

party at trial. Macro and MOE certainly cannot be said to have controlled

this action or to have reasonably expected to be bound by this judgment as

they had already been adjudicated to have no liability and were dismissed.

The question of whether the doctrines of privity and collateral

estoppel apply to # case are questions of fact for the trial court (Areajet v.

19

Askew (1975) 511 F.2d 710, 719). It was not appropriate for the CNMI

Supreme Court to usurp the trial court’s power to decide these issues of

fact and summarily deny Macro its right to a trial on the merits.

The CNMI Supreme Court does not indicate whether it adopted

plaintiffs arguments regarding privity and collateral estoppel. However, if

it did so, it did so in error. (1) Collateral estoppel is not applicable where

a case involves only one action. (Lytle v. Household Manufacturing

(1990) 494 US 545). The threat of multiple lawsuits, prevention of which

is the purpose of collateral estoppel, is not a danger here. (2) Collateral

estoppel should not be imposed offensively against on who is not a party

to the original trial. (Whittler v. Seibel (1982) 675 F.2d 245). (3) Privity

in the collateral estoppel context can only be found where the party in

privity reasonably expected to be bound by the earlier decision

(Restatement of Judgments, 2d §39) and controlled the earlier lawsuit

(Drier v. Tarpon 522 F.2d 199 (Sth Cir. 1975). In this case, on the

contrary, Macro was specifically adjudicated to have no liability and it

cannot be said to have controlled the earlier lawsuit from which they were

dismissed; it was not present at trial.

The United States Court of Appeal committed error in failing to

recognize that imposing a $2.4 million judgment against a party dismissed

months before trial raises an issue of constitutional due process.

IV. Federal Question Jurisdiction Arises From Hirai’s Colorable

Appeal On The Grounds That Hirai Has Not Been Granted A

New Trial Despite The Fact That Another Party Defendant Is

Entitled To A New Trial

It is fundamental that a judgment is not final with respect to any

defendant if it is not final with respect to all defendants. Commonwealth

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) which is adopted from Rule 54(b) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

...Any order or other form of decision,

however it is designated, which

adjudicates fewer than all claims or the

rights and liabilities of fewer than all the

parties shall not terminate the action as to

any of the claims or parties, and the order

or other form of decision is subject to

revision at any time before the entry of

20

judgment adjudicating all the claims or

rights and liabilities of the parties.

Accordingly, a new trial against Macro necessitates a new trial for

Hirai also. This is the only way to prevent inconsistent findings of fact

and conclusions of law in a single judgment. Since the judgment is joint

and several, it cannot be based upon inconsistent findings with respect to

different parties within the same judgment.

The threat of inconsistent judgments within the same action not

only violates the Rules of Civil Procedure, it also violates due process.

The effect of inconsistent judgments is different treatment for different

defendants within the same action. This would include the threat of

different findings of fact with regard to negligence, liability, and damages,

with respect to different defendants. Such a scenario is, of course, unheard

of in the case law since it would be such a patent violation of due process.

As such, the threat herein of inconsistent judgments within the

same action, should Macro receive the trial to which it is entitled, clearly

raises a federal question. Thus the United states Court of Appeals

committed error in not taking jurisdiction of this issue.

21

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner, appellant and defendant

Nobuo Hirai respectfully requests that this honorable Court issue a writ of

certiorari and direct the United States Court of Appeals to take jurisdiction

of this matter on the grounds that the issues raised herein involve the

Constitution; treaties, or laws of the United States under 48 USC

§1694c(a).

DATED: October 15, 1994

Respectfully submitted,

Harold A. Stone

Counsel of Record

Francis M. McKeown

Gudmundson, Siggins Stone & Skinner

One Embarcadero Center, Suite 1350

San Francisco, CA 94111

(415) 391-4200

Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX A

Law Offices

Fitzgerald, Herald & Bergsma

Post Office Box 909

lst Floor, Macaranas Building

Garapen Beach Road

Saipan, MP 96950

Telephone: (670) 234-724 1/7680

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

RYOKO ITO, as Personal CIVIL ACTION NO.

Represenatative of the heirs of

AKINOBU ITO, Deceased,

Plaintiff,

vs.

OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO

HIRAI, SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI,

AND AMERICAN HOME

INSURANCE CoO.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS)

)

)

)

)

)

Defendants. )

)

JURISDICTION

1. This Court has jurisdiction persuant to the Commonwealth

Judicial Reorganization Act of 1989.

2. This is an action for the wrongful death of Akinobu Ito

hereinafter referred to as “Ito” brought by Ryoko Ito as the personal

representative hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff, that occurred while Ito

was on a scuba diving tour organized, supervised and under the complete

control o Marianas Ocean Enterprises Inc., acting through its alter ego

A-2

Macro Energy, Inc. and employees and or offecers Shigemi Yamagishi

and Nobuo Hirai.

i Plaintiff Ryoko Ito is of age and the widow of the

deceased and the mother of the two children of the deceased.

4. At all times relevant hereto defendant Macro Energy, Inc.

(MEI) was a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the

Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, acting as the alter ego of

defendant Marianas Ocean Enterprises, Inc.

5. At all times relevant hereto defendant Marianas Ocean

Enterprises, Inc. (MOE) was a corporation organixzed and existing under

the laws of the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas.

6. At all times relevant hereto defendant Nobuo Hirai (Hirai)

was employed by either MOE or MEI or both as a diving instructor and

guide.

cf At all times relevant hereto, defendants Shigemi

Yamagishi was an officer, director and/or employee of MOE and or MEI.

8. In June, 1989, the decedent Aki9nobu Ito enrolled in a

scuba diving class conducted by the defendatns for the purpose of

obtaining a license or certification as a scuba diver.

9. Defendants MOE and or MEI accepted compensation for

and undertook to train Ito as a scuba diver.

10. Despite receiving compensation for and undertakin to

train Ito as a scuba diver, the defendants were grossly deficient in the

instruction which fell far below the standard accepted in the scuba diving

industry as adequate for certification as a scuba diver.

11. In September, 1988, Ito, in the company of fellow

employees returned to Saipan for the purpose of engaging in scuba diving.

12. _ Despite the fact that defendants were aware the Ito had

had only the most rudimentary instruction in scuba diving, they accepted

compensation te guide hin cngatthe Ging ier of ngeies amine es

the Grotto, 9 lees any OO

A-3

13. Defendants also accepted compensation for the rental of

scuba diving equipment which they warranted to be fit for its intended use.

14. The dive commenced and the divers all descended into

theGrotto and proceeded through an underwater tunnel to the ocean

outside.

15. Shortly thereafter, Yasuharu Fuj itomi (Fujitomi) the dive

partner of Ito signaled that he was out of air and rose to the surface. Ito

and Hirai followed him up.

16. At the surface, Hirai found no air coming out of

Fujitomi’s rugulator and instructed him to descend breathing from Hirai’s

alternate air source known as an octopus.

ay. The three descended and proceeded to the tunnel entrance

to return to the Grotto pool.

18. At the entrance to the tunnel, Hirai checked Ito’s air

pressure gauge to determine how much air he had and the gauge read less

than 500 pounds.

19. The three proceeded into the tunnel and shortly therafter

Ito signaled thayt he had no air.

20. Hirai and Fujitomi proceeded through the tennel and

emerged safely at the surface without Ito. Hirai then returned underwater

and brough Ito to the surface and out of the water.

21. Cardio pulmonary resuscitation and mouth to mouth

resuscitation was initiated to no avail and Ito was pronounced dead at the

Commonwealth Health Center.

22. Plaintiff realleges and repeats each sand every allegation

of paragraphs | through 21 of the complaint.

23. In June, 1988, Ito enrolled in a scuba diving instruction

course and for a fee duly paoid to the defendants, the defendants agreed to

furnish Ito with scuba diving instruction to enable him to obtain a scuba

diving license and safely engage in the sport of scuba diving. Defendants

had a duty to adequately instruct Ito so that he could safely engage in the

sport of scuba diving.

A-4

24. In June, 1988, the defendants instructed Ito in scuba

diving and awarded him a certification card assuring him that he was now

adequately trained to safely engage in the sport of scuba diving.

25. Defendants failed to give the time and attention necessary

to adequately train the decedemt and failed to give sufficient instruction or

adhere to the standards of scuba diving instruction which would inhsure

that Ito could safely engage in the sport of scuba diving.

26. Defendants’ negligence included but is not limited to the

followig:

(1) failing to hire competent instructors;

(2) failing to instruct Ito in emergency procedures;

(3) failing to instruct Ito in alternate air source

breathing techniques;

(4) failing to provide sufficient classroom instruction;

and

(5) failing to provide sufficient proctical instruction.

27. The above described negligence was a proximate cause of

the death of Akinobu Ito and he was not contributory negligent.

28. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the

defendants described herein, plaintiff Ryoko Ito, wife of desedent and the

minor children of decedent Ito and Ryoko, all of whom were being

supported by the decedent prior to the time of the injury, were deprived of

the decedent’s financial support and the children who lived with the

decedent prior to the time of the injury were deprived of the help,

company, love, affection and consortium of the decedent.

29. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation of

paragraphs | through 28.

A-5

30. Defendant Shigemi Yamagishi at all times relevant was an

officer and or a director of defendant’s MEI and/or MOE, defendant Hirai

was at all times relevant an employee of MEI and/or MOE, at the time and

place of the events relevant hereto the defendants and each of them, were

members and engaged in a joint venture or common enterprise.

31. On September 22, 1988, Ito went to the dive shop of MEI

and/or MOE for the purpose of obtaining a guide for a scuba diving tour

and renting scuba diving equipment and for menetary consideration, duly

paid by Ito, defendants agreed to rent him scuba diving equipment, and

suggested that he join a scuba diving tour that was diving the Grotto,

promising to provide a guide who would give his time and attention to

insure a safe dive.

32. The defendants each and all of them were negligent in

discharging their duty to the decedent in the following respects:

(1) in recommending a scuba dive that was suitable only for

advanced divers and far above the ability of the decedent, which was

known to them.

(2) providing incompetent guides.

(3) failing to provide adequate safety instructions.

(4) providing defective equipment which both leaked air and

provided the decedent with a false reading of the amount of air left

remaining to him.

(5) failingto follow proper safety and emergency procedures

during the dive.

33. The above described negligence was a proximate cause of

the death of Akinobu Ito, and he was not contributory negligent.

34, As a direct and proximate result of the negloigence of the

defendants described herein, plaintiff Ryoko Ito, wife of decedent and the

minor children of decedent Ito and Ryoko, all of whom were being

suppoprted by the decedent prior to the time of the injury, were deprived

of the decedent’s financial support and the children who lived with the

decedent prior tothe time of injury were deprdived of the care, guidance,

support, love, and affection of the decedent and plaintiff Ryoko Ito, the

A-6

wife of the decedent was deprived of the help, company, love, affection

and consortium of the decedent.

Ill

35. Plaintiff realleges and repeats each and every allegation of

paragraphs | through 34 of the complaint.

36. On or about September 22, 1988, defendnts were each and

all of them insured by a public liability insurance policy issued by

American Home Insurance Company covering liability and damages

caused during the operation of their scuba diving instruction and tours.

37. Pursuant to the coverage contained in the said insurance

policy and pursuant to the laws of the Commonwealth of the Northern

Mariana Islands, plaintiff is entitledj to maintain a direct action against

defendants American Home Insurance Company and to recover against

said insurance carrier in an amount equal to any judgment recovered

against defendants.

IV

38. Plaintiff realleges and repeats each and every allegation of

paragraphs | through 37 of the complaint.

39. Defendant MEI is and at all times mentioned was the alter

ego of defendant MOE, and there exists and at all times herein mentioned

had existed, a unity of interest and ownership between defendants such

that any separateness between them has ceased to exist,in that defendant

MOE completely controlled, dominated, managed, and operated both

corporate defendants and intermingled the assets of each to suit the

convenience of MOE by intermingling the funds of both companies and

failing to observe any corporate formalities or have any separate accounts

or meetings.

40. Defendant MOE operated its business through its alter ego

MEI in order to avoid potential liability and to avoid creditors, and all

claims of corporate separateness are a sham.

41. Defendants MEI and MOE are both responsible for the

acts alleged herein. wired

A-7

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants

individually, jointly and severally as follows;

l. For general damages according to proof.

2. For damages as alleged above by the widow for loss of

maintenance, support, counsel and affection in an amount to be

determined at trial;

3. For damages and loss as described above for the two

children, in an amount to be determined at trial;

4. For costs and attorney’s fees due to the gross and

negligent conduct of the Defendants in causing the death of the Akinobu

Ito.

3. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem

proper.

Dated this 14the day of September, 1989.

