Reply Brief — Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995) (No. 94-511)

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Bape Court, U.S

FILED

(4) JAN 6 1995

No. 94-511 Fide us (HE CLERK

4 .

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1994

°

FLORIDA ROCK INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent.

+

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Federal Circuit

+

PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF

+

Joun A. DeVautrt, III

Counsel of Record

C. WARREN TRIPP, JR.

Counsel

Jane A. LESTER

Counsel

Bepvett, Ditrmar, DeVautt &

Pirttans P.A.

The Bedell Building

101 East Adams Street

Jacksonville, Florida 32202

(904) 353-0211

For Petitioner

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

ARGUMENT

The government’s response fails to distinguish the

Court’s holding in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,

112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992), from that of the Federal Circuit

herein; and misconstrues the Federal Circuit’s new partial

taking doctrine, underscoring the need for immediate

review.

1. Contrary to Respondent’s assertion that the Fed-

eral Circuit “did not decide whether the facts of this case

constitute a taking,” (Resp. Br. 8), the Federal Circuit

indeed held that Petitioner Florida Rock did not suffer a

compensable “categorical taking” (App. 11, 32), because

of the possibility of sales to persons without knowledge

of the restrictions (App. 14 n.12), despite the fact that the

Army Corps of Engineers’ denial of a Clean Water Act

permit left Florida Rock with no “allowable and practica-

ble immediate use” of its property (App. 111).

The possibility of resale of oceanfront property in

Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2895 n. 8, did not defeat the categorical

taking determination where the court found the govern-

ment had deprived the owner of all economically benefi-

cial use by requiring the land to be left substantially in its

natural state. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2824-95. Nor should the

possibility of the resale of Florida Rock’s wetlands, bur-

dened by federal regulations which require it be left in its

natural state, enable the government to avoid the pay-

ment of just compensation in the instant case.

2. The government suggests that “the court's refer-

ences to ‘partial takings’ are unfortunate,” and acknowl-

edges that the opinion “could create confusion.” (Resp.

Br. 10-11). Nevertheless, rather than cross-petitioning, the

government urges that because the Federal Circuit's

holding that partial compensation is required “whether

the taking is by physical occupation . . . or by regulatory

imposition to preserve the property as a wetland” (App.

22-23) is “wrong,” (Resp. Br. at 11), review by this court is

not required.

The government insists that any “misunderstanding

that might be generated by the [Federal Circuit’s] opin-

ion”! may likely later be resolved by lower court deci-

sions. (Resp. Br. at 11.) Clearly such a resolution has not

emerged during the period since publication of the opin-

ion. Thus far, contrary to the government’s view, the

courts and commentators discussing the Federal Circuit's

Florida Rock opinion, have consistently interpreted it as

permitting compensation under the Fifth Amendment for

a regulatory deprivation of less than all economic use.?

1 Pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 149, the Federal

Circuit is, of course, the appellate court to hear all appeals

involving claims seeking “compensation for any taking that

may occur through the operation of a federal statute.” United

States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,128 (1985).

2 See Creppel v. United States, No. 94-5070, 1994 WL 647932,

at *3 (Fed.Cir. 1994); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28

F.3d 1171, 1180-82 (Fed.Cir. 1994); Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v.

United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1573-79 (Fed.Cir. 1994) (Nies, C.J.,

dissenting) (App. 32-50); Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed.Cl. 37, 45

(1994); John J. Delaney and Emily J. Vaias, American Law Insti-

tute, ALI-ABA Course of Study, “Land Use Institute: Planning,

Regulation, Litigation, Eminent Domain, and Compensation; A

Survey of Selected Recent Cases” (Aug. 17, 1994), available in

Westlaw, C930 ALI-ABA 23, 38-40; Michael M. Berger, American

Law Institute, ALI-ABA Course of Study, “Land Use Institute:

Planning, Regulation, Litigation, Eminent Domain, and Com-

pensation; Recent Takings and Eminent Domain Cases” (Aug.

¥

Such acknowledged confusion on a constitutional issue of

first impression demonstrates the necessity for this

court’s review.

Respectfully submitted,

JouHn A. DeVautt, III

Counsel of Record

C. WarrEN Tripp, JR.

JANE A. LESTER

Bepett, Dirrmar, DeVautt &

Pittans P.A.

The Bedell Building

101 East Adams Street

Jacksonville, Florida 32202

(904) 353-0211

17, 1994), available in, Westlaw, C930 ALI-ABA 221, 233-38; John

L. Horwich and Hertha L. Lund, Montana Supreme Court Unnec-

essarily Misconstrues Takings Law, 55 Mont.L.Rev. 455 (Summer,

1994); Ronald L. Weaver and Mark D. Solov, Emerging Property

Rights Protection, Fla.Bar J. (June, 1994), available in Westlaw, 68

Jun FLBJ 103.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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