Opposition Brief — Weatherly v. Federal Debt Management, Inc.
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Bupreme Court, U.S.
FILED
AUG 17 1994
No. 94-126 : OFFICE OF THE CLERK
|
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1994
+
LEE WEATHERLY,
Petitioner,
FEDERAL DEBT MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Respondent.
+
Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court Of The State Of Texas
+
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT FEDERAL DEBT
MANAGEMENT, INC. IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
4
STEVEN T. PoLINO
Gopwin & Cartton, P.C.
901 Main Street, Suite 3300
Dallas, Texas 75202-3714
(214) 939-4474
(214) 760-7332 — Telecopy
Counsel of Record
for Respondent Federal
Debt Management, Inc.
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
| BEST AVAILABLE COPY
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Do assignees and transferees of failed bank assets
purchased from the FDIC, receive in the assignment
and transfer of the underlying substantive right, the
right and benefit of the six-year statute of limitations
enjoyed by FDIC pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14),
as a matter of federal law.
Whether 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) is a right, interest, or
benefit of the FDIC that runs with an assignment of
the underlying substantive right to FDIC's assignees.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED.................0-0eeeeeee 7
TABLE OF CONTENTS...............0eee cece. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...............0.0e0ee. iy
SES TIEN «5 cc lod occ ooeesoadecnee ee
STATUTE INVOLVED .............0-0eeeeeeee 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............0.0-0000:- 2
REASONS FOR NOT GRANTING WRIT........... 4
i.
IT.
The Passing of the Federal Six-Year Statute of
Limitations to Assignees With the Assignment
of Underlying Substantive Rights Enhances
FDIC’s Ability to Efficiently Liquidate Assets
Of FPadind TmetOOs 6 sic 3 66d doe cksese tae
A. This Court Has Only Intervened Twice in
Cases OF TONG TVG 0s cdsccavsndonsare
B. The Lower Federal and State Courts Deci-
sions Are Uniform, Thus Demonstrating This
Court’s Supervision Is Not Necessary......
C. The Texas Supreme Court Correctly Con-
cluded That § 1821(d)(14) Creates a
“Right” Transferrable to Subsequent Pur-
CRAIG 6s bo ks Seaane eee
D. Resort To Common Law Is Necessary To
Fill Inevitable Statutory Gaps ...........
The Extension of the Benefit of the Six-Year
Statute of Limitations to Assignees Does Not
Conflict With the Purposes of Statutes of Lim-
SEO. ood s.0 sc wwe ee-eden sent eee
ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page
Ill. The Decision of the Texas Supreme Court is in
Accord With the Decision in Hinkson and the
BE By ee: ee ae 15
A. The Texas Supreme Court Followed Well-
Settled Rules of Statutory Construction.. 19
IV. The Extension of Federal Statutory Rights to
Assignees, as Well as Congressional Intent
Support the Decision of the Texas Supreme
8 Be BOE aa er a Pane eee 22
A. Federal and State Courts have extended the
statutory provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) to
entities other than the FDIC .............. 22
B. Congressional Intent Underlying Section
1821(d)(14) as Well as the Entire Compre-
hensive Scheme of Facilitating Resolution
of Insolvent Institutions and Minimizing
the Cost to the Insurance Fund Support the
Decision of the Texas Supreme Court.... 26
ae da kss oie a5 b ORK SONS oo Dae eee ED 28
TABLE CF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Aaron v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 446 U.S. 680
PEN 64 had Soe ee RE ae ee eke 26
Alarcon v. FDIC, 772 F.Supp. 334 (E.D.Mich. 1991) .... 25
Bell & Murphy & Assoc. v. InterFirst Bank Gateway,
894 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895
Peace ee ieee on eng cae eee See eas 8
Cadle Co. II, Inc. v. Lewis, 864 P.2d 718 (Kan. 1993),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 1613 (1994) ...8 9
Cadle Co. v. Estate of Weaver, No. D-3866, 1994 WL
Fa CO. Fe es x + oo vice oh cee césnaken Y
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) ....... 19
Central States Resources Corp. v. First National Bank
in Morrill, 501 N.W.2d 271 (Neb. 1993)............. 9
Cressey 0: Meyer, 1356 U.S. 525 (1691) ......... 17, 18, 19
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 363
eG ga eee keer heer eae ees eee 20
D’Oench, Duhme & Co.; v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942)
Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184 (1991)...19, 20, 21
Deposit Guaranty Bank v. Hall, 741 FSupp. 1287
Sst Ss 5a 5 nner ees ee Nee A Tee ees =
EKA Liquidators v. Phillips, No. 4157, 1994 WL
Pure Cem, WOT DF, TOPE. nck vc ccd cc ceccics 9
Fall v. Keasler, No. C-90-20643, 1991 WL 340182
po BE te” Se 2 ae RS |: | a a 9, 14
FDIC v. Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 904 (1991)....... 6, 13, 15
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.
SOND waht sk ace eae Ee ee 9, 12, 19, 20
FDIC v. Hinkson, 848 F.2d 432 (3rd Cir. 1988) 13, 15, 16
FDIC v. Howse, 736 F.Supp. 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1990) 10, 11
FDIC v. Newhart, 713 F.Supp. 320 (W.D. Miss.),
aff'd, 892 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1989) .................. 23
FDIC v. Newhart, 892 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1989)...... 23, 24
Federal Debt Management v. Weatherly, 842 S.W.2d
774 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1992), rev’d, 37 Tex.
supp. Ct. ]. Sam CNeRiere SBP) oo oc ke cas tecsases 9
Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert.
sensed, 459 US. Re CRs so oak oko cee ease esac 5
Investment Co. of the Southwest v. Reese, 875 P.2d
SOO ATR. SO ica cx Sk eee 8, 9
Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245 (1926) ........ 21, 22
Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 496 VS. BG (IIE aon civ dccan ts adeanens 25
Langiey v. FOIC, 464 U.S. G6 CIGBF7) a aoc cs icsesns ck caus 8
Mountain States Financial Resources Corp. v.
