Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Meche v. Meche

Supreme Gourt, U.S.

FILED

ion

/ 94 558 SEP 22 19%

OFFIGE OF THE CLERK

No.

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1994

«

NORWOOD JOSEPH MECHE,

Petitioner,

versus

DAISY THIBODEAUX MECHE,

Respondent.

4

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Louisiana Supreme Court

¢

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

¢

Dee D. DrReELL

Go.tp, Weems, BRUSER,

Sues & RUNDELL

2001 MacArthur Drive

P.O. Box 6118

Alexandria, Louisiana 71307-6118

(318) 445-6471

Attorneys for Petitioner,

Norwood Joseph Meche

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

I. QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The question presented for review in this case is:

Whether the decisions below, (1) the judgment of the

Ninth Judicial District Court, Rapides Parish, Louisiana,

of May 13, 1993, (2) the judgment of the Louisiana Third

Circuit Court of Appeal of April 6, 1994, and (3) the

denial of writs by the Louisiana Supreme Court of June

24, 1994, improperly applied 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) and

thus deprived Norwood Joseph Meche of a large portion

of his military retired pay.

Il. LIST OF ALL INTERESTED PARTIES

Petitioner: Norwood Joseph Meche

Respondent: Daisy Thibodeaux Meche

If. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW..... i

If. LIST OF ALL INTERESTED PARTIES..... ii

Me yy) ae ili

Vv. TABLE OF AUTIIORIIIES ..........005008. iv

V. REFERENCES TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFI-

RPRGs GPW RPWEREMO COEEAIUY oo ccc cece: l

VI. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT........... ]

i Ro Fee) ey Oy)

Vises. Stesereemn Or ise CASE ............... 2

IX. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ......... 7

ee Es isp v ovo ee Neca c ae aces das 17

eS ne re ra ree eee App. 1

A. Meche v. Meche, 93-1045 (La. App. 3 Cir.

ir we We Te GPW ooo cc kc ccc cecdess App. 1

B. Judgment from the Ninth Judicial District

Court, Rapides Parish, Louisiana, Honorable

Judge B. Dexter Ryland, May 13, 1993..... App. 8

C. Reasons for Judgment from the Ninth Judicial

District Court, Rapides Parish, Louisiana,

Honorable Judge B. Dexter Ryland, February

SRC oe ne er we ae ra kee App. 12

D. Meche v. Meche, 94-1174 (La. 6/24/94) ....App. 14

E. Partial Settlement of Community, dated Octo-

bie ec o we oe App. 15

F. Stipulation accompanying cross-motions for

summary judgment in trial court .......... App. 21

G. Judgment of Separation, Ninth Judicial Dis-

trict Court, Rapides Parish, Louisiana, Honor-

able Richard E. Lee, May 4, 1981.......... App. 24

IV. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

J URISPRUDENCI

UNitEep STATES SUPREME CouRT

McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728,

ee & eo Bi... rr ere ee passim

Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S.Ct. 2023,

wR Ee ee oe ere 7

STATE Courts

Hollyfield v. Hollyfield, 618 So.2d 1303 (Miss.

a ce Se Oe ak pr One ee Toe wae eo ee 8

Knowles v. Knowles, 811 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App.

RR ee cot ieee eee ee Ue 4

Menard v. Menard, 460 So.2d 751 (La. App. 3 Cir.

I eA as oa or aie ee ale ee tree eae oe eee oe oe Y

Mings v. Mings, 841 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. App. 1992)..... 8

Rohring v. Rohring, 441 So.2d 485 (La. App. 2 Cir.

RS etn Ny a ee 9

Rose v. Rose, 483 So.2d 181 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1986),

affirmed on appeal after remand, 535 So.2d 1167

ee! OE Be, rere Perr rer erer: Pere y

Sims v. Sims, 358 So.2d 919 (La. 1978) ............ eae

Swope v. Mitchell, 224 So.2d 461 (La. App. 3 Cir

SP Bia ac ONG ok ee Ps Sd A wee as 2

White v. White, 623 So.2d 31 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1993)

PPPS DOR Pee fer Fe ah ee ye oe ee Ire 8, 13, 14, 18

STATUTES

ee Ss i ES sins 0 ek he wd sees ome al passim

PE me tie

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Courr Rutes

SU. ROLE. DORE... «civ Fk eee ot Oke Fide ea eu 7

LeGIsLATIVE History

H.R. Rep. No. 665, section 555, 101st Cong., 2nd

Sess., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3004-05... .. 4, 10

V. REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL

OPINIONS BELOW

Judgment from the Ninth Judicial District Court,

Rapides Parish, Louisiana, Honorable Judge B. Dexter

Ryland, May 13, 1993.

Reasons for Judgment from the Ninth Judicial Dis-

trict Court, Rapides Parish, Louisiana, Honorable Judge

B. Dexter Ryland, February 12, 1993.

Meche v. Meche, 93-1045 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/6/94); 635

So.2d 614.! Meche v. Meche, 94-1174 (La. 6/24/94) [denial

of writs].

VI. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is estab-

lished by 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c). Petitioner’s Application for

Writs of Certiorari, or Review, was denied by the Louisi-

ana Supreme Court on June 24, 1994.

VII. APPLICABLE STATUTE

10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1):

Subject to the limitations of this section, a court

may treat disposable retired pay payable to a

member for pay periods beginning after June 25,

' This citation follows the form specified by Order of the

Louisiana Supreme Court dated December 17, 1993, requiring

that opinions issued by the Louisiana Supreme Court and the

Louisiana Courts of Appeal following December 31, 1993, be

cited according to a uniform public domain citation form with a

parallel citation to West’s Southern Reporter.

1981, either as property solely of the member or

as property of the member and his spouse in

accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of

such court. A court may not treat retired pay as

property in any proceeding to divide or parti-

tion any amount of retired pay of a member as

the property of the member and the member's

spouse or former spouse if a final decree of

divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separa-

tion (including a court ordered, ratified, or

approved property settlement incident to such

decree) affecting the member and the member's

spouse or former spouse (A) was issued before

June 25, 1981,-and (B) did not treat (or reserve

jurisdiction to treat) any amount of retired pay

of the member as property of the member and

the member's spouse or former spouse.

VIIi. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Statement of the Facts:

In 1958, Norwood Meche and Daisy Thibodeaux were

married in Louisiana, a community property state which

by the mid-1970s treated military retired pay as commu-

nity property in which each spouse owned an undivided

one-half interest.2 In 1962, Norwood Meche joined the

United States Air Force; he served his country with honor

for thirty years and retired a Colonel.

On May 4, 1981, while Norwood Meche was still on

active duty, a judgment of legal separation was granted in

favor of Daisy Thibodeaux Meche in the Ninth Judicial

District Court, Rapides Parish, Louisiana. An appeal was

2 Swope v. Mitchell, 324 So.2d 461 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1975).

taken. On February 3, 1982, the Louisiana Third Circuit

Court of Appeal affirmed the grant of a judgment of

separation but reversed the judgment in favor of Daisy

Thibodeaux Meche, granting it instead to Norwood

Meche. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment of

May 4, 1981, was affirmed. Meche v. Meche, 410 So.2d 1174

(La. App. 3 Cir. 1982).

