Opposition Brief — Weatherly v. Federal Debt Management, Inc.

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Bupreme Court, U.S.

FILED

AUG 17 1994

No. 94-126 : OFFICE OF THE CLERK

|

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1994

+

LEE WEATHERLY,

Petitioner,

FEDERAL DEBT MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Respondent.

+

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Supreme Court Of The State Of Texas

+

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT FEDERAL DEBT

MANAGEMENT, INC. IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

4

STEVEN T. PoLINO

Gopwin & Cartton, P.C.

901 Main Street, Suite 3300

Dallas, Texas 75202-3714

(214) 939-4474

(214) 760-7332 — Telecopy

Counsel of Record

for Respondent Federal

Debt Management, Inc.

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

| BEST AVAILABLE COPY

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Do assignees and transferees of failed bank assets

purchased from the FDIC, receive in the assignment

and transfer of the underlying substantive right, the

right and benefit of the six-year statute of limitations

enjoyed by FDIC pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14),

as a matter of federal law.

Whether 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) is a right, interest, or

benefit of the FDIC that runs with an assignment of

the underlying substantive right to FDIC's assignees.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED.................0-0eeeeeee 7

TABLE OF CONTENTS...............0eee cece. i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...............0.0e0ee. iy

SES TIEN «5 cc lod occ ooeesoadecnee ee

STATUTE INVOLVED .............0-0eeeeeeee 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............0.0-0000:- 2

REASONS FOR NOT GRANTING WRIT........... 4

i.

IT.

The Passing of the Federal Six-Year Statute of

Limitations to Assignees With the Assignment

of Underlying Substantive Rights Enhances

FDIC’s Ability to Efficiently Liquidate Assets

Of FPadind TmetOOs 6 sic 3 66d doe cksese tae

A. This Court Has Only Intervened Twice in

Cases OF TONG TVG 0s cdsccavsndonsare

B. The Lower Federal and State Courts Deci-

sions Are Uniform, Thus Demonstrating This

Court’s Supervision Is Not Necessary......

C. The Texas Supreme Court Correctly Con-

cluded That § 1821(d)(14) Creates a

“Right” Transferrable to Subsequent Pur-

CRAIG 6s bo ks Seaane eee

D. Resort To Common Law Is Necessary To

Fill Inevitable Statutory Gaps ...........

The Extension of the Benefit of the Six-Year

Statute of Limitations to Assignees Does Not

Conflict With the Purposes of Statutes of Lim-

SEO. ood s.0 sc wwe ee-eden sent eee

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

Ill. The Decision of the Texas Supreme Court is in

Accord With the Decision in Hinkson and the

BE By ee: ee ae 15

A. The Texas Supreme Court Followed Well-

Settled Rules of Statutory Construction.. 19

IV. The Extension of Federal Statutory Rights to

Assignees, as Well as Congressional Intent

Support the Decision of the Texas Supreme

8 Be BOE aa er a Pane eee 22

A. Federal and State Courts have extended the

statutory provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) to

entities other than the FDIC .............. 22

B. Congressional Intent Underlying Section

1821(d)(14) as Well as the Entire Compre-

hensive Scheme of Facilitating Resolution

of Insolvent Institutions and Minimizing

the Cost to the Insurance Fund Support the

Decision of the Texas Supreme Court.... 26

ae da kss oie a5 b ORK SONS oo Dae eee ED 28

TABLE CF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Aaron v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 446 U.S. 680

PEN 64 had Soe ee RE ae ee eke 26

Alarcon v. FDIC, 772 F.Supp. 334 (E.D.Mich. 1991) .... 25

Bell & Murphy & Assoc. v. InterFirst Bank Gateway,

894 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895

Peace ee ieee on eng cae eee See eas 8

Cadle Co. II, Inc. v. Lewis, 864 P.2d 718 (Kan. 1993),

cert. denied, ___ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 1613 (1994) ...8 9

Cadle Co. v. Estate of Weaver, No. D-3866, 1994 WL

Fa CO. Fe es x + oo vice oh cee césnaken Y

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) ....... 19

Central States Resources Corp. v. First National Bank

in Morrill, 501 N.W.2d 271 (Neb. 1993)............. 9

Cressey 0: Meyer, 1356 U.S. 525 (1691) ......... 17, 18, 19

Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 363

eG ga eee keer heer eae ees eee 20

D’Oench, Duhme & Co.; v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942)

Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184 (1991)...19, 20, 21

Deposit Guaranty Bank v. Hall, 741 FSupp. 1287

Sst Ss 5a 5 nner ees ee Nee A Tee ees =

EKA Liquidators v. Phillips, No. 4157, 1994 WL

Pure Cem, WOT DF, TOPE. nck vc ccd cc ceccics 9

Fall v. Keasler, No. C-90-20643, 1991 WL 340182

po BE te” Se 2 ae RS |: | a a 9, 14

FDIC v. Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir.

1990), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 904 (1991)....... 6, 13, 15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.

SOND waht sk ace eae Ee ee 9, 12, 19, 20

FDIC v. Hinkson, 848 F.2d 432 (3rd Cir. 1988) 13, 15, 16

FDIC v. Howse, 736 F.Supp. 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1990) 10, 11

FDIC v. Newhart, 713 F.Supp. 320 (W.D. Miss.),

aff'd, 892 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1989) .................. 23

FDIC v. Newhart, 892 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1989)...... 23, 24

Federal Debt Management v. Weatherly, 842 S.W.2d

774 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1992), rev’d, 37 Tex.

supp. Ct. ]. Sam CNeRiere SBP) oo oc ke cas tecsases 9

Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert.

sensed, 459 US. Re CRs so oak oko cee ease esac 5

Investment Co. of the Southwest v. Reese, 875 P.2d

SOO ATR. SO ica cx Sk eee 8, 9

Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245 (1926) ........ 21, 22

Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 496 VS. BG (IIE aon civ dccan ts adeanens 25

Langiey v. FOIC, 464 U.S. G6 CIGBF7) a aoc cs icsesns ck caus 8

Mountain States Financial Resources Corp. v.

