Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Utah v. Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District

Supreme Court brief1994

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

-\ FILED

94 14-7 JuL 25 19%

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1994

+

THE STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH THE

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, and

KENNECOTT CORPORATION,

Petitioners,

SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER

CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,

Respondent.

+

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Tenth Circuit

¢

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

*

JAN GRAHAM* James B. LEE

Utah Attorney General DanieL M. ALLRED

Davip W. TUNDERMANN

Frep G NELSON

Jim BuTLER

DENISE CHANCELLOR

Utah Attorney General’s

Office

236 State Capitol Bldg.

Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

; Suite 1800

Telephone: (801) 538-1015 P.O. Box 45898

Counsel for Petitioner Salt Lake City, Utah

State of Utah 84145-0898

Telephone: (801) 532-1234

Counsel for Petitioner

Kennecott Corporation

Lisa A. KIRSCHNER

JEANNETTE F. Swent

Parsons BEHLE & LATIMER

201 South Main Street,

*Counsel of Record

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

(1) Is immediate appeal available from a district

court’s refusal to enter a jointly supported consent decree

that is proposed by a government Trustee acting pursuant

to a federal statute (CERCLA) which explicitly favors

“minimiz[ing] litigation”?

(2) Did the court below err in holding, contrary to

decisions in four other circuits, that district court rejec-

tion of a settlement does not conclusively determine the

disputed question under the collateral order doctrine?

FEE ee Ee ee a ADT RO Pn MN TdY iu pae ee TE PRT RT EOE eR TY

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

AND RULE 29.1 STATEMENT

Petitioner State of Utah was plaintiff-appellant

below; Petitioner Kennecott Corporation was defendant-

appellant below; Respondent Salt Lake County Water

Conservancy District was intervenor-appellee below.

Petitioner Kennecott Corporation is a wholly-owned

subsidiary of RTZ America Inc. RTZ America Inc. is a

wholly-owned subsidiary of RTZ Western Holdings Lim-

ited. RTZ Western Holdings Limited is a wholly-owned

subsidiary of RTZ European Holdings Limited. RTZ

European Holdings Limited is a wholly-owned subsid- .

iary of The RTZ Corporation PLC.

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PRP FMI EOD pens sp ec cncecewsacvewsss i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND RULE 29.1

0. Oe ene ii

pe se ee | rae Vv

oa Parked does cee ctuscesiveceens 2

Ee, ooo 45h e SS aes sancecdseviceess 2

PERTINENT STATUTORY PROVISION ............. 3

pe ies 8 te ae 3

A. The CERCLA Complaint and Proposed Set-

tek aca dans deeds ibes bass o's 0 4

B. Intervention by Salt Lake County Water Con-

EE MONE ord x's es cig Stemeckssedescsees >

C. District Court Refusal to Enter Proposed

NIE SS. Ss awh veccbemhwedcewssvedin 5

D. Appeals by Both the CERCLA Trustee and

ORES ne ee ee ee 6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........... 8

i. THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY WHETHER A

CERCLA TRUSTEE’S RIGHT TO BRING, TRY,

AND SETTLE CLAIMS IS “IMPORTANT” AND

NOT EFFECTIVELY REVIEWABLE ON APPEAL

a Pee we Gs Owe sac diccescnenscess 9

A. Statutory Framework for Natural Resource

SN ooo Seb ca seccresscccee. 10

B. Congress Expressly Intended to Encourage

CERCLA Trustees to Settle Claims ......... 14

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

C. Denial of the Right of a CERCLA Trustee

Regarding Settlement of a Statutory Claim

Meets This Court’s Requirement of An

Important Question Effectively Unreview-

able on Appeal From Final Judgment...... 16

1. Denial of the CERCLA Trustee’s Right Is

An Important Question ................ 18

2. Denial of the CERCLA Trustee’s Right Is

Effectively Unreviewable On Appeal

From Final Judgment .................. 21

Il. THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING THAT

REJECTION OF A SETTLEMENT IS NOT A

“CONCLUSIVE DETERMINATION” IS ERRO-

NEOUS AND CONFLICTS WITH OTHER CIR-

CUED GAAP BARN Os occ scccesccesseeess 23

A. Recent Decisions of the Second, Third, Fifth,

SN FEW ONIN CHMOD a. 5 oo oc ene h che ceicncs 23

B. The Tenth Circuit’s Erroneous Analysis of

“Conclusive Determination” ............... 25

ee et} PEPE Ter ee bl cr ee Ce reer ee eee 28

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Opinion of the Court of

WIN Na hare hein coker eb sees. 1A

Appendix B: District Court Memorandum

Decision and Order............. 1B

Appendix C: Order of the Court of

Appeals Denying Petition for

Rehearing and Suggestion

for Rehearing In Banc.......... 1C

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274

CROOY «6% CEN O0 & dd. Chee 8 de eee Cee bes cents 6

Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424 (10th Cir. 1984)........ 6

Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981) .... 22

City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677

CARA FE Re DOOD + near ceed eatevensa bey ee ee Riis eee 15

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541

CSOD kek os ho Seed icteesi Chiesa eee 6, 9, 16

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978)... .passim

Desktop Direct, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 993 F.2d

FO TIE Nt POM eee Seve eeatens Wig. 84 Dy De Oe

Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 114 S.

CR Re CREE ks Cone ec ke tn ee RORRE ESE oor BEE passim

Forbus v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d 1036 (11th

RM BD Fer ak co 4s ceded ss eke Abe eneeee 8, 24, 25

Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148

RUE 4a ck sc RUA RV Ade 6O MeN AEN ees Pe Gee 6

Grillet v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217 (5th Cir.

WE sek eb k cna ek cys seed ahs eeenees 8, 24, 25

In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F.

ee ee er ee rere ee 12, 35

In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d 110 (2d Cir.

| EO TEP TE Pere TES TF Ty Ti Pe TOR CTE 14

Janneh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1989)

OPO rr Mer ror Er re See eee rT wo 9, 24, 26

Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.

Care., 460.075. 7 CURRED «05561 see des eas 9, 26

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior. 880 F.2d 432

ite TS | Geer ree ae T Tey Pent ree Pree r ree I!

Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978).......... 26

Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d

5 nS LMG ENE ETE Tee Tee ree oy eee 8, 25

United States v. Acton Corp., 733 F. Supp. 869 (D.

PE COOP cen vevecvns vuchenas enbe Gee Ghubuts Gonai 19

United States v. Atlas Minerals and Chems., Inc.,

1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2441 (E.D. Pa. March 1,

che. EU OEE inves SokeR kL Aae SM ORMEMES BANKSY 8 15

United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79

[Oe Se cas vibe bas SR GRO WSWLREREOURGLE EAC ena. 19

United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 793 F. Supp.

de of eR Ae re os | ee 15

United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 827 F. Supp.

EE Si AA. GM BOON Wks. (be ckee MLERS RERR EE ON ET 15

STATUTES AND RULES

I TE A NAW bee eed pnenws bieGien Same cab eee 10

ae ae Or NMUGLD & as > Wav NRCUS SU OAR ERER ERAS 11

SS & 4 6. ti Sn eeerr ey Ue tere eye 11, 12

Le eh PION bbc sa cc eer kpbebsucaestsekseus 11

GEE Ue MOP UUEDs 0 65 bee See eee Vinkonvnea sete. 11

ee ae INES Ska AnNsus ceeds Le besebnebh cok eu whe s 15

ite A 2 ht eee es ofr Sree 13

> Tek, Rag. T4261 (U9PE) . ww ccc ete cceae, 13

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

DP FOG, Ws MG CRIP E ab 6s iccebedisdincsiacdvas 13

Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 311(f)(4), (5) .... 11

Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act

Oil Pollution Act of 1990 §& 10U2(b)(2)(A)......... 11, 13

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

of 1986 (“SARA”), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.

alae 60 858 CCE es CERT ER OS Ce ri oa Ea i4

ey IS es des ss veces bacleeraeweds 23

iw g . . BARR Arg eet are Ate ine A 2 oe 10

De BR ETT, GN 6 Fc dnc be o Soave deusdCavenees 11

ee a ss SO ee ere rep reer iar. ys Ae 2

Bp fe PRES See Re on er Ter er rey passim

Oe SE a IIe odin e deen vis ov sescevegen nwa 7, 22

Pe se I EE wider dt eedeeoaves'ougevks 11

DO GAS ee II o's eck on ow ade daeevneokewes 11

Be Se I iio. o'os eldvs dave uevowvweevens So

er ilo ine old's e'vlene vey oes ve dareks 10

42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C)

a US0. S ae... ES.

42 US.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A)

42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(B)

ET I oe hia tickicc cee

¥

]

af

/

4

/

Viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

MISCELLANEOUS

re ge ne rer ey

BOO Come. Bes TEs TR ce nn on ccc cncweevs

WSs GA, GRE, DFA? TOPO) nc cccecaccccanvusess

ee ae ee FP eee Tere TT Err ere

131 Comp. Bec. SQ 7AP-SO (IFGS) «na csc cececceees

ee ee ee. | PePeTerer TTT ee ree

Page

S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1980) .... 10

Frederick R. Anderson, Natural Resource Damages,

Superfund, and the Courts, 16 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L.

OG, Ge Sas voc ena wdsndecnepaewh een eea ne as

Frank L. Amoroso & Linda R. Keenan, Natural

Resource Damage Recovery Actions: A Legal Tidal

Wave Looming, 17 Westchester B.J. 109 (1990)...

Mehron Azarmehr, Natural Resources Damages

Under CERCLA § 107: How the Liability Rules

Differ Between Actions for Natural Resource Dam-

ages and Response Costs, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.

A le RSP rT oe eee ee

David T. Buente, }:. Thomas G. Echikson, James

L. Connaughton, The “Civil” Implications of Envi-

ronmental Crimes, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.

RR gS TT Pre Tee

Thomas A. Campbell, Natural Resource Damage

Assessments: A Glance Backward and a Lock For-

ward, 45 Baylor L. Rev. 221 (1993) .............

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued

Page

Lloyd W. Landreth & Kevin M. Ward, Natural

Resource Damages: Recovery Under State Law

Compared With Federal Laws, 20 Envtl. L. Rep.

(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10134 (April 1990)................ 11

Bradley M. Marten & Cestjon L. McFarland, Liti-

gating CERCLA Natural Resource Damage Claims,

22 Env’t. Rep. (BNA) 670 (July 1991) ............. 13

Resources, Community, and Economic Dev. Div.,

U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Natural Resources

Damage Assessment: Information on Study of Sea-

birds Killed by Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Report to

Hon. Frank H. Murkowski, U.S. Senate 1 (Nov.

WO a heck ee Aa So awn ones 12

No.

Sd

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1994

S

THE STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH THE

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, and

KENNECOTT CORPORATION,

Petitioners,

SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER

CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,

Respondent.

¢

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Tenth Circuit

\ S

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

+

The court below declined to review the district

court’s refusal to enter a consent decree to settle a claim

for natural resource damages brought by a government

Trustee pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. That jurisdictional decision raises

compelling questions of public policy regarding CERCLA

and the statutory rights of government Trustees. These

questions will likely recur as increasing numbers of

claims for natural resource damages are brought and

1

settled under CERCLA and other federal and state envi-

ronmental statutes.

Petitioners respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari

issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit entered in

this case on January 31, 1994.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra,

1A-18A) is reported at 14 F.3d 1489. The opinion of the

district court (App., infra, 1B-46B) is reported at 801 F.

Supp. 553.

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth

Circuit dismissed the appeal in this case for lack of juris-

diction on January 31, 1994. The court of appeals denied a

timely petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing

in banc on March 28, 1994. On Petitioners’ motion, the

court of appeals ordered that the mandate shall be stayed

until July 25, 1994.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).

te ee oe eee

PERTINENT STATUTORY PROVISION

Section 1291 of Title 28, United States Code, provides

in pertinent part:

The courts of appeals (other than the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit)

shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final

decisions of the district courts of the United

States, the United States District Court for the

District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of

Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin

Islands, except where a direct review may be

had in the Supreme Court.

S

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner State of Utah, acting as Trustee of public

natural resources under the Comprehensive Environmen-

tal Response, Compensation and Liability Act

(“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (“the CERCLA

Trustee”), brought a claim against Petitioner Kennecott

Corporation (“Kennecott”) for damages resulting from

alleged contamination of certain ground water and sur-

face water. The CERCLA Trustee negotiated a settlement

of the claim pursuant to statutory authority and submit-

ted a consent decree to the district court for approval.

Although both the CERCLA Trustee and Kennecott urged

approval of the consent decree, the court refused to enter

the settlement following de novo review. The CERCLA

Trustee and Kennecott both appealed, arguing that the

district court’s misreading of CERCLA frustrated the

clear congressional purpose of CERCLA’s provisions for

natural resource damage claims. The Tenth Circuit subse-

quently held that no immediate appeal could be taken

from the district court’s action, relying on its decision

regarding appeal from denial of a private settlement

agreement in Desktop Direct, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp.,

993 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1993), which was then before this

Court.

This Court recently affirmed the Tenth Circuit as to

interlocutory appeal from denial of a private settlement

agreement. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 114

S. Ct. 1992 (1994). However, this Court explicitly noted

“sound reasons for treating [privately conferred rights]

differently from those originating in the Constitution or

statutes.” Id. at 2001.

The Tenth Circuit’s decision in this case also con-

flicted with the analysis applied in four other circuits

regarding this Court’s requirement of a conclusive deter-

mination where interlocutory appeal is taken from denial

of a settlement.

A. The CERCLA Complaint and Proposed Settle-

ment

The State of Utah, acting through the Utah Depart-

ment of Health, which was then designated as the

CERCLA Trustee for natural resources in Utah,! filed a

complaint against Kennecott in October 1986 alleging

contamination of certain ground water and surface water,

1 The CERCLA Trustee in Utah is now Dianne R. Nielson,

Ph.D., Executive Director of the Utah Department of Environ-

mental Quality.

and seeking to recover damages for injury to those natu-

ral resources under CERCLA. The district court stayed

the proceedings to allow the parties to conduct technical

studies. Upon completion of those studies, the CERCLA

Trustee and Kennecott entered into settlement negotia-

tions, and in July 1991 the parties jointly submitted a

proposed consent decree to the district court settling the

CERCLA Trustee’s claim. App. 14B. The proposed settle-

ment was subjected to public comment, App. 15B, and

some provisions were modified in response to the com-

ments received. The consent decree provided for Ken-

necott to pay the CERCLA Trustee $12 million as

settlement for claimed injuries to ground water and sur-

face water within a defined region in exchange for a

limited release and covenant not to sue. App. 4A.

B. Intervention by Salt Lake County Water Conser-

vancy District

In September 1991, the Salt Lake County Water Con-

servancy District moved to intervene in opposition to the

proposed settlement. App. 15B-16B. The district court

granted permissive intervention for the limited purposes

of participating in discovery and in evidentiary hearings.

App. 16B.

C. District Court Refusal to Enter Proposed Con-

sent Decree

After a period of discovery, the district court held a

six-day evidentiary hearing and heard legal arguments

from the CERCLA Trustee, Kennecott, and the Salt Lake

County Water Conservancy District. App. 16B. The dis-

trict court found that the CERCLA Trustee and Kennecott

had conducted negotiations with “candor, openness, and

bargaining balance.” App. 32B n.13 (citation omitted).

However, based on de novo review of the consent decree

and the supporting technical data, the district court

found that the CERCLA Trustee had failed to prove by “a

preponderance of the evidence” that the consent decree

“satisf[ied] substantive fairness under CERCLA.” App.

34B-35B. In its Memorandum Decision and Order

(“Order”), the court denied approval of the consent

decree and ordered the parties to prepare for trial. App.

45B-46B.

D. Appeals by Both the CERCLA Trustee and Ken-

necott

The CERCLA Trustee and Kennecott timely appealed

the district court’s decision, arguing that the district court

had misread CERCLA in its review of the proposed settle-

ment. The CERCLA Trustee and Kennecott jointly argued

that the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction over the appeal on

three grounds: (1) The collateral order doctrine under

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)

and its progeny; (2) precedent regarding a “practical

rather than a technical construction” of the finality

requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546; see

also Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152

(1964); American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274,

279 (1980); Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir.

1984)); and (3) statutory allowance of immediate appeal

vd ell

from district court orders which grant or deny injunctive

relief (28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)). App. 2A.

The Tenth Circuit heard oral argument on jurisdiction

and on the merits, but dismissed the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction on January 31, 1994. App. 2A. That court

found, inter alia, that the appeal failed to satisfy the

requirements of the collateral order construction of the

final judgment rule. App. 14A. The CERCLA Trustee and

Kennecott filed a timely petition for rehearing and sug-

gestion for rehearing in banc which was denied on March

28, 1994. App. 1C.?

