Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Utah v. Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District
Supreme Court brief1994
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-\ FILED
94 14-7 JuL 25 19%
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1994
+
THE STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH THE
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, and
KENNECOTT CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,
Respondent.
+
Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Tenth Circuit
¢
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
*
JAN GRAHAM* James B. LEE
Utah Attorney General DanieL M. ALLRED
Davip W. TUNDERMANN
Frep G NELSON
Jim BuTLER
DENISE CHANCELLOR
Utah Attorney General’s
Office
236 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
; Suite 1800
Telephone: (801) 538-1015 P.O. Box 45898
Counsel for Petitioner Salt Lake City, Utah
State of Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Counsel for Petitioner
Kennecott Corporation
Lisa A. KIRSCHNER
JEANNETTE F. Swent
Parsons BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main Street,
*Counsel of Record
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1) Is immediate appeal available from a district
court’s refusal to enter a jointly supported consent decree
that is proposed by a government Trustee acting pursuant
to a federal statute (CERCLA) which explicitly favors
“minimiz[ing] litigation”?
(2) Did the court below err in holding, contrary to
decisions in four other circuits, that district court rejec-
tion of a settlement does not conclusively determine the
disputed question under the collateral order doctrine?
FEE ee Ee ee a ADT RO Pn MN TdY iu pae ee TE PRT RT EOE eR TY
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
AND RULE 29.1 STATEMENT
Petitioner State of Utah was plaintiff-appellant
below; Petitioner Kennecott Corporation was defendant-
appellant below; Respondent Salt Lake County Water
Conservancy District was intervenor-appellee below.
Petitioner Kennecott Corporation is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of RTZ America Inc. RTZ America Inc. is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of RTZ Western Holdings Lim-
ited. RTZ Western Holdings Limited is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of RTZ European Holdings Limited. RTZ
European Holdings Limited is a wholly-owned subsid- .
iary of The RTZ Corporation PLC.
ili
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PRP FMI EOD pens sp ec cncecewsacvewsss i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND RULE 29.1
0. Oe ene ii
pe se ee | rae Vv
oa Parked does cee ctuscesiveceens 2
Ee, ooo 45h e SS aes sancecdseviceess 2
PERTINENT STATUTORY PROVISION ............. 3
pe ies 8 te ae 3
A. The CERCLA Complaint and Proposed Set-
tek aca dans deeds ibes bass o's 0 4
B. Intervention by Salt Lake County Water Con-
EE MONE ord x's es cig Stemeckssedescsees >
C. District Court Refusal to Enter Proposed
NIE SS. Ss awh veccbemhwedcewssvedin 5
D. Appeals by Both the CERCLA Trustee and
ORES ne ee ee ee 6
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........... 8
i. THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY WHETHER A
CERCLA TRUSTEE’S RIGHT TO BRING, TRY,
AND SETTLE CLAIMS IS “IMPORTANT” AND
NOT EFFECTIVELY REVIEWABLE ON APPEAL
a Pee we Gs Owe sac diccescnenscess 9
A. Statutory Framework for Natural Resource
SN ooo Seb ca seccresscccee. 10
B. Congress Expressly Intended to Encourage
CERCLA Trustees to Settle Claims ......... 14
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page
C. Denial of the Right of a CERCLA Trustee
Regarding Settlement of a Statutory Claim
Meets This Court’s Requirement of An
Important Question Effectively Unreview-
able on Appeal From Final Judgment...... 16
1. Denial of the CERCLA Trustee’s Right Is
An Important Question ................ 18
2. Denial of the CERCLA Trustee’s Right Is
Effectively Unreviewable On Appeal
From Final Judgment .................. 21
Il. THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING THAT
REJECTION OF A SETTLEMENT IS NOT A
“CONCLUSIVE DETERMINATION” IS ERRO-
NEOUS AND CONFLICTS WITH OTHER CIR-
CUED GAAP BARN Os occ scccesccesseeess 23
A. Recent Decisions of the Second, Third, Fifth,
SN FEW ONIN CHMOD a. 5 oo oc ene h che ceicncs 23
B. The Tenth Circuit’s Erroneous Analysis of
“Conclusive Determination” ............... 25
ee et} PEPE Ter ee bl cr ee Ce reer ee eee 28
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Opinion of the Court of
WIN Na hare hein coker eb sees. 1A
Appendix B: District Court Memorandum
Decision and Order............. 1B
Appendix C: Order of the Court of
Appeals Denying Petition for
Rehearing and Suggestion
for Rehearing In Banc.......... 1C
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274
CROOY «6% CEN O0 & dd. Chee 8 de eee Cee bes cents 6
Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424 (10th Cir. 1984)........ 6
Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981) .... 22
City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677
CARA FE Re DOOD + near ceed eatevensa bey ee ee Riis eee 15
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
CSOD kek os ho Seed icteesi Chiesa eee 6, 9, 16
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978)... .passim
Desktop Direct, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 993 F.2d
FO TIE Nt POM eee Seve eeatens Wig. 84 Dy De Oe
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 114 S.
CR Re CREE ks Cone ec ke tn ee RORRE ESE oor BEE passim
Forbus v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d 1036 (11th
RM BD Fer ak co 4s ceded ss eke Abe eneeee 8, 24, 25
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148
RUE 4a ck sc RUA RV Ade 6O MeN AEN ees Pe Gee 6
Grillet v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217 (5th Cir.
WE sek eb k cna ek cys seed ahs eeenees 8, 24, 25
In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F.
ee ee er ee rere ee 12, 35
In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d 110 (2d Cir.
| EO TEP TE Pere TES TF Ty Ti Pe TOR CTE 14
Janneh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1989)
OPO rr Mer ror Er re See eee rT wo 9, 24, 26
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Care., 460.075. 7 CURRED «05561 see des eas 9, 26
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior. 880 F.2d 432
ite TS | Geer ree ae T Tey Pent ree Pree r ree I!
Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978).......... 26
Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d
5 nS LMG ENE ETE Tee Tee ree oy eee 8, 25
United States v. Acton Corp., 733 F. Supp. 869 (D.
PE COOP cen vevecvns vuchenas enbe Gee Ghubuts Gonai 19
United States v. Atlas Minerals and Chems., Inc.,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2441 (E.D. Pa. March 1,
che. EU OEE inves SokeR kL Aae SM ORMEMES BANKSY 8 15
United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79
[Oe Se cas vibe bas SR GRO WSWLREREOURGLE EAC ena. 19
United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 793 F. Supp.
de of eR Ae re os | ee 15
United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 827 F. Supp.
EE Si AA. GM BOON Wks. (be ckee MLERS RERR EE ON ET 15
STATUTES AND RULES
I TE A NAW bee eed pnenws bieGien Same cab eee 10
ae ae Or NMUGLD & as > Wav NRCUS SU OAR ERER ERAS 11
SS & 4 6. ti Sn eeerr ey Ue tere eye 11, 12
Le eh PION bbc sa cc eer kpbebsucaestsekseus 11
GEE Ue MOP UUEDs 0 65 bee See eee Vinkonvnea sete. 11
ee ae INES Ska AnNsus ceeds Le besebnebh cok eu whe s 15
ite A 2 ht eee es ofr Sree 13
> Tek, Rag. T4261 (U9PE) . ww ccc ete cceae, 13
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
DP FOG, Ws MG CRIP E ab 6s iccebedisdincsiacdvas 13
Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 311(f)(4), (5) .... 11
Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 §& 10U2(b)(2)(A)......... 11, 13
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 (“SARA”), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
alae 60 858 CCE es CERT ER OS Ce ri oa Ea i4
ey IS es des ss veces bacleeraeweds 23
iw g . . BARR Arg eet are Ate ine A 2 oe 10
De BR ETT, GN 6 Fc dnc be o Soave deusdCavenees 11
ee a ss SO ee ere rep reer iar. ys Ae 2
Bp fe PRES See Re on er Ter er rey passim
Oe SE a IIe odin e deen vis ov sescevegen nwa 7, 22
Pe se I EE wider dt eedeeoaves'ougevks 11
DO GAS ee II o's eck on ow ade daeevneokewes 11
Be Se I iio. o'os eldvs dave uevowvweevens So
er ilo ine old's e'vlene vey oes ve dareks 10
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C)
a US0. S ae... ES.
42 US.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A)
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(B)
ET I oe hia tickicc cee
¥
]
af
/
4
/
Viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
MISCELLANEOUS
re ge ne rer ey
BOO Come. Bes TEs TR ce nn on ccc cncweevs
WSs GA, GRE, DFA? TOPO) nc cccecaccccanvusess
ee ae ee FP eee Tere TT Err ere
131 Comp. Bec. SQ 7AP-SO (IFGS) «na csc cececceees
ee ee ee. | PePeTerer TTT ee ree
Page
S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1980) .... 10
Frederick R. Anderson, Natural Resource Damages,
Superfund, and the Courts, 16 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L.
OG, Ge Sas voc ena wdsndecnepaewh een eea ne as
Frank L. Amoroso & Linda R. Keenan, Natural
Resource Damage Recovery Actions: A Legal Tidal
Wave Looming, 17 Westchester B.J. 109 (1990)...
Mehron Azarmehr, Natural Resources Damages
Under CERCLA § 107: How the Liability Rules
Differ Between Actions for Natural Resource Dam-
ages and Response Costs, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
A le RSP rT oe eee ee
David T. Buente, }:. Thomas G. Echikson, James
L. Connaughton, The “Civil” Implications of Envi-
ronmental Crimes, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
RR gS TT Pre Tee
Thomas A. Campbell, Natural Resource Damage
Assessments: A Glance Backward and a Lock For-
ward, 45 Baylor L. Rev. 221 (1993) .............
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued
Page
Lloyd W. Landreth & Kevin M. Ward, Natural
Resource Damages: Recovery Under State Law
Compared With Federal Laws, 20 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10134 (April 1990)................ 11
Bradley M. Marten & Cestjon L. McFarland, Liti-
gating CERCLA Natural Resource Damage Claims,
22 Env’t. Rep. (BNA) 670 (July 1991) ............. 13
Resources, Community, and Economic Dev. Div.,
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Natural Resources
Damage Assessment: Information on Study of Sea-
birds Killed by Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Report to
Hon. Frank H. Murkowski, U.S. Senate 1 (Nov.
WO a heck ee Aa So awn ones 12
No.
Sd
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1994
S
THE STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH THE
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, and
KENNECOTT CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,
Respondent.
¢
Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Tenth Circuit
\ S
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
+
The court below declined to review the district
court’s refusal to enter a consent decree to settle a claim
for natural resource damages brought by a government
Trustee pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. That jurisdictional decision raises
compelling questions of public policy regarding CERCLA
and the statutory rights of government Trustees. These
questions will likely recur as increasing numbers of
claims for natural resource damages are brought and
1
settled under CERCLA and other federal and state envi-
ronmental statutes.
Petitioners respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit entered in
this case on January 31, 1994.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra,
1A-18A) is reported at 14 F.3d 1489. The opinion of the
district court (App., infra, 1B-46B) is reported at 801 F.
Supp. 553.
JURISDICTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit dismissed the appeal in this case for lack of juris-
diction on January 31, 1994. The court of appeals denied a
timely petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing
in banc on March 28, 1994. On Petitioners’ motion, the
court of appeals ordered that the mandate shall be stayed
until July 25, 1994.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1).
te ee oe eee
PERTINENT STATUTORY PROVISION
Section 1291 of Title 28, United States Code, provides
in pertinent part:
The courts of appeals (other than the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit)
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United
States, the United States District Court for the
District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of
Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin
Islands, except where a direct review may be
had in the Supreme Court.
S
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner State of Utah, acting as Trustee of public
natural resources under the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (“the CERCLA
Trustee”), brought a claim against Petitioner Kennecott
Corporation (“Kennecott”) for damages resulting from
alleged contamination of certain ground water and sur-
face water. The CERCLA Trustee negotiated a settlement
of the claim pursuant to statutory authority and submit-
ted a consent decree to the district court for approval.
Although both the CERCLA Trustee and Kennecott urged
approval of the consent decree, the court refused to enter
the settlement following de novo review. The CERCLA
Trustee and Kennecott both appealed, arguing that the
district court’s misreading of CERCLA frustrated the
clear congressional purpose of CERCLA’s provisions for
natural resource damage claims. The Tenth Circuit subse-
quently held that no immediate appeal could be taken
from the district court’s action, relying on its decision
regarding appeal from denial of a private settlement
agreement in Desktop Direct, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp.,
993 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1993), which was then before this
Court.
This Court recently affirmed the Tenth Circuit as to
interlocutory appeal from denial of a private settlement
agreement. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 114
S. Ct. 1992 (1994). However, this Court explicitly noted
“sound reasons for treating [privately conferred rights]
differently from those originating in the Constitution or
statutes.” Id. at 2001.
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in this case also con-
flicted with the analysis applied in four other circuits
regarding this Court’s requirement of a conclusive deter-
mination where interlocutory appeal is taken from denial
of a settlement.
A. The CERCLA Complaint and Proposed Settle-
ment
The State of Utah, acting through the Utah Depart-
ment of Health, which was then designated as the
CERCLA Trustee for natural resources in Utah,! filed a
complaint against Kennecott in October 1986 alleging
contamination of certain ground water and surface water,
1 The CERCLA Trustee in Utah is now Dianne R. Nielson,
Ph.D., Executive Director of the Utah Department of Environ-
mental Quality.
and seeking to recover damages for injury to those natu-
ral resources under CERCLA. The district court stayed
the proceedings to allow the parties to conduct technical
studies. Upon completion of those studies, the CERCLA
Trustee and Kennecott entered into settlement negotia-
tions, and in July 1991 the parties jointly submitted a
proposed consent decree to the district court settling the
CERCLA Trustee’s claim. App. 14B. The proposed settle-
ment was subjected to public comment, App. 15B, and
some provisions were modified in response to the com-
ments received. The consent decree provided for Ken-
necott to pay the CERCLA Trustee $12 million as
settlement for claimed injuries to ground water and sur-
face water within a defined region in exchange for a
limited release and covenant not to sue. App. 4A.
B. Intervention by Salt Lake County Water Conser-
vancy District
In September 1991, the Salt Lake County Water Con-
servancy District moved to intervene in opposition to the
proposed settlement. App. 15B-16B. The district court
granted permissive intervention for the limited purposes
of participating in discovery and in evidentiary hearings.
App. 16B.
C. District Court Refusal to Enter Proposed Con-
sent Decree
After a period of discovery, the district court held a
six-day evidentiary hearing and heard legal arguments
from the CERCLA Trustee, Kennecott, and the Salt Lake
County Water Conservancy District. App. 16B. The dis-
trict court found that the CERCLA Trustee and Kennecott
had conducted negotiations with “candor, openness, and
bargaining balance.” App. 32B n.13 (citation omitted).
However, based on de novo review of the consent decree
and the supporting technical data, the district court
found that the CERCLA Trustee had failed to prove by “a
preponderance of the evidence” that the consent decree
“satisf[ied] substantive fairness under CERCLA.” App.
34B-35B. In its Memorandum Decision and Order
(“Order”), the court denied approval of the consent
decree and ordered the parties to prepare for trial. App.
45B-46B.
D. Appeals by Both the CERCLA Trustee and Ken-
necott
The CERCLA Trustee and Kennecott timely appealed
the district court’s decision, arguing that the district court
had misread CERCLA in its review of the proposed settle-
ment. The CERCLA Trustee and Kennecott jointly argued
that the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction over the appeal on
three grounds: (1) The collateral order doctrine under
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)
and its progeny; (2) precedent regarding a “practical
rather than a technical construction” of the finality
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546; see
also Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152
(1964); American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274,
279 (1980); Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir.
1984)); and (3) statutory allowance of immediate appeal
vd ell
from district court orders which grant or deny injunctive
relief (28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)). App. 2A.
The Tenth Circuit heard oral argument on jurisdiction
and on the merits, but dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction on January 31, 1994. App. 2A. That court
found, inter alia, that the appeal failed to satisfy the
requirements of the collateral order construction of the
final judgment rule. App. 14A. The CERCLA Trustee and
Kennecott filed a timely petition for rehearing and sug-
gestion for rehearing in banc which was denied on March
28, 1994. App. 1C.?