Agrawal, 777 F.Supp. 1550 (W.D. Okla. 1991) ....... 9

North Amer. Credit Consultants v. Garlic Sales and

Serv. Co., No. 91-1066-C, 1992 WL 477016, (W.D.

Code, Ghee, Bi. BOM ks cna ve wed eacseelenl eee 9

RSR Properties, Inc. v. FDIC, 706 F.Supp 524

Se ae) rr rrr errr re oy bares eet tr 25

V1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

RTC v. Krantz, 757 F.Supp. 915 (N.D. Ill. 1991) ...... 1]

In re Shearer, 139 F.Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1956)....... 21

Tivoli Ventures, Inc. v. Tallman, 852 P.2d 1310 (Colo.

App. 1992), rev'd, 870 P.2d 1244 (Colo. 1994)....... )

United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715

(1979)... 0 0 ee eee. 20

United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940) ...17, 18

West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Cassey,

4

U.S. __, 111 S.Ct. 1138 (1991) ............. 19, 21

White v. Moriarty, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200 (Cal. C.

App.), review denied............ jae saeasewa ..... 10

Willow Tree Inv., Inc. v. Wagener, 453 N.W.2d 641

(lowa 1990) ......... 00. eee ee ee ey 4.

JI

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12 U.S.C. § 1441A(b)(4).... 000.00 ee eee. eee I

12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i)&(ii) . 2 ee. .. 16

12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) ............ , .... passim

12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(14)(A), (B)...... ...2, 16

12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(14)(A)(i)(1) & (ID)....... 17

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued

Page

aria Act C6 1555, BOR Boikc nc dcccnccecncunsecs +

Danking Act Of 1935, SectsOm I01.......0.60sciecccsens 4

Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L.

No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987) (the “Bridge

SO SN Fou bo edna tas nd ad oksndeawatenescueseys 6

Explanations to FIRREA, Title I, Purposes of the

eM Ee eT eee TORE Tee TET TET CTE TOL ey 26

Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and

Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-73, 103

Sk, Ser a EE Ss Sac Ges ca ca ceva veuvertans eas 3 2

PEEL, OCIIR MUL, DRAIR. ZIOE 2. sce crsccecccssesni 26

FUE ta; UY SUPROUED 60:50 0-05.05 0 Cava teeeaeeesawad 6, 27

te a ey errr rer rrr ee rey Ty 27

FIRREA, Section 501 (b)(4)..... cia es ea ee 1]

[he Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”), 12

ae I eke eo cee 5

The Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 264 (1933)...... 5

H.R. Rep. No. 2564, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950),

reprinted tn 1950 USAL.AN. S765 . occ ccccesenci 4,5

H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1989),

reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 87-93, 108 ....... 26

S. Rep. 19, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in

Gy USA L.A. GPL, Dabs cs ccesenvctsnaveseoy

135 Cong. Rec. $10182-01 (Daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989) .... 27

Vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

TREATISES

James J. Boteler, Comment, Protecting the American

Taxpayers: Assigning the FDIC’s Six-Year Statute

of Limitations to Third Party Purchasers, 24 Tex.

Tech. L. Rev. 1169, 1200 (1993)[hereinafter “Bot-

gg: ne ae ar ERR a are Cg TP ee ee Oe 7, 10

Jeffrey M. Sharp, Extending the FDIC’s “Super

Powers” to its Transferrees: A Vehicle for Privatiz-

ing Loss Recovery, 97 Com. L.J. 49, 59, 66 (1992)

ae at Er era Se ae

Brian J. Woram, FIRREA’S Statutes Of Limitations:

Their Availability To Purchasers From The FDIC,

110 Banking L.J. 292 (1993)[hereinafter

NE TB a scare ON ws aid win Se OS Rea 10

No. 94-126

4

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1994

a —_

LEE WEATHERLY,

Petitioner,

FEDERAL DEBT MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Respondent.

*

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Supreme Court Of The State Of Texas

+

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT FEDERAL DEBT

MANAGEMENT, INC. IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

+

TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT:

The Respondent, Federal Debt Management, Inc.,

respectfully requests that this Court deny Petition for

Writ of Certiorari submitted by the Petitioner, Lee Weath-

erly.

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked

under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

No

However, as noted below, there are no conflicts

among the United States Court of Appeals on the issue

involved here, nor has such a Court decided a federal

question in a way that would conflict with a state court of

last resort or so far departed from the accepted and usual

course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of

his Court’s power of supervision. Rule 10.1(a), Supreme

Court Rules. Further, no state court of last resort has

decided the federal issues involved in this suit in conflict

with the decision of another state court of last resort. Rule

10.1(b), Supreme Court Rules.

The decisions of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit and the various state courts of last

resort are in harmony with the decisions of this Court

and each court has shown its ability to decide this impor-

tant question of federal law without the necessity of the

supervision of this Court. Rule 10.1(c), Supreme Court

Rules

STATUTE INVOLVED

12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(14)(A), (B).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The question before the Court is a case of first

impression involving the application of the right, interest

and benefit of the federal six-year statute of limitations,

12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14), as added by the Financial Institu-

tions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989

Pub. L. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (“FIRREA”), Title XII, to

assignees and transferees of assets purchased from the

FDIC.

The issue presented is whether assignees and trans-

ferees of failed bank assets purchased from the Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) receive as part

of the assignment and transfer, as a matter of federal law,

the right and benefit of the federal six-year statute of

limitations enjoyed by FDIC pursuant to 12 U.S.C.

§ 1821(d)(14).

Respondent agrees with the statement of the case

stated by Petitioner except in the following particulars.