FITGERALD, HERALD & BERGSMA

Attorneys at Law

William M. Fitgerald

APPENDIX B

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANAS

RYOKO ITO, as Personal ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 89-918

Representative of the heirs of )

AKINOBU ITO, Deceased, )

)

Plaintiff, )

vs. ) ANSWER

)

MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS _)

OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO HIRAI,)

SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI, and AMERICAN)

HOME INSURANCE CO., )

)

Defendants. )

p19

COMES NOW Defendants, Macro Energy, Inc., Nobuo Hirai, Shigemi

Yamagishi, and American Home Assurance Co., severing themselves from

the other Defendant named herein and answer that Complaint filed against

then an follows:

1. Deny each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 10, 12, 13,

15, 16, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 40 and 41.

2. State, with respect to those allegations contained in paragraphs 2, 3,

4, 5, 8, 9 and 11, that answering Defendants do not have sufficient

information and belief with which to admit or deny the allegations

contained in said numbered paragraphs and based thereon deny each and

every allegation contained in said paragraphs.

3. Answering Defendants hereby answer the allegations incorporated

by reference by paragraphs 22, 29, 35 and 38 by incorporating the answers

previously furnished herein to those incorporated paragraphs as their

answer to those paragraphs.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief may

se be granted and therefore should be dismissed.

— jh A NE

B-2

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ,

The deceased, Mr. Ito, prior to participating in the dive which is

the subject matter of Plaintiff's complaint, executed and delivered to

Defendant Macro Energy Incorporated a release in writing whereby the

deceased Ito, released the Defendants and forever discharged then from

the claims set forth in tire Complaint and from any and all claims against

Defendants.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

If Plaintiffs’ suffered any of the damages alleged in their

complaint, the decedent assumed the risk of such injuries and damages are

decadent's own voluntary assumption of the risk was the proximate cause

of Plaintiffs’ damages.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

If Plaintiffs’ suffered any of the damages alleged in their

complaint, such damages were proximately caused by decadent’s own

negligence and Plaintiffs’ cannot recover against Defendants for such

damages.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

If Piaintiffs' suffered any of the damages alleged in their

complaint, such damages were proximately caused by decedent's own

negligence which was greater than or equal to any allege negligence of

Defendants (which negligence in hereby denied) which requires the

dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint or the reduction of any recovery by

Plaintiffs’ by the percentage of cause negligence attributable to decedent.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

If Plaintiffs’ suffered any of the damages alleged in their

complaint, such were caused and resulted from natural at unavoidable

causes beyond the control of Defendants. —

WHEREFORE, answering Defendants pray for relief as follows:

1. That the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice.

2. That Defendants recover their costs.

3. For such other and future relief as the Court may deem just and

Respectfully submitted this 27th day of October, 1989.

e PT wr ‘a tp out “x

IST ey > PP a Le a hee) att a

END B

B-3

MOORE, CHING, BOERTZEL & LAWLOR

A Professional Corporation

Counsel for Defendants Mack

Energy, Inc. , Nobuo Hirai

Shigemi Yamagishi and American

Home Insurance Co.,

By PAUL A. LAWLOR

A Licensed Employee

APPENDIX C

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

RYOKO ITO, as Personal ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 89-918

Representative of the heirs

of AKINOBU ITO, Deceased,

Plaintiff,

v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS)

OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO )

HIRAI, SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI, and)

AMERICAN HOME INSURANCE CO,)

)

Defendants. )

)

Pursuant to the Memorandum Decision entered this date;

IT IS ADJUDGED the plaintiff take nothing by her complaint against

Macro Energy, Inc., Nobuo Hirai, Shigemi Yamagishil and American

Home Insurance Co. Defendants are entitled to their court costs.

Dated at Saipan, MP, 17th day of December, 1990.

Robert A. Hefner, Presiding Judge

END C

APPENDIX D

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

RYOKO ITO, as Personal ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 89-918

Representative of the heirs

Of AKINOBU ITO, Deceased,

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM DECISION

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS)

OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO )

HIRAI, SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI, and)

AMERICAN HOME INSURANCE CO,)

)

Defendants. )

met

FACTS /1/

In June of 1988, the decedent, Akinobu Ito became a certified

scuba diver after successfully completing an instruction course sponsored

by a Japanese scuba diving sanctioning organization know as "A.D.S.

Japan” and taught by defendant Shigemi Yamagishi, president of

defendant Macro Energy, Inc. (Macro) in Saipan. Ito's instruction included

10

/i/

These facts (except for those relating to Ito's initial visit to Saipan)

are taken from defendants’ memorandum in support of their motion for

summary judgment, pp. 6-11. The plaintiff does not dispute these facts.

See, plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendants’ motion.

D-2

hours of classroom instruction, a minimum of 3 hours in the water with

scuba gear and a written test. In the first session of the course, students

are taught how to fit their masks and regulators and how to clear their ears

and masks while wearing full scuba gear. The second session consists of

diving, underwater stabilization, ascension, proper wearing of the gear and

"buddy breathing." Ito was also taught how to make an "emergency

ascent" in an "out-of-air" situation. The A. D. S. certification contains no

restriction preventing certified divers from diving in caves or tunnels.

Upon completion of the certification course, Ito and his friend,

Yosuhiro Fujitomi went on a guided dive of Saipan's Grotto without

incident./2/

Several months later on September 24, 1988, Ito, and several of his

friends including Fujitomi returned to Saipan and went to Macro to sign-

up for a guided dive of Saipan's Grotto taking place that day. Macro's

professional dive instructors, defendants Yamagishi and Nabuo Hirai,

were to act as guides and supervise the dive.

While at Macro, Ito was asked to read and sign an "Agreement for

Exemption from Obligation" (Exemption Agreement) included in an

Application for Scuba Diving and Invoice

/2/

The Grotto is a popular Saipan dive spot which is essentially a small

pool surrounded by natural rock formations. Those diving the Grotto enter

the pool and descend approximately 30 meters to the bottom and enter any

of three tunnels leading to the open ocean.

\

prepared by Macro. Ito signed and dated the Exemption Agreement. The

terms of the Exemption Agreement were printed in both Japanese and

English. The terms, as printed in English are reprinted verbatim as

follows:

I submitted an application for participating

in the diving tour and or training program

D-3

to be conducted by your agency, I fully

accept and understand that such a diving

tour and training involves basic risk and

danger. if we fail to abide by the rules

and regulations set by the guides and

instructors and, if we neglect the diving

rules, we realize that we may risk our

lives. All the risks that we may have

during the period of stay here belong to

each of us personally. In case of accident,

causing injury or death to myself, I myself,

my family, or inherited organization and

other related personnel shall have no right

to protest against nor to claim for

damages. we hereby swear to abide by and

act at the rules and instructions set by the

guides and instructors. Also I am fully a

grown up at law and I acknowledge the fact

that I am fully qualified to sign this

agreement, to verify the exemptions from all

the claims for damages. All the items in

this application are to be decided by the

agreement, and I personally sign this

document at my own will rather than someone

directing me to sign this paper.

There were 15 divers, including Ito and his friends who were to be

guided by Yamagishi, and Hirai at this particular dive at the Grotto. Ito

rented his scuba gear from Macro. All of the divers assembled and

inspected their scuba gear at Macro's shop before leaving for the Grotto.

The equipment inspection included an air check of the tanks. Ito and his

dive "buddy" Fujitomi complained about a noise coming from Ito's gear

but this noise was determined not to be a problem by Hirai.

Upon arriving at the Grotto and after a briefing by Yamagishi, ito and

the other divers entered the Grotto's pool accompanied by Hirai and

Yamagishi. At the surface of the pool, one of the group could not clear

her ears and was told to remain on the surface. The remaining group

members then descended to the bottom of the Grotto with Yamagishi in

the lead and Hirai in the rear. The group entered the center tunnel of the

Grotto, exited at the other end and proveeded to an area approximately 20

D-4

meters deep whereupon Yamagishi checked the group's air gauges. After

the air check, the group proceeded back to the tunnel.

At this point, Hirai noticed Fujitomi having problems with his regulator

and went to assist him. Fujitomi headed for the surface followed by Ito,

despite Hirai's signals to remain below.

Upon reaching Fujitomi, Hirai gave him his main regulator and used

one of the two spare regulators included in his gear for his own air

supply./3/ At the surface, Hirai tested Fujitomi's regulator and found it

difficult to breathe from. Hirai then gave Fujitomi the spare regulator and

took

/3/

Although it is unclear from the deposition testimony, at some point

during the ascent to the surface, Hirai signalled to Yamagishi that things

were "O.K." Upon receiving this signal from Hirai, Yamagishi took the

remaining 12 divers back through the tunnel and up to the pool's surface.

his Gwn regulator back from Fujitomi The three divers then descended and

headed back to the tunnel entrance. At this point Ito had between 400 to

500 pounds of air remaining in his tank while Hirai's own tank had

approximately 1,500 pounds of air remaining. According to Hirai, Ito had,

"plenty of air to return by.”

Upon entering the tunnel with Fujitomi and Ito, Hirai began to pull

himself along the tunnel wall with his right arm while holding Fujitomi

with his left arm. At this point Ito was moving along the wall with Hirai

and ‘Fujitomi. Approximately midway through the tunnel, Ito signalled

Hirai that he was out of air whereupon Hirai gave Ito his main regulator.

After ensuring that Ito was breathing through the regulator, Hirai, now

using the second spare regulator, continued along the wall. Hirai last

confirmed Ito's presence at about 10 feet from the pool's surface. At the

surface, Hirai discovered that Ito was not with him. Looking underwater,

Hirai saw Ito hovering approximately 10 feet below. Hirai descended and

brought Ito to the surface where efforts to revive him failed, The

D-5

Certificate of Death states the cause of death as "asphyxia due to

drowning."

PLEADINGS

The plaintiff, Ryoko Ito, decedent Ito's wife, subsequently filed this

wrongful death action as personal representative of the deceased. The

complaint 3 lleged negligence on the part of Macro in two counts. The

first count alleges that Macro failed to provide adequate instruction and

train the decedent in the sport of scuba diving while the second count

alleges a breach of Macro's duty to recommend a safe place to dive,

provide competent guides and properly working equipment, and follow

proper safety and emergency procedures during the dive. The third and

fourth counts are drafted to extend liability to Marianas Ocean Enterprises

(MOE) as the alter ego of Macro and American Home Assurance Co. as

the insurer of Macro and MOE.

Defendants Macro, Hirai, Yamagishi and American Home Assurance

Co. now move for summary judgment against the plaintiff maintaining

that, as a matter of law, the Exemption Agreement bars the plaintiff's

claim for all damages against the defendants, including those proximately

caused by any negligence on their part.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A summary judgment will be granted only if there is no genuine issue

of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Com.R.Civ.Pro. Rule 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). To withstand a motion for summary

judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are genuine factual

issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they

may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of a plaintiff's

DISCUSSION

D-6

At common law there was no cause of action for wrongful death; the

right to bring such an action is strictly statutory. Flowers v. Hyatt, 1 CR

693 (C.T.C. 1983). The Commonwealth's wrongful death statute (7 CMC

QQQQ 2101 - 2103 creates a cause of action for wrongful death in the

Commonwealth. Pursuant to 7 CMC QQ 2101(a), the plaintiff, as personal

representative of the decedent, is entitled to maintain this action and

recover any damages to the extent that the decedent would have been

entitled to maintain an action and recover damages for injuries had he not

died.

Conceding the truth of the allegations of negligence contained in the

plaintiff's complaint for purposes of this motion only, the defendants argue

that the Exemption Agreement's language includes any acts of negligence

by the defendants and thus operates as a bar to the plaintiff's cause of

action.

In her opposition to the defendants' motion, the plaintiff first contends

that the defendants misconstrue the waiver provisions of the Application

of Scuba Diving and Invoice. She points cut that under the section entitled

"Invoice" which appears at the bottom of the Application for Scuba Diving

and Invoice, there is another waiver provision that is unsigned. This

provision which is printed in English only, reads as follows:

1, (sic) fully check the equipment and

everything are (sic) confirmed. I, the

undersigned not (sic) hold the Macro Energy,

Inc. responsible nor liable any (sic)

diving, fishing boating (sic) accidents. I

will return the equipment ....

The plaintiff argues that the Exemption Agreement released the

defendants from liability for inherent risks of diving generally, while the

second, unsigned waiver specifically waives liability for defective

equipment. Relying on the general rule of contracts holding that when a

contract has two provisions, one general and one specific, the specific

provision controls over the general provision, the plaintiff concludes that

the second unsigned waiver provision operates to limit the scope of the

Exemption Agreement, thus denying the defendants insulation from

liability for negligent issuance of defective scuba diving equipment. This

argument is without merit.

D-7

Assuming arguendo that the Application for Scuba Diving and Invoice

is a contract between Ito and Macro,/4/

/4/

The court makes no finding on this issue.

since Ito never signed the second waiver provision, it never became part of

the "contract." As such, the plaintiff's cited contract rule is inapplicable.