The circuit court based its jurisdictional result partly
on its earlier decision in Desktop Direct, 993 F.2d 755,
which this Court recently affirmed as it applied to denial
of a disputed private settlement agreement. Digital Equip.,
114 S. Ct. at 2004. This Court’s decision leaves unresolved
the issue in the current case, which is the district court’s
denial! of an important right that is conferred by federal
statute and is deeply rooted in public policy. Id. at
2001-02. This Court’s decision also does not address the
circumstances here, where the parties’ commitment to
this settlement has not wavered. Unlike the Digital Equip-
ment parties, whose settlement agreement unraveled,
Petitioners in this case have jointly supported entry of the
proposed consent decree and continue to do so.
Sf
2 On Petitioners’ motion, the Tenth Circuit ordered that the
mandate shall be stayed until July 25, 1994.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
This Court should grant certiorari because this case
presents precisely the conflict that was left unaddressed
in Digital Equipment: the conflict between an important
right conferred by federal statute (here, the CERCLA
Trustee’s right to bring and settle a claim for natural
resource damages) and the efficient operation of the fed-
eral courts as protected under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This
Court suggested in Digital Equipment that the “impor-
tance” requirement for interlocutory appeal would likely
be satisfied where the right at issue is rooted in statute.
Digital Equip., 114 S. Ct. at 2001-02. Moreover, unlike the
situation in Digital Equipment, there is no means of
redress here except for immediate appeal. This Court
suggested that the parties to the disputed settlement in
Digital Equipment could pursue a separate action for
breach of contract after final judgment. Id. at 2003. That
avenue is not open here, however, where the parties
maintain joint support for the proposed settlement.
Whether this matter proceeds to trial or is resolved by a
different settlement, it will be impossible for the parties
to obtain appellate review of the district court’s decision
to reject this settlement, a decision that infringes an
important right of the CERCLA Trustee.
This Court should also grant certiorari because
the decision below parts company with four
other circuit courts? and misreads this Court’s
3 See Transtech Indus. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d 51 (3d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3826 (U.S. June 14, 1994); Forbus v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 412 (1992); Grillet v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217 (5th
at baal
bs teat dees L
9
precedents‘ in concluding that district court rejection of a
particular settlement agreement is not “conclusive.” The
Tenth Circuit’s misreading of this Court’s decisions will
infringe on the right of government Trustees to manage
litigation, including settlement, of natural resource dam-
age claims by denying their right to seek appellate review
of wrongly rejected settlements. That result will under-
mine congressional policy encouraging CERCLA settle-
ments.
This Court may wish to consider summary disposi-
tion of this case for two reasons: This Court’s recent
decision in Digital Equipment sheds new light on the
issues of “importance” and “effective unreviewability”
regarding interlocutory appeal, and the decision below
regarding “conclusive determin{ation of] the disputed
question” deviates from this Court’s precedents, deci-
sions in four other circuit courts, and the Tenth Circuit’s
own recent decision in Desktop Direct.
I. THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY WHETHER A
CERCLA TRUSTEE’S RIGHT TO BRING, TRY,
AND SETTLE CLAIMS IS “IMPORTANT” AND
NOT EFFECTIVELY REVIEWABLE ON APPEAL
AFTER TRIAL.
In the decision below, the Tenth Circuit disregarded
statutory language by disparaging CERCLA settlements
Cir. 1991); Janneh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 865 (1990).
4 See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463
(1978); Cohen, 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
10
as not “important” as that term is used to determine the
availability of interlocutory appeal. This Court should
grant certiorari to clarify whether denial of a government
Trustee’s statutory right to settle a natural resource dam-
age claim under CERCLA and the concomitant frustra-
tion of the congressional purpose and public policy
underlying that statute satisfy the legal requirement of
“importance” for purposes of interlocutory appeal. See S.
Ct. Rule 10.1(c).
A. Statutory Framework for Natural Resource
Damage Claims
CERCLA, which was heralded as “the most impor-
tant environmental legislation in this decade,” created a
legal framework for governmental response to releases of
hazardous substances and injuries to publicly owned nat-
ural resources resulting therefrom. This “powerful correc-
tive and compensatory mechanism”® created legal claims
for injuries to natural resources, and it required the Presi-
dent and each governor to designate Natural Resources
Trustees with exclusive and plenary power to bring,
assess, try, and settle such claims.”
5 126 Cong. Rec. 30,937 (1980) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan); see also S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 105
(1980) (letter from President Jimmy Carter urging “prompt con-
sideration and speedy enactment” of CERCLA, because “(t]he
health of the public and the environment cannot afford less.”).
© Frederick R. Anderson, Natural Resource Damages, Super-
fund, and the Courts, 16 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 405, 408-09 (1989).
7 Section 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, provides that
the United States or any state can bring a claim against a
1]
The “primary objective [of CERCLA’s natural
resource damage provisions] was to achieve restoration
[of the injured resources].” Ohio v. United States Dep't of
Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 450-51 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citations
omitted).* To this end, CERCLA mandates that sums
responsible party for “an injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1); CERCLA § 107(f)(1).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C); CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(C).
CERCLA requires each governor to appoint a Trustee to assess
any injuries that might occur to natural resources held in the
public trust and to bring damage claims for those injuries. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(B); CERCLA § 107(f)(2)(B). CERCLA also
requires the President to designate federal Trustees for federal
natural resources. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A); CERCLA
§ 107(f)(2)(A). The term “government Trustee” applies to indi-
viduals designated as state, federal or tribal Trustees.
Determination of the first question presented in this case
will resonate beyond CERCLA, as it will affect the rights of
government Trustees under other federal environmental stat-
utes. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 1002(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C.
§ 2702(b)(2)(A); Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 311(f)}{4),
(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4), (5); Marine Protection, Research and
Sanctuaries Act § 312, 16 U.S.C. § 1443(a)(1), (c). Congress’s use
of appointed Natural Resources Trustees in other environmental
legislation underscores both the importance of these claims and
Congress’s satisfaction with the Trustee-driven approach to
them. Moreover, many state environmental statutes are based
on the CERCLA model. See generally Lloyd W. Landreth & Kevin
M. Ward, Natural Resource Damages: Recovery Under State Law
Compared With Federal Laws, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10134 (April 1990). Thus the determination in this case may
affect implementation of state laws to the extent that claims
under state environmental statutes are brought in federal
courts.
8 As Senator Mitchell noted in floor debate over CERCLA,
“[W]e do not want damage to natural resources to await the
workings of that process [of pursuing a final determination in
12
recovered by government Trustees in natural resource
damage actions can be used “only to restore, replace, or
acquire the equivalent of such natural resources.” 42
U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1); CERCLA § 107(f)(1).°
Claims for injuries to natural resources under
CERCLA and other federal envirorimental statutes are
growing, are highly complex technically and, if tried,
place significant burdens on judicial and government
resources. Assessing the injuries to bring the claims can
be extraordinarily complex. In the wake of “the worst
marine environmental disaster this nation has ever expe-
rienced,”!° the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, approx-
imately fifty-one assessment studies were performed to
evaluate injury to the many types of resources affected.!!
court]; we want prompt, full compensation in such cases so we
can replant trees in the park.” 126 Cong. Rec. 30,942 (1980).
° “([C]justomarily, natural resource damages are. viewed as
the difference between the natural resource in its pristine condi-
tion and the natural resource after the cleanup, together with
the lost use value and the costs of assessment.” In re Acushnet
River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1035 (D. Mass.
1989).
10 Thomas A. Campbell, Natural Resource Damage Assess-
ments: A Glance Backward and a Look Forward, 45 Baylor L. Rev.
221, 221 (1993) (quoting President George Bush) (citation omit-
ted).
1! Resources, Community, and Economic Dev. Div., U.S.
Gen. Accounting Office, Natural Resources Damage Assessment:
Information on Study of Seabirds Killed by Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,
Report to Hon. Frank H. Murkowski, U.S. Senate 1 (Nov. 1991).
13
These are only the first rumblings of an anticipated litiga-
tion explosion involving natural resource damage
claims. !?
Settlement of natural resource damage claims under
CERCLA and the statutory rights of CERCLA Trustees
are important areas of the law that this Court has not yet
examined. Clarifying the jurisdiction of circuit courts to
hear appeals of rejected settlements will be critical as
claims are brought and settlements are proposed under
12 See, e.g., Frank L. Amoroso & Linda R. Keenan, Natural
Resource Damage Recovery Actions: A Legal Tidal Wave Looming, 17
Westchester B.J. 109 (1990); Mehron Azarmehr, Natural Resources
Damages Under CERCLA § 107: How the Liability Rules Differ
Between Actions for Natural Resource Damages and Response Costs,
22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10655, 10665 (Oct. 1992) (“the
stage is set for an explosion of litigation involving staggering
stakes”); Bradley M. Marten & Cestjon L. McFarland, Litigating
CERCLA Natural Resource Damage Claims, 22 Env’t Rep. (BNA)
670, 670 (July 19, 1991) (quoting a top official of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration as expecting “the
number of specific natural resource damages cases before the
courts to increase exponentially”) (citation omitted).
Filing of natural resource damage claims has been slowed
by delays by the U.S. Department of the Interior (“DOI”) in
promulgating regulations for natural resource damage assess-
ments, and by subsequent legal challenges to those regulations.
Most of the final regulations were published on March 25, 1994
(59 Fed. Reg. 14,261) and can be expected to lead to a new wave
of claims by government Trustees. See also 59 Fed. Reg. 23,098
(1994) (DOI’s proposed regulations). The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration is developing regulations to gov-
ern assessments of claims for natural resource damages due to
oil spills pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Proposed
regulations, which were published on January 7, 1994 (59 Fed.
Reg. 1,062), are similar to the DOI regulations for CERCLA.
14
CERCLA and other federal and state statutes by federal,
tribal, and state Natural Resources Trustees.!%
B. Congress Expressly Intended to Encourage
CERCLA Trustees to Settle Claims
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 “to encourage
prompt and effective responses to hazardous waste
releases.” In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d 110, 119
(2d Cir. 1992). Congress amended and reauthorized
CERCLA in 1986!4 and explicitly “refocus[ed] the intent
of [CERCLA] back on cleaning up the sites and away
from the slow and costly litigation. .. . [This amendment
will lend] some strong impetus to settlements out of
court.” 131 Cong. Rec. 24,727 (1985) (statement of Sen.
Domenici); see also id. at 24,728 (statement of Sen. Simp-
son: “[W]hat pleases me most [about these amendments]
is that we bring Superfund back into the real world, by
promoting settlements. Let us urge companies to settle.”);
id. at 24,729-30 (statement of Sen. Domenici: Prior to the
proposed amendments, the “litigation driven poli-
cy . . . add[ed] years to cleanup as cases crawl[ed]
through the Federal courts, . . . incurring staggering
13 Efficient operation of the federal courts as protected
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 would best be served by early resolution
of the underlying question in this case regarding judicial review
of a CERCLA Trustee’s proposed consent decree in a natural
resource damage claim. Allowing interlocutory appeal here will
not loose a flood of appeals, but rather will settle this legal
question and provide guidance for lower courts in similar cases.
14 See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (“SARA”), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
ae 5 ae
15
transaction costs. . . . The Superfund problem is pro-
tracted litigation.”). CERCLA explicitly encourages settle-
ment of claims “[w]henever practicable and in the public
interest . .. in order to expedite effective remedial actions
and minimize litigation.” 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a); CERCLA
§ 122(a).15
Courts have frequently acknowledged this congres-
sional intent as well as the strong legal and public poli-
cies favoring settlement of CERCLA actions.'!© At least
one court has found “the strong policy in favor of settle-
ment in CERCLA actions” so powerful that it approved a
proposed consent decree even though some parties to the
consent decree ultimately opposed its entry. United States
v. Atlas Minerals and Chems., Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2441 at *24 (E.D. Pa. March 1, 1994) (the objecting parties
15 Although this section of CERCLA refers to “the Presi-
dent” rather than explicitly to CERCLA Trustees, courts have
relied on this provision to recognize “CERCLA’s primary goal to
encourage early settlement” in claims for natural resource dam-
ages brought by state and local governments. United States v.
Montrose Chem. Corp., 827 F. Supp. 1453, 1458 (C.D. Cal. 1993)
(natural resource damage claim brought by United States and
State of California); see City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F.
Supp. 677, 692-93 (S.D. N.Y. 1988) (natural resource damage
claim brought by City of New York).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 793 F.
Supp. 237, 240 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (“CERCLA’s overriding goal of
achieving prompt settlement”); Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. at
1029 (“Congressional purpose [of CERCLA] is better served
through settlements which provide funds to enhance environ-
mental protection, rather than the expenditure of limited
resources on protracted litigation. Without question, Congress
passed the SARA amendments to encourage settlements for this
very reason.”).
16
argued that after the consent decree had been filed with
the court, serious issues regarding its legality were raised
by a circuit court decision in an unrelated case).
The rights and powers of CERCLA Trustees serve the
congressional intent that animated passage and amend-
ment of the federal statute: The Trustees serve as guard-
ians of congressional intent regarding CERCLA as they
bring claims in order to restore, replace, or acquire natu-
ral resources equivalent to those injured by releases of
hazardous substances, and as they negotiate settlements
in order to avoid the time and expense of protracted
litigation and to speed restoration of the injured
resources.
C. Denial of the Right of a CERCLA Trustee
Regarding Settlement of a Statutory Claim
Meets This Court’s Requirement of An Impor-
tant Question Effectively Unreviewable on
Appeal From Final Judgment
This Court has held that a nonfinal order is appeal-
able immediately if it is “a final disposition of a claimed
right which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and
does not require consideration with it.” Cohen, 337 U.S. at
546-47. In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463
(1978), this Court set out three requirements that a nonfi-
nal order must meet to qualify for interlocutory appeal: It
must “[1] conclusively determine the disputed question,
[2] resolve an important issue completely separate from
the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreview-
able on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers, 437 U.S.
at 468 (citations omitted).
17
In Digital Equipment, this Court elaborated on the
third requirement under Coopers and set as the standard
“decisions . . . that would render such important ques-
tions effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judg-
ment in the underlying action.” Digital Equip., 114 S. Ct.
at 1995-96 (citation omitted). In the same opinion, this
Court determined that “an order denying effect to a
settlement agreement does not come within the narrow
ambit of collateral orders,” because “rights under private
settlement agreements can be adequately vindicated on
appeal from final judgment.” Id. at 1994-96 (emphasis
added). This Court also suggested that denial of rights
that are grounded in statute and deeply rooted in public
policy would rise to the ievel of “importance” required
for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id. at 2001-02. This
Court should grant certiorari to clarify whether rejection
of a government settlement of a federal statutory claim, a
settlement that furthers an express congressional purpose
and which both parties support, qualifies for appellate
review, even if rejection of a disputed private settlement,
such as that in Digital Equipment, does not.'7
17 The Tenth Circuit did not address the collateral nature of
the issue raised on appeal in this case. Clearly, however, the
question of the district court’s misreading of CERCLA in
reviewing the CERCLA Trustee’s proposed consent decree is
completely separate from the merits of the CERCLA action,
which would involve, for example, questions of liability and
causation. The district court Order therefore meets the second
requirement for interlocutory appeal under Coopers by resolving
an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action.
18
1. Denial of the CERCLA Trustee’s Right Is An
Important Question
In this case, the Tenth Circuit referred to its own
recent decision in Desktop Direct and held that “[t]he bare
desire of [the CERCLA Trustee] and Kennecott to avoid
trial is not ‘important’ enough to justify ignoring the
§ 1291 prerequisite of finality.” App. 12A. Because it
focused so narrowly on the right not to go to trial, the
Tenth Circuit ignored the main point of the appeal, which
is that the district court’s refusal to enter the consent
decree improperly interfered with the CERCLA Trustee’s
statutory authority to settle this claim. The circuit court
here defied congressional policy expressly favoring set-
tlement of CERCLA claims, deprecating CERCLA settle-
ments as not “important.”
The district court in this case denied the CERCLA
Trustee’s right regarding settlement of its claim when the
court made errors of law which included applying an
unprecedented and improper standard of review to the
Trustee’s proposed consent decree.!® The district court’s
18 The court examined the CERCLA Trustee’s proposed
consent decree under a “preponderance of the evidence” stan-
dard, App. 34B, conducting its review de novo and substituting
its judgment for that of the CERCLA Trustee in assessing the
merits of the settlement. For example, although the proposed
consent decree explicitly reserved the CERCLA Trustee’s right
to bring later claims regarding any alleged contamination out-
side of the geographic area specified in the settlement, and
although the CERCLA Trustee had determined the limits of that
geographic area based on various multi-year studies, the dis-
trict court inexplicably rejected the CERCLA Trustee’s -deter-
mination and, based in part on the court’s own conclusions
19
decision flies in the face of court decisions consistently
counseling judges that congressional intent requires
courts to use a deferential standard in evaluating pro-
posed CERCLA settlements, in all of their technical com-
plexity,'? and emphasizing that presumptions favoring
proposed CERCLA settlements are particularly strong
where a government party is involved.?° The district
court’s denial of the proposed consent decree departed
dramatically from legal precedent in this area and frus-
trated congressional intent to minimize CERCLA litiga-
tion by encouraging settlement.