From the commencement of this suit on April 15,

1991, Respondent, Federal Debt Management, Inc. (here-

inafter “FDM” or “Respondent”), asserted that it was the

assignee and transferee of the notes in question from the

FDIC pursuant to those exhibits evidencing assignment

and transfer attached to FDM’s Original Petition (“Peti-

tion”). FDM argued in response to Petitioner’s Motion

For Summary Judgment that the Texas four-year statute

of limitations did not apply, but that the federal six-year

statute of limitations cited above applied to the time

limits available to FDM’s right to recover in this case.

At the time that the FDIC acquired the notes in

question, there is no question that the respective causes

of actions on all three notes were still alive. In fact, the

cause of action on one of the notes involved did not even

accrue until after FDIC acquired the notes on September

25, 1986. Further, there is no quest.on that had the FDIC

held on to the notes in question it would have had until

at least September 2, 1992 through November 3, 1992 to

file suit on the respective notes.

On August 9, 1989, FIRREA was enacted creating 12

U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14). All causes of action on the notes

were still alive and were still owned by the FDIC as

receiver for Heritage National Bank (“FDIC Receiver”).

The exhibits attached to FDM’s Petition show that the

FDIC-Receiver sold, transferred, and assigned the notes

to FDOM on November 7, 1989!, nearly three months after

the enactment of FIRREA. Thus, this case does not neces-

sarily require the retroactive application of FIRREA to

claims in existence on August 9, 1989.

REASONS FOR NOT GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Passing of the Federal Six-Year Statute of Lim-

itations to Assignees With the Assignment of Under-

lying Substantive Rights Enhances FDIC’s Ability to

Efficiently Liquidate Assets of Failed Institutions.

The FDIC was established under authority of Section

8 of the Banking Act of 1933, and Section 101 of the

Banking Act of 1935, which became effective August 23,

1935, and which provided the permanent plan of deposit

insurance contained in existing law. H. R. Rep. No. 2564,

8ist Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N

| The Briefs of the parties below, including FDM, and th«

opinions below state that the notes were assigned on October

27, 1989. Further review of the respective Bills of Sale attached

to FDM’s Petition reveal that they were executed November 7

1989. The difference is not material to the issues in the case but

is only cited for clarity

3765. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”), 12

U.S.C. § 1811, et seq., which established and created the

FDIC, was originally enacted as Section 12B of the Fed-

eral Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 264 (1933).

The purpose of the FDIC, as articulated in the FDIA,

is to bring to depositors sound, effective, and uninter-

rupted operation of the banking system with resulting

safety and equity of bank deposits. H. R. Rep. No. 2564,

1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3765-66.

[he FDIC traditionally had two choices in the dispo-

sition of failed bank assets: straight liquidation and dis-

tribution to depositors and creditors or transferring such

assets to an assuming bank thereby lessening the poten-

tial negative impact on the insurance fund. Gunter v.

Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459

U.S. 1059 (1982).

Over time, the FDIA has been amended to provide

the FDIC with greater authority and power. Initial

amending legislation gave the FDIC added authority to

make loans, purchase its assets, or make deposits in order

to prevent the closing of an insured bank.?

[The increased number of bank failures in the

mid-1980s together with geographic concentration of

banking problems and the large size of some troubled

banks made it increasingly difficult for the FDIC to effi-

ciently liquidate the assets of failed banks. S. Rep. 19,

100th Cong. Ist Sess. (1987), reprinted in 1987

> H. R. Rep. No. 2564, 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3773-74,

U.S.C.C.A.N. 491, 511-12. In an effort to deal with grow-

ing problems among financial institutions, the FDIC

sought legislation to enhance its ability to handle failed

and failing banks with minimum disruption to local econ-

Omies and minimum costs to the insurance fund.

As a result, Congress initially enacted the Competi-

tive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101

Stat. 552 (1987) (the “Bridge Bank Statute”). Two years

later, Congress enacted FIRREA. One of the main goals of

both pieces of legislation was to enhance FDIC’s ability to

find purchasers of failed bank assets and obtain the best

possible price for such banking business, thus lessening

the potential negative impact on the FDIC insurance

fund. S. Rep. 19, 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 512; FIRREA, Sec-

tion 101(8).

Congress authorized suits by FDIC in its corporate

capacity (“FDIC-Corporate”), in assets acquired from

FDIC as receiver that are not transferred to an assuming

bank, in order that FDIC might recoup, or at least miti-

gate, the losses to the insurance fund (and, in large mea-

sure, ultimately to the taxpayers) that result from bank

failure. FDIC v. Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d 1466, 1470 (10th

Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 904 (1991).

Until recently, the FDIC almost always sought to

recover such losses by bringing suit in its own name, as

evidenced by the hundreds of reported decisions involv-

ing FDIC suits on notes, guarantees and other instru-

ments or assets acquired by purchase and assignment

from FDIC as receiver.

In recent years, however, the sheer volume of assets

coming into the hands of the FDIC has forced the FDIC to

attempt to realize value for some of such assets in ways

other than bringing suit in its own name. One of the

alternative methods by which the FDIC does so is by

selling such assets to third parties at their market value.

Jeffrey M. Sharp, Extending the FDIC’s “Super Powers” to

its Transferrees: A Vehicle for Privatizing Loss Recovery, 97

Com. L.J. 49, 59, 66 (1992) [hereinafter “Sharp”].

Contrary to Petitioner’s unsupported statement that

these investors hope “to gain a windfall at the expense of

the FDIC and... the taxpayers” the application of the

six-year statute of limitations benefits both. Id.; James J.

Boteler, Comment, Protecting the American Taxpayers:

Assigning the FDIC’s Six-Year Statute of Limitations to Third

Party Purchasers, 24 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1169, 1200 (1993)

[hereinafter “Boteler”]; cf., Petition for Writ of Certiorari

(“Petition for Cert.”) at 4.