On June 25, 1981, a month after the trial court ren-

dered the judgment of separation, this Honorable Court

handed down its decision in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S.

210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), holding that (1)

federal law preempts state law in the classification of

military retired pay for purposes of dividing marital

property, and (2) as a matter of federal law, military

retired pay belongs entirely to the retiree and not to the

former spouse.

In October, 1981, four months after McCarty was

handed down, the Meches returned to the Ninth Judicial

District Court, Rapides Parish, Louisiana, and obtained a

judgment of absolute divorce based upon having lived

separate and apart for over one year. Later that month,

they entered into a partial community property settle-

ment which did not divide military retired pay and did

not reserve the right to litigate the issue of military

retired pay in the future. The settlement was apparently

Cenominated “partial” because the parties agreed they

would not immediately partition a piece of community

real estate; no other issues were reserved for future dis-

position.

The next year, Congress responded to McCarty v.

McCarty by enacting the Uniformed Services Former

Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA), Pub.L. 97-252, Title X,

§ 1002(a), 96 Stat. 730 (Sept. 8, 1982), codified at 10 U.S.C.

§ 1408. This federal law allows courts to treat retired pay

either as property solely of the member or as property of

the member and his spouse in accordance with state law

under certain circumstances. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1)

[first sentence].

Congress’ action prompted re-litigation of many

claims which had been decided by judgment or agree-

ment under the McCarty rule. In 1990, Congress declared

it did not intend such wholesale re-litigation® and

attempted to put a stop to the practice by enacting Pub.L.

101-510, § 555(a), 104 Stat. 1569 (Nov. 5, 1990), amending

10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1). The 1990 amendment adds a sen-

tence, the proper interpretation of which is at the heart of

this dispute:

A court may not treat retired pay as property in

any proceeding to divide or partition any

amount of retired pay of a member as the prop-

erty of the member and the member’s spouse or

former spouse if a final decree of divorce, disso-

lution, annulment, or legal separation (including

a court ordered, ratified, or approved property

settlement incident to such decree) affecting the

member and the member’s spouse or former

spouse (A) was issued before June 25, 1981, and

(B) did not treat (or reserve jurisdiction to treat)

any amount of retired pay of the member as

property of the member and the member’s

spouse or former spouse.

3 H.R. Rep. No. 665, section 555, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess.,

reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3004-05.

Section 555(e) of Pub.L. 101-510, as amended Pub.L.

102-190, Div. A, Title X, § 1062(a)(1), 105 Stat. 1475

(December 5, 1991), provided that the effective date of the

amendment quoted immediately above is November 5,

1990.

In 1991, Daisy Thibodeaux, now remarried, filed a

“Petition for Partial Partition of Community Property and

for Money Judgment” in the Ninth Judicial District Court,

Rapides Parish, Louisiana, asserting Colonel Meche’s

imminent military retired pay is community property and

seeking a partition of the asset.

In 1992, Colonel Meche, also remarried, retired from

the Air Force and began receiving his military retired pay.

On November 3, 1992, the trial judge ruled on cross-

motions for summary judgment and held Colonel

Meche’s military retired pay was not his separate prop-

erty but was community property to be split with Daisy

Thibodeaux according to a particular formula.

B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in

Courts Below

1. The Trial Court:

Daisy Thibodeaux’s “Petition for Partial Partition of

Community Property and for Money Judgment” was filed

in the Ninth Judicial District Court, Rapides Parish, Loui-

siana, docket number 118,036, on August 23, 1991.

Norwood Meche responded by filing exceptions

(similar to a motion to dismiss under rule 12 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). The exceptions were

brought on for hearing and overruled. The Honorable F.

Rae Swent, district judge, signed the judgment overruling

the exceptions on July 9, 1992. Later that month, Colonel

Meche filed an answer to the “Petition for Partial Parti-

tion of Community Property and for Money Judgment.”

On October 27, 1992, Daisy Thibodeaux filed a

motion for summary judgment. Soon thereafter, Colonel

Me-he filed a countervailing motion for summary judg-

ment. On November 30, 1992, the trial court heard argu-

ment on both motions at the same time. On February 12,

1993, the Honorable B. Dexter Ryland, the trial judge,

signed Reasons for Judgment, ruling that Colonel

Meche’s military retired pay is community property. On

May 13, 1993, Judge Ryland signed a judgment decreeing

a partition of the community property according to the

formula set forth in the Louisiana Supreme Court case of

Sims v. Sims, 358 So.2d 919 (La. 1978).

On June 3, 1993, the district judge signed an order

granting a suspensive appeal to Colonel Meche.

2. Appeals Courts

On April 6, 1994, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of

Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a reported

opinion, Meche v. Meche, 93-1045 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/6/94);

635 So.2d 614.

Colonel Meche applied for writs of certiorari, or

review, to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Writs were

denied on June 24, 1994, Meche v. Meche, 94-1174 (La.

6/24/94).

IX. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A. Review on Writ of Certiorari is Proper.

The issue presented in this application fits the crite-

rion of Supreme Court Rule 10.1 (c): “[A] state

court ... has decided an important question of federal

law which has not been, but should be, settled by this

Court... ”

Proper statutory interpretation of the Uniformed Ser-

vices Former Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA)‘ presents

an important federal question. This Court held in

McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69

L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), that federal law preempts state laws

dealing with the classification of military retired pay for

purposes of dividing marital property. Congress

responded to the the decision by enacting USFSPA. One

may assert USFSPA “legislatively overruled” McCarty,

but the assertion would not be entirely accurate; this

Court has already held in Mansell v. Mansell that USFSPA

contains a specific and limited grant of jurisdiction to

states, and in all other respects federal pre-emption still

obtains.°

Therefore, when a state court engages in statutory

interpretation of the language of 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1)

and the opinion is published in the West reporter system,

it becomes part of a national body of federal law, with

national impact.

410 U.S.C. § 1408.

> Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104

L.Ed.2d 675 (1989).

Additionally, proper interpretation of laws dealing

with military retired pay has already been identified by

this Honorable Court as vital to the national interest. In

McCarty, the Court said, “[I]t is manifest that the applica-

tion of community property principles to military retired

pay threatens grave harm to ‘clear and substantial’ fed-

eral interests.”© The Court also said the community prop-

erty division of military retired pay has the potential to

frustrate the two major goals Congress seeks to achieve

by enacting the military retirement system: “to provide

for the retired service member, and to meet the personnel

management needs of the active military forces.”” Enforc-

ing proper interpretation of USFSPA’s provisions by state

courts is necessarily as vital to the national interest today

as was addressing the pre-McCarty conflict between com-

munity property laws and the congressionally enacted

military retirement system in 1981. Granting a writ of

certiorari was proper in McCarty, was proper in Mansell,

and is proper here.