Agrawal, 777 F.Supp. 1550 (W.D. Okla. 1991) ....... 9
North Amer. Credit Consultants v. Garlic Sales and
Serv. Co., No. 91-1066-C, 1992 WL 477016, (W.D.
Code, Ghee, Bi. BOM ks cna ve wed eacseelenl eee 9
RSR Properties, Inc. v. FDIC, 706 F.Supp 524
Se ae) rr rrr errr re oy bares eet tr 25
V1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
RTC v. Krantz, 757 F.Supp. 915 (N.D. Ill. 1991) ...... 1]
In re Shearer, 139 F.Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1956)....... 21
Tivoli Ventures, Inc. v. Tallman, 852 P.2d 1310 (Colo.
App. 1992), rev'd, 870 P.2d 1244 (Colo. 1994)....... )
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715
(1979)... 0 0 ee eee. 20
United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940) ...17, 18
West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Cassey,
4
U.S. __, 111 S.Ct. 1138 (1991) ............. 19, 21
White v. Moriarty, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200 (Cal. C.
App.), review denied............ jae saeasewa ..... 10
Willow Tree Inv., Inc. v. Wagener, 453 N.W.2d 641
(lowa 1990) ......... 00. eee ee ee ey 4.
JI
>)
12 U.S.C. § 1441A(b)(4).... 000.00 ee eee. eee I
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i)&(ii) . 2 ee. .. 16
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) ............ , .... passim
12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(14)(A), (B)...... ...2, 16
12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(14)(A)(i)(1) & (ID)....... 17
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued
Page
aria Act C6 1555, BOR Boikc nc dcccnccecncunsecs +
Danking Act Of 1935, SectsOm I01.......0.60sciecccsens 4
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987) (the “Bridge
SO SN Fou bo edna tas nd ad oksndeawatenescueseys 6
Explanations to FIRREA, Title I, Purposes of the
eM Ee eT eee TORE Tee TET TET CTE TOL ey 26
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-73, 103
Sk, Ser a EE Ss Sac Ges ca ca ceva veuvertans eas 3 2
PEEL, OCIIR MUL, DRAIR. ZIOE 2. sce crsccecccssesni 26
FUE ta; UY SUPROUED 60:50 0-05.05 0 Cava teeeaeeesawad 6, 27
te a ey errr rer rrr ee rey Ty 27
FIRREA, Section 501 (b)(4)..... cia es ea ee 1]
[he Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”), 12
ae I eke eo cee 5
The Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 264 (1933)...... 5
H.R. Rep. No. 2564, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950),
reprinted tn 1950 USAL.AN. S765 . occ ccccesenci 4,5
H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1989),
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 87-93, 108 ....... 26
S. Rep. 19, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in
Gy USA L.A. GPL, Dabs cs ccesenvctsnaveseoy
135 Cong. Rec. $10182-01 (Daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989) .... 27
Vill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
TREATISES
James J. Boteler, Comment, Protecting the American
Taxpayers: Assigning the FDIC’s Six-Year Statute
of Limitations to Third Party Purchasers, 24 Tex.
Tech. L. Rev. 1169, 1200 (1993)[hereinafter “Bot-
gg: ne ae ar ERR a are Cg TP ee ee Oe 7, 10
Jeffrey M. Sharp, Extending the FDIC’s “Super
Powers” to its Transferrees: A Vehicle for Privatiz-
ing Loss Recovery, 97 Com. L.J. 49, 59, 66 (1992)
ae at Er era Se ae
Brian J. Woram, FIRREA’S Statutes Of Limitations:
Their Availability To Purchasers From The FDIC,
110 Banking L.J. 292 (1993)[hereinafter
NE TB a scare ON ws aid win Se OS Rea 10
No. 94-126
4
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1994
a —_
LEE WEATHERLY,
Petitioner,
FEDERAL DEBT MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Respondent.
*
Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court Of The State Of Texas
+
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT FEDERAL DEBT
MANAGEMENT, INC. IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
+
TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT:
The Respondent, Federal Debt Management, Inc.,
respectfully requests that this Court deny Petition for
Writ of Certiorari submitted by the Petitioner, Lee Weath-
erly.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked
under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
No
However, as noted below, there are no conflicts
among the United States Court of Appeals on the issue
involved here, nor has such a Court decided a federal
question in a way that would conflict with a state court of
last resort or so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of
his Court’s power of supervision. Rule 10.1(a), Supreme
Court Rules. Further, no state court of last resort has
decided the federal issues involved in this suit in conflict
with the decision of another state court of last resort. Rule
10.1(b), Supreme Court Rules.
The decisions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit and the various state courts of last
resort are in harmony with the decisions of this Court
and each court has shown its ability to decide this impor-
tant question of federal law without the necessity of the
supervision of this Court. Rule 10.1(c), Supreme Court
Rules
STATUTE INVOLVED
12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(14)(A), (B).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The question before the Court is a case of first
impression involving the application of the right, interest
and benefit of the federal six-year statute of limitations,
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14), as added by the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
Pub. L. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (“FIRREA”), Title XII, to
assignees and transferees of assets purchased from the
FDIC.
The issue presented is whether assignees and trans-
ferees of failed bank assets purchased from the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) receive as part
of the assignment and transfer, as a matter of federal law,
the right and benefit of the federal six-year statute of
limitations enjoyed by FDIC pursuant to 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(14).
Respondent agrees with the statement of the case
stated by Petitioner except in the following particulars.