For approximately the last fourteen years, the lower

federal and state courts have been very busy addressing

issues relating to the rights of purchasers of assets of

failed institutions from the FDIC. This is so despite the

fact that the fall-out of major banking institutions has had

an impact on customers, depositors, and creditors nation-

wide.

A. this Court Has Only Intervened Twice in Cases

of This Type.

For the last fifty-two years, this Court has only found

it necessary to intervene in cases involving the rights and

obligations of the FDIC or its assignees of this type in two

instances.° There are many instances where this Court has

not found it necessary to decide cases involving the

rights and obligations of assignees (purchasers) of the

various federal banking regulators. See e.g. Bell & Murphy

é& Assoc. v. InterFirst Bank Gateway, 894 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895 (1990).

This Court has already denied certiorari to hear a

case squarely on point with the present case. ( adle ( I]

Inc. v. Lewis, 864 P.2d 718 (Kan. 1993), cert. denied, U.S

, 114 &.Ct. 1613 (1994)

B. The Lower Federal and State Courts Decisions

Are Uniform, Thus Demonstrating This Court's

Supervision Is Not Necessary.

As noted by the Petition for Cert., over the past several

years, numerous courts have considered and decided the

issue of whether an assignee of the FDIC is entitled to the

benefits of the federal six-year statute of limitations under

U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14). One court has noted that there is at least

twenty opinions to date, published and unpublished, that

}

discuss this-issue.* All federal and state courts have held that

The first instance was in this Court’s semina iSé

Wen h Duhme ry Fl ]( 15 U.S 147 194; YO Fe 1e1

Statute defined the rights of the corporation as holder of

note it acquired). The second instance, some forty-five (45

years later was another leading case, Langley v. FD 184 U.S. 8¢

’

(1987) (rights of FDIC in its corporate capacity as assignes

FDIC as receiver in note not transferred to an assuming bat

under a purchase and assumption transactior1

+ In tment f the South in B 875 Prd 86 (N.M

199 1)

a successor in interest to the FDIC enjoys the benefits of the

six-year statute of limitations. Three federal district courts

have confronted this issue.5 One Circuit Court of Appeals

has recently addressed this question.© Four prior lower state

court decisions that held that the federal limitations period

could not be transferred, all have been reversed.”

Nine opinions from various state courts follow the

unanimous federal court opinions. Of these nine state

court cases, five (5) have been decided by the highest

court of the state* and the highest court of the State of

> Mountain States Financial Resources Corp. v. Agrawal, 777 F.

Supp. 1550 (W.D. Okla. 1991); North Amer. Credit Consultants v.

Garlic Sales and Serv. Co., No. 91-1066-C, 1992 WL 477016 (W.D.

Okla., Oct. 20, 1992); Fall v. Keasler, No. C-90-20643, 1991 WL

340182 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 18, 1991).

© FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that

assignees of both FDIC and FSLIC are entitled to the six-year

statute of limitations).

’ Three of these come from Texas: Federal Debt Management

v. Weatherly, 842 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1992), rev'd, 37

lex. Sup. Ct. J. 555 (March 9, 1994); EKA Liquidators v. Phillips,

No. 4157, 1994 WL 70402 (Tex. March 9, 1994); Cadle Co. v. Estate

of Weaver, No. D-3866 1994 WL 70403 (Tex. March 9, 1994). The

fourth case concerns 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a), Tivoli Ventures, Inc. v.

Tallman, 852 P.2d 1310 (Colo. App. 1992), rev'd, 870 P.2d 1244

(Colo. 1994).

5 Federal Debt Management, Inc. v. Weatherly, 37 Tex. S.Ct. J.

244 (Colo. 1994); Investment Co. of the Southwest v. Reese, 875

P.2d 1086 (N.M. 1994); Cadle Co. II Inc. v. Lewis, 864 P.2d 718

(Kan. 1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 1613 (1994); and

Central States Resources Corp. v. First National Bank in Morrill, 501

N.W.2d 271 (Neb. 1993).

10

California has refused to review the reported lower court

opinions on this issue.’

There are thus no effective federal or state court

decisions holding that the benefit of the federal limita-

tions period cannot be assigned to a private party by the

FDIC.

Thus, despite the alleged “proliferation of suits by

the third party purchasers” characterized by Petitioner

herein, this uniformity of decisions among at least nine

(9) separate jurisdictions demonstrates that the lower fed-

eral and state courts are fully capable of deciding this

issue of federal law and that the question presented is not

one that should be answered by this court.

C. The Texas Supreme Court Correctly Concluded

That § 1821(d)(14) Creates a “Right” Transfer-

rable to Subsequent Purchasers.

Both federal common and statutory law recognize

that 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) is not only a “right” but is

also a right which is transferrable to subsequent pur-

chasers of assets from FDIC as Receiver who are not

expressly named in the statute. Boteler, supra, at 1177; see

also Brian J. Woram, FIRREA‘S Statutes Of Limitations:

Their Availability To Purchasers From The FDIC, 110 Bank

ing L.J. 292 (1993) [hereinafter “Woram”].

In FDIC v. Howse, 736 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1990),

the Defendants argued that since FDIC was acting in its

9 White v. Moriarty, 19 Cal Rptr. 2d 200 (Cal. C. App.)

review denied, (August 12, 1993).

11

a

corporate capacity in that action § 1821(d)(14) did not

apply because that section purportedly “applies only to

actions brought by FDIC as conservator or receiver.” Id.

at 1444-45. In that case, FDIC-Corporate was the assignee

of FDIC in its capacity as receiver of certain of the failed

institution’s causes of action. Id. at 1445.