The correct interpretation of USFSPA’s 1990 amend-

ment, governing which pre-McCarty cases may be re-

litigated, is at issue here. There are now reported state

court decisions which are in direct conflict. An opinion

from the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal® inter-

prets the statute as imposing two requirements, and some

appellate courts interpret the statute the same way.’ By

6 453 U.S. at 232; 101 S.Ct. at 2741.

7 453 U.S. at 233-34; 101 S.Ct. at 2741.

8 White v. White, 623 So.2d 31 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1993).

See Hollyfield v. Hollyfield, 618 So.2d 1303 (Miss. 1993);

Mings v. Mings, 841 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. App. 1992); Knowles v.

Knowles, 811 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App. 1991).

©

contrast, in the instant case the Louisiana Third Circuit

Court of Appeal has interpreted the statute as imposing

three requirements, and other Louisiana decisions have

also done so.!° Perhaps it would have been better for the

Louisiana Supreme Court to resolve the conflict within

the state and interpret the statute correctly, but that

court’s failure to take up the issue does not make it of any

less importance nationally.

The growing line of reported Louisiana decisions

which incorrectly interpret the statute, and the Louisiana

Supreme Court’s disinclination to take up the issue,

appear to be the latest manifestation of an ongoing state-

federal power struggle over military retired pay, and this

Court should step in to resolve the issue.

The state-federal struggle is the same one identified

by the Court in McCarty: on the federal side, Congress

enacted the military retirement system to help meet the

national need for an efficient and effective military; on

the state side, state courts are hostile to any federal

encroachment in the fields of domestic relations and mar-

ital property rights.

The Louisiana courts’ recent actions are remarkably

similar to the collective actions of California courts in the

'” More than one reported decision incorrectly interprets 10

U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1). See, e.g., Rohring v. Rohring, 441 So.2d 485

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1983); Rose v. Rose, 483 So.2d 181 (La. App. 2 Cir.

1986), affirmed on appeal after remand, 535 So.2d 1167 (La. App. 2

Cir. 1988); Menard v. Menard, 460 So.2d 751 (La. App. 3 Cir.

1984).

10

mid-1980’s which prompted Congress to amend the stat-

ute in 1990. The House Report!! accompanying the 1990

amendment sharply criticizes the California court deci-

sions in the 1980s which held the courts had continuing

jurisdiction which enabled them to re-open final divorce

or separation decrees for the purpose of partitioning the

assets of the former community. Although such proceed-

ings are apparently a normal feature of California prac-

tice and are assuredly a normal feature of Louisiana

practice, Congress did not approve:

The committee is concerned because some

state courts have been less than faithful in their

adherence to the spirit of the law. The reopening

of divorce cases finalized before the Supreme

Court’s decision in McCarty v. McCarty that did

not divide retired pay continues to be a signifi-

cant problem. Years after final divorce decrees

have been issued, some state courts, particularly

those in California, have reopened cases

(through partition actions or otherwise) to

award a share of retired pay. Although Congress

has twice stated in report language that this

result was not intended, the practice continues

unabated. Such action is inconsistent with the

notion that a final decree of divorce represents a final

disposition of the marital estate.'?

The legislative history clearly shows congressional

intent underlying the 1990 amendment to 10 U.S.C.

§ 1408(c)(1) includes the intent to enact pre-emptive fed-

eral law to prevent re-litigation of pre-McCarty divorce

1! H.R. Rep. No. 665, section 555, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess.,

reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3004-05.

12 Jd. at 3005 {emphasis added].

1]

decrees on the grounds that the original decree did not

partition the community. Put another way, even if state

practice is to grant the divorce first and come back later

to partition the community, pre-emptive federal law pre-

vents that method of dividing military retired pay if the

divorce decree is issued pre-McCarty and has no specific

reservation.

Ironically, the courts below and other Louisiana

courts have used the very language of the 1990 amend-

ment to conclude they are allowed to do exactly what

Congress has forbidden. It is now proper for this Court to

correct the error and ensure proper interpretation nation-

ally of a federal statute implicating vital national inter-

ests.

B. Petitioner’s military retired pay cannot be clas-

sified as community property, because under

the correct interpretation of 10 U.S C.

§ 1408(c)(1), the issue may not now be litigated.

1. The statute prevents litigating marital prop-

erty issues when a final judgment of sep-

aration was issued before June 25, 1981, and

when the judgment neither divides the mar-

ital property nor reserves the right to do so

in the future.

The plain language of the 1990 amendment to 10

U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) says marital property issues affecting

military retired pay may not be litigated if a final decree

of separation or divorce:

... (A) was issued before June 25, 1981, and (B)

did not treat (or reserve jurisdiction to treat) any

12

amount of retired pay of the member as prop-

erty of the member and the member’s spouse or

former spouse.

The statute lists two characteristics of the final decree

of separation, clearly labeled (A) and (B). The trial judge

and the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal erro-

neously added a third requirement: that the decree itself

must include within its four corners a court ordered,

ratified, or approved property settlement incident to the

decree. The courts below did not find statutory language

labeled “(C)” to support their position, because the stat-

ute does not contain any clause or phrase labeled “(C).”

Instead, the courts below took a parenthetical phrase in

the statute and elevated it in status to a third require-

ment:

A court may not treat retired pay as property in

any proceeding to divide or partition any

amount of retired pay of a member as the prop-

erty of the member and the member’s spouse or

former spouse if a final decree of divorce, disso-

lution, annulment, or legal separation (including

a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settle-

ment incident to such decree) affecting the member

and the member’s spouse or former spouse (A)

was issued before June 25, 1981, and (B) did not

treat (or reserve jurisdiction to treat) any

amount of retired pay of the member as prop-

erty of the member and the member’s spouse or

former spouse. [emphasis added]

The courts below ignored the plain language of the

statute and in effect rewrote the statute to support a

desired outcome in a particular case. The correct

13

approach, however, is to apply the statute as written and

leave amendments to Congress and the political process.

The statute was correctly interpreted by the Louisi-

ana First Circuit Court of Appeal in White v. White, 623

So.2d 31 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1993). In White, a wife sued her

former husband, after a divorce, seeking recognition of

her community interest in her husband’s military retired

pay. The trial court denied benefits for the wife. She

appealed.

The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held that

when the issue of how to characterize military retired pay

is not addressed or reserved in a pre-McCarty judgment

of separation or divorce, the wife is precluded thereafter

from seeking the community portion of her husband’s

military retired pay.!3 The court denied the wife’s claim

based on the very preemption provisions of the USFSPA

upon which Colonel Meche relies here:

The intent of Congress by amending 10 U.S.C.

§ 1408(c)(1) was to prevent relitigation of cases

concluded prior to McCarty. The clear wording

of this federal preemption statute requires a

specific treatment of military retirement benefits

in the division of the community or a specific

reservation of jurisdiction to treat military

retirement benefits as community property.

