Opposition Brief — Yeoman v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet

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oti Dart, US

No. 94-504

IN THE

RICE D

OCT 20 1994

“OERDE 08 AE CLERK

ET

———e

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1994

STUART G. YEOMAN, M.D., et al. - - Petitioners

versus

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

REVENUE CABINET, et al. - - - Respondents

AND

No. 94-525

CHARLES C. SMITH, JR., M.D., et al. - Petitioners

versus

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

REVENUE CABINET, et al. - - - Respondents

On Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari

to the Supreme Court of Kentucky

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

LEONARD G. ROWEKAMP

SMITH, WOLNITZEK, SCHACHTER

& ROWEKAMP, P.S.C.

502 Greenup Street

P.O. Box 352

Covington, Kentucky 41012-0352

Ph.: 606/491-4444 FAX: 606/491-1001

Counsel of Record

DANA BYNUM MAYTON ANGELA M. FORD

CATHY CRAVENS SNELL E. D. KLATTE

Division of Legal Services Office of the Counsel

Revenue Cabinet Cabinet for Human Resources

P.O. Box 423 275 E. Main Street

Frankfort, Kentucky 40602 Frankfort, Kentucky 40602

Counsel for Respondents

WESTERFIELD BONTE CO., 619 W. KENTUCKY-P.O. BOX 3251, LOUISVILLE, KY.

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether three sitting special supreme court jus-

tices appointed by the governor in accordance with Section

110(8) of the Kentucky Constitution should have disquali-

fied themselves when there was no allegation or evidence

in the record of impropriety, bias or prejudice on the part

of any of those special justices.

2. Whether a state health care provider tax imposed

on physicians violates the prohibition against special

legislation contained in Section 59 of the Kentucky

Constitution.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................ccccccccsesssseeeees i

yy ks gg ____g : SEED E TE eT EN ETI ii-ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................::ccccccssesseeeeees iv—v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...............ccccccesssceeeseees 1- 3

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ............... 4-13

I. The Supreme Court of Kentucky Was

Properly Constituted When It Included

Special Justices Appointed by the

Governor Pursuant to Kentucky

Constitution Section 110(3) ................0...... 4— 9

A. The Governor Is Required by Kentucky

Constitution Section 110(3) to Appoint

Special Justices upon the Recusal of

Two OF NEOTO SUBECED sccccccsccsccescccsesecccesesees 4— 6

B. Recusal of the Sitting Special Justices

Would Have Been Inappropriate Because

There Were No Allegations or Evidence

in the Record Showing Impropriety,

Bias or Prejudice on the Part of Any of

ORD I chcsUiieatimateanitirecserrscs cen 6 8

C. A Practicing Attorney May Sit as a

Special Justice under Established

Regattas COS BaP cccnsisnvecvescrseeesesesocecesese 8

D. The Petitioners’ Alternate Methods

for Choosing Special Justices Have

No Constitutional or Statutory Merit ...... 8- 9

II. The State Court Decision Should Not Be

Reviewed Because It Is Based on

Adequate and Independent Nonfederal

COP GUTID covincicsentlisuanisdieaddeadialtniamintmedinmneeien 9-13

A. The Language and Application of

the Special Legislation Prohibition

Found in Section 59 are Unique

0p TD svsniscienteceeaiscstinibitabiamitstininyshannin 10-11

B. The Kentucky Supreme Court Decision

Was Not Based on a Federal Question

and Is Not in Conflict with Any Other

Federal or State Court Decisions ............. 11-13

iii

os 5. sak, cn cdvapnavodensideuntencoatensds 14

a. sa inns tentonbeinnnansiepeenennienuens la—22a

ara il cacnintiincaveoevs la— 3a

ie cor ndieninisomondorevendnsennteneen Ap,

January 28, 1993 jsic] Affidavit of Stuart G.

ne cacceunpessseannen 5a—19a

December 21, 1993 Order of the Supreme Court

of Kentucky Granting Intermediate Relief

PG TE FIR IO eicaiccvecccencscenesccvepscseccsceses 20a—22a

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

‘

PAGE :

Cases:

Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813

CRIN cic eistnsuscicinidtibdidintatoaneienaredebtaunteciutceitenegs ‘Pe S|

City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc.,

fo ges he | o.. ee aenereE 10

Commonwealth v. Smith, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 873

(2) PCE ea eR ERA Ok T: 2,6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13

Commonwealth v. Wasson, Ky., 842 S.W.2d 487

CE cig eedalaseresandaceced gs ails iki a tAminaid teatabsninionse: 10

Coy v. Florida Birth-Related Injury Compensa-

tion Plan, Fla., 595 So.2d 943, cert. denied,

sub nom, McGibony v. Florida Birth-Related

Neurological Injury Compensation Plan,

FE Be Cee eathcsecciensesas:.. 12

Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, Ky.,

8 a fk BT Pe. : RRR ee een 13

Edwards v. Land, Ky. App., 851 S.W.2d 484

CI ios akiccstbhisickecadinsLiaennttleanatiaisbinbiaienvicieres. 11

Enterprise Irrig. District v. Farmers Mutual

Cmts Ci, BO We BOE CREED cacsndsccssvecccszcee... 9

Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, Ky.,

a te I I inshciteassccretsivtrssctsessvecesees 3,6

Federal Communications Commission v. Beach

Communications, Inc., __U.S.___, 113 S.Ct.

I ak detithcinethcsimasblbsesnnladccibtabdiccavessese0s 3

Gillis v. Yount, Ky., 748 S.W.2d 357 (1988) .......... 3

Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Holmes, Ky.,

re ER iitihececadiieibdeccecedacienns 10, 11

Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987)..........0005 10

Kentucky Utilities v. South East Coal Company,

Ky., 836 S.W.2d 407, pet. cert. voluntarily

dismissed pursuant to Rule 46, __ U.S. __.,

Se i ae 0 ee waists Fibbetetiennsccse a. 8

Liteky v. U.S.,__ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (1994) 8

Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940)............0. 13

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)..............4. 9

Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, Ky., 808

Fg): ) RES ere oe eeeee 10

Cases—Continued

Regency Pheasant Run Ltd. v. Karem, Ky., 860

I oi i namnunice 8

Reynolds Metal Co. v. Martin, 269 Ky. 378,

ee TED ilaricatshinskci tn seiinisenvitacccsoese 3

Sims v. Board of Education of Jefferson County,

ang SE EAE ARNE CRUD enc csccnsccceriescrscscccocess 11

Tabler v. Wallace, Ky., 704 S.W.2d 179 (1985),

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 (1986)..................008 3, 10

Waggoner v. Waggoner, Ky., 846 S.W.2d 704,

cert. denied, _U.S.__, 114 S.Ct. 346 (1993) 3,11

Constitution of the United States:

9 I nc cuceatiduasantisnwnanee 5

Se i I Wiihidnsinreidsisntasvccecciaceccsondcessecvece 2

Be III, FREY cspcctncnccocatuesesssvassncdcsvdutaniens 2

Federal Statutes:

- See oe a re 5

EES TEE TIE AERP I Re RPRTONE aCT? 5

i i lala duacaneonatbia 5

io avetasidstslidbabeandevtinenit 5

a ce cag dmupnsadaans 7

A I ooo ccnencnvaveosnensesccsvescvecedsnaves 13

Federal Regulations:

iia cud biccccapsrtianevoasincinnids 2

Constitution of the Commonwealth

of Kentucky:

as snenineansnavenmnevasnsunsieesens 2

Be NE occ ccnesiciscsacescrondecacecoxecesiesesseten 2

Bs IE TI once cacansocvnscosskotentsunsedanececions passim

Fe I EL vigversdsccnesenncessissinsendtvervcnetctas passim

i no. cpcadwnsaeundenandenceowees 5

a, EE OO... sccnascickdeecendeecadeineess 5

SS AIOE AT TOT 5

ee ccc cncvacsscnspasevevecmisucdapee 5

FR, es PI, BOUT boinscivncndccncersccsnaccsvesebesncoksncnss 6, 8

State Statutes:

PEM HI BPEL ING. 1 cos cnvcscccccccosccccccscesecsessnces passim

FAMNGteeey 2200SO Till No. 250 ............cccccccccccocccsceees 2

pe Ga a 5

Se dl Uialbsiaesavendeniuios 7

State Court Rules:

Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 4.300 .................. 7

No. 94-504

IN THE

SUPREME COURT F THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1994

Sruart G. YEOMAN, M.D., etal. - - - - Petitioners

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, REVENUE

CaBINET,etal. - - - - - - - Respondents

AND

No. 94-525

CHARLES C. SMITH JR., M.D., et al. - - - Petitioners

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, REVENUE

CaBINET, etal. - - - - - - Respondents

On Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari

to the Supreme Court of Kentucky

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondents accept the statement of the case as set

forth by the Petitioners, except as clarified or modified

herein.