Congress encouraged settlement of CERCLA cases
because they are often highly complex technically and are
notorious for bearing litigation and other transaction
costs which rival the value of the underlying claims.?!
regarding the area potentially affected, the court then rejected
the proposed consent decree. App. 21B.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 84
(1st Cir. 1990) (“while the district court should not mechanistically
rubberstamp the agency’s suggestions, neither should it approach
the merits of the contemplated settlement de novo.”); United States v.
Acton Corp., 733 F. Supp. 869, 872 (D. N.J. 1990) (it is not the district-
court’s role to “determine whether a better settlement could be
calculated . ... A more intrusive role would prove unduly burden-
some and contravene Congressional intent by having [the] Court
substitute its judgment for that of the statutorily appointed repre-
sentatives of the public interest... . ”).
20 See, e.g., Cannons, 899 F.2d at 84 (presumptions that
attach to a settlement have “particular force where, as here, a
government actor committed to the protection of the public
interest has pulled the laboring oar in constructing the proposed
settlement.”) (citations omitted).
21 After the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, costs were
approximately $130 million simply for state and federal
20
When approval of a proposed consent decree is improp-
erly denied, the ability of a government Trustee to settle
and the incentive of a potentially liable party to settle are
both undermined. The question of the parties’ recourse
when a CERCLA consent decree is improperly denied is
therefore deeply compelling, both to the parties and to
the public.
In addition to these important issues of public policy
regarding judicial review of CERCLA settlements, there
are important reasons of legal policy to allow immediate
appeal under the circumstances of this case. This is not
simply a private settlement agreement gone sour or chal-
lenged by a third-party spoiler. It is, rather, an agreement
between a private party and a duly-appointed guardian
of the public trust, both of which parties maintain sup-
port for the agreement. Moreover, the parties reached the
agreement by acting pursuant to a federal statute that
sets out requirements and incentives for settlement. In
this highly regulated atmosphere, the CERCLA Trustee
and Kennecott conducted five years of technical studies
and negotiations with “candor, openness, and bargaining
balance.” App. 32B n.13 (citation omitted). After reaching
a settlement agreement, subjecting it to public review and
comment, modifying the terms of the consent decree in
response to those comments, and answering the district
Trustees to assess natural resource damages. Campbell, supra
note 10, at 227 (citation omitted). Exxon may have spent just as
much money attacking the assessments. Id. at 230. The natural
resource damage claim subsequently settled for $1 billion. Id. at
225 n.14; David T. Buente, Jr., Thomas G. Echikson, James L.
Connaughton, The “Civil” Implications of Environmental Crimes,
23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10589, 10598 n.100 (Oct. 1993).
ja eS che I i Oe awl
21
court’s questions in a six-day evidentiary hearing, these
parties’ proposal was rejected through errors of law that
the Tenth Circuit does not even advert to in letting the
errors stand.
This Court should grant certiorari to examine the
Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of “importance” under
these circumstances, where the district court denied the
statutory right of a government Trustee to bring and
settle a claim regarding injuries to natural resources held
in the public trust.
2. Denial of the CERCLA Trustee’s Right Is
Effectively Unreviewable On Appeal From
Final Judgment
Denial of the CERCLA Trustee’s right to bring and
settle a claim for natural resource damages cannot be
effectively reviewed on appeal from final judgment. On
this point, this case poses a conundrum that was not
present in Digital Equipment. The court below found that
appellate review was unavailable, in part because “the
trial court did not foreclose future proposed consent
decrees” in this case. App. 9A. However, if the parties
negotiate further and reach a new settlement that is
approved by the district court, then there will be no final
judgment on this settlement, and an appeal will still be
barred. Alternatively, if the parties proceed to trial and
final judgment, then the current settlement terms will be
lost, and no appeal at that stage will revive them. More-
over, whereas a party to a settlement agreement that went
awry might have recourse after final judgment to bring
an action against the other party for breach of contract,
22
see Digital Equip. at 2003, Petitioners here jointly support
the proposed consent decree and thus will have no such
recourse. If denial of this settlement is not reviewed
immediately, then the CERCLA Trustee’s right to bring,
and settle this claim will be infringed with no oppor-
tunity for redress.
This Court has recognized that interlocutory appeal
is appropriate where a district court order denying a
consent decree might have “the ‘serious, perhaps irrepar-
able, consequence’ of denying the parties their right to
compromise their dispute on mutually agreeable terms.”
Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1981)
(denial of consent decree found appealable under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1); determination of appealability under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 explicitly reserved). Where, as here, the
plaintiff and defendant reached a settlement agreement
but were then denied their right to settle on their negoti-
ated terms, and where they jointly seek to appeal from
that denial, postponing the appeal through rigorous
application of the final judgment requirement would rob
them of any meaningful opportunity to protect their
important statutory interests.
Moreover, forcing the parties to litigate the claim to
final judgment would contravene Congress’s express
intent for CERCLA natural resource damage claims,
which was to avoid protracted litigation and encourage
settlement so that CERCLA Trustees might expeditiously
23
obtain funds and spend them to “put shovels in the
ground, not lawyers in the courtroom.”?2
Il. THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING THAT REJEC-
TION OF A SETTLEMENT IS NOT A “CONCLU-
SIVE DETERMINATION” IS ERRONEOUS AND
CONFLICTS WITH OTHER CIRCUIT COURT
DECISIONS.
The first requirement that a nonfinal order must meet
under Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay:is that it “conclusively
determine the disputed question.” Coopers, 437 U.S. at 468
(1978) (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit’s holding
that the Order failed to meet this requirement conflicts
with all other circuit court decisions concerning inter-
locutory appeal from denial of a settlement agreement,
including the Tenth Circuit’s own recent decision in Desk-
top Direct. This Court should grant certiorari to resolve
the conflict among circuit courts. See S. Ct. Rule 10.1(a).
A. Recent Decisions of the Second, Third, Fifth,
and Eleventh Circuits
Recent collateral order cases from the Second, Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits have arisen from efforts to settle
private employment disputes.*° Each case has involved
22 131 Cong. Rec. 34,642 (1985) (statement of Rep. Johnson);
see also discussion of congressional intent to encourage settle-
ment in order to speed restoration of injured resources at 14-16,
supra.
23 Although some aspects of the circuit court decisions dis-
cussed here may have been overturned by Digital Equipment, the
24
an employee who brought suit against an employer, later
agreed to settle, and then subsequently attempted to set
aside the settlement or release and bring a new suit. In
Janneh v. GAF Corp., the employee asked the district court
to set aside a settlement agreement, alleging that he had
been coerced to sign it. 887 F.2d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 1989). In
Grillet v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., and Forbus v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., the employees alleged that duress and misrepre-
sentation in the settlement process made the releases
unenforceable, while the employers alleged that the
agreements were enforceable because the employees had
ratified the agreements by accepting payments under
them. Grillet, 927 F.2d 217, 218 (5th Cir. 1991); Forbus, 958
F.2d 1036, 1038 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 412
(1992). In each case, the district court declined to enforce
the settlement agreement or release. When the employer
appealed in each case, the circuit court held that it had
jurisdiction under the Coopers analysis of the collateral
order doctrine. Janneh, 887 F.2d at 434-36; Grillet, 927 F.2d
at 219-20; Forbus, 958 F.2d at 1039-40.
These cases all found that the “conclusive determina-
tion” test was met where the district court refused to
enforce a settlement agreement. In Janneh, the Second
Circuit considered the first requirement under Coopers
and held that the district court decision conclusively
determined the issue of “whether settlement was
reached.” Janneh, 887 F.2d at 434. In Grillet, the Fifth
Circuit found that the district court’s decision had been
“the final word on whether Grillet had effectively
analysis of “conclusive determination” in these cases remains
undisturbed.
dint BRA SB a: the
25
released Sears from suit.” Grillet, 927 F.2d at 219. The
Eleventh Circuit in Forbus similarly found that the district
court’s decision “was intended to be the final word on
whether Sears could avoid litigation on the basis of the
releases.” Forbus, 958 F.2d at 1039. Finally, the Third Cir-
cuit also held recently that a district court’s rejection of a
private settlement was conclusive. Transtech Indus. v. A &
Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d 51, 57 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 62
U.S.L.W. 3826 (U.S. June 14, 1994).24
ao
B. The Tenth Circuit’s Erroneous Analysis of
“Conclusive Determination”
The Tenth Circuit parted company with the other
circuit courts in applying the requirement of conclusive
determination to the disputed question in this case. The
Tenth Circuit stated: “We conclude the better reasoned
rule finds a denial of a settlement does not conclusively
determine the parties’ ability to settle.” App. 8A.25 The
circuit court contrived a nonfinal result while ignoring
two conclusive determinations made by the district court
24 The dispute in Transtech, which arose out of CERCLA,
was among private parties. The circuit court’s holding that
interlocutory appeal was not available therefore did not impli-
cate the rights of CERCLA Trustees, as the circuit court decision
does in this case.
25 The Tenth Circuit thereby implicitly disagreed with its
own determination in Desktop Direct that “[t]he first require-
ment is that the [district court] order conclusively determine the
validity or enforceability of the settlement agreement.” Desktop
Direct, 993 F.2d at 757 (finding requirement of conclusive deter-
mination satisfied where district court set aside settlement
agreement) (emphasis added).
26
and challenged by Petitioners: (1) CERCLA requires that
consent decrees proposed in certain circumstances be
reviewed de novo or under a “preponderance of the evi-
dence” standard, App. 34B, and (2) “[A]pproval of the
proposed Consent Decree is denied,” App. 45B. The Tenth
Circuit’s decision to ignore the finality of the district
court’s order puts it at odds with the other circuit
courts.76
In the language of this Court, the district court’s
order rejecting the consent decree was not “inherently
tentative,” Coopers, 437 U.S. at 469 n.11. There is “no basis
to suppose that the District Judge contemplated any
reconsideration of his decision” regarding either his read-
ing of CERCLA or approval of this consent decree. Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 12-13 (1983). Neither is “some revision [of the decision]
reasonably . . . expected in the ordinary course of litiga-
tion” regarding either point. Id. at 12 n.14.
26 The Tenth Circuit tried to shore up its decision by citing
the Second Circuit’s opinion in Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35 (2d
Cir. 1978) (finding that immediate appeal was not available
from an order disapproving a settlement agreement in stock-
holder derivative actions). App. 7A-8A. The Second Circuit
noted, however, that “[t]he determination of whether to
approve a Rule 23.1 settlement is peculiarly an amalgam of fact
and law.” Seigal, 590 F.2d at 38. The Second Circuit distin-
guished Seigal in its Janneh opinion, noting that appellate review
of the order in Seigal would have involved the court in assessing
the merits of the underlying case, and would therefore not have
met the Coopers requirement of an issue “completely separate
from the merits of the action.” Janneh, 887 F.2d at 435 n.4. The
Seigal decision, therefore, by the Second Circuit’s own analysis,
does not effectively bolster the Tenth Circuit’s decision on the
Coopers requirements at issue here.
-
27
Although the Tenth Circuit correctly pointed out that
the CERCLA Trustee and Kennecott are free to submit
other agreements for the district court’s approval, App.
9A-10A, the circuit court ignored the fact that the district
court conclusively — and erroneously — determined the
standard of review for consent decrees proposed under
CERCLA in the future. The Order is the final word on the
standard of review that the district court applied here
and, most importantly, will apply to any settlement that may
be proposed in the future. The district court’s Order thus
satisfies the first requirement under Coopers, and, in light
of this Court’s precedents, the Tenth Circuit erred in
ruling otherwise.
* + +
This case presents compelling grounds for applica-
tion of the collateral order doctrine. The decision below
announces that efficient operation of the federal courts as
protected from interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 is to be promoted at the expense of the rights of a
CERCLA Trustee who acts pursuant to a federal statute
and its underlying roots in public policy, and who
attempts to carry out explicit congressional intent in
bringing and settling a claim for injury to natural
resources held in trust for the public. Moreover, the deci-
sion below forecloses any meaningful opportunity for the
parties supporting the settlement to seek redress. This
Court should grant certiorari to clarify the effect of its
recent decision in Digital Equipment on the jurisdictional
question in this case.
28
In addition, the Tenth Circuit’s “better reasoned rule”
regarding conclusive determination for purposes of inter-
locutory appeal, announced in this case, conflicts with
this Court’s precedents and decisions in four other cir-
cuits. This Court should grant certiorari to resolve the
conflict.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted. This Court may wish to consider summary dis-
position of this case in view of its recent opinion in
Digital Equipment and because the decision below devi-
ates from this Court’s precedents and decisions of four
other circuit courts regarding “conclusiveness.”
Respectfully submitted,
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General
Counsel of Record
Frep G NELSON
DENISE CHANCELLOR
Utah Attorney General’s Office
236 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1015
Counsel for Petitioner State of Utah
29
James B. LEE
Danie. M. ALLRED
Davip W. TUNDERMANN
Jim BuTLerR
Lisa A. KIRSCHNER
JEANNETTE F, SweNT
Parsons BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Counsel for Petitioner Kennecott
Corporation
APPENDICES
oo Se hs ae
F Se ee ee ed en? Fe ee
sary. isis ”
1A
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
STATE OF UTAH, By and Through the
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
KENNECOTT CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant and
Cross-Appellee,
SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT, Intervenor-Appellee and
Cross-Appellant.
Nos. 92-4173, 92-4179 and 92-4180.
January 31, 1994
Fred G. Nelson (Jan Graham, Atty. Gen.; R. Paul Van
Dam, and Denise Chancellor, Utah Atty. General’s Office,
with him on the brief), Salt Lake City, UT, for plaintiff-
appellant State of Utah; David W. Tundermann (James B.
Lee, Daniel M. Allred, Jim Butler, and Lisa A. Kirschner
with him, on the briefs) of Parsons Behle & Latimer, Salt
Lake City, UT, for defendant-appellant and cross-appellee
Kennecott Corp.
Douglas J. Parry of Parry Murray Ward & Cannon,
Salt Lake City, UT, and Dale F. Gardiner, Salt Lake
County Water Conservancy Dist., West Jordan, UT (Blake
S. Atkin of Parry Murray Ward & Cannon, Salt Lake City,
UT, with him on the briefs), for intervenor-appellee and
cross-appellant.
2A
Rex E. Lee,’Richard B. Stewart, and James L. Con-
naughton of Sidley & Austin, Washington, DC, for amicus
curiae Western Regional Council.
Maria Savasta Kennedy and Laurens H. Silver of
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, San Francisco, CA, and
Kenley W. Brunsdale, Salt Lake City, UT, for amici curiae
Sierra Club and the Mineral Policy Center.
Before BALDOCK, McWILLIAMS, and BRORBY, Cir-
cuit Judges.
BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
Both the State of Utah and Defendant Kennecott Cor-
poration appeal an order of the federal district court
denying a motion to approve and enter a consent decree
submitted by the parties. The proposal would settle
Utah’s claim for natural resources damages under § 107
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675. Salt Lake County Conservancy District
(District), a permissive intervenor in the proceeding
below, cross-appeals the trial court’s decision to deny the
District intervention as a matter of right. The District also
moves to dismiss the appeal of Utah and Kennecott for
lack of jurisdiction. We are asked to review a nonfinal
order of a district court under various exceptions to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 including (1) the collateral order exception
to the finality doctrine, (2) this court’s interpretation of
pragmatic finality, and (3) an interlocutory order with the
practical effect of granting or denying injunctive relief.
We grant the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
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BACKGROUND
Kennecott, Utah, and various local governments
have, since 1983, studied the threat of groundwater con-
tamination from Kennecott’s Bingham Canyon mining
operations in Salt Lake County. In 1986, Utah filed
CERCLA claims, presumably to preserve its rights in
light of CERCLA’s statute of limitations. At that time,
asserted damages were $129 million based on potential
injury to 109,215 acre feet of groundwater over a ten to
twenty year period. Prior to the 1992 memorandum and
order of the trial court,! various stays were granted to
allow settlement negotiations and the completion of tech-
nical studies.