Under general principles of Louisiana law, once

a court obtains jurisdiction in a divorce proceed-

ing, it retains control over incidental matters

connected with the original proceeding. How-

ever, it appears that the operation of general

13 White v. White, supra, 623 So.2d at 34.

14

principles of continuing jurisdiction will not sat-

isfy the federal statutory requirement of 10

U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1).'4

The First Circuit properly rejected the spouse’s vague

appeal to “equity” and noted that at the time of separa-

tion, the wife would certainly be aware that her husband

would, at some future date, become eligible for military

retired pay, yet she and her lawyer failed to litigate the

issue or obtain a judgment which reserved the right to do

so later.}5

The conflict between White v. White and the instant

case comes sharply into focus when one recognizes that,

in White, the community property of the parties had

never been previously judicially partitioned. The Whites

were separated in 1966 and divorced in 1967, and Mrs.

White filed suit for recognition of her alleged community

interest in Mr. White’s military retired pay in 1989.

Thus, the White case and the instant case present

essentially the same scenario:

— there is a final judgment of separation or

divorce before June 25, 1981;

— the judgment of separation or divorce con-

tains no decree to partition the community;

— after June 25, 1981, the parties attempt to

partition the community.

The only important difference between the cases is

that the First Circuit in White correctly interpreted the

a4 Id.

1S Id.

15

federal statute but the Third Circuit in the instant case

did not.

In summary, the 1990 amendment to 10 U.S.C.

§ 1408(c)(1) adds the second sentence to the statute. As a

matter of federal law, the second sentence does not allow

a spouse of a retired member of the United States Armed

Forces to claim ownership of a portion of the veteran’s

military retired pay if there is a final judgment of separa-

tion or divorce granted before June 25, 1981, and the

judgment does not either divide the retired pay or reserve

jurisdiction to do so later. The parenthetical phrase in the

statute’s second sentence merely means that when one is

determining whether the old judgment divides the mili-

tary retired pay or reserves the right to do so in the

future, one must refer not only to the piece of paper

labeled “Judgment,” but one must also refer to any inci-

dental order attached to the “Judgment.”

2. Colonel Meche’s judgment of separation is

a final judgment of separation issued

before June 25, 1981, and the judgment nei-

ther divides the marital property nor

reserves the right to do so in the future.

The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal speci-

fically held! the Meche judgment of legal separation was

issued before June 25, 1981, and was a final decree under

Louisiana law, thus meeting requirement (A) of the sec-

ond sentence of 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1). Daisy Thibodeaux

16 Meche v. Meche, supra, at 4-5; 635 So.2d at 616.

16

took no appeal from the Third Circuit’s judgment, and

therefore this portion of the ruling is final.

The Meche judgment of legal separation also meets

requirement (B), because the Meche judgment of legal

separation!” “did not treat (or reserve jurisdiction to

treat) any amount of retired pay of the member as prop-

erty of the member and the member’s spouse or former

spouse,” and because there was no order incident to the

judgment of legal separation which either divided Colo-

nel Meche’s military retired pay or reserved the right to

do so in the future. The record does contain a “Partial

Community Property Settlement,”!8 but the only matter

reserved in that document for later disposition is parti-

tion of community real estate located in Lafayette, Louisi-

ana. The document does not mention military retired pay.

3. Therefore, Colonel Meche’s military retired

pay cannot be treated as community prop-

erty.

As of June 25, 1981, the classification of military

retired pay as separate property or as community prop-

erty is a matter of federal law and is governed by a

clearly written statute.

When the statute is applied as written, it prevents

Colonel Meche’s retired pay from being classified as com-

munity property of the community which formerly exis-

ted between him and Daisy Thibodeaux, because:

17 Reprinted in the Appendix, page App. 24.

18 Reprinted in the Appendix, page App. 21.

17

(1) in the divorce between Norwood Meche and

Daisy Thibodeaux, there was a judgment of separation

rendered before June 25, 1981; and

(2) the judgment did not classify the military retired

pay as community property, and no order incident to the

judgment classified the military retired pay as commu-

nity property or reserved the right to do so in the future.

X. CONCLUSION

State courts must apply the Uniformed Services For-

mer Spouses Protection Act and have issued conflicting

opinions interpreting the second sentence of 10 U.S.C.

§ 1408(c)(1). The conflict affects every state court in the

United States, because the Act is applied nationally as a

matter of federal law.

Through the mechanism of the 1990 amendment to

USFSPA, Congress intended to prevent courts from doing

exactly what was done in this case.

Under the correct statutory interpretation, the second

sentence of 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) does not allow a spouse

of a retired member of the United States Armed Forces to

claim ownership of a portion of the veteran’s military

retired pay if there is a final judgment of separation or

divorce granted before June 25, 1981, and the judgment

does not either divide the retired pay or reserve jurisdic-

tion to do so later. The parenthetical phrase in the stat-

ute’s second sentence means that when one is

determining whether the old judgment divides the mili-

tary retired pay or reserves the right to do so in the

future, one must refer not only to the piece of paper

18

labeled “Judgment,” but one must also refer to any inci-

dental order attached to the “Judgment.”

Under the correct interpretation of the statute, Daisy

Thibodeaux is not allowed to claim ownership of any

portion of the military retired pay of Colonel Norwood

Meche, because there was a judgment of separation ren-

dered before June 25, 1981; the judgment did not classify

the military retired pay as community property or reserve

the right to do so in the future; and, the judgment did not

have any order attached to it which either classified the

military retired pay as community property or reserved

the right to do so in the future.

Wherefore, petitioner prays that This Honorable

Court (1) grant this application for writ of certiorari, and:

(2) reverse the judgment in favor of Daisy Thibodeaux

Meche and render judgment in favor of Colonel Norwood

Meche, dismissing Daisy Thibodeaux Meche’s “Petition

for Partial Partition of Community Property and for

Money Judgment” at her cost and prejudice, or, alter-

natively: (3) reverse the judgment in favor of Daisy

Thibodeaux Meche, settle the dispute over statutory

interpretation in favor of the plain wording of the statute

as espoused in White v. White, and remand to the Ninth

19

Judicial District Court, Rapides Parish, Louisiana, for fur-

ther proceedings, assessing costs against respondent.

Respectfully submitted,

Gop, Weems, BRUSER,

Sues & RUNDELL

Dee D. Drete

2001 MacArthur Drive

P.O. Box 6118

Alexandria, LA 71307-6118

(318) 445-6471

Attorneys for Norwood

Joseph Meche, Petitioner

App. 1

NUMBER 93-1045

APR 06 1994

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

DAISY THIBODEAUX MECHE

Plaintiff — Appellee

VERSUS

NORWOOD JOSEPH MECHE

Defendant — Appellant

Appeal from the Ninth Judicial District Court for the

Parish of Rapides, State of Louisiana, the Honorable B.

Dexter Ryland, District Judge, presiding.

Before GUIDRY, LABORDE, and *CULPEPPER, Judges.

CULPEPPER, J.

This is an action to partition the community assets of

the parties. At issue is whether the defendant’s military

retirement pay is community property.

The district court granted summary judgment in the

plaintiff’s favor, holding that the military retirement ben-

efits were community property. The defemdant appeals

the trial court’s ruling on the following specifications of

error.

“It is respectfully submitted that the trial

court erred to defendant/appellant’s substantial

prejudice:

*Honorable William A. Culpepper participated in this decision

by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court as Judge Pro

Tempore.