The circuit court based its jurisdictional result partly

on its earlier decision in Desktop Direct, 993 F.2d 755,

which this Court recently affirmed as it applied to denial

of a disputed private settlement agreement. Digital Equip.,

114 S. Ct. at 2004. This Court’s decision leaves unresolved

the issue in the current case, which is the district court’s

denial! of an important right that is conferred by federal

statute and is deeply rooted in public policy. Id. at

2001-02. This Court’s decision also does not address the

circumstances here, where the parties’ commitment to

this settlement has not wavered. Unlike the Digital Equip-

ment parties, whose settlement agreement unraveled,

Petitioners in this case have jointly supported entry of the

proposed consent decree and continue to do so.

Sf

2 On Petitioners’ motion, the Tenth Circuit ordered that the

mandate shall be stayed until July 25, 1994.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This Court should grant certiorari because this case

presents precisely the conflict that was left unaddressed

in Digital Equipment: the conflict between an important

right conferred by federal statute (here, the CERCLA

Trustee’s right to bring and settle a claim for natural

resource damages) and the efficient operation of the fed-

eral courts as protected under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This

Court suggested in Digital Equipment that the “impor-

tance” requirement for interlocutory appeal would likely

be satisfied where the right at issue is rooted in statute.

Digital Equip., 114 S. Ct. at 2001-02. Moreover, unlike the

situation in Digital Equipment, there is no means of

redress here except for immediate appeal. This Court

suggested that the parties to the disputed settlement in

Digital Equipment could pursue a separate action for

breach of contract after final judgment. Id. at 2003. That

avenue is not open here, however, where the parties

maintain joint support for the proposed settlement.

Whether this matter proceeds to trial or is resolved by a

different settlement, it will be impossible for the parties

to obtain appellate review of the district court’s decision

to reject this settlement, a decision that infringes an

important right of the CERCLA Trustee.

This Court should also grant certiorari because

the decision below parts company with four

other circuit courts? and misreads this Court’s

3 See Transtech Indus. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d 51 (3d Cir.

1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3826 (U.S. June 14, 1994); Forbus v.

Sears Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.

Ct. 412 (1992); Grillet v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217 (5th

at baal

bs teat dees L

9

precedents‘ in concluding that district court rejection of a

particular settlement agreement is not “conclusive.” The

Tenth Circuit’s misreading of this Court’s decisions will

infringe on the right of government Trustees to manage

litigation, including settlement, of natural resource dam-

age claims by denying their right to seek appellate review

of wrongly rejected settlements. That result will under-

mine congressional policy encouraging CERCLA settle-

ments.

This Court may wish to consider summary disposi-

tion of this case for two reasons: This Court’s recent

decision in Digital Equipment sheds new light on the

issues of “importance” and “effective unreviewability”

regarding interlocutory appeal, and the decision below

regarding “conclusive determin{ation of] the disputed

question” deviates from this Court’s precedents, deci-

sions in four other circuit courts, and the Tenth Circuit’s

own recent decision in Desktop Direct.

I. THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY WHETHER A

CERCLA TRUSTEE’S RIGHT TO BRING, TRY,

AND SETTLE CLAIMS IS “IMPORTANT” AND

NOT EFFECTIVELY REVIEWABLE ON APPEAL

AFTER TRIAL.

In the decision below, the Tenth Circuit disregarded

statutory language by disparaging CERCLA settlements

Cir. 1991); Janneh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.

denied, 498 U.S. 865 (1990).

4 See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.

Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463

(1978); Cohen, 337 U.S. 541 (1949).

10

as not “important” as that term is used to determine the

availability of interlocutory appeal. This Court should

grant certiorari to clarify whether denial of a government

Trustee’s statutory right to settle a natural resource dam-

age claim under CERCLA and the concomitant frustra-

tion of the congressional purpose and public policy

underlying that statute satisfy the legal requirement of

“importance” for purposes of interlocutory appeal. See S.

Ct. Rule 10.1(c).

A. Statutory Framework for Natural Resource

Damage Claims

CERCLA, which was heralded as “the most impor-

tant environmental legislation in this decade,” created a

legal framework for governmental response to releases of

hazardous substances and injuries to publicly owned nat-

ural resources resulting therefrom. This “powerful correc-

tive and compensatory mechanism”® created legal claims

for injuries to natural resources, and it required the Presi-

dent and each governor to designate Natural Resources

Trustees with exclusive and plenary power to bring,

assess, try, and settle such claims.”

5 126 Cong. Rec. 30,937 (1980) (statement of Sen.

Moynihan); see also S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 105

(1980) (letter from President Jimmy Carter urging “prompt con-

sideration and speedy enactment” of CERCLA, because “(t]he

health of the public and the environment cannot afford less.”).

© Frederick R. Anderson, Natural Resource Damages, Super-

fund, and the Courts, 16 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 405, 408-09 (1989).

7 Section 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, provides that

the United States or any state can bring a claim against a

1]

The “primary objective [of CERCLA’s natural

resource damage provisions] was to achieve restoration

[of the injured resources].” Ohio v. United States Dep't of

Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 450-51 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citations

omitted).* To this end, CERCLA mandates that sums

responsible party for “an injury to, destruction of, or loss of

natural resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1); CERCLA § 107(f)(1).

See also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C); CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(C).

CERCLA requires each governor to appoint a Trustee to assess

any injuries that might occur to natural resources held in the

public trust and to bring damage claims for those injuries. 42

U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(B); CERCLA § 107(f)(2)(B). CERCLA also

requires the President to designate federal Trustees for federal

natural resources. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A); CERCLA

§ 107(f)(2)(A). The term “government Trustee” applies to indi-

viduals designated as state, federal or tribal Trustees.

Determination of the first question presented in this case

will resonate beyond CERCLA, as it will affect the rights of

government Trustees under other federal environmental stat-

utes. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 1002(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C.

§ 2702(b)(2)(A); Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 311(f)}{4),

(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4), (5); Marine Protection, Research and

Sanctuaries Act § 312, 16 U.S.C. § 1443(a)(1), (c). Congress’s use

of appointed Natural Resources Trustees in other environmental

legislation underscores both the importance of these claims and

Congress’s satisfaction with the Trustee-driven approach to

them. Moreover, many state environmental statutes are based

on the CERCLA model. See generally Lloyd W. Landreth & Kevin

M. Ward, Natural Resource Damages: Recovery Under State Law

Compared With Federal Laws, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)

10134 (April 1990). Thus the determination in this case may

affect implementation of state laws to the extent that claims

under state environmental statutes are brought in federal

courts.

8 As Senator Mitchell noted in floor debate over CERCLA,

“[W]e do not want damage to natural resources to await the

workings of that process [of pursuing a final determination in

12

recovered by government Trustees in natural resource

damage actions can be used “only to restore, replace, or

acquire the equivalent of such natural resources.” 42

U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1); CERCLA § 107(f)(1).°

Claims for injuries to natural resources under

CERCLA and other federal envirorimental statutes are

growing, are highly complex technically and, if tried,

place significant burdens on judicial and government

resources. Assessing the injuries to bring the claims can

be extraordinarily complex. In the wake of “the worst

marine environmental disaster this nation has ever expe-

rienced,”!° the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, approx-

imately fifty-one assessment studies were performed to

evaluate injury to the many types of resources affected.!!

court]; we want prompt, full compensation in such cases so we

can replant trees in the park.” 126 Cong. Rec. 30,942 (1980).

° “([C]justomarily, natural resource damages are. viewed as

the difference between the natural resource in its pristine condi-

tion and the natural resource after the cleanup, together with

the lost use value and the costs of assessment.” In re Acushnet

River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1035 (D. Mass.

1989).

10 Thomas A. Campbell, Natural Resource Damage Assess-

ments: A Glance Backward and a Look Forward, 45 Baylor L. Rev.

221, 221 (1993) (quoting President George Bush) (citation omit-

ted).

1! Resources, Community, and Economic Dev. Div., U.S.

Gen. Accounting Office, Natural Resources Damage Assessment:

Information on Study of Seabirds Killed by Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,

Report to Hon. Frank H. Murkowski, U.S. Senate 1 (Nov. 1991).

13

These are only the first rumblings of an anticipated litiga-

tion explosion involving natural resource damage

claims. !?

Settlement of natural resource damage claims under

CERCLA and the statutory rights of CERCLA Trustees

are important areas of the law that this Court has not yet

examined. Clarifying the jurisdiction of circuit courts to

hear appeals of rejected settlements will be critical as

claims are brought and settlements are proposed under

12 See, e.g., Frank L. Amoroso & Linda R. Keenan, Natural

Resource Damage Recovery Actions: A Legal Tidal Wave Looming, 17

Westchester B.J. 109 (1990); Mehron Azarmehr, Natural Resources

Damages Under CERCLA § 107: How the Liability Rules Differ

Between Actions for Natural Resource Damages and Response Costs,

22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10655, 10665 (Oct. 1992) (“the

stage is set for an explosion of litigation involving staggering

stakes”); Bradley M. Marten & Cestjon L. McFarland, Litigating

CERCLA Natural Resource Damage Claims, 22 Env’t Rep. (BNA)

670, 670 (July 19, 1991) (quoting a top official of the National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration as expecting “the

number of specific natural resource damages cases before the

courts to increase exponentially”) (citation omitted).

Filing of natural resource damage claims has been slowed

by delays by the U.S. Department of the Interior (“DOI”) in

promulgating regulations for natural resource damage assess-

ments, and by subsequent legal challenges to those regulations.

Most of the final regulations were published on March 25, 1994

(59 Fed. Reg. 14,261) and can be expected to lead to a new wave

of claims by government Trustees. See also 59 Fed. Reg. 23,098

(1994) (DOI’s proposed regulations). The National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration is developing regulations to gov-

ern assessments of claims for natural resource damages due to

oil spills pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Proposed

regulations, which were published on January 7, 1994 (59 Fed.

Reg. 1,062), are similar to the DOI regulations for CERCLA.

14

CERCLA and other federal and state statutes by federal,

tribal, and state Natural Resources Trustees.!%

B. Congress Expressly Intended to Encourage

CERCLA Trustees to Settle Claims

Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 “to encourage

prompt and effective responses to hazardous waste

releases.” In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d 110, 119

(2d Cir. 1992). Congress amended and reauthorized

CERCLA in 1986!4 and explicitly “refocus[ed] the intent

of [CERCLA] back on cleaning up the sites and away

from the slow and costly litigation. .. . [This amendment

will lend] some strong impetus to settlements out of

court.” 131 Cong. Rec. 24,727 (1985) (statement of Sen.

Domenici); see also id. at 24,728 (statement of Sen. Simp-

son: “[W]hat pleases me most [about these amendments]

is that we bring Superfund back into the real world, by

promoting settlements. Let us urge companies to settle.”);

id. at 24,729-30 (statement of Sen. Domenici: Prior to the

proposed amendments, the “litigation driven poli-

cy . . . add[ed] years to cleanup as cases crawl[ed]

through the Federal courts, . . . incurring staggering

13 Efficient operation of the federal courts as protected

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 would best be served by early resolution

of the underlying question in this case regarding judicial review

of a CERCLA Trustee’s proposed consent decree in a natural

resource damage claim. Allowing interlocutory appeal here will

not loose a flood of appeals, but rather will settle this legal

question and provide guidance for lower courts in similar cases.

14 See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of

1986 (“SARA”), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).

ae 5 ae

15

transaction costs. . . . The Superfund problem is pro-

tracted litigation.”). CERCLA explicitly encourages settle-

ment of claims “[w]henever practicable and in the public

interest . .. in order to expedite effective remedial actions

and minimize litigation.” 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a); CERCLA

§ 122(a).15

Courts have frequently acknowledged this congres-

sional intent as well as the strong legal and public poli-

cies favoring settlement of CERCLA actions.'!© At least

one court has found “the strong policy in favor of settle-

ment in CERCLA actions” so powerful that it approved a

proposed consent decree even though some parties to the

consent decree ultimately opposed its entry. United States

v. Atlas Minerals and Chems., Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

2441 at *24 (E.D. Pa. March 1, 1994) (the objecting parties

15 Although this section of CERCLA refers to “the Presi-

dent” rather than explicitly to CERCLA Trustees, courts have

relied on this provision to recognize “CERCLA’s primary goal to

encourage early settlement” in claims for natural resource dam-

ages brought by state and local governments. United States v.

Montrose Chem. Corp., 827 F. Supp. 1453, 1458 (C.D. Cal. 1993)

(natural resource damage claim brought by United States and

State of California); see City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F.

Supp. 677, 692-93 (S.D. N.Y. 1988) (natural resource damage

claim brought by City of New York).

16 See, e.g., United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 793 F.

Supp. 237, 240 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (“CERCLA’s overriding goal of

achieving prompt settlement”); Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. at

1029 (“Congressional purpose [of CERCLA] is better served

through settlements which provide funds to enhance environ-

mental protection, rather than the expenditure of limited

resources on protracted litigation. Without question, Congress

passed the SARA amendments to encourage settlements for this

very reason.”).

16

argued that after the consent decree had been filed with

the court, serious issues regarding its legality were raised

by a circuit court decision in an unrelated case).

The rights and powers of CERCLA Trustees serve the

congressional intent that animated passage and amend-

ment of the federal statute: The Trustees serve as guard-

ians of congressional intent regarding CERCLA as they

bring claims in order to restore, replace, or acquire natu-

ral resources equivalent to those injured by releases of

hazardous substances, and as they negotiate settlements

in order to avoid the time and expense of protracted

litigation and to speed restoration of the injured

resources.

C. Denial of the Right of a CERCLA Trustee

Regarding Settlement of a Statutory Claim

Meets This Court’s Requirement of An Impor-

tant Question Effectively Unreviewable on

Appeal From Final Judgment

This Court has held that a nonfinal order is appeal-

able immediately if it is “a final disposition of a claimed

right which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and

does not require consideration with it.” Cohen, 337 U.S. at

546-47. In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463

(1978), this Court set out three requirements that a nonfi-

nal order must meet to qualify for interlocutory appeal: It

must “[1] conclusively determine the disputed question,

[2] resolve an important issue completely separate from

the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreview-

able on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers, 437 U.S.

at 468 (citations omitted).

17

In Digital Equipment, this Court elaborated on the

third requirement under Coopers and set as the standard

“decisions . . . that would render such important ques-

tions effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judg-

ment in the underlying action.” Digital Equip., 114 S. Ct.

at 1995-96 (citation omitted). In the same opinion, this

Court determined that “an order denying effect to a

settlement agreement does not come within the narrow

ambit of collateral orders,” because “rights under private

settlement agreements can be adequately vindicated on

appeal from final judgment.” Id. at 1994-96 (emphasis

added). This Court also suggested that denial of rights

that are grounded in statute and deeply rooted in public

policy would rise to the ievel of “importance” required

for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id. at 2001-02. This

Court should grant certiorari to clarify whether rejection

of a government settlement of a federal statutory claim, a

settlement that furthers an express congressional purpose

and which both parties support, qualifies for appellate

review, even if rejection of a disputed private settlement,

such as that in Digital Equipment, does not.'7

17 The Tenth Circuit did not address the collateral nature of

the issue raised on appeal in this case. Clearly, however, the

question of the district court’s misreading of CERCLA in

reviewing the CERCLA Trustee’s proposed consent decree is

completely separate from the merits of the CERCLA action,

which would involve, for example, questions of liability and

causation. The district court Order therefore meets the second

requirement for interlocutory appeal under Coopers by resolving

an important issue completely separate from the merits of the

action.

18

1. Denial of the CERCLA Trustee’s Right Is An

Important Question

In this case, the Tenth Circuit referred to its own

recent decision in Desktop Direct and held that “[t]he bare

desire of [the CERCLA Trustee] and Kennecott to avoid

trial is not ‘important’ enough to justify ignoring the

§ 1291 prerequisite of finality.” App. 12A. Because it

focused so narrowly on the right not to go to trial, the

Tenth Circuit ignored the main point of the appeal, which

is that the district court’s refusal to enter the consent

decree improperly interfered with the CERCLA Trustee’s

statutory authority to settle this claim. The circuit court

here defied congressional policy expressly favoring set-

tlement of CERCLA claims, deprecating CERCLA settle-

ments as not “important.”