From the commencement of this suit on April 15,
1991, Respondent, Federal Debt Management, Inc. (here-
inafter “FDM” or “Respondent”), asserted that it was the
assignee and transferee of the notes in question from the
FDIC pursuant to those exhibits evidencing assignment
and transfer attached to FDM’s Original Petition (“Peti-
tion”). FDM argued in response to Petitioner’s Motion
For Summary Judgment that the Texas four-year statute
of limitations did not apply, but that the federal six-year
statute of limitations cited above applied to the time
limits available to FDM’s right to recover in this case.
At the time that the FDIC acquired the notes in
question, there is no question that the respective causes
of actions on all three notes were still alive. In fact, the
cause of action on one of the notes involved did not even
accrue until after FDIC acquired the notes on September
25, 1986. Further, there is no quest.on that had the FDIC
held on to the notes in question it would have had until
at least September 2, 1992 through November 3, 1992 to
file suit on the respective notes.
On August 9, 1989, FIRREA was enacted creating 12
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14). All causes of action on the notes
were still alive and were still owned by the FDIC as
receiver for Heritage National Bank (“FDIC Receiver”).
The exhibits attached to FDM’s Petition show that the
FDIC-Receiver sold, transferred, and assigned the notes
to FDOM on November 7, 1989!, nearly three months after
the enactment of FIRREA. Thus, this case does not neces-
sarily require the retroactive application of FIRREA to
claims in existence on August 9, 1989.
REASONS FOR NOT GRANTING THE WRIT
I. The Passing of the Federal Six-Year Statute of Lim-
itations to Assignees With the Assignment of Under-
lying Substantive Rights Enhances FDIC’s Ability to
Efficiently Liquidate Assets of Failed Institutions.
The FDIC was established under authority of Section
8 of the Banking Act of 1933, and Section 101 of the
Banking Act of 1935, which became effective August 23,
1935, and which provided the permanent plan of deposit
insurance contained in existing law. H. R. Rep. No. 2564,
8ist Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N
| The Briefs of the parties below, including FDM, and th«
opinions below state that the notes were assigned on October
27, 1989. Further review of the respective Bills of Sale attached
to FDM’s Petition reveal that they were executed November 7
1989. The difference is not material to the issues in the case but
is only cited for clarity
3765. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”), 12
U.S.C. § 1811, et seq., which established and created the
FDIC, was originally enacted as Section 12B of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 264 (1933).
The purpose of the FDIC, as articulated in the FDIA,
is to bring to depositors sound, effective, and uninter-
rupted operation of the banking system with resulting
safety and equity of bank deposits. H. R. Rep. No. 2564,
1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3765-66.
[he FDIC traditionally had two choices in the dispo-
sition of failed bank assets: straight liquidation and dis-
tribution to depositors and creditors or transferring such
assets to an assuming bank thereby lessening the poten-
tial negative impact on the insurance fund. Gunter v.
Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1059 (1982).
Over time, the FDIA has been amended to provide
the FDIC with greater authority and power. Initial
amending legislation gave the FDIC added authority to
make loans, purchase its assets, or make deposits in order
to prevent the closing of an insured bank.?
[The increased number of bank failures in the
mid-1980s together with geographic concentration of
banking problems and the large size of some troubled
banks made it increasingly difficult for the FDIC to effi-
ciently liquidate the assets of failed banks. S. Rep. 19,
100th Cong. Ist Sess. (1987), reprinted in 1987
> H. R. Rep. No. 2564, 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3773-74,
U.S.C.C.A.N. 491, 511-12. In an effort to deal with grow-
ing problems among financial institutions, the FDIC
sought legislation to enhance its ability to handle failed
and failing banks with minimum disruption to local econ-
Omies and minimum costs to the insurance fund.
As a result, Congress initially enacted the Competi-
tive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101
Stat. 552 (1987) (the “Bridge Bank Statute”). Two years
later, Congress enacted FIRREA. One of the main goals of
both pieces of legislation was to enhance FDIC’s ability to
find purchasers of failed bank assets and obtain the best
possible price for such banking business, thus lessening
the potential negative impact on the FDIC insurance
fund. S. Rep. 19, 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 512; FIRREA, Sec-
tion 101(8).
Congress authorized suits by FDIC in its corporate
capacity (“FDIC-Corporate”), in assets acquired from
FDIC as receiver that are not transferred to an assuming
bank, in order that FDIC might recoup, or at least miti-
gate, the losses to the insurance fund (and, in large mea-
sure, ultimately to the taxpayers) that result from bank
failure. FDIC v. Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d 1466, 1470 (10th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 904 (1991).
Until recently, the FDIC almost always sought to
recover such losses by bringing suit in its own name, as
evidenced by the hundreds of reported decisions involv-
ing FDIC suits on notes, guarantees and other instru-
ments or assets acquired by purchase and assignment
from FDIC as receiver.
In recent years, however, the sheer volume of assets
coming into the hands of the FDIC has forced the FDIC to
attempt to realize value for some of such assets in ways
other than bringing suit in its own name. One of the
alternative methods by which the FDIC does so is by
selling such assets to third parties at their market value.
Jeffrey M. Sharp, Extending the FDIC’s “Super Powers” to
its Transferrees: A Vehicle for Privatizing Loss Recovery, 97
Com. L.J. 49, 59, 66 (1992) [hereinafter “Sharp”].
Contrary to Petitioner’s unsupported statement that
these investors hope “to gain a windfall at the expense of
the FDIC and... the taxpayers” the application of the
six-year statute of limitations benefits both. Id.; James J.
Boteler, Comment, Protecting the American Taxpayers:
Assigning the FDIC’s Six-Year Statute of Limitations to Third
Party Purchasers, 24 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1169, 1200 (1993)
[hereinafter “Boteler”]; cf., Petition for Writ of Certiorari
(“Petition for Cert.”) at 4.