/5/

The plaintiff next attacks the Exemption Agreement itself, claiming

that unless an agreement clearly and unequivocally provides for the

release of another's negligence, that obligation will not be inferred.

Charles Poe Masonry, Inc. V. Spring Lock Scaffolding Rental Equipment

Co., 374 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1979). Citing Madison v. Superior Court, 250

Cal.Rptr. 299 (1988), the plaintiff maintains that the Exemption

Agreement must specifically refer to the defendants’ negligence in order to

include such negligence within its waiver terms. The plaintiff has cited

other cases which she claims support the above rule of law. See, O’Connel

v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1982); Sivaslian v.

Rawlins, 451 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1987). The defendants, on the other hand.

have cited cases wherein it was held that 2 release did not have to

specifically waive liability for negligence in order to bar claims based on

negligence. See, Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Sumkin, 784 P.2d 781 (Cole.

1989); Hewitt v.

/5/

The court notes that the Application for Scuba Diving and Invoice is

distinctly divided into two parts, the first being the scuba application and

the second being the invoice. At the hearing on the motion, defendants

counsel explained that the waiver provision in the invoice section would

only be signed if the customer were renting equipment and diving oa bis

own rather than as a member of a dive supervised by Macro, im which case

the Exemption Agreement would be signed by the customer, as Ito did.

D-8

Miller 521 P.2d 244 (Wash. Ct.App. 1974); Trainer v. Azatlan Cycle

Club, Inc., 442 N. W. 2d 626 (Wis. 1988).

While none of the above cited cases are controlling in the

Commonwealth, they are instructive and, at the very least, indicate a split

of authority on the issue of whether a release must specifically refer to

negligent conduct in order to act as a bar to claims based upon negligence.

At the very most, all of the cases are in agreement that a waiver of liability

must be clear and unambiguous. In any event, Section 496 of the

Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) is dispostive and controlling on this

issue./6/ Section 496 B provides:

A plaintiff who by contract or otherwise

expressly agrees to accept a risk of harm

arising from the defendant's negligent or

reckless conduct cannot recover for such

harm, unless the agreement is invalid as

contrary to public policy.

By signing the Exemption Agreement, Ito acknowledged that "all the

risks" that he would be exposed to on the dive were his alone. Moreover,

Ito expressly agreed to forego all claims for damages in the event of a

diving accident causing

6/

In all proceedings, the rules of the common law, as expressed in the

restatement of the law approved by the American Law Institute and, to the

extent not so expressed as Generally understood and applied in the United

States, shall be the rules of decision in the courts of the Commonwealth, in

the absence of written law or local customary law to the contrary;

provided, that no person shall be subject to criminal prosecution except

under the written law of the Commonwealth. See 7 CMC QQ 3401.

D-9

his injury or death. Clearly, the unambiguously expressed intent of the

parties to the Exemption Agreement was to extinguish liability. In signing

the Exemption Agreement, Ito also acknowledged that he had read and

fully understood its terms. Moreover, Ito understood that equipment

failure was an obvious risk of scuba diving inasmuch as his training

included what to do in "out-of-air" situations. Under these circumstances,

it is reasonable to conclude, as a matter of law, that Ito expressly agreed to

accept a risk of harm arising from the defendants’ negligent conduct.

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any claim that Ito, or in this case, the

plaintiff, could have brought that would not have been based on

negligence. To construe the Exemption Agreement in any other manner

would render it essentially meaningless.

The plaintiff begins her next argument by erroneously asserting that the

defendants’ motion rests on Hirai's belief that Ito died of a ruptured lung

caused by holding his breath while surfacing, a violation of a basic diving

rule. Proceeding on the false premise that the Exemption Agreement

operates to relieve the defendants of liability only if Ito violated a diving

rule the plaintiff asserts that Hirai is unqualified to assert a medical

opinion of Ito's death. The plaintiff then concludes that the defendants

have failed to show that Ito violated a diving rule, thus precluding the

Exemption Agreement from serving as a basis for summary judgment.

While the defendants’ statement of facts did include Hirai's hypothesis

as to the cause of Ito's death, the defendants also stated that for our poses

of their motion, it made no difference how Ito died (Defendants’ Memo. at

p. 12). The defendants further slate that their motion rests upon Ito's

knowing, voluntary and express waiver of his right to sue for damages in

the event of his injury., Since the court's interpretation of the Exemption

Agreement necessarily compels its rejection of the plaintiff's interpretation

of the Exemption Agreement that is a premise of plaintiff's argument now

under discussion, there is no need to consider the argument further.

Finally, the plaintiff argues that even if the Exemption Agreement

applies to the defendants’ negligent acts, it does not release them from

those acts constituting willful and wanton misconduct. willful or wanton

misconduct falls between simple negligence and an intentional tort and is

sufficient where an actor knows, or has reason to know, of circumstances

which would bring home to the realization of the ordinary reasonable

person the highly dangerous character of his conduct. Liberty Furniture v.

Sonitrol of Spokane, 770 P.2d 1086 (Wash. Ct.App. 1989).

D-10

Because a determination of whether conduct in a particular case .

constitutes willful and wanton misconduct is greatly dependent upon the

particular facts of each case, it is generally within the peculiar province of

the jury to consider whether the actor's conduct can be so designated. 57A

Am.Jur.2d, Negligence, QQ 307. Where, however, there is insufficient

evidence regarding an element of the pertinent type of conduct, the issue

should not be submitted to the jury. Id.

The plaintiff relies, to a large extent, on the statement of Robert

Campbell, who tested Ito's equipment after the accident (see, Campbell

Statement attached to Hirai's dep.) and Hirai's deposition testimony to

raise the issue of the defendants’ willful and wanton misconduct. Since

Campbell's statement is not in affidavit form as required by Rule 56, its

contents will not be considered by the court. Colan v. Cutler-Hammer,

Inc., 812 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1987). Moreover, even if the Campbell

statement were admissible and considered with plaintiff's cited Hirai

deposition testimony in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, this

evidence would be, as a matter of law, far short of that which would

require its submission to a jury on the issue of willful and wanton

misconduct.

In summary, the court concludes as a matter of law that under any fact

scenario plaintiff advocates as a basis for her wrongful death action

against the movants, the Exemption Agreement signed by Ito bars

recovery.

Dated at Saipan, MP, this 17th day of December, 1990.

Robert A. Hefner, Presiding Judge

END D

ne Tia th a

wee TARE ad

APPENDIX E

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

RYOTO ITO, as Personal ) CIVIL ACTION NO.

Representative of the heirs )

of AKINOBU TIO, Deceased, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff,

MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS _)

OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO HIRAI,)

SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI,and AMERICAN)

HOME INSURANCE CO., )

Defendant.

Upon the motion of the plaintiff to amend the summary judgment

entered December 17, 1990 and for the reasons state in the Memorandum

Decision entered this date;

The summary judgment is amended to read:

IT IS ADJUDGED the plaintiff take nothing by the complaint

against Macro Energy, Inc., and Marianas Ocean Enterprises. Those

defendants are entitled to court costs.

Dated at Saipan, MP, this 28 day of January, 1991.

Robert A. Hefner, Presiding Judge

END E

OT te, eae eee ee

APPENDIX F

MOORE, CHING, BOERTZEL & LAWLOR,

A Professional Corporation

Suits 400, GCIC Building

414 West Soledad Avenue

Agana, Guam 96910

Telephone: (671) 477-9708

Of Counsel:

CARLSMITH BALL WICHMAN MURRAY

CASE MUKAI & ICHIKI

Carlsmith Building

Capitol Hill

Saipan, MP 96950

Telephone: (670) 322-3455/6

Attorneys for Defendants

‘Nobuo Hirai and Shigemi Yamagishi

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE

: COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

RYOKO ITO, as Personal yCIVIL CASE NO. 89-918

Representative of the heirs )

: of AKINOBU ITO, Deceased, )

:

)

Plaintiff, )

) )

vs. ) AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS

) L. ROBERTS

MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS)

OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO )

HIRAI, SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI )

and AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE)

Z

F-2

I, THOMAS L. ROBERTS, being first duly sworn, do hereby depose

and state upon my oath:

1. That I am a Director and Shareholder in the law firm of Moore,

Ching, Boertzel & Lawlor, P.C., the attorneys of record for Shigemi

Yamagishi and Nobuo Hirai in the above-referenced action;

2. That at approximately 3:31 p.m. during the afternoon of June 21,

1991, this office received via facsimile a June 21, 1991 settlement offer

made by Plaintiff, wherein the case was to be dismissed against Nobuo

Hirai on the condition that "Mr. Hirai will meet with a (sic) expert of

Plaintiff's choosing to discuss the events surrounding this case and his

employment in Saipan" and on the condition that 'Mr. Hirai agrees to

testify at the trial". A true and correct copy of the facsimile copy of this

settlement offer and the facsimile transmittal page are attached hereto as

Exhibits "A" and "B";

3. That at approximately 4:19 p.m. that same day, I caused Plaintiff's

settlement offer to be sent via facsimile to Mr. Hirai, in care of Macro

Energy, Inc. in Saipan, along with a cover letter. True and correct copies

of our firm's facsimile confirmation slip and the confirmation copy of the

cover letter are attached hereto as Exhibits "C" and "D";

4. That in the late afternoon of June 21, or June 22, 1991, Mr.

Fitzgerald telephoned me to confirm that I had transmitted Plaintiff's

settlement offer to Mr. Hirai;

5. That on June 25, 1991 at the Macro Energy dive shop in Saipan, I

met with Shigemi Yamagishi and Nobuo Hirai, both together and

separately, for several hours, discussing Mr. Fitzgerald's settlement offer.

A true and correct copy of Mr. Fitzgerald's offer, bearing Mr. Hirai's

signature and evidencing his receipt of the same, is attached hereto as

Exhibit "E";

6. That at the conclusion of our meetings at approximately 2:30 p.m.

on June 25, 1991, at Macro Energy's dive shop, a Macro Energy employee

typed an unconditional written acceptance of Mr. Fitzgerald's offer with

signature spaces for both Mr. Hirai and myself, which we executed at that

time. A true and correct copy of this executed acceptance is attached

hereto as Exhibit "F";

F-3

7. That after Mr. Hirai and I executed the acceptance, I told Mr. Hirai

to take three hours to think about our discussions by himself, and that if he

still wanted to accept the settlement offer, he should telephone me at the

Hyatt Regency Saipan just prior to 5:30 p.m. that evening, whereupon |

would fax our written acceptance to Mr. Fitzgerald's office;

8. That sometime between 5:00 and 5:15 p.m. on June 25, 199l,a

Macro Energy employee telephoned me at the Hyatt Regency Saipan to

inform me that Mr. Hirai wanted to accept the settlement offer, and that I

should go ahead and fax our acceptance, at which time Mr. Hirai came on

the line and reconfirmed his desire to accept the settlement offer;

9. That commencing at exactly 5:30 p.m. on June 25, 1991, I caused

Hyatt Regency Saipan employees to send via facsimile to Mr. Fitzgerald's

office both Mr. Hirai's written acceptance of Plaintiffs settlement offer

and a copy of the offer itself bearing Mr. Hirai’s signature. True and

correct copies of the facsimile confirmation pages for both the acceptance

as well as the offer bearing Mr. Hirai's signature are attached hereto as

Exhibits "G" and "H";

10. That the next day, shortly after heated arguments in the morning in

Saipan's Superior Court on Mr. Fitzgerald's renoticed motion for summary}

judgment on the "air’ issue, but prior to the afternoon arguments on the

"Judicial admission" issue, just outside the door of Courtroom A and

within earshot of Mr. Hirai, and within the presence of Mr. Horiguchi, Mr.

Fitzgerald told me the settlement was off,

11. That at that time I informed Mr. Fitzgerald that as far as | was

concerned, we had a binding agreement and I did not accept his

repudiation, whereupon Mr. Fitzgerald told me that the deal was

“contingent’ or ‘conditioned™ on Mr. Hirai testifying consistently with his

deposition testimony, which was an apparent reference to an Affidavit

executed by Mr. Hirai and filed on his behalf at 10:07 a.m. earlier that

day;

12. That at no time during that conversation did Mr. Fitzgerald refer to

any written materials or oral communications other than Mr. Hirar's

deposition testimony;

13. That one day later, I received a June 27, 1991 facsimile

transmission from Mr. Fitzgerald formally withdrawing the settlement

F-4

offer, which had been unconditionally accepted two days earlier, a true

and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "I";

14. That I have personal knowledge of the matters attested to herein,

and if called, could testify competently thereto; and Further your Affiant

sayeth naught.

THOMAS L. ROBERTS

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1 1th day of September,

1991.

