Opposition Brief — Yeoman v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet
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oti Dart, US
No. 94-504
IN THE
RICE D
OCT 20 1994
“OERDE 08 AE CLERK
ET
———e
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1994
STUART G. YEOMAN, M.D., et al. - - Petitioners
versus
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
REVENUE CABINET, et al. - - - Respondents
AND
No. 94-525
CHARLES C. SMITH, JR., M.D., et al. - Petitioners
versus
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
REVENUE CABINET, et al. - - - Respondents
On Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Kentucky
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
LEONARD G. ROWEKAMP
SMITH, WOLNITZEK, SCHACHTER
& ROWEKAMP, P.S.C.
502 Greenup Street
P.O. Box 352
Covington, Kentucky 41012-0352
Ph.: 606/491-4444 FAX: 606/491-1001
Counsel of Record
DANA BYNUM MAYTON ANGELA M. FORD
CATHY CRAVENS SNELL E. D. KLATTE
Division of Legal Services Office of the Counsel
Revenue Cabinet Cabinet for Human Resources
P.O. Box 423 275 E. Main Street
Frankfort, Kentucky 40602 Frankfort, Kentucky 40602
Counsel for Respondents
WESTERFIELD BONTE CO., 619 W. KENTUCKY-P.O. BOX 3251, LOUISVILLE, KY.
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether three sitting special supreme court jus-
tices appointed by the governor in accordance with Section
110(8) of the Kentucky Constitution should have disquali-
fied themselves when there was no allegation or evidence
in the record of impropriety, bias or prejudice on the part
of any of those special justices.
2. Whether a state health care provider tax imposed
on physicians violates the prohibition against special
legislation contained in Section 59 of the Kentucky
Constitution.
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................ccccccccsesssseeeees i
yy ks gg ____g : SEED E TE eT EN ETI ii-ili
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................::ccccccssesseeeeees iv—v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...............ccccccesssceeeseees 1- 3
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ............... 4-13
I. The Supreme Court of Kentucky Was
Properly Constituted When It Included
Special Justices Appointed by the
Governor Pursuant to Kentucky
Constitution Section 110(3) ................0...... 4— 9
A. The Governor Is Required by Kentucky
Constitution Section 110(3) to Appoint
Special Justices upon the Recusal of
Two OF NEOTO SUBECED sccccccsccsccescccsesecccesesees 4— 6
B. Recusal of the Sitting Special Justices
Would Have Been Inappropriate Because
There Were No Allegations or Evidence
in the Record Showing Impropriety,
Bias or Prejudice on the Part of Any of
ORD I chcsUiieatimateanitirecserrscs cen 6 8
C. A Practicing Attorney May Sit as a
Special Justice under Established
Regattas COS BaP cccnsisnvecvescrseeesesesocecesese 8
D. The Petitioners’ Alternate Methods
for Choosing Special Justices Have
No Constitutional or Statutory Merit ...... 8- 9
II. The State Court Decision Should Not Be
Reviewed Because It Is Based on
Adequate and Independent Nonfederal
COP GUTID covincicsentlisuanisdieaddeadialtniamintmedinmneeien 9-13
A. The Language and Application of
the Special Legislation Prohibition
Found in Section 59 are Unique
0p TD svsniscienteceeaiscstinibitabiamitstininyshannin 10-11
B. The Kentucky Supreme Court Decision
Was Not Based on a Federal Question
and Is Not in Conflict with Any Other
Federal or State Court Decisions ............. 11-13
iii
os 5. sak, cn cdvapnavodensideuntencoatensds 14
a. sa inns tentonbeinnnansiepeenennienuens la—22a
ara il cacnintiincaveoevs la— 3a
ie cor ndieninisomondorevendnsennteneen Ap,
January 28, 1993 jsic] Affidavit of Stuart G.
ne cacceunpessseannen 5a—19a
December 21, 1993 Order of the Supreme Court
of Kentucky Granting Intermediate Relief
PG TE FIR IO eicaiccvecccencscenesccvepscseccsceses 20a—22a
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
‘
PAGE :
Cases:
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813
CRIN cic eistnsuscicinidtibdidintatoaneienaredebtaunteciutceitenegs ‘Pe S|
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc.,
fo ges he | o.. ee aenereE 10
Commonwealth v. Smith, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 873
(2) PCE ea eR ERA Ok T: 2,6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13
Commonwealth v. Wasson, Ky., 842 S.W.2d 487
CE cig eedalaseresandaceced gs ails iki a tAminaid teatabsninionse: 10
Coy v. Florida Birth-Related Injury Compensa-
tion Plan, Fla., 595 So.2d 943, cert. denied,
sub nom, McGibony v. Florida Birth-Related
Neurological Injury Compensation Plan,
FE Be Cee eathcsecciensesas:.. 12
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, Ky.,
8 a fk BT Pe. : RRR ee een 13
Edwards v. Land, Ky. App., 851 S.W.2d 484
CI ios akiccstbhisickecadinsLiaennttleanatiaisbinbiaienvicieres. 11
Enterprise Irrig. District v. Farmers Mutual
Cmts Ci, BO We BOE CREED cacsndsccssvecccszcee... 9
Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, Ky.,
a te I I inshciteassccretsivtrssctsessvecesees 3,6
Federal Communications Commission v. Beach
Communications, Inc., __U.S.___, 113 S.Ct.
I ak detithcinethcsimasblbsesnnladccibtabdiccavessese0s 3
Gillis v. Yount, Ky., 748 S.W.2d 357 (1988) .......... 3
Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Holmes, Ky.,
re ER iitihececadiieibdeccecedacienns 10, 11
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987)..........0005 10
Kentucky Utilities v. South East Coal Company,
Ky., 836 S.W.2d 407, pet. cert. voluntarily
dismissed pursuant to Rule 46, __ U.S. __.,
Se i ae 0 ee waists Fibbetetiennsccse a. 8
Liteky v. U.S.,__ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (1994) 8
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940)............0. 13
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)..............4. 9
Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, Ky., 808
Fg): ) RES ere oe eeeee 10
Cases—Continued
Regency Pheasant Run Ltd. v. Karem, Ky., 860
I oi i namnunice 8
Reynolds Metal Co. v. Martin, 269 Ky. 378,
ee TED ilaricatshinskci tn seiinisenvitacccsoese 3
Sims v. Board of Education of Jefferson County,
ang SE EAE ARNE CRUD enc csccnsccceriescrscscccocess 11
Tabler v. Wallace, Ky., 704 S.W.2d 179 (1985),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 (1986)..................008 3, 10
Waggoner v. Waggoner, Ky., 846 S.W.2d 704,
cert. denied, _U.S.__, 114 S.Ct. 346 (1993) 3,11
Constitution of the United States:
9 I nc cuceatiduasantisnwnanee 5
Se i I Wiihidnsinreidsisntasvccecciaceccsondcessecvece 2
Be III, FREY cspcctncnccocatuesesssvassncdcsvdutaniens 2
Federal Statutes:
- See oe a re 5
EES TEE TIE AERP I Re RPRTONE aCT? 5
i i lala duacaneonatbia 5
io avetasidstslidbabeandevtinenit 5
a ce cag dmupnsadaans 7
A I ooo ccnencnvaveosnensesccsvescvecedsnaves 13
Federal Regulations:
iia cud biccccapsrtianevoasincinnids 2
Constitution of the Commonwealth
of Kentucky:
as snenineansnavenmnevasnsunsieesens 2
Be NE occ ccnesiciscsacescrondecacecoxecesiesesseten 2
Bs IE TI once cacansocvnscosskotentsunsedanececions passim
Fe I EL vigversdsccnesenncessissinsendtvervcnetctas passim
i no. cpcadwnsaeundenandenceowees 5
a, EE OO... sccnascickdeecendeecadeineess 5
SS AIOE AT TOT 5
ee ccc cncvacsscnspasevevecmisucdapee 5
FR, es PI, BOUT boinscivncndccncersccsnaccsvesebesncoksncnss 6, 8
State Statutes:
PEM HI BPEL ING. 1 cos cnvcscccccccosccccccscesecsessnces passim
FAMNGteeey 2200SO Till No. 250 ............cccccccccccocccsceees 2
pe Ga a 5
Se dl Uialbsiaesavendeniuios 7
State Court Rules:
Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 4.300 .................. 7
No. 94-504
IN THE
SUPREME COURT F THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1994
Sruart G. YEOMAN, M.D., etal. - - - - Petitioners
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, REVENUE
CaBINET,etal. - - - - - - - Respondents
AND
No. 94-525
CHARLES C. SMITH JR., M.D., et al. - - - Petitioners
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, REVENUE
CaBINET, etal. - - - - - - Respondents
On Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Kentucky
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents accept the statement of the case as set
forth by the Petitioners, except as clarified or modified
herein.
