Appendix — Heli-Mejia v. United States

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94 258 sue 111994

NO.

UFFilc Ur iftc ULeKK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

JOSE HELI-MEJIA

Petitioner

vs.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIZ TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

KENT A. SCHAFFER

Counsel of Record

600 Travis

Suite 3000

Houston, TX 77002

(713) 228-8500

CN So ote Ce eer’ ee Cee ek 6 éee

Temae GE GCRHOGOHERs occ cccenode ‘

Opinion of The Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals...........2.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 92-2631

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GERMAN CRUZ, JOSE HELI-MEJIA

and DAVID RAMOS,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Southern District of Texas

(May 18, 1994)

Before KING, and WEINER, Circuit Judges,

and DOHERTY', District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

‘District Judge of the Western

District of Louisiana, sitting by

designation.

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Defendants-Appellants David Ramos,

Jose Heli-Mejia, and German Cruz appeal

their convictions for conspiracy to

possess with intent to distribute cocaine

in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1),

(b) (1) (A), 846; and aiding and abetting

the possession with intent to distribute

cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §

841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

After carefully considering the facts and

legal arguments advanced by counsel in

their briefs to this court and in their

oral arguments to this panel, and having

reviewed the record from the district

court, we conclude that the majority of

the cited points of error* -- while not

“cruz, Ramos, and Heli-Mejia all

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.

Cruz challenges the admission of certain

inculpatory statements as violative of his

Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to

counsel. Cruz also challenges the

district court’s refusal to declare a

mistrial on the basis of testimony

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necessarily frivolous -- lack sufficient

factual and legal substance to justify

reversal of Defendants-Appellants’

convictions. Whether Cruz’s right to

counsel was violated, however, merits more

discussion. We, therefore, confine our

factual review and legal analysis in this

opinion to that issue.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Cruz was arrested by Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA) agents after an

indictment was returned charging him with

complicity in a cocaine conspiracy. Cruz

elicited from a government agent on cross-

examination. Ramos challenges the

restriction of the scope of his cross-

examination. Heli-Mejia challenges the

denial of his requests for disclosure of

evidence held by the government, and the

district court’s finding that he was a

manager or supervisor of criminal activity

for purposes of the sentencing guidelines.

Both Ramos and Heli-Mejia challenge the

admittance of evidence of extraneous acts.

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was promptly given Miranda warnings;

however, as Cruz was not proficient in

English, the agents employed Cruz’s wife

as an interpreter. Cruz had no questions

and did not request an attorney. Cruz was

taken to another location where several

agents had left their vehicles. A

Spanish-speaking officer then repeated the

Miranda warnings in Spanis.i. Cruz was

asked if he understood the warnings and

replied that he did. Cruz was then asked

if he had a lawyer. Cruz replied that he

was a “working man" and "couldn’t afford

an attorney." The agents then proceeded

to conduct a cursory interrogation.

Shortly thereafter, Cruz was transported

to the DEA field office and again was

given Miranda warnings in Spanish. Cruz

indicated that he understood his rights,

3384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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but he did mot request counsel. DEA

agents then questioned Cruz for twenty

minutes. In response to their questions,

Cruz gave several inculpatory statements

to the agents.

Later that day, Cruz was arraigned,

at which time he requested the appointment

of counsel. With benefit of counsel, Cruz

moved to suppress his inculpatory

statements on the grounds that he had

invoked his right to counsel when he

stated that he was a "working man" and

"couldn’t afford an attorney." Cruz

argued that, as he had not waived his

right to counsel at any time after making

those comments, his statements to the DEA

agents should be suppressed as the product

of improper questioning.‘ The district

‘Neither party disputes the words

spoken by Cruz. The only dispute is the

effect to be given to those words.

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court rejected Cruz’s motion, reasoning,

in part, that Cruz’s comments were not "a

positive affirmation of the right to

counsel." At trial, the government

introduced the inculpatory statements into

evidence. The jury convicted Cruz, and he

timely filed a notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

"An accused in custody, ‘having

expressed his desire to deal with the

police only through counsel, is not

subject to further interrogation by the

authorities until counsel has been made

available to him,’ unless he validly

waives his earlier request ffor the

assistance of counsel.” "If the

interrogation continues without the

*Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 94-95

(1984) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.

477, 484-85 (1981); accord Miranda v. Anzona,

384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966); United States v.

Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124, 1130 (5th Cir. 1984).

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presence of an attorney and a statement is

taken, a heavy burden rests on the

government to demonstrate that the

[accused] knowingly and _ intelligently

waived his privilege against’ self-

incrimination and his right to retained or

appointed counsel."® "[A] valid waiver of

the right cannot be established by showing

only that [the accused) responded to

further police-initiated custodial

interrogation even if [the accused] has

been advised of his rights."’

‘Miranda, 384 U.S. at 75.

"Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484; see Smith, 469

U.S. at 95 ("This ‘rigid’ prophylactic

rule embodies two distinct inquiries.