The district court in this case denied the CERCLA

Trustee’s right regarding settlement of its claim when the

court made errors of law which included applying an

unprecedented and improper standard of review to the

Trustee’s proposed consent decree.!® The district court’s

18 The court examined the CERCLA Trustee’s proposed

consent decree under a “preponderance of the evidence” stan-

dard, App. 34B, conducting its review de novo and substituting

its judgment for that of the CERCLA Trustee in assessing the

merits of the settlement. For example, although the proposed

consent decree explicitly reserved the CERCLA Trustee’s right

to bring later claims regarding any alleged contamination out-

side of the geographic area specified in the settlement, and

although the CERCLA Trustee had determined the limits of that

geographic area based on various multi-year studies, the dis-

trict court inexplicably rejected the CERCLA Trustee’s -deter-

mination and, based in part on the court’s own conclusions

19

decision flies in the face of court decisions consistently

counseling judges that congressional intent requires

courts to use a deferential standard in evaluating pro-

posed CERCLA settlements, in all of their technical com-

plexity,'? and emphasizing that presumptions favoring

proposed CERCLA settlements are particularly strong

where a government party is involved.?° The district

court’s denial of the proposed consent decree departed

dramatically from legal precedent in this area and frus-

trated congressional intent to minimize CERCLA litiga-

tion by encouraging settlement.

Congress encouraged settlement of CERCLA cases

because they are often highly complex technically and are

notorious for bearing litigation and other transaction

costs which rival the value of the underlying claims.?!

regarding the area potentially affected, the court then rejected

the proposed consent decree. App. 21B.

19 See, e.g., United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 84

(1st Cir. 1990) (“while the district court should not mechanistically

rubberstamp the agency’s suggestions, neither should it approach

the merits of the contemplated settlement de novo.”); United States v.

Acton Corp., 733 F. Supp. 869, 872 (D. N.J. 1990) (it is not the district-

court’s role to “determine whether a better settlement could be

calculated . ... A more intrusive role would prove unduly burden-

some and contravene Congressional intent by having [the] Court

substitute its judgment for that of the statutorily appointed repre-

sentatives of the public interest... . ”).

20 See, e.g., Cannons, 899 F.2d at 84 (presumptions that

attach to a settlement have “particular force where, as here, a

government actor committed to the protection of the public

interest has pulled the laboring oar in constructing the proposed

settlement.”) (citations omitted).

21 After the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, costs were

approximately $130 million simply for state and federal

20

When approval of a proposed consent decree is improp-

erly denied, the ability of a government Trustee to settle

and the incentive of a potentially liable party to settle are

both undermined. The question of the parties’ recourse

when a CERCLA consent decree is improperly denied is

therefore deeply compelling, both to the parties and to

the public.

In addition to these important issues of public policy

regarding judicial review of CERCLA settlements, there

are important reasons of legal policy to allow immediate

appeal under the circumstances of this case. This is not

simply a private settlement agreement gone sour or chal-

lenged by a third-party spoiler. It is, rather, an agreement

between a private party and a duly-appointed guardian

of the public trust, both of which parties maintain sup-

port for the agreement. Moreover, the parties reached the

agreement by acting pursuant to a federal statute that

sets out requirements and incentives for settlement. In

this highly regulated atmosphere, the CERCLA Trustee

and Kennecott conducted five years of technical studies

and negotiations with “candor, openness, and bargaining

balance.” App. 32B n.13 (citation omitted). After reaching

a settlement agreement, subjecting it to public review and

comment, modifying the terms of the consent decree in

response to those comments, and answering the district

Trustees to assess natural resource damages. Campbell, supra

note 10, at 227 (citation omitted). Exxon may have spent just as

much money attacking the assessments. Id. at 230. The natural

resource damage claim subsequently settled for $1 billion. Id. at

225 n.14; David T. Buente, Jr., Thomas G. Echikson, James L.

Connaughton, The “Civil” Implications of Environmental Crimes,

23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10589, 10598 n.100 (Oct. 1993).

ja eS che I i Oe awl

21

court’s questions in a six-day evidentiary hearing, these

parties’ proposal was rejected through errors of law that

the Tenth Circuit does not even advert to in letting the

errors stand.

This Court should grant certiorari to examine the

Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of “importance” under

these circumstances, where the district court denied the

statutory right of a government Trustee to bring and

settle a claim regarding injuries to natural resources held

in the public trust.

2. Denial of the CERCLA Trustee’s Right Is

Effectively Unreviewable On Appeal From

Final Judgment

Denial of the CERCLA Trustee’s right to bring and

settle a claim for natural resource damages cannot be

effectively reviewed on appeal from final judgment. On

this point, this case poses a conundrum that was not

present in Digital Equipment. The court below found that

appellate review was unavailable, in part because “the

trial court did not foreclose future proposed consent

decrees” in this case. App. 9A. However, if the parties

negotiate further and reach a new settlement that is

approved by the district court, then there will be no final

judgment on this settlement, and an appeal will still be

barred. Alternatively, if the parties proceed to trial and

final judgment, then the current settlement terms will be

lost, and no appeal at that stage will revive them. More-

over, whereas a party to a settlement agreement that went

awry might have recourse after final judgment to bring

an action against the other party for breach of contract,

22

see Digital Equip. at 2003, Petitioners here jointly support

the proposed consent decree and thus will have no such

recourse. If denial of this settlement is not reviewed

immediately, then the CERCLA Trustee’s right to bring,

and settle this claim will be infringed with no oppor-

tunity for redress.

This Court has recognized that interlocutory appeal

is appropriate where a district court order denying a

consent decree might have “the ‘serious, perhaps irrepar-

able, consequence’ of denying the parties their right to

compromise their dispute on mutually agreeable terms.”

Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1981)

(denial of consent decree found appealable under 28

U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1); determination of appealability under

28 U.S.C. § 1291 explicitly reserved). Where, as here, the

plaintiff and defendant reached a settlement agreement

but were then denied their right to settle on their negoti-

ated terms, and where they jointly seek to appeal from

that denial, postponing the appeal through rigorous

application of the final judgment requirement would rob

them of any meaningful opportunity to protect their

important statutory interests.

Moreover, forcing the parties to litigate the claim to

final judgment would contravene Congress’s express

intent for CERCLA natural resource damage claims,

which was to avoid protracted litigation and encourage

settlement so that CERCLA Trustees might expeditiously

23

obtain funds and spend them to “put shovels in the

ground, not lawyers in the courtroom.”?2

Il. THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING THAT REJEC-

TION OF A SETTLEMENT IS NOT A “CONCLU-

SIVE DETERMINATION” IS ERRONEOUS AND

CONFLICTS WITH OTHER CIRCUIT COURT

DECISIONS.

The first requirement that a nonfinal order must meet

under Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay:is that it “conclusively

determine the disputed question.” Coopers, 437 U.S. at 468

(1978) (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit’s holding

that the Order failed to meet this requirement conflicts

with all other circuit court decisions concerning inter-

locutory appeal from denial of a settlement agreement,

including the Tenth Circuit’s own recent decision in Desk-

top Direct. This Court should grant certiorari to resolve

the conflict among circuit courts. See S. Ct. Rule 10.1(a).

A. Recent Decisions of the Second, Third, Fifth,

and Eleventh Circuits

Recent collateral order cases from the Second, Fifth

and Eleventh Circuits have arisen from efforts to settle

private employment disputes.*° Each case has involved

22 131 Cong. Rec. 34,642 (1985) (statement of Rep. Johnson);

see also discussion of congressional intent to encourage settle-

ment in order to speed restoration of injured resources at 14-16,

supra.

23 Although some aspects of the circuit court decisions dis-

cussed here may have been overturned by Digital Equipment, the

24

an employee who brought suit against an employer, later

agreed to settle, and then subsequently attempted to set

aside the settlement or release and bring a new suit. In

Janneh v. GAF Corp., the employee asked the district court

to set aside a settlement agreement, alleging that he had

been coerced to sign it. 887 F.2d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 1989). In

Grillet v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., and Forbus v. Sears Roebuck

& Co., the employees alleged that duress and misrepre-

sentation in the settlement process made the releases

unenforceable, while the employers alleged that the

agreements were enforceable because the employees had

ratified the agreements by accepting payments under

them. Grillet, 927 F.2d 217, 218 (5th Cir. 1991); Forbus, 958

F.2d 1036, 1038 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 412

(1992). In each case, the district court declined to enforce

the settlement agreement or release. When the employer

appealed in each case, the circuit court held that it had

jurisdiction under the Coopers analysis of the collateral

order doctrine. Janneh, 887 F.2d at 434-36; Grillet, 927 F.2d

at 219-20; Forbus, 958 F.2d at 1039-40.

These cases all found that the “conclusive determina-

tion” test was met where the district court refused to

enforce a settlement agreement. In Janneh, the Second

Circuit considered the first requirement under Coopers

and held that the district court decision conclusively

determined the issue of “whether settlement was

reached.” Janneh, 887 F.2d at 434. In Grillet, the Fifth

Circuit found that the district court’s decision had been

“the final word on whether Grillet had effectively

analysis of “conclusive determination” in these cases remains

undisturbed.

dint BRA SB a: the

25

released Sears from suit.” Grillet, 927 F.2d at 219. The

Eleventh Circuit in Forbus similarly found that the district

court’s decision “was intended to be the final word on

whether Sears could avoid litigation on the basis of the

releases.” Forbus, 958 F.2d at 1039. Finally, the Third Cir-

cuit also held recently that a district court’s rejection of a

private settlement was conclusive. Transtech Indus. v. A &

Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d 51, 57 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 62

U.S.L.W. 3826 (U.S. June 14, 1994).24

ao

B. The Tenth Circuit’s Erroneous Analysis of

“Conclusive Determination”

The Tenth Circuit parted company with the other

circuit courts in applying the requirement of conclusive

determination to the disputed question in this case. The

Tenth Circuit stated: “We conclude the better reasoned

rule finds a denial of a settlement does not conclusively

determine the parties’ ability to settle.” App. 8A.25 The

circuit court contrived a nonfinal result while ignoring

two conclusive determinations made by the district court

24 The dispute in Transtech, which arose out of CERCLA,

was among private parties. The circuit court’s holding that

interlocutory appeal was not available therefore did not impli-

cate the rights of CERCLA Trustees, as the circuit court decision

does in this case.

25 The Tenth Circuit thereby implicitly disagreed with its

own determination in Desktop Direct that “[t]he first require-

ment is that the [district court] order conclusively determine the

validity or enforceability of the settlement agreement.” Desktop

Direct, 993 F.2d at 757 (finding requirement of conclusive deter-

mination satisfied where district court set aside settlement

agreement) (emphasis added).

26

and challenged by Petitioners: (1) CERCLA requires that

consent decrees proposed in certain circumstances be

reviewed de novo or under a “preponderance of the evi-

dence” standard, App. 34B, and (2) “[A]pproval of the

proposed Consent Decree is denied,” App. 45B. The Tenth

Circuit’s decision to ignore the finality of the district

court’s order puts it at odds with the other circuit

courts.76

In the language of this Court, the district court’s

order rejecting the consent decree was not “inherently

tentative,” Coopers, 437 U.S. at 469 n.11. There is “no basis

to suppose that the District Judge contemplated any

reconsideration of his decision” regarding either his read-

ing of CERCLA or approval of this consent decree. Moses

H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.

1, 12-13 (1983). Neither is “some revision [of the decision]

reasonably . . . expected in the ordinary course of litiga-

tion” regarding either point. Id. at 12 n.14.

26 The Tenth Circuit tried to shore up its decision by citing

the Second Circuit’s opinion in Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35 (2d

Cir. 1978) (finding that immediate appeal was not available

from an order disapproving a settlement agreement in stock-

holder derivative actions). App. 7A-8A. The Second Circuit

noted, however, that “[t]he determination of whether to

approve a Rule 23.1 settlement is peculiarly an amalgam of fact

and law.” Seigal, 590 F.2d at 38. The Second Circuit distin-

guished Seigal in its Janneh opinion, noting that appellate review

of the order in Seigal would have involved the court in assessing

the merits of the underlying case, and would therefore not have

met the Coopers requirement of an issue “completely separate

from the merits of the action.” Janneh, 887 F.2d at 435 n.4. The

Seigal decision, therefore, by the Second Circuit’s own analysis,

does not effectively bolster the Tenth Circuit’s decision on the

Coopers requirements at issue here.

-

27

Although the Tenth Circuit correctly pointed out that

the CERCLA Trustee and Kennecott are free to submit

other agreements for the district court’s approval, App.

9A-10A, the circuit court ignored the fact that the district

court conclusively — and erroneously — determined the

standard of review for consent decrees proposed under

CERCLA in the future. The Order is the final word on the

standard of review that the district court applied here

and, most importantly, will apply to any settlement that may

be proposed in the future. The district court’s Order thus

satisfies the first requirement under Coopers, and, in light

of this Court’s precedents, the Tenth Circuit erred in

ruling otherwise.

* + +

This case presents compelling grounds for applica-

tion of the collateral order doctrine. The decision below

announces that efficient operation of the federal courts as

protected from interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291 is to be promoted at the expense of the rights of a

CERCLA Trustee who acts pursuant to a federal statute

and its underlying roots in public policy, and who

attempts to carry out explicit congressional intent in

bringing and settling a claim for injury to natural

resources held in trust for the public. Moreover, the deci-

sion below forecloses any meaningful opportunity for the

parties supporting the settlement to seek redress. This

Court should grant certiorari to clarify the effect of its

recent decision in Digital Equipment on the jurisdictional

question in this case.

28

In addition, the Tenth Circuit’s “better reasoned rule”

regarding conclusive determination for purposes of inter-

locutory appeal, announced in this case, conflicts with

this Court’s precedents and decisions in four other cir-

cuits. This Court should grant certiorari to resolve the

conflict.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted. This Court may wish to consider summary dis-

position of this case in view of its recent opinion in

Digital Equipment and because the decision below devi-

ates from this Court’s precedents and decisions of four

other circuit courts regarding “conclusiveness.”

Respectfully submitted,

JAN GRAHAM

Utah Attorney General

Counsel of Record

Frep G NELSON

DENISE CHANCELLOR

Utah Attorney General’s Office

236 State Capitol Bldg.

Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Telephone: (801) 538-1015

Counsel for Petitioner State of Utah

29

James B. LEE

Danie. M. ALLRED

Davip W. TUNDERMANN

Jim BuTLerR

Lisa A. KIRSCHNER

JEANNETTE F, SweNT

Parsons BEHLE & LATIMER

201 South Main Street, Suite 1800

P.O. Box 45898

Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898

Telephone: (801) 532-1234

Counsel for Petitioner Kennecott

Corporation

APPENDICES

oo Se hs ae

F Se ee ee ed en? Fe ee

sary. isis ”

1A

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF UTAH, By and Through the

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH, Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

KENNECOTT CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant and

Cross-Appellee,

SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY

DISTRICT, Intervenor-Appellee and

Cross-Appellant.

Nos. 92-4173, 92-4179 and 92-4180.

January 31, 1994

Fred G. Nelson (Jan Graham, Atty. Gen.; R. Paul Van

Dam, and Denise Chancellor, Utah Atty. General’s Office,

with him on the brief), Salt Lake City, UT, for plaintiff-

appellant State of Utah; David W. Tundermann (James B.

Lee, Daniel M. Allred, Jim Butler, and Lisa A. Kirschner

with him, on the briefs) of Parsons Behle & Latimer, Salt

Lake City, UT, for defendant-appellant and cross-appellee

Kennecott Corp.

Douglas J. Parry of Parry Murray Ward & Cannon,

Salt Lake City, UT, and Dale F. Gardiner, Salt Lake

County Water Conservancy Dist., West Jordan, UT (Blake

S. Atkin of Parry Murray Ward & Cannon, Salt Lake City,

UT, with him on the briefs), for intervenor-appellee and

cross-appellant.

2A

Rex E. Lee,’Richard B. Stewart, and James L. Con-

naughton of Sidley & Austin, Washington, DC, for amicus

curiae Western Regional Council.

Maria Savasta Kennedy and Laurens H. Silver of

Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, San Francisco, CA, and

Kenley W. Brunsdale, Salt Lake City, UT, for amici curiae

Sierra Club and the Mineral Policy Center.

Before BALDOCK, McWILLIAMS, and BRORBY, Cir-

cuit Judges.

BRORBY, Circuit Judge.

Both the State of Utah and Defendant Kennecott Cor-

poration appeal an order of the federal district court

denying a motion to approve and enter a consent decree

submitted by the parties. The proposal would settle

Utah’s claim for natural resources damages under § 107

of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-

sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 9601-9675. Salt Lake County Conservancy District

(District), a permissive intervenor in the proceeding

below, cross-appeals the trial court’s decision to deny the

District intervention as a matter of right. The District also

moves to dismiss the appeal of Utah and Kennecott for

lack of jurisdiction. We are asked to review a nonfinal

order of a district court under various exceptions to 28

U.S.C. § 1291 including (1) the collateral order exception

to the finality doctrine, (2) this court’s interpretation of

pragmatic finality, and (3) an interlocutory order with the

practical effect of granting or denying injunctive relief.

