Appendix — Johnson v. Los Angeles Community College District
Supreme Court brief1993
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
rY\ « |
a |) Wee Bupreme Court, U.S.
92 =1738h PE
‘ sia
APR 2 8 1993
CrACE OF THE CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term 1992
JACK P. JOHNSON, LINDA JOHNSON,
Petitioners,
Vv.
LOS ANGELES COMMUNITY
COLLEGE DISTRICT,
Respondent.
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL
William J. Cleary, Jr. Jack P. and Linda
1853 1/2 N. Canyon Drive Johnson
Los Angeles, CA. 90028 8807 Gold Creek
(213) 465-3633 Road
Lake View Terrace,
CA. 91342
(818) 370-8088
(818) 542-9300
Of Counsel Pro Se
Contents
Written Opinion Of Court Of Appeal....
Oral Opinion Of Trial Court...........
Order Denying Rehearing.......cccesece
Order Denying Review By The
California Supreme Court..............
Order Granting Extension of Time......
Constitutions, Statutes and Rules
Excerpt From Opening Brief In
ro eg ae eS ee re ee
Excerpt From Amended Complaint Filed
On January 10, 1985 by Johnsons
WEGLMBS BGNGOL DISS IGE «occ cccccccccss
Excerpt From Second Amended Complaint
Filed May 14, 1985 by Johnsons Against
aoe Ss 9 nr
Excerpt From Respondent School
District’s Brief in the California
eg eT ee ee ee Te eee ee ee
Second and Third Causes of Action of
Excerpts From Reporter’s Transcripts
Claude Rucker: 1RT 112:4-19
lestimony of Laurel Woodley,
District Gold Creek ad hoc
GOMES ECOG. i.6 6s 0 00 bee eh eee eee 8
TESTIMONY OF FLOYD BODLE,
Johnson’s predecessor in interest..... 89
CLARENCE JOE BROWN, commercial
user GE BOGEG RONG: +5400 6006 ee eee ee 93
DENNIS LEE, L.A.C.C. District
custodian OF r@COrage :«<-<<«s6ee eee 94
JACK JOHNSON, Zoned Uses of property 92
Eynibits Im BViGence<«<«.«6éeee8 see 100
il
NOT TO BE PU
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
JACK P. JOHNSON, et al.,
BLISHED
}
)
Plaintiff’s, Cross-Defendants, ) No.
and Appellants, ) BO50096
) (Super.
V. ) CG. HO.
) NCC
LOS ANGELES COMMUNITY ) 25594B)
COLLEGE DISTRICT, )
)
Defendant, Cross- )
Complainant and Appellant. )
an _)
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County. Thomas C. Murphy,
Judge. Affirmed.
William J. Cleary, Jr. for Plaintiffs,
Cross-Defendants and Appellants.
Veatch, Carlson, Grogan & Nelson and Pamela
Benben for Defendant, Cross-Complainant and
Appellant.
litt NC OL LAO
This dispute between neighbors
concerns title to a private road through
defendant’s property to plaintiffs’
property, and plaintiffs’ right to remove
trees, vegetation, slopes, and soil from
defendant’s' property. Plaintiffs Jack
Johnson and Linda Johnson, who believe they
hold an undivided ownership interest in
their neighbor’s private road, filed suit
against defendant Los Angeles Community
College District (District) for quiet title, °
declaratory and injunctive relief, and
general and punitive damages. The District,
which claims the Johnsons are entitled only
to an easement for access to their property,
cross-complained against the Johnsons for
Similar relief. After a court trial, the
trial court quieted title in the District,
Subject to the Johnsons’ easement for non-
commercial ingress and ingress, but denied
the District damages for the lost trees,
vegetation, slopes and soil. Both the
2
Johnsons and the District appealed. We
affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
The parties’ respective adjoining
parcels contain several hundred wilderness
acres which are surrounded by United States
Forest Service land in the Little Tujunga
area. The District, which acquired its
property in 1950, has kept its land in a
natural state as an ecological preserve used
by students and faculty. The Johnsons, who
acquired their property in 1975, wish to
rent their land for commercial ventures such
as motion picture filming and camping.1/
1. We do not intend to imply that the
Johnsons’ property is zoned for such uses,
or that the Johnsons have complied with
appliceble license or permit regulations, if
any. The record is silent on these points.