The health care provider tax statute in question was

challenged in the trial court as violating the Petitioners’

2

rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

U.S. Constitution, and Sections 2, 3, and 59 of the Ken-

tucky Constitution, but both the trial court and the Su-

preme Court of Kentucky’s rulings rested on Section 59 of

the Kentucky Constitution. Commonwealth v. Smith, Ky.,

875 S.W.2d 873 (1994); Yeoman Pet. 31a-49a. The Petition-

ers sued the Revenue Cabinet and its Secretary, the Cabi-

net for Human Resources and its Secretary, and the

Kentucky Health Care Data Commission. The Governor of

Kentucky, Brereton C. Jones, was not a party-defendant,

and is not a respondent herein.

The tax was contained in House Bill 1 (HB 1) enacted

by the Kentucky General Assembly in its Second Extraordi-

nary Session of 1993 to provide partial funding for Medic-

aid, the state/federal indigent health care program in which

Kentucky voluntarily participates. HB 1 was repealed ef-

fective July 14, 1994 and replaced with another health

care provider tax, House Biil 250, which differs from HB 1

in several regards. In addition to imposing a tax on physi-

cian services, HB 1 imposed a tax on hospital services,

nursing facility services, intermediate care facility services

for the mentally retarded, home health care services, ser-

vices of health maintenance organizations, and outpatient

prescription drugs. The method of taxation chosen here

was but one of several federally permissible health care

tax options availabic to the states. See 42 C.F.R. 433.55.

The legislature amended HB 1 numerous times before its

enactment, and the bill contained significant health care

legislation in addition to the provider tax. Contrary to

Petitioners’ statements, HB 1 was not the “governor's bill.”

The governor’s proposal was contained in House Bill 3 which

was considered that session but not adopted.

The trial court held that the challenged statutes were

unconstitutional as special legislation under Section 59 of

the Kentucky Constitution. Respondents appealed to the

Kentucky Court of Appeals and the case was transferred

3

to the Supreme Court of Kentucky. In reversing the trial

court, the Supreme Court of Kentucky rested its decision

on state constitutional law. In applying Kentucky Consti-

tution Section 59 to the provider tax statute, the court

held that the statute was not special legislation, relying

upon Tabler v. Wallace, Ky., 704 S.W.2d 179 (1985), cert.

denied, 479 U.S. 822 (1986), Federal Communications Com-

mission v. Beach Communications, Inc., __ U.S. __, 113

S.Ct. 2096 (1993), Waggoner v. Waggoner, Ky., 846 S.W.2d

704, cert. denied, ___ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 346 (1993),

Reynolds Metal Co. v. Martin, 269 Ky. 378, 107 S.W.2d

251 (1937), Gillis v. Yount, Ky., 748 S.W.2d 357 (1988),

and other state law decisions.

In addressing Petitioners’ allegations regarding the

three special justices appointed by Governor Jones, the

opinion relied upon interpretation of the method of ap-

pointment adopted in the Kentucky Constitution. The Su-

preme Court of Kentucky relied on Section 110 of the

Kentucky Constitution and the cases interpreting it, par-

ticularly Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, Ky., 609

S.W.2d 682 (1980), and held that recusal is a personal

matter to be decided by each individual justice in the ab-

sence of any so-called per se disqualification or statutory

prohibition. The special justices made such personal re-

view. See Orders, Yeoman Pet. 26a-28a. In addition, the

court pointed out that the Petitioners’ affidavit to the court

at no point made any allegations of impropriety, bias or

prejudice against the three sitting special justices. Affida-

vit of Stuart G. Yeoman, M.D., App. 5a-19a. The Petition-

ers failed to address the issue when offered the chance at

oral argument. A unanimous court denied the Petitioners’

motions for recusal, determining that the governor prop-

erly appointed the special justices in accordance with the

Kentucky Constitution.

ey

4

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

In finding that the tax imposed on physicians under

House Bill 1 does not violate the Kentucky Constitution,

the Supreme Court of Kentucky fully considered and cor-

rectly applied the relevant sections of the Kentucky

Constitution and state cases construing those sections. The

court also held that the Petitioners’ allegations that the

governor’s interest in state health care reform and his ac-

tive participation in the political process did not require

recusal of the three sitting special justices appointed by

the governor where there was no evidence in the record

showing impropriety, bias or prejudice of any of those spe-

cial justices.

I. THE SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY WAS

PROPERLY CONSTITUTED WHEN IT INCLUDED

SPECIAL JUSTICES APPOINTED BY THE GOV-

ERNOR PURSUANT TO KENTUCKY CONSTITU-

TION SECTION 110(3).

No special or important issue justifying the grant of

certiorari was raised when the Supreme Court of Ken-

tucky held that the Governor followed proper Kentucky

constitutional procedure in appointing special justices to

the Supreme Court of Kentucky.

A. The Governor Is Required by Kentucky Constitution

Section 110(3) to Appoint Special Justices upon the

Recusal of Two or More Justices.

Kentucky Constitution § 110(3) provides:

(3) A majority of the justices of the Supreme Court

shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of busi-

ness. If as many as two justices decline or are unable

to sit in the trial of any cause, the Chief Justice shall

certify that fact to the Governor, who shall appoint to

try the particular cause a sufficient number of jus-

tices to constitute a full court for the trial of the cause.

App. 4a.

5

Three justices of the Supreme Court of Kentucky recused

themselves from hearing this case. The lead plaintiff be-

low, Dr. Charles C. Smith, Jr., was the personal physician

of Justice Charles M. Leibson. Order, Yeoman Pet. 20a-

21a. Justice Thomas B. Spain was a member of the Board

of Directors and Executive Committee of Trover Clinic Foun-

dation, Inc. Justice Joseph E. Lambert was a member of

the Governing Board of the Rockcastle Hospital and Respi-

ratory Care Center, Inc. Notices of Recusal, Yeoman Pet.

17a-19a.

After the Chief Justice certified the recusal of the three

justices to the governor, Governor Jones appointed three

special justices who met the qualifications for a supreme

court justice set forth in KRS 21A.120. Those appointments

were mandated by Section 110(3) of the Kentucky Consti-

tution. The Kentucky Constitution provides no alternate

method of filling vacancies on the court. Indeed, failure to

appoint would have been a dereliction of the governor's

constitutional duties.

The governor fills vacancies at all levels of the state

court system, just as the President of the United States

fills vacancies in the federal court system. U.S. Const. art.

II, § 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133, 171, 251; Ky. Const. § 118.

The executive branch’s power and duty to make judicial

appointments is rooted in the American system of govern-

ment.

The constitutional check-and-balance relationship

between the executive and judicial branches of the

government consists of the provisions for filling va-

cancies in judicial offices and for the appointment of

temporary substitutes when two or more justices of

the Supreme Court decline or are unable to partic-

ipate in the disposition of a cause pending before that

court. Const. Secs. 118, 110(3). Those relationships

between the legislature and judicial branches exist by

virtue of Const. Secs. 110(4), 111(1), 112(2) and (3)

and 113(2) and (3), pertaining to judicial districts and

number of judges and justices.

6

Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d at 685.

Petitioners do not challenge the constitutionality of Sec-

tion 110(3), only its application in this case. Smith Pet., p.

17. Respondents are in total agreement with the Smith

Petitioners that “if the Kentucky Constitutional directives

in Section 110 and 123 are disregarded, the due process

rights of persons subject to the tribunal are violated.” Smith

Pet., p. 14. Thus, as the Petitioners admit, if the governor

had not acted in accordance with Section 110(3), their con-

stitutional rights would have been violated.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky unanimously held that

the governor acted in accordance with Kentucky Constitu-

tion Section i110(3). The disposition of this issue rested

wholly on Section 110 and the Kentucky cases interpreting

that section. Commonwealth v. Smith, Ky., 875 S.W.2d

873, 878-879 (1994); Yeoman Pet. 31a-49a.