While the literal language of § 1821(d)(14) did not

apply directly to FDIC-Corporate, the court in Howse,

relied upon another provision of the same statute holding

that FDIC-Corporate was entitled to “the same rights and

powers as FDIC-R under § 1821.” Howse, 736 F. Supp. at

1445 (emphasis added). The court recognized that pur-

suant to the language of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(d)(3)(A), FDIC-

Corporate was entitled to “all of the rights, powers, privi-

leges and authorities of the corporation as receiver under

§ 1821” with respect to any asset acquired by the corpora-

tion. Id. at 1445 (emphasis added). “Since one of those

rights is § 1821(d)(14)’s new limitations periods . . . it

follows that § 1821(d)(14) applies equally to FDIC-Corpo-

rate.” Id. (emphasis added)

Similarly, at least one court has held that

§ 1821(d)(14) applies to the Resolution Trust Corporation

(“RTC”), even though RTC is not expressly named in the

statute. RTC v. Krantz, 757 F. Supp. 915, 922 (N.D. Il.

1991), 10

0 Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1441A(b)(4), as added by FIR-

REA, § 501(b)(4), the RTC shall have the same powers and rights

to carry out its duties ...as the [FDIC] has under sections 11, 12

and 13 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Section 1821(d)(14)

is part of section 11 of the FDIA.

12

Thus, this “right” is not “manufactured out of thin

air by the Texas Supreme Court” as suggested by Peti-

tioner but is created by § 1821(d)(14) itself, and recog-

nized elsewhere in the text of FIRREA and by the courts

D. Resort To Common Law Is Necessary To Fill

Inevitable Statutory Gaps.

Precisely because the statute is silent as to the rights

of any other party other than FDIC, the principles of the

common law are to be utilized by the courts to fill this

statutory gap. D’Oench, Duhme & Company v. FDIC, 315

U.S. 447, 469-72 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).

[he common law of assignments not only supports

but also establishes the assignment of the right, benefit

and remedy of the FIRREA statute of limitations provi-

sion to purchasers of the FDIC. FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d

$05, 810 (5th Cir. 1993) (and authorities cited therein)

While an assignment would not carry with it all

rights, remedies and benefits incidental to the thing

ssigned when a contrary intent appears in the assign-

ment or when the right, remedy or benefit is personal to

the assignor and for his benefit alone, neither of these

exceptions are epplicable here. Further, the operation of

the common law of assignments has absolutely nothing to

do with whether or not a party pur hasing an asset is

ioing so for its own benefit

13

Not one single case or secondary source which has

stated that rights, remedies or benefits personal to assig-

nors and for their benefit alone are not assignable has

involved a statute of limitations provision.!!

Il. The Extension of the Benefit of the Six-Year Statute

of Limitations to Assignees Does Not Conflict With

the Purposes of Statutes of Limitation.

FDM instituted this suit consistent with the purpose

of statutes of limitations articulated in the authorities

cited by Petitioner. See Petition For Cert. at 9-10.

While the primary purpose of statutes of limitation is

to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reason-

able time so that the opposing party has a fair oppor-

tunity to defend, that “reasonable time” became six years

once the FDIC took over the notes in question from

Heritage National Bank.

At that time, by operation of law, Petitioner was on

notice that the FDIC could have waited six years to bring

an action against Weatherly to enforce it. FDIC v. Hinkson,

848 F.2d 432, 435 (3rd Cir. 1988) (the 6-year limitation

provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) “does not mandate a fed-

eral agency be precluded from suing in less than 6 years

on an assigned claim.”). Instead, the FDIC chose to sell

and assign the Note to FDM. Weatherly did not win the

'l See Texas Supreme Court Opinion below. Petitioner is

less than candid with this Court when he states that “statutes of

limitation have never been treated as rights of plaintiffs

instead courts have uniformly held that statutes of limitation

are personal to defendants.” Petition For Cert. at 11

14

right to repose under a shorter limitations period when

the inn meigees to sell the Note and assign it to FDM.

Fall v. Keasler, No. C-90-20643, 1991 WL 340182 (N.D. Cal.,

Dec 18, 1991).

FDM asserted its cause of action within the reason-

able time articulated by the six-year statute of limitations.

There is no concern in this case with stale facts, lost

evidence or other difficulty in proof, defective memory,

death or other unavailability of witnesses

can it be argued in the context of the extraordin-

ary circumstances of bank failure that allowing “private

third parties to assert a state law claim founded on con-

tract beyond the time allowed by a state statute of limita-

tions only frustrates the reasonable commercial

expectations of the parties involved.” Petition For Cert. at

learly, the legitimate expectations OF a maker of

note do not include the windfall of ps liability

because of the transfer of the note. Applyi 1 uniform

} lt ir .

imitations would result only in a maker

being required to defend suit brought by a transferee

jiirino the « t myeorin wrh 1? + . ild } 1re Hep bro ot

during the same period when it could have Deen Drought

by the FDIC. As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted

in Bank of Boulder, in the context of a federal rule permit

ting FDIC-Corporate to acquire non-transferrable letters

of credit contrary to state law

the rule would come into effect only after an

insured bank has failed. Parties cannot reason-

ably expect to carry on normal relationsh ps at

15

[W]e note that if Colorado’s transfer restrictions

were enforced against FDIC/Corporation in this

case, Bank of Boulder would likely receive an

unexpected benefit. . . . If FDIC/Corporation is

not allowed to enforce the letter of credit

. then Bank of Boulder will be freed of its

obligation to honor drafts of the Receiver of

Dominion Bank. Clearly, Bank of Boulder could

not have had a reasonable commercial expecta-

tion based on state law that if Dominion Bank

went bankrupt, Bank of Boulder would be

relieved of al! liability under the letter of credit.

Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d at 1147.

In the instant case, Petitioner Weatherly’s expecta-

tions at the time he borrowed money from Heritage

National Bank presumably included the ultimate repay-

ment of his notes; he should not be given the windfall of

forgiveness of his notes because of the vehicle by which

FDIC sought to realize upon them.

lil. The Decision of the Texas Supreme Court is in

Accord With the Decision in Hinkson and the

Decisions of This Court.