Despite the contrary indications in the
Johnsons’ brief, the trial court excluded
the Johnsons’ evidence of zoning ordinances,
exhibit 8. Since the Johnsons do not
contend exhibit 8 was erroneously excluded,
we do not address the propriety of that
ruling.
The Johnsons’ property would be
landlocked were it not for the private road
which crosses the District’s property and
intersects the public highway. . The lower
portion of this private road was built in
1902 by the District’s predecessor, R.S.
Watt, whose house was at the end of his
gated, locked, and private road, and which
was then about 200 to 300 yards below the
Johnsons’ property line.
The upper portion of the private
road was built in 1908, when Watt gave the
Johnsons’ predecessors, Edward D. Silent and
Frank J. Thomas, and their heirs,
Successors, and assigns, a permanent,
undivided one-half interest in the private
road and a right of way over Watt’s land
along the course of the private road. In
return, Silent and Thomas paid Watt $250
plus $300 for extending the road from Watt’s
house to their property line. Silent and
Thomas agreed to bear their pro rata share
of the work or costs necessary to maintain
the road and gate.
Until the Johnsons acquired their
property in 1975, the private dirt road
remained about 10 to 12 feet wide, and was
not used for commercial purposes. The road
was used mainly by the owners of the two
parcels and their guests, including the
District’s students who travelled to the
District’s property by bus.
The Johnsons, who contend the 1908
recorded agreement gave them an undivided
ownership interest in the private road,
unilaterally widened the road to accommodate
their increased and changed use of the
property. Motion picture filming crews
brought large trucks up the road, and as
many as 500 people would go to the Johnsons’
property at a time, in as many as 200 to 300
cars. Without the District’s permission,
the Johnsons moved, widened and elevated the
5
road by cutting back the slope of the canyon
wall, excavating the stream channel
throughout the canyon, and removing most of
the trees along the stream. The District,
which claims the 1908 agreement gave the
Johnsons only an easement for ingress and
egress, threatened to obtain an injunction
against the Johnsons. The Johnsons
responded by filing suit for quiet title,
declaratory and injunctive relief, and
general and punitive damages. The District
then cross-complained for similar relief.
The trial court granted the District
a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
Johnsons from excavating and widening the
road, and from using the road for commercial
purposes. Following a court trial, the
trial court determined the Johnsons had an
easement rather than an ownership interest
in the road, and quieted title to the road
in the District subject to the Johnsons’
easement. The trial court determined the
6
——__$— aa ——ee een nena
scope of the Johnsons’ easement was. for
private, noncommercial use only, and
permanently enjoined the Johnsons’ from
altering the course of the road, using the
road for commercial purposes, or repairing
the road without the District’s prior
written consent. The trial court also
ordered the parties to share the cost of
surveying the exact location of their mutual
boundary to resolve their ongoing dispute on
that point.
The risa court rejected the
District’s claim for money damages of $1.5
million. The District, although conceding
that many of its trees were damaged by
natural causes, contended that at least a
third of its trees (about 60) were
unnecessarily cut down by the Johnsons. The
Johnsons, on the other hand, contended that
all of the District’s trees were damaged by
natural causes, and several witnesses so
testified. The trial court concluded there
7
was insufficient evidence that the Johnsons,
rather than the area’s three recent natural
disasters (the 1975 Angeles Forest Fire, and
the 1978 and 1983 floods) and the current
California drought, were responsible for
damaging the trees on the District’s
property.
The Johnsons contend (I) the 1908
agreement gave them an undivided one-half
ownership interest in the road as a matter
of law. Alternatively, they contend (IT)
the scope of their easement includes all
reasonable uses, including commercial use.