Kennecott’s first settlement proposal offered the
assignment of their water rights (valued at $2 million)
plus $100 million for remediation of the contaminated
’ water in exchange for dismissal of the lawsuit. Kennecott
also proposed to take independent action to reduce con-
tinued pollution from the mining operation sources and
to remediate heavy metals from the spreading contami-
nate plume. Utah rejected this offer and stressed that,
given the tentative knowledge of the plume’s content,
boundary, and migration, the State could not conclude
the settlement would satisfy all public health concerns.
Subsequent negotiations split the issues of natural
resources damages and costs of remediation. Utah, Ken-
necott and the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) negotiated an Agreement in Principle
toward future cleanup and response costs associated with
1 Utah v. Kennecott Corp., 801 F. Supp. 553 (D. Utah 1992).
that was
4A
remediating the Kennecott mining operation contamina-
tion.2 The Agreement expressly disclaimed any effect on
Utah’s settlement of natural resources damage claims.
With the current proposal, in exchange for monetary
recovery of $12 million, Utah agreed to release Kennecott
from (1) all damages to surface or groundwater in a
defined mining impact area, and (2) injunctive relief or
response costs associated with plume remediation. The
release was limited by a reopener provision, reserving
Utah’s right to seek additional recovery if the contamina-
tion was discovered to be greater than anticipated. The
release also expressly preserved potential claims by third
parties.
After a period of public comment, the trial court
declined to approve the proposed settlement and ordered
an evidentiary hearing. The District moved to intervene
as a matter of right. The trial court denied this motion but
granted permissive intervention for the limited purposes
of participating in discovery and evidentiary hearings.
Reviewing the proposed consent decree for a settlement
“ ‘reasonable, fair, and consistent with the pur-
poses that CERCLA is intended to serve,’ ” the trial court
concluded the proposal was deficient. Kennecott, 801 F.
Supp. at 567 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the trial
court denied approval of the proposed consent decree. Id.
at 572. Instead of attending a scheduled case management
conference, both Utah and Kennecott separately appealed
2 More recently, the EPA announced the three parties
jointly decided not to pursue the comprehensive cleanup pro-
posal embodied in the Agreement in Principle. U.S. EPA Press
Release (Aug. 27, 1993).
:
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the trial court’s order of denial. The District, a permissive
intervenor, cross-appealed the denial of intervention as a
matter of right.
After consolidating the appeals, we asked the parties
to file memorandum briefs on the issue of jurisdiction
pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 27.2.2. Before us is a motion by
the District to dismiss the Utah and Kennecott appeals for
lack of a “final appealable order” upon which to base 28
U.S.C. § 1291 jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides “jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of
the United States.” Historically, a “final decision” is a
decision by the district court that “ends the litigation on
the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but
execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S.
229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945); see
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S.
271, 275, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 1136, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988). In the
instant case, an order denying a motion to approve and
enter a consent decree is not a decision on the merits that
ends the litigation. Rather, the district court’s order
ensures that litigation will continue in the district court.
Appellants Utah and Kennecott concede as much and
argue the trial court’s order is immediately appealable
under various exceptions to the finality requirement. In
3 No party has moved for trial court certification under 28
U.S.C § 1292(b), nor sought a writ of mandamus, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a), on their respective issues.
6A
particular, Appellants contend jurisdiction is proper
under (1) the collateral order exception to § 1291, (2) the
pragmatic finality doctrine, or (3) the § 1292(a)(1) statu-
tory exception, an order with the practical effect of grant-
ing or denying injunctive relief.4
I
The Supreme Court, beginning with Cohen v. Benefi-
cial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed.
1528 (1949), has inter, ceted § 1291 to permit an appeal of
a nonfinal order if an order falls within the “narrow
exception to the normal application of the final judgment
rule, which has come to be known as the collateral order
doctrine.” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S.
794, 798, 109 S.Ct. 1494, 1498, 103 L.Ed.2d 879 (1989). To
meet the Cohen exception an order must “[1] conclusively
determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important
issue completely separate from the merits of the action,
and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468,
98 S.Ct. 2454, 2458, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). Unless all three
requirements are met, jurisdiction is not available under
the collateral order doctrine. Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 276,
4 The District has stated it will withdraw its cross-appeal in
the event we deny jurisdiction to the appeals of Utah and Ken-
necott. For this reason, we do not analyze our jurisdiction to
review an order granting permissive intervention but denying
intervention of right. We note that, should the District fail to
withdraw its appeal, Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in
Action, 480 U.S. 370, 107 S.Ct. 1177, 94 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987), would
require a denial of jurisdiction as well.
Dae ol
7A
108 S.Ct. at 1136-37. The trial court’s denial of the pro-
posed consent decree does not satisfy either the first or
second prongs.
A
To first satisfy the Cohen doctrine, the trial court's
denial of the consent decree must conclusively determine
the parties’ ability to settle their claims. Orders that are
“inherently tentative” are contrasted with those expected
to be the final word on the subject addressed. See
Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 277-78, 108 S.Ct. at 1137-38 (reject-
ing collateral order review of a denial of a motion to stay
as inherently tentative); Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 469
& n.1l1, 98 S.Ct. at 2458 & n.11 (holding the collateral
order exception does not apply to a pretrial order deny-
ing class certification because the order is subject to revi-
sion prior to a decision on the merits). Inherently
tentative orders are those “to which some revision might
reasonably be expected in the ordinary course of litiga-
tion.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12-13 n.14, 103 S.Ct. 927, 935 n.14, 74
L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). Utah and Kennecott argue the district
court conclusively determined the parties’ ability to settle
by rejecting the technical premises underlying the settle-
ment.
Although noting a conflict in the circuits, the
Supreme Court, in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450
U.S. 79, 82-83 nn.6 & 7, 101 S.Ct. 993, 996 nn.6 & 7, 67
L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), declined to decide whether an appeal
under the collateral order exception was proper for
denials of consent decrees. At least one federal circuit has
8A
ruled a district court’s refusal to enter a consent decree is
not appealable under § 1291, see Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d
35 (2d Cir. 1978), while another has decided such orders
are appealable, Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912, 91 S.Ct. 879, 880, 27
L.Ed.2d 811 (1971).5 Other circuits simply reject collateral
order jurisdiction in dicta. See Donovan v. Robbins, 752
F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1985) (refusal to approve consent
decree is “classic example of a nonfinal order”); New York
v. Dairylea Coop. Inc., 698 F.2d 567, 570 n.10 (2d Cir. 1983)
(approving of appellant’s decision not to raise collateral
order grounds, stating the Cohen exception “is to be kept
within narrow bounds”); Carson v. American Brands, Inc.,
606 F.2d 420, 423-24 (4th Cir. 1979) (approving of Seigal as
an analogous case though dismissing on § 1292(a)(1)
grounds), rev’d on other grounds, 450 U.S. 79, 101 S.Ct. 993,
67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). We conclude the better reasoned
rule finds a denial of a settlement does not conclusively
determine the parties’ ability to settle.
Similar to the denial of a motion to stay in Gulfstream
and the denial of class certification in Coopers & Lybrand,
denial of an offer of settlement is commonly open to
revision by the trial court prior to a final judgment on the
merits. In this case, the parties are free to continue with
renewed settlement efforts and further proceedings to
secure court approval. Although the trial court concluded
> The persuasive authority of Norman is negligible. Subse-
quent to Carson, the Ninth Circuit disavowed its prior decision
and determined that Norman had been overruled by Carson.
EEOC v. Pan American World Airways, 796 F.2d 314, 318 n.7 (9th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030, 107 S.Ct. 874, 93 L.Ed.2d
829 (1987).
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9A
that Utah and Kennecott have not yet met their burden of
substantive fairness under CERCLA, the trial court did
not foreclose future proposed consent decrees.
The Appellants contend even though the trial court
may not have expressly barred further negotiation the
order impliedly did so by attacking the underlying tech-
nical premises of the settlement. In particular, Utah and
Kennecott assert the order requires them to undertake
additional technical studies and include in the consent
decree injunctive provisions requiring Kennecott to pro-
tect and restore injured ground water. This argument
reads too much into the trial court’s order and too little
into the doctrinal requirements of the Cohen exception.
The proper inquiry is whether the trial court is less
likely to revise its prior denial as new settlement pro-
posals are offered, not whether the parties feel discour-
aged and less likely to continue with settlement
negotiations. Orders that are inherently tentative charac-
teristically allow or invite reconsideration on the basis of
express procedural requirements or, in common experi-
ence, are regularly reconsidered. See 15A Charles A.
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3911.1, at
375 (1992). Commonly, settlements may be offered during
the final hearings on the merits. The trial court’s order
contains no limitations on the court’s ability to reconsider
future proposals or the initial order denying the proposed
consent decree. Appellants have no right to an unfair
consent decree under CERCLA, even if the unfair terms
are underlying “technical premises.” The trial court’s
order does no more than permit Appellants to propose a
new consent decree within the bounds of substantive
10A
fairness. The order does not conclusively determine the
ability of the parties to settle.
B
Utah and Kennecott next argue, since the parties lost
the right to settle on the specific terms of the proposed
consent decree, they lost an important right that cannot
be vindicated effectively after the trial has concluded.
Because we recently held a broad and unbounded “right
not to be tried” is no grounds for immediate appeal,
Appellants fail to satisfy the second Cohen requirement.
See Desktop Direct, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 993 F.2d 755
(10th Cir.), cert. granted, _. US. __, T14 SACK. 379, 126
L.Ed.2d 329 (1993). Although Utah and Kennecott con-
tend the lost right to settle satisfies the third Cohen prong,
we have held the question of an “important issue” — part
of the second Cohen prong - is the appropriate analysis in
© The Supreme Court’s recent grant of certiorari in this case
will likely resolve the circuits’ diverging treatment of pretrial
orders refusing to enforce previously granted settlements. Com-
pare Desktop Direct (rejecting a broad reading of a right not to go
to trial); Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d 51 (3d
Cir. 1993) (same), petition for cert. filed, 62 USLW 3429 (Dec. 16,
1993) (No. 93-960), with Forbus v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d
1036 (11th Cir.) (granting jurisdiction to review a denial of
enforcement of a settlement on grounds of a right not to go to
trial), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 412, 121 L.Ed.2d 336
(1992); Grillet v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1991)
(same); Janneh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1989) (same),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865, 111 S.Ct. 177, 112 L.Ed.2d 141 (1990).
Our adherence to Desktop Direct in this section does not affect
our earlier conclusion that Appellants have not satisfied the
first Cohen prong.
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this context. Id. at 758. The original formulation by the
Cohen Court examined whether the “decision [fell into]
that small class . . . too important to be denied review.”
337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1225-26; see Lauro Lines S.R.L. v.
Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 503, 109 S.Ct. 1976, 1980, 104
L.Ed.2d 548 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (a right not to
be tried, even if unreviewable, must be sufficiently
important to overcome the policies militating against
interlocutory appeals).
The Supreme Court has cautioned courts “not to play
word games with the concept of a ‘right not to be tried.’ ”
Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 801, 109 S.Ct. at 1499. “[I]n
some sense, all litigants who have a meritorious pretrial
claim for dismissal can reasonably claim a right not to
stand trial.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 524,
108 S.Ct. 1945, 1950, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988). The mere
possibility that an erroneous ruling at the trial level may
result in additional litigation is not sufficient to set aside
the finality requirement imposed by Congress. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436, 105 S.Ct.
2757, 2764, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985).
The Appellants in Desktop Direct sought review of an
order vacating a prior dismissal and rescinding a settle-
ment formerly accepted by the trial court. We rejected the
jurisdictional importance of a so-called “right not to be
tried” absent a constitutional or statutory basis. Desktop
Direct, 993 F.2d at 760. The Supreme Court’s narrow
reading of the collateral order doctrine reveals only one
situation important enough - qualified immunity for a
public official defendant — to allow an interlocutory
appeal in the absence of a constitutional or statutory
guarantee. In dismissing the appeal, we concluded the
12A
Cohen doctrine should not be “expanded without compel-
ling justification.” Id. In the case at hand, Utah and Ken-
necott do not point to a right of review under CERCLA or
other statutory or constitutional grounds that would
require appellate review of a denied consent decree. The
bare desire of Utah and Kennecott to avoid trial is not
“important” enough to justify ignoring the § 1291 prereq-
uisite of finality.
Requiring a constitutional or statutory basis for a
“right not to go to trial” is sensible. Without clarity in the
application of exceptions, the finality doctrine becomes
riddled and ineffective. Repeatedly, the Court and com-
mentators encourage the use of statutory exceptions in
the face of efforts to stretch the collateral order doctrine.
See Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U. S. at 529-30, 108 S.Ct. at
1953-54 (conclusion to deny collateral order appeal “ forti-
fied by the availability of interlocutory review” under
§ 1292(b)); Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 474, 98 S.Ct. at
2461 (principal vice of “death knell” doctrine is circum-
vention of proper use of § 1292(b)); 16 Wright et al., supra
§ 3929, at 137-38 (vigorous use of § 1292(b) to limit the
expansion of other appealability concepts reduces ambi-
guity that could lead to unnecessary appeals).
Reinforcing the need for definition in appellate
review, Congress has recently increased Supreme Court
rulemaking authority to define the scope of interlocutory
and other nonfinal appeals. See Judicial Improvements
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 315, 104 Stat. 5089, 5115
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072(c) (Supp.
1993)) (power to define “final” for the purposes of appeal
under § 1291); Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-572 § 101, 106 Stat. 4506, 4506 (codified as
sc hci PAIS ACI NE dE ates BAe Sai Kap aii
Aiea les OANA FON: Nh Sealant iste itil APART mie WO Laxsacanaes soiree tit weap 6 tll ion bate
13A
amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(e) (Supp. 1993)) (power to
prescribe new rules for interlocutory appeals not other-
wise provided in § 1292).
An obvious statutory basis for appeal in the context
of avoiding unnecessary litigation is § 1292(b) certifica-
tion. A primary purpose of § 1292(b) is to provide an
opportunity to review an order when an immediate
appeal would “materially advance the ultimate termina-
tion of the litigation.” S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1958) (hereinafter S. Rep. 2434), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5255, 5255; see Note, Interlocutory Appeals in
the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b), 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 607, 609-11 (1975) (avoidance of wasted trial court
time is sole purpose of § 1292(b)). A report by a Tenth
Circuit committee addressing the same problem found:
Our recommendation is founded upon the
premise that the enlargement of the right to
appeal should be limited to extraordinary cases
in which extended and expensive proceedings
probably can be avoided by immediate final
decision of controlling questions encountered
early in the action.
S. Rep. 2434, supra, 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5262 (appendix
to the Senate report, submitted without dissent from
other circuits). The requirement of district court certifica-
tion is equally imperative, however, as a procedural
screen to avoid a flood of fruitless petitions invoked
contrary to the purpose of § 1292(b). Id.
Utah and Kennecott seek to expand the Cohen doc-
trine. They claim without immediate appeal they will
forever lose the opportunity to avoid the costs and risks
of trial and protracted litigation. Despite the potential
14A
accuracy of this assertion, a broadly worded rule allow-
ing review of denied settlements under the Cohen doc-
trine would burden appellate courts with the threat of
successive appeals and interfere intolerably with the dis-
cretion of trial courts. We decline to adopt such a rule in
the absence of constitutional or congressional intent. The
denial order is not appealable under the collateral order
exception.
II
Utah and Kennecott next contend this court’s “practi-
cal rather than technical construction” of § 1291 finality is
broad enough to include their appeal. The doctrine has
lived a checkered life in both our court and the United
States Supreme Court, but finds its current incarnation in
Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424 (10th Cir. 1984).7 Even
where jurisdiction under the Cohen exception is unavail-
able, a practical construction of § 1291 may generate
7 The “practical, rather than a technical” approach was
announced in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148,
152, 85 S.Ct. 308, 311, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964), but the case was
purportedly limited to its facts in Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at
477 n.30, 98 S.Ct. at 2462 n.30 (“If Gillespie were extended
beyond the unique facts of that case, § 1291 would be stripped of
all significance”). Accordingly, this circuit disavowed the prac-
tical finality concept in light of the Coopers & Lybrand decision.
Daiflon, Inc. v. Bohanon, 612 F.2d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1979), rev'd
on other grounds sub. nom., Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.,
449 U.S. 33, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980). The Gillespie
decision reappeared, however, in American Export Lines, Inc. v.
Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 277-79 & n.7, 100 S.Ct. 1673, 1675-76 & n.7,
64 L.Ed.2d 284 (1980), and, four years later, practical finality
was revived in Bender.
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jurisdiction through a subjective and ad hoc balancing of
the interests of the parties against the policies of an
unambiguous finality rule. See Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 10
F.3d 746, 751-52 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing 15A Wright et al.,
supra § 3913, at 464). “The critical inquiry is whether the
danger of injustice by delaying appellate review out-
weighs the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review.”