For approximately the last fourteen years, the lower
federal and state courts have been very busy addressing
issues relating to the rights of purchasers of assets of
failed institutions from the FDIC. This is so despite the
fact that the fall-out of major banking institutions has had
an impact on customers, depositors, and creditors nation-
wide.
A. this Court Has Only Intervened Twice in Cases
of This Type.
For the last fifty-two years, this Court has only found
it necessary to intervene in cases involving the rights and
obligations of the FDIC or its assignees of this type in two
instances.° There are many instances where this Court has
not found it necessary to decide cases involving the
rights and obligations of assignees (purchasers) of the
various federal banking regulators. See e.g. Bell & Murphy
é& Assoc. v. InterFirst Bank Gateway, 894 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895 (1990).
This Court has already denied certiorari to hear a
case squarely on point with the present case. ( adle ( I]
Inc. v. Lewis, 864 P.2d 718 (Kan. 1993), cert. denied, U.S
, 114 &.Ct. 1613 (1994)
B. The Lower Federal and State Courts Decisions
Are Uniform, Thus Demonstrating This Court's
Supervision Is Not Necessary.
As noted by the Petition for Cert., over the past several
years, numerous courts have considered and decided the
issue of whether an assignee of the FDIC is entitled to the
benefits of the federal six-year statute of limitations under
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14). One court has noted that there is at least
twenty opinions to date, published and unpublished, that
}
discuss this-issue.* All federal and state courts have held that
The first instance was in this Court’s semina iSé
Wen h Duhme ry Fl ]( 15 U.S 147 194; YO Fe 1e1
Statute defined the rights of the corporation as holder of
note it acquired). The second instance, some forty-five (45
years later was another leading case, Langley v. FD 184 U.S. 8¢
’
(1987) (rights of FDIC in its corporate capacity as assignes
FDIC as receiver in note not transferred to an assuming bat
under a purchase and assumption transactior1
+ In tment f the South in B 875 Prd 86 (N.M
199 1)
a successor in interest to the FDIC enjoys the benefits of the
six-year statute of limitations. Three federal district courts
have confronted this issue.5 One Circuit Court of Appeals
has recently addressed this question.© Four prior lower state
court decisions that held that the federal limitations period
could not be transferred, all have been reversed.”
Nine opinions from various state courts follow the
unanimous federal court opinions. Of these nine state
court cases, five (5) have been decided by the highest
court of the state* and the highest court of the State of
> Mountain States Financial Resources Corp. v. Agrawal, 777 F.
Supp. 1550 (W.D. Okla. 1991); North Amer. Credit Consultants v.
Garlic Sales and Serv. Co., No. 91-1066-C, 1992 WL 477016 (W.D.
Okla., Oct. 20, 1992); Fall v. Keasler, No. C-90-20643, 1991 WL
340182 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 18, 1991).
© FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that
assignees of both FDIC and FSLIC are entitled to the six-year
statute of limitations).
’ Three of these come from Texas: Federal Debt Management
v. Weatherly, 842 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1992), rev'd, 37
lex. Sup. Ct. J. 555 (March 9, 1994); EKA Liquidators v. Phillips,
No. 4157, 1994 WL 70402 (Tex. March 9, 1994); Cadle Co. v. Estate
of Weaver, No. D-3866 1994 WL 70403 (Tex. March 9, 1994). The
fourth case concerns 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a), Tivoli Ventures, Inc. v.
Tallman, 852 P.2d 1310 (Colo. App. 1992), rev'd, 870 P.2d 1244
(Colo. 1994).
5 Federal Debt Management, Inc. v. Weatherly, 37 Tex. S.Ct. J.
244 (Colo. 1994); Investment Co. of the Southwest v. Reese, 875
P.2d 1086 (N.M. 1994); Cadle Co. II Inc. v. Lewis, 864 P.2d 718
(Kan. 1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 1613 (1994); and
Central States Resources Corp. v. First National Bank in Morrill, 501
N.W.2d 271 (Neb. 1993).
10
California has refused to review the reported lower court
opinions on this issue.’
There are thus no effective federal or state court
decisions holding that the benefit of the federal limita-
tions period cannot be assigned to a private party by the
FDIC.
Thus, despite the alleged “proliferation of suits by
the third party purchasers” characterized by Petitioner
herein, this uniformity of decisions among at least nine
(9) separate jurisdictions demonstrates that the lower fed-
eral and state courts are fully capable of deciding this
issue of federal law and that the question presented is not
one that should be answered by this court.
C. The Texas Supreme Court Correctly Concluded
That § 1821(d)(14) Creates a “Right” Transfer-
rable to Subsequent Purchasers.
Both federal common and statutory law recognize
that 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) is not only a “right” but is
also a right which is transferrable to subsequent pur-
chasers of assets from FDIC as Receiver who are not
expressly named in the statute. Boteler, supra, at 1177; see
also Brian J. Woram, FIRREA‘S Statutes Of Limitations:
Their Availability To Purchasers From The FDIC, 110 Bank
ing L.J. 292 (1993) [hereinafter “Woram”].
In FDIC v. Howse, 736 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1990),
the Defendants argued that since FDIC was acting in its
9 White v. Moriarty, 19 Cal Rptr. 2d 200 (Cal. C. App.)
review denied, (August 12, 1993).
11
a
corporate capacity in that action § 1821(d)(14) did not
apply because that section purportedly “applies only to
actions brought by FDIC as conservator or receiver.” Id.
at 1444-45. In that case, FDIC-Corporate was the assignee
of FDIC in its capacity as receiver of certain of the failed
institution’s causes of action. Id. at 1445.