Notary Public |

Hole boom peakpc Ef :

poet Yate ‘it Bhs igen Bes ask: romelase 2

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LAW OFFICES

WILLIAM M. FITZGERALD

June 21, 1991

John E. Moore, Esq.

Moore, Ching, Boertzel & Lswlor

Suite 400, GCIC Building

414 West Sledad Avenue

Agana, Guam 96910

Re: Ito v. MOE, et al.

Dear Mr. Moore:

This will constitute Plaintiff's offer to defendant Nobuo Hirai to

dismiss the case with prejudice against him under the following

conditions:

a) Mr. Hirai will meet with a expert of Plaintiff's choosing to

discuss the events surrounding this case and his employment in Saipan.

b) Mr. Hirai agrees to testify at the trial.

There is a treaty between the United States and Japan which

allows execution in Japan and if a judgment is obtained against Mr. Hirai

we intend to pursue all avenues open to us to execute on any of his assests.

This offer therefore provides a very significant benefit to your client and j

hope that you will communicate it to him as expeditiously as possible.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM M. FITGERALD

F-6

June 25, 1991

William M. Fitzgerald, Esq.

P.O. Box 909

ist Fir., Macaranas Bldg.,

Garapan, Saipan MP 96950

Re: Ito vs. Macro Energy, Inc.

Civil Action 918-89

Dear Mr. Fitzgerald:

My client, NOBUO HIRAI, unconditionally accepts the offer to settle

the case against him contained in your letter of June 21, 1991 under the |

terms specified therein.

THOMAS L. ROBERTS

NOBUO HIRAI

pee og oR ae

F-7

LAW OFFICES

WILLIAM M. FITZGERALD

June 27, 1991

Thomas L. Roberts, Esq.

Moore, Ching, Boertzel & Lawlor

Suite 400, GCIC Building

414 West Soledad Avenue

Agana, Guam 96910

Re: Ito v. MOE, et al.

Dear Mr. Roberts:

The offer to setle with Nobuo Hirai was made in the good faith

belief that while e might not agree with everything that he had to say, he

would testify consistently with previous testimony and admissions. The

patently perjurious affidavit submitted at 10:07 a.m. yesterday makes a

mockery of that and our offer is hereby withdrawn.

We sincerely would like to settle this matter with Mr. Hirai but

feel that your continued representation of both these defendants prevents

this since Mr. Hirai is being used to protect Yamagishi.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM M. FITGERALD

END F (including Exhibits)

APPENDIX G

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE .

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

RYOKO ITO, as Personal CIVIL ACTION No. 89-918

Representative of the heirs

of AKINOBU ITO, Deceased,

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

)

)

)

)

)

. )

VS. )

: )

MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS)

OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO )

HIRAI, SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI, )

and AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE)

)

)

Defendants. )

)

This matter came before the Court for trial on May 26, 1992 Based on

the matters adduced at trial good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED,

ADJUDGED and DECREED that:

1. Plaintiff shall have judgment over and against defendants for

general damages in the amount of $2,434,857.55.

2. Plaintiff is entitled to costs as may be taxed by the Clerk of Court.

SO ORDERED this 22nd day of June, 1992.

PEDRO M. ATALIG

Presiding Judge

APPENDIX H

MAIR, MAIR, SPADE & THOMPSON

A Professional Corporation.

Attorneys at Law Suite 807, GCIC Building

414 West Soledad Avenue

Agana, Guam 96910

Telephone: (671) 472-2089/2090

Attorneys for Defendant

American Home Assurance Co.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

RYOKO ITO, as Personal CIVIL ACTION No. 89-918

Representative of the heirs

of AKINOBU ITO, Deceased,

vs. AMENDED JUDGMENT

)

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

)

)

MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS)

OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO )

HIRAI, SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI, )

and AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE)

)

)

Defendants. )

)

This matter came before the Court for trial on May 26, 1992.

Based on the matters addressed at trial and good cause appearing, it is

hereby ADJUDGED and DECREED that:

1, Plaintiff shall have judgment over and against defendants

Yamagishi and Hirai for general damages in the amount of $2,434,857.5>.

2. _ Plaintiff shall have judgment over and against defendant

American Home Assurance Co. for general damages in the amount of

$100,000 ofthe sbove stated sum, pareuant to the Commonweal Dees

H-2

Action Statute and the terms and limits of the applicable policy of

insurance.

3. Plaintiff is entitled to costs as may be taxed by the Clerk

of Court.

SO ORDERED this 10the day of August, 1992.

PEDRO M. ATALIG

Presiding Judge

APPENDIX I

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

RYOKO ITO, as Personal

Representative of the heirs

of AKINOBU ITO, Deceased,

CIVIL ACTION No. 89-918

Plaintiff,

)

)

)

)

)

)

VS. )

)

MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS)

OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO )

HIRAI, SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI, )

and AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE)

)

Defendants.

—~—" ~~

REPORTERS TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL

The Honorable Pedro Atalig, Judge

May 26, 1992-June 5, 1992

Tuesday, May 26, 1992

Vol I of XIV

Pages 1-108

Appearances:

For the Plaintiff: William M. Fitzgerald, Esq.

For the Defendants:

Nobuo Hirai, Shigemi Yamagishi Law Offices of

Moore, Ching & Boertzel

by: H. Thomas Evans, Esq.

Thomas L. Roberts, Esq.

American Home Assurance Co. Law Offices of

Mair, Mair & Spade

by: Randall Todd Thompson. Esq

]-2

THE COURT: We're at trial.

MR. FITZGERALD: _ In the evening? I mean, to put him on the witness

stand without any opportunity for me to...

THE COURT: Are the parties ready for trial, or not/

MR. FITZGERALD: We’re ready, your Honor.

THE COURT; But I...taking a deposition of the witness during

trial is...anything else?

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, your Honor, there is one further point. Well,

just the...the question of the...there’s another motion outstanding. The

defendants have filed amotion to enforce a setlement, and this had never

been set, and one of the points of the settlement was that the person who

was Offered the settlement, who agreed tothe settlement, was to cooperate

to the plaintiff prior to the trial. So, I think the whole thing is pretty much

moot at this point, and I would just request, or ask the court that this

motion be denied or deemed untimely, orwhatever, so we don’t have to be

bothered with it.

THE COURT; I think there’s another motion...a motionfor

summary judgment?

MR. FITZGERALD: That’s right.

THE COURT; And these were not heard, were they?

MR. FITZGERALD: _ Right, that’s...I should have clar...I think we both

should have clarified that in our pretrial statements. My position and

understanding on that motion for summary judgment is that when we went

in to that motion we were operating on the...with the understanding that

the defendants had admitted that Mr. Ito. the decedent, had run out of air.

And this also had something to do with the settlement offer. And then, I

believe this was last June, the response came back that in fact Mr. Ito had

not run out of air, that he had...and Mr. Hirai, the defendant, came up with

a new affidavit. We filed a motion in front of Judge Hefner, requesting

that the defendants be held to their judicial admission, and a hearing was

had on that in which Judge Hefner stated that he felt that either Mr. Hirai

1-3

had misled his counsel, or his counsel had misled me, the plaintiff, but that

he would allow them to basically withdraw their admission. So with

withdrawal of the admission, basically, whether or not he ran out ofair

became a factual issue, and I think that the summary judgment motion that

we filed probably should be withdrawn at this point. And then...so, but the

other issue is the settlement motion. | think it’s kind of moot at this point

and I just ask that it be denied.

MR. EVANS: I think Mr. Roberts would like to argue that

motion, oif we can have just five minutes on that motion, because we

thought the offer had been made and accepted. So, that would not make it

moot.

THE COURT: But the motion was never heard.

MR. EVANS: That’s right, you Honor. But, I mean, our position

was that an offer of settlement had been made and that it was accepted,

and I...

THE COURT: Yes, but before you could bring up before the

court, you have to notice this thing, and set it for hearing.

MR. ROBERTS: If I can explain, your Honor. My name is Thomas

Roaberts. I’m with the same firm as Mr. Evans. Mr. Evans will be trying

the case. I’m along for logistical support. The motion was filed initially

last September, for the reasons stated in my affidavit filed that date. In

October the Superior Court certified certain decisions under Rule 54(b)

and the whole case went up to the Supreme Court. It didn’t return the

Superior Court until January. In the intervening months, there was an

agreement entered between counsel that the motion wouldn’t be heard

until Mr. Fitzgerald had a chance to take Mr. Hirai’s deposition a second

time, to ask him about the offending affidavit that purportedly caused Mr.

Fitzgerald to repudiate his settlement offer. Through a series of

scheduling difficulties, Mr. Hirai’s deposition wasn’t taken again until

April 9the, only a month and a half ago. On April 7, Mr. Thompson and I

appeared here on a defferent motion...two different motions in the same

case, and basically, Judge Castro let us know he didn’t want to hear any

more motions. So, I’m just doing the best I can for Mr. Hirai, you Honor.

I’ve raised it. If your Honor is willing to hear it today or at some point

during the trial, we’d like to argue it. If your Honor would prefer that it be

a matter of proof at some time during the trial, then that would be

acceptable to us, too. But there is a reason for why it hasn’t been heard

1-4

yet, and that was scheduling difficulties, and an agreement of counsel that

the hearing would’t go forward until Mr. Hirai’s deposition could be

retaken.

MR. FITZGERALD: _ I would take some issue with that. This point,

again, goes back to last summer, and the settlement offer was revoked

after Mr. Hirai filed his affidavit, changing what we had perceived as a

judicial admission. Subsefquent to that,the motion to enforce the

settlement was filed, and my position was, fine. I want to take Hirai’s

deposition. This was proabably in August or September. Counsel for the

other side agreed. Mr. Hirai was off in Tokido, various times were

discussed, and I believe agreed to, in early October, and Mr. Roberts is

right that the case was certified, but actually, now as I recall it, it was up

in...I think more importantly though, between October and February, when

the Supreme Court dismissed the 54(b) certification...dismissed the appeal,

the case came back down to this court. I believe it was the early part of

February, the middle part of February. At that time I set a deposition,

noticed a deposition for Mr. Hirai in Saporo, Japan. I got the permission

signed and reserved the room in Saporo, went through all the cumbersome

procedure to do his deposition in Japan. Mr. Evans suggested to me that it

could be done cheaper if they brought Mr. Hirai to Guam. So | said, fine.

So the deposition was set for March Ist...or the first week of March. Mr.

Evans suggested that we do it in Guam. I said, fine, anytime in March we

can do the deposition in Guam. I was then informed that Mr. Hirai would

not be able to come to Guam until some time after April 8. So, I had set

up the deposition for March first, it would have been done at that point,

except for the request of the defendants and their representation that they

would have him in Guam. After making that representation, they had to

withdraw it because he had to work and couldn’t come to Guam, so his

deposition wasn’t taken until April 8, or April 9, but it was taken then, and

they still haven’t filed the motion. Just because Judge Castro gave them a

hard time about some other motions, that’s no excuse for them not filing

or resetting this motion. And like I said, the time is over. I mean, the part

of the settlement was that he’d cooperate, and now once again we’re ready

to start trial, so the failure to have that issue resolved is clearly on the

doorstep of the defendant.

THE COURT: We have about seven files this thick here, and

these are matters that should have been taken up before trial. That’s why I

asked the parties, “are you ready for trial?” Now, at this point, to entertain

this motion, the court will not...will deny the motion.

I-5

MR. FITZGERALD: Your Honor, I have agreed to admit all of the

exhibits of the defendant. I submitted to them this morning, a marked

copy of our exhibits and asked if we have an agreement on these exhibits.

If not, which ones are...

THE COURT: Counsel?

MR. EVANS: I didn’t hear the question, your Honor.

APPENDIX J

Consolidated Appeal Nos. 92-020 and 92-022

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

RYOKO ITO, as Personal Representative

of the heirs of AKINOBU ITO, Deceased

Plaintiff,

V.

MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS OCEAN

ENTERPRISES, NOBUO HIRAI, SHIGEMI

YAMAGISHI AND AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO.

Defendants.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA | SLANDS

OPENING BRIEF

OF

DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT NOBUO HIRAI

VINCENTE T. SALAS, ESQ. HAROLD A. STONE, ESQ.

SALAS & MANIBUSAN FRANCIS M. McKEOWN, ESQ.

Torres Building GUDMUNDSON SIGGINS STONE &

SKINNER

Second Floor One Embarcadero Center, Ste. 1350

San Jose, Saipan 96950

Telephone: (670) 234-7455

Facsimile: (670) 234-7256

San Francisco, CA 94111

Telephone: (415) 391-4200

Facsimile: (415) 989-4739

Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant

NOBUO HIRAI

his heirs should not have been able to recover in the court below. The

Judgment should be reversed.

