Opposition Brief — Lekvold v. Westinghouse Hanford Co.
Supreme Court brief1994
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 94-310
OFFIOE
In The ine
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1994
& —
GARY L. LEKVOLD,
Petitioner,
WESTINGHOUSE HANFORD COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation;
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION,
a Pennsylvania corporation,
Respondents.
——— 6
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
+
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
.
Stuart R. DuUNwoopy*
WILLIAM R. Soguires III
Davis WRIGHT TREMAINE
2600 Century Square
1501 Fourth Avenue
Seattle, WA 98101-1688
(206) 622-3150
*Counsel of Record
Attorneys for Respondents
Of Counsel:
Rosert A. DuTTon
Assistant General Counsel
Westinghouse Hanford Co.
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
ee
BEST AVAILABLE COPY
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether “special factors” exist and bar a former
employee of a government contractor at a Department of
Energy facility from maintaining a Bivens action against
his former employer where Congress’ enactment of some
remedies and its repeated consideration and rejection of
proposed legislation to create additional remedies shows
that its failure to create the precise remedy that the
employee seeks has not been inadvertent.
il
RULE 29.1 LISTING
Westinghouse Electric Corporation is the parent com-
pany of Westinghouse Hanford Company. Westinghouse
Hanford Company has no other parent companies and no
subsidiaries.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation has the following
subsidiaries (other than wholly-owned subsidiaries):
Micros System, Inc.
New World Power Corp.
Royal International Optical, Inc.
The Actava Group, Inc.
iil
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ............ i
a ii
ME ED 6 occ ccc cscs erescccccescess iii
pe sg iv
So Ale is | 8 oe: Sa 1
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT............. 4
I. The Issue Petitioner Presents Is Not Suffi-
ciently Important to Justify Review by This
Nee eee eeeaces 4
II. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Is Correct
and Is Consistent With Other Authority........ 5
EOE nee ee 8
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Adams v. Dole, 927 F.2d 771 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 GS GE Se Ces eo a Peak hase ceaeces sss 6
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)...... 23,43
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
CRUE kk 6a koko ce ee oa a ec a ees 1 Gos 7
Bricker v. Rockwell International Corp., 22 F.3d 871
(9th Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, No. 94-120
LID. ube PGi Be aces eck nt ae case seccenssns 3, 5, 6
Beem wv. Leia, S62 TES. SBF Cie he os cooks ck ver cwss 4,5
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 :
EE ee a Gh so bk Oa koe es Ve Rah eat ake 7
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) ........... 4,5
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, 10
Bi: a 8 ol aka occa eee eee d Teen Ge ks 7
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486,
S 2902(a), 106 Stat. 2776, SiZS (U99Z). «wwe. ccc esee 4
Energy Reorganization Act, Section 210, 42 U.S.C.
GE ._, TARP Rr colette Ce ae mee een ae entietsPnOe a extra oe 4, 6
Sr ne Oe os ks is nee hoe ne 2
MISCELLANEOUS
i Mey Me ae a rere re rere 7
Fi. Dae, SAO Come, Te is a ok os a vcisinesdacenens 7
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued
Lexis Bill Tracking Reports 1989 H.R. 2579 and
FOO BE CE Neca cbekecrcenens:
S. 436, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989)
Me We ME Nobu s kes vacteaebeucas
—— i ae ee er
No. 94-310
®
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1994
e
GARY L. LEKVOLD,
Petitioner,
WESTINGHOUSE HANFORD COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation;
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION,
a Pennsylvania corporation,
Respondents.
>
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
+
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
¢
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner was employed by respondent Westing-
house Hanford Company (“WHC”) at the Hanford
Nuclear Reservation in Southeastern Washington, an
installation owned by the United States and managed by
the United States Department of Energy. WHC manages
portions of the site under contract with DOE.
Petitioner alleges in his complaint that he had dis-
agreements with his supervisors regarding the physical
security of nuclear materials stored at the Hanford Reser-
vation, and concluded that WHC management did not
intend to take the necessary measures to protect the
public from theft of nuclear materials. In February 1989,
petitioner wrote to Michael Lawrence, the senior DOE
official at the Hanford Reservation, expressing his con-
cerns. DOE promptly assigned an independent investiga-
tor to look into petitioner’s allegations, who found no
basis to support them.