The District contends (III) the
trial court erred in refusing to award
damages.
DISCUSSION
Lam
We conclude that the 1908 agreement
gave the Johnsons an easement rather than
8
fee simple title to the private road across
the District’s property.
Where the interpretation of a
contract is derived solely from its terms,
the question is one of law and the appellate
court makes its own independent
interpretation. (Medical Operations
Management, ine. Vv. National Health
Laboratories, Inc. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d
886, 891.)
The 1908 agreement stated in
relevant part: "This Agreement, made this
2ist day of July, 1908, by and between R. S.
Watt... and Edward D. Silent and Frank J.
Thomas... Whereas, said [Silent and Thomas]
are, in common with others, the owners of a
certain parcel of land situated in the said
county of Los Angeles, being known as [legal
description omitted], and
"Whereas, the old road that led to
the above described land is still open for
travel, and a certain portion has fallen
9
into disuse through neglect, and
"Whereas, [Watt] did build and
construct a new piece of road in 1902, and
has used, maintained and kept the same in
repair from time to time, and has maintained
the gate on the same, it being a private
road to and on certain lands owned by
[Watt], located in [legal description
omitted], and all rights in said road are
vested solely in [Watt], and
"Whereas, (Silent and Thomas}
despite to obtain a permanent interest in
Said road, and a permanent right of way over
[Watt’s] land... for themselves and co-
owners[,] their heirs and assigns forever,
under the following conditions’) and
stipulations,
"Now, therefore, this is to witness:
That [Watt], in consideration of the
promises and agreements on the part of
[Silent and fThomas], and in further
consideration of the sum of $250. cash to be
10
paid by [Silent and Thomas] to [Watt],
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and
in further consideration of the promises
herein contained on the part of [Silent and
Thomas], [Watt] does hereby grant, convey
and assign to [Silent and Thomas] and their
co-owners, their heirs, executors,
administrators and assigns, owners of the
above described land, an[{] undivided One
Half (1/2) interest in and to the said road,
so built and constricted by [Watt] in 1902,
and also right of way over the land of
[Watt], along the line of said road so
constructed in 1902, and over and along the
road to be constructed by [Watt] over his
said lands and the lands of [Silent and
Thomas], which said road to be _ so
constructed shall follow the line as now
laid our and upon which work has been done,
Together with the right at all times of
ingress and egress over and along the same
for the purpose of passage to and from the
11
lands owned by [Silent and Thomas] and their
co-owners, with the right at all times to
enter into and upon the said road, make
repairs thereon and to maintain and assist
in the maintenance of the same.
"(Silent and Thomas] further agree
to expend [$300] on said road so built by
[Watt], and designated ‘Watt Grade’ and
running to a point opposite the house of
[Watt], in making cuts and eee
particularly at the upper portion of said
grade, in cutting off corners, improving
grade and widening same, leaving no portion
narrower than nine feet, and to finish the
finished portion thereof in conformity with
the grade already established.
"It is mutually agreed that each of
the parties hereto, shall, from time to
time, when needed, and from year to year, do
their portion or pro rata of the work or
costs thereof necessary for the maintenance
of said piece of road, and that the same
12
will be kept in repair..."
The issue is whether the _ 1908
agreement conveyed a fee simple title or an
easement. A striking point on first reading
is the absence of the word "easement." One
could say that if the parties had intended
to convey an easement, they would have so
stated. However, a review of the cases
construing similar language in older grant
deeds leads us to conclude the parties to
the 1908 agreement intended to transfer an
easement rather than an ownership interest
in land. (See Parks v. Gates (1921) 186
Cal.151, 154 ("{A] direct grant of a ‘right
of way’ for a road carries with it only an
easement in the land."); People v. Thompson
(1954) 43 Cal.2d 13, 18-19 (only an easement
was conveyed by a deed which granted a right
of way); City of Glendora v. Faus (1957) 148
Cal.App.2d 920, 923-926 (only an easement
was conveyed by a deed which granted
property for railroad purposes only);
13
Moakley v. Los Angeles Pacific Ry. co.