Even assuming the decision in FDIC v. Hinkson, 848

F.2d 432 (3rd Cir. 1988), were decided the same way

under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14), which would not be the

case, it would still not conflict with the Texas Supreme

Court decision. Hinkson, contrary to Petitioner’s argu-

ment, does not stand for the proposition that an assignee

of failed bank assets from the FDIC is not governed by the

same statute of limitations that apply to its assignor.

Petition For Cert. at 11.

16

In Hinkson, the FDIC received an assignment of the

note upon which it brought suit as a result of an open bank

assistance transaction not by operation of law as a result of

bank failure. Section 1821(d)(14) only applies to assets

acquired by operation of law!2 initially by a conservator

or receiver of an insured depository institution or subse-

quently acquired by FDIC or RTC in their corporate

capacities and private parties (whether banks, individ-

uals or other organizations) by transfer and assignment.

Further, even assuming the result in Hinkson was not

changed by the current state of the law, which it would

be, Hinkson merely stands for the proposition that there

would be a uniform statute of limitations rule for FDIC

and its subsequent assignees — the federal limitations

period would govern an action by either FDIC or its

assignees. As stated by the court in Hinkson:

The federal limitations period will therefore

govern in both instances - whether the state

statute provides for a longer or shorter time

than section 2415.

Hinkson, 848 F.2d at 434.

Significantly, however, if Hinkson were decided

today, the FDIC would have been entitled to the longer

period under state law. Section 1821(d)(14)(A) overrules

Hinkson to the extent argued by Petitioner here as fol-

lows:

'2 Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i)&(ii) “The Corpeo-

ration shall, as conservator receiver, and by operation of law,

succeed to - (i) all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the

insured depository institution . . . and (ii) title to the books,

records, and assets” of the institution.

17

(A) IN GENERAL - Notwithstanding any pro-

vision of any contract, the applicable stat-

ute of limitations with regard to any action

brought by the corporation as conservator

or receiver shall be -

(i) in the case of any contract claim, the

longer of —

(I) The 6-year period beginning on

the date the claim accrues; or

(II) The period applicable under state

law.

12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A)(i)(I)&(ID) (emphasis added).

Thus, since the State of Delaware has a twenty-year

statute of limitations, the FDIC acquiring an asset in

Delaware as conservator or receiver, would be entitled to

a twenty-year statute of limitations period. In turn, an

assignee of FDIC as conservator or receiver would like-

wise be entitled to the twenty-year statute of limitations

period. Thus, the decision in Hinkson does not conflict

with the decision of the Texas Supreme Court.

Nor does the Texas Supreme Court decision conflict

with this Court’s decision in Cressey v. Meyer, 138 U.S. 525

(1891) or any other decision of this Court.

First, Petitioner’s reliance upon Cressey, like Peti-

tioner’s reliance upon United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S.

414 (1940), is misplaced. There is no point to be made that

the United States and its agencies at one time were not

subject to state or federal limitations periods.

More importantly, neither Summerlin nor Cressey

involve in any way rights of an assignee or transferee of

18

the government or its agencies. Thus, neither case can or

does stand for the proposition that when the United

States was immune from statutes of limitation, such

immunity did not pass to its assignees or transferees.

In Summerlin, the United States itself was the party

which brought suit. As noted by this Court in Summerlin:

By a series of transactions . . . the Federal Hous-

ing Administrator, acting on behalf of the

United States, became the assignee of a claim

against the estate of one J. F. Andrew, deceased.

* + *

The claim assigned to the Federal Housing

Administrator acting on behalf of the United

States became the claim of the United States,

and the United States thereupon became entitled

to enforce it.

United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. at 414, 416.

In Cressey, suit was brought by a creditor of the

“sovereign”, not an assignee or transferee, there is a differ-

ence. 5

Nothing in Cressey or Summerlin addresses the rights,

interests or remedies of the “sovereign” that pass to an

assignee or transferee with the assignment of substantive

rights. Neither of these cases anywhere expressly states

that immunity from the application of statutes of limita-

tions or the doctrine of laches is a personal right of the

sovereign. Nor can Cressey be so construed vis-a-vis the

government and its assignees from the fact that the gov-

ernment “does not give to [its] creditor its sovereign exemp-

tion from liability to the statute of limitation and the

19

defense of laches.” Cressey, 138 U.S. at 528 (emphasis

added).

A. The Texas Supreme Court Followed Well-Set-

tled Rules of Statutory Construction.

Respondent agrees that the starting point in any case

of statutory construction is the statute itself. Demarest v.

Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184 (1991). If the statute’s language

is plain as to the rights of the parties concerned, “the sole

function of the court is to enforce it according to its

terms.” Caminetti v. United States 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).

If, on the other hand, the meaning of the statute is

coubtful or ambiguous as the rights of the parties

involved, the court “construes it to contain that permiss-

ible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably

into the body of both previously and subsequently

enacted law.” West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v.

Cassey, __ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 1148 (1991).

In the present case, the statute in question, 12 U.S.C.

§ 1821(d)(14), is neither ambiguous nor unambiguous as

to the rights of the parties concerned, i.e., assignees and

transferees of assets from the FDIC. FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989

F.2d at 809-810. In other words, the clear and unam-

biguous language of the text itself says nothing about

when assignees of the FDIC must bring substantive

claims assigned.

Thus, as noted by the Fifth Circuit in Bledsoe, “the

statutes are absolutely silent” as to the rights of the

parties concerned. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d at 810. In such an

20

instance, another axiomatic principle of statutory con-

struction is triggered. “In effectuating Congress’ intent,

courts are to fill the inevitable statutory gaps by reference

to the principles of common law.” Bledsoe, 989 F.2d at 810.