App. 2

1. In finding that his military retirement

benefits were community property;

2. In failing to find that federal law had

preempted state law insofar as Daisy

Thibodeaux Meche’s claim is concerned;

3. In erroneously finding that, to bar her

claim, the judgment of separation between the

parties had to include a “court ordered, ratified,

or approved property settlement”;

4. In relying on the judgment of divorce of

October 9, 1981 and not the judgment of separa-

tion on May 4, 1981 as the “final decree” under

10 U.S.C. Section 1408(c)(1);

5. In failing to grant Norwood Meche’s

motion for summary judgment.”

GENERAL FACTS

The parties were married on December 20, 1958, in

Lafayette, Louisiana. The defendant joined the U.S. Air

Force in 1962. On May 4, 1981, the parties were legally

separated by judgment of the Ninth Judicial District

Court for the Parish of Rapides. They were divorced by

judgment of that court on October 9, 1981. On October 31,

1981, they entered into a partial community property

settlement that did not include the defendant's military

retirement pay which had not yet accrued. In 1992 the

defendant retired from the Air Force and began receiving

his retirement benefits. Shortly before the defendant's

retirement, the plaintiff sought partition of the retirement

benefits. Both parties moved for summary judgment.

After hearing arguments on November 30, 1992, the trial

court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding

App. 3

that the military retirement benefits were community

property and that the plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to a

part of those benefits.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Before 1981, Louisiana treated military retirement

pay as community property. In that year the U.S.

Supreme Court ruled, in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210,

101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), decided June 25,

1981, that military retirement pay was not community

property. McCarty’s effect was short-lived because Con-

gress, in 1983, enacted the Uniformed Services Former

Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA), which consisted of

amendments to 10 U.S.C. § 1408. Paragraph (c)(1) of that

section now reads as follows:

(c) Authority for court to treat retired pay as

property of the member and spouse. — (1) Sub-

ject to the limitations of this section, a court may

treat disposable retired pay payable to a mem-

ber for pay periods beginning after June 25,

1981, either as property solely of the member or

as property of the member and his spouse in

accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of

such court. A court may not treat retired pay as

property in any proceeding to divide or parti-

tion any amount of retired pay of a member as

the property of the member and the member’s

spouse or former spouse if a final decree of

divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation

(including a court ordered, ratified, or approved

property settlement incident to such decree) affecting

the member and the member's spouse or former

spouse (A) was issued before June 25, 1981, and (B)

did not treat (or reserve jurisdiction to treat) any

App. 4

amount of retired pay of the member as property of

the member and the member's spouse or former

spouse. (Emphasis supplied.)

When this amendment was originally enacted, it

completely abrogated the ruling in McCarty, supra, that

military retirement benefits were not community prop-

erty. Because of the reopening of cases which were

decided prior to the enactment of the USFSPA, Congress

added the second sentence of 10 U.S.C. § 1048(c)(1). That

sentence is designed to limit the retroactivity of McCarty

by preventing former spouses from reopening a case in

which there was a property settlement, prior to the

McCarty decision, that did not treat military retirement

benefits as community property or did not reserve juris-

diction to treat such benefits as community property.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in McCarty, there-

fore, only affects those cases in which the court issued,

before June 25, 1981, a final decree of divorce, dissolu-

tion, annulment or legal separation that includes a court

ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement inci-

dent to such decree and that did not treat (or reserve

jurisdiction to treat) any amount of retired pay as com-

munity property. Appellant urges that the case at bar is a

pre-McCarty case by virtue of the judgment of separation

that was issued by the Ninth Judicial District Court on

May 4, 1981, and is therefore governed by the ruling in

McCarty.

To determine whether the appellant’s military retire-

ment pay may be treated as community property, this

court must first determine whether the judgment of sep-

aration issued on May 4, 1981, is the type of final decree

that prevents such treatment under 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1),

App. 5

supra. Reading that statute reveals four requirements of a

judgment or decree that, if met, will prevent the applica-

tion of Louisiana’s community property laws to military

retirement benefits.

The first requirement is that the decree must be one

of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation.

The decree at issue is one of legal separation.

The second requirement is that the decree must have

been issued before June 25, 1981, a requirement clearly

fulfilled, because the date of issue was May 4, 1981.

The third requirement is that the decree of divorce,

dissolution, annulment, or legal separation must be a

“final decree” as defined by 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(3), which.

states:

(3) “Final decree” means a decree from which

no appeal may be taken or from which no

appeal has been taken within the time allowed

for taking such appeals under the laws applica-

ble to such appeals, or a decree from which

timely appeal has been taken and such appeal

has been finally decided under the laws applica-

ble to such appeals.

The judgment of separation that was issued by the Ninth

Judicial Court on May 4, 1981, is a final decree. It is a

decree from which a timely appeal was taken and such

appeal was finally decided under the laws of Louisiana,

specifically, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Articles

2081 through 2167.

The final requirement is that the decree must include

a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement

incident to such decree. The appellant argues that no

App. 6

such requirement exists. His argument is based upon the

fact that this requirement is placed between parenthesis

[sic] in the second sentence of § 1408(c)(1). In support of

his argument, appellant urges the court to adopt an inter-

pretation described in his brief as follows:

“In the 1990 amendment, it is significant that the

terms “including a court ordered, ratified, or

approved property settlement incident to such

decree” are in parenthesis. The obvious intent of

the parenthesis is merely to point out that the

amendment is inclusive to such decrees in addi-

tion to a decree which does not contain such

provisions.”

This interpretation is not logically supported by the par-

enthetic language in § 1408(c)(1). The words “incident to

such decree” obviate the appellant's proffered interpreta-

tion.

Such interpretation is also not supported by the

intent of Congress in its amending § 1408(c)(1) in 1990 to

add the second sentence. With this amendment, Congress

intended to prevent the reopening of cases that were

decided before McCarty and that did not treat military

retirement benefits as community property or reserve the

right to so treat it. See Dunham v. Dunham, 602 So.2d 1139

(La. App. 1st Cir. 1992). The apparent purpose of the

amendment, therefore, is to prevent the re-litigation of

community property issues concerning military retire-

ment benefits that were resolved prior to the McCarty

ruling. Thus, where there is a pre-McCarty final decree

that divides the property of former spouses and that does

App. 7

not either find that military retirement benefits are com-

munity property or reserve jurisdiction to treat such ben-

efits as community property, the decree cannot be

disturbed by the retrospective application of § 1408(c)(1).

Under the interpretation urged by the appellant, a

decree of legal separation issued before June 25, 1981,

that did not deal with any property of the spouses will

act to bar the determination of the status of military

retirement benefits as community property. This ignores

the requirement of § 1408(c)(1) that there also be a court

ordered property settlement which treats, or reserves

jurisdiction to treat retirement pay as community prop-

erty. Since the judgment of separation issued on May 4,

1981, did not include a court ordered, ratified, or

approved property settlement of any kind, the court may

treat the appellant’s military retirement benefits as com-

munity property.