The health care provider tax statute in question was
challenged in the trial court as violating the Petitioners’
2
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution, and Sections 2, 3, and 59 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution, but both the trial court and the Su-
preme Court of Kentucky’s rulings rested on Section 59 of
the Kentucky Constitution. Commonwealth v. Smith, Ky.,
875 S.W.2d 873 (1994); Yeoman Pet. 31a-49a. The Petition-
ers sued the Revenue Cabinet and its Secretary, the Cabi-
net for Human Resources and its Secretary, and the
Kentucky Health Care Data Commission. The Governor of
Kentucky, Brereton C. Jones, was not a party-defendant,
and is not a respondent herein.
The tax was contained in House Bill 1 (HB 1) enacted
by the Kentucky General Assembly in its Second Extraordi-
nary Session of 1993 to provide partial funding for Medic-
aid, the state/federal indigent health care program in which
Kentucky voluntarily participates. HB 1 was repealed ef-
fective July 14, 1994 and replaced with another health
care provider tax, House Biil 250, which differs from HB 1
in several regards. In addition to imposing a tax on physi-
cian services, HB 1 imposed a tax on hospital services,
nursing facility services, intermediate care facility services
for the mentally retarded, home health care services, ser-
vices of health maintenance organizations, and outpatient
prescription drugs. The method of taxation chosen here
was but one of several federally permissible health care
tax options availabic to the states. See 42 C.F.R. 433.55.
The legislature amended HB 1 numerous times before its
enactment, and the bill contained significant health care
legislation in addition to the provider tax. Contrary to
Petitioners’ statements, HB 1 was not the “governor's bill.”
The governor’s proposal was contained in House Bill 3 which
was considered that session but not adopted.
The trial court held that the challenged statutes were
unconstitutional as special legislation under Section 59 of
the Kentucky Constitution. Respondents appealed to the
Kentucky Court of Appeals and the case was transferred
3
to the Supreme Court of Kentucky. In reversing the trial
court, the Supreme Court of Kentucky rested its decision
on state constitutional law. In applying Kentucky Consti-
tution Section 59 to the provider tax statute, the court
held that the statute was not special legislation, relying
upon Tabler v. Wallace, Ky., 704 S.W.2d 179 (1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 822 (1986), Federal Communications Com-
mission v. Beach Communications, Inc., __ U.S. __, 113
S.Ct. 2096 (1993), Waggoner v. Waggoner, Ky., 846 S.W.2d
704, cert. denied, ___ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 346 (1993),
Reynolds Metal Co. v. Martin, 269 Ky. 378, 107 S.W.2d
251 (1937), Gillis v. Yount, Ky., 748 S.W.2d 357 (1988),
and other state law decisions.
In addressing Petitioners’ allegations regarding the
three special justices appointed by Governor Jones, the
opinion relied upon interpretation of the method of ap-
pointment adopted in the Kentucky Constitution. The Su-
preme Court of Kentucky relied on Section 110 of the
Kentucky Constitution and the cases interpreting it, par-
ticularly Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, Ky., 609
S.W.2d 682 (1980), and held that recusal is a personal
matter to be decided by each individual justice in the ab-
sence of any so-called per se disqualification or statutory
prohibition. The special justices made such personal re-
view. See Orders, Yeoman Pet. 26a-28a. In addition, the
court pointed out that the Petitioners’ affidavit to the court
at no point made any allegations of impropriety, bias or
prejudice against the three sitting special justices. Affida-
vit of Stuart G. Yeoman, M.D., App. 5a-19a. The Petition-
ers failed to address the issue when offered the chance at
oral argument. A unanimous court denied the Petitioners’
motions for recusal, determining that the governor prop-
erly appointed the special justices in accordance with the
Kentucky Constitution.
ey
4
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
In finding that the tax imposed on physicians under
House Bill 1 does not violate the Kentucky Constitution,
the Supreme Court of Kentucky fully considered and cor-
rectly applied the relevant sections of the Kentucky
Constitution and state cases construing those sections. The
court also held that the Petitioners’ allegations that the
governor’s interest in state health care reform and his ac-
tive participation in the political process did not require
recusal of the three sitting special justices appointed by
the governor where there was no evidence in the record
showing impropriety, bias or prejudice of any of those spe-
cial justices.
I. THE SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY WAS
PROPERLY CONSTITUTED WHEN IT INCLUDED
SPECIAL JUSTICES APPOINTED BY THE GOV-
ERNOR PURSUANT TO KENTUCKY CONSTITU-
TION SECTION 110(3).
No special or important issue justifying the grant of
certiorari was raised when the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky held that the Governor followed proper Kentucky
constitutional procedure in appointing special justices to
the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
A. The Governor Is Required by Kentucky Constitution
Section 110(3) to Appoint Special Justices upon the
Recusal of Two or More Justices.
Kentucky Constitution § 110(3) provides:
(3) A majority of the justices of the Supreme Court
shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of busi-
ness. If as many as two justices decline or are unable
to sit in the trial of any cause, the Chief Justice shall
certify that fact to the Governor, who shall appoint to
try the particular cause a sufficient number of jus-
tices to constitute a full court for the trial of the cause.
App. 4a.
5
Three justices of the Supreme Court of Kentucky recused
themselves from hearing this case. The lead plaintiff be-
low, Dr. Charles C. Smith, Jr., was the personal physician
of Justice Charles M. Leibson. Order, Yeoman Pet. 20a-
21a. Justice Thomas B. Spain was a member of the Board
of Directors and Executive Committee of Trover Clinic Foun-
dation, Inc. Justice Joseph E. Lambert was a member of
the Governing Board of the Rockcastle Hospital and Respi-
ratory Care Center, Inc. Notices of Recusal, Yeoman Pet.
17a-19a.
After the Chief Justice certified the recusal of the three
justices to the governor, Governor Jones appointed three
special justices who met the qualifications for a supreme
court justice set forth in KRS 21A.120. Those appointments
were mandated by Section 110(3) of the Kentucky Consti-
tution. The Kentucky Constitution provides no alternate
method of filling vacancies on the court. Indeed, failure to
appoint would have been a dereliction of the governor's
constitutional duties.
The governor fills vacancies at all levels of the state
court system, just as the President of the United States
fills vacancies in the federal court system. U.S. Const. art.
II, § 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133, 171, 251; Ky. Const. § 118.
The executive branch’s power and duty to make judicial
appointments is rooted in the American system of govern-
ment.
The constitutional check-and-balance relationship
between the executive and judicial branches of the
government consists of the provisions for filling va-
cancies in judicial offices and for the appointment of
temporary substitutes when two or more justices of
the Supreme Court decline or are unable to partic-
ipate in the disposition of a cause pending before that
court. Const. Secs. 118, 110(3). Those relationships
between the legislature and judicial branches exist by
virtue of Const. Secs. 110(4), 111(1), 112(2) and (3)
and 113(2) and (3), pertaining to judicial districts and
number of judges and justices.
6
Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d at 685.
Petitioners do not challenge the constitutionality of Sec-
tion 110(3), only its application in this case. Smith Pet., p.
17. Respondents are in total agreement with the Smith
Petitioners that “if the Kentucky Constitutional directives
in Section 110 and 123 are disregarded, the due process
rights of persons subject to the tribunal are violated.” Smith
Pet., p. 14. Thus, as the Petitioners admit, if the governor
had not acted in accordance with Section 110(3), their con-
stitutional rights would have been violated.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky unanimously held that
the governor acted in accordance with Kentucky Constitu-
tion Section i110(3). The disposition of this issue rested
wholly on Section 110 and the Kentucky cases interpreting
that section. Commonwealth v. Smith, Ky., 875 S.W.2d
873, 878-879 (1994); Yeoman Pet. 31a-49a.