While the literal language of § 1821(d)(14) did not
apply directly to FDIC-Corporate, the court in Howse,
relied upon another provision of the same statute holding
that FDIC-Corporate was entitled to “the same rights and
powers as FDIC-R under § 1821.” Howse, 736 F. Supp. at
1445 (emphasis added). The court recognized that pur-
suant to the language of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(d)(3)(A), FDIC-
Corporate was entitled to “all of the rights, powers, privi-
leges and authorities of the corporation as receiver under
§ 1821” with respect to any asset acquired by the corpora-
tion. Id. at 1445 (emphasis added). “Since one of those
rights is § 1821(d)(14)’s new limitations periods . . . it
follows that § 1821(d)(14) applies equally to FDIC-Corpo-
rate.” Id. (emphasis added)
Similarly, at least one court has held that
§ 1821(d)(14) applies to the Resolution Trust Corporation
(“RTC”), even though RTC is not expressly named in the
statute. RTC v. Krantz, 757 F. Supp. 915, 922 (N.D. Il.
1991), 10
0 Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1441A(b)(4), as added by FIR-
REA, § 501(b)(4), the RTC shall have the same powers and rights
to carry out its duties ...as the [FDIC] has under sections 11, 12
and 13 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Section 1821(d)(14)
is part of section 11 of the FDIA.
12
Thus, this “right” is not “manufactured out of thin
air by the Texas Supreme Court” as suggested by Peti-
tioner but is created by § 1821(d)(14) itself, and recog-
nized elsewhere in the text of FIRREA and by the courts
D. Resort To Common Law Is Necessary To Fill
Inevitable Statutory Gaps.
Precisely because the statute is silent as to the rights
of any other party other than FDIC, the principles of the
common law are to be utilized by the courts to fill this
statutory gap. D’Oench, Duhme & Company v. FDIC, 315
U.S. 447, 469-72 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
[he common law of assignments not only supports
but also establishes the assignment of the right, benefit
and remedy of the FIRREA statute of limitations provi-
sion to purchasers of the FDIC. FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d
$05, 810 (5th Cir. 1993) (and authorities cited therein)
While an assignment would not carry with it all
rights, remedies and benefits incidental to the thing
ssigned when a contrary intent appears in the assign-
ment or when the right, remedy or benefit is personal to
the assignor and for his benefit alone, neither of these
exceptions are epplicable here. Further, the operation of
the common law of assignments has absolutely nothing to
do with whether or not a party pur hasing an asset is
ioing so for its own benefit
13
Not one single case or secondary source which has
stated that rights, remedies or benefits personal to assig-
nors and for their benefit alone are not assignable has
involved a statute of limitations provision.!!
Il. The Extension of the Benefit of the Six-Year Statute
of Limitations to Assignees Does Not Conflict With
the Purposes of Statutes of Limitation.
FDM instituted this suit consistent with the purpose
of statutes of limitations articulated in the authorities
cited by Petitioner. See Petition For Cert. at 9-10.
While the primary purpose of statutes of limitation is
to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reason-
able time so that the opposing party has a fair oppor-
tunity to defend, that “reasonable time” became six years
once the FDIC took over the notes in question from
Heritage National Bank.
At that time, by operation of law, Petitioner was on
notice that the FDIC could have waited six years to bring
an action against Weatherly to enforce it. FDIC v. Hinkson,
848 F.2d 432, 435 (3rd Cir. 1988) (the 6-year limitation
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) “does not mandate a fed-
eral agency be precluded from suing in less than 6 years
on an assigned claim.”). Instead, the FDIC chose to sell
and assign the Note to FDM. Weatherly did not win the
'l See Texas Supreme Court Opinion below. Petitioner is
less than candid with this Court when he states that “statutes of
limitation have never been treated as rights of plaintiffs
instead courts have uniformly held that statutes of limitation
are personal to defendants.” Petition For Cert. at 11
14
right to repose under a shorter limitations period when
the inn meigees to sell the Note and assign it to FDM.
Fall v. Keasler, No. C-90-20643, 1991 WL 340182 (N.D. Cal.,
Dec 18, 1991).
FDM asserted its cause of action within the reason-
able time articulated by the six-year statute of limitations.
There is no concern in this case with stale facts, lost
evidence or other difficulty in proof, defective memory,
death or other unavailability of witnesses
can it be argued in the context of the extraordin-
ary circumstances of bank failure that allowing “private
third parties to assert a state law claim founded on con-
tract beyond the time allowed by a state statute of limita-
tions only frustrates the reasonable commercial
expectations of the parties involved.” Petition For Cert. at
learly, the legitimate expectations OF a maker of
note do not include the windfall of ps liability
because of the transfer of the note. Applyi 1 uniform
} lt ir .
imitations would result only in a maker
being required to defend suit brought by a transferee
jiirino the « t myeorin wrh 1? + . ild } 1re Hep bro ot
during the same period when it could have Deen Drought
by the FDIC. As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted
in Bank of Boulder, in the context of a federal rule permit
ting FDIC-Corporate to acquire non-transferrable letters
of credit contrary to state law
the rule would come into effect only after an
insured bank has failed. Parties cannot reason-
ably expect to carry on normal relationsh ps at
15
[W]e note that if Colorado’s transfer restrictions
were enforced against FDIC/Corporation in this
case, Bank of Boulder would likely receive an
unexpected benefit. . . . If FDIC/Corporation is
not allowed to enforce the letter of credit
. then Bank of Boulder will be freed of its
obligation to honor drafts of the Receiver of
Dominion Bank. Clearly, Bank of Boulder could
not have had a reasonable commercial expecta-
tion based on state law that if Dominion Bank
went bankrupt, Bank of Boulder would be
relieved of al! liability under the letter of credit.
Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d at 1147.