CONCLUSION

All of the appellant’s specifications of error rest upon

the premise that the lower court misinterpreted or misap-

plied 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1). Because we find that the trial

court correctly interpreted and applied that statute, the

appellant’s specifications of error have no merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed at the cost of Norwood Joseph Meche.

AFFIRMED.

App. 8

CIVIL SUIT NUMBER 118,036

NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF RAPIDES

STATE OF LOUISIANA

DAISY THIBODEAUX MECHE

V.

NORWOOD JOSEPH MECHE

FILED: May 13, 1993 /s/ Sandra Harper DY.CLK.

JUDGMENT

This matter having come on for hearing before the court

on cross motions for summary judgment by the parties;

the motions were argued on November 30, 1992;

Present in court were Chris J. Roy, Jr. for Daisy

Thibodeaux Meche; and Dee D. Drell for Norwood Joseph

Meche;

The court when after considering the pleadings, evi-

dence, and arguments of counsel, and pursuant to written

reasons rendered on February 12, 1993 made the follow-

ing specific findings:

1. Plaintiff and defendant were married on

December 20, 1958 in Lafayette, Louisiana

and were separated by a judgment of this

court on May 4, 1981; that the parties were

divorced by judgment of this court on Octo-

ber 9, 1981;

ho

That the parties entered into a partial settle-

ment of community property on October 31,

1981 which did not include the military

retirement pay of Norwood Joseph Meche;

UI

App. 9

Since petitioner and defendant were married

in the State of Louisiana, the community

property regime attached to the property

acquired during the marriage between

plaintiff and defendant, including the mili-

tary retirement pay at issue;

That the judgment of separation of May 4,

1981 did not constitute a “final” judgment

within the meaning of 10 U.S.C. 1408(a)(3)

prior to June 25, 1981;

That the judgment of separation signed on

May 4, 1981 did not include a court ordered,

ratified, or approved property settlement;

Norwood Joseph Meche entered active duty

in the United States Air Force on July 8, 1962

and retired from the United States Air Force

on August 1, 1992;

Daisy Thibodeaux Meche owns a one-half

undivided interest in and to Norwood Jos-

eph Meche’s military retirement since

August 1, 1992 according to the following

formula pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 1408(D):

Portion of pension

attributable to

creditable service

during existence

of community

(Date of entry in

service is July 8, 1962

until May 4, 1981)

X '/2 = Portion owed to

Daisy Thibodeaux Meche

Pension attributable to total

creditable service.

App. 10

8. That the foregoing formula is in accordance

with current law of Sims v. Sims, 358 So.2d

919 (La. 1978);

9. The rights of the service member pursuant

to the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of

1940 have been protected herein;

10. Norwood Joseph Meche received his first

military retirement check from the Air Force

on September 1, 1992 in the amount of Four

Thousand One Hundred Ten and No/100

($4,110.00) Dollars, and since that time, on

or about December 19, 1992, received a cost

of living adjustment wherein his check is

now approximately Four Thousand Two

Hundred Six and No/100 ($4,206.00) Dol-

lars;

11. Under the Sims formula, it was determined

that plaintiff is entitled to thirty-one (31%)

percent of the military retirement pay of

defendant.

12. The social security numbers of the parties

are as follows:

1) Daisy Thibodeaux Meche 434-56-9548

2) Norwood Joseph Meche 435-58-2660

Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that the court decrees a partition of the

undivided portion of Norwood Joseph Meche’s military

retirement benefits according to the foregoing formula;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that payment of Daisy Thibodeaux Meche from Norwood

Joseph Meche’s retirement constitutes a division of prop-

erty and that payment made to her is to be made from his

disposable retired pay.

App. 11

[Tt Is FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that all rights of Norwood Joseph Meche were complied with

pursuant to the Soldiers and Sailor’s Civil Relief Act.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that Daisy Thibodeaux Meche is entitled to thirty-one (31%)

percent of Norwood Joseph Meche’s military retirement pay

pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 1408(D) which constitutes the percent-

age under the Sims formula mentioned hereinabove;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that Norwood Joseph Meche be cast with all court costs in

this matter.

JUDGMENT RENDERED AND SIGNED on this 13 day of

May, 1993.

/s/ Illegible

JUDGE

Review — All Rights to Appeal Reserved.

GOLD, WEEMS, BRUSER, CHRIS J. ROY, JR.

SUES & RUNDELL (A LAW CORPORATION)

BY: /s/ Dee D. Drell BY:

Dee D. Drell, #5074 Chris J. Roy, Jr. #18416

2001 MacArthur Drive 711 Washington Street

Post Office Box 6118 Post Office Box 1592

Alexandria, LA 71307 Alexandria, LA 71309

(318) 445-6471 (318) 487-9537

Attorney for Norwood Attorney for Daisy

Joseph Meche Thibodeaux Meche

App. 12

CIVIL SUIT NUMBER 118,036

DAISY THIBODEAUX NINTH JUDICIAL

MECHE DISTRICT COURT

VERSUS

NORWOOD JOSEPH PARISH OF RAPIDES

MECHE

STATE OF LOUISIANA

WRITTEN REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Filed Feb. 12, 1993)

This matter came before the Court on reciprocal Motions

for Summary Judgment.

The Court finds that the judgment of separation dated

May 4, 1981 and relied upon by the defendant herein did

not constitute a “final” judgment within the meaning of

10 U.S.C. 1408(a)(3) prior to June 25, 1981.

Additionally, the Court finds that 10 U.S.C. 1408(c)(1),

requires that where a final decree of legal separation

issued before June 25, 1981 is relied on, such decree must

include a court ordered, ratified, or approved property

settlement incident to such degree.

In the present matter, the judgment of separation signed

on May 4, 1981, even if it were determined to constitute a

“final” judgment, did not include a court ordered, rat-

ified, or approved property settlement. Having found

that the separation judgment did not include the neces-

sary property settlement, the Court must look to the

Judgment of Absolute Divorce which was signed on

October 9, 1981. This date being subsequent to June 25,

1981, the Court finds that Louisiana’s community prop-

erty laws can be applied.

App. 13

In accordance with these findings, the Court grants plain-

tiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denies defen-

dant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with defendant

being cast with all costs of these proceedings.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 12th day of February,

1993, at Alexandria, Rapides Parish, Louisiana.

/s/ B. Dexter Ryland

B. DEXTER RYLAND, JUDGE

NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COURT

DIVISION “E”

MAILED TO:

Mr. Dee D. Drell

Attorney at Law

Post Office Box 6118

Alexandria, Louisiana 71307

Mr. Chris Roy, Jr.

Attorney at Law

Post Office Box 1911

Alexandria, Louisiana 71309

App. 14

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF LOUISIANA

DAISY THIBODEAUX MECHE

VS. NO. 94-( 1174

NORWOOD JOSEPH MECHEI

IN RE: Meche, Norwood Joseph; — Defendant(s); Apply

ing for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review; to the Court of

Appeal, Third Circuit, Number CA93-1045; Parish of Rap-

ides 9th Judicial District Court Div. “E” Number 118,036

June 24, 1994

Denied.