This court has recognized the principle that source

materials of the common law may be used to answer a

question presented to the court where reference to the

text of the statute alone does not answer the question

with regard to the parties concerned. D’Oench Duhme, 315

U.S. at 469-72 (Jackson, J., concurring).

This court has also directed the federal courts “to fill

the interstices of federal legislation ‘according to their

own standards’ ” in areas affecting nationwide federal

programs. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715,

727 (1979) (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 315

U.S. 363, 367 (1943)).

The authorities cited by Petitioner are clearly distin-

guishable. The statutes being construed in those cases

either: (1) expressly mentioned the parties affected by the

statute or the specific rights of the specific parties

affected; or (2) undertook to deal with rights related to

the right in question, in various ways.

The question presented in Demarest was whether 28

U.S.C. § 1821 required payment of witness fees to a

- convicted state prisoner who was brought to testify at a

federal trial pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad testifi-

candum. Demarest, 111 S.Ct. at 601. The text of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1821 provided that “a witness in attendance at any

court of the United States . . . shall be paid the fees and

allowances provided by the section.” Demarest, 111 S.Ct.

at 602. The statute further provided that a “subsistence

21

allowance shall be paid to a witness (other than a witness

who is incarcerated) when an overnight stay is required.”

Id.

Thus, the statute in Demarest is far different from the

statute in the present case. The category of persons whose

rights were being adjudicated were expressly mentioned

in the statute.

Similarly, the issue in West Virginia v. Cassey was

whether the term “witness fees” in a statute designed to

shift court costs to losing parties also included “expert

fees.” West Virginia, 111 S.Ct. at 1140-1141. In that case,

both the common law and the record of statutory usage of

the term “witness fees” clearly evidenced that expert fees

were separate from witness fees. West Virginia, 111 S.Ct.

at 1141-1146. In the present case, both the common law

and the application of statutory rights to assignees would

require a different result.

Likewise, the statute in question in In re Shearer, 139

F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1956) provided that “any natural

person except a wage earner . . . may be adjudged an

involuntary bankrupt.” In re Shearer, 139 F. Supp. at 218.

The petitioner in that case sought review of an order of a

Referee adjudicating him an involuntary bankrupt after

finding that he was not a “wage earner” within the mean-

ing of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. The Bankruptcy Act in that

case defined the term “wage earner.” In re Shearer, 139 F.

Supp. at 219. Thus, the category of persons affected was

expressly defined in the statute.

Finally, unlike the present case, in Iselin v. United

States, 270 U.S. 245 (1926), the legislature had

exhaustively undertaken to deal with rights related to the

22

right in question in that case in various ways but omitted

any reference to the particular right involved. The ques-

tion in Iselin was whether the sale of a stockholder’s

opera box tickets which were not sold at ticket offices

could be taxed under a statutory provision taxing the sale

of tickets at ticket offices. The statute relied upon by the

government to impose a tax was not applicable because it

only applied to tickets which were regularly sold at ticket

offices or other similar places. Iselin, 270 U.S. at 247. The

tickets sold by the stockholder in question were free

tickets which were reserved by the lessor of the opera

house for all performances. Thus, the tickets were not

regularly sold.

IV. The Extension of Federal Statutory Rights to

Assignees, as Well as Congressional Intent Sup-

port the Decision of the Texas Supreme Court.

A. Federal and State Courts have extended the

statutory provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) to

entities other than the FDIC.

While the literal language of § 1821(d)(14) speaks

directly to the FDIC and not assignees, federal and state

courts have not hesitated to extend the protections of 12

U.S.C. § 1823(e) to assignees of FDIC, and other federal

banking regulators. Section 1823(e) contains language

similar to § 1821(d)(14), speaking only to the FDIC.

A careful read of such cases demonstrates not only

that the courts understand the distinction between statu-

tory and common law rights, but also, that they care

about the outcome under either scheme. This is evi-

denced by the fact that the rationale articulated for such

23

extension is twofold: (1) if a note is enforceable in the

hands of the FDIC, it is equally enforceable in the hands

of an assignee; and (2) the extension of such rights facili-

tates Congress’ policy of protecting failed institutions’

assets and the insurance fund.

In FDIC v. Newhart, 892 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1989), the

Eighth Circuit embraced the extension of § 1823(e) to

assignees of the FDIC when it held, in the context of a

discussion of that defense, that “the FDIC transfers its

protected status to subsequent purchasers of notes it

holds.” Newhart, 892 F.2d at 50.

The district court in Newhart found that the terms of

§ 1823(e) preempted the technical requirements of Mis-

souri holder-in-due-course law once FDIC acquired an

asset. FDIC v. Newhart, 713 F. Supp. 320, 324 (W.D. Miss.),

aff'd, 892 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1989). The defendant argued

that while his defenses were cut off as to FDIC, FDIC’s

assignee cculd not assert FDIC’s holder-in-due-course

status. Id. The court disagreed, holding in reliance upon

two of its unpublished opinions that:

[Detendant’s] defenses could not be revived

simply because the FDIC transferred the note to

a third party.

Id.

The district court found the reasoning of the

unpublished cases compelling “especially since a con-

trary result would emasculate the policy behind § 1823(e)

of encouraging the FDIC to participate in transfer agree-

ments.” Id.

24

The Eighth Circuit affirmed, based on the dual prop-

ositions of law, that (1) an assignee stands in the shoes of

the assignor, and (2) under Section 3.201(1) of the U.C.C.,

transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such

rights as the transferor had therein. Newhart, 892 F.2d at

50.