In the instant case, Petitioner Weatherly’s expecta-
tions at the time he borrowed money from Heritage
National Bank presumably included the ultimate repay-
ment of his notes; he should not be given the windfall of
forgiveness of his notes because of the vehicle by which
FDIC sought to realize upon them.
lil. The Decision of the Texas Supreme Court is in
Accord With the Decision in Hinkson and the
Decisions of This Court.
Even assuming the decision in FDIC v. Hinkson, 848
F.2d 432 (3rd Cir. 1988), were decided the same way
under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14), which would not be the
case, it would still not conflict with the Texas Supreme
Court decision. Hinkson, contrary to Petitioner’s argu-
ment, does not stand for the proposition that an assignee
of failed bank assets from the FDIC is not governed by the
same statute of limitations that apply to its assignor.
Petition For Cert. at 11.
16
In Hinkson, the FDIC received an assignment of the
note upon which it brought suit as a result of an open bank
assistance transaction not by operation of law as a result of
bank failure. Section 1821(d)(14) only applies to assets
acquired by operation of law!2 initially by a conservator
or receiver of an insured depository institution or subse-
quently acquired by FDIC or RTC in their corporate
capacities and private parties (whether banks, individ-
uals or other organizations) by transfer and assignment.
Further, even assuming the result in Hinkson was not
changed by the current state of the law, which it would
be, Hinkson merely stands for the proposition that there
would be a uniform statute of limitations rule for FDIC
and its subsequent assignees — the federal limitations
period would govern an action by either FDIC or its
assignees. As stated by the court in Hinkson:
The federal limitations period will therefore
govern in both instances - whether the state
statute provides for a longer or shorter time
than section 2415.
Hinkson, 848 F.2d at 434.
Significantly, however, if Hinkson were decided
today, the FDIC would have been entitled to the longer
period under state law. Section 1821(d)(14)(A) overrules
Hinkson to the extent argued by Petitioner here as fol-
lows:
'2 Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i)&(ii) “The Corpeo-
ration shall, as conservator receiver, and by operation of law,
succeed to - (i) all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the
insured depository institution . . . and (ii) title to the books,
records, and assets” of the institution.
17
(A) IN GENERAL - Notwithstanding any pro-
vision of any contract, the applicable stat-
ute of limitations with regard to any action
brought by the corporation as conservator
or receiver shall be -
(i) in the case of any contract claim, the
longer of —
(I) The 6-year period beginning on
the date the claim accrues; or
(II) The period applicable under state
law.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A)(i)(I)&(ID) (emphasis added).
Thus, since the State of Delaware has a twenty-year
statute of limitations, the FDIC acquiring an asset in
Delaware as conservator or receiver, would be entitled to
a twenty-year statute of limitations period. In turn, an
assignee of FDIC as conservator or receiver would like-
wise be entitled to the twenty-year statute of limitations
period. Thus, the decision in Hinkson does not conflict
with the decision of the Texas Supreme Court.
Nor does the Texas Supreme Court decision conflict
with this Court’s decision in Cressey v. Meyer, 138 U.S. 525
(1891) or any other decision of this Court.
First, Petitioner’s reliance upon Cressey, like Peti-
tioner’s reliance upon United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S.
414 (1940), is misplaced. There is no point to be made that
the United States and its agencies at one time were not
subject to state or federal limitations periods.
More importantly, neither Summerlin nor Cressey
involve in any way rights of an assignee or transferee of
18
the government or its agencies. Thus, neither case can or
does stand for the proposition that when the United
States was immune from statutes of limitation, such
immunity did not pass to its assignees or transferees.
In Summerlin, the United States itself was the party
which brought suit. As noted by this Court in Summerlin:
By a series of transactions . . . the Federal Hous-
ing Administrator, acting on behalf of the
United States, became the assignee of a claim
against the estate of one J. F. Andrew, deceased.
* + *
The claim assigned to the Federal Housing
Administrator acting on behalf of the United
States became the claim of the United States,
and the United States thereupon became entitled
to enforce it.
United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. at 414, 416.
In Cressey, suit was brought by a creditor of the
“sovereign”, not an assignee or transferee, there is a differ-
ence. 5
Nothing in Cressey or Summerlin addresses the rights,
interests or remedies of the “sovereign” that pass to an
assignee or transferee with the assignment of substantive
rights. Neither of these cases anywhere expressly states
that immunity from the application of statutes of limita-
tions or the doctrine of laches is a personal right of the
sovereign. Nor can Cressey be so construed vis-a-vis the
government and its assignees from the fact that the gov-
ernment “does not give to [its] creditor its sovereign exemp-
tion from liability to the statute of limitation and the
19
defense of laches.” Cressey, 138 U.S. at 528 (emphasis
added).
A. The Texas Supreme Court Followed Well-Set-
tled Rules of Statutory Construction.
Respondent agrees that the starting point in any case
of statutory construction is the statute itself. Demarest v.
Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184 (1991). If the statute’s language
is plain as to the rights of the parties concerned, “the sole
function of the court is to enforce it according to its
terms.” Caminetti v. United States 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
If, on the other hand, the meaning of the statute is
coubtful or ambiguous as the rights of the parties
involved, the court “construes it to contain that permiss-
ible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably
into the body of both previously and subsequently
enacted law.” West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v.
Cassey, __ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 1148 (1991).
In the present case, the statute in question, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(14), is neither ambiguous nor unambiguous as
to the rights of the parties concerned, i.e., assignees and
transferees of assets from the FDIC. FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989
F.2d at 809-810. In other words, the clear and unam-
biguous language of the text itself says nothing about
when assignees of the FDIC must bring substantive
claims assigned.
Thus, as noted by the Fifth Circuit in Bledsoe, “the
statutes are absolutely silent” as to the rights of the
parties concerned. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d at 810. In such an
20
instance, another axiomatic principle of statutory con-
struction is triggered. “In effectuating Congress’ intent,
courts are to fill the inevitable statutory gaps by reference
to the principles of common law.” Bledsoe, 989 F.2d at 810.