B. Recusal of the Sitting Special Justices Would Have
Been Inappropriate Because There Were No Alle-
gations or Evidence in the Record Showing Impro-
priety, Bias or Prejudice on the Part of Any of Those
Justices.
The Yeoman Petitioners’ affidavit, submitted to the Su-
preme Court of Kentucky, contained no allegations that
any of the three justices who participated in the decision
were biased or that they had any pecuniary or other inter-
est in this matter. Instead, the motion for recusal and
supporting affidavit consisted of a litany of times and places
in which Governor Jones announced his interest in health
care reform. In view of the nationwide interest in such
reform, this hardly makes the governor unique. The Peti-
tioners’ case is based solely upon the premise that because
the Governor of Kentucky has publicly stated his position
and the goals of his administration regarding the issue of
health care he is unable to fulfill his constitutional duty to
appoint special justices in this case. If the Petitioners’
7
argument is followed to its logical conclusion, no United
States Supreme Court Justice would be permitted to hear
any case involving an issue on which the President ap-
pointing such justice has expressed a public opinion.
Although the Petitioners devote several pages recount-
ing the actions and public statements of the governor, the
governor is not a party to this action. The key issue is
whether the special justices appointed by the governor had
any bias or prejudice or otherwise acted improperly thereby
disqualifying them from sitting. In Aetna Life Insurance
Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986), this Court held that for
recusal to be constitutionally mandated, there must be more
than mere allegations of a justice’s interest in a case. The
Aetna Court noted that “accepting appellant’s expansive
contentions might require the disqualification of every judge
in the state.”' Id. at 825. Additionally, when the Peti-
tioners raised specific objections to the appointment of one
of the proposed special justices, that person declined the
appointment.
In declining to recuse themselves from hearing this
matter, each of the special justices followed the procedures
for personal review required by KRS 26A.015 and SCR
4.300. These procedures are consistent with those followed
in the federal court system which set forth an objective
reasonable person standard. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). See Yeo-
man Pet. 26a-28a. “[A] judge should be disqualified only if
it appears that he or she harbors an aversion, hostility, or
disposition of a kind that a fair minded person could not
‘Contrary to the Smith Petitioners’ proposed remedy, the
Court in Lavoie specifically provided the proper remedy when a
disqualified justice participates in a decision. The Court held
that the “appearance of justice” will best be served by vacating
the decision and remanding for further proceedings. 475 U.S. at
837. Smith Pet., p. 15.
8
put aside when judging the dispute.” Liteky v. U.S., __
U.S.__, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1158 (1994) (Kennedy, J. concur-
ring). The Supreme Court of Kentucky and the individual
sitting justices fully considered the issues raised by their
appointment and participation in this case and correctly
held that such actions were constitutional on state law
grounds and in full compliance with the judicial canons of
ethics.
C. A Practicing Attorney May Sit as a Special Justice
under Established Kentucky Case Law.
Contrary to the Smith Petitioners’ argument, although
Kentucky Constitution Section 123 prohibits a judge or
justice from practicing law “[{djuring his term of office,”
that section does not apply to special justices. A special
justice does not serve a “term of office” since he is not
elected for a specific term and acts on a pro tempore basis.
Regency Pheasant Run Ltd. v. Karem, Ky., 860 S.W.2d
755, 757 (1993). Further, Kentucky Constitution Section
110(5)(b) prohibits the appointment of an active judge to
sit as a special justice on the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
See Kentucky Utilities v. South East Coal Company, Ky.,
836 S.W.2d 407, 409, pet. cert. voluntarily dismissed pur-
suant to Rule 46, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 1147 (1992).
D. The Petitioners’ Alternate Methods for Choosing
Special Justices Have No Constitutional or
Statutory Merit.
The Petitioners suggest that the Chief Justice or the
Kentucky Bar Association could have appointed the spe-
cial justices in this case. However, the Chief Justice is
prohibited from appointing special justices when three sit-
ting justices recuse themselves. Ky. Const. § 110(3); Ken-
tucky Utilities v. South East Coal Company, 836 S.W.2d
407. Since the Chief Justice voted with the majority, Peti-
tioners would no doubt complain that the Chief Justice
would have been inclined to choose individuals who shared
9
his beliefs, particularly since the Chief Justice had previ-
ously ruled that the Commonwealth had a “strong possibil-
ity of success on appeal.” December 21, 1993 Order of the
Supreme Court of Kentucky Granting Intermediate Relief
Pursuant to CR 76.33, App. 21a.
The suggestion of an appointment by the Kentucky Bar
Association also has no merit, legally or practically. No
constitutional or statutory provision even alludes to such a
method of appointment. A bar association appointment
would place the selection of a special justice in the hands
of an individual or group unaccountable to the electorate.
Therefore, neither of Petitioners’ suggested alternatives
have constitutional or statutory merit.
Il. THE STATE COURT DECISION SHOULD NOT
BE REVIEWED BECAUSE IT IS BASED ON ADE-
QUATE AND INDEPENDENT NONFEDERAL
GROUNDS.
This Court should deny the petitions for writ of certio-
rari because the decision of the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky, Commonwealth v. Smith, 875 S.W.2d 873; Yeoman
Pet. 3la-42a, rests on the independent and adequate
nonfederal grounds of the Kentucky Constitution Section
59 and the state cases construing that section. “Respect
for the independence of state courts, as well as avoidance
of rendering advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones
of this Court’s refusal to decide cases where there is an
adequate and independent state ground.” Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983). The grounds for the decision
of the Supreme Court of Kentucky are independent be-
cause of the unique constitutional provision involved, and
adequate because they are broad enough to dispose of this
entire issue. Enterprise Irrig. District v. Farmers Mutual
Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917).
10
A. The Language and Application of the Special
Legislation Prohibition Found in Section 59 are
Unique to Kentucky.
Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution prohibits “spe-
cial legislation” in the area of taxation and twenty-seven
other enumerated areas. Section 59 also provides that
“liJn all other cases where a general law can be made
applicable, no special law shall be enacted.” Ky. Const. §
59(29), App. 3a. The underlying purpose of Section 59 is to
protect citizens without means from lobbyists who influ-
ence legislation. Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Holmes,
Ky., 872 S.W.2d 446 (1994).
The Petitioners concede that Section 59 “has long been
interpreted as providing greater protection for individual
liberty and against arbitrary exercises of legislative power
than the United States Constitution and other state con-
stitutions,” Yeoman Pet., p. 15 n. 2. “When considered
against its historical background, it is evident that Section
59 is more than simply another way of restating the gener-
alized language of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 183, cert. denied, 479
U.S. 822 (1986). See also Smith, 875 S.W.2d at 878; Yeo-
man Pet. 38a. In light of the Court’s policy of avoiding
adjudication of unnecessary constitutional questions, this
Court should not review the Supreme Court of Kentucky's
decision. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455
U.S. 283 (1982); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
Section 59 is complex because:each factual situation
must be judged separately against the state constitutional
standard that has evolved in interpreting that section. The
Yeoman Petitioners cite Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179,
Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, Ky., 808 S.W.2d 809
(1991), and Commonwealth v. Wasson, Ky., 842 S.W.2d
487 (1992), for the proposition that Section 59 is consis-
tently invoked to void arbitrary legislation. Yeoman Pet.,
11
p.15 n.2. While the Supreme Court of Kentucky voided
the statutes in those cases, many other statutes are held
valid under Section 59. In Waggoner v. Waggoner, 864
S.W.2d 704, the Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld a statu-
tory classification exempting teachers’ retirement contri-
butions from consideration as marital property in a divorce
proceeding while other pensions were subject to division.
Also, in Sims v. Board of Education of Jefferson County,
Ky., 290 S.W.2d 491 (1956), Kentucky’s highest court up-
held an occupational license tax on the earnings of indi-
viduals and profits of businesses to benefit public schools
even though the taxpayer had no children in school and
received no direct personal benefit. The Smith decision is
consistent with other recent holdings by the Kentucky ap-
pellate courts. Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Holmes, 872
S.W.2d 446; Edwards v. Land, Ky. App., 851 S.W.2d 484
(1992). Therefore, no departure from established Kentucky
law exists in the instant case. Cf. Aetna v. Lavoie, 475
U.S. 813.