B. Recusal of the Sitting Special Justices Would Have

Been Inappropriate Because There Were No Alle-

gations or Evidence in the Record Showing Impro-

priety, Bias or Prejudice on the Part of Any of Those

Justices.

The Yeoman Petitioners’ affidavit, submitted to the Su-

preme Court of Kentucky, contained no allegations that

any of the three justices who participated in the decision

were biased or that they had any pecuniary or other inter-

est in this matter. Instead, the motion for recusal and

supporting affidavit consisted of a litany of times and places

in which Governor Jones announced his interest in health

care reform. In view of the nationwide interest in such

reform, this hardly makes the governor unique. The Peti-

tioners’ case is based solely upon the premise that because

the Governor of Kentucky has publicly stated his position

and the goals of his administration regarding the issue of

health care he is unable to fulfill his constitutional duty to

appoint special justices in this case. If the Petitioners’

7

argument is followed to its logical conclusion, no United

States Supreme Court Justice would be permitted to hear

any case involving an issue on which the President ap-

pointing such justice has expressed a public opinion.

Although the Petitioners devote several pages recount-

ing the actions and public statements of the governor, the

governor is not a party to this action. The key issue is

whether the special justices appointed by the governor had

any bias or prejudice or otherwise acted improperly thereby

disqualifying them from sitting. In Aetna Life Insurance

Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986), this Court held that for

recusal to be constitutionally mandated, there must be more

than mere allegations of a justice’s interest in a case. The

Aetna Court noted that “accepting appellant’s expansive

contentions might require the disqualification of every judge

in the state.”' Id. at 825. Additionally, when the Peti-

tioners raised specific objections to the appointment of one

of the proposed special justices, that person declined the

appointment.

In declining to recuse themselves from hearing this

matter, each of the special justices followed the procedures

for personal review required by KRS 26A.015 and SCR

4.300. These procedures are consistent with those followed

in the federal court system which set forth an objective

reasonable person standard. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). See Yeo-

man Pet. 26a-28a. “[A] judge should be disqualified only if

it appears that he or she harbors an aversion, hostility, or

disposition of a kind that a fair minded person could not

‘Contrary to the Smith Petitioners’ proposed remedy, the

Court in Lavoie specifically provided the proper remedy when a

disqualified justice participates in a decision. The Court held

that the “appearance of justice” will best be served by vacating

the decision and remanding for further proceedings. 475 U.S. at

837. Smith Pet., p. 15.

8

put aside when judging the dispute.” Liteky v. U.S., __

U.S.__, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1158 (1994) (Kennedy, J. concur-

ring). The Supreme Court of Kentucky and the individual

sitting justices fully considered the issues raised by their

appointment and participation in this case and correctly

held that such actions were constitutional on state law

grounds and in full compliance with the judicial canons of

ethics.

C. A Practicing Attorney May Sit as a Special Justice

under Established Kentucky Case Law.

Contrary to the Smith Petitioners’ argument, although

Kentucky Constitution Section 123 prohibits a judge or

justice from practicing law “[{djuring his term of office,”

that section does not apply to special justices. A special

justice does not serve a “term of office” since he is not

elected for a specific term and acts on a pro tempore basis.

Regency Pheasant Run Ltd. v. Karem, Ky., 860 S.W.2d

755, 757 (1993). Further, Kentucky Constitution Section

110(5)(b) prohibits the appointment of an active judge to

sit as a special justice on the Supreme Court of Kentucky.

See Kentucky Utilities v. South East Coal Company, Ky.,

836 S.W.2d 407, 409, pet. cert. voluntarily dismissed pur-

suant to Rule 46, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 1147 (1992).

D. The Petitioners’ Alternate Methods for Choosing

Special Justices Have No Constitutional or

Statutory Merit.

The Petitioners suggest that the Chief Justice or the

Kentucky Bar Association could have appointed the spe-

cial justices in this case. However, the Chief Justice is

prohibited from appointing special justices when three sit-

ting justices recuse themselves. Ky. Const. § 110(3); Ken-

tucky Utilities v. South East Coal Company, 836 S.W.2d

407. Since the Chief Justice voted with the majority, Peti-

tioners would no doubt complain that the Chief Justice

would have been inclined to choose individuals who shared

9

his beliefs, particularly since the Chief Justice had previ-

ously ruled that the Commonwealth had a “strong possibil-

ity of success on appeal.” December 21, 1993 Order of the

Supreme Court of Kentucky Granting Intermediate Relief

Pursuant to CR 76.33, App. 21a.

The suggestion of an appointment by the Kentucky Bar

Association also has no merit, legally or practically. No

constitutional or statutory provision even alludes to such a

method of appointment. A bar association appointment

would place the selection of a special justice in the hands

of an individual or group unaccountable to the electorate.

Therefore, neither of Petitioners’ suggested alternatives

have constitutional or statutory merit.

Il. THE STATE COURT DECISION SHOULD NOT

BE REVIEWED BECAUSE IT IS BASED ON ADE-

QUATE AND INDEPENDENT NONFEDERAL

GROUNDS.

This Court should deny the petitions for writ of certio-

rari because the decision of the Supreme Court of Ken-

tucky, Commonwealth v. Smith, 875 S.W.2d 873; Yeoman

Pet. 3la-42a, rests on the independent and adequate

nonfederal grounds of the Kentucky Constitution Section

59 and the state cases construing that section. “Respect

for the independence of state courts, as well as avoidance

of rendering advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones

of this Court’s refusal to decide cases where there is an

adequate and independent state ground.” Michigan v. Long,

463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983). The grounds for the decision

of the Supreme Court of Kentucky are independent be-

cause of the unique constitutional provision involved, and

adequate because they are broad enough to dispose of this

entire issue. Enterprise Irrig. District v. Farmers Mutual

Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917).

10

A. The Language and Application of the Special

Legislation Prohibition Found in Section 59 are

Unique to Kentucky.

Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution prohibits “spe-

cial legislation” in the area of taxation and twenty-seven

other enumerated areas. Section 59 also provides that

“liJn all other cases where a general law can be made

applicable, no special law shall be enacted.” Ky. Const. §

59(29), App. 3a. The underlying purpose of Section 59 is to

protect citizens without means from lobbyists who influ-

ence legislation. Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Holmes,

Ky., 872 S.W.2d 446 (1994).

The Petitioners concede that Section 59 “has long been

interpreted as providing greater protection for individual

liberty and against arbitrary exercises of legislative power

than the United States Constitution and other state con-

stitutions,” Yeoman Pet., p. 15 n. 2. “When considered

against its historical background, it is evident that Section

59 is more than simply another way of restating the gener-

alized language of the equal protection clause of the Four-

teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”

Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 183, cert. denied, 479

U.S. 822 (1986). See also Smith, 875 S.W.2d at 878; Yeo-

man Pet. 38a. In light of the Court’s policy of avoiding

adjudication of unnecessary constitutional questions, this

Court should not review the Supreme Court of Kentucky's

decision. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455

U.S. 283 (1982); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987).

Section 59 is complex because:each factual situation

must be judged separately against the state constitutional

standard that has evolved in interpreting that section. The

Yeoman Petitioners cite Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179,

Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, Ky., 808 S.W.2d 809

(1991), and Commonwealth v. Wasson, Ky., 842 S.W.2d

487 (1992), for the proposition that Section 59 is consis-

tently invoked to void arbitrary legislation. Yeoman Pet.,

11

p.15 n.2. While the Supreme Court of Kentucky voided

the statutes in those cases, many other statutes are held

valid under Section 59. In Waggoner v. Waggoner, 864

S.W.2d 704, the Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld a statu-

tory classification exempting teachers’ retirement contri-

butions from consideration as marital property in a divorce

proceeding while other pensions were subject to division.