Bender, 744 F.2d at 1427.
Since Bender we have repeatedly stressed a narrow
reading of the rule. See Boughton, 10 F.3d at 752 (Bender
and its progeny must be narrowly construed and invoked
only in truly “unique instances” in order to preserve the
vitality of § 1291); Quinn v. CGR, 828 F.2d 1463, 1467 (10th
Cir. 1987) (Bender must be applied only in the “most
exceptional circumstances.”) The case at hand is neither
unique nor exceptional. Although Utah and Kennecott
raise an unsettled question of law —- the standard for a
trial court’s review of a proposed CERCLA consent
decree — the only real peril to the Appellants is the cost of
extraneous litigation. The magnitude of this interest alone
does not overcome the policies of a finality requirement.
See 15A Wright et al., supra § 3913, at 473 (cost of a wasted
proceeding does not justify immediate appeal). The order
denying Appellants’ proposed consent decree does not
fall within the narrow scope of the Bender exception.
III
Utah and Kennecott lastly contend the order is
appealable as an interlocutory order that grants or denies
injunctive relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Generally, two
strands of analysis have developed for § 1292(a)(1)
16A
appeals. The first applies to orders ruling on express
motions for injunctive relief and the second applies to
orders with the “practical effect” of granting or refusing
an injunction. MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Basis, Inc., 962 F.2d
978, 982 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Tri-State Generation &
Transmission Ass'n v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 874 F.2d
1346, 1351 (10th Cir. 1989)). An interlocutory order
expressly denying or granting an injunction fits squarely
within the plain language of § 1292(a)(1) and need not
make the additional showings required in the second
strand of analysis. Tri-State Generation, 874 F.2d at 1351.
Utah and Kennecott acknowledge that no express motion
for injunctive relief is pending, and focus their argument
on the strand recognizing the appeal of orders with the
“practical effect” of granting or denying injunctive relief.
In Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 101
S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), the Court examined an
appeal from an order refusing to approve a class settle-
ment and proposed consent decree to a Title VII claim of
racial discrimination. The settlement would have
required the employer to prospectively give hiring and
seniority preferences to black employees. Even though
the order did not specifically deny an injunction, the
Court found the denial of inherently prospective relief
had the “practical effect” of refusing an injunction. Id. at
83, 101 S.Ct. at 996. For appellate jurisdiction, Carson
requires the challenged order have (1) “the practical
effect of refusing [or granting] an injunction,” (2) threaten
a “ ‘serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,’ ” and be
(3) “ ‘effectually challenged’ ” only by immediate appeal.
Id. at 84, 101 S.Ct. at 996-97 (citation omitted); United
States v. Colorado, 937 F.2d 505, 507-08 (10th Cir. 1991).
OE te ee ae Ne Oman
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17A
Utah and Kennecott cannot sustain the first require-
ment. Missing from the consent decree is any equitable or
prospective relief, injunctive or otherwise. The Appel-
lants erroneously state the order has the substantive
effect of granting an injunction because it “mandates
inclusion of a covenant to protect.” See United States v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 804 F.2d 348, 351 (6th Cir.
1986) (where the district court conditioned entry of a
consent decree on inclusion of specific court-defined
terms, jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) proper to review
the order). A careful reading of the order shows only the
court’s analysis of deficiencies in the settlement.® The
order does not affirmatively demand the inclusion of
specific terms in subsequent consent decree proposals.
Hence, the order is not appealable under the § 1292(a)(1)
statutory exception as an order granting or denying an
injunction.
° The proposed Consent Decree also does not
address what will have to be done to manage and
contain the existing contaminated waters, such as
pumping water or other measures designed to “pro-
tect” uncontaminated waters from the damaged
resource. In this regard, the proposed Consent Decree
contains no provision requiring measures to be taken
to minimize future expansion of the existing plumes,
or to assure that the contamination will not spread
beyond the MIA.
801 F. Supp. at 570 (footnote omitted).
18A
CONCLUSION
Denial of Utah and Kennecott’s proposed settlement
of CERCLA natural resource damages is not appealable
as a Cohen collateral order, a § 1292(a)(1) interlocutory
order, or under the pragmatic finality doctrine. Conse-
quently, we grant the District’s motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction.
DISMISSED.
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APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
THE STATE OF UTAH, By and Through the
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Plaintiff,
V.
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, Defendant.
SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT, Intervenor.
Civil No. 86-0902G
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
[Entered September 3, 1992]
This matter is before the court on the joint motion of
plaintiff, the State of Utah, and defendant, Kennecott
Corporation, for approval of a proposed Consent Decree
relating to a negotiated monetary settlement for damages
to the State’s interest in ground waters in an area within
Salt Lake County, Utah. The proposed Consent Decree
would settle the State’s claim for natural resources dam-
age under Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601, et seq.}
1 References hereafter are to the Transcript and exhibits
introduced at hearings before the court March 23-30 and May
14, 1992.
2B
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
A. Kennecott’s Five-Year Hydrogeologic Study
In 1983, Kennecott undertook a five-year hydro-
geologic study to assess surface and ground water condi-
tions in a 216 square mile area affected by mining and
milling operations in the Bingham Mining District. Offi-
cials of the State of Utah and Salt Lake County were
consulted and informally participated in the study
through advisory groups. On October 4, 1983, Kennecott
submitted ground water monitoring data to the State
which indicated significant ground water contamination
from the Kennecott operations. In December 1983, the
State requested additional information and investigation,
and continued to monitor the study. After Phases I and II
of the five-year study had been completed in 1985, Ken-
necott, the State of Utah and Salt Lake County entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 3, 1985, to
formalize participation of the environmental health
departments of the concerned State and local govern-
ments. (Exh. P-10.) Among other things, the agreement
called for completion of the five year study with annual
reports and development of a final Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA). On March 15, 1990, a draft of an EIA
was submitted by Ke~>ecott (Exh. P-28), but a final EIA
as required by the June 3, 1985 Memorandum of Agree-
ment has never been completed.
4st bd Hare! Res SOP ba i tw Reade
3B
B. State Claim and Lawsuit for Natural Resources
Dama ge
On July 31, 1986, the State filed a Notice of Claim for
Natural Resource Damages under section 107 of CERCLA
in the amount of $129 million dollars. The damage figure
was based upon present and anticipated injury to 59,406 -
109,215 acre feet of ground water in the affected area over
a ten to twenty year period. In a transmittal letter to
Kennecott, Kenneth L. Alkema, Director of the State Divi-
sion of Environmental Health, took the position that Ken-
necott should be given the opportunity to complete its
ongoing hydrogeologic study and “to conduct a compre-
hensive resource damage assessment,” but that in order
to preserve its rights under CERCLA, and to prevent
expiration of the statute of limitations, the claim was
being filed by the State and would be followed up with a
lawsuit. (Exh. P-41.) On October 3, 1986, the State filed
the pending lawsuit against Kennecott seeking, among
other things, recovery pursuant to Section 107(a)(4)(c) of
CERCLA for alleged damage to State ground water natu-
ral resources.
Immediately after the lawsuit was filed, this court
granted a motion to stay all proceedings so that the
parties could pursue and complete the five year study,
and later continued the stay pending settlement negotia-
tions.
C. Kennecott’s Experts
In 1987 Kennecott contracted with Dames & Moore,
an environmental consulting firm in Denver, Colorado, to
prepare a computer-generated ground water model to
4B
simulate past, present and future conditions of the
affected ground water in order to project future move-
ment of the contaminated plumes which had been identi-
fied. After the five year study was completed, Kennecott
retained an expert hydrologist, Adrian Brown, of Adrian
Brown Consultants (ABC) Denver, Colorado, to provide
additional data. ABC drilled nine new wells for purposes
of analysis, and reevaluated the five year study data.
D. Kennecott Offer of Settlement
In August 1990, Kennecott presented an offer of set-
tlement to the State which envisioned exchange of water
rights valued at about $2 million dollars for the natural
resource damage, plus providing about $100 million
worth of remediation work. The Kennecott proposal
involved:
e Kennecott undertaking remedial actions
aimed at curtailing potential sources of
groundwater pollution;
e Kennecott undertaking actions to remediate
the heavy metals plume;
e Kennecott assigning water rights to the State
as replacement for ground water containing
elevated levels of sulfates and heavy metals;
e The State dismissing the lawsuit with preju-
dice. (Exh. P-44 at 2-4.)
The remedial action proposed by Kennecott involved
drilling very deep wells below the low pH or heavy
metals plume (area of contamination characterized by
low pH materials or heavy metals) and pumping the
contaminated water down through the uncontaminated
eee
5B
soil, attenuating the metals and raising the pH. (Trans.
Vol. I Pt. 2 at 179.)
E. State’s Evaluation of the Kennecott Offer
The State looked to its own staff at the Utah Depart-
ment of Environmental Health, environmental health per-
sonnel at Salt Lake City - County, and experts it hired to
evaluate the Kennecott offer. The principal expert con-
cerning natural resources damages was RCG/Hagler,
Bailly, Inc. of Boulder, Colorado, which organization sup-
plied a substantial “Preliminary Assessment of Natural
Resource Damages Associated with Kennecott Mining
Operations in the Great Salt Lake Valley” dated Decem-
ber 20, 1990 (“Hagler report”) (Exh. P-44.) Dr. Douglas
James at the Utah State University was hired to evaluate
the Hagler report, and Dr. Upmanu Lall, an Associate
Professor at Utah State University, was hired to review
the Kennecott proposal and to estimate the “safe annual
yield” of the underground waters in the affected area. Dr.
Hong of the University of Utah also was hired to evaluate
Kennecott’s settlement offer.
The Hagler report was never finalized, but it set forth
much information and a proposed course of action which
would have identified more fully damages suffered and
to be suffered by the State as a result of the contamina-
tion, as well as alternatives for remediation.? The report
2 The Hagler report set forth the following pertinent to
damages determination:
[T]here are several factors to indicate that the damage
estimates might be underestimated. First, we have not
6B
stressed that the heavy metals plume where there is much
contamination presents a dynamic and spreading prob-
lem rather than a static situation.* As to the potential
incorporated past damages, to the extent that contam-
ination has already affected welfare in the valley (net
of Kennecott’s past efforts to provide deeper wells to
impacted users, etc.). These losses accrued to house-
holds who had their well supplies tainted, and may
also include foregone increases in property values
due to potential inhibitions on increased residential
development in that part of the valley. Second, the
water resource values are based on tra1.sactions that are
unlikely to have fully taken into acco:nt the recent
recognition of water scarcity in the valley. Third, the
estimated groundwater damages only pertain to the
contaminated waters, and do not include damages
that are likely to arise due to institutional efforts to
manage the plume’s future growth and movement
through reducing allowable pumping rates at permit-
ted wells along and beyond the edges of the plume.
Finally, the damage estimates do not include values
for injuries other than groundwater contamination.
* * +
[T]he value of these damages depends on the quantity
of water impacted, and the value of the damages
appears to range between $283 to $1429 for each acre
foot of safe annual yield impacted (and may be as high
as $2162 per acre foot if one considers outright replace-
ment). (emphasis added.)
3 The Hagler report called the following to the attention of
the State:
It must be recalled that the contaminant plume acts in
a dynamic rather than a static manner. This dynamic
behavior has two important ramifications. First,
future advection and dispersion of the plume would
involve increasing the volume of groundwater affected
7B
quantity of ground water which may be regarded as
damaged, the report states:
(and, thus, proximate damages). Theoretically, one
could calculate the maximum possible extent of dam-
ages (in the future) by estimating the total mass of
contaminant present in the aquifer, and dividing it by
the volume of water needed to dilute that mass to the
desired threshold concentration (e.g., 500 mg/1 for
sulfates).
A secondary consideration associated with a dynamic
plume involves the institutional, management, and
energy costs required to minimize future expansion of the
plume. Historically, the main influence on the contam-
inant plume appears to have been hydrogeologic. The
leading edge of the contaminated water has moved
down-gradient towards the Jordan River. . .
Assuming other factors remain constant, it appears
that the plume will eventually flow, as a result of the
hydraulic gradient, up through the confining layer
into the Jordan River... .
The main institutional element associated with the
plume is the administration of well pumping from the
principal aquifer throughout the Salt Lake Valley.
Based on the number of perfected and approved well
permits for the principal aquifer, if appears that the
aquifer is over-appropriated. Pumping associated with a
certain number of all of these well permits may
change the direction and steepness of the hydraulic
gradient, thereby allowing the plume to spread in differ-
ent directions and at different rates than at present... .
It appears that when considering the dynamics of the
plume, there is a significant hidden administrative
cost over and above any natural resource cost being
pondered. Thus, if administrative steps are needed to
contain the plume, this cost should be considered as part of
any damage claim. (emphasis added.)
8B
To estimate total groundwater damages, the
above range of values ($283/AF to $1429/AF)
was multiplied by the annual yield represented
by the plume. Kennecott’s estimate of 8,000 AF
as a safe annual yield relies on an overly limited
interpretation of the plume (delineating the
plume at 1000 mg/1 of sulfates, rather than the
400 to 500 mg/1 range that the U.S. EPA has
stated it intends to propose for health-based
drinking water standards). With a larger plume
so defined, and with more appropriate inter-
pretations of the concept of safe annual yield,
the impacted yield may be as high as 100,000 AF/
year. (emphasis added.)
Estimated damages to the State were set forth in the
Hagler report using three approaches - restoration,
replacement and loss of value. Estimated damages values
based on these methods alone, apart from other damage
considerations noted in the report, ranged from $2.3 mil-
lion to $216 million, depending upon the quantity of
ground water contamination and the method of valua-
tion. It was also noted in the Hagler report that one
“appreciable negative attribute” of the proposed settle-
ment was that it “use[d] dismissal with prejudice to pre-
clude future claims for natural resource damages other
than those associated with groundwater plume remedia-
tion,” and that it did not cover other damages, including
“potential losses of intrinsic values.” (Exh. P-44 at pp.
2-5.)
A “Preliminary Assessment Plan” envisioned in the
Hagler report apparently was never ordered by the State.
It was also pointed out in the Hagler report that “more
refined estimates of natural resources damage would
require substantial additional information,” particularly as
9B
to alternative estimates of plume size. (Exh. P-44 at p. 6-2)
(emphasis added.) Hagler has not been authorized by the
State to provide such additional information.
Dr. Lall, the State’s expert ground water hydrologist
at Utah State University, considered two areas for safe
annual yield analysis, which areas had been identified by
Dames & Moore. The first was an area of 216 square
miles, 15.75 miles in the east-west direction and 13.75
miles in the north-south direction, which covered con-
tamination from the Kennecott site within “ ‘the entire
area of known and potential contaminant effects related
to the mining and leaching activities,’ and relevant
boundary fluxes.” (Exh. P-47 — Attachment 1, p. 2.) The
other area identified was 77.5 square miles, “a smaller
area that bounds the area with wells that had one or more
drinking water standard violations.” (Id.) In this smaller
area Dr. Lall estimated the safe annual yield to be 25,000
to 40,000 acre feet. In a letter to the State dated February
6, 1991, Dr. Lall pointed out that the “safe yield issue is
incontrovertibly tied to the remediation issue” and said that
“the appropriate area to consider for yield analysis depends on
the outcome of the remediation process.” (Exh. P-47)
(emphasis added.) On the assumption that the likelihood
of success of the proposed remediation is low, Dr. Lall
opined that “the area to be considered for safe yield
impact should reflect the present and potential extent of
contamination.” (Exh. P-47 — Attachment 1, p. 1.)
Dr. Douglas James of Utah State University, an expert
engaged by the State to evaluate the Hagler report, sub-
mitted a preliminary review on January 15, 1991. (Exh.
P-45.) He noted that RCG/Hagler Bailly, Inc. had dis-
cussed “environmental and social impacts . . . from the
10B
depletion of a groundwater resource” and damages to the
State apart from loss of the “safe annual yield” value.
(Id.) Dr. James also stressed that loss of the underground
aquifer for “subsurface storage as a reserve during
drought or after a climate change” was a major element
of damage. (Id.)
In March 1991, Terry D. Sadler, the Director of Envi-
ronmental Health for Salt Lake City-County, in a letter to
Mr. Alkema, expressed grave concerns as to the Ken-
necott settlement proposal and called for completion of
the final Environmental Impact Assessment required by
the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement entered into
by the State, Salt Lake County and Kennecott in 1985.