The Kentucky courts review and weigh each Section 59
case individually. After full consideration of the facts of
this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky rested its deci-
sion on Section 59, an independent and adequate nonfederal
ground. Smith, 875 S.W.2d at 875; Yeoman Pet. 31a-32a.
Therefore, this Court should deny certiorari.
B. The Kentucky Supreme Court Decision Was Not
Based on a Federal Question and Is Not in Con-
flict with Any Other Federal or State Court
Decisions.
While the Supreme Court of Kentucky referred to gen-
eral constitutional principles in deciding these issues, the
court did not construe or directly apply the U.S. Constitu-
tion in its decision. Nor did the court decide any matter at
issue directly relating to the validity, construction, appli-
cation or administration of any federal statute, or any right,
title, privilege or immunity under any federal statute.
12
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Kentucky did not de-
cide a federal question in direct conflict with any appli-
cable decision of this Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals, or a
state court of last resort. Indeed, the Petitioners fail to
identify any such cases. In the only analogous case, the
Florida Supreme Court upheld a tax on all physicians li-
censed to practice medicine in Florida to fund the Birth-
Related Neurological Injury Compensation Fund that
compensates victims for birth-related neurological injuries.
Coy v. Florida Birth-Related Injury Compensation Plan,
Fla., 595 So.2d 943, cert. denied, sub nom, McGibony v.
Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Plan, __ U.S.___ , 118 S.Ct. 194 (1992). Although not all
physicians subject to the tax would benefit from poten-
tially lower malpractice premiums, the Coy court found
that the tax was sufficiently related to the delivery of health
care in general.
The Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in Smith re-
ferred to “federal criteria” imposed on the states to be eli-
gible to obtain federal matching funds under the Medicaid
program. Smith, 875 S.W.2d at 875-876; Yeoman Pet. 34a.
However, those references are simply a recognition by the
court of the factual background against which the Ken-
tucky General Assembly enacted the tax provisions in HB
1, and not, as Petitioner Smith contends, the court’s
“misconstru[ction]” and “misapplication” of federal law.
Smith Pet., pp. 22-25. The determination of whether the
provider tax revenues are eligible for match will be made
by the federal Health Care Financing Administration. This
issue is not before the Court.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky properly recognized
that it would have been “illogical” for the legislature not to
have “designed” HB 1 “to meet” those federal “require-
ments as to the class of health care providers that may be
taxed in order to qualify for matching funds.” Smith, 875
13
S.W.2d at 876; Yeoman Pet. 34a. The Kentucky General
Assembly, facing a July 1, 1993 deadline for changing
Kentucky’s existing provider tax, met in special session to
find a way to provide money needed to match federal Med-
icaid dollars. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w). Contrary to Peti-
tioner Smith’s characterization, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky did not determine that the federal criteria “com-
pelled” or “mandate[d]” the tax provisions at issue. Smith
Pet., pp. 24-25. Rather, the court correctly found that the
federal criteria were operative facts in the enactment of
HB 1, and that “defining the class [of those to be taxed
under HB 1] in a coextensive manner with the federal law
results in a rational basis for such classification without
arbitrariness.” Smith, 875 S.W.2d at 876; Yeoman Pet.
34a.
Federal and state courts have consistently held that
legislative bodies possess greater freedom in classifications
in the field of taxation than in other areas. Madden v.
Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Rev-
enue Cabinet, Ky., 689 S.W.2d 14 (1985).
Since the Supreme Court of Kentucky correctly decided
the particular issues in this case using state law principles
which are not in conflict with federal law or decisions,
there is no basis or need for review of those state law
issues on a writ of certiorari.
14
CONCLUSION
Because the Supreme Court of Kentucky did not decide
a federal question nor specifically rule on the constitution-
ality of a state statute under the federal constitution, but
declared a tax statute enacted by the Kentucky General
Assembly and the appointment of three special justices to
be constitutionally sound, no special and important rea-
sons exist for the Court to review this matter.
For the foregoing reasons, the Petitions for Writ of Cer-
tiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
LEONARD G. ROWENKAMP
SMITH, WOLNITZEK, SCHACHTER
& ROWENKAMP, P.S.C.
502 Greenup Street
P.O. Box 352
Covington, Kentucky 41012-0352
Ph.: 606/491-4444
FAX: 606/491-1001
Counsel of Record
DaNA BYNUM MAyYTON
CaTHy CRAVENS SNELL
Division of Legal Services
Revenue Cabinet
P.O. Box 423
Frankfort, Kentucky 40602
ANGELA M. ForpD
E.D. KLATTE
Office of the Counse!
Cabinet for Human Resources
275 E. Main Street
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Counsel for Respondents
APPENDIX
la
[EXCERPTS FROM KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION]
§ 59. Local and special legislation. — The Gen-
eral Assembly shall not pass local or specia! acts concern-
ing any of the following subjects, or for any of the following
purposes, namely:
First: To regulate the jurisdiction, or practice, or the
circuits of the courts of justice, or the rights, powers, du-
ties or compensation of the officers thereof; but the prac-
tice in circuit courts in continuous session may, by a gen-
eral law, be made different from the practice of circuit
courts held in terms.
Second: To regulate the summoning, impaneling or com-
pensation of grand or petit jurors.
Third: To provide for changes of venue in civil or crimi-
nal causes. :
Fourth: To regulate the punishment of crimes and mis-
demeanors, or to remit fines, penalties or forfeitures.
Fifth: To regulate the limitation of civil or criminal
causes.
Sixth: To affect the estate of cestuis que trust, dece-
dents, infants or other persons under disabilities, or to
authorize any such persons to sell, lease, encumber or dis-
pose of their property.
Seventh: To declare any person of age, or to relieve an
infant or feme covert of disability, or to enable him to do
acts allowed only to adults not under disabilities.
Eighth: To change the law of descent, distribution or
succession.
Ninth: To authorize the adoption or legitimation of chil-
dren.
Tenth: To grant divorces.
Eleventh: To change the names of persons.
Twelfth: To give effect to invalid deeds, wills or other
instruments.
2a
Thirteenth: To legalize, except as against the Common-
wealth, the unauthorized or invalid act of any officer or
public agent of the Commonwealth, or of any city, county
or municipality thereof.
Fourteenth: To refund money legally paid into the State
Treasury.
Fifteenth: To authorize or to regulate the levy, the as-
sessment or the collection of taxes, or to give any indul-
gence or discharge to any assessor or collector of taxes, or
to his sureties.
Sixteenth: To authorize the opening, altering, main-
taining or vacating of roads, highways, streets, alleys, town
plats, cemeteries, graveyards, or public grounds not owned
by the Commonwealth.
Seventeenth: To grant a charter to any corporation, or
to amend the charter of any existing corporation; to license
companies or persons to own or operate ferries, bridges,
roads or turnpikes; to declare streams navigable, or to au-
thorize the construction of booms or dams therein, or to
remove obstructions therefrom; to affect toll gates or to
regulate tolls; to regulate fencing or the running at large
of stock.
Eighteenth: To create, increase or decrease fees, per-
centages or allowances to public officers, or to extend the
time for the collection thereof, or to authorize officers to
appoint deputies.
Nineteenth: To give any person or corporation the right
to lay a railroad track or tramway, or to amend existing
charters for such purposes.
Twentieth: To provide for conducting elections, or for
designating the places of voting, or changing the bound-
aries of wards, precincts or districts, except when new coun-
ties may be created.
Twenty-first: To regulate the rate of interest.
Twenty-second: To authorize the creation, extension,
enforcement, impairment or release of liens.
3a
Twenty-third: To provide for the protection of game
and fish.
Twenty-fourth: To regulate labor, trade, mining or
manufacturing.
Twenty-fifth: To provide for the management of com-
mon schools.
Twenty-sixth: To locate or change a county seat.
Twenty-seventh: To provide a means of taking the sense
of the people of any city, town, district, precinct or county,
whether they wish to authorize, regulate or prohibit therein
the sale of vinous, spirituous or malt liquors, or alter the
liquor laws.