Also, in Sims v. Board of Education of Jefferson County,

Ky., 290 S.W.2d 491 (1956), Kentucky’s highest court up-

held an occupational license tax on the earnings of indi-

viduals and profits of businesses to benefit public schools

even though the taxpayer had no children in school and

received no direct personal benefit. The Smith decision is

consistent with other recent holdings by the Kentucky ap-

pellate courts. Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Holmes, 872

S.W.2d 446; Edwards v. Land, Ky. App., 851 S.W.2d 484

(1992). Therefore, no departure from established Kentucky

law exists in the instant case. Cf. Aetna v. Lavoie, 475

U.S. 813.

The Kentucky courts review and weigh each Section 59

case individually. After full consideration of the facts of

this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky rested its deci-

sion on Section 59, an independent and adequate nonfederal

ground. Smith, 875 S.W.2d at 875; Yeoman Pet. 31a-32a.

Therefore, this Court should deny certiorari.

B. The Kentucky Supreme Court Decision Was Not

Based on a Federal Question and Is Not in Con-

flict with Any Other Federal or State Court

Decisions.

While the Supreme Court of Kentucky referred to gen-

eral constitutional principles in deciding these issues, the

court did not construe or directly apply the U.S. Constitu-

tion in its decision. Nor did the court decide any matter at

issue directly relating to the validity, construction, appli-

cation or administration of any federal statute, or any right,

title, privilege or immunity under any federal statute.

12

Moreover, the Supreme Court of Kentucky did not de-

cide a federal question in direct conflict with any appli-

cable decision of this Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals, or a

state court of last resort. Indeed, the Petitioners fail to

identify any such cases. In the only analogous case, the

Florida Supreme Court upheld a tax on all physicians li-

censed to practice medicine in Florida to fund the Birth-

Related Neurological Injury Compensation Fund that

compensates victims for birth-related neurological injuries.

Coy v. Florida Birth-Related Injury Compensation Plan,

Fla., 595 So.2d 943, cert. denied, sub nom, McGibony v.

Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation

Plan, __ U.S.___ , 118 S.Ct. 194 (1992). Although not all

physicians subject to the tax would benefit from poten-

tially lower malpractice premiums, the Coy court found

that the tax was sufficiently related to the delivery of health

care in general.

The Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in Smith re-

ferred to “federal criteria” imposed on the states to be eli-

gible to obtain federal matching funds under the Medicaid

program. Smith, 875 S.W.2d at 875-876; Yeoman Pet. 34a.

However, those references are simply a recognition by the

court of the factual background against which the Ken-

tucky General Assembly enacted the tax provisions in HB

1, and not, as Petitioner Smith contends, the court’s

“misconstru[ction]” and “misapplication” of federal law.

Smith Pet., pp. 22-25. The determination of whether the

provider tax revenues are eligible for match will be made

by the federal Health Care Financing Administration. This

issue is not before the Court.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky properly recognized

that it would have been “illogical” for the legislature not to

have “designed” HB 1 “to meet” those federal “require-

ments as to the class of health care providers that may be

taxed in order to qualify for matching funds.” Smith, 875

13

S.W.2d at 876; Yeoman Pet. 34a. The Kentucky General

Assembly, facing a July 1, 1993 deadline for changing

Kentucky’s existing provider tax, met in special session to

find a way to provide money needed to match federal Med-

icaid dollars. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w). Contrary to Peti-

tioner Smith’s characterization, the Supreme Court of

Kentucky did not determine that the federal criteria “com-

pelled” or “mandate[d]” the tax provisions at issue. Smith

Pet., pp. 24-25. Rather, the court correctly found that the

federal criteria were operative facts in the enactment of

HB 1, and that “defining the class [of those to be taxed

under HB 1] in a coextensive manner with the federal law

results in a rational basis for such classification without

arbitrariness.” Smith, 875 S.W.2d at 876; Yeoman Pet.

34a.

Federal and state courts have consistently held that

legislative bodies possess greater freedom in classifications

in the field of taxation than in other areas. Madden v.

Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Rev-

enue Cabinet, Ky., 689 S.W.2d 14 (1985).

Since the Supreme Court of Kentucky correctly decided

the particular issues in this case using state law principles

which are not in conflict with federal law or decisions,

there is no basis or need for review of those state law

issues on a writ of certiorari.

14

CONCLUSION

Because the Supreme Court of Kentucky did not decide

a federal question nor specifically rule on the constitution-

ality of a state statute under the federal constitution, but

declared a tax statute enacted by the Kentucky General

Assembly and the appointment of three special justices to

be constitutionally sound, no special and important rea-

sons exist for the Court to review this matter.

For the foregoing reasons, the Petitions for Writ of Cer-

tiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

LEONARD G. ROWENKAMP

SMITH, WOLNITZEK, SCHACHTER

& ROWENKAMP, P.S.C.

502 Greenup Street

P.O. Box 352

Covington, Kentucky 41012-0352

Ph.: 606/491-4444

FAX: 606/491-1001

Counsel of Record

DaNA BYNUM MAyYTON

CaTHy CRAVENS SNELL

Division of Legal Services

Revenue Cabinet

P.O. Box 423

Frankfort, Kentucky 40602

ANGELA M. ForpD

E.D. KLATTE

Office of the Counse!

Cabinet for Human Resources

275 E. Main Street

Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

Counsel for Respondents

APPENDIX

la

[EXCERPTS FROM KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION]

§ 59. Local and special legislation. — The Gen-

eral Assembly shall not pass local or specia! acts concern-

ing any of the following subjects, or for any of the following

purposes, namely:

First: To regulate the jurisdiction, or practice, or the

circuits of the courts of justice, or the rights, powers, du-

ties or compensation of the officers thereof; but the prac-

tice in circuit courts in continuous session may, by a gen-

eral law, be made different from the practice of circuit

courts held in terms.

Second: To regulate the summoning, impaneling or com-

pensation of grand or petit jurors.

Third: To provide for changes of venue in civil or crimi-

nal causes. :

Fourth: To regulate the punishment of crimes and mis-

demeanors, or to remit fines, penalties or forfeitures.

Fifth: To regulate the limitation of civil or criminal

causes.

Sixth: To affect the estate of cestuis que trust, dece-

dents, infants or other persons under disabilities, or to

authorize any such persons to sell, lease, encumber or dis-

pose of their property.

Seventh: To declare any person of age, or to relieve an

infant or feme covert of disability, or to enable him to do

acts allowed only to adults not under disabilities.

Eighth: To change the law of descent, distribution or

succession.

Ninth: To authorize the adoption or legitimation of chil-

dren.

Tenth: To grant divorces.

Eleventh: To change the names of persons.

Twelfth: To give effect to invalid deeds, wills or other

instruments.

2a

Thirteenth: To legalize, except as against the Common-

wealth, the unauthorized or invalid act of any officer or

public agent of the Commonwealth, or of any city, county

or municipality thereof.

Fourteenth: To refund money legally paid into the State

Treasury.

Fifteenth: To authorize or to regulate the levy, the as-

sessment or the collection of taxes, or to give any indul-

gence or discharge to any assessor or collector of taxes, or

to his sureties.

Sixteenth: To authorize the opening, altering, main-

taining or vacating of roads, highways, streets, alleys, town

plats, cemeteries, graveyards, or public grounds not owned

by the Commonwealth.

Seventeenth: To grant a charter to any corporation, or

to amend the charter of any existing corporation; to license

companies or persons to own or operate ferries, bridges,

roads or turnpikes; to declare streams navigable, or to au-

thorize the construction of booms or dams therein, or to

remove obstructions therefrom; to affect toll gates or to

regulate tolls; to regulate fencing or the running at large

of stock.

Eighteenth: To create, increase or decrease fees, per-

centages or allowances to public officers, or to extend the

time for the collection thereof, or to authorize officers to

appoint deputies.

Nineteenth: To give any person or corporation the right

to lay a railroad track or tramway, or to amend existing

charters for such purposes.

Twentieth: To provide for conducting elections, or for

designating the places of voting, or changing the bound-

aries of wards, precincts or districts, except when new coun-

ties may be created.

Twenty-first: To regulate the rate of interest.

Twenty-second: To authorize the creation, extension,

enforcement, impairment or release of liens.

3a

Twenty-third: To provide for the protection of game

and fish.

Twenty-fourth: To regulate labor, trade, mining or

manufacturing.

Twenty-fifth: To provide for the management of com-

mon schools.

Twenty-sixth: To locate or change a county seat.

