Appendix — Heli-Mejia v. United States
Supreme Court brief1994
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94 258 sue 111994
NO.
UFFilc Ur iftc ULeKK
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1993
JOSE HELI-MEJIA
Petitioner
vs.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
APPENDIZ TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
KENT A. SCHAFFER
Counsel of Record
600 Travis
Suite 3000
Houston, TX 77002
(713) 228-8500
CN So ote Ce eer’ ee Cee ek 6 éee
Temae GE GCRHOGOHERs occ cccenode ‘
Opinion of The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals...........2.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-2631
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GERMAN CRUZ, JOSE HELI-MEJIA
and DAVID RAMOS,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States
District Court for the
Southern District of Texas
(May 18, 1994)
Before KING, and WEINER, Circuit Judges,
and DOHERTY', District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
‘District Judge of the Western
District of Louisiana, sitting by
designation.
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Defendants-Appellants David Ramos,
Jose Heli-Mejia, and German Cruz appeal
their convictions for conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1),
(b) (1) (A), 846; and aiding and abetting
the possession with intent to distribute
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
After carefully considering the facts and
legal arguments advanced by counsel in
their briefs to this court and in their
oral arguments to this panel, and having
reviewed the record from the district
court, we conclude that the majority of
the cited points of error* -- while not
“cruz, Ramos, and Heli-Mejia all
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
Cruz challenges the admission of certain
inculpatory statements as violative of his
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel. Cruz also challenges the
district court’s refusal to declare a
mistrial on the basis of testimony
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necessarily frivolous -- lack sufficient
factual and legal substance to justify
reversal of Defendants-Appellants’
convictions. Whether Cruz’s right to
counsel was violated, however, merits more
discussion. We, therefore, confine our
factual review and legal analysis in this
opinion to that issue.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Cruz was arrested by Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agents after an
indictment was returned charging him with
complicity in a cocaine conspiracy. Cruz
elicited from a government agent on cross-
examination. Ramos challenges the
restriction of the scope of his cross-
examination. Heli-Mejia challenges the
denial of his requests for disclosure of
evidence held by the government, and the
district court’s finding that he was a
manager or supervisor of criminal activity
for purposes of the sentencing guidelines.
Both Ramos and Heli-Mejia challenge the
admittance of evidence of extraneous acts.
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was promptly given Miranda warnings;
however, as Cruz was not proficient in
English, the agents employed Cruz’s wife
as an interpreter. Cruz had no questions
and did not request an attorney. Cruz was
taken to another location where several
agents had left their vehicles. A
Spanish-speaking officer then repeated the
Miranda warnings in Spanis.i. Cruz was
asked if he understood the warnings and
replied that he did. Cruz was then asked
if he had a lawyer. Cruz replied that he
was a “working man" and "couldn’t afford
an attorney." The agents then proceeded
to conduct a cursory interrogation.
Shortly thereafter, Cruz was transported
to the DEA field office and again was
given Miranda warnings in Spanish. Cruz
indicated that he understood his rights,
3384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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but he did mot request counsel. DEA
agents then questioned Cruz for twenty
minutes. In response to their questions,
Cruz gave several inculpatory statements
to the agents.
Later that day, Cruz was arraigned,
at which time he requested the appointment
of counsel. With benefit of counsel, Cruz
moved to suppress his inculpatory
statements on the grounds that he had
invoked his right to counsel when he
stated that he was a "working man" and
"couldn’t afford an attorney." Cruz
argued that, as he had not waived his
right to counsel at any time after making
those comments, his statements to the DEA
agents should be suppressed as the product
of improper questioning.‘ The district
‘Neither party disputes the words
spoken by Cruz. The only dispute is the
effect to be given to those words.
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court rejected Cruz’s motion, reasoning,
in part, that Cruz’s comments were not "a
positive affirmation of the right to
counsel." At trial, the government
introduced the inculpatory statements into
evidence. The jury convicted Cruz, and he
timely filed a notice of appeal.
ANALYSIS
"An accused in custody, ‘having
expressed his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel, is not
subject to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been made
available to him,’ unless he validly
waives his earlier request ffor the
assistance of counsel.” "If the
interrogation continues without the
*Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 94-95
(1984) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 484-85 (1981); accord Miranda v. Anzona,
384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966); United States v.
Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124, 1130 (5th Cir. 1984).
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presence of an attorney and a statement is
taken, a heavy burden rests on the
government to demonstrate that the
[accused] knowingly and _ intelligently
waived his privilege against’ self-
incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel."® "[A] valid waiver of
the right cannot be established by showing
only that [the accused) responded to
further police-initiated custodial
interrogation even if [the accused] has
been advised of his rights."’
‘Miranda, 384 U.S. at 75.
"Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484; see Smith, 469
U.S. at 95 ("This ‘rigid’ prophylactic
rule embodies two distinct inquiries.