(Exh. I-34.) Mr. Sadler evaluated the Kennecott offer
thusly:
Removing just the metals from the contami-
nated plume while leaving the water unusable
to Salt Lake County residents is unacceptable.
Additional consideration must be given to the
sulphate plume where treatment is logical in
relation to public health and should be part of
remediation.
* + *
As we emphasized earlier, it is inappropri-
ate and contrary to good public health practices
to limit cleanup levels to only CERCLA parame-
ters. The aquifer east of the evaporation ponds
has been contaminated, private wells have been
rendered useless, the plume outline has not
been defined, plume migration has not been
evaluated, and the public has been put at risk
because some private well users are drinking
water containing metals and other contaminates
11B
in amounts that exceed the drinking water stan-
dards. Again, in no case should the decision be
no further action. (Exh. I-34 at 3.)
After due consideration and review from September
1990 to March 1991, the State rejected the Kennecott
settlement proposal.
F. Negotiations and Agreement for Separate Settle-
ment of Natural Resources Damage Claim
In rejecting the Kennecott proposal, the State deter-
mined that remediai action issues should be analyzed in
greater detail and pursued with the approval and cooper-
ation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Mr.
Alkema testified at the hearing that ultimate remediation
“probably would and will cost in excess of several hun-
dred million dollars.” (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 185.) Negotia-
tions involving EPA, the Utah Department of
Environmental Quality [DEQ] and Kennecott began in
February 1991 to establish a “framework for the parties to
negotiate a legally enforceable consent decree.” This
resulted in an Agreement in Principle which was exe-
cuted on about April 1, 1992. (Attached to State of Utah’s
Posthearing Brief, Exh. A.) The agreement covers all Ken-
necott property located in and around the Oquirrh moun-
tains, excluding active mining operations in Barneys
Canyon, and calls for Kennecott to pay response costs
which will be incurred by EPA and DEQ in cleaning up
the contamination at or from Kennecott’s property. The
natural resource damage claim in the case at bar will not be
affected by the future clean up consent decree. However, the
Agreement in Principle does specify that entry of the
12B
proposed Consent Decree in the case now before this
court
in no way affects or prejudices the United
States’ ability to require Kennecott to perform
response actions under CERCLA (or recover
costs for response actions implemented by the
EPA), including but not limited to those for
ground water, and that such settlement will not
impair whatever rights, if any, federal trustees
may have to bring a claim for resources within
their trusteeship. (Id. at 4.)
During the period March to July 1991 the State and
Kennecott negotiated settlement of the State’s natural
resource damage claim apart from remediation. Coinci-
dentally during this same time frame, on April 5, 1991,
the Utah State Engineer released the “Salt Lake Valley
Interim Ground-Water Management Plan” (Interim Plan)
which identified nine water quality zones in the Salt Lake
Valley, and set out the maximum annual withdrawals
from each zone. (Exh. P-l.) The water quality zones set
forth in the Interim Plan were based upon data and maps
developed by the USGS. (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 53-64.) The
Interim Plan identified area eight as having a maximum
withdrawal rate of 13,000 acre feet per year. Thereafter,
the State and Kennecott determined that area eight of the
Interim Plan embraced the apparent area in which Ken-
necott’s operations have caused underground water con-
tamination. Accordingly, this area was adopted as the
appropriate area within which damages should be calcu-
lated, and was designated as the “Mining Impact Area”
(MIA). In this regard, the State and Kennecott also
reached agreement that the “safe annual yield” of the
aquifer within the MIA essentially was the same as the
13B
maximum withdrawal rate for area eight as identified in
the Interim Plan, 13,000 acre feet per year. Accordingly,
the $11.7 million dollar settlement figure which was
arrived at primarily was based upon an estimate of the
market value of water rights per acre foot within the MIA
multiplied by the 13,000 acre feet per year “safe annual
yield” estimate. Litigation costs, legal uncertainties such
as causation, as well as present availability and use of the
settlement money were factors also taken into account.
The State’s decision to settle was based upon its
determination that the contaminated ground water
within the MIA cannot feasibly be remediated. Mr.
Alkema did not insist that Kennecott should finalize the
Environmental Impact Statement with a full discussion of
alternatives because he had determined that only natural
remediation would be feasible. He so testified at the
hearing:
[I]t was my conclusion that practically the only
thing that will work and is feasible is to allow
the aquifer to self-attenuate, to let it essentially
be cleaned up by the soil as the contaminated
water moves through it.
(Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 5-6.) This process of natural remedi-
ation will take hundreds of years to eliminate the acid
plume and approximately a thousand years to remove the
sulfate plume.*
4 Trans. Vol. III Pt. 2 at 59-61.
14B
G. Proposed Consent Decree
On or about July 31, 1991 a proposed Consent Decree
was tendered to the court which envisioned settlement of
the State’s natural resource damage claim for $11.7 mil-
lion. Kennecott and the State assume in the Consent
Decree that the safe annual yield of underground waters
within the entire MIA has been permanently lost because
of contamination and that the estimated 13,000 acre feet
safe annual yield must be permanently replaced.°®
Another assumption is that the sulfate plume and the
heavy metals or low pH plume will continue to be con-
fined within the MIA. For purposes of settlement, it was
also agreed that the waters lost should be valued at the
same market value as waters of drinking water quality. In
exchange for $11.7 million, the proposed Consent Decree
provides that the State releases and covenants not to sue
Kennecott as follows:
1) regarding damages for injury to, destruction of,
or loss of surface water or groundwater in the Min-
ing Impact Area under federal law, State law, or
common law including the cost of assessing
such injury, destruction or loss; and 2). for
administrative or injunctive relief or response
costs in connection with any groundwater plume
remediation (as that term is commonly under-
stood, not as defined by statute or regulation) in
5 Kennecott asserts that some water in the area is being
used for “irrigation and other purposes” and that “the contami-
nated plume has had little impact on use of the ground water
within the Mining Impact Area. Kennecott owns most of the
rights to the ground water within the Mining Impact Area and
continues to pump water from the aquifer for industrial and
other purposes.” (Kennecott’s Prehearing Brief, at 14.)
15B
the Mining Impact Area under CERCLA, the
State Hazardous Substances Mitigation Act
(Utah Code Ann. Section 19-6-301 et seq.), or
under common law. The term “groundwater
remediation” does not include remediation or
control of sources that have contributed, or may
contribute, to contamination of surface or
groundwater. (emphasis added.)
The Consent Decree also contains a reopener provi-
sion in the form of a reservation of the State’s right to
institute proceedings against Kennecott for damages
“that are of a type that was unknown, or of an order of
magnitude greater than was known to the State at the
date of entry of this Decree. ...” as well as the right to
seek ground water plume remediation based on condi-
tions “that are of a type unknown, or of an order of
magnitude greater than was known to the State at the
date of entry of this Decree. ... ” Finally, the Consent
Decree preserves potential claims by third parties, and
excludes whatever claims third parties might have:
The Decree does not bind third parties who are
not parties to this Decree, and the Decree does
not resolve or bar claims, if any, of third parties,
including, but not limited to, claims by political
subdivisions of the State for interference with
the quantity or quality of their water rights;
provided, however, that nothing in the Decree
affects Kennecott’s rights 0. defenses against
third parties with respect to such claims.
Following a public comment period relative to the
proposed Consent Decree, on October 25, 1991 the court
heard extensive argument by counsel for the State and
Kennecott in which both parties urged court approval of
16B
the proposed settlement and opposed intervention by the
Salt Lake City Water Conservancy District (SLCWCD).
The court also heard argument by SLCWCD in favor of
intervention. The court declined approval of the settle-
ment and proposed Consent Decree at that time and
ordered an evidentiary hearing on the following issues in
order to determine the merits of the settlement:
1) The nature and extent of natural resource
damage which has been caused by Kennecott;
2) Whether it is feasible to restore or remediate
the contamination caused by Kennecott within
the identified area;
3) How the damages which have occurred to
the natural resources may be measured, whether
on the basis of restoration, replacement, market
value or otherwise;
4) The nature and extent of SLCWCD’s interest
in underground waters which may be impaired
by reason of implementation of the Proposed
Consent Decree Order dated November 18,
1992.
SLCWCD was granted permissive intervention to
participate in discovery and to present evidence at the
hearing.
H. Evidentiary Hearing
A week-long evidentiary hearing was held from
March 23, 1992 to March 30, 1992, and on May 15, 1992, at
which various exhibits and extensive testimony were pre-
sented to the court by the State, Kennecott and the SLC-
WCD. The evidence as related to the issues identified by
17B
the court and other issues regarded by the court of partic-
ular import included the following:
1. Nature and Extent of Natural Resource Dam-
age Caused by Kennecott
Mr. Alkema testified on behalf of the State that the
contamination formed two plumes, a low pH or heavy
metals plume “approximately 4 square miles in surface
area,” and a sulphate plume “approximately 17 square
miles in area.” (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 142.) At the present
time the contaminated plumes are contained within the
40 square mile area identified at the hearing as the “Min-
ing Impact Area” (MIA). The MIA happens to be almost
identical in size with water area eight which was identi-
fied by the State Engineer in the Salt Lake Valley Interim
Ground-Water Management Plan, released in April 1991
(Exh. P-1.)
Mr. Adrian Brown of Adrian Brown Consultants tes-
tified on behalf of Kennecott that assuming source con-
trols are implemented he did not “believe it [the low pH
plume] will ever leave the Mining Impact Area.” (Trans.
Vol. III Pt. 2 at 40.) According to Mr. Brown, the MIA has
“a very great amount of neutralizing material” such that
“the acid will be destroyed” by natural materials. (/d.) Mr.
Brown testified that given the approximately “billion
tons” of neutralizing calcium carbonate in the MIA which
acts to neutralize the low pH, there are enough neutraliz-
ing agents to “take care of the plume in perpetuity,”
“providing there is some level of source control.” (/d.)
However, Mr. Brown also testified that natural attenua-
tion and remediation will take hundreds of years of
Pee op ee Ee eee eR PT ee oe
18B
movement through soils. In this regard, Mr. Brown testi-
fied that natural remediation of the sulfate plume would
take “in the order of a thousand years” (Trans. Vol. III Pt.
2 at 61) provided there is “source control from Ken-
necott’s mining operations.” (Id. at 60.) With regard to the
acid plume, he estimated that if Kennecott implements
various source controls it will take approximately 512
years for the low pH plume to naturally remediate. (Id. at
59-60.)
SLCWCD presented evidence that the area of damage
even now extends well beyond the MIA based upon
ground water well readings which indicate contamination
of various kinds beyond “background” levels. (Trans. Vol.
I Pt. 2 at 20; Trans. Vol. V Pt. 1 at 14, 15; Trans. Vol. IV Pt.
2 at 95-97; Trans. Vol. IV Pt. 2 at 104-05.) In this regard,
Mr. Kaliser, of Bruce N. Kaliser & Associates, a consulting
practitioner in engineering geology and ground water
hydrogeology, testified that the area of contamination
was larger than the 40 square miles identified as the MIA,
and said that the area of contamination is more accurately
described as an area with a wide transitional zone rather
than distinguished by a single bright line. (Trans. Vol. IV
Pt. 2 at 102.) According to Mr. Kaliser the area which has
been impacted by Kennecott’s mining operation is
“54-1/2 square miles for the interior limit of the transi-
tion zone. For the exterior or outside limit it’s 70 square
miles,” with a volume of acre feet affected by Kennecott’s
mining operations, of 2,398,000 acre-feet for the interior
limit and 3,024,000 acre-feet for the exterior limit of the
19B
transition zone. (Id. at 110.) Mr. Kaliser presented evi-
dence of contamination outside the MIA based on drink-
ing water standards.® He also presented data relative to
the erratic and complex geologic formations in the area
and probable extent of the plumes.”
6 Mr. Kaliser identified data which indicated concentra-
tions exceeding drinking water standards, and testified:
For that five-year period, . . . this volume contains the
actual figures, the values of the constituents that
exceed—-those values that exceed drinking water
standards for each one of the following constituents:
chlorides, total dissolved solids, sulfates, aluminum,
manganese, iron, lead, selenium, copper, silver, cad-
mium, zinc. .. . Here I’ve indicated in a synopsis of
the extent to which these substances have been found
in excess of the drinking water standards. For exam-
ple, total dissolved solids exceeded the standards in
179 wells, and they exceeded them up to 6,330 percent
of the standard. I have provided that information for
each one of the constituents. (Trans. Voi. IV Pt. 2 at
64.)
These conclusions were challenged by Kennecott as misleading
and based upon insufficient data.
7 Mr. Kaliser testified that there were additional geologic
features, not considered by Kennecott, that “contributed to the
extent of the plume” such as “the presence of sinkholes” and
“faults in the valley fill or the alluvium.” (Trans. Vol. IV Pt. 2 at
52.) “Faults in the valley fill could modify the flow of ground-
water and redirect or channel it.” (Id.) “Sinkholes are open voids
of vertical extent indicating open channels flow and become
most significant.” (Id.) Mr. Kaliser also noted the existence of
“volcanic rock” in the area and that its porous nature “permits
the passage of groundwater through it more readily than either
the bedrock under it or the alluvium over it in many cases. So
that’s a potential pathway [to the aquifer.]” (Id. at 61.)
20B
Evidence was presented to the effect that not all of
the waters within the MIA are contaminated,’ and that
Kennecott cannot necessarily be identified as having
caused all of the contamination.? However, it was
acknowledged that contaminated substances attributable
8 Mr. Alkema testified that “[t]here are areas within the...
mining im »act area which are not yet contaminated by the
plume that Kennecott has created . . . . So there are areas that
could be used within the plume and in fact are being used
within the plume at the present time.” (Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 27.)
° Evidence was presented that mining companies other
than Kennecott could have contributed to part of the damage,
and that contamination fron: natural processes not directly
related to mining activities could have caused some of the dam-
age. (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 1 at 5-9; Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 9; Exh. P-28 at
5-9.) Mr. Fred Nelson, counsel for the State, represented that
“the history of the mining operations in this area, the story
would go back a [sic] 150 years.” (Trans. Vol. 1 Pt. 1 at 6.) In this
regard, Mr. Alkema testified:
There have been.. . significant mining activities his-
torically here since 1860. And there are along Bing-
ham Creek . . . mine tailings that are all along here.
There are the Anaconda tailings that are on this side
of the creek that were deposited shortly after the turn
of the century. As mining proceeded and they devel-
oped newer techniques or better techniques for pro-
tecting the environment as well as for operations,
instead of just dumping the tailings down the creek
they began building tailings ponds. . . . Also another
section of tailings are the Lark tailings, again were
deposited after the turn of the century, they were
reworked a little bit later in the ‘60s and ‘70s, ... You
can also see along here various tunnels that were used
to mine the ore body in the past, the Bingham Tunnel,
the Mascotte Tunnel, and the Butterfield Tunnel.
Those were used by persons in especially historic
times. ... (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 116-17.)
21B
to Kennecott operations have been released before and
after 1980, in a continuing manner. (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at
103, 116-118; Exh. P-28 at 8; Exh. P-44.)
It appears to the court that the area of contamination
is not now nor in the future will continue to be neatly
contained within water area eight which was identified in
the Utah State Engineer’s Interim Ground-Water Manage-
ment Plan and adopted by the State and Kennecott as the
Mining Impact Area. There is no physical barrier to pre-
vent the contaminated waters from spreading or moving.
Because of the dynamic nature of the plumes in question,
it is likely that the area of contamination will shift, spread
out and continue to grow larger.
2. Determination Regarding the Infeasibility of
Restoration
The State and Kennecott presented evidence that it
would be onerous and extremely costly to pump and treat
the heavy metals within the low pH plume. (Trans. Vol.
III Pt. 2 at 182.) Mr. Alkema testified on behalf of the State
that pumping the ground water and cleaning it would be
unworkable. (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 187-88.) He commented,
[i]t would in my view not be feasible to do that
[pump the water out of the ground to clean it].
The reasons are that it’s an extremely large
plume of contamination many miles in area; the
volume is also very large. That the complexity
of geology also makes it impossible to techni
cally be able to remove the contamination
because of variation and kinds of material, the
rate with which the water can flow through the
22B
geology, the soil varies extremely from 50 to as
high as 4,500 feet per year.
(Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 2-3.) Mr. Alkema also testified that
he believed that restoration could not succeed, and that
likely any remediation of the contaminated waters “will
cost in excess of several hundred million dollars.” (Trans.
Vol. I Pt. 2 at 185.)
SLCWCD presented expert testimony to the effect
that reverse osmosis would be feasible to remediate a
portion of the plume. (Trans. Vol. V Pt. 2 at 18.) Mr.