Twenty-seventh: To provide a means of taking the sense

of the people of any city, town, district, precinct or county,

whether they wish to authorize, regulate or prohibit therein

the sale of vinous, spirituous or malt liquors, or alter the

liquor laws.

Twenty-eighth: Restoring to citizenship persons con-

victed of infamous crimes.

Twenty-ninth: In all other cases where a general law

can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.

§110. Composition — Jurisdiction — Quorum —

Special justices — Districts — Chief justice. — (1)

The Supreme Court shall consist of the chief justice of the

commonwealth and six associate justices.

(2)(a) The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdic-

tion only, except it shall have the power to issue all writs

necessary in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or the com-

plete determination of any cause, or as may be required to

exercise control of the Court of Justice.

(b) Appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court im-

posing a sentence of death or life imprisonment or impris-

onment for twenty years or more shall be taken directly to

the Supreme Court. In all other cases, criminal and civil,

the Supreme Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction as

provided by its rules.

(3) A majority of the justices of the Supreme Court

shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.

If as many as two justices decline or are unable to sit in

the trial of any cause, the chief justice shall certify that

fact to the governor, who shall appoint to try the particu-

4a

lar cause a sufficient number of justices to constitute a full

court for the trial of the cause.

(4) The Court of Appeals districts existing on the effec-

tive date of this amendment to the constitution shall con-

stitute the initial Supreme Court districts. The general

assembly thereafter may redistrict the commonwealth, by

counties, into seven Supreme Court districts as nearly equal

in population and as compact in form as possible. There

shall be one justice from each Supreme Court district.

(5)(a) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect one

of their number to serve as chief justice for a term of four

years.

(b) The chief justice of the commonwealth shall be the

executive head of the Court of Justice and he shall appoint

such administrative assistants as he deems necessary. He

shall assign temporarily any justice or judge of the com-

monwealth, active or retired, to sit in any court other than

the Supreme Court when he deems such assignment nec-

essary for the prompt disposition of causes. The chief jus-

tice shall submit the budget for the Court of Justice and

perform all other necessary administrative functions relat-

ing to the court.

5a

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY

93-SC-946-TG

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,

REVENUE CABINET, ET AL., - - - - APPELLANTS

U.

CHARLES C. SMITH, JR., M.D., Er AL., - - - APPELLEES

AFFIDAVIT OF STUART G. YEOMAN, M.D,

NOW COMES the Affiant, STUART G. YEOMAN, M.D.,

and, after being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. That this Affiant is a physician who practices medi-

cine in Bowling Green, Kentucky, and is one of the

Appellees/Movants in the above-entitled case.

2. That this Affiant obtained from the Louisville Cou-

rier-Journal nearly six hundred (600) news articles in which

Governor Brereton C. Jones, both before and during his

administration, has commented upon the need for health

care reform in Kentucky.

3. That of the aforesaid articles this Affiant obtained,

the following are representative of the involvement of Gov-

ernor Brereton C. Jones in the development and drafting

of what became House Bill 1; and, of the fact that he called

the Kentucky General Assembly into Extraordinary Ses-

sion to consider the Bill; that he publicly lobbied for its

passage and signed the Bill into law; and that he has

publicly commented on the within-styled case:

A. From the start of his political career, Governor Jones

has made health care reform one of his highest political

priorities. He has repeatedly stated that essential to re-

form is universal health insurance coverage for all Ken-

6a

tuckians. As early as May, 1989, while he was Lt. Gover-

nor and the head of the Kentucky Health Care Access

Foundation, Governor Jones endorsed a plan to “expand

the Medicaid program to cover all uninsured Kentuckians

with incomes less than the federal poverty line.” At that

time, Medicaid covered only about half of those for whom

he sought coverage. He has acknowledged that such an

expansion of Medicaid would “cost the State at least $210

million, and is ‘totally impractical’ in the current financial

condition.” Courier-Journal, May 10, 1989. Exhibit 1.

B. During his campaign for Governor, Jones made

health care reform one of his highest priorities. He stated,

“we're going to insist on reform, so that we can improve

the quality of health care, hold down costs and expand

coverage.” Courier-Journal, October 2, 1991. Exhibit 2.

C. As Governor-Elect, Jones, in November, 1991, stated

that proposed changes in Medicaid rules could sidetrack

his proposal to expand Medicaid coverage to approximately

225,000 so-called uninsured Kentuckians. Jones said that,

if Medicaid changes go through, his proposal is not going

to be practical or realistic. Courier-Journal, November 8,

1991. Exhibit 3.

D. In his inaugural address, Governor Jones stated,

“cooperation and mutual respect will give us a fighting

chance to take a national leadership role in providing qual-

ity health care for all people.” Courier-Journal, December

11, 1991. Exhibit 4.

E. In his first State of the State speech (delivered be-

fore the Kentucky General Assembly), Governor Jones said,

“I cannot and I will not allow a temporary budget problem

to deter us from achieving our goals of affordable health

care to every Kentuckian.” He further stated, “I will ap-

point a special task force for comprehensive health care

reform. This task force will be charged with developing

reform recommendations this year because this issue re-

quires action as soon as possible. I will then ask you to

consider those recommendations in a special legislative ses-

sion.” Courier-Journal, January 14, 1992. Exhibit 5.

Ta

F. From the start of his tenure as Governor, Jones has

pushed for legislation mandating universal health insur-

ance for all Kentuckians. In February 1992, Representa-

tive Joe Clarke said, “That whole special session (on health

care reform) concerns me because the Governor has raised

expectations that we'll find a solution. But right now I

can’t think of any comprehensive solution that doesn’t call

for either reduced benefits or cost a lot more money.” Cou-

rier-Journal, February 8, 1992. Exhibit 6.

G. In March 1992, Governor Jones formed the Com-

mission on Health Care Reform, chaired by Leonard Heller,

and the Task Force on Health Care Access and Affordability,

chaired by James Newberry. Jones said, “This announce-

ment begins a process that will bring meaningful health

care reform to Kentucky.” Courier-Journal, March 12, 1992

(7). On March 26, 1992, Governor Jones imposed a mora-

torium on the expansion of health care facilities and ser-

vices to “clear the decks” for the groups he appointed to

come up with health care reform ideas. Courier-Journal,

March 27, 1992 (8). On April 9, 1992, Governor Jones

stated he planned to call a special legislative session on

health care in November of 1992. Courier-Journal, April

10, 1992 (9). On April 25, 1992, Governor Jones, in a

speech in Eastern Kentucky, said, “We are going to take

the national leadership role in providing health care.” Cou-

rier-Journal, April 26, 1992. (10) Exhibits 7, 8. /sic] 9 and 10.

H. In June 1992, Leonard Heller, Governor Jones’ Hu-

man Resources Secretary, again stated that Medicaid cov-

erage could be expanded to cover more people, since the

program now covers only about half of the people living

under the federal poverty line. Courier-Journal, June 13,

1992. Exhibit 11.

I. On July 8, 1992, “Governor Jones told a group of

legislative leaders that he is fully committed to health care

8a

reform in Kentucky, regardless of how much political capi-

tal he must expend, and that any reform measure must

address cost containment, malpractice reform and univer-

sal coverage.” Courier-Journal, July 9, 1992. Exhibit 12.

J. On July 10, 1992, at the first meeting of his Com-

mission for Health Care Reform, Governor Jones stated,

“Health Care Reform is this administration’s top priority.”

He further stated, “The goals of reform would be to provide

everyone access to basic, good-quality care and to control

costs.” Courier-Journal, July 11, 1993. Exhibit 13.

K. On July 18, 1992, Governor Jones said that it “is

very close to time to go to war to win health care reform in

Kentucky.” Jones said he “won’t back away from his pro-

posal to treat health care providers like utilities and regu-

late their rates.” He thinks Kentucky should assert power

to set health care rates so as to guard against the unrea-

sonableness of some who are in the profession. !n a forum

that also featured West Virginia Senator Jay Rockefeller

and Pennsylvania Senator Harris Wofford, Jones said he

is “very confident the November special session will pro-

duce universal coverage and other sweeping reforms in

Kentucky.” Courier-Journal, July 14, 1992 (14). In the

same forum, Governor Jones proposed that employers be

mandated to provide health insurance to all their workers.