J-2

In Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296; Cal.Rptr.2d ,

the Court applied the doctrine of reasonable implied assumption of risk to

recreational activity such as the one at bench. The Court stated:

In the sports setting, however, conditions or

conduct that might otherwise integral might be

viewed as dangerous often are an part of the sport

itself. Thus, although moguls on a ski run pose a

risk of harm to skiers that might not exist were

these configurations removed, the challenge and

risks posed by the moguls are part of the sport of

skiing, and a ski resort has no duty to eliminate

them...in this respect, that nature of a sport is

highly irrelevant in defining the duty of care owed

by the particular defendant. (Knight at p. 315.)

Clearly, it is in the nature of scuba diving that there is an inherent risk

associated with the possibility of drowning. Defendants have no legal

duty to eliminate those risks inherent in the recreational activity.

F. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Hirai's Notion to

Enforce Settlement

During the course of this litigation, Plaintiff and Defendant Hirai

entered into a written settlement agreement.

On June 21, 1991, Plaintiff's counsel sent a written settlement offer to

Hirai. The proposal was simple and short:

This will constitute Plaintiff's offer to the

defendant Nobuo Hirai to dismiss the case with

prejudice against him under the following

conditions:

a) Hirai will meet with a [sic] expert of

Plaintiff's choosing to discuss the events

surrounding this case and his employment in Saipan.

b) Hirai agrees to testify at the trial. (C.R.

9/12/91 11:46:13; 11:45:48; Excepts of Record, p. 54

et sec..)

J-3

Four days later,Hirai's counsel sent Plaintiff's counsel a written

acceptance, signed by both counsel and the defendant, that was similarly

simple and short:

My client, NOBUO HIRAI, unconditionally accepts the

offer to settle the case against him contained in

your letter of June 21, 1991 under the terms

specified therein. (C.R. 9/12/91 11:46:13; Excerpts

of Record, p. 54, et sec..)

The following day, Plaintiff's counsel purported to orally revoke the

offer, and a day later sent a letter purporting to withdraw it. (C.R. 9/12/91

11:46:13; Excerpts of Record, p. 67.)

Despite their executed settlement agreement, Plaintiff did not file a

dismissal of Defendant Hirai. Accordingly, on September 12, 1992, Hirai

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of the settlement

agreement. No opposition was ever filed. However, the parties stipulated

to a stay of the hearing until the matter was finally heard on the first day of

trial on May 26, 1992. At that time, the court stated that this matter should

have been taken up before trial and rather than entertain the Motion, the

Court denied the Motion. (Excerpt of Record, p. 53.)

The trial court committed error in two fundamental respects. First,

procedurally, a Motion for Summary Judgment may be made at any time,

including on the eve of, or even during trial. (Rule 56, Commonwealth

Rules of Civil Procedure; Thrift v. Bell Lines, Inc. 296 F.Supp.214, 217

(D.C.S.C. 1967); H.J. Heinz Co. v. Beech-Nut Lifesavers, Inc. 181 F.Supp.

452, 459 (D.C.N.Y. 1960). Hirai's written settlement agreement entitled

him to dismissal. Whether Plaintiff sought dismissal based upon that

contract before or during trial has no bearing uponHirai's rights under the

contract. He certainly did not waive his rights under the settlement

contract by failing to enforce it before the trial. Obviously, if settlement

agreement can only be enforced by Pretrial Motion, no settlements would

ever be entered into during a trial. Accordingly, the basis for the court's,

refusal to entertain Defendant's Motion is unsound.

Second, substantively, Defendant Hirai is entitled to enforcement of the

settlement agreement. In Del Rosario v. Camacho, Civ. Action No. 88-

868, a slip opinion entered on February 7, 1990, this court enforced John

B. Camacho's oral agreement to settle a case after the plaintiff tried to

repudiate the agreement, holding that "[o]nce a valid compromise and

J-4

settlement is reached, a court's primary object is to effectuate the

intentions of the party,” citing 15 A. ANJUR 2d, Compromise and

Settlement, §§23. In the case at bench, the subject settlement agreement is

not an oral agreement but a written settlement agreement.

According to the authors of 15 A. AMJUR 2d, §§25 (Bancroft Whitney

1976):

A valid compromise in settlement is final,

conclusive, and binding upon the parties and upon

those who knowingly accept its benefit. It is as

binding as any contract the parties could make, and

as binding as if its terms were embodied in a

judgment; and regardless of the actual merits of the

antecedent claim may have been, they will not

afterward be inquired into and examined.

A settlement is simply a contract. Once Plaintiff's offer was accepted,

a contract was formed, and Plaintiff lacked power to revoke the original

offer:

[O]nly where there is cause sufficient to invalidate

a contract, such as fraud, collusion, mistake or

accident, will a party be relieved from the

consequences of a stipulation made during

litigation. State v. Hallock, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 230,

485 N.Y.S.2d 510, 512, 474 N.E.2d 1178, 1180 (N.Y.

1984).

The written settlement agreement is, without doubt, a binding bilateral

contract. Furthermore, Defendant Hirai performed under the contract.

Specifically, he appeared and testified at trial, and made himself available

to meet with Plaintiff's expert. CR 5/22/92 11:17:50.

Accordingly, Defendant Hirai was and is entitled to dismissal based

upon the irrefutable written settlement agreement which is fully

enforceable and was properly the basis for dismissal at the time of trial.

G. The Court Erred in Failing to Explain the basis For

Its Conclusion That the Income Ito Could Have Been

acted to Earn over His Working Life, Reduced To

Its Present Value, Was $2,389,857.55.

J-5

§§913A of the Restatement of Torts, 2d, provides that "[t]he measure

of a lump sum award for future pecuniary losses arising from a tort is the

present worth of the full amount of the loss of what would have been

received at the later time."

JOR ie nals terial Mik, GER.

END J

APPENDIX K

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

Aaa

WA) tris Rhe RIOLT n dertee J 5 Di Lael patna tata

| RYOKO ITO, as Personal )APPEAL NOS. 92-020 & 92-022

Representative of the Heirs ) (Consolidated)

of AKINOBU ITO, Deceased, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 89-918

)

Plaintiff/Appellee/ )

Cross-Appellant, )

) OPINION

V. )

)

MACRO ENERGY, INC., MARIANAS)

OCEAN ENTERPRISES, NOBUO )

if HIRAI, SHIGEMI YAMAGISHI, )

AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE _ )

COMPANY, )

)

Defendants/Appellants/ )

Cross-Appellees. )

)

Argued and submitted March 15, 1993

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee William M. Fitzgerald

Cross-Appellant Ryoko Ito: P.O. Box 909

Saipan, MP 96950

; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Harold A. Stone

and Cross-Appellee Nobuo Hirai: Francis M. McKeown

Gudmundson Siggins Stone

& Skinner

One Embarcadero Center

Suite 1350

San Francisco, CA 94111

ata nsedt ted Memes nie 28 wo ‘aaheat:

Vicente T. Salas

Salas & Manibusan

Torres Building, 2nd FI.

San Jose, Saipan 96950

K-2

Attorneys for Defendants/Appellant

and Cross-Appellees Macro

Energy, Inc. and Shigemi

Yamagishi:

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

and Cross-Appellee

Shigemi Yamagishi for insurance

matters:

Attorneys for Defendant/Cross-

Appellee

Marianas Ocean Enterprises:

Attorneys for Defendant/Cross-

Appellee

American Home Assurance

Company:

Charles A. Lynberg

Randall J. Peters

Lynberg & Watkins

888 South Figueroa Street

16th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90017

James E. Hollman

P.O. Box 2628

Saipan, MP 96950

James H. Grizzard

Macaranas Bldg.

2nd Floor

Saipan, MP 96950

Lecia M. Eason

Wiseman, Eason & Halsell

P.O. Box 2607

Saipan, MP 96950

Randall Todd Thompson

Mair, Mair, Spade

& Thompson

GCIC Bldg., Suite 807

414 Soledad Avenue

Agana, Guam 96910

Michael A. White

White, Novo-Gradac

& Manglona

P.O. Box 222 CHRB

Saipan, MP 96950

BEFORE: DELA CRUZ, Chief Justice; VILLAGOMEZ, Associate

Justice;

and CRUZ, Special Judge

DELA CRUZ, Chief Justice:

eee ae oe

K-3

This consolidated appeal involves several issues arising from plaintiff's

wrongful death suit as personal representative for the heirs of the

decedent, Mr. Akinobu Ito. Ito drowned while on a scuba diving trip

supervised by defendants. On the day of his death, Ito signed an

"AGREEMENT FOR EXEMPTION FROM OBLIGATION."

The trial court ruled on a pre-trial motion that the release exonerated

defendant Macro Energy, Inc. ("Macro") and Marianas Ocean Enterprises

("MOE"), but not defendants Yamagishi and Hirai. After a two-week trial,

the trial court found that Yamagishi and Hirai's negligence was a

proximate cause of Ito's death, and entered judgment for plaintiff. The

threshold issue on this appeal is whether the release exonerates any of the

defendants for their negligence. Plaintiff and defendants also raise several

other issues on appeal, including one involving the coverage liability of

defendant American Home Assurance Company.

We hold that the release does not exonerate any defendant because, as

drafted, it does not comply with Restatement (Second) of Torts Section

496B, the applicable rule in the Commonwealth governing express

assumption of risk. We therefore go on to address the other issues raised

by the parties.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

This lawsuit was filed by Ryoko Ito ("plaintiff") as personal

representative of the heirs of her deceased husband, Akinobu Ito ("Ito")./1/

Ito drowned on September 24, 1988, during a scuba diving accident at

Saipan's "Grotto."

The other parties in this lawsuit are as follows:

Macro Energy, Inc. ("Macro"), the Saipan-based scuba diving company

that trained Ito to dive in June of 1988 and to which he returned on

September 24, 1988.

Marianas Ocean Enterprises ("MOE") -- alleged to be the "alter ego" of

Macro.

/1/

K-4

The CNMI's wrongful death statute is found at 7 CMC Section 2101.

Subsection (a) provides, in part:

When the death of a person is caused by [a] wrongful act, neglect or

default such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action

and recover damages in respect thereof if death had not ensued, the person

or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued, . . .

is liable to an action for damages notwithstanding the death of the person

injured ....

Shigemi Yamagishi ("Yamagishi") -- diving instructor and Macro's

president.

Nobuo Hirai ("Hirai") -- assistant instructor employed by Macro.

American Home Assurance Company ("American Home")

Macro and Yamagishi's insurer during all relevant dates./2/

Plaintiff's complaint contained four causes of action relating to (1)

negligent instruction by defendants in the June 1988 scuba diving course;

(2) negligence of defendants on the day of Ito's death, September 24,

1988; (3) coverage under the American Home insurance policy/3/ and (4)

MOE's alter-ego relationship with Macro.

On November 7, 1990, Macro, American Home, Yamagishi, and Hirai

moved for summary judgment under Section 496B of the Restatement of

Torts (Second), based on the "AGREEMENT FOR EXEMPTION FROM

OBLIGATION" (herein referred to as the "release agreement” or the

"release") which Ito signed on the morning of his accident. The trial court

granted the motion as to all four movants on December 17, 1990. On

December 27, 1990, plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the order

granting summary judgment.

On January 21, 1991, the trial court heard oral argument on plaintiff's

motion for reconsideration, and, on January 28, 1991, entered an

"Amended Summary Judgment" and "Memorandum Decision" which held

that Yamagishi and Hirai were not released from

K-5

/2/ American Home Assurance Company was named as "American

Home Insurance Company" in plaintiff's complaint. American Home

Assurance Company appeared and litigated this action despite the defect.

Accordingly. we have corrected its name in this caption.

/3/ Plaintiff brings this suit against American Home pursuant to the

Commonwealth's "direct action” statute. 4 CMC §7502(e).

liability./4/ The trial court also ruled that, although MOE was not a

movant, "[s]ince the complaint included MOE as a defendant based upon

the theory that it was the alter ego of Macro, the grant of summary

judgment does run in favor of MOE." Memorandum Decision of January

28, 1991 at 4. Therefore, after January 28, 1990, plaintiff's case stood

only against defendants American Home, Yamagishi and Hirai.

On April 16, 1991, after a hearing on a motion for summary judgment

brought by American Home, the trial court ruled that American Home's

liability coverage was limited to $100,000. it

also ruled that plaintiff had waived her claim for loss of consortium. See

Memorandum opinion dated April 16, 1991.

Thereafter, in September 1991, American Home, Yamagishi and Hirai

moved, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Commonwealth Rules Civil Procedure, for

certification of (1) the trial court's January 28, 1991 judgment regarding

the release and (2) the trial court's April 16, 1991 order regarding the

policy limits and plaintiff's claim for loss of consortium. We dismissed

these appeals because they were not final within the meaning of Rule

54(b). See Ito v. Macro Energy, Inc., Nos. 91-032, 91-033, 91-034 & 9I-

037 (Consolidated) (N.M.I. Feb. 3, 1992).