Twenty-eighth: Restoring to citizenship persons con-
victed of infamous crimes.
Twenty-ninth: In all other cases where a general law
can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.
§110. Composition — Jurisdiction — Quorum —
Special justices — Districts — Chief justice. — (1)
The Supreme Court shall consist of the chief justice of the
commonwealth and six associate justices.
(2)(a) The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdic-
tion only, except it shall have the power to issue all writs
necessary in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or the com-
plete determination of any cause, or as may be required to
exercise control of the Court of Justice.
(b) Appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court im-
posing a sentence of death or life imprisonment or impris-
onment for twenty years or more shall be taken directly to
the Supreme Court. In all other cases, criminal and civil,
the Supreme Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction as
provided by its rules.
(3) A majority of the justices of the Supreme Court
shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.
If as many as two justices decline or are unable to sit in
the trial of any cause, the chief justice shall certify that
fact to the governor, who shall appoint to try the particu-
4a
lar cause a sufficient number of justices to constitute a full
court for the trial of the cause.
(4) The Court of Appeals districts existing on the effec-
tive date of this amendment to the constitution shall con-
stitute the initial Supreme Court districts. The general
assembly thereafter may redistrict the commonwealth, by
counties, into seven Supreme Court districts as nearly equal
in population and as compact in form as possible. There
shall be one justice from each Supreme Court district.
(5)(a) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect one
of their number to serve as chief justice for a term of four
years.
(b) The chief justice of the commonwealth shall be the
executive head of the Court of Justice and he shall appoint
such administrative assistants as he deems necessary. He
shall assign temporarily any justice or judge of the com-
monwealth, active or retired, to sit in any court other than
the Supreme Court when he deems such assignment nec-
essary for the prompt disposition of causes. The chief jus-
tice shall submit the budget for the Court of Justice and
perform all other necessary administrative functions relat-
ing to the court.
5a
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY
93-SC-946-TG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
REVENUE CABINET, ET AL., - - - - APPELLANTS
U.
CHARLES C. SMITH, JR., M.D., Er AL., - - - APPELLEES
AFFIDAVIT OF STUART G. YEOMAN, M.D,
NOW COMES the Affiant, STUART G. YEOMAN, M.D.,
and, after being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. That this Affiant is a physician who practices medi-
cine in Bowling Green, Kentucky, and is one of the
Appellees/Movants in the above-entitled case.
2. That this Affiant obtained from the Louisville Cou-
rier-Journal nearly six hundred (600) news articles in which
Governor Brereton C. Jones, both before and during his
administration, has commented upon the need for health
care reform in Kentucky.
3. That of the aforesaid articles this Affiant obtained,
the following are representative of the involvement of Gov-
ernor Brereton C. Jones in the development and drafting
of what became House Bill 1; and, of the fact that he called
the Kentucky General Assembly into Extraordinary Ses-
sion to consider the Bill; that he publicly lobbied for its
passage and signed the Bill into law; and that he has
publicly commented on the within-styled case:
A. From the start of his political career, Governor Jones
has made health care reform one of his highest political
priorities. He has repeatedly stated that essential to re-
form is universal health insurance coverage for all Ken-
6a
tuckians. As early as May, 1989, while he was Lt. Gover-
nor and the head of the Kentucky Health Care Access
Foundation, Governor Jones endorsed a plan to “expand
the Medicaid program to cover all uninsured Kentuckians
with incomes less than the federal poverty line.” At that
time, Medicaid covered only about half of those for whom
he sought coverage. He has acknowledged that such an
expansion of Medicaid would “cost the State at least $210
million, and is ‘totally impractical’ in the current financial
condition.” Courier-Journal, May 10, 1989. Exhibit 1.
B. During his campaign for Governor, Jones made
health care reform one of his highest priorities. He stated,
“we're going to insist on reform, so that we can improve
the quality of health care, hold down costs and expand
coverage.” Courier-Journal, October 2, 1991. Exhibit 2.
C. As Governor-Elect, Jones, in November, 1991, stated
that proposed changes in Medicaid rules could sidetrack
his proposal to expand Medicaid coverage to approximately
225,000 so-called uninsured Kentuckians. Jones said that,
if Medicaid changes go through, his proposal is not going
to be practical or realistic. Courier-Journal, November 8,
1991. Exhibit 3.
D. In his inaugural address, Governor Jones stated,
“cooperation and mutual respect will give us a fighting
chance to take a national leadership role in providing qual-
ity health care for all people.” Courier-Journal, December
11, 1991. Exhibit 4.
E. In his first State of the State speech (delivered be-
fore the Kentucky General Assembly), Governor Jones said,
“I cannot and I will not allow a temporary budget problem
to deter us from achieving our goals of affordable health
care to every Kentuckian.” He further stated, “I will ap-
point a special task force for comprehensive health care
reform. This task force will be charged with developing
reform recommendations this year because this issue re-
quires action as soon as possible. I will then ask you to
consider those recommendations in a special legislative ses-
sion.” Courier-Journal, January 14, 1992. Exhibit 5.
Ta
F. From the start of his tenure as Governor, Jones has
pushed for legislation mandating universal health insur-
ance for all Kentuckians. In February 1992, Representa-
tive Joe Clarke said, “That whole special session (on health
care reform) concerns me because the Governor has raised
expectations that we'll find a solution. But right now I
can’t think of any comprehensive solution that doesn’t call
for either reduced benefits or cost a lot more money.” Cou-
rier-Journal, February 8, 1992. Exhibit 6.
G. In March 1992, Governor Jones formed the Com-
mission on Health Care Reform, chaired by Leonard Heller,
and the Task Force on Health Care Access and Affordability,
chaired by James Newberry. Jones said, “This announce-
ment begins a process that will bring meaningful health
care reform to Kentucky.” Courier-Journal, March 12, 1992
(7). On March 26, 1992, Governor Jones imposed a mora-
torium on the expansion of health care facilities and ser-
vices to “clear the decks” for the groups he appointed to
come up with health care reform ideas. Courier-Journal,
March 27, 1992 (8). On April 9, 1992, Governor Jones
stated he planned to call a special legislative session on
health care in November of 1992. Courier-Journal, April
10, 1992 (9). On April 25, 1992, Governor Jones, in a
speech in Eastern Kentucky, said, “We are going to take
the national leadership role in providing health care.” Cou-
rier-Journal, April 26, 1992. (10) Exhibits 7, 8. /sic] 9 and 10.
H. In June 1992, Leonard Heller, Governor Jones’ Hu-
man Resources Secretary, again stated that Medicaid cov-
erage could be expanded to cover more people, since the
program now covers only about half of the people living
under the federal poverty line. Courier-Journal, June 13,
1992. Exhibit 11.
I. On July 8, 1992, “Governor Jones told a group of
legislative leaders that he is fully committed to health care
8a
reform in Kentucky, regardless of how much political capi-
tal he must expend, and that any reform measure must
address cost containment, malpractice reform and univer-
sal coverage.” Courier-Journal, July 9, 1992. Exhibit 12.
J. On July 10, 1992, at the first meeting of his Com-
mission for Health Care Reform, Governor Jones stated,
“Health Care Reform is this administration’s top priority.”
He further stated, “The goals of reform would be to provide
everyone access to basic, good-quality care and to control
costs.” Courier-Journal, July 11, 1993. Exhibit 13.
K. On July 18, 1992, Governor Jones said that it “is
very close to time to go to war to win health care reform in
Kentucky.” Jones said he “won’t back away from his pro-
posal to treat health care providers like utilities and regu-
late their rates.” He thinks Kentucky should assert power
to set health care rates so as to guard against the unrea-
sonableness of some who are in the profession. !n a forum
that also featured West Virginia Senator Jay Rockefeller
and Pennsylvania Senator Harris Wofford, Jones said he
is “very confident the November special session will pro-
duce universal coverage and other sweeping reforms in
Kentucky.” Courier-Journal, July 14, 1992 (14). In the
same forum, Governor Jones proposed that employers be
mandated to provide health insurance to all their workers.
Courier-Journal, July 15, 1992 (15). Exhibits 14 and 15.