We grant the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

:

4

4

4,

+

a

3A

BACKGROUND

Kennecott, Utah, and various local governments

have, since 1983, studied the threat of groundwater con-

tamination from Kennecott’s Bingham Canyon mining

operations in Salt Lake County. In 1986, Utah filed

CERCLA claims, presumably to preserve its rights in

light of CERCLA’s statute of limitations. At that time,

asserted damages were $129 million based on potential

injury to 109,215 acre feet of groundwater over a ten to

twenty year period. Prior to the 1992 memorandum and

order of the trial court,! various stays were granted to

allow settlement negotiations and the completion of tech-

nical studies.

Kennecott’s first settlement proposal offered the

assignment of their water rights (valued at $2 million)

plus $100 million for remediation of the contaminated

’ water in exchange for dismissal of the lawsuit. Kennecott

also proposed to take independent action to reduce con-

tinued pollution from the mining operation sources and

to remediate heavy metals from the spreading contami-

nate plume. Utah rejected this offer and stressed that,

given the tentative knowledge of the plume’s content,

boundary, and migration, the State could not conclude

the settlement would satisfy all public health concerns.

Subsequent negotiations split the issues of natural

resources damages and costs of remediation. Utah, Ken-

necott and the United States Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) negotiated an Agreement in Principle

toward future cleanup and response costs associated with

1 Utah v. Kennecott Corp., 801 F. Supp. 553 (D. Utah 1992).

that was

4A

remediating the Kennecott mining operation contamina-

tion.2 The Agreement expressly disclaimed any effect on

Utah’s settlement of natural resources damage claims.

With the current proposal, in exchange for monetary

recovery of $12 million, Utah agreed to release Kennecott

from (1) all damages to surface or groundwater in a

defined mining impact area, and (2) injunctive relief or

response costs associated with plume remediation. The

release was limited by a reopener provision, reserving

Utah’s right to seek additional recovery if the contamina-

tion was discovered to be greater than anticipated. The

release also expressly preserved potential claims by third

parties.

After a period of public comment, the trial court

declined to approve the proposed settlement and ordered

an evidentiary hearing. The District moved to intervene

as a matter of right. The trial court denied this motion but

granted permissive intervention for the limited purposes

of participating in discovery and evidentiary hearings.

Reviewing the proposed consent decree for a settlement

“ ‘reasonable, fair, and consistent with the pur-

poses that CERCLA is intended to serve,’ ” the trial court

concluded the proposal was deficient. Kennecott, 801 F.

Supp. at 567 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the trial

court denied approval of the proposed consent decree. Id.

at 572. Instead of attending a scheduled case management

conference, both Utah and Kennecott separately appealed

2 More recently, the EPA announced the three parties

jointly decided not to pursue the comprehensive cleanup pro-

posal embodied in the Agreement in Principle. U.S. EPA Press

Release (Aug. 27, 1993).

:

4

4

5A

the trial court’s order of denial. The District, a permissive

intervenor, cross-appealed the denial of intervention as a

matter of right.

After consolidating the appeals, we asked the parties

to file memorandum briefs on the issue of jurisdiction

pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 27.2.2. Before us is a motion by

the District to dismiss the Utah and Kennecott appeals for

lack of a “final appealable order” upon which to base 28

U.S.C. § 1291 jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides “jurisdiction of

appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of

the United States.” Historically, a “final decision” is a

decision by the district court that “ends the litigation on

the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but

execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S.

229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945); see

Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S.

271, 275, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 1136, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988). In the

instant case, an order denying a motion to approve and

enter a consent decree is not a decision on the merits that

ends the litigation. Rather, the district court’s order

ensures that litigation will continue in the district court.

Appellants Utah and Kennecott concede as much and

argue the trial court’s order is immediately appealable

under various exceptions to the finality requirement. In

3 No party has moved for trial court certification under 28

U.S.C § 1292(b), nor sought a writ of mandamus, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1651(a), on their respective issues.

6A

particular, Appellants contend jurisdiction is proper

under (1) the collateral order exception to § 1291, (2) the

pragmatic finality doctrine, or (3) the § 1292(a)(1) statu-

tory exception, an order with the practical effect of grant-

ing or denying injunctive relief.4

I

The Supreme Court, beginning with Cohen v. Benefi-

cial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed.

1528 (1949), has inter, ceted § 1291 to permit an appeal of

a nonfinal order if an order falls within the “narrow

exception to the normal application of the final judgment

rule, which has come to be known as the collateral order

doctrine.” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S.

794, 798, 109 S.Ct. 1494, 1498, 103 L.Ed.2d 879 (1989). To

meet the Cohen exception an order must “[1] conclusively

determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important

issue completely separate from the merits of the action,

and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final

judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468,

98 S.Ct. 2454, 2458, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). Unless all three

requirements are met, jurisdiction is not available under

the collateral order doctrine. Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 276,

4 The District has stated it will withdraw its cross-appeal in

the event we deny jurisdiction to the appeals of Utah and Ken-

necott. For this reason, we do not analyze our jurisdiction to

review an order granting permissive intervention but denying

intervention of right. We note that, should the District fail to

withdraw its appeal, Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in

Action, 480 U.S. 370, 107 S.Ct. 1177, 94 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987), would

require a denial of jurisdiction as well.

Dae ol

7A

108 S.Ct. at 1136-37. The trial court’s denial of the pro-

posed consent decree does not satisfy either the first or

second prongs.

A

To first satisfy the Cohen doctrine, the trial court's

denial of the consent decree must conclusively determine

the parties’ ability to settle their claims. Orders that are

“inherently tentative” are contrasted with those expected

to be the final word on the subject addressed. See

Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 277-78, 108 S.Ct. at 1137-38 (reject-

ing collateral order review of a denial of a motion to stay

as inherently tentative); Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 469

& n.1l1, 98 S.Ct. at 2458 & n.11 (holding the collateral

order exception does not apply to a pretrial order deny-

ing class certification because the order is subject to revi-

sion prior to a decision on the merits). Inherently

tentative orders are those “to which some revision might

reasonably be expected in the ordinary course of litiga-

tion.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.

Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12-13 n.14, 103 S.Ct. 927, 935 n.14, 74

L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). Utah and Kennecott argue the district

court conclusively determined the parties’ ability to settle

by rejecting the technical premises underlying the settle-

ment.

Although noting a conflict in the circuits, the

Supreme Court, in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450

U.S. 79, 82-83 nn.6 & 7, 101 S.Ct. 993, 996 nn.6 & 7, 67

L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), declined to decide whether an appeal

under the collateral order exception was proper for

denials of consent decrees. At least one federal circuit has

8A

ruled a district court’s refusal to enter a consent decree is

not appealable under § 1291, see Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d

35 (2d Cir. 1978), while another has decided such orders

are appealable, Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir.

1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912, 91 S.Ct. 879, 880, 27

L.Ed.2d 811 (1971).5 Other circuits simply reject collateral

order jurisdiction in dicta. See Donovan v. Robbins, 752

F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1985) (refusal to approve consent

decree is “classic example of a nonfinal order”); New York

v. Dairylea Coop. Inc., 698 F.2d 567, 570 n.10 (2d Cir. 1983)

(approving of appellant’s decision not to raise collateral

order grounds, stating the Cohen exception “is to be kept

within narrow bounds”); Carson v. American Brands, Inc.,

606 F.2d 420, 423-24 (4th Cir. 1979) (approving of Seigal as

an analogous case though dismissing on § 1292(a)(1)

grounds), rev’d on other grounds, 450 U.S. 79, 101 S.Ct. 993,

67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). We conclude the better reasoned

rule finds a denial of a settlement does not conclusively

determine the parties’ ability to settle.

Similar to the denial of a motion to stay in Gulfstream

and the denial of class certification in Coopers & Lybrand,

denial of an offer of settlement is commonly open to

revision by the trial court prior to a final judgment on the

merits. In this case, the parties are free to continue with

renewed settlement efforts and further proceedings to

secure court approval. Although the trial court concluded

> The persuasive authority of Norman is negligible. Subse-

quent to Carson, the Ninth Circuit disavowed its prior decision

and determined that Norman had been overruled by Carson.

EEOC v. Pan American World Airways, 796 F.2d 314, 318 n.7 (9th

Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030, 107 S.Ct. 874, 93 L.Ed.2d

829 (1987).

XS tecaiabe — |

CE Naa SMTA REELS WHO ile ak C8 Whites Be Dd PNAS Ries

9A

that Utah and Kennecott have not yet met their burden of

substantive fairness under CERCLA, the trial court did

not foreclose future proposed consent decrees.

The Appellants contend even though the trial court

may not have expressly barred further negotiation the

order impliedly did so by attacking the underlying tech-

nical premises of the settlement. In particular, Utah and

Kennecott assert the order requires them to undertake

additional technical studies and include in the consent

decree injunctive provisions requiring Kennecott to pro-

tect and restore injured ground water. This argument

reads too much into the trial court’s order and too little

into the doctrinal requirements of the Cohen exception.

The proper inquiry is whether the trial court is less

likely to revise its prior denial as new settlement pro-

posals are offered, not whether the parties feel discour-

aged and less likely to continue with settlement

negotiations. Orders that are inherently tentative charac-

teristically allow or invite reconsideration on the basis of

express procedural requirements or, in common experi-

ence, are regularly reconsidered. See 15A Charles A.

Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3911.1, at

375 (1992). Commonly, settlements may be offered during

the final hearings on the merits. The trial court’s order

contains no limitations on the court’s ability to reconsider

future proposals or the initial order denying the proposed

consent decree. Appellants have no right to an unfair

consent decree under CERCLA, even if the unfair terms

are underlying “technical premises.” The trial court’s

order does no more than permit Appellants to propose a

new consent decree within the bounds of substantive

10A

fairness. The order does not conclusively determine the

ability of the parties to settle.

B

Utah and Kennecott next argue, since the parties lost

the right to settle on the specific terms of the proposed

consent decree, they lost an important right that cannot

be vindicated effectively after the trial has concluded.

Because we recently held a broad and unbounded “right

not to be tried” is no grounds for immediate appeal,

Appellants fail to satisfy the second Cohen requirement.

See Desktop Direct, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 993 F.2d 755

(10th Cir.), cert. granted, _. US. __, T14 SACK. 379, 126

L.Ed.2d 329 (1993). Although Utah and Kennecott con-

tend the lost right to settle satisfies the third Cohen prong,

we have held the question of an “important issue” — part

of the second Cohen prong - is the appropriate analysis in

© The Supreme Court’s recent grant of certiorari in this case

will likely resolve the circuits’ diverging treatment of pretrial

orders refusing to enforce previously granted settlements. Com-

pare Desktop Direct (rejecting a broad reading of a right not to go

to trial); Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d 51 (3d

Cir. 1993) (same), petition for cert. filed, 62 USLW 3429 (Dec. 16,

1993) (No. 93-960), with Forbus v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d

1036 (11th Cir.) (granting jurisdiction to review a denial of

enforcement of a settlement on grounds of a right not to go to

trial), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 412, 121 L.Ed.2d 336

(1992); Grillet v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1991)

(same); Janneh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1989) (same),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865, 111 S.Ct. 177, 112 L.Ed.2d 141 (1990).

Our adherence to Desktop Direct in this section does not affect

our earlier conclusion that Appellants have not satisfied the

first Cohen prong.

3

«

x

4

4

*

4

a

‘4

=

¢

a

2

4

Fi

E>

11A

this context. Id. at 758. The original formulation by the

Cohen Court examined whether the “decision [fell into]

that small class . . . too important to be denied review.”

337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1225-26; see Lauro Lines S.R.L. v.

Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 503, 109 S.Ct. 1976, 1980, 104

L.Ed.2d 548 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (a right not to

be tried, even if unreviewable, must be sufficiently

important to overcome the policies militating against

interlocutory appeals).

The Supreme Court has cautioned courts “not to play

word games with the concept of a ‘right not to be tried.’ ”

Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 801, 109 S.Ct. at 1499. “[I]n

some sense, all litigants who have a meritorious pretrial

claim for dismissal can reasonably claim a right not to

stand trial.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 524,

108 S.Ct. 1945, 1950, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988). The mere

possibility that an erroneous ruling at the trial level may

result in additional litigation is not sufficient to set aside

the finality requirement imposed by Congress. Rich-

ardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436, 105 S.Ct.

2757, 2764, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985).

The Appellants in Desktop Direct sought review of an

order vacating a prior dismissal and rescinding a settle-

ment formerly accepted by the trial court. We rejected the

jurisdictional importance of a so-called “right not to be

tried” absent a constitutional or statutory basis. Desktop

Direct, 993 F.2d at 760. The Supreme Court’s narrow

reading of the collateral order doctrine reveals only one

situation important enough - qualified immunity for a

public official defendant — to allow an interlocutory

appeal in the absence of a constitutional or statutory

guarantee. In dismissing the appeal, we concluded the

12A

Cohen doctrine should not be “expanded without compel-

ling justification.” Id. In the case at hand, Utah and Ken-

necott do not point to a right of review under CERCLA or

other statutory or constitutional grounds that would

require appellate review of a denied consent decree. The

bare desire of Utah and Kennecott to avoid trial is not

“important” enough to justify ignoring the § 1291 prereq-

uisite of finality.

Requiring a constitutional or statutory basis for a

“right not to go to trial” is sensible. Without clarity in the

application of exceptions, the finality doctrine becomes

riddled and ineffective. Repeatedly, the Court and com-

mentators encourage the use of statutory exceptions in

the face of efforts to stretch the collateral order doctrine.

See Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U. S. at 529-30, 108 S.Ct. at

1953-54 (conclusion to deny collateral order appeal “ forti-

fied by the availability of interlocutory review” under

§ 1292(b)); Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 474, 98 S.Ct. at

2461 (principal vice of “death knell” doctrine is circum-

vention of proper use of § 1292(b)); 16 Wright et al., supra

§ 3929, at 137-38 (vigorous use of § 1292(b) to limit the

expansion of other appealability concepts reduces ambi-

guity that could lead to unnecessary appeals).

Reinforcing the need for definition in appellate

review, Congress has recently increased Supreme Court

rulemaking authority to define the scope of interlocutory

and other nonfinal appeals. See Judicial Improvements

Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 315, 104 Stat. 5089, 5115

(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072(c) (Supp.

1993)) (power to define “final” for the purposes of appeal

under § 1291); Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992,

Pub. L. No. 102-572 § 101, 106 Stat. 4506, 4506 (codified as

sc hci PAIS ACI NE dE ates BAe Sai Kap aii

Aiea les OANA FON: Nh Sealant iste itil APART mie WO Laxsacanaes soiree tit weap 6 tll ion bate

13A

amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(e) (Supp. 1993)) (power to

prescribe new rules for interlocutory appeals not other-

wise provided in § 1292).

An obvious statutory basis for appeal in the context

of avoiding unnecessary litigation is § 1292(b) certifica-

tion. A primary purpose of § 1292(b) is to provide an

opportunity to review an order when an immediate

appeal would “materially advance the ultimate termina-

tion of the litigation.” S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d

Sess. 1 (1958) (hereinafter S. Rep. 2434), reprinted in 1958

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5255, 5255; see Note, Interlocutory Appeals in

the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b), 88 Harv. L.

Rev. 607, 609-11 (1975) (avoidance of wasted trial court

time is sole purpose of § 1292(b)). A report by a Tenth

Circuit committee addressing the same problem found:

Our recommendation is founded upon the

premise that the enlargement of the right to

appeal should be limited to extraordinary cases

in which extended and expensive proceedings

probably can be avoided by immediate final

decision of controlling questions encountered

early in the action.

S. Rep. 2434, supra, 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5262 (appendix

to the Senate report, submitted without dissent from

other circuits). The requirement of district court certifica-

tion is equally imperative, however, as a procedural

screen to avoid a flood of fruitless petitions invoked

contrary to the purpose of § 1292(b). Id.

Utah and Kennecott seek to expand the Cohen doc-

trine. They claim without immediate appeal they will

forever lose the opportunity to avoid the costs and risks

of trial and protracted litigation. Despite the potential

14A

accuracy of this assertion, a broadly worded rule allow-

ing review of denied settlements under the Cohen doc-

trine would burden appellate courts with the threat of

successive appeals and interfere intolerably with the dis-

cretion of trial courts. We decline to adopt such a rule in

the absence of constitutional or congressional intent. The

denial order is not appealable under the collateral order

exception.

II

Utah and Kennecott next contend this court’s “practi-

cal rather than technical construction” of § 1291 finality is

broad enough to include their appeal. The doctrine has

lived a checkered life in both our court and the United

States Supreme Court, but finds its current incarnation in

Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424 (10th Cir. 1984).7 Even

where jurisdiction under the Cohen exception is unavail-

able, a practical construction of § 1291 may generate

7 The “practical, rather than a technical” approach was

announced in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148,

152, 85 S.Ct. 308, 311, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964), but the case was

purportedly limited to its facts in Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at

477 n.30, 98 S.Ct. at 2462 n.30 (“If Gillespie were extended

beyond the unique facts of that case, § 1291 would be stripped of

all significance”). Accordingly, this circuit disavowed the prac-

tical finality concept in light of the Coopers & Lybrand decision.