A two-week trial was held between May 26, 1992 and June 5, 1992,

after which the trial court entered judgment in the amount of

$2,434,857.55 against Hirai, Yamagishi and American Home.

On August 10, 1992, after motion by American Home, the court issued

an

/4/ The trial court's Amended Summary Judgment does not state why

the trial court changed course. The court wrote: "upon further review of

the Exemption Agreement, the court finds that its coverage does not

extend to defendants Hirai and Yamagishi individually." Memorandum

Decision of January 28, 1991 at 4. Defendants Yamagishi and Hirai

contend on appeal that the trial court amended its order because they were

not specifically mentioned in the release.

Amended Judgment limiting American Home's liability for damages to

$100,000.

Yamagishi and Hirai timely filed a joint notice of appeal on August 14,

1992. Plaintiff also timely appealed on August 21, 1992. We

consolidated the two appeals on September 22, 1992. Other procedural

matters of this case are set forth where pertinent, below.

II. FACTS.

The following 73 points of fact are taken verbatim from the trial court's

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated

June 22, 1992 (hereafter, "Findings of Fact")./5/

1. In June of 1988, the decedent, Akinobu Ito ("Ito") with Yosuhiro

Fujitomi ("Fujitomi") enrolled in a scuba diving course offered by

MACRO Energy, Inc. ["Macro"] in Saipan.

2. Shige Yamagishi ("Yamagishi") is a shareholder and a director of

[Macro].

3. Yamagishi is the diving instructor of [Macro].

4. Ito enrolled in the scuba diving course so that he [could] obtain[]

certification as an open water diver.

K-7

5. The course [Macro] offered Ito, require[d] minimal pre-dive

instruction and training. There was no pool or confined water training.

Written student testing consisted of requests for student/volunteers to

answer questions orally whether the students answered the questions

correctly or not the instructor revealed the answer to the students who.

filled in the answers on their book.

/S/ Defendants do not directly challenge the trial court's factual findings

except to argue that (1) the trial court applied a wrong standard of care in

evaluating their dive course and supervision, and (2) the trial court's

damage award was excessive and clearly erroneous. These issues are

discussed below.

Water instructions took place inside the Grotto./6/

6. Upon the completion of Ito's scuba diving course, Yamagishi signed

a certification card certifying Ito as an ADS open water diver. ADS is a

Japanese scuba diving agency that issues a card certifying a diver as an

open water diver.

7. Yamagishi signed a certification card certifying Ito as a CMAS one-

star diver. CMAS is a French agency which is internationally recognized

around the world and issues a card certifying a diver as a CMAS one-star

diver.

8. Although Yamagishi signed the ADS and CMAS certification for

Ito, he never personally instructed Ito in the class or in the water

instruction in the Grotto.

9. Open water diver is a term recognized as being required in any

certification course issued by various agencies.

Various agencies around the world certify people as scuba divers under

standards established for their respective agencies.

10. The course that Ito and Fujitomi attended to receive their open

water diver certification did not meet the minimum standards.

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11. CMAS has specific standards which describe the knowledge and

skills required in order for a diver to be granted a CMAS one-star diver

certificate.

/6/ The Grotto is a sometimes turbulent pool of water surrounded on

three sides by a natural rock formation. It contains three underwater

outlets through which a diver can swim into the Pacific ocean. These

outlets differ in length and width. The north entrance requires a diver to

go 15 feet underwater and swim under an overhead rock formation for

another 10 to 15 feet. This outlet is very simple to dive. It was revealed at

trial that on a calm day, a strong swimmer can "free dive" under the rock

formation and out to the ocean quickly without the assistance of an

underwater breathing apparatus. This was not the hole used by the divers

in this case. The hole that was used was the center hole. This hole is

approximately 20 meters [65.6 feet] underwater and is approximately 120

feet in length.

12. CMAS has a diver training program which indicates the current

standard of training necessary in order to reach the minimum level of

proficiency required for the award of a CMAS one-star diver certificate.

13. The course that Ito attended to receive his open water certification

did not meet the standards or follow the training program required by

CMAS.

14. Yamagishi did not exercise reasonable care as a scuba instructor in

certifying Ito as an open water diver and a CMAS one star diver.

15. The following is a partial list of the deficiencies of the course that

Ito took before Yamagishi issued the two certification cards:

(a) Unqualified persons were employed as instructors.

(b) Students were not given text books.

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(c) Ito was not given time to study for a theory test.

(d) Ito was not given a formal test that would require him to prove

mastery of scuba diving theory.

(e) No accurate records exist of by whom or what Ito was taught.

(f) No accurate records exist to prove that Ito demonstrated his

mastery of the required scuba diving skills to a qualified instructor.

(g) No record exists to prove that Ito was taught scuba diving theory

by a qualified instructor.

(h) Ito was taught a major part of the course by Aline Bouhey who

was nota qualified instructor at the time.

(i) The only records that do exist were fabricated by Shige

Yamagishi after Akinobu Ito was dead.

(j) The confined water training was done at the Grotto which is not

an appropriate place to learn the necessary skills.

(k) open water dive training was virtually non-existent and provided

no opportunity to practice skills during supervised ocean dives.

(1) Octopus breathing was not taught.

(m) The number of exposures to each skill was not enough to learn

the skill.

(n) Ito was not taught rescue techniques.

16. Yamagishi deceived Ito into believing that he was receiving the

legitimate CMAS one star course and a legitimate open water diver

course.

17. It was not aware of all the risks of scuba diving as a legitimate

CMAS one star diver and an open water diver would be because he had

not been properly trained.

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18. Failure to receive the proper training in the scuba diving course

that Ito took in June, 1988 was a proximate cause of Ito's death in

September 24, 1988.

19. In September, Ito returned to Saipan to go scuba diving.

20. On September 24, 1988, Ito paid for the services of a dive guide

because he did not want to dive unsupervised.

21. Shige Yamagishi and Nobuo Hirai were aware that Akinobu Ito

was a CMAS one star diver, and that he had had only one ocean dive

outside of the inner pool of the Grotto.

22. Yamagishi and Hirai knew that the dive that they planned to take

Ito, along with fourteen other people, on[] that day was a deep dive and

that Ito had never dove deeper than 30 feet.

23. Yamagishi and Hirai knew that divers must be closely supervised

on their first deep dive.

24. A dive of more than 100 feet is a deep dive.

25. Yamagishi and Hirai undertook to render the service of dive guide

and dive supervisor of Akinobu Ito.

26. Yamagishi and Hirai failed to exercise reasonable care in the

performance of supervising the dive.

27. Yamagishi was a shareholder and officer of the company that

provided the scuba diving equipment and was responsible for its proper

maintenance.

28. The regulator given to Ito leaked air which may have caused air to

be used faster than normal.

29. The pressure gauge of the regulator given to Ito read 130 psi higher

than was actually in the tank, so if the gauge read 400 psi, it actually only

had 270 psi in the tank.

30. Yamagishi and Hirai failed prior to the dive to familiarize

themselves with the divers under their charge and their respective abilities.

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31. Yamagishi and Hirai failed to discuss with Ito the special

circumstances of a dive to more than 100 feet, including the more rapid

exhaustion of air and nitrogen narcosis.

32. At the site of the Grotto, Yamagishi and Hirai failed to give an

adequate dive briefing and failed to check Ito's equipment.

33. During the first half of the dive, Yamagishi was the only guide

with fourteen divers.

34. Yamagishi led the dive to a depth of more than 100 feet far beyond

the training capabilities of Ito.

35. Scuba divers are required to dive with a partner termed a buddy;

Fujitomi and Ito were buddies.

36. Fujitomi developed a problem with his air source and was assisted

by Hirai and the two rose to the surface.

37. At the time that Fujitomi rose to the surface, Ito followed the

correct procedure that he had been taught and followed his buddy Fujitomi

to the surface.

38. At the time Ito, Fujitomi and Hirai rose to the surface, Yamagishi

was at the mouth of the central entrance to the Grotto, with all the other

divers between them.

39. At the time that Fujitomi rose to the -surface Hirai failed to signal

Yamagishi to halt the dive and Yamagishi failed to wait to resolve the

problem.

40. With two divers on what he claims is the dangerous surface,

Yamagishi, without determining their problem, turned and led the other

divers back through the Grotto entrance and at no time after that did

Yamagishi ever search for them.

41. At the time that Ito rose to the surface Hirai did not instruct him to

immediately descend and join the other divers.

42. At the time that Ito rose to the surface Hirai did not check Ito's

remaining air supply.

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43. Hirai directed Ito to follow him down and then chose the longest

and deepest way to return to the surface inside the Grotto.

44. A much easier and safe alternative was available to Hirai by

snorkeling on the surface with inflated BCD and then returning through

the much more shallow and shorter northern entrance.

45. At the entrance to the tunnel to return to the inner Grotto, Hirai had

1500 psi of air, a very comfortable supply even for two people.

46. At the same point Ito had only between 400-500 psi, a questionable

amount, particularly because at readings of less than 500 the pressure

gauges are not as accurate as they are at higher readings.

47. Instead of swimming normally holding on to Fujitomi and Ito,

Hirai turned upside down and pulled himself along the roof of the center

tunnel of the Grotto, with Fujitomi clutching his tank and he using his

hands to pull himself along the roof.

48. Hirai's goal seemed to be to arrive at the surface in the fastest time

rather than in the safest way, yet there was noreason for his haste, since he

had ample air.

49. Hirai's decision to pull himself along tie roof prevented him from

maintaining a clear view of Ito and keeping Ito close by holding onto Ito's

vest.

50. At some point in the tunnel, Ito gave Firai an out of air sign and

Hirai gave him his octopus regulator.

51. Hirai did not hold Ito's vest while Ito was using his regulator in

violation of the standard procedure that he hac learned in his training.

52. Hirai continued his unreasonable craw along the roof upside

down, instead of swimming normally to the surface while holding onto Ito

and Fujitomi.

53. After discovering that Ito was not togeher with him when he

surfaced, Hirai dove and brought Ito to the surface.

54. The most important thing to do for a submersion incident victim is

to get the victim out of the water as quickly aspossible.

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55. Hirai and Yamagishi did not take Ito directly out of the water but

attempted for fifteen to twenty minutes to resuscitate him in the water.

56. At this time one of the members of the dive group, a Dr. Takagi,

surfaced and observed that Hirai and Yamagishi were supporting Ito on

the surface and giving mouth to mouth resuscitation to him; he noted the

time as 10:46.

57. Takagi watched for three or four minutes and then went over to

help, Yamagishi told him to take Ito's pulse, and he did noting that the

pulse was 60 and beating normally. Yamagishi told Takagi to make sure

in taking the pulse. Ito vomited water a number of times.

58. Thereafter at two to three minute intervals Takagi continued to

take Ito's pulse and it continued to beat at rate of about 40/50 per minute.

59. Shortly after 11:00 the pulse rate became drastically weak and

pinkish water started coming out of Ito's mouth.

60. At 11:03 the pulse became 0, and Yamagishi said to get him up,

and other people then helped to get him up and out of the water, where

heart massage was commenced and mouth to mouth resuscitation

continued.

61. At about 11:10 the ambulance arrived and they carried Ito away

and he was pronounced dead on arrival at the Commonwealth Health

Center.

62. The appropriate treatment for either drowning or air embolism is

oxygen. Yamagishi and Hirai did not have oxygen at the Grotto.

63. Akinobu Ito's cause of death was drowning.

64. Yamagishi and Hirai made statements to the police and other

agencies immediately after the incident but did not mention seeing blood

in the water.

65. Blood is a potential symptom of air embolism but is seldom seen.

66. Air embolisms occur because of a change in pressure upon ascent,

and descent.

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67. Pink froth is indicative of pulmonary edema which results from the

inhalation of water or other foreign matter to the lung.

68. The blood found in Ito's stomach resulted from his stomach ulcer.

69. Hirai stated in a memorandum to the Japanese Consulate that at

11:05 Ito had a weak pulse.

70. At the time of his death Akinobu Ito was 46 years old, gainfully

employed by a major Japanese company, earning more than $60, 000 a

year. He expected to work for that same company or one of its

subsidiaries until he was seventy years old.

71. Akinobu Ito is survived by a loving wife Ryoko and two children,

Chiyo and Masteru.

72. The income that Akinobu Ito could have been expected to provide

to his wife and children over his working life reduced to present value at

an exchange rate of Y126.78/$ is $2,389,857.55.

73. Funeral and burial expenses total $45,000.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.

1. The threshold issue on this appeal is whether Ito expressly assumed

the risk of harm arising from defendants’ negligence by sighing the

release, and, if so, which defendants are exonerated by operation of the

release. The trial court interpreted the release as exonerating defendants

Macro Energy and MOE and entered summary judgment in their favor.

We review de novo the effect of the release on the question of liability.