First, courts must determine whether the
accused actually invoked--ais right to
counsel. Second, if the accused invoked
his right to counsel, courts may admit his
responses to further questioning only on
finding that he (a) initiated further
discussions with the police, and (b)
knowingly and intelligently waived the
right he had invoked." (citations
omitted).
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Cruz contends that he invoked his
right to counsel, thus rendering the
fruits of subsequent questioning
inadmissible, when he stated that he was a
“working man" and "“couldn’t afford an
attorney."® But "[t]he word ‘attorney’
has no talismanic qualities. A defendant
does not invoke his right to counsel any
time the word falls from his lips.’
®cruz had both a Fifth Amendment and
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The
Fifth Amendment right to counsel arises
when, as here, an individual is subject to
custodial interrogation. Edwards, 451 U.S.
at 482; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470; United States
v. Berisha, 925 F.2d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 1991).
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches upon the initiation of judicial
proceedings against an individual. See
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986);
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
Cruz was under indictment at the time that
he was questioned, so his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel had attached. See Patterson
v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 (1988).
°United States v. Jardina, 747 F.2d 945, 949
(Sth Cir. 1984); cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058
(1985); accord Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d
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Viewing Cruz’s comments in context of the
officer’s question and giving his words
their ordinary meaning, Cruz did not
evince "a desire to deal with the police
only though counsel.""
Given the officer’s inquiry whether
Cruz had a lawyer, his response could only
be construed as a statement of fact --
equivalent to, "no, I don’t have an
attorney.""' cruz’s response could not
768, 772 (Sth Cir. 1979); Nash v. Estelle, 597
F.2d 513, 519 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
"Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. "[W]hile
an accused is not required to use any
magic language to invoke the right to
counsel, we do not ignore the plain
meaning of his words in order to find
invocation of the right to counsel." Griffin
v. Lynaugh, 823 F.2d 856, 863 n.3 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079 (1988).
“cruz contends his comments were made
in response to the Miranda warnings;
however, the uncontested testimony at the
suppression hearing establishes that his
comments were made in response to an
inquiry whether he had a lawyer. Under
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reasonably be construed as a request for
counsel.'* We are satisfied that, under
the instant circumstances, Cruz did not
evince a desire for counsel; and, as there
is no suggestion that his subsequent
statements were involuntary, we conclude
that the district court did no err in
denying the motion to suppress on the
basis of Cruz’s statement that he was a
working man who could not afford an
cross-examination, the officer giving the
Miranda warnings testified: "Well, during
when I was reading the Miranda warning to
him, at that time I asked him if he had a
lawyer, and he answered back that, no, he
didn’t have a lawyer." Later the officer
Clarified this testimony: "I remember him
also telling me in Spanish when I asked
him about if he had an attorney or
whatever, and he said, ’No.’ He said he
was just a working man. He couldn’t
afford an attorney."
a different case would have been
presented had the officer asked Cruz
whether he wanted a lawyer. Given such a
context, Cruz’s response would arguably
have been an ambiguous or equivocal
request. However, we are not presented
with such facts.
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attorney.
Cruz nevertheless argues in the
alternative that his response was at least
an ambiguous or equivocal request for
counsel, thereby limiting further
questioning to a clarification of his
desires. -In United States v. C. 3 ~6we
affirmed the principle that, when an
accused expresses an ambiguous or
equivocal request for counsel, further
interrogation is limited to clarification
of the accused’s desires."™
Here, though,
we find no ambiguity or equivocation in
Cruz’s response: He had been asked not if
he wanted a lawyer, but if he had one; and
he answered that question in the negative.
3733 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1984).
“See id. at 1130-31; accord Thompson v.
Wainwright , 601 F.2d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir.
1979); Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 517-18
(Sth Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 981 (1979).
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That answer can not be stenbatind to
constitute an unresponsive request for
counsel, even an ambiguous or equivocal
one.
This case is thus unlike prior cases
in which we found an equivocal or
ambiguous request for counsel. For
example, in Cherry, the accused stated,
"Maybe I should talk to an attorney before
I make a further statement," then added
rhetorically, “Why should I not get an
attorney?"" We found that, as the
accused’s statements suggested conflicting
desires to talk to an attorney and to talk
to the authorities, his utterances
constituted a request, albeit an equivocal
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one. Unlike the comments in Chery,
“Chery, 733 F.2d at 1127.
See id at 1130. Likewise, in Thompson
v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d at 769, and Nash v.
Estelle, 597 F.2d at 516-17, the accused
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An eR An, ES a AE Om «abe
though, Cruz’s comments did not suggest a
desire for counsel; to the contrary, they
unambiguously and unequivocally stated a
matter of fact. Hence, as Cruz’s comments
could not be construed as an ambiguous or
equivocal request, subsequent questioning
was not limited to mere clarification of
his desires. Denial of the motion to
suppress was not error.
i ew
CONCLUSION
Having found no reversible error as
to any of the Defendants-Appellants’
assignments of error, their convictions
and sentences are in all respects
AFFIRMED.
expressed both a desire to talk to
authorities and a desire to talk to an
attorney.
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