Opposition Brief — Enterprise Consolidated School District v. Lauderdale County

No. 94-482 a

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1994

ENTERPRISE CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT

by and through Its Board of Trustees,

Petitioner,

V.

THE LAUDERDALE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI SCHOOL DISTRICT,

by and through Its Board of Trustees, et al.,

and the

QUITMAN, MISSISSIPPI SCHOOL DISTRICT,

by and through Its Board of Trustees, et al.,

Respondent

Consolidated With

ENTERPRISE CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Petitioner,

¥.

QUITMAN CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ of Certiorari to the

Uni‘ ed States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TALLY D. RIDDELL PERRY SANSING

P.O. Box 199 (Counsel of Record)

Quitman, MS 39355-0199 JAMES A. KEITH

BRUNINI, GRANTHAM, GROWER &

HEWES

Post Office Drawer 199

Jackson, Mississippi 39205

Counsel for Respondent

October 13, 1994

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. 1-800-347-8208

PTOrcT AVAIL ARIE COPY Ee

ee ae se

a .

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the Court of Appeals properly applied

Milliken vs. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), in reversing the

District Court’s decision to order interdistrict relief in the

absence of a finding by the District Court of an interdistrict

constitutional violation?

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding under

the clearly erroneous standard the District Court’s factual

finding that equitable estoppel barred a party from asserting a

position inconsisent with that party’s conduct and

representations over a 26-year period?

——

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........----++++-- i

STATEMENT OF PACTS «sc cccccsssecvsuss 2

REASONS WHY THE PETITION SHOULD BE

CONG ak 0 6 bk CERES ae eee 4

A. The Fifth Circuit’s decision regarding

estoppel is fact-sensitive and creates no

conflict with the decisions of this Court

or any court of appeals. In addition,

the Fifth Circuit relied on an alternative

holding to support its decision. ...... 4

B. The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of

Milliken vs. Bradley does not create a

conflict with the decisions of any court

ff Serre rer ree eee 8

COMNCTAMIIGN 2c cin b curse ee enna 10

il

ee ee Me eee Me Les EE RE oe ea a Pe rt

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Anderson vs. City of Bessemer City,

Og ee ee ee ee

City of Richmond vs. United States,

ER)

Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ. vs.

Wayne County Bd. of Educ.,

745 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1984) .......

Goodman vs. Lukens Steel Co.,

482 U.S. 656 (1987) .............

Graver Mfg. vs. Linde Co,

re

Hoots vs. Pennsylvania,

672 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1982) .......

Jenkins vs. Missouri,

807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1987) .......

Lee vs. Lee County Bd. of Educ.,

639 F.2d 1243 (Sth Cir. 1981) .......

Lopez vs. Hale County,

797 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Tex. 1992),

aff’d mem., it

ee

iil

f

2

oO

Milliken vs. Bradley,

418 U.S. 717 (1974) . 0. ee ee ees i, 8,9

NCAA vs. Board of Regents,

a eok | re ere ee ee 5

Shelley vs. Kraemer,

TEI es) | Bee ere eae 7

United States vs. Dallas County Comm’n,

548 F. Supp. 794 (S.D. Ala. 1982),

aff’d in part and rev’d in part on

other grounds, 739 F.2d 1529

4) 4° Ge ae ee 7

Williams vs. City of Dothan,

745 F.2d 1406 (1ith Cir. 1984) ........... 7

OTHER

Rat OO BF Oe oi ee Ce ee 8 8 y

Robert L. Stern, et al.,

Supreme Court Practice

§ 4.4 (Tth ed. 1993) .... 22 eee cere cece 6

iV

No. 94-482

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1994

ENTERPRISE CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

by and through It Board of Trustees,

Petitioner,

Vv.

THE LAUDERDALE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI SCHOOL

DISTRICT, by and through Its Board of Trustees, et al.,

and the

QUITMAN, MISSISSIPPI SCHOOL DISTRICT,

by and through Its Board of Trustees, et ai.,

Respondents,

Consolidated with

ENTERPRISE CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Petitioner,

v.

QUITMAN CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondent Quitman School District respectfully

requests that this Court deny the petition for writ of certiorari,

which seeks review of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion reported at

24 F.3d 671.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Enterprise mischaracterizes the Fifth Circuit’s holding

and misstates the record in several instances.