This court has recognized the principle that source
materials of the common law may be used to answer a
question presented to the court where reference to the
text of the statute alone does not answer the question
with regard to the parties concerned. D’Oench Duhme, 315
U.S. at 469-72 (Jackson, J., concurring).
This court has also directed the federal courts “to fill
the interstices of federal legislation ‘according to their
own standards’ ” in areas affecting nationwide federal
programs. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715,
727 (1979) (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 315
U.S. 363, 367 (1943)).
The authorities cited by Petitioner are clearly distin-
guishable. The statutes being construed in those cases
either: (1) expressly mentioned the parties affected by the
statute or the specific rights of the specific parties
affected; or (2) undertook to deal with rights related to
the right in question, in various ways.
The question presented in Demarest was whether 28
U.S.C. § 1821 required payment of witness fees to a
- convicted state prisoner who was brought to testify at a
federal trial pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad testifi-
candum. Demarest, 111 S.Ct. at 601. The text of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1821 provided that “a witness in attendance at any
court of the United States . . . shall be paid the fees and
allowances provided by the section.” Demarest, 111 S.Ct.
at 602. The statute further provided that a “subsistence
21
allowance shall be paid to a witness (other than a witness
who is incarcerated) when an overnight stay is required.”
Id.
Thus, the statute in Demarest is far different from the
statute in the present case. The category of persons whose
rights were being adjudicated were expressly mentioned
in the statute.
Similarly, the issue in West Virginia v. Cassey was
whether the term “witness fees” in a statute designed to
shift court costs to losing parties also included “expert
fees.” West Virginia, 111 S.Ct. at 1140-1141. In that case,
both the common law and the record of statutory usage of
the term “witness fees” clearly evidenced that expert fees
were separate from witness fees. West Virginia, 111 S.Ct.
at 1141-1146. In the present case, both the common law
and the application of statutory rights to assignees would
require a different result.
Likewise, the statute in question in In re Shearer, 139
F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1956) provided that “any natural
person except a wage earner . . . may be adjudged an
involuntary bankrupt.” In re Shearer, 139 F. Supp. at 218.
The petitioner in that case sought review of an order of a
Referee adjudicating him an involuntary bankrupt after
finding that he was not a “wage earner” within the mean-
ing of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. The Bankruptcy Act in that
case defined the term “wage earner.” In re Shearer, 139 F.
Supp. at 219. Thus, the category of persons affected was
expressly defined in the statute.
Finally, unlike the present case, in Iselin v. United
States, 270 U.S. 245 (1926), the legislature had
exhaustively undertaken to deal with rights related to the
22
right in question in that case in various ways but omitted
any reference to the particular right involved. The ques-
tion in Iselin was whether the sale of a stockholder’s
opera box tickets which were not sold at ticket offices
could be taxed under a statutory provision taxing the sale
of tickets at ticket offices. The statute relied upon by the
government to impose a tax was not applicable because it
only applied to tickets which were regularly sold at ticket
offices or other similar places. Iselin, 270 U.S. at 247. The
tickets sold by the stockholder in question were free
tickets which were reserved by the lessor of the opera
house for all performances. Thus, the tickets were not
regularly sold.
IV. The Extension of Federal Statutory Rights to
Assignees, as Well as Congressional Intent Sup-
port the Decision of the Texas Supreme Court.
A. Federal and State Courts have extended the
statutory provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) to
entities other than the FDIC.
While the literal language of § 1821(d)(14) speaks
directly to the FDIC and not assignees, federal and state
courts have not hesitated to extend the protections of 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e) to assignees of FDIC, and other federal
banking regulators. Section 1823(e) contains language
similar to § 1821(d)(14), speaking only to the FDIC.
A careful read of such cases demonstrates not only
that the courts understand the distinction between statu-
tory and common law rights, but also, that they care
about the outcome under either scheme. This is evi-
denced by the fact that the rationale articulated for such
23
extension is twofold: (1) if a note is enforceable in the
hands of the FDIC, it is equally enforceable in the hands
of an assignee; and (2) the extension of such rights facili-
tates Congress’ policy of protecting failed institutions’
assets and the insurance fund.
In FDIC v. Newhart, 892 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1989), the
Eighth Circuit embraced the extension of § 1823(e) to
assignees of the FDIC when it held, in the context of a
discussion of that defense, that “the FDIC transfers its
protected status to subsequent purchasers of notes it
holds.” Newhart, 892 F.2d at 50.
The district court in Newhart found that the terms of
§ 1823(e) preempted the technical requirements of Mis-
souri holder-in-due-course law once FDIC acquired an
asset. FDIC v. Newhart, 713 F. Supp. 320, 324 (W.D. Miss.),
aff'd, 892 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1989). The defendant argued
that while his defenses were cut off as to FDIC, FDIC’s
assignee cculd not assert FDIC’s holder-in-due-course
status. Id. The court disagreed, holding in reliance upon
two of its unpublished opinions that:
[Detendant’s] defenses could not be revived
simply because the FDIC transferred the note to
a third party.
Id.
The district court found the reasoning of the
unpublished cases compelling “especially since a con-
trary result would emasculate the policy behind § 1823(e)
of encouraging the FDIC to participate in transfer agree-
ments.” Id.
24
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, based on the dual prop-
ositions of law, that (1) an assignee stands in the shoes of
the assignor, and (2) under Section 3.201(1) of the U.C.C.,
transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such
rights as the transferor had therein. Newhart, 892 F.2d at
50.