Daiflon, Inc. v. Bohanon, 612 F.2d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1979), rev'd

on other grounds sub. nom., Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.,

449 U.S. 33, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980). The Gillespie

decision reappeared, however, in American Export Lines, Inc. v.

Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 277-79 & n.7, 100 S.Ct. 1673, 1675-76 & n.7,

64 L.Ed.2d 284 (1980), and, four years later, practical finality

was revived in Bender.

4

4

i

?

|

4

15A

jurisdiction through a subjective and ad hoc balancing of

the interests of the parties against the policies of an

unambiguous finality rule. See Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 10

F.3d 746, 751-52 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing 15A Wright et al.,

supra § 3913, at 464). “The critical inquiry is whether the

danger of injustice by delaying appellate review out-

weighs the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review.”

Bender, 744 F.2d at 1427.

Since Bender we have repeatedly stressed a narrow

reading of the rule. See Boughton, 10 F.3d at 752 (Bender

and its progeny must be narrowly construed and invoked

only in truly “unique instances” in order to preserve the

vitality of § 1291); Quinn v. CGR, 828 F.2d 1463, 1467 (10th

Cir. 1987) (Bender must be applied only in the “most

exceptional circumstances.”) The case at hand is neither

unique nor exceptional. Although Utah and Kennecott

raise an unsettled question of law —- the standard for a

trial court’s review of a proposed CERCLA consent

decree — the only real peril to the Appellants is the cost of

extraneous litigation. The magnitude of this interest alone

does not overcome the policies of a finality requirement.

See 15A Wright et al., supra § 3913, at 473 (cost of a wasted

proceeding does not justify immediate appeal). The order

denying Appellants’ proposed consent decree does not

fall within the narrow scope of the Bender exception.

III

Utah and Kennecott lastly contend the order is

appealable as an interlocutory order that grants or denies

injunctive relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Generally, two

strands of analysis have developed for § 1292(a)(1)

16A

appeals. The first applies to orders ruling on express

motions for injunctive relief and the second applies to

orders with the “practical effect” of granting or refusing

an injunction. MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Basis, Inc., 962 F.2d

978, 982 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Tri-State Generation &

Transmission Ass'n v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 874 F.2d

1346, 1351 (10th Cir. 1989)). An interlocutory order

expressly denying or granting an injunction fits squarely

within the plain language of § 1292(a)(1) and need not

make the additional showings required in the second

strand of analysis. Tri-State Generation, 874 F.2d at 1351.

Utah and Kennecott acknowledge that no express motion

for injunctive relief is pending, and focus their argument

on the strand recognizing the appeal of orders with the

“practical effect” of granting or denying injunctive relief.

In Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 101

S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), the Court examined an

appeal from an order refusing to approve a class settle-

ment and proposed consent decree to a Title VII claim of

racial discrimination. The settlement would have

required the employer to prospectively give hiring and

seniority preferences to black employees. Even though

the order did not specifically deny an injunction, the

Court found the denial of inherently prospective relief

had the “practical effect” of refusing an injunction. Id. at

83, 101 S.Ct. at 996. For appellate jurisdiction, Carson

requires the challenged order have (1) “the practical

effect of refusing [or granting] an injunction,” (2) threaten

a “ ‘serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,’ ” and be

(3) “ ‘effectually challenged’ ” only by immediate appeal.

Id. at 84, 101 S.Ct. at 996-97 (citation omitted); United

States v. Colorado, 937 F.2d 505, 507-08 (10th Cir. 1991).

OE te ee ae Ne Oman

LR res Rk whch k CANS

Sa ARIE 700d RCS

17A

Utah and Kennecott cannot sustain the first require-

ment. Missing from the consent decree is any equitable or

prospective relief, injunctive or otherwise. The Appel-

lants erroneously state the order has the substantive

effect of granting an injunction because it “mandates

inclusion of a covenant to protect.” See United States v.

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 804 F.2d 348, 351 (6th Cir.

1986) (where the district court conditioned entry of a

consent decree on inclusion of specific court-defined

terms, jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) proper to review

the order). A careful reading of the order shows only the

court’s analysis of deficiencies in the settlement.® The

order does not affirmatively demand the inclusion of

specific terms in subsequent consent decree proposals.

Hence, the order is not appealable under the § 1292(a)(1)

statutory exception as an order granting or denying an

injunction.

° The proposed Consent Decree also does not

address what will have to be done to manage and

contain the existing contaminated waters, such as

pumping water or other measures designed to “pro-

tect” uncontaminated waters from the damaged

resource. In this regard, the proposed Consent Decree

contains no provision requiring measures to be taken

to minimize future expansion of the existing plumes,

or to assure that the contamination will not spread

beyond the MIA.

801 F. Supp. at 570 (footnote omitted).

18A

CONCLUSION

Denial of Utah and Kennecott’s proposed settlement

of CERCLA natural resource damages is not appealable

as a Cohen collateral order, a § 1292(a)(1) interlocutory

order, or under the pragmatic finality doctrine. Conse-

quently, we grant the District’s motion to dismiss for lack

of jurisdiction.

DISMISSED.

;

3

3

i 4

f

4

Ac hah INS aN ths Be

1B

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

THE STATE OF UTAH, By and Through the

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Plaintiff,

V.

KENNECOTT CORPORATION, Defendant.

SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY

DISTRICT, Intervenor.

Civil No. 86-0902G

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

[Entered September 3, 1992]

This matter is before the court on the joint motion of

plaintiff, the State of Utah, and defendant, Kennecott

Corporation, for approval of a proposed Consent Decree

relating to a negotiated monetary settlement for damages

to the State’s interest in ground waters in an area within

Salt Lake County, Utah. The proposed Consent Decree

would settle the State’s claim for natural resources dam-

age under Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environ-

mental Response Compensation and Liability Act

(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601, et seq.}

1 References hereafter are to the Transcript and exhibits

introduced at hearings before the court March 23-30 and May

14, 1992.

2B

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

A. Kennecott’s Five-Year Hydrogeologic Study

In 1983, Kennecott undertook a five-year hydro-

geologic study to assess surface and ground water condi-

tions in a 216 square mile area affected by mining and

milling operations in the Bingham Mining District. Offi-

cials of the State of Utah and Salt Lake County were

consulted and informally participated in the study

through advisory groups. On October 4, 1983, Kennecott

submitted ground water monitoring data to the State

which indicated significant ground water contamination

from the Kennecott operations. In December 1983, the

State requested additional information and investigation,

and continued to monitor the study. After Phases I and II

of the five-year study had been completed in 1985, Ken-

necott, the State of Utah and Salt Lake County entered

into a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 3, 1985, to

formalize participation of the environmental health

departments of the concerned State and local govern-

ments. (Exh. P-10.) Among other things, the agreement

called for completion of the five year study with annual

reports and development of a final Environmental Impact

Assessment (EIA). On March 15, 1990, a draft of an EIA

was submitted by Ke~>ecott (Exh. P-28), but a final EIA

as required by the June 3, 1985 Memorandum of Agree-

ment has never been completed.

4st bd Hare! Res SOP ba i tw Reade

3B

B. State Claim and Lawsuit for Natural Resources

Dama ge

On July 31, 1986, the State filed a Notice of Claim for

Natural Resource Damages under section 107 of CERCLA

in the amount of $129 million dollars. The damage figure

was based upon present and anticipated injury to 59,406 -

109,215 acre feet of ground water in the affected area over

a ten to twenty year period. In a transmittal letter to

Kennecott, Kenneth L. Alkema, Director of the State Divi-

sion of Environmental Health, took the position that Ken-

necott should be given the opportunity to complete its

ongoing hydrogeologic study and “to conduct a compre-

hensive resource damage assessment,” but that in order

to preserve its rights under CERCLA, and to prevent

expiration of the statute of limitations, the claim was

being filed by the State and would be followed up with a

lawsuit. (Exh. P-41.) On October 3, 1986, the State filed

the pending lawsuit against Kennecott seeking, among

other things, recovery pursuant to Section 107(a)(4)(c) of

CERCLA for alleged damage to State ground water natu-

ral resources.

Immediately after the lawsuit was filed, this court

granted a motion to stay all proceedings so that the

parties could pursue and complete the five year study,

and later continued the stay pending settlement negotia-

tions.

C. Kennecott’s Experts

In 1987 Kennecott contracted with Dames & Moore,

an environmental consulting firm in Denver, Colorado, to

prepare a computer-generated ground water model to

4B

simulate past, present and future conditions of the

affected ground water in order to project future move-

ment of the contaminated plumes which had been identi-

fied. After the five year study was completed, Kennecott

retained an expert hydrologist, Adrian Brown, of Adrian

Brown Consultants (ABC) Denver, Colorado, to provide

additional data. ABC drilled nine new wells for purposes

of analysis, and reevaluated the five year study data.

D. Kennecott Offer of Settlement

In August 1990, Kennecott presented an offer of set-

tlement to the State which envisioned exchange of water

rights valued at about $2 million dollars for the natural

resource damage, plus providing about $100 million

worth of remediation work. The Kennecott proposal

involved:

e Kennecott undertaking remedial actions

aimed at curtailing potential sources of

groundwater pollution;

e Kennecott undertaking actions to remediate

the heavy metals plume;

e Kennecott assigning water rights to the State

as replacement for ground water containing

elevated levels of sulfates and heavy metals;

e The State dismissing the lawsuit with preju-

dice. (Exh. P-44 at 2-4.)

The remedial action proposed by Kennecott involved

drilling very deep wells below the low pH or heavy

metals plume (area of contamination characterized by

low pH materials or heavy metals) and pumping the

contaminated water down through the uncontaminated

eee

5B

soil, attenuating the metals and raising the pH. (Trans.

Vol. I Pt. 2 at 179.)

E. State’s Evaluation of the Kennecott Offer

The State looked to its own staff at the Utah Depart-

ment of Environmental Health, environmental health per-

sonnel at Salt Lake City - County, and experts it hired to

evaluate the Kennecott offer. The principal expert con-

cerning natural resources damages was RCG/Hagler,

Bailly, Inc. of Boulder, Colorado, which organization sup-

plied a substantial “Preliminary Assessment of Natural

Resource Damages Associated with Kennecott Mining

Operations in the Great Salt Lake Valley” dated Decem-

ber 20, 1990 (“Hagler report”) (Exh. P-44.) Dr. Douglas

James at the Utah State University was hired to evaluate

the Hagler report, and Dr. Upmanu Lall, an Associate

Professor at Utah State University, was hired to review

the Kennecott proposal and to estimate the “safe annual

yield” of the underground waters in the affected area. Dr.

Hong of the University of Utah also was hired to evaluate

Kennecott’s settlement offer.

The Hagler report was never finalized, but it set forth

much information and a proposed course of action which

would have identified more fully damages suffered and

to be suffered by the State as a result of the contamina-

tion, as well as alternatives for remediation.? The report

2 The Hagler report set forth the following pertinent to

damages determination:

[T]here are several factors to indicate that the damage

estimates might be underestimated. First, we have not

6B

stressed that the heavy metals plume where there is much

contamination presents a dynamic and spreading prob-

lem rather than a static situation.* As to the potential

incorporated past damages, to the extent that contam-

ination has already affected welfare in the valley (net

of Kennecott’s past efforts to provide deeper wells to

impacted users, etc.). These losses accrued to house-

holds who had their well supplies tainted, and may

also include foregone increases in property values

due to potential inhibitions on increased residential

development in that part of the valley. Second, the

water resource values are based on tra1.sactions that are

unlikely to have fully taken into acco:nt the recent

recognition of water scarcity in the valley. Third, the

estimated groundwater damages only pertain to the

contaminated waters, and do not include damages

that are likely to arise due to institutional efforts to

manage the plume’s future growth and movement

through reducing allowable pumping rates at permit-

ted wells along and beyond the edges of the plume.

Finally, the damage estimates do not include values

for injuries other than groundwater contamination.

* * +

[T]he value of these damages depends on the quantity

of water impacted, and the value of the damages

appears to range between $283 to $1429 for each acre

foot of safe annual yield impacted (and may be as high

as $2162 per acre foot if one considers outright replace-

ment). (emphasis added.)

3 The Hagler report called the following to the attention of

the State:

It must be recalled that the contaminant plume acts in

a dynamic rather than a static manner. This dynamic

behavior has two important ramifications. First,

future advection and dispersion of the plume would

involve increasing the volume of groundwater affected

7B

quantity of ground water which may be regarded as

damaged, the report states:

(and, thus, proximate damages). Theoretically, one

could calculate the maximum possible extent of dam-

ages (in the future) by estimating the total mass of

contaminant present in the aquifer, and dividing it by

the volume of water needed to dilute that mass to the

desired threshold concentration (e.g., 500 mg/1 for

sulfates).

A secondary consideration associated with a dynamic

plume involves the institutional, management, and

energy costs required to minimize future expansion of the

plume. Historically, the main influence on the contam-

inant plume appears to have been hydrogeologic. The

leading edge of the contaminated water has moved

down-gradient towards the Jordan River. . .

Assuming other factors remain constant, it appears

that the plume will eventually flow, as a result of the

hydraulic gradient, up through the confining layer

into the Jordan River... .

The main institutional element associated with the

plume is the administration of well pumping from the

principal aquifer throughout the Salt Lake Valley.

Based on the number of perfected and approved well

permits for the principal aquifer, if appears that the

aquifer is over-appropriated. Pumping associated with a

certain number of all of these well permits may

change the direction and steepness of the hydraulic

gradient, thereby allowing the plume to spread in differ-

ent directions and at different rates than at present... .

It appears that when considering the dynamics of the

plume, there is a significant hidden administrative

cost over and above any natural resource cost being

pondered. Thus, if administrative steps are needed to

contain the plume, this cost should be considered as part of

any damage claim. (emphasis added.)

8B

To estimate total groundwater damages, the

above range of values ($283/AF to $1429/AF)

was multiplied by the annual yield represented

by the plume. Kennecott’s estimate of 8,000 AF

as a safe annual yield relies on an overly limited

interpretation of the plume (delineating the

plume at 1000 mg/1 of sulfates, rather than the

400 to 500 mg/1 range that the U.S. EPA has

stated it intends to propose for health-based

drinking water standards). With a larger plume

so defined, and with more appropriate inter-

pretations of the concept of safe annual yield,

the impacted yield may be as high as 100,000 AF/

year. (emphasis added.)

Estimated damages to the State were set forth in the

Hagler report using three approaches - restoration,

replacement and loss of value. Estimated damages values

based on these methods alone, apart from other damage

considerations noted in the report, ranged from $2.3 mil-

lion to $216 million, depending upon the quantity of

ground water contamination and the method of valua-

tion. It was also noted in the Hagler report that one

“appreciable negative attribute” of the proposed settle-

ment was that it “use[d] dismissal with prejudice to pre-

clude future claims for natural resource damages other

than those associated with groundwater plume remedia-

tion,” and that it did not cover other damages, including

“potential losses of intrinsic values.” (Exh. P-44 at pp.

2-5.)

A “Preliminary Assessment Plan” envisioned in the

Hagler report apparently was never ordered by the State.

It was also pointed out in the Hagler report that “more

refined estimates of natural resources damage would

require substantial additional information,” particularly as

9B

to alternative estimates of plume size. (Exh. P-44 at p. 6-2)

(emphasis added.) Hagler has not been authorized by the

State to provide such additional information.

Dr. Lall, the State’s expert ground water hydrologist

at Utah State University, considered two areas for safe

annual yield analysis, which areas had been identified by

Dames & Moore. The first was an area of 216 square

miles, 15.75 miles in the east-west direction and 13.75

miles in the north-south direction, which covered con-

tamination from the Kennecott site within “ ‘the entire

area of known and potential contaminant effects related

to the mining and leaching activities,’ and relevant

boundary fluxes.” (Exh. P-47 — Attachment 1, p. 2.) The

other area identified was 77.5 square miles, “a smaller

area that bounds the area with wells that had one or more

drinking water standard violations.” (Id.) In this smaller

area Dr. Lall estimated the safe annual yield to be 25,000

to 40,000 acre feet. In a letter to the State dated February

6, 1991, Dr. Lall pointed out that the “safe yield issue is

incontrovertibly tied to the remediation issue” and said that

“the appropriate area to consider for yield analysis depends on

the outcome of the remediation process.” (Exh. P-47)

(emphasis added.) On the assumption that the likelihood

of success of the proposed remediation is low, Dr. Lall

opined that “the area to be considered for safe yield

impact should reflect the present and potential extent of

contamination.” (Exh. P-47 — Attachment 1, p. 1.)

Dr. Douglas James of Utah State University, an expert

engaged by the State to evaluate the Hagler report, sub-

mitted a preliminary review on January 15, 1991. (Exh.