1. Enterprise states that "in 1962, Enterprise and

Quitman entered into a twenty-five (25) year contract ceding

[the Stonewall area] from Enterprise to Quitman in return for

Enterprise’s agreeing to educate all black school age children

continuing to reside in Stonewall." Pet. at 3. Throughout this

litigation, Enterprise has attempted to link the validity of the

annexation to the student-transfer contract, which all agree is

unconstitutional. Both the District Court and the Court of

Appeals rejected Enterprise's position. As the District Court

found, the annexation, which was not limited in duration, and

the 25-year student-transfer contract were separate parts of a

larger compromise that settled the dispute over ownership of

Stonewall. App. 6-7, 55. The Fifth Circuit affirmed this

factual finding under the clearly erroneous standard of Fed. R.

Civ. P. 52(a). "The annexation should be viewed separately

from the rest of the agreement. By itself, the annexation is

constitutional." App. 50. The Fifth Circuit also held that

"even assuming that the Stonewall annexation and [the 1962]

transfer agreement are linked, the annexation is not void."

App. 55. The annexation, which was accomplished by a

statutory procedure separate and distinct from the 25-year

student-transfer contract, did not promote segregation. App.

55-57.

2. Enterprise states that it was estopped from "raising

the constitutionality of the contract" and that the Fifth Circuit

“affirmed the District Court by upholding the contract between

Enterprise and [Quitman]." Pet. at 6; see also id. at 10. The

Fifth Circuit upheld the validity of the annexation and

affirmed the District Court’s holding that equitable estoppel

prevented Enterprise from challenging the annexation. The

validity of the student-transfer contract was not in issue. All

parties, including Enterprise, acknowledged the

unconstitutionality of that contract. App. 62. In fact,

Quitman stopped performing under the student-transfer

contract in 1969, and repudiated it in 1977 because it

discriminated against blacks. App. 12. — Enterprise’s

suggestion that the District Court or Fifth Circuit upheld the

student-transfer contract is simply wrong.

3. Enterprise’s reference to "(t]he insulation of the

town of Stonewall in its whiteness" suggests that Quitman’s

annexation was racially motivated. Pet. at 11. The impetus

for the annexation, however, was not race but Enterprise’s

decision to close the Stonewall High School. Parents of the

high school students actually initiated the process resulting in

the annexation. App. 42-43. Moreover, the territory annexed

was clearly defined, and not a "white only" area. Prior to

1962, the area annexed was the "Stonewall Attendance Area"

of the Enterprise district and, before then, had comprised the

boundaries of a separate school district. Neither the District

Court nor the Court of Appeals held that a racial animus

motivated the annexation. App. 57.

REASONS WHY THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED

A. The Fifth Circuit’s decision regarding estoppel

is fact-sensitive and creates no conflict with the decisions of

this Court or any court of appeals. In addition, the Fifth

Circuit relied on an alternative holding to support its

decision.

1. The Fifth Circuit’s holding that Quitman validly

annexed the Stonewall area is based on alternative holdings.

The Court of Appeals held that equitable estoppel precluded

Enterprise from challenging the annexation and that Quitman’s

ownership and control over Stonewall is consistent with the

final order in the desegregation litigation. App. 41-42, 50.

The basis for each holding is briefly reviewed.

During the desegregation litigation in the 1960s,

Enterprise admitted in its pleadings, testimony and exhibits

that the Stonewall area was a part of Quitman. App. 50-51.

After entry of the final desegregation order in 1969,

Enterprise continued to recognize that Stonewall had been

lawfully annexed by Quitman. "For over twenty-six years,

from June 1962 until June 17, 1988, when suit was filed,

Enterprise did nothing to indicate that the Stonewall area had

not lawfully been annexed to Quitman." App. 51 Asa result,

"Quitman was unaware that Enterprise would suddenly

challenge the annexation after decades of acquiescence." App.

51-52.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s factual

finding that Quitman relied to its detriment on Enterprise’s

representations. App. 50. The evidence before the District

Court showed that "Quitman planned, budgeted, forecasted,

funded, hired teachers and staff members, paid taxes, and

maintained school property since [the 1962 annexation] under

the assumption that the Stonewall territory was properly

annexed." App. 53. Based on this evidence, the District

Court found that equitable estoppel applied. App. 50.

Consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), the Fifth Circuit

upheld the finding. See Anderson vs. City of Bessemer City,

470 U.S. 564, 573-76 (1985).

Enterprise’s Petition is simply an effort to have this

Court review the same record in the hope that a different

outcome might be reached. Therefore, this issue does not

merit review by this Court. See Goodman vs. Lukens Steel

Co., 482 U.S. 656, 665 (1987) ("[BJoth courts below having

agreed on the facts, we are not inclined to examine the record

for ourselves absent some extraordinary reason for

undertaking this task. Nothing the [Petitioners] have

submitted indicates that we should do so."); NCAA vs. Board

of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 n.15 (1984) ("In-accord with our

usual practice, we must now accord great weight to a finding ~

of fact which has been approved by a court of appeals.");

Graver Mfg. vs. Linde Co, 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949) (Court

should not "undertake to review concurrent findings of fact by

two courts below in the absence of a very obvious and

exceptional show of error").

2. Apart from the estoppel issue, the Fifth Circuit also

held that "Quitman’s control over Stonewall would comport

with" the Fifth Circuit’s 1969 desegregation order. App. 42.

The final order in that litigation was "based upon interdistrict

boundaries that assumed the validity of the annexation of

Stonewall by Quitman." App. 54. Although no Court ruled

specifically on the validity of the annexation, "they did not

have cause to do so. All parties, including Enterprise,

represented to the court that the annexation was valid." Id.

Enterprise neither acknowledges nor challenges this alternative

holding by the Fifth Circuit. The presence of an alternative

basis to uphold the annexation militates against granting the

Petition. See generally R. Stern, et al., Supreme Court

Practice § 4.4, at pp. 172-73 (7th ed. 1993) (conflict in

decisions may not merit grant of certiorari if Court can decide

case on another ground and thereby avoid reaching issue upon

which there is a conflict).

3. Enterprise contends that equitable estoppel cannot

be applied to preclude it "from changing its earlier position,

even if that position is wrong, ... to comport with newly

developed law." Pet. at 8. The underlying premise for

Enterprise’s argument is incorrect. Enterprise did challenge

the constitutionality of the annexation, and the Fifth Circuit

rejected Enterprise’s argument. App. 57-58. Enterprise has

not been prevented from changing its position based on a

change in the applicable law. Rather, Enterprise was estopped

from challenging the annexation of Stonewall after almost

three decades of acquiescence and after representing to the

District Court and the Court of Appeals in the desegregation

litigation that the Stonewall territory properly belonged in the

Quitman district.

No court has prevented Enterprise from acknowledging

that the student-transfer contract is unconstitutional. In fact,

Enterprise took that position in the Fifth Circuit, App. 62, and

again in this Court, Pet. at 10-11.

4. Enterprise fails to cite any authority to support its

argument that equitable estoppel cannot bar assertion of a

constitutional claim. As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, "[t}he

admittedly sparse authority on applicability of equitable

estoppel indicates the opposite." App. 52. Two district

courts have held that parties could be equitably estopped from

arguing constitutional violations, and this Court recently

affirmed a three-judge district court’s decision that laches, a

doctrine similar to equitable estoppel, could prevent a plaintiff

from enjoining unprecleared election changes. Id.'

5. Enterprise contends that the "illicit racial

motivation" for the 1962 student-transfer contract "should void

the entire" compromise agreement, including the annexation,

reached between Enterprise and Quitman. Pet. 11. The Fifth

Circuit rejected "the idea that an unconstitutional clause in a

contract automatically voids the entire contract." App. 57

n.38 (citing Shelley vs. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).

Furthermore, the annexation did not contribute to

segregation in 1962 and does not today. "The Stonewall

annexation was no more promotive of segregation than was

any of the other pre-desegregation boundary changes among

Mississippi’s school districts." App. 57. Thus, Enterprise’s

reliance on City of Richmond vs. United States, 422 U.S. 358

(1975), is misplaced. The annexation of Stonewall was not

"taken for the purpose of discriminating against" blacks. Id.

at 378.