(1934) 139 Cal.App. 421, 423-425 (only an
easement was conveyed by a2 deed which
granted a right of way); Marlin v. Robinson
(1932) 123 Cal.App. 373, 375-377 (only an
easement was conveyed by a deed which
granted land for the purpose of a private
road); but see Basin Oil Company v. City of
Inglewood (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 661, 666
(fee simple title was conveyed by a grant of
land for a public street or right of way).)
The dominant purpose of the parties
as expressed in the 1908 agreement was to
transfer the "right at all times of ingress
and egress over and along [Watt’s road] for
the purpose of passage to and from the lands
owned by [Silent and Thomas] and their co-
owners." Although the grant of a right of
way "may refer to the land owned in
unlimited fee by the owner of the road or
railroad passing over it, or...to denote an
easement only" (City of Glendora v. Faus,
14
supra 148 Cal.App.2d at p. 926; People v.
Thompson, supra, 43 Cal.2d at pp. 19-21),
the 1908 agreement does not disclose an
intention to transfer ownership of the road.
Since the right of way in this case is
expressly described as being "over" Watt’s
land and along the line of the road, we
conclude the phrase "right of way" was used
to describe an easement rather than a fee
simple title, and reject the Johnsons’
contrary assertion.
We further disagree with the
Johnsons’ contention that the following
language in the 1908 agreement evidences an
intent to transfer ownership of land:
"(Watt ] does hereby grant, convey and
assign...an[] undivided One Half (1/2)
interest in and to the said _ road...."
(Emphasis added.) The Johnsons”~ state:
"Ordinarily, the use of the word ‘grant’ by
itself is sufficient to create an estate in
fee simple absolute. Schlageter v. Cutting[ ]
15
(1931) 116 Cal.[]App. 489, [] 498. See
also, Civil Code Section 1105 which creates
a presumption of fee simple."
Schlageter v. Cutting, supra, 116
Cal.App. at page 498, however, is not on
point. The court in Schlageter found the
challenged deed "conveyed absolutely
whatever right cr claim [the grantors] may
have had to the premises and in addition
thereto quitclaimed their defeasible right."
(Ibid.) In this case, however, Watt did not
grant whatever right or claim he had to the
road; Watt simply conveyed an undivided one-
half interest in the road, together with a
right of way over Watt’s land along the line
of the road. Rather than conveying all of
his interest in the road, Watt expressly
limited the right of way to an easement only
and reserved his joint "right to...use [the]
road..."
Similarly, Civil Code section 1105
does not aid us in deciding whether Watt
16
conveyed a fee simple title. That section
merely provides that if we find the 1908
agreement was a grant of real property, we
must presume that a fee simple was intended
unless "it appears from the grant that a
lesser estate was intended." (Civ. Code,
section 1105.) But since we do not believe
the parties intended to transfer title to
the land, we do not find section 1105’s
presumption to be applicable.
Because the 1908 agreement grants an
interest in a road for ingress and egress,
we believe the contracting parties were
referring to an easement for access. The
granting of an interest in a road and a
right of way over the land of another 1S
consistent with such an easement. "An
easement is an interest in the land of
nother, which entitles the owner of the
easement to a limited use or enjoyment of
the other’s land. [Citations]. [new para: }
An easement is an interest in the land of
17
another; hence, though it is an interest in
land, it is not an estate in land.
[Citation]." (4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law
(9th ed. 1987) Real Property, Section 434,
p. 614.) "An interest in land is not
presumptively an estate in land: the term
estate is confined to those interests in
land which are or may become possessary.
[Citations]. ..-.-{A]n easement is a
nonpossessary interest in real property.
[Citation.j" (Darr v. Lone Star Industries,
Inc. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 895, 901.)
The Johnsons further rely on the fact
that the 1908 agreement conveyed _ an
undivided one-half interest in the road.