L. On August 9, 1992, Governor Jones stated, in re-
sponse to an unrelated setback, “this quite frankly, will
probably serve as a blessing because it will allow me to
take the focus off of things that maybe are not as impor-
tant as health care reform and put all of our focus on
health care.” Courier-Journal, August 10, 1992. Exhibit 16.
M. In an article in the Courier-Journal dated August
19, 1992, it was reported that Governor Jones was still
planning on a November Special Session on Health Care,
even though he had not yet revealed his own proposals for
health care reform to his Commission on Health Care Re-
form. Key legislators questioned the wisdom of a Novem-
ber Special Session. Joe Clarke said, “I have never thought
9a
shooting for November was wise. I don’t see how in the
world we can do it now.” Courier-Journal, August 19,
1992. Exhibit 17.
N. In September 1992, in the plan developed by Gover-
nor Jones to his Health Reform Commission, Governor
Jones called for extending the current tax on health care
providers used to help fund the Medicaid program to more
providers to pay for expanding the Medicaid program. The
plan said the reforms would be financed without a new
tax. But, health care providers and individuals would be
expected to pay so the coverage can be provided. Courier-
Journal, September 3, 1992 (18). On September 2, 1992,
Governor Jones stated, “I am unwilling to allow any issue
to create problems that will stand in the path of our pro-
viding health care for every Kentuckian”, [sic] and that he
intends for “health care reform to be the hallmark of his
administration”. [sic] Courier-Journal, September 3, 1992
(19). Exhibits 18 and 19.
O. On September 9, 1992, Governor Jones formally un-
veiled his health reform plan that called for all Kentuck-
ians to have health insurance by the end of 1993. All
employers would have to provide coverage for their em-
ployees and the state picking up the cost for the poor. The
state Medicaid program would be expanded to fully cover
health care for unemployed adults living below the federal
poverty level. To pay for the plan, Governor Jones pro-
posed broadening the existing tax on providers of health
services, to obtain additional federal Medicaid money. Cou-
rier-Journal, September 10, 1992. Exhibit 20.
P. On September 18, 1992, Governor Jones, respond-
ing to mounting questions about his health care proposals,
said, “I will convene a special session in November regard-
less of whether the plan is ready or if there are enough
votes to pass it.” Courier-Journal, September 19, 1992
(21). In a September 24, 1992 article in the Courier-Jour-
nal, Governor Jones’ problems in gaining support for his
health reform plan with legislators was discussed. Repre-
sentative Kenny Rapier, House Majority Whip, said of
10a
Jones’ plan, “There was zero support for it before today,
and there’s zero today.” Both Senator Mike Moloney and
Representative Marshall Long questioned financing. Cou-
rier-Journal, September 24, 1992 (22). On September 24,
1992, Governor Jones backed off his promise to call a spe-
cial session in November after meeting with Senator John
“Eck” Rose and Representative Joe Clarke. Clarke told
the Governor he was “losing his capital with legislators” by
insisting on the November deadline.” [sic] Courier-Jour-
nal, September 25, 1992 (23). Exhibits 21, 22 and 23.
Q. On November 8, 1992, Governor Jones said in an
interview that Kentucky is further along in health reform
than the federal government and, “we've got to show the
leadership in health care reform”. [sic] He said “Kentucky
was in a better position to act for the simple reason that
this is my No. 1 priority, and I’m willing to spend all of my
political capital if necessary to get this done.” Courier-
Journal, November 9, 1992. Exhibit 24.
R. In response to the Governor, Representative Kenny
Rapier stated that small business opposed the mandate for
employers to provide insurance coverage for their employ-
ees and “knowledgeable House Democrats want to go slow
on providing universal health coverage, phasing it in over
several years.” Courier-Journal, November 22, 1992. Ex-
hibit 25.
S. On December 4, 1992, Governor Jones said “he would
unveil his revised health care package in the next few
days.” He said, “the failure to get his health care plan off
the ground this year was the biggest disappointment of his
first year in office.” He further stated he plans to call a
special session on health care early in 1993. Courier-Jour-
nal, December 5, 1992. Exhibit 26.
T. On December 8, 1992, Governor Jones said he “will
do whatever it takes to get his health care reform plan
passed. When we get this plan together. . . you will see a
fight like you’ve never seen before. You just have to play
hardball politics.” He said, “this is my No. 1 priority.”
Courier-Journal, December 9, 1992. Exhibit 27.
Pi ek Anche nc: WOR Bi Aleta Fon ine
lla
U. On December 9, 1992, Governor Jones said his re-
vised plan would be financed through cost saving measures
and expanding tax on providers. Courier-Journal, Decem-
ber 10, 1992. Exhibit 28.
V. After Governor Jones presented his revised plan and
further modifications, there were still major problems with
the Legislature. Speaker Joe Clarke said, “There’s no way
to pass it, at least not this year. I probably mean next
year, too. The problem is in the Governor's insistence on
universal access.” Courier-Journal, March 7, 1993. Ex-
hibit 29.
W. On March 10, 1993, a “health care advisor to the
Governor acknowledged that opposition to Jones’s two re-
form plans may mean he'll have to come up with a third
one.” However, Governor Jones reiterated that any reform
plan must extend coverage to all Kentuckians, not just
give them a chance to buy it. Courier-Journal, March 11,
1993. Exhibit 30.
X. On March 31, 1993, Governor Jones outlined an-
other proposal for universal health care coverage in Ken-
tucky. This proposal created a payroll tax of 3% or 4% and
mandated that individuals buy health insurance. Gover-
nor Jones “stuck by his insistence that the state should
seek immediate, universal coverage for all of its residents.”
Democratic representatives said mandates and new taxes
would be very hard to pass. Courier-Journal, April 1, 1993.
Exhibit 31.
Y. On April 21, 1993, the Courier-Journal reported that
Governor Jones was meeting with lawmakers, one-on-one,
to line up support for his health reform plan and to prepare
for a special session in May. But 9 of 10 lawmakers who
met with Jones said they can’t take firm positions on Jones’
plans because Jones has not yet come up with a Bill. Cou-
rier-Journal, April 21, 1993. Exhibit 32.
Z. On April 23, 1993, Governor Jones unveiled his
health care reform Bill [House Bill 1] and said he will call
a special session on May 10. The Bill [House Bill 1] in-
12a
cludes universal coverage. “Doctors, hospitals, and other
providers would be taxed a percentage of their revenues;
they would be prohibited from passing the tax onto con-
sumers in higher charges. [sic] Courier-Journal, April 24,
1993. Exhibit 33.
AA. An article in the Courier-Journal, dated April
27, 1993 states, “Although the Commission on Health
Care reform was created by Jones to draft a health
care reform package, it only briefly discussed Jones’
Bill.” Courier-Journal, April 27, 1993 (84). On May
5, 1993, Joe Clarke and others recommended delaying
the session citing a lack of support for Jones’ plan.
Courier-Journal, May 6, 1993 (85). Exhibits 34 and
35.
BB. On May 7, 1993, Governor Jones said he will
favor Legislators who support his health care plan when
he chooses park improvement projects. The governor
made his remarks after Representative Kenny Rapier
said he heard reports that Jones is holding projects
hostage for votes to pass his troubled health care bill.
“If you get to the point where you've got 3 or 4 worthy
projects and they're all deserving, and one is spon-
sored by someone who’s for your bill, and the other
three are sponsored by someone who's against your
bill, which one are you going to go for?” Jones asked.
“I’m going to go for the one that was for the bill, of
course.” Courier-Journal, May 8, 1993. Exhibit 36.
CC. A May 11, 1993 article in the Courier-Jour-
nal stated that Jones shows no backing off on his two
main goals: controlling cost and providing immediate
universal coverage. Legislative leaders say the state
cannot afford immediate universal coverage, and many
lawmakers disliké the proposed payroll tax. Courier-
Journal, May 11, 1993. In the same article, Jones
said he would be the “lobbyist” for 450,000 uninsured
Kentuckians, and that he would provide insurance cov-
erage to some by expanding Medicaid. “Everyone will
have to make sacrifices to accomplish his goals”, [sic]
lhe .