First, courts must determine whether the

accused actually invoked--ais right to

counsel. Second, if the accused invoked

his right to counsel, courts may admit his

responses to further questioning only on

finding that he (a) initiated further

discussions with the police, and (b)

knowingly and intelligently waived the

right he had invoked." (citations

omitted).

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Cruz contends that he invoked his

right to counsel, thus rendering the

fruits of subsequent questioning

inadmissible, when he stated that he was a

“working man" and "“couldn’t afford an

attorney."® But "[t]he word ‘attorney’

has no talismanic qualities. A defendant

does not invoke his right to counsel any

time the word falls from his lips.’

®cruz had both a Fifth Amendment and

Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The

Fifth Amendment right to counsel arises

when, as here, an individual is subject to

custodial interrogation. Edwards, 451 U.S.

at 482; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470; United States

v. Berisha, 925 F.2d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 1991).

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel

attaches upon the initiation of judicial

proceedings against an individual. See

Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986);

Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).

Cruz was under indictment at the time that

he was questioned, so his Sixth Amendment

right to counsel had attached. See Patterson

v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 (1988).

°United States v. Jardina, 747 F.2d 945, 949

(Sth Cir. 1984); cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058

(1985); accord Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d

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Viewing Cruz’s comments in context of the

officer’s question and giving his words

their ordinary meaning, Cruz did not

evince "a desire to deal with the police

only though counsel.""

Given the officer’s inquiry whether

Cruz had a lawyer, his response could only

be construed as a statement of fact --

equivalent to, "no, I don’t have an

attorney.""' cruz’s response could not

768, 772 (Sth Cir. 1979); Nash v. Estelle, 597

F.2d 513, 519 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.

denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).

"Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. "[W]hile

an accused is not required to use any

magic language to invoke the right to

counsel, we do not ignore the plain

meaning of his words in order to find

invocation of the right to counsel." Griffin

v. Lynaugh, 823 F.2d 856, 863 n.3 (5th Cir.

1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079 (1988).

“cruz contends his comments were made

in response to the Miranda warnings;

however, the uncontested testimony at the

suppression hearing establishes that his

comments were made in response to an

inquiry whether he had a lawyer. Under

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reasonably be construed as a request for

counsel.'* We are satisfied that, under

the instant circumstances, Cruz did not

evince a desire for counsel; and, as there

is no suggestion that his subsequent

statements were involuntary, we conclude

that the district court did no err in

denying the motion to suppress on the

basis of Cruz’s statement that he was a

working man who could not afford an

cross-examination, the officer giving the

Miranda warnings testified: "Well, during

when I was reading the Miranda warning to

him, at that time I asked him if he had a

lawyer, and he answered back that, no, he

didn’t have a lawyer." Later the officer

Clarified this testimony: "I remember him

also telling me in Spanish when I asked

him about if he had an attorney or

whatever, and he said, ’No.’ He said he

was just a working man. He couldn’t

afford an attorney."

a different case would have been

presented had the officer asked Cruz

whether he wanted a lawyer. Given such a

context, Cruz’s response would arguably

have been an ambiguous or equivocal

request. However, we are not presented

with such facts.

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attorney.

Cruz nevertheless argues in the

alternative that his response was at least

an ambiguous or equivocal request for

counsel, thereby limiting further

questioning to a clarification of his

desires. -In United States v. C. 3 ~6we

affirmed the principle that, when an

accused expresses an ambiguous or

equivocal request for counsel, further

interrogation is limited to clarification

of the accused’s desires."™

Here, though,

we find no ambiguity or equivocation in

Cruz’s response: He had been asked not if

he wanted a lawyer, but if he had one; and

he answered that question in the negative.

3733 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1984).

“See id. at 1130-31; accord Thompson v.

Wainwright , 601 F.2d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir.

1979); Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 517-18

(Sth Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 444

U.S. 981 (1979).

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That answer can not be stenbatind to

constitute an unresponsive request for

counsel, even an ambiguous or equivocal

one.

This case is thus unlike prior cases

in which we found an equivocal or

ambiguous request for counsel. For

example, in Cherry, the accused stated,

"Maybe I should talk to an attorney before

I make a further statement," then added

rhetorically, “Why should I not get an

attorney?"" We found that, as the

accused’s statements suggested conflicting

desires to talk to an attorney and to talk

to the authorities, his utterances

constituted a request, albeit an equivocal

16

one. Unlike the comments in Chery,

“Chery, 733 F.2d at 1127.

See id at 1130. Likewise, in Thompson

v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d at 769, and Nash v.

Estelle, 597 F.2d at 516-17, the accused

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An eR An, ES a AE Om «abe

though, Cruz’s comments did not suggest a

desire for counsel; to the contrary, they

unambiguously and unequivocally stated a

matter of fact. Hence, as Cruz’s comments

could not be construed as an ambiguous or

equivocal request, subsequent questioning

was not limited to mere clarification of

his desires. Denial of the motion to

suppress was not error.

i ew

CONCLUSION

Having found no reversible error as

to any of the Defendants-Appellants’

assignments of error, their convictions

and sentences are in all respects

AFFIRMED.

expressed both a desire to talk to

authorities and a desire to talk to an

attorney.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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