The Johnsons point out that an undivided
interest is the "very essence of tenancy in
common." (Davis v. Davis (1963) 222
Cal.App.2d 691, 693.) Accordingly, the
Johnsons conclude that Watt "severed the
title to the road from the title to the rest
of [Watt’s] land, and [Watt] and [Silent and
18
Thompson became] co-owners of the road in
fee. Reed v. Spicer (1864) 27 Ciel.) S72”
We are not convinced. Although in
Reed v. Spicer, supra 2/7 Cal. 57, the
California Supreme Court concluded that a
deed which transferred a right of way to a
mining ditch conveyed interest in the ditch
itself rather than a mere easement (id. at
pp. 63-64), the court reached a contrary
result in Parks v. Gates, Supra, 186 Cai. &&
page 154 and People v. Thompson, supra, 43
Cal.2a at pages 18-19. As stated by the
appellate court in Basin Oil Co. v. City of
Inqlewood, supra, 125 Cal.App.2d at page
664: “Analysis of caseS on this subject
makes it abundantly clear that it is
impossible to lay down an invariable and
universal rule of construction. (Citation. }
Every transaction must be considered
individually."
While the Johnsons construe the
words “undivided One-Half" interest to
19
indicate a fee simple title held in tenancy
in common, we may disregard those words if
the rest of the document indicates’ the
parties nevertheless intended to pass only
an easement. "If an intention to pass
particular title is disclosed, the court
will give effect to such intention
notwithstanding inaccuracy of expression or
inaptness of the words used. [Citation.]"
(Basin Oil Co. v. City of Inglewood, supra,
125 Cal.App.2d at p. 663.)
When the granting clause in a deed
is so broadly worded as to raise the issue
of whether the language creates an easement
of a complete title in fee, the courts will
read the deed as a whole, and ascertain
whether the grantor intended to limit the
estate named in the granting clause. The
question of "whether the particular language
creates an easement or a complete title in
fee...is raised frequently where’ the
granting clause of the deed is broad enough
20
to suggest a fee, but the habendum clause
contains qualifying words. Whether these
words merely declare the purpose of the
grant (consistent with fee) or limit the
estate conveyed is a question of intent, and
the strict common law rule that the granting
clause prevails over the habendum clause is
no longer followed. ‘The cardinal
requirement in the construction of deeds
now, as in the construction of other
instruments, is that the intention of the
parties as gathered from the whole
instrument must govern. ...Thus if it should
appear from such consideration that the
grantor intended by the habendum clause to
restrict or limit or enlarge the estate
named in the granting clause to restrict or
limit or enlarge the estate named in the
granting clause, the habendum may prevail.’"
(4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra,
section 44C, p. 621, citing Basin Oil Co. v.
City of Inglewood, supra, 125 Cal.App.2d at
21
I el! t é LW @ Y€
Granting clause in t }
ambiguous , the 17reement
that the intention of t
qrant an easement FOr
land along the Line of
agreement specifically
Watt’s right of Joint use
an
t consider the
1908 iwreement
Qa hole reflect
parties i: CC
“ess over Watt’:
the road. he
stated hat the
|
ssage to ana from
ana Thomas and
it prejudice t
hat the 1908 agreement agave the J
ownersh]l
in the private road across the
property.
The Johnsons contend
erroneously Limited the
easement to noncommercial]
t
he cr
Scope
uses.
+
Ol
that the oO! commercia use mentioned by
the Johnson it trial had signi cantly
reaseda trafri on the road e., motion
ture filming and camping With this
itext nN mur ffirm the trial yurt’s
ieter! nat1on
We begin with the language of the
.areement, because "[t]he language ol
th grant determines the scope of the
easement *itations]. Hence, a clear and
pecific grant for a particular use 1S
lecisilve. 1ew para: Whether a use 1S
nduly burdensome depends upon the terms of
the aqrant and the circumstances. While
normal future
contemplation
permissible,
ich greatly
Nii
(Citations. ]"
Law, supra,
The
agreement
uses are withi
O f t h e
uncontemplated
increase the
n the
parties and
abnormal]
burden,
reasonable
therefore
uses,
not.
are
Cai.