13a
said Jones, who specifically mentioned health care pro-
viders whom he wants to tax to help finance his reform
plan. Those who have profited the most from this
dollars-driven system must now, in fairness, be asked
to give the most.” Courier-Journal, May 11, 1993.
Exhibit 37.
DD. On May 10, 1993, Governor Jones told law-
makers that he will compromise on “100 other issues”,
[sic] but not on health care. Courier-Journal, May 11,
1993. Exhibit 38.
EE. On May 11, 1993, Governor Jones disclosed
his estimates of the cost of covering everyone under
his bill. About half of the newly covered people would
be added to the Medicaid rolls. The additional cost
would be paid by a tax on health care providers. Cou-
rier-Journal, May 12, 1993. Exhibit 39.
FF. Articles from May 13, 1993 (40), May 14,
1993 (41), May 15, 1993 (42), May 17, 1993 (43), May
18, 1993 (44), and May 19, 1993 (45), reveal the inter-
play between a persistent Governor, pushing for uni-
versal coverage and cost-controls, and a Legislature
that wouldn’t agree with Governor Jones’ plan for
health reform. Courier-Journal, May 13-19, 1993. Ex-
hibits 40-45. Finally, on May 20, 1993, the Special
Session collapsed, but House Bill 1 passed. Represen-
tative Clarke said that the news that lawmakers had
decided to call it quits was quite a shock to the Gover-
nor. “I don’t think he saw it coming”, [sic] Clarke
said. “Jones repeatedly asked for a couple of days to
reflect on this and make a counter proposal”, [sic] said
Senator Charles Berger. “We didn’t have much of a
discussion”, [sic] said Senator Fred Bradley. “We had
to say the same thing over and over, about 10 or 15
times.” In a later meeting, Jones salvaged a promise of
another Special Session on Health Care later this year.
Courier-Journal, May 21, 1993 (46). Exhibits 40-46.
GG. Discussing the Special Session, the Courier-
Journal related Jones’ threats to hold lawmakers hos-
l4a
tage until Christmas Day, if necessary, to get his health
plan passed. He talked tough about rewarding friends
in the Legislature with projects in the $100 million
Parks bond issue. And he threatened in advance of
May’s Special Session to reconvene the Legislators, ad
infinitum, if they sat on his health care initiative. Cou-
rier-Journal, May 23, 1993. Exhibit 47.
HH. In an op-ed piece in the Courier-Journal, Gov-
ernor Jones stated, “The campaign to reform health
care in Kentucky is alive and well. To solve, this, the
most crucial problem facing our state, first, we must
get control of health care costs which are now spiral-
ing out of control. Second, we must see that every
Kentuckian has affordable health insurance coverage.”
Courier-Journal, June 20, 1993. Exhibit 48.
II. On June 18, 1993, when informed of a law-
suit planned by the KMA challenging the 2% provider
tax, Governor Jones said, through a spokesman, that
he was disappointed by the KMA’s decision and that
when his goal of universal health insurance coverage
is achieved, doctors will be paid for serving indigent
people in excess of the 2% tax. Courier-Journal, June
19, 1993. Exhibit 49.
JJ. Two leading state legislators express doubts
on July 16, 1993, that Kentucky will enact health care
reform legislation either this year or next year. “I
just don’t see it happening,” said Senator Mike
Moloney. Senator [sic] Joe Clarke said that expand-
ing the number of Kentuckians who are covered by
health insurance would take new state revenue. “I
don’t see us raising taxes in 1993 or 1994 to take care
of health care or to balance the budget”, [sic] said
Clarke. Courier-Journal, July 17, 1993. Exhibit 50.
KK. Later in July in a television interview, Joe
Clarke told viewers that lawmakers won’t be ready
for a Special Session “if the Governor takes the posi-
tion that he has to have universal coverage within his
term, that is not in the cards.” Courier-Journal, July
27, 1993. Exhibit 51.
15a
LL. Governor Jones, in early August, “accused
House Speaker Joe Clarke of a flip-flop on the May
agreement for saying in a July 18 broadcast interview
that the General Assembly would not raise taxes to
pay for universal health insurance coverage. Jones
said he plans to call the second Special Session by the
end of the year, and the public will know who wants to
solve the problem and who doesn’t.” Clarke responded
saying, “There wasn’t any commitment made to any
specific package or any specific solution. I had been
telling him (Jones) all along there was no support for
a tax increase, and that hasn’t changed, and he knew
that.” Jones insisted in an interview that he still
considers health care the “most important single issue
facing the Commonwealth”. [sic] Courier-Journal, Au-
gust 6, 1993. Exhibit 52.
MM. On August 6, 1993, House members indicated
that they are willing to enact health care legislation,
but they agreed that a tax increase to extend health
insurance to all Kentuckians is not feasible in the
near future. Courier-Journal, August 7, 1993. Ex-
hibit 53.
NN. Finally, on August 12, 1993, Governor Jones
said that he’s given up pushing for passage of univer-
sal health care coverage in a Special Session that could
be held in October. Jones said he still wanted univer-
sal coverage, “but I think the reality of the situation is
telling all of us that it’s not going to be done immedi-
ately. I have not changed my goal of getting universal
coverage as quickly as possible.” Jones said he ex-
pects the coverage to be phased in beginning with
“where the greatest need is and where you can get the
greatest return for the dollars invested.” He said he
would not seek a tax increase in the Special Session.
Jones said “that people will be surprised by how quickly
universal coverage can be attained.” Courier-Journal,
August 13, 1993. Exhibit 54.
OO. In a report on the Health Task Force dated
October 9, 1993, Governor Jones again stated his de-
PS
l6a
sire for a special session before the end of the year.
Jones said he wants the state to set aside any savings
it receives in the health care funds in a special trust
fund that would be used to extend coverage to the
poor. Courier-Journal, October 9, 1993. Exhibit 55.
PP. On November 16, 1993, Governor Jones said
his plan for universal coverage at controlled cost was
stalled by Legislative inaction and “a lot of people
making a lot of money who don’t want the system to
change.” Courier-Journal, November 17, 1993. Ex-
hibit 56.
QQ. On December 9, 1993, Governor Jones an-
nounced that Health and Human Services Secretary
Donna Shalala had approved Kentucky’s five-year pi-
lot project, which will start July 1. Kentucky can
dramatically expand its medicaid program to cover |
everyone living under the poverty line. This expands |
health insurance coverage to another 201,000 children |
and adults. Jones said vhe plan would still leave an
estimated 200,000 to 230,000 Kentuckians without in-
surance, but would be a major step toward universal |
insurance coverage. Jones acknowledged that the Med- |
icaid expansion depends upon the outcome of the court |
case (the 2% provider tax on appeal), but he said he |
believed the Supreme Court would issue a ruling
quickly. Courier-Journal, December 10, 1993. Ex-
hibit 57.
RR. In mid-December, three Supreme Court Jus-
tices, Leibson, Spain and Lambert, disqualified them-
selves from hearing the appeal of my lawsuit, because
of conflict of interest concerns. Courier-Journal, Janu-
ary 7, 1994. Exhibit 58.
SS. On January 6, 1994, Governor Jones named
three Special Justices to the Kentucky Supreme Court
for the appeal involving the health care provider tax:
Sheryl G. Snyder of Louisville, Ben S. Fletcher III of
Hopkinsville, and Stephen C. Cawood of Pineville.
Courier-Journal, January 7, 1994. Exhibit 59.
17a
TT. Even after the appointment of the three (3)
Special Justices, Governor Jones, in his State of the
Commonwealth address, stated:
“A centerpiece to the health care financing issue
and to the state budget is, of course, the retention of
the provider tax. We must collect this amount of money,
have it more than tripled in Washington, and give it
to providers to pay for the health care of thousands of
Kentuckians.”
Courier-Journal, January 25, 1993; Lexington Herald-
Leader, January 25, 1993.
4. The foregoing chronology documents that Governor
Jones has been, and continues to be, the principal political
figure in Kentucky pushing for health reform. Health care
reform is “his number one priority”, [sic] and he has staked
all of his “political capital” on accomplishing his two chief
goals of health reform: (1) universal insurance coverage
for all Kentuckians; and, (2) cost containment.