Petitioner alleges that WHC retaliated against him
for expressing his concerns. WHC suspended petitioner
in March 1989 for violations of attendance and time card
rules, but, as he admits, “his employment status contin-
ued,” Pet. at 5, and WHC continued to pay him his
salary.!
Petitioner filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Washington, asserting
claims against WHC under the First and Fifth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution and seeking
thirty-three million dollars in damages. Petitioner
founded his claims on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
which permits, under certain circumstances, damages
1 After this action was filed, DOE independently revoked
petitioner’s security clearance, Pet. at 6, on the authority set
forth in 10 C.F.R. Part 710 because he gave false answers to
questions concerning his use of marijuana. Because petitioner’s
position required a security clearance, WHC then terminated
his employment.
suits against federal officials who violate federal constitu-
tional rights under color of federal law.? Petitioner claims
that WHC is subject to suit under Bivens because it is a
“federal actor.” Although WHC denies that it is a federal
actor, it did not seek summary judgment on the issue and
the courts below did not rule on it or on any other
allegation contained in the complaint.
The district court dismissed petitioner’s constitu-
tional claims with prejudice on the ground that the “spe-
cial factors counseling hesitation” recognized by this
Court in Bivens exist and preclude petitioner from main-
taining a Bivens action, and dismissed his state law claims
against Westinghouse Electric Corporation without preju-
dice. The court of appeals affirmed, relying on its recent
decision in Bricker v. Rockwell International Corp., 22 F.3d
871 (9th Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, No. 94-120 (U.S.
July 14, 1994).
2 Petitioner’s complaint also asserted state law tort claims
(but not the federal constitutional claims) against WHC’s parent
corporation, Westinghouse Electric Corporation. After filing his
federal court action, petitioner filed state law claims against
WHC in the Superior Court of Franklin County, Washington;
those claims are still pending.
3 The allegations of wrongdoing set forth in the Petition,
which respondents vigorously deny, thus remain unproved.
Respondents will not engage in a point by point rebuttal of the
factual misstatements contained in the Petition, however,
because they have no bearing on the question of what issues
would properly be before the Court if certiorari were granted.
See S. Ct. R. 15.1.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
The Petition should be denied, both because the issue
it presents will not recur in future cases and thus is of
historical interest only, and because the decisions below
were correctly decided and are fully consistent with the
decisions of this Court and of the courts of appeals.
I. The Issue Petitioner Presents Is Not Sufficiently
Important to Justify Review by This Court.
A recent statutory amendment ensures that the ques-
tion that petitioner presents will not arise in cases that are
filed after October 24, 1992. The issue thus is a narrow
one that does not justify review by this Court on cer-
tiorari.
The question that petitioner presents is whether the
“special factors” recognized by this Court in Bivens and
its progeny preclude a plaintiff such as petitioner, who
claims that he has suffered retaliation for voicing safety
or health concerns relating to a DOE installation, from
maintaining a damages action directly under the United
States Constitution. A recent amendment to Section 210 of
the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851, provid-
ing remedies for employees of DOE contractors who have
claims for such retaliation arising on or after October 24,
1992,4 constitutes, under this Court’s decisions in Bush v.
Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), and Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487
4 The amendment was made by the Energy Policy Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 2902(a), 106 Stat. 2776, 3123 (1992),
and applies to claims that are filed on or after the date of its
enactment, October 24, 1992. Id., § 2902(i), 106 Stat. at 3125.
U.S. 412 (1988), a “special factor” that would bar any
Bivens actions by DOE contractor employees for claims
arising after that date.
The question that petitioner presents, therefore, is
whether special factors existed before Congress amended
Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act in October
of 1992. This question will only have bearing on those
claims by employees of DOE contractors that arose before
October 24, 1992 and are not yet barred by the statute of
limitations.5 The issue thus is of historical interest only
and will not recur in future cases. It is not an issue
worthy of this Court’s review on certiorari.
II. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Is Correct
and Is Consistent With Other Authority.
In any event, the decisions below are correct and do
not conflict with any other authority.
Under this Court’s decisions in Bush and Chilicky,
special factors bar a Bivens suit even where no alternative
remedy exists for the harm that the plaintiff alleges, so
long as Congress’ failure to provide the precise remedy
that the plaintiff seeks has not been inadvertent. Chilicky,
487 U.S. at 423. The courts below correctly held that
> Counsel for respondents are aware of only one other case
currently pending in which an employee of a DOE contractor
asserts a Bivens claim that arose before October 24, 1992 against
his employer, Bricker v. Rockwell International Corp., 22 F.3d 871
(9th Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, No. 94-120 (U.S. July 14,
1994).
Congress’ failure to create a remedy for persons in peti-
tioner’s position — an employee of a DOE contractor who
voices safety concerns at a DOE installation - was any-
thing but inadvertent.
This is clear first from Congress’ enactment in 1978 of
Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act. As origi-
nally enacted, Section 210 protected only employees of
commercial nuclear facilities from retaliation. 42 U.S.C.
§ 5851 (1988). As the Fourth Circuit recognized in Adams
v. Dole, 927 F.2d 771, 776 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
122 (1991), Congress deliberately excluded employees of
DOE contractors from the protections of Section 210 when
it first enacted the statute. Its failure to provide those
protections to persons such as petitioner thus was not
inadvertent.
Congress’ lack of inadvertence in providing the rem-
edy petitioner seeks for employees of DOE contractors
was repeatedly demonstrated between 1978, when Sec-
tion 210 was first enacted, and 1992, when it was finally
amended to include employees of DOE contractors. Dur-
ing that time Congress repeatedly considered and, until
1992, rejected bills that would create protections for whis-
tleblowers at DOE installations. Although none of the
bills was enacted, they received substantial attention
from Congress. Many of the bills had numerous co-spon-
sors. One bill, S. 436, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), was
favorably reported to the full Senate in a report noting
6 Some (but not all) of these bills are cited in the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion in Bricker v. Rockwell, 22 F.3d at 875 n.4, which
was the basis for the opinion of the court of appeals in this case.
the current lack of whistleblower protection for contrac-
tor employees at DOE facilities. See S. Rep. No. 349, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1990). Furthermore, Congress con-
sidered these bills at the same time that it was enacting
whistleblower protections for other classes of
employees.” These failed bills thus show that Congress’
failure to enact protections for DOE employees before
October 1992 was not inadvertent.®
Finally, as the court of appeals recognized, Congress’
lack of inadvertence is shown by the very enactment of
the amendments to Section 210 and by the decision to
give those amendments only prospective effect. Pet. App.
at App. 5 — App. 6.
————_———_—_- @ —
” For example, a bill to create whistleblower protections for
employees of Department of Defense contractors, H.R. 2579,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., and a bill to create protections for
employees of DOE contractors, H.R. 3255, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.,
were both considered at a joint hearing of a subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee. See Lexis Bill Tracking
Reports 1989 H.R. 2579 and 1989 H.R. 3255. Congress enacted
the first bill as part of the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1991, 10 U.S.C. § 2409a, but failed to enact the bill that
would have created similar protections for DOE contractor
employees.
8 The courts below did not consider the failed legislation to
construe a previously enacted statute, see Pet. at 12 (quoting
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp.. 496 U.S. 633, 650
(1990)). Rather, they properly considered the failed bills to
determine that Congress was aware of the issue and that its
failure to enact the remedy that petitioners seek was not inad-
vertent. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
600-601 (1983).
8
CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.
September 16, 1994
Respectfully submitted,
STuART R. DuNwoopy*
WILLIAM R. Squires III
Davis WRIGHT TREMAINE
2600 Century Square
1501 Fourth Avenue
Seattle, WA 98101-1688
(206) 622-3150
*Counsel of Record
Attorneys for Respondents
Of Counsel:
Rosert A. DuTTON
Assistant General Counsel
Westinghouse Hanford Co.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.