Rios

v. MPLC, No. 92-019 (N.M.I. Feb. 19, 1993)./7/

2. Whether Ito impliedly assumed the risks which led to the accident.

3. Whether Ito was contributorily negligent.

4. Whether the trial court applied an incorrect standard with respect to

defendants, duty of care.

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Issues no. 2 through 4 involve mixed questions of law and fact and

therefore are rev‘zwed de novo. Id.

5. Whether the trial court erred in failing to consider defendant Hirai's

motion for summary judgment to enforce a settlement agreement on the

date set for trial. A trial court's failure to rule on a motion is a denial

thereof by operation of law and, in this case, implicates the trial court's

power to control its docket. We therefore review its ruling for abuse of

discretion. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Parr, 391 P.2d 575

(Ariz. 1964); Edwards v. Cass County, Tex., 919 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1990).

6. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff had waived her

loss of consortium claim. The trial court found that plaintiff's counsel

"admitted" that plaintiff had no claim for consortium on summary

judgment. Such ruling is a conclusion of law

/7/ \n the trial court, plaintiff and MOE briefed the issue of whether

MOE is the "alter-ego" of Macro. However, "the issue was not resolved in

the trial court. [Footnote omitted.] Instead, summary judgment

proceedings commenced on the issue of the express release agreement."

See Brief of appellee MOE at x. We do not decide the alter-ego issue

because it has not been raised on this appeal.

and is reviewable de novo. Rios v. MPLC, No. 92-019 (N.M.I. Feb. 19,

1993).

7. Whether the trial court erred in its calculation of damages, and in

not revealing its calculations in determining damages. Damage awards are

reviewed under a "clearly erroneous standard." Reyes v. Ebetuer, No. 90-

017 (N.M.I. Jan. 29, 1992).

8. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that American Home's

coverage under the policy is limited to $100,000. The trial court's

interpretation of language in an insurance policy involves a question of

law which is subject to de novo review. Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., Ltd.

v. Marianas Ocean Enterprises, Inc., 3 CR 748, 753 (D.C.N.M.I. App.

Div. 1989).

K-16

IV. ANALYSIS.

. Ito's Express Assumption of the Risk.

The release which Ito signed before the diving accident and which is

critical to this litigation states as follows:

MACRO ENERGY, INC.

APPLICATION FOR PARTICIPATING IN SCUBA DIVING &

INVOICE

* * *

(AGREEMENT FOR EXEMPTION FROM OBLIGATION)

I SUBMITTED AN APPLICATION FOR

PARTICIPATING IN THE

DIVING TOUR AND OR TRAINING PROGRAM TO

BE CONDUCTED BY YOUR AGENCY. I FULLY

ACCEPT AND UNDERSTAND THAT SUCH A

DIVING TOUR AND TRAINING INVOLVES BASIC

RISK AND DANGER.IF WE FAIL TO ABIDE BY THE

RULES AND REGULATION SET BY THE GUIDES

AND INSTRUCTORS AND IF WE NEGLECT THE

DIVING RULES, WE REALIZE THAT WE MAY RISK

OUR LIVES. ALL THE RISKS THAT WE MAY HAVE

DURING THE PERIOD OF STAY HERE

BELONG TO EACH OF US PERSONALLY. IN CASE

OF ACCIDENT,

CAUSING INJURY OR DEATH TO MYSELF, |

MYSELF, MY FAMILY, OR INHERITED

ORGANIZATION AND OTHER RELATED

PERSONNEL SHALL HAVE NO RIGHT TO PROTEST

AGAINST NOR TO CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. WE

HEREBY SWEAR TO ABIDE BY AND ACT AT THE

RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS SET BY THE GUIDES

AND INSTRUCTORS. ALSO I AM FULLY A GROWN

UP AT LAW AND I ACKNOWLEDGE THE FACT

THAT I AM FULLY QUALIFIED TO SIGN THIS

AGREEMENT, TO VERIFY THE EXEMPTIONS

FROM ALL THE CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES. ALL THE

ITEMS IN THIS APPLICATION ARE TO BE DECIDED

‘

‘

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BY THE AGREEMENT, AND I PERSONALLY SIGN

THIS DOCUMENT AT MY OWN WILL RATHER

THAN SOMEONE DIRECTING ME TO SIGN THIS

PAPER.

The release also contains the above paragraph in Japanese./8/ The

release was signed by Ito and dated "9/24/88." The trial court initially

ruled that the release exonerated all defendants, but subsequently amended

its summary judgment and ruled that the release did not exonerate

defendants Yamagishi, the president of Macro Energy, and Hirai, an

employee of Macro Energy.

In the Commonwealth, the rules of the common law as expressed in the

Restatements of the law as approved by the American Law Institute serve

as the applicable rules of decision, in the absence of written or local

customary law to the contrary. 7 CMC §3401. Because we have no statute

or local customary law regarding express releases, Restatement (Second)

of Torts Section 496B (hereafter referred to as "Section 496B") is

applicable. That section provides:

A plaintiff who by contract or otherwise expressly agrees

to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant's

negligent or reckless conduct cannot recover for such

harm, unless the agreement is invalid as contrary to

public policy.

There is no dispute that the release is either a "contract" or a document

by which Ito may have "otherwise expressly agree [d]" to assume certain

risks. There also is no dispute that Ito read and executed the release. The

issue on appeal concerns the language of

/8/ The decedent rentty was proficient only in Japanese, and read the

inse language version of the release before signing it. At oral argument,

counsel for plaintiff stated that only the English language version of the

release has been the subject of dispute in this lawsuit. Defendants do not

contend otherwise, nor do they assert that the Japanese version of the

release contains language which in legal effect differs from the English

version. Therefore, our decision is based solely on the English language

version.

the release instrument, and whether that language, as a matter of law,

exonerates defendants from their negligence. We conclude that it does

not

A. The Requirements of Section 496B

In order for a release to be valid and binding, it must comply with the

requirements of Section 496B. In determining whether the release meets

the requirements of Section 496B, we shall strictly construe the language

of the release, Schutkowski v. Carey, 725 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Wyo. 1986),

especially where, as in this case, it is drafted by defendants and purports to

exonerate them. Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo.

1989); see also, Section 496B cmt. d.

By signing the release, Ito must have "expressly agree[d] to accept a

risk of harm arising from the defendant{s'] negligent or reckless conduct."

(Emphasis supplied.) We turn to the language of the release to determine

what risks Ito "expressly" agreed to assume.

In doing so, we find no mention of Ito accepting a risk of harm arising

from the "defendant[s'] negligent conduct.” The release contains no

language that the risk of harm which Ito agreed to assume was that harm

which may arise due to defendants' negligence. Although the release

states that "ALL THE RISKS THAT WE MAY HAVE DURING THE

PERIOD OF STAY HERE BELONG TO EACH OF US PERSONALLY"

and that Ito (or his heirs) will not file suit "INCASE OF ACCIDENT,

CAUSING INJURY OR DEATH TO MYSELF," it fails to mention that

the risks encompass defendants’ negligence.

The language of the release does not "expressly" warn or alert Ito that

the risk of harm he was assuming is one that may arise from defendants,

negligence. Absent clear language in the release itself, we are not

persuaded, as a matter of law, that the release meets the requirements of

Section 496B: that Ito "expressly agree[d] to accept a risk of harm arising

from the defendant(s'] negligent or reckless conduct."

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"[A |ithough uniformly agreeing that exculpatory agreements must be

strictly construed against the drafter, [courts] are split on whether

‘negligence’ must be specifically mentioned [in a release], or whether more

inclusive and general terms may be employed." Heil Valley Ranch, Inc.,

784 P.2d at 784 (footnote omitted). This split in authority regarding such

a requirement appears to be based on the various jurisdictions, public

policy views pertaining to these types of releases, and how each views the

importance of the language of the release itself, ie. whether the language

is sufficiently clear so that the one signing it knows what is being given

up. In the absence of legislation, the common law is developed, based on

the application of general notions of justice and fair play, taking into

account the circumstances and experiences unique to a particular

jurisdiction.

Our jurisdiction is not vested with a similar degree of freedom in

formulating our own common law as that exercised by courts in other

jurisdictions, because of the statutory dictate that we apply the

Restatement. 7 CMC §3401. Thus, we must acknowledge the doctrine of

express assumption of risk as set forth

in Section 496B, which is part of our "rules of decision” in the

Commonwealth. Id.

In interpreting Section 496B, however, we shall side with those

jurisdictions which take the more cautious approach with respect to

express assumption of risk. In doing so, we interpret Section 496B as

requiring that a release must expressly mention that the risks of harm

being assumed by a releasor include those arising from a releasee's

negligence or reckless conduct. Certain notable jurisdictions have taken

this approach to releases. See Saenz v. Whitewater Voyages, Inc., 276

Cal.Rptr. 672 (Ct. App. 1990); Madison v. Superior Court, 250 Cal.Rptr.

299 (Ct. App. 1988); O'Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d

444 (Fla. App. 1982); Goyings v. Jack and Ruth Eckerd Foundation, 403

So.2d 1144 (Fla. App. 1981).

In Madison v. Superior Court, 250 Cal.Rptr. 299 (Ct. App. 1988),

review denied, the court held that the release barred plaintiff's wrongful

death action, which was premised on defendants, negligence during a

scuba-diving course. The release at issue in Madison, however, clearly

stated that the releasor agreed not to sue if he suffered injury caused "by

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the negligence of" the releasees, and that the releasor agreed to "exempt

and relieve [releasees] from liability for personal injury, property damage

or wrongful death caused by negligence." Id. at 302 (quote in lower case).

In upholding the release, the court wrote that "[a]s long as the release

constitutes a clear and unequivocal waiver with specific reference to a

defendant's negligence, it will be sufficient." Id. at 304 (emphasis

supplied).

Florida agrees with the California analysis. In Goyings v. Jack and

Ruth Eckerd Foundation, 403 So.2d 1144, for example, the court wrote,

"an exculpatory clause, while not favored, may operate to absolve a

defendant from liability arising out of his own negligent acts. For such a

clause to be effective, however it must clearly state that it releases the

party from liability for his own negligence." Id. at 1146.

Under the language of the release signed by Ito, we are not satisfied

that, in signing the release, he "expressly agree[d]" to accept the risks,

arising from defendants, negiigence Or reckless conduct, which caused his

death. The release fails to set forth any express language as to defendants,

negligence.

B. Applying a Less-Restrictive Standard under §496B.

Some state jurisdictions have held that a release need not contain

specific reference that the releasor is to assume the risk of harm arising

from the releasee's negligent or reckless conduct. Heil Valley Ranch, Inc,

784 P.2d at 784; Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc., 636 P.2d 492, 493

(Wash. App. 1981), review denied, 96 Wash.2d 1027 (1982);

Schutkowski, 725 P.2d at 1061. Where that is the case, however, the

release must be "clear that the parties’ intent was to release [defendants]

from liability for negligence." Schutkowski, 725 P.2d at 1061.

If we were to disregard a strict interpretation of the requirements of

Section 496B and apply Schutkowski's less-restrictive standard to the

release signed by Ito, the release would still not meet that standard

because the only risk of harm which the release covers are those arising

from Ito's conduct, not the risk of harm arising from defendants,

negligence. The release alerted Ito that he could be injured if he failed

"TO ABIDE BY THE RULES AND REGULATION SET BY THE

GUIDES AND INSTRUCTORS," or if he were to "NEGLECT THE

DIVING RULES."/9/

K-21]

We fail to see how these warnings regarding injury arising from Ito's

failure to follow diving rules and regulations could be satisfactorily

construed to mean that he intended "to release [defendants] from liability

for [their] negligence." Schutkowski, 725 P.2d at 1061. The release as

drafted and signed by Ito simply was not "clear" regarding the parties’

intent. Thus, even if we read the release broadly, we still have difficulty

construing the language of the release as containing an intent to absolve

the releasees from their negligence.

C. The Effect of Comment d.

Yamagishi and Hirai contend that Comment d to Section 496B supports

a ruling that the release exonerates them from liability. However, we are

not convinced that if we apply the test implicit in Comment d, we would

reach a different result.

Comment d provides that a "general clause[] . . . will not be construed

to include loss or damage resulting from [a defendant's] intentional,

negligent, or reckless misconduct unless the circumstances clearly indicate

that such was the plaintiff's

/9/ The trial court found that it was defendants who did not abide by the

rules of proper training, supervision and rescue. See, Findings of Fact

Nos. 13-18.

understanding and intention." (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, where a general

clause is used in the release, as in this case, the rule is that courts may not

construe it to release a defendant from liability unless "the circumstances

clearly indicate that such was the plaintiff's understanding and intention."

Here, again, the general clause releases the defendants from liability if

Ito's death was caused by Ito's (1) failure to abide by the rules and

regulations set by the guides and instructors, and (2) neglect of diving

rules.