5. He has relentlessly pushed for universal coverage
against a reluctant Legislature, a Legislature that has been
bound by budgetary restrains, /sic] and the almost unani-
mous opinion of all Legislators that the enactment of any
new general tax measures would be impolitic. The Gover-
nor, in the span of several months, has presented various
means of trying to accomplish immediate universal health
insurance coverage, but has failed to convince the Legisla-
ture to enact his comprehensive plans, because of their
aversion to any general tax measure.
6. In trying to devise plans for providing insurance
coverage for the approximately 450,000 uninsured Ken-
tuckians, the Governor has consistently (in every plan he
has presented) relied on the expansion of the Medicaid
program to cover those below the federal poverty line, but
not currently covered by Medicaid. This encompasses ap-
proximately 200,000 so-called uninsured Kentuckians, about
one-half of the total so-called uninsured in Kentucky. In
each plan, the 2% provider tax was proposed as the rev-
“enue measure to provide funding for this Medicaid expan-
18a
sion, a tax on 6,000 physicians, rather than any general
tax measure. Then the Governor’s plan, when published
in the Spring of 1993, stated that the 2% tax on providers’
gross revenues could not be passed through to the public
by raising fees. This step of making a pass-through of the
tax illegal, was the creation of the Governor and first ap-
peared in his House Bill 1.
7. In the Special Session on Health Care in May of
1993, the Governor failed to enact his reform plan. He
succeeded in gaining the passage of House Bill 1, which
expanded the 2% provider tax to all health care providers,
and he was able to have the non-pass-through provision of
the tax enacted into law.
8. Subsequent to the failure of the Special Session on
Health Care Reform and the Task Force activities of the
summer of 1993, Governor Jones was forced to accept the
fact that the Legislature was not going to enact universal
health insurance for all Kentuckians. "
9. Governor Jones, still maintaining that health re-
form was his number one priority, subsequently decided
he would have to phase-in universal coverage. He then
applied for, and was granted, a waiver from the federal
government to expand Medicaid by 201,000 people. The
funding for this expansion of Medicaid was to be, in part,
provided by the 2% provider tax.
10. Acknowledging that his plan to expand Medicaid is
contingent on continuation of the provider tax, Governor
Jones in mid-December was faced with the recusal of 3 of
the 7 Supreme Court Justices in his appeal of Judge
Crittenden’s adverse decision.
11. In naming Sheryl G. Snyder, an executive of ICH
Corporation, as a Special Justice, Governor Jones ignores
(or knows and understands) the fact that ICH has a con-
tract with the state awarded by the Executive Branch that
has paid ICH over 16 million dollars since 1988; ignores
(or knows and understands) that ICH donated $5,000 to
his inauguration celebration; and (or knows and under-
19a
stands) ignores the fact that Stephen L. Miller, his ex-aide
and ex-Campaign Manager, and Miller’s law partner, James
H. Newberry, Jr., represent ICH. James Newberry also
chaired the Governor’s Task Force on Health Care Access
and Affordability. Courier-Journal, March 12, 1992 (7),
August 21, 1992 (60), November 15, 1991 (61), March 26,
1992 (62), and January 18, 1992 (63); 8 1994 Martindale-
Hubble Law Directory, KY 109B-KY 110B (64). See also:
Exhibits 7, 60, 61, 62, 63 and 64.
12. Governor Jones is a party in interest in the above-
styled case; he has an interest in its outcome. This Affiant’s
success in the case would jeopardize his stated goals. By
naming the three (3) Special Justices, Governor Jones is
denying this Affiant’s right to a fair and impartial hearing
in Court.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
/s/_ Stuart G. Yeoman MD
Stuart G. YEOMAN, M.D.
STATE Or KENTUCKY \
County OF
SUBSCRIBED AND Sworn to before me by Stuart G. YEo-
MAN, M.D., on this the 28 day of January, 1993 [sic].
My Commission Expires: 4-3-97.
/s/_ Patricia Trotter
Notary PUBLIC
KENTUCKY, STATE AT LARGE
PREPARED By:
/sf/ Kent Masterson Brown
KENT MASTERSON BROWN
CHRISTOPHER J. SHAUGHNESSY
1114 First National Building
167 West Main Street
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
(606) 233-7879
(606) 252-6791—facsimile
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Stuart G. YEOMAN, M.D., Er AL.
20a
SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY
93-SC-946-TG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
REVENUE CaBINET; Er AL., - - - - - Movants
On Appeal From Franklin Circuit Court
Honorable Roger Crittenden, Judge
93-CI-959
v.
Cuar.es C. SmitH, Jr., M.D.; Er AL., - - RESPONDENTS
To Be Heard With:
93-SC-944-TG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
REVENUE CaBINET; Et AL., - - - - - MOVANTS
On Appeal From Franklin Circuit Court
Honorable Roger Crittenden, Judge
93-CI-1275
Uv.
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION
ASSOCIATION OF KENTUCKY, INC., Et AL., - RESPONDENTS
ORDER GRANTING INTERMEDIATE RELIEF
PURSUANT TO CR 76.33
These cases are before the undersigned pursuant to CR
76.33. Movants have requested a stay of the final judg-
ment/order of the Franklin Circuit Court, pending a deci-
sion on the merits by this Court.
Respondents, successfully, in the Franklin Circuit Court
challenged the constitutionality of House Bill 1 (Special
Session, 1993) which imposed a tax on physicians’ services
and health maintenance organizations’ services. The pro-
2la
ceeds of the tax were earmarked to obtain federal match-
ing money to support Kentucky’s extensive Medicaid pro-
gram.
In the judgment, the trial court, inter alia, permanently
enjoined the movant Revenue Cabinet from collecting any
more taxes under the provisions of HB 1, and ordered the
Revenue Cabinet to remit refunds on “taxes already paid”
within 90 days of the order. The emphasis of the present
motion deals with these two provisions.
Transfer of this case has been granted. By separate
order this day, an abbreviated briefing schedule has been
designated, and oral argument has been set for February
17, 1994.
For a temporary stay to be granted, the movants must
show a possibility of success on the merits of the appeal
and must also show that a failure to grant the stay will
cause irreparable damage to them.
The basic legal question presented in the underlying
case involves the right of the Kentucky General Assembly
to establish the classification set out in HB 1, for taxation
purposes, under the proscriptions of Sections 59 and 2 of
the Kentucky Constitution. The undersigned believes that
there is a strong possibility of success on appeal to this
Court. Thus, at least in the opinion of the undersigned,
the first requirement of CR 76.33 is satisfied.
The question of irreparable injury to the Commonwealth
and to the recipients of Medicaid benefits and other clients
served by the movants, Cabinet for Human Resources
(CHR), is more difficult. It is clear from argument of coun-
sel that if the collection of the tax is stopped, that at least
10% of the so-called “matching funds” (presumably for the
next taxing period) will be withdrawn. It is also clear that
the amount of money involved is at least 12 Million Dol-
lars and the maximum amount of money is 25 Million
Dollars. Although the federal matching funds would not
be immediately withdrawn (due to the provision of a bu-
reaucratic hearing process) they could be in serious jeop-
ardy at a later time. It is also clear that if CHR was
22a
without the federal matching money, other scarce resources
of CHR would have to be used to continue Medicaid ser-
vices to Kentucky citizens. In any case, it seems to the
undersigned that unless CHR reallocates its present re-
sources from currently provided social services, the Ken-
tucky Medicaid program would suffer an immediate loss of
10% (12 Million Dollars or 25 Million Dollars) and that
many Kentuckians would suffer a decrease or loss of health
care benefits. Clearly this constitutes irreparable damage
to the citizens of Kentucky who depend on Medicaid for
their health care.
In addition, during argument on the CR 76.33 motion,
counsel for certain respondents conceded that they have no
basic objection to staying the portion of the order of the
Franklin Circuit Court that ordered refunds to be made to
their clients within 90 days of the entry of that order.
Such time frame is unworkable as the matter is currently
on appeal and is not final until a final ruling by this Court
is entered.
The motion for relief pursuant to CR 76.33 is granted,
and the judgment/order of the Franklin Circuit Court dated
November 23, 1993, is stayed pending the final decision of
this Court.
ENTERED: December 21, 1993
/s/_ Robert F. Stephens
Chief Justice
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.