Courier-Journal, July 15, 1992 (15). Exhibits 14 and 15.

L. On August 9, 1992, Governor Jones stated, in re-

sponse to an unrelated setback, “this quite frankly, will

probably serve as a blessing because it will allow me to

take the focus off of things that maybe are not as impor-

tant as health care reform and put all of our focus on

health care.” Courier-Journal, August 10, 1992. Exhibit 16.

M. In an article in the Courier-Journal dated August

19, 1992, it was reported that Governor Jones was still

planning on a November Special Session on Health Care,

even though he had not yet revealed his own proposals for

health care reform to his Commission on Health Care Re-

form. Key legislators questioned the wisdom of a Novem-

ber Special Session. Joe Clarke said, “I have never thought

9a

shooting for November was wise. I don’t see how in the

world we can do it now.” Courier-Journal, August 19,

1992. Exhibit 17.

N. In September 1992, in the plan developed by Gover-

nor Jones to his Health Reform Commission, Governor

Jones called for extending the current tax on health care

providers used to help fund the Medicaid program to more

providers to pay for expanding the Medicaid program. The

plan said the reforms would be financed without a new

tax. But, health care providers and individuals would be

expected to pay so the coverage can be provided. Courier-

Journal, September 3, 1992 (18). On September 2, 1992,

Governor Jones stated, “I am unwilling to allow any issue

to create problems that will stand in the path of our pro-

viding health care for every Kentuckian”, [sic] and that he

intends for “health care reform to be the hallmark of his

administration”. [sic] Courier-Journal, September 3, 1992

(19). Exhibits 18 and 19.

O. On September 9, 1992, Governor Jones formally un-

veiled his health reform plan that called for all Kentuck-

ians to have health insurance by the end of 1993. All

employers would have to provide coverage for their em-

ployees and the state picking up the cost for the poor. The

state Medicaid program would be expanded to fully cover

health care for unemployed adults living below the federal

poverty level. To pay for the plan, Governor Jones pro-

posed broadening the existing tax on providers of health

services, to obtain additional federal Medicaid money. Cou-

rier-Journal, September 10, 1992. Exhibit 20.

P. On September 18, 1992, Governor Jones, respond-

ing to mounting questions about his health care proposals,

said, “I will convene a special session in November regard-

less of whether the plan is ready or if there are enough

votes to pass it.” Courier-Journal, September 19, 1992

(21). In a September 24, 1992 article in the Courier-Jour-

nal, Governor Jones’ problems in gaining support for his

health reform plan with legislators was discussed. Repre-

sentative Kenny Rapier, House Majority Whip, said of

10a

Jones’ plan, “There was zero support for it before today,

and there’s zero today.” Both Senator Mike Moloney and

Representative Marshall Long questioned financing. Cou-

rier-Journal, September 24, 1992 (22). On September 24,

1992, Governor Jones backed off his promise to call a spe-

cial session in November after meeting with Senator John

“Eck” Rose and Representative Joe Clarke. Clarke told

the Governor he was “losing his capital with legislators” by

insisting on the November deadline.” [sic] Courier-Jour-

nal, September 25, 1992 (23). Exhibits 21, 22 and 23.

Q. On November 8, 1992, Governor Jones said in an

interview that Kentucky is further along in health reform

than the federal government and, “we've got to show the

leadership in health care reform”. [sic] He said “Kentucky

was in a better position to act for the simple reason that

this is my No. 1 priority, and I’m willing to spend all of my

political capital if necessary to get this done.” Courier-

Journal, November 9, 1992. Exhibit 24.

R. In response to the Governor, Representative Kenny

Rapier stated that small business opposed the mandate for

employers to provide insurance coverage for their employ-

ees and “knowledgeable House Democrats want to go slow

on providing universal health coverage, phasing it in over

several years.” Courier-Journal, November 22, 1992. Ex-

hibit 25.

S. On December 4, 1992, Governor Jones said “he would

unveil his revised health care package in the next few

days.” He said, “the failure to get his health care plan off

the ground this year was the biggest disappointment of his

first year in office.” He further stated he plans to call a

special session on health care early in 1993. Courier-Jour-

nal, December 5, 1992. Exhibit 26.

T. On December 8, 1992, Governor Jones said he “will

do whatever it takes to get his health care reform plan

passed. When we get this plan together. . . you will see a

fight like you’ve never seen before. You just have to play

hardball politics.” He said, “this is my No. 1 priority.”

Courier-Journal, December 9, 1992. Exhibit 27.

Pi ek Anche nc: WOR Bi Aleta Fon ine

lla

U. On December 9, 1992, Governor Jones said his re-

vised plan would be financed through cost saving measures

and expanding tax on providers. Courier-Journal, Decem-

ber 10, 1992. Exhibit 28.

V. After Governor Jones presented his revised plan and

further modifications, there were still major problems with

the Legislature. Speaker Joe Clarke said, “There’s no way

to pass it, at least not this year. I probably mean next

year, too. The problem is in the Governor's insistence on

universal access.” Courier-Journal, March 7, 1993. Ex-

hibit 29.

W. On March 10, 1993, a “health care advisor to the

Governor acknowledged that opposition to Jones’s two re-

form plans may mean he'll have to come up with a third

one.” However, Governor Jones reiterated that any reform

plan must extend coverage to all Kentuckians, not just

give them a chance to buy it. Courier-Journal, March 11,

1993. Exhibit 30.

X. On March 31, 1993, Governor Jones outlined an-

other proposal for universal health care coverage in Ken-

tucky. This proposal created a payroll tax of 3% or 4% and

mandated that individuals buy health insurance. Gover-

nor Jones “stuck by his insistence that the state should

seek immediate, universal coverage for all of its residents.”

Democratic representatives said mandates and new taxes

would be very hard to pass. Courier-Journal, April 1, 1993.

Exhibit 31.

Y. On April 21, 1993, the Courier-Journal reported that

Governor Jones was meeting with lawmakers, one-on-one,

to line up support for his health reform plan and to prepare

for a special session in May. But 9 of 10 lawmakers who

met with Jones said they can’t take firm positions on Jones’

plans because Jones has not yet come up with a Bill. Cou-

rier-Journal, April 21, 1993. Exhibit 32.

Z. On April 23, 1993, Governor Jones unveiled his

health care reform Bill [House Bill 1] and said he will call

a special session on May 10. The Bill [House Bill 1] in-

12a

cludes universal coverage. “Doctors, hospitals, and other

providers would be taxed a percentage of their revenues;

they would be prohibited from passing the tax onto con-

sumers in higher charges. [sic] Courier-Journal, April 24,

1993. Exhibit 33.

AA. An article in the Courier-Journal, dated April

27, 1993 states, “Although the Commission on Health

Care reform was created by Jones to draft a health

care reform package, it only briefly discussed Jones’

Bill.” Courier-Journal, April 27, 1993 (84). On May

5, 1993, Joe Clarke and others recommended delaying

the session citing a lack of support for Jones’ plan.

Courier-Journal, May 6, 1993 (85). Exhibits 34 and

35.

BB. On May 7, 1993, Governor Jones said he will

favor Legislators who support his health care plan when

he chooses park improvement projects. The governor

made his remarks after Representative Kenny Rapier

said he heard reports that Jones is holding projects

hostage for votes to pass his troubled health care bill.

“If you get to the point where you've got 3 or 4 worthy

projects and they're all deserving, and one is spon-

sored by someone who’s for your bill, and the other

three are sponsored by someone who's against your

bill, which one are you going to go for?” Jones asked.

“I’m going to go for the one that was for the bill, of

course.” Courier-Journal, May 8, 1993. Exhibit 36.

CC. A May 11, 1993 article in the Courier-Jour-

nal stated that Jones shows no backing off on his two

main goals: controlling cost and providing immediate

universal coverage. Legislative leaders say the state

cannot afford immediate universal coverage, and many

lawmakers disliké the proposed payroll tax. Courier-

Journal, May 11, 1993. In the same article, Jones

said he would be the “lobbyist” for 450,000 uninsured

Kentuckians, and that he would provide insurance cov-

erage to some by expanding Medicaid. “Everyone will

have to make sacrifices to accomplish his goals”, [sic]

lhe .