The general clause of the release reads:

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IN CASE OF ACCIDENT, CAUSING INJURY OR D,

TO MYSELF, | MYSELF, MY FAMILY, OR INHERITED

ORGANIZATION AND OTHER RELATED PERSONNEL

SHALL HAVE NO RIGHT TO PROTEST AGAINST NOR TO

CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.

This clause, when read together with the preceding sentences, does not

"clearly indicate" that Ito understood or intended to release defendants

from their negligence. For the reasons stated, even under Comment d, we

do not read the releases "general clause" as exempting the negligent

defendants from liability.

D. The Release Fails to Exonerate the Defendants.

The release at issue in this case does not meet the requirements of

Restatement (Second) Torts Section 496B. We hold that a release, in

order to be valid, at the very least must expressly mention that the releasor

is assuming the risk of harm that may arise from the releasee's negligence

or reckless conduct. Because the release which Ito signed did not comply

with this requirement, we conclude as a matter of law that Ito did not

"expressly agree[] to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant(s']

negligent or reckless conduct." Section 496B. The trial court thus erred in

ruling that the release exonerated defendants Macro Energy, Inc. (the

named releasee) and its alleged alter-ego MOE. Both Macro and MOE, as

well as their agents/employees Yamagishi and Hirai, are not exempted

from liability by operation of the release.

Plaintiff asserted liability against Macro on the theory of respondeat

superior. Ito's Supplemental Brief at 3. Macro is liable for the negligence

of its employees and/or agents, Hirai and Yamagishi, unless they were

"acting outside the a of their employment" during the course of events

that caused Ito's death. Restatement (Second) of Agency §219.

Plaintiff's complaint alleged that Hirai was employed by and

Yamagishi was "an officer, director and/or employee" of Macro at the

time the incident took place. Complaint ZZZZ 6 and 7. Macro, Hirai and

Yamagishi filed a joint Answer and did not deny these allegations.

Moreover, their joint Answer did not set forth an affirmative defense that

Hirai and Yamagishi "acted outside the scope of their employment." And,

Marcro's briefs on appeal do not assert such a defense, only the same

defenses of Hirai and Yamagishi which were resolved against them by the

K-23

trial court and, as set forth below, by this court. Thus, we hold. as a matter

of law, that Macro is subject to joint and several liability on the judgment.

We shall therefore remand the matter to the trial court for the limited

purposes of (1) entering judgment against Macro, Yamagishi and Hirai,

jointly and severally, in the amount of $2,434,857.55 and (2) determining

whether MOE should also be held jointly and severally liable to plaintiff

for the same monetary judgment, based on the theory that MOE is the

"alter ego" of Macro.

2. Ito's Implied Assumption of Risk.

Defendants alternatively argue that if the release is not valid, Ito

impliedly assumed the risk of harm arising from defendants, conduct.

They contend that the risk of drowning is so inherent in the sport of scuba

diving, that Ito must have impliedly assumed that risk by participating in

the diving excursion with defendants.

The doctrine of implied assumption of risk, as contained in

Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 496C (hereafter, "Section 496C a"

States, in pertinent part:

(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), a plaintiff who

fully understands a risk of harm to himself. . . caused

by the defendant's conduct . . . and who nevertheless

voluntarily chooses to enter or remain. . . .under

circumstances that manifest his willingness to accept it,

is not entitled to recover for harm within that risk.

(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) does not apply in

any situation in which an express agreement to accept the

risk would be invalid as contrary to public policy.

Plaintiff argues that Section 496C(1) is inapplicable because the release

is "invalid as contrary to public policy" under Section 496C(2). In support,

she points to the trial court's finding that "Yamagishi deceived Ito into

believing that he was receiving the legitimate CMAS one star course and a

legitimate open water diver course." Finding of Fact No. 16. We have

already ruled that the release failed because it did not comply with the

express requirements of Section 496B, not because accepting such risk

would be contrary to public policy. We shall therefore address the issue of

whether Ito impliedly assumed the risk of harm arising from defendants,

conduct.

K-24

Under Section 496C (1), Ito's implied assumption of the risk must have

been voluntarily made, with his full understanding of the risk of harm

resulting from defendants' conduct. There is no dispute that Ito

voluntarily chose to go diving. The issue, however, is whether Ito had

knowledge of, and understood the risk of harm caused by defendants,

conduct. Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 496D ("Section 496D")

provides guidance in determining what level of knowledge a person must

possess in order to impliedly assume the risk of harm arising from

defendants, conduct. See, Restatement (Second) of Torts 5496C cmt. a.

Section 496D states:

Except where he expressly so agrees, a plaintiff does not

assume a risk of harm arising from the defendant's

conduct unless he then knows of the existence of the risk

and appreciates its unreasonable character./10/

Defendants argue that Ito knew he could drown in water if he were to

go scuba diving. See Section 496D cmt. d. That is true. However, the

"risk of harm" which we must examine is that "arising from the

defendant([s'] conduct." Section 496D. We need not examine any and all

risks which could occur on a dive, such as drowning, a

/10/ Again we note that, because the release used by defendants was

invalid, Ito did not "expressly agree" to assume the risk of harm arising

from the defendant's conduct.

shark bite, or jellyfish sting.

Under Section 496D, Ito must have known of the existence of the risk

and appreciated its unreasonable character to have impliedly assumed the

risk. This means Ito "must not only be aware of the facts which create the

danger, but must also appreciate the danger itself and the nature, character,

and extent which make it unreasonable." Section 496D cmt. b. Whether Ito

K-25

was aware of and appreciated the dangers are questions of fact. See

Section 496D cmt. e.

After a two week trial, the court found as a matter of fact that "Ito was

r ot aware of all the risks of scuba diving . . . because he had not been

properly trained." It also found that Ito's poor training "was a proximate

cause of [his] death." (See Finding of Facts Nos. 17 and 18).

Although the trial court found that Ito "was not aware of all the risks of

scuba diving," we cannot say with certainty whether he was likewise not

aware of the specific risks which could arise from defendants, conduct.

Nothing in the facts of this case indicates that Ito had any warning that

defendants may be negligent in performing their duties.

There are no facts to indicate that Ito knew of the existence of the risk

arising from defendants’ conduct or that he "appreciate[d] its unreasonable

character." Section 496D. Therefore, we hold that Ito did not impliedly

assume the risk arising from defendants, conduct because he did not

"fully" understand the "risk of harm to himself... caused by the

defendant[s'] conduct" as required under Section 496C.

3. Ito's Contributory Negligence.

Defendants also argue that Ito was contributorily negligent as a matter

of law because he failed to take reasonable precautions before

encountering the risks of diving. According to Hirai, Ito failed to ask how

long the dive would take and to find out what he should do if he and his

dive buddy became separated. Defendants Macro and Yamagishi allege

that Ito's death was caused by his violation of basic scuba diving rules and

that Ito had the "last clear chance" to prevent his own death.

Contributory negligence is defined in Section 463 of the Restatement

(Second) of Torts ("Section 463") as follows:

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the

plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he

should conform for his own protection, and which is a

legally contributing cause co-operating with the

negligence of the defendant in bringing about the

plaintiff's harm.

K-26

To conclude that Ito was contributorily negligent under Section 463,

we conduct a two-step test. First, we must find that Ito did not observe the

proper standard of conduct for his own safety. According to Restatement

(Second) of Torts Section 464 (1), the standard of conduct "to which [Ito]

must conform for his own protection is that of a reasonable man under like

circumstances."

Only if we find that Ito's conduct did not meet this 'reasonable man’

standard may we move on to the second part of the test which is whether

Ito's conduct legally contributed to his death. In conducting this analysis,

we may find that Ito's own negligence "is a legally contributing cause of

his harm if, but only if, it is a substantial factor in bringing about his harm

and there is no rule restricting his responsibility for it." Restatement

(Second) of Torts §465(1).

We do not reach the second part of the test, however, because the facts

show that Ito's conduct conformed to that of "a reasonable [person] under

like circumstances." Section 464 (1). Ito took defendants’ diving course.

The trial court did not find irom the evidence that Ito was negligent in the

manner he conducted himself.

Defendants’ assertion that Ito was negligent in failing to ask questions

about the dive's depth, duration, course, and emergency procedures does

not have merit. See Hirai's Opening Brief at 41. Defendants had the duty

to provide this information to Ito and the other divers, not the other way

around: "Yamagishi and Hirai failed to discuss with Ito the special

circumstances of a dive to more than 100 feet, including the more rapid

exhaustion of air and nitrogen narcosis." Also, "[a]t the site of the Grotto,

Yamagishi and Hirai failed to give an adequate dive briefing and failed to

check Ito's equipment." See Findings of Fact Nos. 31 and 32./11/

Defendants held themselves out to be professional dive instructors and

supervisors. Ito reasonably relied on their representation of

professionalism when he registered to learn how to dive from defendants,

and subsequently when he decided to dive at the Grotto under defendants'

professional supervision. Ito paid

/11/ The trial court also found that "Yamagishi led the dive to a depth

of more than 100 [feet] far beyond the training capabilities of Ito."

Findings of fact No. 34.

for defendants’ expert services. He had a right to expect that defendants

would provide him with all important pre-dive information and conduct

any last minute equipment checks that would be necessary. Defendants

failed to do so.

It was the defendants who failed in their duty to Ito. Ito acted as a

reasonable person would have under the circumstances. We, therefore,

hold that Ito was not contributorily negligent under Section 463.

4. The Standard of Care for Diving.

Defendants argue that the trial court applied an incorrect standard of

care in evaluating their conduct. They argue that the trial court erred

because it measured their conduct "against a foreign standard of care

rather than the prevailing standard of care in the Commonwealth." See

Hirai's Opening Brief at 32; Yamagishi's Opening Brief at 34 (quote in

lower case).

The trial court heard testimony by plaintiff and defendants, dive

experts, and subsequently found that Marcro's diving course "did not meet

the minimum standards" and "did not meet the standards or follow the

training program required by CMAS." Findings of Fact Nos. 10 and 13.

The trial court, therefore, applied a standard premised upon the CMAS

requirements for dive certification. Defendants contend, however, that

their conduct should be "adjudged according to the ADS/12/ standard

adhered to by scuba diving shops throughout the community of Saipan.”

See

/12/ ADS is a Japanese dive organization and is a member of CMAS,

an internationally recognized French dive agency. Reporter's Transcript

("R.T.") Vol. Ill, pp. 225-226.

K-28

Yamagishi's Reply Brief at 20 (quote in lower case).

We reject defendants’ contention for three reasons. First, defendants

purported to certify Ito under the ADS and CMAS standards. The trial

court found that defendant Yamagishi had "signed a certification card

certifying Ito as an ADS open water diver" and "signed a certification card

certifying Ito as a CMAS one-star diver."/13/ Findings of Fact Nos. 6 and

7.

Defendants may not now contend that, although they purported to

certify Ito under the CMAS standard, the trial court should have adjudged

Marcro's training course under a different "Saipan-only" standard.

Defendants may not purport to offer one standard of dive instruction to its

students, and subsequently argue that the trial court erred by not applying

an apparently lower level standard in evaluating their dive course. The

trial court correctly applied the standard which defendants themselves

purported to offer Ito: CMAS.

Second, there apparently is no ADS "standard" for dive courses or

other diving requirements. Defendants’ own dive expert testified that he is

"not familiar with any [ADS standard]" and that ADS "refer[s] to the

CMAS standard."/14/ In light of this, we cannot say that the trial court

erred in applying the CMAS standard.

/13/ In fact, "(t]he course that Ito attended to receive his open water

certification did not meet the standards or follow the training program

required by CMAS." Findings of Fact No. 13.

/14/ See R.T. Vol. XIII, pp. 1006-1007, quoted in Plaintiff's response

Brief at 31-32. Yamagishi, on the other hand, states that the alleged ADS

standard is "based in part on the CMAS standard" as "established and

adhered to by the dive shops throughout Saipan." Yamagishi's Reply Brief

at 22-23.

K-29

Lastly, we disagree with defendants' contention that there is, or should

be, a unique standard for Saipan dive shops and professionals. Defendants

argue that -- although there is no ADS standard -- there exists an "ADS

standard adhered to by scuba diving shops throughout the community of

Saipan." Yamagishi's Reply Brief at 20 (quote in lower case). Defendants,

however, fail to state what sort of diving requirements and skills do or

should comprise such a Saipan-only standard, even though their expert

arguably "was and is intimately familiar with the standards of the scuba

diving industry in the Commonwealth and throughout Micronesia." Hirai's

Opening Brief at 39.

Defendants rely on Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 299A

("Section 299A"), which provides:

Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or

knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the

practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise

the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of

that profession or trade in good standing in similar

communities.

For some professions, an "[a]llowance must be made . . . for the type of

community in which the actor carries on his practice." Section 299A cmt.

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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