ROO

WFEM

JCW

HTI

PH

CDK

DENNIS, J. not on panel.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

June 24, 1994

/s/ Illegible

Clerk of Court

For the Court

App. 15

PARTIAL SETTLEMENT : UNITED STATES

OF COMMUNITY : OF AMERICA

is | STATE OF LOUIS

NORWOOD J. MECHE * °!ATE OF LOUISIANA

AND: : PARISH OF RAPIDES

DAISY THIBODEAUX

MECHE

BE IT KNOWN, That on this 31st day of October, 1981,

before me, the undersigned authority, a Notary Public,

duly commissioned and qualified, in and for the Parish of

Rapides, State of Louisiana, therein residing, and in the

presence of the witnesses hereinafter named and under-

signed:

PERSONALLY CAME AND APPEARED: NORWOOD J.

MECHE and DAISY THIBODEAUX MECHE, both citi-

zens and residents of Lafayette Parish, Louisiana who

declared that they were legally separated by a judgment

of the Ninth Judicial District Court on May 4, 1981 in suit

Number 113,094 on its docket in proceedings entitled

“Daisy Thibodeaux Meche versus Norwood J. Meche”,

and that they were judicially divorced by judgment of the

Ninth Judicial District Court in and for Rapides Parish,

Louisiana, dated October 9 1981, in suit number 118,036

of its docket in proceedings entitled “Norwocd J. Meche

versus Daisy Thibodeaux Meche”; that they now desire to

partially settle and liquidate the community which for-

merly existed between them and that they have agreed to

partially settle the same in the manner following, to-wit:

DAISY THIBODEAUX MECHE does hereby convey,

transfer, set over, assign and deliver unto Norwood J.

App. 16

Meche all of her rights, title and interest in and to the

following property, to-wit:

IMMOVABLE PROPERTY:

i

A certain piece, parcel or tract of land, together with

all buildings and improvements located thereon, and

all right ways and privileges thereunto appertaining,

being, lying and situated in the Parish of Rapides,

State of Louisiana, and being more particularly

described as Lot Eighteen (18) of Camellia Heights

Subdivision as per plat thereof recorded in Plat Book

14, Page 155, Records of Rapides Parish, Louisiana,

LESS and EXCEPT that triangular shaped tract of

land sold to David Brewer by Deed dated December

26, 1973, recorded in Conveyance Book 828, page

515, records of Rapides Parish, Louisiana, and being

described as beginning at a point where the line

between Lots 18 and 19 intersects Camellia Lane,

thence run along the common boundary between

Lots 18 and 19 of said subdivision in an easterly

direction the distance of 100 feet; thence turn left

and run North 1.75 feet; thence turn left and run

back to the point of beginning.

MOVABLE PROPERTY:

3

2.

<5

A curio stand;

A reel to reel Sony recorder;

All reels, except the personal recordings of the fam-

ily;

His rings;

A Spanish bar;

A swet of swords;

App. 17

7. Temple rubbings;

8. One oil painting of the three wine drinkers:

9. One macrame;

10. One green glass ball float;

11. One 1976 Chevrolet Corvette automobile, Serial

Number 1237L65426558;

12. Five Bar Stools;

13. Korean folding mattress;

14. Personal clothing and father’s watch.

Daisy Thibodeaux Meche does hereby agree to sign any

deeds, assignments, endorsements, or note or to perform

any other reasonable acts necessary to transfer her inter-

est in that property shown hereinabove.

To have and to hold unto the said Norwood J. Meche, his

heirs and assigns forever.

Norwood J. Meche does hereby specifically agree to pay

the unpaid balance on that certain mortgage note from

Norwood J. Meche and Daisy Thibodeaux Meche to First

Federal Savings and Loan Association of Alexandria

dated September 29, 1978 in the Original principal

amount of $42,250.00, secured by an Act of Mortgage on

the hereinabove described immovable property between

the same parties and of the same date and the same

amount as the mortgage note hereinabove referred to,

recorded on September 29, 1978, in Mortgage Book 836,

Page 763 of the records of Rapides Parish, Louisiana.

In consideration whereof the said Norwood J. Meche

does by these presents, convey, transfer, assign, set over

and deliver unto Daisy Thibodeaux Meche all of his

App. 18

rights, title and interest in and to the following described

property, to-wit:

IMMOVABLE PROPERTY:

1. None.

MOVABLE PROPERTY:

1. Three Thousand and No/100 ($3,000.00) Dollars,

cash in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby

acknowledged;

NO

All of the furniture, applicances [sic] and fixtures,

and all movables which formerly comprised the

movable portion of the community, WITH THE

EXCEPTION of the fourteen (14) items specifically

set out hereinabove that is to be received by Nor-

wood J. Meche:

3. One 1971 Stao. camper trailer, number 715M660243.

4. One 1977 Ford Thunderbird automobile,

Norwood J. Meche agrees to sign any deeds, assignments,

endorsements, or note or to perform any other reasonable

acts necessary to transfer his interest in that property

shown hereinabove.

To have and to hold unto the said Daisy Thibodeaux

Meche, her heirs and assigns forever.

Each party to this agreement assumes the liability for

paying any debts which that party has incurred.

Each party hereto agrees to assume the liability for pay-

ing any unpaid balance on any item received herein.

ARR OORL eneapcoeaaeneen

App. 19

The parties hereto further agree that the assumption by

Norwood J. Meche of the debt described hereinaboe [sic]

does not create any resolutory condition and if it be

construed for any reason to create any such resolutory

conditions, the parties waive any and all rights under

said resolutory conditions tu declare the transfer as one

to another null and void and/or rescind the transaction.

The parties also agree that the declarations herein do not

create any stipulation in favor of any third party.

As a result hereof, the parties hereto discharge each other

from any further accounting to the community which

formerly existed between them, the same being fully

liquidated as above set forth WITH THE EXCEPTION OF

the immovable property and all improvements thereon

located at 124 Lena Street, Lafayette, Louisiana, which

immovable property will continue at this time to be held

in common between them. The immovable property is

more fully described as follows:

That certain lot of ground together with all

improvements thereon, being known and desig-

nated as Lot 37 of the ELEMENTARY HEIGHTS

SUBDIVISION. to the Parish of Lafayette, La.,

said lot having a front of 50 feet on Lena Street

by a depth as shown on the official plat of

survey of said subdivision prepared by Fred L.

Colomb dated Nov. 6, 1953, and recorded under

act number 295777, and being bounded North

by Lena Street, South by the southern boundary

of said subdivision, East by Lot 38, and west by

lot 36, and being the same property acquired by

vendor from the Lafayette Building Association

by act number 355456.

App. 20

THUS DONE AND PASSED, in duplicate originals, in my

office in Alexandria, Rapides Parish, Louisiana, on the

day, month and year hereinabove first written, in the

presence of the undersigned competent witnesses, who

have hereunto signed their names with the said appearers

and me, Notary, after reading of the whole.