13a

said Jones, who specifically mentioned health care pro-

viders whom he wants to tax to help finance his reform

plan. Those who have profited the most from this

dollars-driven system must now, in fairness, be asked

to give the most.” Courier-Journal, May 11, 1993.

Exhibit 37.

DD. On May 10, 1993, Governor Jones told law-

makers that he will compromise on “100 other issues”,

[sic] but not on health care. Courier-Journal, May 11,

1993. Exhibit 38.

EE. On May 11, 1993, Governor Jones disclosed

his estimates of the cost of covering everyone under

his bill. About half of the newly covered people would

be added to the Medicaid rolls. The additional cost

would be paid by a tax on health care providers. Cou-

rier-Journal, May 12, 1993. Exhibit 39.

FF. Articles from May 13, 1993 (40), May 14,

1993 (41), May 15, 1993 (42), May 17, 1993 (43), May

18, 1993 (44), and May 19, 1993 (45), reveal the inter-

play between a persistent Governor, pushing for uni-

versal coverage and cost-controls, and a Legislature

that wouldn’t agree with Governor Jones’ plan for

health reform. Courier-Journal, May 13-19, 1993. Ex-

hibits 40-45. Finally, on May 20, 1993, the Special

Session collapsed, but House Bill 1 passed. Represen-

tative Clarke said that the news that lawmakers had

decided to call it quits was quite a shock to the Gover-

nor. “I don’t think he saw it coming”, [sic] Clarke

said. “Jones repeatedly asked for a couple of days to

reflect on this and make a counter proposal”, [sic] said

Senator Charles Berger. “We didn’t have much of a

discussion”, [sic] said Senator Fred Bradley. “We had

to say the same thing over and over, about 10 or 15

times.” In a later meeting, Jones salvaged a promise of

another Special Session on Health Care later this year.

Courier-Journal, May 21, 1993 (46). Exhibits 40-46.

GG. Discussing the Special Session, the Courier-

Journal related Jones’ threats to hold lawmakers hos-

l4a

tage until Christmas Day, if necessary, to get his health

plan passed. He talked tough about rewarding friends

in the Legislature with projects in the $100 million

Parks bond issue. And he threatened in advance of

May’s Special Session to reconvene the Legislators, ad

infinitum, if they sat on his health care initiative. Cou-

rier-Journal, May 23, 1993. Exhibit 47.

HH. In an op-ed piece in the Courier-Journal, Gov-

ernor Jones stated, “The campaign to reform health

care in Kentucky is alive and well. To solve, this, the

most crucial problem facing our state, first, we must

get control of health care costs which are now spiral-

ing out of control. Second, we must see that every

Kentuckian has affordable health insurance coverage.”

Courier-Journal, June 20, 1993. Exhibit 48.

II. On June 18, 1993, when informed of a law-

suit planned by the KMA challenging the 2% provider

tax, Governor Jones said, through a spokesman, that

he was disappointed by the KMA’s decision and that

when his goal of universal health insurance coverage

is achieved, doctors will be paid for serving indigent

people in excess of the 2% tax. Courier-Journal, June

19, 1993. Exhibit 49.

JJ. Two leading state legislators express doubts

on July 16, 1993, that Kentucky will enact health care

reform legislation either this year or next year. “I

just don’t see it happening,” said Senator Mike

Moloney. Senator [sic] Joe Clarke said that expand-

ing the number of Kentuckians who are covered by

health insurance would take new state revenue. “I

don’t see us raising taxes in 1993 or 1994 to take care

of health care or to balance the budget”, [sic] said

Clarke. Courier-Journal, July 17, 1993. Exhibit 50.

KK. Later in July in a television interview, Joe

Clarke told viewers that lawmakers won’t be ready

for a Special Session “if the Governor takes the posi-

tion that he has to have universal coverage within his

term, that is not in the cards.” Courier-Journal, July

27, 1993. Exhibit 51.

15a

LL. Governor Jones, in early August, “accused

House Speaker Joe Clarke of a flip-flop on the May

agreement for saying in a July 18 broadcast interview

that the General Assembly would not raise taxes to

pay for universal health insurance coverage. Jones

said he plans to call the second Special Session by the

end of the year, and the public will know who wants to

solve the problem and who doesn’t.” Clarke responded

saying, “There wasn’t any commitment made to any

specific package or any specific solution. I had been

telling him (Jones) all along there was no support for

a tax increase, and that hasn’t changed, and he knew

that.” Jones insisted in an interview that he still

considers health care the “most important single issue

facing the Commonwealth”. [sic] Courier-Journal, Au-

gust 6, 1993. Exhibit 52.

MM. On August 6, 1993, House members indicated

that they are willing to enact health care legislation,

but they agreed that a tax increase to extend health

insurance to all Kentuckians is not feasible in the

near future. Courier-Journal, August 7, 1993. Ex-

hibit 53.

NN. Finally, on August 12, 1993, Governor Jones

said that he’s given up pushing for passage of univer-

sal health care coverage in a Special Session that could

be held in October. Jones said he still wanted univer-

sal coverage, “but I think the reality of the situation is

telling all of us that it’s not going to be done immedi-

ately. I have not changed my goal of getting universal

coverage as quickly as possible.” Jones said he ex-

pects the coverage to be phased in beginning with

“where the greatest need is and where you can get the

greatest return for the dollars invested.” He said he

would not seek a tax increase in the Special Session.

Jones said “that people will be surprised by how quickly

universal coverage can be attained.” Courier-Journal,

August 13, 1993. Exhibit 54.

OO. In a report on the Health Task Force dated

October 9, 1993, Governor Jones again stated his de-

PS

l6a

sire for a special session before the end of the year.

Jones said he wants the state to set aside any savings

it receives in the health care funds in a special trust

fund that would be used to extend coverage to the

poor. Courier-Journal, October 9, 1993. Exhibit 55.

PP. On November 16, 1993, Governor Jones said

his plan for universal coverage at controlled cost was

stalled by Legislative inaction and “a lot of people

making a lot of money who don’t want the system to

change.” Courier-Journal, November 17, 1993. Ex-

hibit 56.

QQ. On December 9, 1993, Governor Jones an-

nounced that Health and Human Services Secretary

Donna Shalala had approved Kentucky’s five-year pi-

lot project, which will start July 1. Kentucky can

dramatically expand its medicaid program to cover |

everyone living under the poverty line. This expands |

health insurance coverage to another 201,000 children |

and adults. Jones said vhe plan would still leave an

estimated 200,000 to 230,000 Kentuckians without in-

surance, but would be a major step toward universal |

insurance coverage. Jones acknowledged that the Med- |

icaid expansion depends upon the outcome of the court |

case (the 2% provider tax on appeal), but he said he |

believed the Supreme Court would issue a ruling

quickly. Courier-Journal, December 10, 1993. Ex-

hibit 57.

RR. In mid-December, three Supreme Court Jus-

tices, Leibson, Spain and Lambert, disqualified them-

selves from hearing the appeal of my lawsuit, because

of conflict of interest concerns. Courier-Journal, Janu-

ary 7, 1994. Exhibit 58.

SS. On January 6, 1994, Governor Jones named

three Special Justices to the Kentucky Supreme Court

for the appeal involving the health care provider tax:

Sheryl G. Snyder of Louisville, Ben S. Fletcher III of

Hopkinsville, and Stephen C. Cawood of Pineville.

Courier-Journal, January 7, 1994. Exhibit 59.

17a

TT. Even after the appointment of the three (3)

Special Justices, Governor Jones, in his State of the

Commonwealth address, stated:

“A centerpiece to the health care financing issue

and to the state budget is, of course, the retention of

the provider tax. We must collect this amount of money,

have it more than tripled in Washington, and give it

to providers to pay for the health care of thousands of

Kentuckians.”

Courier-Journal, January 25, 1993; Lexington Herald-

Leader, January 25, 1993.

4. The foregoing chronology documents that Governor

Jones has been, and continues to be, the principal political

figure in Kentucky pushing for health reform. Health care

reform is “his number one priority”, [sic] and he has staked

all of his “political capital” on accomplishing his two chief

goals of health reform: (1) universal insurance coverage

for all Kentuckians; and, (2) cost containment.