\
?
section 444,
relevant
specified
Witkin,
that
pp.
portions
Summary
624
of
the
road
of
the
was
1908
a
"private road" with a locked gate which had
previously been maintained by Watt alone,
but would thereafter be mutually maintained.
The agreement specified that both parties
would keep duplicate keys to the gate. And,
as previously stated, the agreement
explained the purpose of the right of way
was to provide "passage to and from [the
country road to] the lands owned by [Silent
and Thomas] and their co-owners."
Based on this language alone, we would
affirm the trial court’s determination as a
matter of law. But even if we were to deem
the contractual language inadequate to
establish the private nature of the road,
the extrinsic evidence amply supports the
trial court’s finding.
"Acts of the parties, subsequent to
the execution of the contract and before any
controversy has arisen as to its effect, may
be looked to in determining the meaning.
The conduct of the parties may be, in
24
effect, a practical construction thereof,
for they are probably least likely to be
mistaken as to the intent." (] Witkin,
Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Contract,
section 689, p. 622.) "A special rule
governs the situation where an easement,
a right of way across a piece of land,
e.g.,
is granted in general terms, without precise
specification of its location or the manner
of enjoyment. If the owner of the easement
makes a particular use with acquiescence of
the other party, the use fixes the limits of
the right, and it cannot thereafter be
changed against objection of the owner of
the servient tenement. [Citations.]" <€
Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, section
445, p. 626.)
As previously indicated, prior to
the Johnsons’ acquisition of their property
in 1975, the road remained a narrow, dirt
road that was infrequently travelled by
anyone other than the owners of the two
25
parcels and their guests.
Arthur and Robert Watt, the
District’s predecessors, used their land for
fruit trees, bee hives, and hunting.
Floyd Bodle, who owned what is now
the Johnsons’ property from about 1932 (when
he purchased it from his father, who had
bought the property in 1922) to 1975 (when
he sold it to the Johnsons) used his land
for quiet weekend recreation and relaxation.
When Bodle bought his property, he agreed
with the Watts that he would maintain the
upper portion of the road (about 200 to 300
yards running through a narrow canyon along
a stream bed from the Watts’ house to
Bodle’s property line), and the Watts would
maintain the lower portion of the road (from
the highway to the Watts’ house).
According to Bodle’s testimony, the
upper portion of the road was the most
troublesome to maintain because it went
through a narrow canyon along a stream bed
26
that needed to be cleared of rocks ana
" > > Ue a - > ~ 5 2 = - ] “ y
boulders after 1 flood. When Bodle had to
ise big machinery an dvnamite to clear the
~hannel after a flood he did so with the
Watts’s knowledge. The Watts, on the other
hand, could keep the lower road clear with
only hand tools. Bodle moved the upper road
from one side of the canyon to the other
depending on where the flood washed out the
road. Bodle scraped rock, gravel and silt
out of the stream bed to repair the upper
road after a flood.
Although Bodle could not recall ever
asking the District for permission to repair
the road, an internal District memorandum
dated October 5, 1953, indicated he had done
so. The memorandum stated in relevant part:
"Mr. Floyd Bodle...who has an easement to
cross our Gold Creek site is desirous of
improving the access road. I accompanied
him to the site on September 28, 1953 to see
what his plan was in relation to existing
27
roads, trees, and stream courses.
Although I was originally opposed to
his plan, I must now reverse this position.
As he outlined his proposals, I am convinced
we stand to gain a permanent well-graded
road up the canyon. This will be of benefit
to us in any future development that may be
proposed. He plans to spend $2000.00 or
more and is just as desirous as we are of
maintaining a beautiful, natural landscape
in the area. [new para.] ...Mr. Bodle is
awaiting word from us, as he would like to
complete the work prior to the heavy rains."
The District, which acquired its
property from the Watts in 1950, maintained
its land in a natural state as an ecological
preserve for its student and faculty. The
District has not found it necessary to widen
the road, which was between 10 and 12 feet
wide, in order to accommodate the school
buses which bring students to the property.