William Surratt, an environmental engineer with Camp,
Dresser & McKee, an international environmental firm, '
testified that “a reverse osmosis process can be used to
treat the area of contamination which has been referred to
as the sulfate plume.” (Id. at 18-19.) With regard to treat-
ment of the heavy metals or low pH plume Mr. Surratt
testified that it was “much more difficult and much more
expensive [than the sulfate plume]” but that “it can be
done. It depends on how much money you want to spend.” (Id.
at 21) (emphasis added.) Although Mr. Surratt had not
conducted any testing and his analysis focused on fea-
sibility, he testified that it would cost “at least 30 million”
to build a reverse osmosis treatment plant that would
treat the water from the sulfate and heavy metals plumes.
(Id. at 21.)
Dr. Eric Tiepel, a chemical engineer with Resource
Technologies Group, an engineering firm specializing in
hazardous waste remediation, groundwater remediation,
and mining related problems, testified on behalf of Ken-
necott that “all of these proposals [for remediation of the
plumes] are feasible,” and that “anything is feasible in
a
23B
terms of water treatment” but he noted “the results of
this would be very impractical.” (Trans. Vol. III Pt. 2 at
198.) Dr. Tiepel explained that “[w]Je do not believe that it
is feasible to treat directly the metals plume area without
the consumptive use of practically all the water and the
generation of very high quantities of sludges and brines
as a consequence of that treatment.” (Jd. at 182.) He
further testified that “[m]ost people who look at hazard-
ous waste remediation systems typically do not use
reverse osmosis as the primary treatment process, simply
because it’s very difficult to dispose of the brines because
the brine volumes are generally very large as compared
to the clean water that’s produced.” (Id. at 187.) With
respect to the remediation scenarios proposed by SLC-
WCD, Mr. Tiepel testified that 35 to 75 percent of the
water would be lost in the pretreatment process. (/d. at
191-92.)
Mr. Alkema testified at the hearing, consistent with
his prior conclusion in connection with the proposed
settlement, that remediation “[is] really not technically
feasible to do in anybody's lifetime” (Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at
44) and that “we still don’t believe there is, a way to
actually clean up that aquifer.” (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at
164.)'° He testified that the final EIA which Kennecott
was to prepare was never finalized because
10 Mr. Alkema testified that “it was my conclusion that
practically the only thing that will work and is feasible is to
allow the aquifer to self-attenuate, to let it essentially be cleaned
up by the soil as the contaminated water moves through it.”
(Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 6.)
24B
[w]hat we would envision substituting for that,
would be a remedial investigation feasibility
study report that would have EPA’s involve-
ment and blessing and input. So that would be
what I envision would take the place of the final
Environmental Impact Assessment. We couldn’t
get to that .. . without bringing in the Environ-
mental Protection Agency into it. (Id. at 167.)
In this regard Mr. Alkema testified that even though the
State would not require such remediation, the EPA might
do so: “even if we assume worst case and collect the
damage that we think is appropriate for the public loss
that has occurred, and EPA finds in their look at this that
the aquifer can be restored, the restoration would still
have to take place under their authority, under a remedial
action proposal.” (Id. at 163-64.) In the meantime, Mr.
Alkema identified source remediation as the State’s
number one and top priority. (Id. at 154.)
The State ultimately may be proven correct in having
concluded that it would be infeasible to restore the con-
taminated waters. However, such finding may well be in
error because the State failed to require completion of
studies which were begun, and failed to identify and
fully discuss possible alternatives for plume remediation
and restoration.
3. Source Remediation
Eliminating the sources of contamination was identi-
fied by Mr. Alkema as the State’s “number one priority.”
(Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 154.)'! It was brought out at the
11 Mr. Alkema noted “even with the elimination of the
sources of contamination, the plume is so extensive that there’s
25B
hearing that leach collection system upgrades, intercept-
ing leachate by the installation of trenches, the lining and
cementing of ditches, and piping some of the material are
some of the efforts which have been instituted by Ken-
necott in order to reduce the amount of leachate contam-
inating the ground water. (Jd. at 155.) Mr. Alkema
testified, however, that this process is not complete and
“a lot more yet needs to be done to eliminate the sources all
the way around the south end of the waste dumps up
Butterfield Canyon, all of the drainages need to be inter-
cepted properly and ensured that the leachate is not
getting into the groundwater.” (Id. at 155-56) (emphasis
added.) Mr. Alkema also testified about other actions
taken by Kennecott to reduce sources of contamination in
the area such as double lining of the small reservoir,
removal of sludges from the large reservoir, reducing the
volume of the large reservoir (to avoid overspill), con-
struction of structures to intercept the good quality water
and divert it away from the Bingham drainage, and
installation of barrier wells above the large reservoir to
intercept underground flow from Bingham Creek. (Id. at
157-60.) Mr. Alkema opined that these source remediation
efforts are “just the beginning of what needs to be done” (Id.
at 160) (emphasis added), and that although some of the
source remediation efforts have been “initiated but are
not complete, others need to be taken... .” (Trans. Vol. II Pt.
1 at 8) (emphasis added.)
Mr. Adrian Brown testified that despite the remedial
measures in effect now, contamination from Kennecott
a good chance that much of that water is, from the State’s
perspective, could not be used.” (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 163.)
26B
sources continues to occur. In this respect, the large Bing-
ham reservoir and the leach collection systems leak, and
approximately 50 percent of the waters from the Bingham
Canyon underflow are not being recovered by the barrier
wells. (Trans. Vol. III Pt. 2 at 82-83.) Mr. Bruce Kaliser
testified on behalf of the Intervenors that the following
are currently contributing to contamination of the ground
water: the large Bingham Reservoir, the small Bingham
reservoir, the wash area along the Bingham Creek drain-
age, the Bingham Canyon underflow, the Northern east
side dumps, the Southeast side dumps, the Yosemite
dumps, the Lark dumps and the evaporation ponds.
(Trans. Vol. IV Pt. 2 at 90-101.)
It appears to the court that while substantial source
remediation has occurred, much more needs to be done.
Yet, there is no specific requirement for such set forth in
the proposed Consent Decree.
4. Need to Manage and Control Existing Con-
taminated Plumes
Mr. Alkema testified that “it is very difficult” to
identify exactly where the plume is and where it’s going.
(Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 144.) Mr. Alkema further testified
that he understood at the time the Consent Decree was
signed that “if nothing was done it [the area of contam-
ination] was going to continue to grow” and that “even
with just source elimination it was still going to grow
almost as much as without source elimination.” (Trans.
Vol. Il Pt. 2 at 83.) Mr. Alkema then opined that “the size
of the plume will continue to grow for more than 100
years, much more than 100 years probably.” (/d.)
27B
No evidence was presented by the State or Kennecott
at the hearing as to what should be done in order to
prevent the plumes from contaminating waters outside
the MIA. Nor was evidence presented by any party as to
whether uncontaminated areas within the MIA can be
protected from contamination. Also, no evidence was
presented regarding what should be done to manage and
contain the existing plumes, or the cost thereof.
Assuming that the contaminated plumes cannot be
remediated, it appears to the court that the area of con-
tamination will continue to grow and expand, and that
active institutional management will be required to mini-
mize and contain the problem. This is true now and will
continue to be the case even if adequate source remedia-
tion occurs.
5. Measure of Damages
Mr. Alkema testified that the State evaluated the
following methods of damage assessment: loss of value,!?
cost of treatment, and replacement. (Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at
33, 36, 39.) With regard to the loss of value method, Mr.
Alkema characterized it as “a market value method” that
“looks at the value of the resource strictly as a sale of
water rights versus what that overall impact may be to
the public.” (Id. at 35.) As to the cost of treatment
method, Mr. Alkema said that it involved the cost of
“pumping water from the mining impact area and treat-
ing it and then using it as a drinking water supply.” (Jd.
12 The “loss of value” method of damage assessment is also
sometimes referred to as the “loss of use” method.
|
|
|
'
|
28B
at 36.) Mr. Alkema testified about the drawbacks related
to this method of treatment:
“li]Jt does not take into account that much of the
water is already being used for purposes that
don’t require that level of treatment [drinking
water]. It also really did not take into account the
feasibility of this remedy. It was strictly a text-
book kind of analysis where we looked at cost of
treatment for a certain kind of water and just
pulled that out and used it. It was not a feasibility
analysis in any way as to whether this might or
might not work and then it also deals with one
of the tough issues as to what is the right, what
is the damage because of the injury to the
resource, to the public as a whole, and what is
the damage to that resource that impacts the
private water right holder.” (Jd. at 38) (emphasis
added.)
Mr. Alkema testified that the cost of replacement
method of damage involves “purchasing water rights for
water of comparable quality that would have been there.”
(Id. at 39.) However, Mr. Alkema noted a fundamental
difficulty associated with the replacement cost method:
[i]t’s really not true replacement in that if you
take water from Bear River or from out in Cen-
tral Utah Project, you’re really not replacing
water, you’re only moving that water from one
place to the other and that was a concern we
had that although it is acceptable as a replace-
ment kind of alternative, it really does not
replace water. (Id. at 40.)
He also noted that this type of damages analysis
“assumes that there . . . is a complete loss of the resource
that has been damaged or injured, . . . (and) it also
29B
provides . . . a damage to the individual water right
hob@er.....” Gd)
It was apparent at the hearing that the State utilized
the loss of value method based upon market value in
determining damages for purposes of settlement. In this
regard, Mr. Alkema testified that in determining the set-
tlement figure, “there were two factors, major factors that
we considered, one was the amount of water in the terms
of safe annual yield that was impacted and the other was
the value of that water.” (Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 23.)
Evidence was presented at the hearing as to the market
value of an acre foot of water. (Trans. Vol. IV Pt. 1 at 32;
Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 29.) Kennecott and the State also
presented evidence that the settlement agreed upon rep-
resents a fair market price for the safe annual yield of
13,000 acre feet of water within the MIA. (Trans. Vol. IV
Pt. 1 at 32, 47.) In this regard, Dr. Charles J. Ciccetti, an
economist employed by Arthur Anderson Economic Con-
sulting and by the University of Southern California,
testified on behalf of Kennecott that the price arrived at
was “higher than it should have been.” (Id. at 47.)
It is clear that the loss of value or loss of use method
of evaluation was regarded by the State as strictly a
market value method of computing damages. In this
regard, neither Kennecott nor the State presented evi-
dence of damages suffered by the State for loss of use
other than estimated market value of the 13,000 acre feet.
(Id. at 21-23.) No amounts were presented as to existence
and option values or damages. Existence value is derived
from the satisfaction of simply knowing that a natural
resource exists, even if no use occurs. Option value is the
value associated with an individual’s desire to preserve
30B
the option to use the natural resource, even if it is not
currently being used. In this regard, Dr. Ciccetti, Ken-
necott’s expert, testified:
[We] have a situation here where the injured
resource is groundwater so the typical catego-
ries of damages that are related to recreation, to
scenic and esthetic [sic] amenities, to the kinds
of things that in most other natural resource
damage claims cases are very important and
involve a lot of time and effort. In this situation,
we just don’t have those categories of damage, so the
lost services, that is, the lost utility to people
that is relevant is the ability to use the ground-
water for either municipal, commercial, or
industrial or irrigation uses, in other words its
value is limited to removing it from below the
surface and bringing it up and putting it into
some productive or consumptive use when it’s
needed and when it would be cost effective to
do so.
(Id. at 21) (emphasis added.)
Evidence was presented indicating both a scarcity
and an over abundance of water in the Salt Lake valley.
(Trans. Vol. [IV Pt. 1 at 29; Exh. D-2, p. 2; Exh. 1-44, p.
ES-2.) However, water scarcity in this arid part of the
country was not adequately developed in terms of impact
upon the existence value of the aquifer.
It appears to the court that the State prematurely
utilized the “loss of value” measure of damages since it
had not developed sufficient facts to justify its conclusion
that the contaminatec plumes could not be remediated. In
any event, it appears that the loss of value method was
not correctly applied In this regard, the State purported
31B
to utilize the loss of value method in determining dam-
ages to its ground water resources, but it actually utilized
a strictly market value approach, based upon water quan-
tity measured by safe annual yield. Other use and nonuse
values apart from market value, including option and
existence values, were regarded as inapplicable. Failure
to take into account damages such as loss of the aquifer
apart from market value of the quantity of water the State
determined to be contaminated resulted in an inadequate
assessment of damages under the loss of use method.
6. Nature and Extent of SLCWCD’s Interest
Evidence was presented that at least one well is
controlled by SLCWCD within the MIA. Mr. Bay, Chief
Engineer of the Salt Lake Water Conservancy District,
testified that “I found one [a water right belonging to
SLCWCD] that lies within nearly the center of the plume
area and several around the perimeter or within the areas
that’s defined here.” (Trans. Vol. VI Pt. 1 at 9.) The Dis-
trict owns other wells in the area to which Mr. Bay
testified:
One is located within 200 feet of the mining
impact area, the other two are located within
1600 and 1700 feet, very close and those that |
find would draw water from that area. The
others are water right numbers 57-8817 located
right here, (indicating), and right close to that is
57-2426. I determined that the state engineer
would find that these are so close that they
would draw water from area 8. (Id. at 11.)
The Sierra Club and the Mineral Policy Center were
granted leave as Amicus Curiae to submit a memorandum of
32B
law following the evidentiary hearing, and the parties and
intervenor were permitted to file post hearing briefs. On
May 14, 1992, in an all day session, the court heard extensive
argument on the ultimate issue, i.e., whether the court
should approve the Consent Decree as being just, fair and
reasonable and consistent with the purposes CERCLA is
intended to serve, and the matter was taken under advise-
ment. Now being fully advised, the court makes and enters
its Memorandum Decision and Order.
Il. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The trial court’s function when reviewing proposed con-
sent decrees forged under CERCLA is to “satisfy itself that
the settlement is reasonable, fair, and consistent with the
purposes that CERCLA is intended to serve.” U.S. Cannons
Engineering Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 85 (1st Cir. 1990). In this
regard, the “statute’s overreaching [sic] principles” are
“accountability, the desirability of an unsullied environment
and promptness of response activities.” Id. at 91. Fairness in
the CERCLA settlement context has both procedural and
substantive components.'? Clean up and remediation is the
'3 The First Circuit pointed out that procedural fairness
evaluates the negotiating process and attempts to “gauge its
candor, openness, and bargaining balance.” Cannons, 899 F.2d at
86. In this case it appears that procedural fairness has been
satisfied.
Substantive fairness requires that “a party bear the cost of
the harm for which it is legally responsible.” Id. at 87. It is
“roughly correlated with, some acceptable measure of compara-
tive fault, apportioning liability among the settling parties
33B
fundamental purpose of CERCLA.!'4
B. Settlements in Which Federal Regulations are
Not Followed
In this case the State chose not to follow the existing
federal regulations in making its determinations.!5 It was
not required to do so, but failure to do so eliminates the
presumption of validity and correctness which otherwise
the State would enjoy.'© This is important in a case such
according to rational estimates of how much harm each PRP has
done.” Id.
14 “Congress, in enacting CERCLA, intended to provide a
vehicle for cleaning up and preserving the environment from
the evils of improperly disposed of hazardous substances... . ”
Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle County, 659 F.Supp.
1269, 1286 (D.Del. 1987) (quoting Artesian I, 605 F.Supp. at 1357
n. 10.)
1S See 51 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (1986) (codified at 43 C.F.R.
§§ 11.10-11.93 (1987). Among other things the regulations
require the Trustee to determine whether there has been an
injury to the natural resources (43 C.F.R. § 11.61 - .64), to quan-
tify the amount of natural resources damaged (43 C.F.R. § 11.70 -
.73), and to assess the dollar amount of damages to be paid (43
C.F.R. § 11.80 - .84). At the hearing Kenneth L. Alkema, the
trustee appointed by the Governor of the State of Utah and
Director of the State Division of Environmental Health, testified
that “[w]e did not follow the procedural requirements that are
spoken of in the regulation.” (Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 30, 31.) Mr.
Alkema further testified that “he did not conduct a formal
Department of Interior Part B assessment as outlined in the
regulations.” (Id at 30-31.)