5. He has relentlessly pushed for universal coverage

against a reluctant Legislature, a Legislature that has been

bound by budgetary restrains, /sic] and the almost unani-

mous opinion of all Legislators that the enactment of any

new general tax measures would be impolitic. The Gover-

nor, in the span of several months, has presented various

means of trying to accomplish immediate universal health

insurance coverage, but has failed to convince the Legisla-

ture to enact his comprehensive plans, because of their

aversion to any general tax measure.

6. In trying to devise plans for providing insurance

coverage for the approximately 450,000 uninsured Ken-

tuckians, the Governor has consistently (in every plan he

has presented) relied on the expansion of the Medicaid

program to cover those below the federal poverty line, but

not currently covered by Medicaid. This encompasses ap-

proximately 200,000 so-called uninsured Kentuckians, about

one-half of the total so-called uninsured in Kentucky. In

each plan, the 2% provider tax was proposed as the rev-

“enue measure to provide funding for this Medicaid expan-

18a

sion, a tax on 6,000 physicians, rather than any general

tax measure. Then the Governor’s plan, when published

in the Spring of 1993, stated that the 2% tax on providers’

gross revenues could not be passed through to the public

by raising fees. This step of making a pass-through of the

tax illegal, was the creation of the Governor and first ap-

peared in his House Bill 1.

7. In the Special Session on Health Care in May of

1993, the Governor failed to enact his reform plan. He

succeeded in gaining the passage of House Bill 1, which

expanded the 2% provider tax to all health care providers,

and he was able to have the non-pass-through provision of

the tax enacted into law.

8. Subsequent to the failure of the Special Session on

Health Care Reform and the Task Force activities of the

summer of 1993, Governor Jones was forced to accept the

fact that the Legislature was not going to enact universal

health insurance for all Kentuckians. "

9. Governor Jones, still maintaining that health re-

form was his number one priority, subsequently decided

he would have to phase-in universal coverage. He then

applied for, and was granted, a waiver from the federal

government to expand Medicaid by 201,000 people. The

funding for this expansion of Medicaid was to be, in part,

provided by the 2% provider tax.

10. Acknowledging that his plan to expand Medicaid is

contingent on continuation of the provider tax, Governor

Jones in mid-December was faced with the recusal of 3 of

the 7 Supreme Court Justices in his appeal of Judge

Crittenden’s adverse decision.

11. In naming Sheryl G. Snyder, an executive of ICH

Corporation, as a Special Justice, Governor Jones ignores

(or knows and understands) the fact that ICH has a con-

tract with the state awarded by the Executive Branch that

has paid ICH over 16 million dollars since 1988; ignores

(or knows and understands) that ICH donated $5,000 to

his inauguration celebration; and (or knows and under-

19a

stands) ignores the fact that Stephen L. Miller, his ex-aide

and ex-Campaign Manager, and Miller’s law partner, James

H. Newberry, Jr., represent ICH. James Newberry also

chaired the Governor’s Task Force on Health Care Access

and Affordability. Courier-Journal, March 12, 1992 (7),

August 21, 1992 (60), November 15, 1991 (61), March 26,

1992 (62), and January 18, 1992 (63); 8 1994 Martindale-

Hubble Law Directory, KY 109B-KY 110B (64). See also:

Exhibits 7, 60, 61, 62, 63 and 64.

12. Governor Jones is a party in interest in the above-

styled case; he has an interest in its outcome. This Affiant’s

success in the case would jeopardize his stated goals. By

naming the three (3) Special Justices, Governor Jones is

denying this Affiant’s right to a fair and impartial hearing

in Court.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

/s/_ Stuart G. Yeoman MD

Stuart G. YEOMAN, M.D.

STATE Or KENTUCKY \

County OF

SUBSCRIBED AND Sworn to before me by Stuart G. YEo-

MAN, M.D., on this the 28 day of January, 1993 [sic].

My Commission Expires: 4-3-97.

/s/_ Patricia Trotter

Notary PUBLIC

KENTUCKY, STATE AT LARGE

PREPARED By:

/sf/ Kent Masterson Brown

KENT MASTERSON BROWN

CHRISTOPHER J. SHAUGHNESSY

1114 First National Building

167 West Main Street

Lexington, Kentucky 40507

(606) 233-7879

(606) 252-6791—facsimile

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Stuart G. YEOMAN, M.D., Er AL.

20a

SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY

93-SC-946-TG

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,

REVENUE CaBINET; Er AL., - - - - - Movants

On Appeal From Franklin Circuit Court

Honorable Roger Crittenden, Judge

93-CI-959

v.

Cuar.es C. SmitH, Jr., M.D.; Er AL., - - RESPONDENTS

To Be Heard With:

93-SC-944-TG

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,

REVENUE CaBINET; Et AL., - - - - - MOVANTS

On Appeal From Franklin Circuit Court

Honorable Roger Crittenden, Judge

93-CI-1275

Uv.

HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION

ASSOCIATION OF KENTUCKY, INC., Et AL., - RESPONDENTS

ORDER GRANTING INTERMEDIATE RELIEF

PURSUANT TO CR 76.33

These cases are before the undersigned pursuant to CR

76.33. Movants have requested a stay of the final judg-

ment/order of the Franklin Circuit Court, pending a deci-

sion on the merits by this Court.

Respondents, successfully, in the Franklin Circuit Court

challenged the constitutionality of House Bill 1 (Special

Session, 1993) which imposed a tax on physicians’ services

and health maintenance organizations’ services. The pro-

2la

ceeds of the tax were earmarked to obtain federal match-

ing money to support Kentucky’s extensive Medicaid pro-

gram.

In the judgment, the trial court, inter alia, permanently

enjoined the movant Revenue Cabinet from collecting any

more taxes under the provisions of HB 1, and ordered the

Revenue Cabinet to remit refunds on “taxes already paid”

within 90 days of the order. The emphasis of the present

motion deals with these two provisions.

Transfer of this case has been granted. By separate

order this day, an abbreviated briefing schedule has been

designated, and oral argument has been set for February

17, 1994.

For a temporary stay to be granted, the movants must

show a possibility of success on the merits of the appeal

and must also show that a failure to grant the stay will

cause irreparable damage to them.

The basic legal question presented in the underlying

case involves the right of the Kentucky General Assembly

to establish the classification set out in HB 1, for taxation

purposes, under the proscriptions of Sections 59 and 2 of

the Kentucky Constitution. The undersigned believes that

there is a strong possibility of success on appeal to this

Court. Thus, at least in the opinion of the undersigned,

the first requirement of CR 76.33 is satisfied.

The question of irreparable injury to the Commonwealth

and to the recipients of Medicaid benefits and other clients

served by the movants, Cabinet for Human Resources

(CHR), is more difficult. It is clear from argument of coun-

sel that if the collection of the tax is stopped, that at least

10% of the so-called “matching funds” (presumably for the

next taxing period) will be withdrawn. It is also clear that

the amount of money involved is at least 12 Million Dol-

lars and the maximum amount of money is 25 Million

Dollars. Although the federal matching funds would not

be immediately withdrawn (due to the provision of a bu-

reaucratic hearing process) they could be in serious jeop-

ardy at a later time. It is also clear that if CHR was

22a

without the federal matching money, other scarce resources

of CHR would have to be used to continue Medicaid ser-

vices to Kentucky citizens. In any case, it seems to the

undersigned that unless CHR reallocates its present re-

sources from currently provided social services, the Ken-

tucky Medicaid program would suffer an immediate loss of

10% (12 Million Dollars or 25 Million Dollars) and that

many Kentuckians would suffer a decrease or loss of health

care benefits. Clearly this constitutes irreparable damage

to the citizens of Kentucky who depend on Medicaid for

their health care.

In addition, during argument on the CR 76.33 motion,

counsel for certain respondents conceded that they have no

basic objection to staying the portion of the order of the

Franklin Circuit Court that ordered refunds to be made to

their clients within 90 days of the entry of that order.

Such time frame is unworkable as the matter is currently

on appeal and is not final until a final ruling by this Court

is entered.

The motion for relief pursuant to CR 76.33 is granted,

and the judgment/order of the Franklin Circuit Court dated

November 23, 1993, is stayed pending the final decision of

this Court.

ENTERED: December 21, 1993

/s/_ Robert F. Stephens

Chief Justice

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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