Discussing the policy behind § 1823(e), the Eighth
Circuit stated as follows:
In certain cases, such as the instant one, the
FDIC may decide to sell returned assets after
bringing suit for collection. Because these assets
are usually non-performing loans, there would
be little or no incentive for prospective pur-
chasers to acquire them if they were subject to
the personal defenses of the obligors based on
undisclosed agreements. If this avenue of cut-
ting losses became unavailable to the FDIC, pur-
chase and assumption transactions would
become more experisive and thus, less likely to
occur.
Newhart, 892 F.2d at 50.
Concluding that this policy behind § 1823(e) sup-
ported the extension of federal holder-in-due-course sta-
tus to an assignee bank, the Eighth Circuit stated:
If holder-in-due-course status did not run with
the notes acquired by the FDIC in purchase and
assumption transactions, the market for such
notes would be smaller, which would have a
deleterious effect on the FDIC’s ability to pro-
tect the assets of failed banks.
Id.
én
Similarly, in reliance upon the Eighth Circuit in New-
hart, as well as Deposit Guaranty Bank v. Hall, 741 F. Supp.
1287 (S.D.Tex. 1990) and Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523
(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1083 (1991), the court in
Alarcon v. FDIC, 772 F. Supp. 334 (E.D.Mich. 1991)
expressly held that § 1823(e) extends to assignees of the
FDIC stating:
[T]he court fully concurs [with] the proposition
that when the FDIC has obtained a note previ-
ously held by a bank which has gone into
receivership, and assigns the note to another
bank, the assignee bank is entitled to the same
protection under D’Oench, Duhme, and § 1823(e)
as the FDIC itself. In other words, if the note is
enforceable in the hands of the FDIC, it is equally
enforceable in the hands of the assignee bank.
Alarcon, 772 F. Supp. at 342 (emphasis added); see also,
Hall, 741 F. Supp. at 1290 (holding under § 1823(e) defen-
dant was estopped from asserting affirmative defenses
against an assignee of the FDIC); RSR Properties, Inc. v.
FDIC, 706 F. Supp 524, 532 (W.D.Tex. 1989) (applying
§ 1823(e) to deficiency suit brought by an assignee of the
FDIC).
In Willow Tree Inv., Inc. v. Wagner, 453 N.W.2d 641, 643
(Iowa 1990), the Iowa Supreme Court in extending
§ 1823(e)’s protections to assignees noted and rejected an
argument identical to that raised by Petitioner here:
Defendants claim that while the FDIC is granted
special protection under § 1823(e), plaintiff, as
purchaser, is not similarly insulated from the
defenses that defendants could raise against the
insolvent bank. They note that the statute refers
only to the “corporation” and makes no mention of
26
extending its provisions to assignees or purchasers.
We believe that the purpose of § 1823(e) would
not be furthered by limiting the application of
its provisions to the FDIC.
Willow Tree Inv., 453 N.W.2d at 643 (emphasis added). The
same analysis applies with equal force in the present case.
B. Congressional Intent Underlying Section
1821(d)(14) as Well as the Entire Comprehensive
Scheme of Facilitating Resolution of Insolvent
Institutions and Minimizing the Cost to the
Insurance Fund Support the Decision of the
Texas Supreme Court.
As noted above, when Congress passed FIRREA, it
was not legislating on a clean slate. H.R. Rep. No. 54(I),
101st Cone., 1st Sess. 6 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 87-93, 108. FIRREA “grew out of the
acute and massive financial crisis of the thrift industry
and the [FSLIC] a situation caused by a number of factors
that included a regional economic collapse and fraud and
insider abuse.” See, Explanations to FIRREA, Title 1, Pur-
poses of the Act, para. 101; FIRREA, Section 101 at para.
2101. In this way, FIRREA buiids upon the purposes and
intent of the FDIA and the Bridge Bank Statute.
As noted by this court, “the words of a statute,
particularly one with a remedial object, have a meaning
imparted to them by ‘the mischief to be remedied.’ ”
Aaron v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 446 U.S. 680, 705
(1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). By 1989, it had become
clear that the savings and loan industry was in dire
trouble and emergency legislation was required to restore
public confidence in the industry. H.R. Rep No. 54(I) at
a
27
90, 98-104. With respect to the extended statute of limita-
tions provision contained in Section 212(d)(14) of FIR-
REA, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14), Senator Reigle
explained:
Section 212 of the conference bill provides for
extended statute of limitations p ds for
claims brought by the FDIC in its capacity as
conservator or receiver of a failed financial insti-
tution. Although these provisions have attracted
little attention from the media, they are of the
utmost importance. Extending these limitations
periods wiil significantly increase the amount of
money that can be recovered by the Federal
Government through litigation, and help ensure
the accountability of the persons responsible for
the massive losses the Government has suffered
through the failures of insured institutions. The
provisions should be construed to maximize potential
recoveries by the Federal Government by preserving
to the greatest extent permissible by law claims that
would otherwise have been lost due to the expiration
of hitherto applicable limitations periods.
135 Cong. Rec. $10182-01 at S10205 (Daily ed. Aug. 4,
1989) (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that the mischief
to be remedied was to avoid massive losses to the Gov-
ernment by maximizing the amount of money that could
be recovered by the FDIC.
It is further clear that Congress contemplated using
the private sector to maximize the amount of money that
could be recovered by the FDIC. One of the purposes of
FIRREA itself is to “provide funds from public and pri-
vate sources to deal expediticusly with failed depository
institutions.” FIRREA, Section 101(8), para. 2101.
28
Those funds are provided from private sources
through the purchase of assets from FDIC under purchase
and assumption or bulk sale tvansactions. See e.g., Sharp,
supra, at 66.
CONCLUSION
For these various reasons, the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Gopwin & Carton, P.C.
STEVEN T. PoLINo
State Bar No. 16088645
901 Main Street, Suite 3300
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 939-4400
(214) 760-7332 (FAX)
Attorneys for Respondent
Federal Debt Management, Inc.
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