16 42 U.S.C. 9607(f)(2)(C) provides: “Any determination or
assessment of damages to natural resources for the purposes of
this chapter . . . made by a Federal or State trustee in accordance
34B
as this where the State has chosen to settle its damage
claim before the remediation process. This “cart before the
horse” approach is unusual as noted by the court in In re
Acushnet River and New Bedford Harbor: Proceedings re
Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F.Supp. 1019, 1035 (D. Mass
1989):
. customarily, natural resource damages set-
tlements follow or are contemporaneous with
cleanup settlements. This is so because, custom-
arily, natural resource damages are viewed as
the difference between the natural resource in
its pristine condition and the natural resource
after the cleanup, together with the lost use
value and the costs of assessment. As a residue
of the cleanup action, in effect, they are thus not
generally settled prior to a cleanup settlement.!7
C. Deficiencies in Proposed Settlement
The court has determined from a preponderance of
the evidence at the hearing that the settlement contained
within the proposed Consent decree is deficient in at least
with the regulation promulgated under section 9651 of this title
shall have the force and effect of a rebuttable presumption on
behalf of the trustee ....” 43 C.F.R. 11.10 provides: “The
assessment procedures set forth in this part are not mandatory.
However, they must be used by Federal or State natural
resource trustees in order to obtain the rebuttable presumption
contained in section 107(f)(C)(2) of CERCLA.”
17 In Acushnet River, the court ultimately approved settle-
ment of the natural resource damages claim prior to and inde-_
pendent of the clean up and remediation process, but imposed
conditions including a requirement to “;» tect and restore.”
Acushnet, 712 F.Supp at 1038.
35B
three major respects. First, lack of sufficient foundation
for the State’s determination that its ground water natu-
ral resource cannot be restored.!8 Second, failure to
require substantial protection of State natural resources
from further contamination. Third, failure to apply the
proper measure of damages, which resulted in failure
adequately to take into account the extent of the damages
the State has suffered and will suffer as a result of the
contamination. Failure to develop sufficient factual foun-
dation to support the State’s determination that contami-
nated ground waters cannot be restored requires that the
proposed Consent Decree be rejected for failure to dem-
onstrate that the remedial purposes CERCLA was
intended to achieve cannot be achieved. Failure to man-
date containment and management of the contaminated
waters, and failure to require further source control does
not comport with the CERCLA requirement to “protect
and restore.” Inadequate consideration of damages
requires that the proposed Consent Decree be rejected for
failure to satisfy substantive fairness under CERCLA.
1. State’s Determination Not to Require Resto-
ration of its Contaminated Ground Waters
In this case the State determined that it is not feasible
to restore the contaminated ground water within the so-
called “Mining Impact Area.” However, the State failed to
require Kennecott to complete a final Environmental
18 “Restoration” can be achieved by cleaning up and thus
restoring a damaged resource, or by replacing or acquiring the
equivalent of the damaged resource. See footnote 26, infra.
36B
Impact Assessment which would have set forth and
assessed possible remedial alternatives. When the 1990
Kennecott settlement offer was submitted, the State prop-
erly engaged experts to evaluate the offer. The State
rejected the Kennecott plan for plume remediation, but
remediation studies and evaluations called for by RCG/
Hagler were not ordered to be completed. (Exh. P-44 at
5-1.) In Dr. Lall’s review of thé settlement offer he made it
plain that analysis of the natural resources damage claim
was “inextricably tied to the remediation issue,” but he
was not asked to complete his work. (Exh. P-47.) As a
result, alternative possibilities for remediation which may
have been suggested were not identified. In this regard,
at the hearing of this matter, SLCWCD presented a plan
for partial remediation based upon reverse osmosis.
Apparently that possibility, which was not fully devel-
oped at the hearing, was not analyzed by the State prior
to its determination that remediation was not feasible.
Also, it is not clear that the State’s determination of the
“safe annual yield” was fully analyzed.!9
This court concludes that the State and Kennecott
failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence
that restoration and plume remediation is not feasible in
justification of the State’s determination not to require
19 It is questionable whether 13,000 acre feet is an accurate
estimate of the safe annual yield of contaminated waters within
the MIA. Mr. Alkema testified at the hearing that, “[i]f your
decision was not to enter this Consent Decree, we would defi-
nitely complete his (Dr. Lall’s) report, get more information, and do
whatever we needed to prove what safe annual yield was. In
our mind it still is and will probably continue to be the 13,000
acre feet.” (Trans. Vol. II Pt. 2 at 147) (emphasis added.)
37B
such. Failure to develop sufficient factual foundation to
support the State’s determination that contaminated
ground waters cannot be remediated requires that the
proposed Consent Decree be rejected for failure to dem-
onstrate that the remedial purposes CERCIA was
intended to achieve cannot be achieved.
2. Failure to Require Source Control or Manage-
ment and Containment of Existing Contami-
nated Waters
Section 9622(j)(2) of CERCLA requires a federal
trustee, when settling a natural resource damage claim
that contains a covenani not to sue for natural resource
damages, to require the potentially responsible party
(PRP) to commit to “actions necessary to protect and
restore the natural resources damaged by such release or
such threatened release.” In this regard, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9622(j)(2) provides:
An agreement under this section may contain a
covenant not to sue under section 9607(a)(4)(C)
of this title for damages to natural resources
under the trusteeship of the United States
resulting from the release or threatened release
of hazardous substances that is the subject of the
agreement, but only if the Federal natural
resource trustee has agreed in writing to such
covenant. The Federal natural resource trustee
may agree to such covenant if the potentially
responsible party agrees to undertake appropriate
action necessary to protect and restore the natural
resources damages by such release or threatened
release of hazardous substances. (emphasis added.)
38B
In the Acushnet River case, the court ruled under CERCLA
section 9622(j) that natural resources damages settlements
which do not require clean up but which contain a cove-
nant not to sue (on the part of the government) — must
include provisions assuring that the responsible party
will take actions necessary to “protect and restore” the
injured natural resources. Acushnet, 712 F.Supp. at 1036.2°
In this case, even though the State determined that it
would be infeasible to “restore” the contaminated natural
resource, it could have required a covenant to “protect”
by way of source control as well as containment and
management of the existing contaminated plumes.?!
However, the proposed Consent Decree contains no
such protective requirements.
The proposed Consent Decree fails to require protec-
tion against further contamination by way of source con-
trol. Although the State does not waive its right to require
source control, the Consent Decree fails to impose any
substantial duties upon Kennecott in that regard. It was
20 The plain language of Section 9622(j)(2) applies only to
cases involving a federal trustee, with no corresponding provi-
sion applicable to state trusteeships. However, consistent with
the purposes of CERCLA, the “protect and restore” mandate
should apply to covenants not to sue for natural resource dam-
age settlements that precede clean up whether such involve
federal or state trustees.
21 Such a covenant could have been required by the State as
owner of the damaged ground waters. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1
provides “[a]ll waters in this state, whether above or under the
ground are... the property of the public, subject to all existing
rights to the use thereof.”
39B
demonstrated at the hearing that Kennecott has accom-
plished some source control,?? but it was also made clear
that much more is needed.?3 Notwithstanding such recog-
nized need, the State has failed to require additional
source control measures even though it is apparent that
the contaminated plumes are being further contaminated
by Kennecott operations.74
The proposed Consent Decree also does not address
what will have to be done to manage and contain the
existing contaminated waters, such as pumping water or
other measures designed to “protect” uncontaminated
waters from the damaged resource. In this regard, the
proposed Consent Decree contains no provision requiring
measures to be taken to minimize future expansion of the
existing plumes, or to assure that the contamination will
not spread beyond the MIA.?5
22 Kennecott has engaged in a number of activities to allevi-
ate sources of contamination including: lining the leach collec-
tion system, double lining and installation of a leak detection
system in the small reservoir, reducing the level of water in the
large Bingham reservoir and lining it, removing sludge from the
large Bingham reservoir, and development of a surface water
management system to redirect contaminated mine area surface
waters to the concentrator. (Trans. Vol. I Pt. 2 at 155-61.)
23 See discussion on source remediation, pp. 24-26 [pp.
24B-26B], supra.
24 Mr. Alkema testified at the hearing that “contamination
continues” and that the “plume continues to grow.” (Trans. Vol.
I] Pt. 2 at 126.)
25 The proposed Consent Decree does provide for a ground
water permit program wherein a ground water discharge per-
mit is required for active operations that have the potential to
discharge to ground water. The permit is granted if an applicant
40B
The State and Kennecott did not present a sufficient
factual predicate to convince the court that the proposed
Consent Decree would be just and fair without a cove-
nant to perform necessary additional source control and
to provide for containment and management of the exis-
ting contamination. Failure to require containment and
management of the contaminated water, and failure to
require further source control does not comport with the
CERCLA requirement to “protect and restore.”
3. The State Failed to Assess Damages Ade-
quately
In the landmark case of State of Ohio v. United States
Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1989), at issue
was the Department of Interior’s regulations which provided
that damages in such actions would equal the lesser of
restoration or replacement costs, or diminution in use values.
The court rejected the “lesser of” approach and held that
CERCLA mandates a distinct preference for restoration costs
as the measure of damages.?° This court adopts and follows
the Ohio court’s rule of law in that respect.
can demonstrate that all discharges will meet applicable dis-
charge standards. The program involves monitoring, sampling
and reporting to ensure that the discharge standards are met.
(Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 10-12.) This water permit program will
help to prevent the contaminated plumes from growing larger,
but does nothing to manage or contain the existing contamina-
tion.
26 The term restoration is commonly used by courts as
“shorthand” for “restoring, replacing or acquiring the equiva-
lent of the damaged resource.” See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 441.
41B
The Ohio court also rejected a narrow interpretation of
use values contained in DOI’s rules which placed extraordin-
ary reliance on market values.?”7 The court ordered the DOI
to issue a rule “that would permit trustees to derive use
values for natural resources by summing up all reliably
calculated use values, however measured so long as the
trustee does not double count.” Id. at 464. In this regard, the
court held that option and existence values “prima facie,
ought to be included in a damage assessment,” assuring full
compensation for the lost resource. Id. While option and
existence values may represent “ ‘passive’ use, . . . they
nonetheless reflect utility derived by humans from a
resource, and thus, prima facie, ought to be included in
damage assessment.” [d.28
27 The Ohio court illustrated this point: “[I]magine a hazardous
substance spill that kills a rookery of fur seals and destroys a habitat
for seabirds at a sealife reserve. The lost use value of the seals and
seabird habitat would be measured by the market value of the fur
seals’ pelts (which would be approximately $15 each) plus the
selling price per acre of land comparable in value to that on which
the spoiled bird habitat was located. Even if, as likely, the use value
turns out to be far less than the cost of restoring the rookery and
seabird habitat, it would nonetheless be the only measure of dam-
ages eligible for the presumption of recoverability under the Interior
rule.” Ohio, 880 F.2d at 442. The court then went on to say: “[f]rom
the bald eagle to the blue whale and snail darter, natural resources
have values that are not fully captured by the market system.” Id. at
462-63.
28 Very few resources, “such as plants and animals, possess
an established economic value.” Cross, Frank B., “Natural
Resource Damage Valuation,” 42 Vand. L. Rew. [sic] 269, 307
(1989). When a market does exist, the values ascribed may
inadequately value the resource to the public. For instance,
recreational sports anglers may find that the presence of fish has
higher value or greater utility than commercial fishermen. Id.
42B
In this case, having determined that restoration is not
feasible, the State turned to loss of value as the sole
method of measuring damages. If further study demon-
strates that restoration is feasible, the State would be
obliged to follow and apply the statutory preference for
restoration in assessing costs and damages, unless excep-
tional circumstances would warrant adoption of a differ-
ent measure of damages. In this regard, the Ohio court
did note that a possible exception to restoration could
exist where “other considerations—i.e., infeasibility of
restoration or grossly disproportionate cost to use value
—warrant a different standard.” Id. at 459. Assuming that
this case presents the exception, and that the State would
be justified in determining that restoration is not feasible,
it appears that the State adopted a too narrow interpreta-
tion of use value by equating such with market value
only. Manifestly, the settlement amount is based on loss
of value which essentially calculates the alleged market
value of the safe annual yield within the Mining Impact
Area without reference to existence and option values.
(Trans. Vol. II Pt. 1 at 23.) The State simply failed to assess
the non-consumptive use values of the aquifer, i.e., option
and existence values.?9
29 Although the aquifer is unlike most other natural
resources such as lakes, eagles or seals which have more
obvious existence and option values, its existence value should
have been considered in the settlement given the fact that peo-
ple who live in a desert most likely would assign substantial
value in just knowing that an aquifer exists. The Hagler Report
(Exh. P-44, at p. ES-2) notes that there is “water scarcity in the
valley.” There was conflicting testimony at the hearing on this
matter, but if true, this would certainly enhance existence value.
43B
It appears to the court that significant additional
possible damages such as loss of the aquifer are not
provided for in the proposed Consent Decree, even
assuming that loss of value ultimately is determined to be
the proper standard. Moreover, the State failed to calcu-
late into the settlement the costs of preventing the plumes
from spreading and contaminating the remaining
unspoiled portion of the aquifer, by pumping water or
other methods. In addition, the State did not require that
the settlement include the cost of further source control
which would at least lessen contamination from continu-
ing on a daily basis. Apparently, the State clings to the
possibility of future plume remediation to be ordered by
EPA. That possibility is not a justifiable reason for the
State to fail to adequately study possible alternatives or
to fail to require a covenant to “protect and restore” State
owned natural resources. In this regard, the settlement as
proposed does not “capture fully all aspects of the loss.”
Ohio, 880 F.2d at 463.
This court concludes that inadequate consideration of
damages requires that the proposed Consent Decree be
rejected for failure to demonstrate to the court the exis-
tence of substantive fairness under CERCLA.
lil. INTERVENTION
Intervention in a CERCLA action is governed by
CERCLA § 133(j) and is also subject to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.
A potential intervenor must (1) make a timely application
for intervention, (2) have an interest in the subject of the
action, (3) be so situated that without intervention the
disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair
44B
or impede the applicant’s ability to protect his interest,
and (4) have an interest not adequately protected by the
existing parties. United States v. Mid-State Disposal, Inc.,
131 F.R.D. 573, 576 (W.D. Wis. 1990). See also United States
v. Bliss, 132 F.R.D. 58, 59 (E.D. Mo. 1990). If one or more of
the above criteria are not met, a party will not qualify for
intervention of right, as distinguished from permissive
intervention.
In this case, because of the exclusions contained in
the Consent Decree preserving rights of third parties to
recover for “interference with the quantity and quality of
their water rights,” adjudication of this action would not
necessarily impair or impede the ability of non party
third persons to protect their interests. The Consent
Decree specifically provides that “the Decree does not
resolve or bar claims, if any, of third parties, including,
but not limited to, claims by political subdivisions of the
State.”
Turning to the petition of SLCWCD for intervention,
the court has determined that permissive intervention
should be granted. The petition of SLCWCD was timely
under the circumstances of this case. Only after publica-
tion of the proposed Consent Decree did it become appar-
ent that the State and Kennecott were jointly advocating
settlement pursuant to terms thereof. Other factors to be
considered in connection with permissive intervention
are:
the nature and extent of the intervenor’s inter-
est, whether the intervention will unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
45B
original parties, whether the applicant will ben-
efit by the intervention, whether the inter-
venor’s interests are adequately represented by
the other parties, and whether the intervenors
will significantly contribute to the full develop-
ment of the underlying factual issues in the suit
and to the just and equitable adjudication of the
legal ,uestions presented.
Acushnet, 712 F.Supp. at 1023. See Rule 24(b)(2) Fed. R.
Civ. P. See also United States Postal System v. Brennan, 579
F.2d 188, 191-92 (2d Cir. 1978).
After due consideration of the aforesaid factors, this
court determines to exercise its discretion and to permit
SLCWCD to intervene in this case. SLCWCD is uniquely
situated to significantly contribute to the underlying fac-
tual and legal issues which have a bearing upon the just
and equitable determination of legal questions presented.
Based upon the foregoing, this court concludes that
the proposed Consent Decree as written is not just and
fair or consistent with the purposes of CERCLA. Accord-
ingly, the application for approval of the proposed Con-
sent Decree is denied.
This case is set for a case management conference on
October 23, 1992, at 10:30 a.m. Prior to the conference
with the court counsel for the parties are directed to meet
and develop a suggested plan for the conduct of discov-
ery pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f). The parties should
46B
file the jointly agreed upon plan with the court by noon
on October 16, 1992.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 3rd, 1992.
/s/ J. Thomas Greene
J. THOMAS GREENE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE
1C
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
STATE OF UTAH, By and Through the
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
KENNECOTT CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant and
Cross-Appellee,
SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT, Intervenor-Appellee and
Cross-Appellant.
Nos. 92-4173, 92-4179 and 92-4180.
ORDER
Entered March 28, 1994
Before BALDOCK, McWILLIAMS and BRORBY, Cir
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