P-45.) He noted that RCG/Hagler Bailly, Inc. had dis-

cussed “environmental and social impacts . . . from the

10B

depletion of a groundwater resource” and damages to the

State apart from loss of the “safe annual yield” value.

(Id.) Dr. James also stressed that loss of the underground

aquifer for “subsurface storage as a reserve during

drought or after a climate change” was a major element

of damage. (Id.)

In March 1991, Terry D. Sadler, the Director of Envi-

ronmental Health for Salt Lake City-County, in a letter to

Mr. Alkema, expressed grave concerns as to the Ken-

necott settlement proposal and called for completion of

the final Environmental Impact Assessment required by

the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement entered into

by the State, Salt Lake County and Kennecott in 1985.

(Exh. I-34.) Mr. Sadler evaluated the Kennecott offer

thusly:

Removing just the metals from the contami-

nated plume while leaving the water unusable

to Salt Lake County residents is unacceptable.

Additional consideration must be given to the

sulphate plume where treatment is logical in

relation to public health and should be part of

remediation.

* + *

As we emphasized earlier, it is inappropri-

ate and contrary to good public health practices

to limit cleanup levels to only CERCLA parame-

ters. The aquifer east of the evaporation ponds

has been contaminated, private wells have been

rendered useless, the plume outline has not

been defined, plume migration has not been

evaluated, and the public has been put at risk

because some private well users are drinking

water containing metals and other contaminates

11B

in amounts that exceed the drinking water stan-

dards. Again, in no case should the decision be

no further action. (Exh. I-34 at 3.)

After due consideration and review from September

1990 to March 1991, the State rejected the Kennecott

settlement proposal.

F. Negotiations and Agreement for Separate Settle-

ment of Natural Resources Damage Claim

In rejecting the Kennecott proposal, the State deter-

mined that remediai action issues should be analyzed in

greater detail and pursued with the approval and cooper-

ation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Mr.

Alkema testified at the hearing that ultimate remediation

“probably would and will cost in excess of several hun-

dred million dollars.” (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 185.) Negotia-

tions involving EPA, the Utah Department of

Environmental Quality [DEQ] and Kennecott began in

February 1991 to establish a “framework for the parties to

negotiate a legally enforceable consent decree.” This

resulted in an Agreement in Principle which was exe-

cuted on about April 1, 1992. (Attached to State of Utah’s

Posthearing Brief, Exh. A.) The agreement covers all Ken-

necott property located in and around the Oquirrh moun-

tains, excluding active mining operations in Barneys

Canyon, and calls for Kennecott to pay response costs

which will be incurred by EPA and DEQ in cleaning up

the contamination at or from Kennecott’s property. The

natural resource damage claim in the case at bar will not be

affected by the future clean up consent decree. However, the

Agreement in Principle does specify that entry of the

12B

proposed Consent Decree in the case now before this

court

in no way affects or prejudices the United

States’ ability to require Kennecott to perform

response actions under CERCLA (or recover

costs for response actions implemented by the

EPA), including but not limited to those for

ground water, and that such settlement will not

impair whatever rights, if any, federal trustees

may have to bring a claim for resources within

their trusteeship. (Id. at 4.)

During the period March to July 1991 the State and

Kennecott negotiated settlement of the State’s natural

resource damage claim apart from remediation. Coinci-

dentally during this same time frame, on April 5, 1991,

the Utah State Engineer released the “Salt Lake Valley

Interim Ground-Water Management Plan” (Interim Plan)

which identified nine water quality zones in the Salt Lake

Valley, and set out the maximum annual withdrawals

from each zone. (Exh. P-l.) The water quality zones set

forth in the Interim Plan were based upon data and maps

developed by the USGS. (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 53-64.) The

Interim Plan identified area eight as having a maximum

withdrawal rate of 13,000 acre feet per year. Thereafter,

the State and Kennecott determined that area eight of the

Interim Plan embraced the apparent area in which Ken-

necott’s operations have caused underground water con-

tamination. Accordingly, this area was adopted as the

appropriate area within which damages should be calcu-

lated, and was designated as the “Mining Impact Area”

(MIA). In this regard, the State and Kennecott also

reached agreement that the “safe annual yield” of the

aquifer within the MIA essentially was the same as the

13B

maximum withdrawal rate for area eight as identified in

the Interim Plan, 13,000 acre feet per year. Accordingly,

the $11.7 million dollar settlement figure which was

arrived at primarily was based upon an estimate of the

market value of water rights per acre foot within the MIA

multiplied by the 13,000 acre feet per year “safe annual

yield” estimate. Litigation costs, legal uncertainties such

as causation, as well as present availability and use of the

settlement money were factors also taken into account.

The State’s decision to settle was based upon its

determination that the contaminated ground water

within the MIA cannot feasibly be remediated. Mr.

Alkema did not insist that Kennecott should finalize the

Environmental Impact Statement with a full discussion of

alternatives because he had determined that only natural

remediation would be feasible. He so testified at the

hearing:

[I]t was my conclusion that practically the only

thing that will work and is feasible is to allow

the aquifer to self-attenuate, to let it essentially

be cleaned up by the soil as the contaminated

water moves through it.

(Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 5-6.) This process of natural remedi-

ation will take hundreds of years to eliminate the acid

plume and approximately a thousand years to remove the

sulfate plume.*

4 Trans. Vol. III Pt. 2 at 59-61.

14B

G. Proposed Consent Decree

On or about July 31, 1991 a proposed Consent Decree

was tendered to the court which envisioned settlement of

the State’s natural resource damage claim for $11.7 mil-

lion. Kennecott and the State assume in the Consent

Decree that the safe annual yield of underground waters

within the entire MIA has been permanently lost because

of contamination and that the estimated 13,000 acre feet

safe annual yield must be permanently replaced.°®

Another assumption is that the sulfate plume and the

heavy metals or low pH plume will continue to be con-

fined within the MIA. For purposes of settlement, it was

also agreed that the waters lost should be valued at the

same market value as waters of drinking water quality. In

exchange for $11.7 million, the proposed Consent Decree

provides that the State releases and covenants not to sue

Kennecott as follows:

1) regarding damages for injury to, destruction of,

or loss of surface water or groundwater in the Min-

ing Impact Area under federal law, State law, or

common law including the cost of assessing

such injury, destruction or loss; and 2). for

administrative or injunctive relief or response

costs in connection with any groundwater plume

remediation (as that term is commonly under-

stood, not as defined by statute or regulation) in

5 Kennecott asserts that some water in the area is being

used for “irrigation and other purposes” and that “the contami-

nated plume has had little impact on use of the ground water

within the Mining Impact Area. Kennecott owns most of the

rights to the ground water within the Mining Impact Area and

continues to pump water from the aquifer for industrial and

other purposes.” (Kennecott’s Prehearing Brief, at 14.)

15B

the Mining Impact Area under CERCLA, the

State Hazardous Substances Mitigation Act

(Utah Code Ann. Section 19-6-301 et seq.), or

under common law. The term “groundwater

remediation” does not include remediation or

control of sources that have contributed, or may

contribute, to contamination of surface or

groundwater. (emphasis added.)

The Consent Decree also contains a reopener provi-

sion in the form of a reservation of the State’s right to

institute proceedings against Kennecott for damages

“that are of a type that was unknown, or of an order of

magnitude greater than was known to the State at the

date of entry of this Decree. ...” as well as the right to

seek ground water plume remediation based on condi-

tions “that are of a type unknown, or of an order of

magnitude greater than was known to the State at the

date of entry of this Decree. ... ” Finally, the Consent

Decree preserves potential claims by third parties, and

excludes whatever claims third parties might have:

The Decree does not bind third parties who are

not parties to this Decree, and the Decree does

not resolve or bar claims, if any, of third parties,

including, but not limited to, claims by political

subdivisions of the State for interference with

the quantity or quality of their water rights;

provided, however, that nothing in the Decree

affects Kennecott’s rights 0. defenses against

third parties with respect to such claims.

Following a public comment period relative to the

proposed Consent Decree, on October 25, 1991 the court

heard extensive argument by counsel for the State and

Kennecott in which both parties urged court approval of

16B

the proposed settlement and opposed intervention by the

Salt Lake City Water Conservancy District (SLCWCD).

The court also heard argument by SLCWCD in favor of

intervention. The court declined approval of the settle-

ment and proposed Consent Decree at that time and

ordered an evidentiary hearing on the following issues in

order to determine the merits of the settlement:

1) The nature and extent of natural resource

damage which has been caused by Kennecott;

2) Whether it is feasible to restore or remediate

the contamination caused by Kennecott within

the identified area;

3) How the damages which have occurred to

the natural resources may be measured, whether

on the basis of restoration, replacement, market

value or otherwise;

4) The nature and extent of SLCWCD’s interest

in underground waters which may be impaired

by reason of implementation of the Proposed

Consent Decree Order dated November 18,

1992.

SLCWCD was granted permissive intervention to

participate in discovery and to present evidence at the

hearing.

H. Evidentiary Hearing

A week-long evidentiary hearing was held from

March 23, 1992 to March 30, 1992, and on May 15, 1992, at

which various exhibits and extensive testimony were pre-

sented to the court by the State, Kennecott and the SLC-

WCD. The evidence as related to the issues identified by

17B

the court and other issues regarded by the court of partic-

ular import included the following:

1. Nature and Extent of Natural Resource Dam-

age Caused by Kennecott

Mr. Alkema testified on behalf of the State that the

contamination formed two plumes, a low pH or heavy

metals plume “approximately 4 square miles in surface

area,” and a sulphate plume “approximately 17 square

miles in area.” (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 142.) At the present

time the contaminated plumes are contained within the

40 square mile area identified at the hearing as the “Min-

ing Impact Area” (MIA). The MIA happens to be almost

identical in size with water area eight which was identi-

fied by the State Engineer in the Salt Lake Valley Interim

Ground-Water Management Plan, released in April 1991

(Exh. P-1.)

Mr. Adrian Brown of Adrian Brown Consultants tes-

tified on behalf of Kennecott that assuming source con-

trols are implemented he did not “believe it [the low pH

plume] will ever leave the Mining Impact Area.” (Trans.

Vol. III Pt. 2 at 40.) According to Mr. Brown, the MIA has

“a very great amount of neutralizing material” such that

“the acid will be destroyed” by natural materials. (/d.) Mr.

Brown testified that given the approximately “billion

tons” of neutralizing calcium carbonate in the MIA which

acts to neutralize the low pH, there are enough neutraliz-

ing agents to “take care of the plume in perpetuity,”

“providing there is some level of source control.” (/d.)

However, Mr. Brown also testified that natural attenua-

tion and remediation will take hundreds of years of

Pee op ee Ee eee eR PT ee oe

18B

movement through soils. In this regard, Mr. Brown testi-

fied that natural remediation of the sulfate plume would

take “in the order of a thousand years” (Trans. Vol. III Pt.

2 at 61) provided there is “source control from Ken-

necott’s mining operations.” (Id. at 60.) With regard to the

acid plume, he estimated that if Kennecott implements

various source controls it will take approximately 512

years for the low pH plume to naturally remediate. (Id. at

59-60.)

SLCWCD presented evidence that the area of damage

even now extends well beyond the MIA based upon

ground water well readings which indicate contamination

of various kinds beyond “background” levels. (Trans. Vol.

I Pt. 2 at 20; Trans. Vol. V Pt. 1 at 14, 15; Trans. Vol. IV Pt.

2 at 95-97; Trans. Vol. IV Pt. 2 at 104-05.) In this regard,

Mr. Kaliser, of Bruce N. Kaliser & Associates, a consulting

practitioner in engineering geology and ground water

hydrogeology, testified that the area of contamination

was larger than the 40 square miles identified as the MIA,

and said that the area of contamination is more accurately

described as an area with a wide transitional zone rather

than distinguished by a single bright line. (Trans. Vol. IV

Pt. 2 at 102.) According to Mr. Kaliser the area which has

been impacted by Kennecott’s mining operation is

“54-1/2 square miles for the interior limit of the transi-

tion zone. For the exterior or outside limit it’s 70 square

miles,” with a volume of acre feet affected by Kennecott’s

mining operations, of 2,398,000 acre-feet for the interior

limit and 3,024,000 acre-feet for the exterior limit of the

19B

transition zone. (Id. at 110.) Mr. Kaliser presented evi-

dence of contamination outside the MIA based on drink-

ing water standards.® He also presented data relative to

the erratic and complex geologic formations in the area

and probable extent of the plumes.”

6 Mr. Kaliser identified data which indicated concentra-

tions exceeding drinking water standards, and testified:

For that five-year period, . . . this volume contains the

actual figures, the values of the constituents that

exceed—-those values that exceed drinking water

standards for each one of the following constituents:

chlorides, total dissolved solids, sulfates, aluminum,

manganese, iron, lead, selenium, copper, silver, cad-

mium, zinc. .. . Here I’ve indicated in a synopsis of

the extent to which these substances have been found

in excess of the drinking water standards. For exam-

ple, total dissolved solids exceeded the standards in

179 wells, and they exceeded them up to 6,330 percent

of the standard. I have provided that information for

each one of the constituents. (Trans. Voi. IV Pt. 2 at

64.)

These conclusions were challenged by Kennecott as misleading

and based upon insufficient data.

7 Mr. Kaliser testified that there were additional geologic

features, not considered by Kennecott, that “contributed to the

extent of the plume” such as “the presence of sinkholes” and

“faults in the valley fill or the alluvium.” (Trans. Vol. IV Pt. 2 at

52.) “Faults in the valley fill could modify the flow of ground-

water and redirect or channel it.” (Id.) “Sinkholes are open voids

of vertical extent indicating open channels flow and become

most significant.” (Id.) Mr. Kaliser also noted the existence of

“volcanic rock” in the area and that its porous nature “permits

the passage of groundwater through it more readily than either

the bedrock under it or the alluvium over it in many cases. So

that’s a potential pathway [to the aquifer.]” (Id. at 61.)

20B

Evidence was presented to the effect that not all of

the waters within the MIA are contaminated,’ and that

Kennecott cannot necessarily be identified as having

caused all of the contamination.? However, it was

acknowledged that contaminated substances attributable

8 Mr. Alkema testified that “[t]here are areas within the...

mining im »act area which are not yet contaminated by the

plume that Kennecott has created . . . . So there are areas that

could be used within the plume and in fact are being used

within the plume at the present time.” (Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 27.)

° Evidence was presented that mining companies other

than Kennecott could have contributed to part of the damage,

and that contamination fron: natural processes not directly

related to mining activities could have caused some of the dam-

age. (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 1 at 5-9; Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 9; Exh. P-28 at

5-9.) Mr. Fred Nelson, counsel for the State, represented that

“the history of the mining operations in this area, the story

would go back a [sic] 150 years.” (Trans. Vol. 1 Pt. 1 at 6.) In this

regard, Mr. Alkema testified:

There have been.. . significant mining activities his-

torically here since 1860. And there are along Bing-

ham Creek . . . mine tailings that are all along here.

There are the Anaconda tailings that are on this side

of the creek that were deposited shortly after the turn

of the century. As mining proceeded and they devel-

oped newer techniques or better techniques for pro-

tecting the environment as well as for operations,

instead of just dumping the tailings down the creek

they began building tailings ponds. . . . Also another

section of tailings are the Lark tailings, again were

deposited after the turn of the century, they were

reworked a little bit later in the ‘60s and ‘70s, ... You

can also see along here various tunnels that were used

to mine the ore body in the past, the Bingham Tunnel,

the Mascotte Tunnel, and the Butterfield Tunnel.

Those were used by persons in especially historic

times. ... (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 116-17.)

21B

to Kennecott operations have been released before and

after 1980, in a continuing manner. (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at

103, 116-118; Exh. P-28 at 8; Exh. P-44.)

It appears to the court that the area of contamination

is not now nor in the future will continue to be neatly

contained within water area eight which was identified in

the Utah State Engineer’s Interim Ground-Water Manage-

ment Plan and adopted by the State and Kennecott as the

Mining Impact Area. There is no physical barrier to pre-

vent the contaminated waters from spreading or moving.

Because of the dynamic nature of the plumes in question,

it is likely that the area of contamination will shift, spread

out and continue to grow larger.

2. Determination Regarding the Infeasibility of

Restoration

The State and Kennecott presented evidence that it

would be onerous and extremely costly to pump and treat

the heavy metals within the low pH plume. (Trans. Vol.

III Pt. 2 at 182.) Mr. Alkema testified on behalf of the State

that pumping the ground water and cleaning it would be

unworkable. (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 187-88.) He commented,

[i]t would in my view not be feasible to do that

[pump the water out of the ground to clean it].