Discussing the policy behind § 1823(e), the Eighth

Circuit stated as follows:

In certain cases, such as the instant one, the

FDIC may decide to sell returned assets after

bringing suit for collection. Because these assets

are usually non-performing loans, there would

be little or no incentive for prospective pur-

chasers to acquire them if they were subject to

the personal defenses of the obligors based on

undisclosed agreements. If this avenue of cut-

ting losses became unavailable to the FDIC, pur-

chase and assumption transactions would

become more experisive and thus, less likely to

occur.

Newhart, 892 F.2d at 50.

Concluding that this policy behind § 1823(e) sup-

ported the extension of federal holder-in-due-course sta-

tus to an assignee bank, the Eighth Circuit stated:

If holder-in-due-course status did not run with

the notes acquired by the FDIC in purchase and

assumption transactions, the market for such

notes would be smaller, which would have a

deleterious effect on the FDIC’s ability to pro-

tect the assets of failed banks.

Id.

én

Similarly, in reliance upon the Eighth Circuit in New-

hart, as well as Deposit Guaranty Bank v. Hall, 741 F. Supp.

1287 (S.D.Tex. 1990) and Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523

(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1083 (1991), the court in

Alarcon v. FDIC, 772 F. Supp. 334 (E.D.Mich. 1991)

expressly held that § 1823(e) extends to assignees of the

FDIC stating:

[T]he court fully concurs [with] the proposition

that when the FDIC has obtained a note previ-

ously held by a bank which has gone into

receivership, and assigns the note to another

bank, the assignee bank is entitled to the same

protection under D’Oench, Duhme, and § 1823(e)

as the FDIC itself. In other words, if the note is

enforceable in the hands of the FDIC, it is equally

enforceable in the hands of the assignee bank.

Alarcon, 772 F. Supp. at 342 (emphasis added); see also,

Hall, 741 F. Supp. at 1290 (holding under § 1823(e) defen-

dant was estopped from asserting affirmative defenses

against an assignee of the FDIC); RSR Properties, Inc. v.

FDIC, 706 F. Supp 524, 532 (W.D.Tex. 1989) (applying

§ 1823(e) to deficiency suit brought by an assignee of the

FDIC).

In Willow Tree Inv., Inc. v. Wagner, 453 N.W.2d 641, 643

(Iowa 1990), the Iowa Supreme Court in extending

§ 1823(e)’s protections to assignees noted and rejected an

argument identical to that raised by Petitioner here:

Defendants claim that while the FDIC is granted

special protection under § 1823(e), plaintiff, as

purchaser, is not similarly insulated from the

defenses that defendants could raise against the

insolvent bank. They note that the statute refers

only to the “corporation” and makes no mention of

26

extending its provisions to assignees or purchasers.

We believe that the purpose of § 1823(e) would

not be furthered by limiting the application of

its provisions to the FDIC.

Willow Tree Inv., 453 N.W.2d at 643 (emphasis added). The

same analysis applies with equal force in the present case.

B. Congressional Intent Underlying Section

1821(d)(14) as Well as the Entire Comprehensive

Scheme of Facilitating Resolution of Insolvent

Institutions and Minimizing the Cost to the

Insurance Fund Support the Decision of the

Texas Supreme Court.

As noted above, when Congress passed FIRREA, it

was not legislating on a clean slate. H.R. Rep. No. 54(I),

101st Cone., 1st Sess. 6 (1989), reprinted in 1989

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 87-93, 108. FIRREA “grew out of the

acute and massive financial crisis of the thrift industry

and the [FSLIC] a situation caused by a number of factors

that included a regional economic collapse and fraud and

insider abuse.” See, Explanations to FIRREA, Title 1, Pur-

poses of the Act, para. 101; FIRREA, Section 101 at para.

2101. In this way, FIRREA buiids upon the purposes and

intent of the FDIA and the Bridge Bank Statute.

As noted by this court, “the words of a statute,

particularly one with a remedial object, have a meaning

imparted to them by ‘the mischief to be remedied.’ ”

Aaron v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 446 U.S. 680, 705

(1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). By 1989, it had become

clear that the savings and loan industry was in dire

trouble and emergency legislation was required to restore

public confidence in the industry. H.R. Rep No. 54(I) at

a

27

90, 98-104. With respect to the extended statute of limita-

tions provision contained in Section 212(d)(14) of FIR-

REA, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14), Senator Reigle

explained:

Section 212 of the conference bill provides for

extended statute of limitations p ds for

claims brought by the FDIC in its capacity as

conservator or receiver of a failed financial insti-

tution. Although these provisions have attracted

little attention from the media, they are of the

utmost importance. Extending these limitations

periods wiil significantly increase the amount of

money that can be recovered by the Federal

Government through litigation, and help ensure

the accountability of the persons responsible for

the massive losses the Government has suffered

through the failures of insured institutions. The

provisions should be construed to maximize potential

recoveries by the Federal Government by preserving

to the greatest extent permissible by law claims that

would otherwise have been lost due to the expiration

of hitherto applicable limitations periods.

135 Cong. Rec. $10182-01 at S10205 (Daily ed. Aug. 4,

1989) (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that the mischief

to be remedied was to avoid massive losses to the Gov-

ernment by maximizing the amount of money that could

be recovered by the FDIC.

It is further clear that Congress contemplated using

the private sector to maximize the amount of money that

could be recovered by the FDIC. One of the purposes of

FIRREA itself is to “provide funds from public and pri-

vate sources to deal expediticusly with failed depository

institutions.” FIRREA, Section 101(8), para. 2101.

28

Those funds are provided from private sources

through the purchase of assets from FDIC under purchase

and assumption or bulk sale tvansactions. See e.g., Sharp,

supra, at 66.

CONCLUSION

For these various reasons, the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Gopwin & Carton, P.C.

STEVEN T. PoLINo

State Bar No. 16088645

901 Main Street, Suite 3300

Dallas, Texas 75201

(214) 939-4400

(214) 760-7332 (FAX)

Attorneys for Respondent

Federal Debt Management, Inc.

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