Throughout its Petition, Enterprise refers or alludes to

current segregative effects of the annexation or the student-

transfer contract, or both. Pet. at i ("ongoing racially

gerrymandered district lines"); id. at 13 (interdistrict

constitutional violation in Pennsylvania case "similar to the

resulting segregative effects in the Mississippi school districts

1 The Fifth Circuit cited Williams vs. City of Dothan,

745 F.2d 1406 (11th Cir. 1984), United States vs. Dallas

County Comm’n, 548 F. Supp. 794 (S.D. Ala. 1982), aff'd

in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 739 F.2d 1529

(11th Cir. 1984), and Lopez vs. Hale County, 797 F. Supp.

547 (N.D. Tex. 1992), aff'd mem., Um. , tee kL.

Ed 2d 112 (1993).

iT.

A

here described"); id. at 15 (Fifth Circuit upheld "the

annexation of [Stonewall] to a school district and enforced

student transfers which perpetuated segregation"). The Fifth

Circuit ruled, however, that neither the annexation nor the

student-transfer contract could support interdistrict relief

because these events do not have current segregative effects.

App. 59.

B. The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Milliken vs.

Bradley does not create a conflict with the decisions of any

court of appeals.

Enterprise purports to find a conflict among the courts

of appeals concerning the application of Milliken vs. Bradley,

418 U.S. 717 (1974), which holds that interdistrict relief can

be imposed in a desegregation case only if "there has been a

constitutional violation within one district that produces a

significant segregative effect in another district." Id. at 744.

Thus, “without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict

effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an

interdistrict remedy." Id. at 745. A review of the cases cited

by Enterprise on pages 12 and 13 of its Petition reveals no

conflict on this issue. The differences among these cases arise

solely from the evidence in each case, not from their

application of Milliken.

Here, the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court’s

interdistrict remedy because no school district committed a

constitutional violation that had current segregative effects in

another district. App. 58-59. The court relied on Milliken

and Lee vs. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 639 F.2d 1243 (Sth

Cir. 1981), which interpreted Milliken to permit an

interdistrict remedy only “when there is proof of

unconstitutional governmental action that has been a

‘substantial cause’ of a ‘significant’ interdistrict segregative

effect, and where an interdistrict desegregation plan is

necessary in order to remedy segregation ‘directly’ caused by

this constitutionaily impermissible conduct." Id. at 1256.

The Fifth Circuit’s holding does not create a conflict. In fact,

Lee’s interpretation of Milliken has been followed in two of

the cases cited by Enterprise. See Jenkins vs. Missouri, 807

F.2d 657, 666 (8th Cir. 1987); Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ.

vs. Wayne County Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 324, 330-31 (4th

Cir. 1984). ;

In the context of the Milliken standard, the facts of

each case will determine whether an interdistrict remedy is

proper. For example, in Goldsboro, the Fourth Circuit stated

that the "present case differs from those cases where the

courts have found an interdistrict remedy to be appropriate."

745 F. 2d at 330. In both Lee and Goldsboro, the appellate

courts summarized the cases cited by Enterprise, pointing out

that some presented evidence to support interdistrict relief and

others did not.’

Rather than reveal a conflict, the cases cited by

Enterprise demonstrate quite clearly that the facts of each case

will determine the propriety of interdistrict relief under the

Milliken standard. In the absence of an actual conflict, the

fact-based issue raised by Enterprise is not the type that merits

2 The two cases not discussed in Goldshoro or Lee do

not aid Enterprise’s efforts to create a conflict. In Hoots vs.

Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1107, 1120 (3d Cir. 1982), the court

applied Milliken and noted that the interdistrict remedy "was

appropriate in this case because [the district court] concluded

that the violation itself was interdistrict in nature." In Jenkins

vs. Missouri, 807 F.2d at 666, the court, as noted, relied on

Goldsboro and Lee and held that the absence of a

constitutional violation precluded interdistrict relief.

9

review by this Court.

CONCLUSION

Respondent Quitman School District respectfully

requests that the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari be denied.

Dated: October 13, 1994

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

PERRY SANSING

(Counsel of Record)

JAMES A. KEITH

BRUNINI, GRANTHAM,

GROWER & HEWES

1400 Trustmark Building

Post Office Drawer 119

Jackson, Mississippi 39205

Telephone: (601)948-3101

TALLY D. RIDDELL

P.O. Box 199

Quitman, MS 39355-0199

10