The reasons are that it’s an extremely large

plume of contamination many miles in area; the

volume is also very large. That the complexity

of geology also makes it impossible to techni

cally be able to remove the contamination

because of variation and kinds of material, the

rate with which the water can flow through the

22B

geology, the soil varies extremely from 50 to as

high as 4,500 feet per year.

(Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 2-3.) Mr. Alkema also testified that

he believed that restoration could not succeed, and that

likely any remediation of the contaminated waters “will

cost in excess of several hundred million dollars.” (Trans.

Vol. I Pt. 2 at 185.)

SLCWCD presented expert testimony to the effect

that reverse osmosis would be feasible to remediate a

portion of the plume. (Trans. Vol. V Pt. 2 at 18.) Mr.

William Surratt, an environmental engineer with Camp,

Dresser & McKee, an international environmental firm, '

testified that “a reverse osmosis process can be used to

treat the area of contamination which has been referred to

as the sulfate plume.” (Id. at 18-19.) With regard to treat-

ment of the heavy metals or low pH plume Mr. Surratt

testified that it was “much more difficult and much more

expensive [than the sulfate plume]” but that “it can be

done. It depends on how much money you want to spend.” (Id.

at 21) (emphasis added.) Although Mr. Surratt had not

conducted any testing and his analysis focused on fea-

sibility, he testified that it would cost “at least 30 million”

to build a reverse osmosis treatment plant that would

treat the water from the sulfate and heavy metals plumes.

(Id. at 21.)

Dr. Eric Tiepel, a chemical engineer with Resource

Technologies Group, an engineering firm specializing in

hazardous waste remediation, groundwater remediation,

and mining related problems, testified on behalf of Ken-

necott that “all of these proposals [for remediation of the

plumes] are feasible,” and that “anything is feasible in

a

23B

terms of water treatment” but he noted “the results of

this would be very impractical.” (Trans. Vol. III Pt. 2 at

198.) Dr. Tiepel explained that “[w]Je do not believe that it

is feasible to treat directly the metals plume area without

the consumptive use of practically all the water and the

generation of very high quantities of sludges and brines

as a consequence of that treatment.” (Jd. at 182.) He

further testified that “[m]ost people who look at hazard-

ous waste remediation systems typically do not use

reverse osmosis as the primary treatment process, simply

because it’s very difficult to dispose of the brines because

the brine volumes are generally very large as compared

to the clean water that’s produced.” (Id. at 187.) With

respect to the remediation scenarios proposed by SLC-

WCD, Mr. Tiepel testified that 35 to 75 percent of the

water would be lost in the pretreatment process. (/d. at

191-92.)

Mr. Alkema testified at the hearing, consistent with

his prior conclusion in connection with the proposed

settlement, that remediation “[is] really not technically

feasible to do in anybody's lifetime” (Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at

44) and that “we still don’t believe there is, a way to

actually clean up that aquifer.” (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at

164.)'° He testified that the final EIA which Kennecott

was to prepare was never finalized because

10 Mr. Alkema testified that “it was my conclusion that

practically the only thing that will work and is feasible is to

allow the aquifer to self-attenuate, to let it essentially be cleaned

up by the soil as the contaminated water moves through it.”

(Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 6.)

24B

[w]hat we would envision substituting for that,

would be a remedial investigation feasibility

study report that would have EPA’s involve-

ment and blessing and input. So that would be

what I envision would take the place of the final

Environmental Impact Assessment. We couldn’t

get to that .. . without bringing in the Environ-

mental Protection Agency into it. (Id. at 167.)

In this regard Mr. Alkema testified that even though the

State would not require such remediation, the EPA might

do so: “even if we assume worst case and collect the

damage that we think is appropriate for the public loss

that has occurred, and EPA finds in their look at this that

the aquifer can be restored, the restoration would still

have to take place under their authority, under a remedial

action proposal.” (Id. at 163-64.) In the meantime, Mr.

Alkema identified source remediation as the State’s

number one and top priority. (Id. at 154.)

The State ultimately may be proven correct in having

concluded that it would be infeasible to restore the con-

taminated waters. However, such finding may well be in

error because the State failed to require completion of

studies which were begun, and failed to identify and

fully discuss possible alternatives for plume remediation

and restoration.

3. Source Remediation

Eliminating the sources of contamination was identi-

fied by Mr. Alkema as the State’s “number one priority.”

(Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 154.)'! It was brought out at the

11 Mr. Alkema noted “even with the elimination of the

sources of contamination, the plume is so extensive that there’s

25B

hearing that leach collection system upgrades, intercept-

ing leachate by the installation of trenches, the lining and

cementing of ditches, and piping some of the material are

some of the efforts which have been instituted by Ken-

necott in order to reduce the amount of leachate contam-

inating the ground water. (Jd. at 155.) Mr. Alkema

testified, however, that this process is not complete and

“a lot more yet needs to be done to eliminate the sources all

the way around the south end of the waste dumps up

Butterfield Canyon, all of the drainages need to be inter-

cepted properly and ensured that the leachate is not

getting into the groundwater.” (Id. at 155-56) (emphasis

added.) Mr. Alkema also testified about other actions

taken by Kennecott to reduce sources of contamination in

the area such as double lining of the small reservoir,

removal of sludges from the large reservoir, reducing the

volume of the large reservoir (to avoid overspill), con-

struction of structures to intercept the good quality water

and divert it away from the Bingham drainage, and

installation of barrier wells above the large reservoir to

intercept underground flow from Bingham Creek. (Id. at

157-60.) Mr. Alkema opined that these source remediation

efforts are “just the beginning of what needs to be done” (Id.

at 160) (emphasis added), and that although some of the

source remediation efforts have been “initiated but are

not complete, others need to be taken... .” (Trans. Vol. II Pt.

1 at 8) (emphasis added.)

Mr. Adrian Brown testified that despite the remedial

measures in effect now, contamination from Kennecott

a good chance that much of that water is, from the State’s

perspective, could not be used.” (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 163.)

26B

sources continues to occur. In this respect, the large Bing-

ham reservoir and the leach collection systems leak, and

approximately 50 percent of the waters from the Bingham

Canyon underflow are not being recovered by the barrier

wells. (Trans. Vol. III Pt. 2 at 82-83.) Mr. Bruce Kaliser

testified on behalf of the Intervenors that the following

are currently contributing to contamination of the ground

water: the large Bingham Reservoir, the small Bingham

reservoir, the wash area along the Bingham Creek drain-

age, the Bingham Canyon underflow, the Northern east

side dumps, the Southeast side dumps, the Yosemite

dumps, the Lark dumps and the evaporation ponds.

(Trans. Vol. IV Pt. 2 at 90-101.)

It appears to the court that while substantial source

remediation has occurred, much more needs to be done.

Yet, there is no specific requirement for such set forth in

the proposed Consent Decree.

4. Need to Manage and Control Existing Con-

taminated Plumes

Mr. Alkema testified that “it is very difficult” to

identify exactly where the plume is and where it’s going.

(Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 144.) Mr. Alkema further testified

that he understood at the time the Consent Decree was

signed that “if nothing was done it [the area of contam-

ination] was going to continue to grow” and that “even

with just source elimination it was still going to grow

almost as much as without source elimination.” (Trans.

Vol. Il Pt. 2 at 83.) Mr. Alkema then opined that “the size

of the plume will continue to grow for more than 100

years, much more than 100 years probably.” (/d.)

27B

No evidence was presented by the State or Kennecott

at the hearing as to what should be done in order to

prevent the plumes from contaminating waters outside

the MIA. Nor was evidence presented by any party as to

whether uncontaminated areas within the MIA can be

protected from contamination. Also, no evidence was

presented regarding what should be done to manage and

contain the existing plumes, or the cost thereof.

Assuming that the contaminated plumes cannot be

remediated, it appears to the court that the area of con-

tamination will continue to grow and expand, and that

active institutional management will be required to mini-

mize and contain the problem. This is true now and will

continue to be the case even if adequate source remedia-

tion occurs.

5. Measure of Damages

Mr. Alkema testified that the State evaluated the

following methods of damage assessment: loss of value,!?

cost of treatment, and replacement. (Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at

33, 36, 39.) With regard to the loss of value method, Mr.

Alkema characterized it as “a market value method” that

“looks at the value of the resource strictly as a sale of

water rights versus what that overall impact may be to

the public.” (Id. at 35.) As to the cost of treatment

method, Mr. Alkema said that it involved the cost of

“pumping water from the mining impact area and treat-

ing it and then using it as a drinking water supply.” (Jd.

12 The “loss of value” method of damage assessment is also

sometimes referred to as the “loss of use” method.

|

|

|

'

|

28B

at 36.) Mr. Alkema testified about the drawbacks related

to this method of treatment:

“li]Jt does not take into account that much of the

water is already being used for purposes that

don’t require that level of treatment [drinking

water]. It also really did not take into account the

feasibility of this remedy. It was strictly a text-

book kind of analysis where we looked at cost of

treatment for a certain kind of water and just

pulled that out and used it. It was not a feasibility

analysis in any way as to whether this might or

might not work and then it also deals with one

of the tough issues as to what is the right, what

is the damage because of the injury to the

resource, to the public as a whole, and what is

the damage to that resource that impacts the

private water right holder.” (Jd. at 38) (emphasis

added.)

Mr. Alkema testified that the cost of replacement

method of damage involves “purchasing water rights for

water of comparable quality that would have been there.”

(Id. at 39.) However, Mr. Alkema noted a fundamental

difficulty associated with the replacement cost method:

[i]t’s really not true replacement in that if you

take water from Bear River or from out in Cen-

tral Utah Project, you’re really not replacing

water, you’re only moving that water from one

place to the other and that was a concern we

had that although it is acceptable as a replace-

ment kind of alternative, it really does not

replace water. (Id. at 40.)

He also noted that this type of damages analysis

“assumes that there . . . is a complete loss of the resource

that has been damaged or injured, . . . (and) it also

29B

provides . . . a damage to the individual water right

hob@er.....” Gd)

It was apparent at the hearing that the State utilized

the loss of value method based upon market value in

determining damages for purposes of settlement. In this

regard, Mr. Alkema testified that in determining the set-

tlement figure, “there were two factors, major factors that

we considered, one was the amount of water in the terms

of safe annual yield that was impacted and the other was

the value of that water.” (Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 23.)

Evidence was presented at the hearing as to the market

value of an acre foot of water. (Trans. Vol. IV Pt. 1 at 32;

Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 29.) Kennecott and the State also

presented evidence that the settlement agreed upon rep-

resents a fair market price for the safe annual yield of

13,000 acre feet of water within the MIA. (Trans. Vol. IV

Pt. 1 at 32, 47.) In this regard, Dr. Charles J. Ciccetti, an

economist employed by Arthur Anderson Economic Con-

sulting and by the University of Southern California,

testified on behalf of Kennecott that the price arrived at

was “higher than it should have been.” (Id. at 47.)

It is clear that the loss of value or loss of use method

of evaluation was regarded by the State as strictly a

market value method of computing damages. In this

regard, neither Kennecott nor the State presented evi-

dence of damages suffered by the State for loss of use

other than estimated market value of the 13,000 acre feet.

(Id. at 21-23.) No amounts were presented as to existence

and option values or damages. Existence value is derived

from the satisfaction of simply knowing that a natural

resource exists, even if no use occurs. Option value is the

value associated with an individual’s desire to preserve

30B

the option to use the natural resource, even if it is not

currently being used. In this regard, Dr. Ciccetti, Ken-

necott’s expert, testified:

[We] have a situation here where the injured

resource is groundwater so the typical catego-

ries of damages that are related to recreation, to

scenic and esthetic [sic] amenities, to the kinds

of things that in most other natural resource

damage claims cases are very important and

involve a lot of time and effort. In this situation,

we just don’t have those categories of damage, so the

lost services, that is, the lost utility to people

that is relevant is the ability to use the ground-

water for either municipal, commercial, or

industrial or irrigation uses, in other words its

value is limited to removing it from below the

surface and bringing it up and putting it into

some productive or consumptive use when it’s

needed and when it would be cost effective to

do so.

(Id. at 21) (emphasis added.)

Evidence was presented indicating both a scarcity

and an over abundance of water in the Salt Lake valley.

(Trans. Vol. [IV Pt. 1 at 29; Exh. D-2, p. 2; Exh. 1-44, p.

ES-2.) However, water scarcity in this arid part of the

country was not adequately developed in terms of impact

upon the existence value of the aquifer.

It appears to the court that the State prematurely

utilized the “loss of value” measure of damages since it

had not developed sufficient facts to justify its conclusion

that the contaminatec plumes could not be remediated. In

any event, it appears that the loss of value method was

not correctly applied In this regard, the State purported

31B

to utilize the loss of value method in determining dam-

ages to its ground water resources, but it actually utilized

a strictly market value approach, based upon water quan-

tity measured by safe annual yield. Other use and nonuse

values apart from market value, including option and

existence values, were regarded as inapplicable. Failure

to take into account damages such as loss of the aquifer

apart from market value of the quantity of water the State

determined to be contaminated resulted in an inadequate

assessment of damages under the loss of use method.

6. Nature and Extent of SLCWCD’s Interest

Evidence was presented that at least one well is

controlled by SLCWCD within the MIA. Mr. Bay, Chief

Engineer of the Salt Lake Water Conservancy District,

testified that “I found one [a water right belonging to

SLCWCD] that lies within nearly the center of the plume

area and several around the perimeter or within the areas

that’s defined here.” (Trans. Vol. VI Pt. 1 at 9.) The Dis-

trict owns other wells in the area to which Mr. Bay

testified:

One is located within 200 feet of the mining

impact area, the other two are located within

1600 and 1700 feet, very close and those that |

find would draw water from that area. The

others are water right numbers 57-8817 located

right here, (indicating), and right close to that is

57-2426. I determined that the state engineer

would find that these are so close that they

would draw water from area 8. (Id. at 11.)

The Sierra Club and the Mineral Policy Center were

granted leave as Amicus Curiae to submit a memorandum of

32B

law following the evidentiary hearing, and the parties and

intervenor were permitted to file post hearing briefs. On

May 14, 1992, in an all day session, the court heard extensive

argument on the ultimate issue, i.e., whether the court

should approve the Consent Decree as being just, fair and

reasonable and consistent with the purposes CERCLA is

intended to serve, and the matter was taken under advise-

ment. Now being fully advised, the court makes and enters

its Memorandum Decision and Order.

Il. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

The trial court’s function when reviewing proposed con-

sent decrees forged under CERCLA is to “satisfy itself that

the settlement is reasonable, fair, and consistent with the

purposes that CERCLA is intended to serve.” U.S. Cannons

Engineering Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 85 (1st Cir. 1990). In this

regard, the “statute’s overreaching [sic] principles” are

“accountability, the desirability of an unsullied environment

and promptness of response activities.” Id. at 91. Fairness in

the CERCLA settlement context has both procedural and

substantive components.'? Clean up and remediation is the

'3 The First Circuit pointed out that procedural fairness

evaluates the negotiating process and attempts to “gauge its

candor, openness, and bargaining balance.” Cannons, 899 F.2d at

86. In this case it appears that procedural fairness has been

satisfied.

Substantive fairness requires that “a party bear the cost of

the harm for which it is legally responsible.” Id. at 87. It is

“roughly correlated with, some acceptable measure of compara-

tive fault, apportioning liability among the settling parties

33B

fundamental purpose of CERCLA.!'4

B. Settlements in Which Federal Regulations are

Not Followed

In this case the State chose not to follow the existing

federal regulations in making its determinations.!5 It was

not required to do so, but failure to do so eliminates the

presumption of validity and correctness which otherwise

the State would enjoy.'© This is important in a case such

according to rational estimates of how much harm each PRP has

done.” Id.

14 “Congress, in enacting CERCLA, intended to provide a

vehicle for cleaning up and preserving the environment from

the evils of improperly disposed of hazardous substances... . ”

Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle County, 659 F.Supp.

1269, 1286 (D.Del. 1987) (quoting Artesian I, 605 F.Supp. at 1357

n. 10.)

1S See 51 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (1986) (codified at 43 C.F.R.

§§ 11.10-11.93 (1987). Among other things the regulations

require the Trustee to determine whether there has been an

injury to the natural resources (43 C.F.R. § 11.61 - .64), to quan-

tify the amount of natural resources damaged (43 C.F.R. § 11.70 -

.73), and to assess the dollar amount of damages to be paid (43

C.F.R. § 11.80 - .84). At the hearing Kenneth L. Alkema, the

trustee appointed by the Governor of the State of Utah and

Director of the State Division of Environmental Health, testified

that “[w]e did not follow the procedural requirements that are

spoken of in the regulation.” (Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 30, 31.) Mr.

Alkema further testified that “he did not conduct a formal

Department of Interior Part B assessment as outlined in the

regulations.” (Id at 30-31.)