WITNESSES: 's/ Norwood J. Meche

NORWOOD J. MECHE

‘s/ IMegible L. Conrad

s/ Daisy Thibodeaux

Mec he

/s/ legible DAISY THIBODEAUX

MECHE

S Illegible

s/ Janey S. Illegible

s / are L. Brown (for

nature of Daisy

Thibode aux Meche >)

NOTARY PUBLIC in

and for Rapides

Parish, Louisiana.

STATE OF VIRGINIA

CITY OF HAMPTON

ON THIS 30th DAY OF October, 1981, PERSONALLY

APPEARED BEFORE ME THE UNDERSIGNED NOTARY

PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE CIT Y OF HAMPTON, STATE

OF VIRGINIA, Norwood Joseph Meche/// ///////

WHO DID SUBSC RIBE his SIGNATURE(S) TO THE

ATTACHED Partial Settlement of Community / / / /

FOR THE STATE OF Louisiana. MY COMMISSION AS A

NOTARY PUBLIC EXPIRES ON 30 Sep 84.

/s/ Mary Illegible

NOTARY PUBLIC

Pee eC ee el

ror aaers

as

Pee et

App. 21

CIVIL SUIT NUMBER 118,036

DIVISION “E”

DAISY THIBODEAUX NINTH JUDICIAL

MECHE DISTRICT COURT

'ERSUS

ideaeentech PARISH OF RAPIDES

NORWOOD JOSEPH

MECHE STATE OF LOUISIANA

STIPULATION

In conjunction with the two pending motions for

summary judgment, it is stipulated by and between the

parties that the following facts are true and that the

attached documents are true and correct copies of the

originals, and that the information contained in this stip-

ulation and the attached documents may be considered

by the court in lieu of certified copies, depositions or

affidavits.

I. STIPULATED FACTS:

Norwood Joseph Meche and Daisy Thibodeaux

Meche were married on December 20, 1958, in Lafayette,

Louisiana. Norwood Joseph Meche entered active duty in

the United States Air Force on July 8, 1962. Norwood

Joseph Meche and Daisy Thibodeaux Meche were judi-

cially separated by rendition of oral judgment on April

22, 1981, which judgment was reduced to writing and

signed on May 4, 1981. That matter was appealed to the

Third Circuit Court of Appeal which rendered its written

opinion on February 3, 1982. A judgment of absolute

divorce was rendered between the parties on October 9,

App. 22

1981. A document entitled “Partial Settlement of Commu-

nity”

was executed on October 31, 1981 by Daisy

Thibodeaux Meche and on October 30, 1981 by Norwood

Joseph Meche. Norwood Joseph Meche retired from the

United States Air Force on August 1, 1992.

I. STIPULATED DOCUMENTS, ATTACHED:

l.

NO

Judgment of Separation, May 4, 1981 in

Suite No. 113,094

Opinion, Court of Appeal, February 3, 1992,

in Suit No. 113,094 (Appeal Docket No.

8616)

Judgment of Absolute Divorce, October 9,

1981, in Suite No. 118,036

Partial Settlement of Community, October

31, 1981

Entire Ninth Judicial District Court suit

record in Civil Suit No. 113,094

This stipulation is dated this 24th day of November,

1992.

Respectfully submitted,

LAW OFFICE OF CHRIS J. ROY

BY:

Chris J. Roy, Jr.

711 Washington Street

P. O. Box 1592

Alexandria, LA 71309

(318) 487-9537

Bar Roll Number:

App. 23

ATTORNEYS FOR DAISY

THIBODEAUX MECHE

GOLD, WEEMS, BRUSER,

SUES & RUNDELL

BY:

ORR. Mame ayes

ed ade La ERR in

Dee D. Drell

2001 MacArthur Drive

Post Office Box 6118

Alexandria, Louisiana 71307-6118

(318) 445-6471

Bar Roll Number: 5074

ATTORNEYS FOR NORWOOD

JOSEPH MECHE

App. 24

CIVIL SUIT NUMBER 113,094

DAISY THIBODEAUX — : NINTH JUDICIAL

MECHE . DISTRICT COURT

VERSUS | PARISH OF RAPIDES

NORWOOD J. MECHE : — STATE OF LOUISIANA

FILED: May 4, 1981 | /s/ Linda L. Miller

, DY. CLK

JUDGMENT OF SEPARATION

This cause comes for trial pursuant to regular assign-

ment, answer and reconventional demand having been

filed to plaintiff’s petition, when after considering the

pleadings, evidence, offerings and testimony, the court

being of the opinion that plaintiff has made due proof of

her demands to the extent as hereinafter set out, and the

law and the evidence being in favor thereof, for the

reasons orally assigned, it is, therefore,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there be

and a judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Daisy

Thibodeaux Meche and against Norwood J. Meche,

decreeing a separation from bed and board between the

parties and forever dissolving the community of acquets

and gains existing between them. It is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Daisy

Thibodeaux Meche be and she is hereby awarded the

care, custody and control of the minor children, namely,

(1) Donald Meche and (2) Sean Meche, awarding unto

Norwood J. Meche reasonable visitation with the said

children. It is further

App. 25

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Norwood

J. Meche be and he is hereby condemned to pay to Daisy

Thibodeaux Meche the sum of Seven Hundred Fifty and

No/100 ($750.00) Dollars per month for alimony and

child support. It is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judg-

ment on rule dated April 21, 1980 be and the same is

hereby perpetuated and, therefore, both Daisy

Thibodeaux Meche and Norwood J. Meche be and they

are hereby restrained, enjoined and prohibited from dis-

posing of, alienating, pledging, mortgaging or in any

manner encumbering any of the property owned by the

community of acquets and gains existing between the

parties, and, further, enjoining and prohibiting the parties

litigant from withdrawing, disposing of converting any

funds owned by the community of acquets and gains

existing between plaintiff and defendant. It is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judg-

ment on rule dated April 21, 1980 be and the same is

hereby perpetuated and, therefore, it is ordered,

adjudged and decreed that Norwood J. Meche will con-

tinue to pay the car note on the Ford Thunderbird and the

house note on the family home. It is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judg-

ment on rule dated April 21, 1980 be and the same is

hereby perpetuated and, therefore, it is ordered,

adjudged and decreed that Daisy Thibodeaux Meche, will

receive One Hundred Thirty and No/100 ($130.00) Dol-

lars, which is from rental property, and Forty-Four

($44.00) Dollars which is from a second mortgage note

owned by the parties. It is further

App. 26

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the recon-

ventional demand of Norwood J. Meche be and the same

is hereby denied and dismissed. It is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Norwood

J. Meche be and he is hereby condemned to pay all costs

in these proceedings. It is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Norwood

J. Meche and Daisy Thibodeaux Meche be and they are

hereby declared as owners of all community property in

the proportion of an undivided one-half interest each.

JUDGMENT RENDERED on April 22, 1981 as per the

written Notice of Rendition of Oral Judgment dated April

22, 1981, at Alexandria, Rapides Parish, Louisiana.

JUDGMENT READ-AND SIGNED, in Chambers, at

Alexandria, Rapides Parish, Louisiana, this 4th day of

May , 1981.

/s/ Richard E. Lee

JUDGE, NINTH JUDICIAL

DISTRICT COURT