16 42 U.S.C. 9607(f)(2)(C) provides: “Any determination or

assessment of damages to natural resources for the purposes of

this chapter . . . made by a Federal or State trustee in accordance

34B

as this where the State has chosen to settle its damage

claim before the remediation process. This “cart before the

horse” approach is unusual as noted by the court in In re

Acushnet River and New Bedford Harbor: Proceedings re

Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F.Supp. 1019, 1035 (D. Mass

1989):

. customarily, natural resource damages set-

tlements follow or are contemporaneous with

cleanup settlements. This is so because, custom-

arily, natural resource damages are viewed as

the difference between the natural resource in

its pristine condition and the natural resource

after the cleanup, together with the lost use

value and the costs of assessment. As a residue

of the cleanup action, in effect, they are thus not

generally settled prior to a cleanup settlement.!7

C. Deficiencies in Proposed Settlement

The court has determined from a preponderance of

the evidence at the hearing that the settlement contained

within the proposed Consent decree is deficient in at least

with the regulation promulgated under section 9651 of this title

shall have the force and effect of a rebuttable presumption on

behalf of the trustee ....” 43 C.F.R. 11.10 provides: “The

assessment procedures set forth in this part are not mandatory.

However, they must be used by Federal or State natural

resource trustees in order to obtain the rebuttable presumption

contained in section 107(f)(C)(2) of CERCLA.”

17 In Acushnet River, the court ultimately approved settle-

ment of the natural resource damages claim prior to and inde-_

pendent of the clean up and remediation process, but imposed

conditions including a requirement to “;» tect and restore.”

Acushnet, 712 F.Supp at 1038.

35B

three major respects. First, lack of sufficient foundation

for the State’s determination that its ground water natu-

ral resource cannot be restored.!8 Second, failure to

require substantial protection of State natural resources

from further contamination. Third, failure to apply the

proper measure of damages, which resulted in failure

adequately to take into account the extent of the damages

the State has suffered and will suffer as a result of the

contamination. Failure to develop sufficient factual foun-

dation to support the State’s determination that contami-

nated ground waters cannot be restored requires that the

proposed Consent Decree be rejected for failure to dem-

onstrate that the remedial purposes CERCLA was

intended to achieve cannot be achieved. Failure to man-

date containment and management of the contaminated

waters, and failure to require further source control does

not comport with the CERCLA requirement to “protect

and restore.” Inadequate consideration of damages

requires that the proposed Consent Decree be rejected for

failure to satisfy substantive fairness under CERCLA.

1. State’s Determination Not to Require Resto-

ration of its Contaminated Ground Waters

In this case the State determined that it is not feasible

to restore the contaminated ground water within the so-

called “Mining Impact Area.” However, the State failed to

require Kennecott to complete a final Environmental

18 “Restoration” can be achieved by cleaning up and thus

restoring a damaged resource, or by replacing or acquiring the

equivalent of the damaged resource. See footnote 26, infra.

36B

Impact Assessment which would have set forth and

assessed possible remedial alternatives. When the 1990

Kennecott settlement offer was submitted, the State prop-

erly engaged experts to evaluate the offer. The State

rejected the Kennecott plan for plume remediation, but

remediation studies and evaluations called for by RCG/

Hagler were not ordered to be completed. (Exh. P-44 at

5-1.) In Dr. Lall’s review of thé settlement offer he made it

plain that analysis of the natural resources damage claim

was “inextricably tied to the remediation issue,” but he

was not asked to complete his work. (Exh. P-47.) As a

result, alternative possibilities for remediation which may

have been suggested were not identified. In this regard,

at the hearing of this matter, SLCWCD presented a plan

for partial remediation based upon reverse osmosis.

Apparently that possibility, which was not fully devel-

oped at the hearing, was not analyzed by the State prior

to its determination that remediation was not feasible.

Also, it is not clear that the State’s determination of the

“safe annual yield” was fully analyzed.!9

This court concludes that the State and Kennecott

failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence

that restoration and plume remediation is not feasible in

justification of the State’s determination not to require

19 It is questionable whether 13,000 acre feet is an accurate

estimate of the safe annual yield of contaminated waters within

the MIA. Mr. Alkema testified at the hearing that, “[i]f your

decision was not to enter this Consent Decree, we would defi-

nitely complete his (Dr. Lall’s) report, get more information, and do

whatever we needed to prove what safe annual yield was. In

our mind it still is and will probably continue to be the 13,000

acre feet.” (Trans. Vol. II Pt. 2 at 147) (emphasis added.)

37B

such. Failure to develop sufficient factual foundation to

support the State’s determination that contaminated

ground waters cannot be remediated requires that the

proposed Consent Decree be rejected for failure to dem-

onstrate that the remedial purposes CERCIA was

intended to achieve cannot be achieved.

2. Failure to Require Source Control or Manage-

ment and Containment of Existing Contami-

nated Waters

Section 9622(j)(2) of CERCLA requires a federal

trustee, when settling a natural resource damage claim

that contains a covenani not to sue for natural resource

damages, to require the potentially responsible party

(PRP) to commit to “actions necessary to protect and

restore the natural resources damaged by such release or

such threatened release.” In this regard, 42 U.S.C.

§ 9622(j)(2) provides:

An agreement under this section may contain a

covenant not to sue under section 9607(a)(4)(C)

of this title for damages to natural resources

under the trusteeship of the United States

resulting from the release or threatened release

of hazardous substances that is the subject of the

agreement, but only if the Federal natural

resource trustee has agreed in writing to such

covenant. The Federal natural resource trustee

may agree to such covenant if the potentially

responsible party agrees to undertake appropriate

action necessary to protect and restore the natural

resources damages by such release or threatened

release of hazardous substances. (emphasis added.)

38B

In the Acushnet River case, the court ruled under CERCLA

section 9622(j) that natural resources damages settlements

which do not require clean up but which contain a cove-

nant not to sue (on the part of the government) — must

include provisions assuring that the responsible party

will take actions necessary to “protect and restore” the

injured natural resources. Acushnet, 712 F.Supp. at 1036.2°

In this case, even though the State determined that it

would be infeasible to “restore” the contaminated natural

resource, it could have required a covenant to “protect”

by way of source control as well as containment and

management of the existing contaminated plumes.?!

However, the proposed Consent Decree contains no

such protective requirements.

The proposed Consent Decree fails to require protec-

tion against further contamination by way of source con-

trol. Although the State does not waive its right to require

source control, the Consent Decree fails to impose any

substantial duties upon Kennecott in that regard. It was

20 The plain language of Section 9622(j)(2) applies only to

cases involving a federal trustee, with no corresponding provi-

sion applicable to state trusteeships. However, consistent with

the purposes of CERCLA, the “protect and restore” mandate

should apply to covenants not to sue for natural resource dam-

age settlements that precede clean up whether such involve

federal or state trustees.

21 Such a covenant could have been required by the State as

owner of the damaged ground waters. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1

provides “[a]ll waters in this state, whether above or under the

ground are... the property of the public, subject to all existing

rights to the use thereof.”

39B

demonstrated at the hearing that Kennecott has accom-

plished some source control,?? but it was also made clear

that much more is needed.?3 Notwithstanding such recog-

nized need, the State has failed to require additional

source control measures even though it is apparent that

the contaminated plumes are being further contaminated

by Kennecott operations.74

The proposed Consent Decree also does not address

what will have to be done to manage and contain the

existing contaminated waters, such as pumping water or

other measures designed to “protect” uncontaminated

waters from the damaged resource. In this regard, the

proposed Consent Decree contains no provision requiring

measures to be taken to minimize future expansion of the

existing plumes, or to assure that the contamination will

not spread beyond the MIA.?5

22 Kennecott has engaged in a number of activities to allevi-

ate sources of contamination including: lining the leach collec-

tion system, double lining and installation of a leak detection

system in the small reservoir, reducing the level of water in the

large Bingham reservoir and lining it, removing sludge from the

large Bingham reservoir, and development of a surface water

management system to redirect contaminated mine area surface

waters to the concentrator. (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 155-61.)

23 See discussion on source remediation, pp. 24-26 [pp.

24B-26B], supra.

24 Mr. Alkema testified at the hearing that “contamination

continues” and that the “plume continues to grow.” (Trans. Vol.

I] Pt. 2 at 126.)

25 The proposed Consent Decree does provide for a ground

water permit program wherein a ground water discharge per-

mit is required for active operations that have the potential to

discharge to ground water. The permit is granted if an applicant

40B

The State and Kennecott did not present a sufficient

factual predicate to convince the court that the proposed

Consent Decree would be just and fair without a cove-

nant to perform necessary additional source control and

to provide for containment and management of the exis-

ting contamination. Failure to require containment and

management of the contaminated water, and failure to

require further source control does not comport with the

CERCLA requirement to “protect and restore.”

3. The State Failed to Assess Damages Ade-

quately

In the landmark case of State of Ohio v. United States

Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1989), at issue

was the Department of Interior’s regulations which provided

that damages in such actions would equal the lesser of

restoration or replacement costs, or diminution in use values.

The court rejected the “lesser of” approach and held that

CERCLA mandates a distinct preference for restoration costs

as the measure of damages.?° This court adopts and follows

the Ohio court’s rule of law in that respect.

can demonstrate that all discharges will meet applicable dis-

charge standards. The program involves monitoring, sampling

and reporting to ensure that the discharge standards are met.

(Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 10-12.) This water permit program will

help to prevent the contaminated plumes from growing larger,

but does nothing to manage or contain the existing contamina-

tion.

26 The term restoration is commonly used by courts as

“shorthand” for “restoring, replacing or acquiring the equiva-

lent of the damaged resource.” See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 441.

41B

The Ohio court also rejected a narrow interpretation of

use values contained in DOI’s rules which placed extraordin-

ary reliance on market values.?”7 The court ordered the DOI

to issue a rule “that would permit trustees to derive use

values for natural resources by summing up all reliably

calculated use values, however measured so long as the

trustee does not double count.” Id. at 464. In this regard, the

court held that option and existence values “prima facie,

ought to be included in a damage assessment,” assuring full

compensation for the lost resource. Id. While option and

existence values may represent “ ‘passive’ use, . . . they

nonetheless reflect utility derived by humans from a

resource, and thus, prima facie, ought to be included in

damage assessment.” [d.28

27 The Ohio court illustrated this point: “[I]magine a hazardous

substance spill that kills a rookery of fur seals and destroys a habitat

for seabirds at a sealife reserve. The lost use value of the seals and

seabird habitat would be measured by the market value of the fur

seals’ pelts (which would be approximately $15 each) plus the

selling price per acre of land comparable in value to that on which

the spoiled bird habitat was located. Even if, as likely, the use value

turns out to be far less than the cost of restoring the rookery and

seabird habitat, it would nonetheless be the only measure of dam-

ages eligible for the presumption of recoverability under the Interior

rule.” Ohio, 880 F.2d at 442. The court then went on to say: “[f]rom

the bald eagle to the blue whale and snail darter, natural resources

have values that are not fully captured by the market system.” Id. at

462-63.

28 Very few resources, “such as plants and animals, possess

an established economic value.” Cross, Frank B., “Natural

Resource Damage Valuation,” 42 Vand. L. Rew. [sic] 269, 307

(1989). When a market does exist, the values ascribed may

inadequately value the resource to the public. For instance,

recreational sports anglers may find that the presence of fish has

higher value or greater utility than commercial fishermen. Id.

42B

In this case, having determined that restoration is not

feasible, the State turned to loss of value as the sole

method of measuring damages. If further study demon-

strates that restoration is feasible, the State would be

obliged to follow and apply the statutory preference for

restoration in assessing costs and damages, unless excep-

tional circumstances would warrant adoption of a differ-

ent measure of damages. In this regard, the Ohio court

did note that a possible exception to restoration could

exist where “other considerations—i.e., infeasibility of

restoration or grossly disproportionate cost to use value

—warrant a different standard.” Id. at 459. Assuming that

this case presents the exception, and that the State would

be justified in determining that restoration is not feasible,

it appears that the State adopted a too narrow interpreta-

tion of use value by equating such with market value

only. Manifestly, the settlement amount is based on loss

of value which essentially calculates the alleged market

value of the safe annual yield within the Mining Impact

Area without reference to existence and option values.

(Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 23.) The State simply failed to assess

the non-consumptive use values of the aquifer, i.e., option

and existence values.?9

29 Although the aquifer is unlike most other natural

resources such as lakes, eagles or seals which have more

obvious existence and option values, its existence value should

have been considered in the settlement given the fact that peo-

ple who live in a desert most likely would assign substantial

value in just knowing that an aquifer exists. The Hagler Report

(Exh. P-44, at p. ES-2) notes that there is “water scarcity in the

valley.” There was conflicting testimony at the hearing on this

matter, but if true, this would certainly enhance existence value.

43B

It appears to the court that significant additional

possible damages such as loss of the aquifer are not

provided for in the proposed Consent Decree, even

assuming that loss of value ultimately is determined to be

the proper standard. Moreover, the State failed to calcu-

late into the settlement the costs of preventing the plumes

from spreading and contaminating the remaining

unspoiled portion of the aquifer, by pumping water or

other methods. In addition, the State did not require that

the settlement include the cost of further source control

which would at least lessen contamination from continu-

ing on a daily basis. Apparently, the State clings to the

possibility of future plume remediation to be ordered by

EPA. That possibility is not a justifiable reason for the

State to fail to adequately study possible alternatives or

to fail to require a covenant to “protect and restore” State

owned natural resources. In this regard, the settlement as

proposed does not “capture fully all aspects of the loss.”

Ohio, 880 F.2d at 463.

This court concludes that inadequate consideration of

damages requires that the proposed Consent Decree be

rejected for failure to demonstrate to the court the exis-

tence of substantive fairness under CERCLA.

lil. INTERVENTION

Intervention in a CERCLA action is governed by

CERCLA § 133(j) and is also subject to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.

A potential intervenor must (1) make a timely application

for intervention, (2) have an interest in the subject of the

action, (3) be so situated that without intervention the

disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair

44B

or impede the applicant’s ability to protect his interest,

and (4) have an interest not adequately protected by the

existing parties. United States v. Mid-State Disposal, Inc.,

131 F.R.D. 573, 576 (W.D. Wis. 1990). See also United States

v. Bliss, 132 F.R.D. 58, 59 (E.D. Mo. 1990). If one or more of

the above criteria are not met, a party will not qualify for

intervention of right, as distinguished from permissive

intervention.

In this case, because of the exclusions contained in

the Consent Decree preserving rights of third parties to

recover for “interference with the quantity and quality of

their water rights,” adjudication of this action would not

necessarily impair or impede the ability of non party

third persons to protect their interests. The Consent

Decree specifically provides that “the Decree does not

resolve or bar claims, if any, of third parties, including,

but not limited to, claims by political subdivisions of the

State.”

Turning to the petition of SLCWCD for intervention,

the court has determined that permissive intervention

should be granted. The petition of SLCWCD was timely

under the circumstances of this case. Only after publica-

tion of the proposed Consent Decree did it become appar-

ent that the State and Kennecott were jointly advocating

settlement pursuant to terms thereof. Other factors to be

considered in connection with permissive intervention

are:

the nature and extent of the intervenor’s inter-

est, whether the intervention will unduly delay

or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the

45B

original parties, whether the applicant will ben-

efit by the intervention, whether the inter-

venor’s interests are adequately represented by

the other parties, and whether the intervenors

will significantly contribute to the full develop-

ment of the underlying factual issues in the suit

and to the just and equitable adjudication of the

legal ,uestions presented.

Acushnet, 712 F.Supp. at 1023. See Rule 24(b)(2) Fed. R.

Civ. P. See also United States Postal System v. Brennan, 579

F.2d 188, 191-92 (2d Cir. 1978).

After due consideration of the aforesaid factors, this

court determines to exercise its discretion and to permit

SLCWCD to intervene in this case. SLCWCD is uniquely

situated to significantly contribute to the underlying fac-

tual and legal issues which have a bearing upon the just

and equitable determination of legal questions presented.

Based upon the foregoing, this court concludes that

the proposed Consent Decree as written is not just and

fair or consistent with the purposes of CERCLA. Accord-

ingly, the application for approval of the proposed Con-

sent Decree is denied.

This case is set for a case management conference on

October 23, 1992, at 10:30 a.m. Prior to the conference

with the court counsel for the parties are directed to meet

and develop a suggested plan for the conduct of discov-

ery pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f). The parties should

46B

file the jointly agreed upon plan with the court by noon

on October 16, 1992.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 3rd, 1992.

/s/ J. Thomas Greene

J. THOMAS GREENE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE

1C

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF UTAH, By and Through the

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH, Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

KENNECOTT CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant and

Cross-Appellee,

SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY

DISTRICT, Intervenor-Appellee and

Cross-Appellant.

Nos. 92-4173, 92-4179 and 92-4180.

ORDER

Entered March 28, 1994

Before BALDOCK, McWILLIAMS and BRORBY, Cir

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.