When the Johnsons acquired Bodle’s
28
ry
property in 1975, they with the interest o
leasing it for motion picture filming and
camping. The Johnsons, believing that the
1908 agreement gave them = an undivided
ownership interest in the private road,
admittedly ignored the District’s protests
and widened, elevated and moved portions of
the road, cut down most of the trees along
the road, bulldozed slopes in the upper
canyon, and excavated the stream bed to make
the road suitable for large commercial
vehicles. The Johnsons widened the road
from about 10 to 12 feet to 30 feet in most
areas of the upper canyon and up to 60 feet
in some areas.
The District presented evidence that
the Johnsons’ commercial activities
significantly increased the traffic along
the private road through the District’s
property. AS many as several hundred people
a day were visiting the Johnsons’ property.
Hundareds of vehicles came up the road at a
29
time. The removal of trees and vegetation,
and the cutting of the toes [sic] of the
canyon’s slopes have increased the threat of
further erosion and landslides along the
District’s property. The loss of most, if
not all, of the tree canopy along the stream
has altered the climate in portions of the
District’s property and threatens to
transform portions of the area into a
desert. The elevation of portions of the
road above the stream bed without any safety
barriers has increased the District’s
exposure to liability.
The Johnsons contend that because
their changed use of their land is within
the normal and reasonable development of
their property, the accompanying changed or
increased use of the private road is also
reasonable. (Citing Norris v. State of
California ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. (1968)
261 Cal.App.2d 41, 49.) However, the record
Supports the trial court’s determination
30
+ 7 + / -~ + +
‘ ' 3} .
Y + > +
k ¢ : —"
+ , f > - y 7 y . f
¢ + \ _ mmer a ¢ :
restricted |} yrant nd | nduct t
ncommercial usé nly WI e the hn:
tate that "the Zoning regulation: ire
presumptive evidence of reascnable use, an
this ordinance allows campgrounds and
film shooting," the zoning regulations were
not admitted at trial.
The Johnsons’ reliance on Laux V.
misplaced. The parties in that case were
formerly married, and upon dissolution of
their business partnership they divided (by
the toss of a coin) range land which they
had owned together and used for personal and
commercial hunting. The husband, who won
the coin toss, chose the northern portion
31
for himself and gave the wife a general
right of way to reach the southern half.
The husband later tried to prevent the wife
from using her right of way in the manner
the couple had used it during their
partnership. In rejecting the husband’s
attempt to limit the scope of the right of
way, the California Supreme Court made the
following statement upon which the Johnsons’
rely: "’A grant in general terms of an
easement of way will ordinarily be construed
as creating a general right of way capable
of use in connection with the dominant
tenement for all reasonable purposes...’
---’A grant of a right of way unrestricted
as to purpose is a grant of a way to be used
for any purpose whatever....’[Citations.]"
(Ibid. )
We distinguish Laux, in which the
division of the property created the
necessity for the right of way. (See 4
Witkin, Summary of Cal.Law, supra, section
32
459, pp. 636-637. ) In this case, the
Johnsons’ property did not become landlocked
because of a division of property. The
i
easement was created by agreement to provide
Silent and Thomas access tO the county road,
and this was the manner in which the
easement was used until 1975. The purpose
of the easement and the manner of its use
limit its scope, which "cannot thereafter be
changed against objection of the owner of
the servient tenement. (Citations. ]" (Id. at
section 445, p, 626.) The record supports
the District’s claim that the Johnsons
changed the manner +n which the private road
had been used prior. to is73, and
significantly ;ncreased the burden on the
District’s property, despite the District’s
repeated objections.
Similarly, we distinguish
Francheschi v. Kuntz (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d
1041, which the Johnsons also cite in their
brief. In Francheschi there was no evidence
33
of a changed use of the right of way or an
increased burden on the servient tenement.
We conclude the _ trial court’s
interpretation of the 1908 agreement to
preclude the Johnsons from changing and
increasing the use of the private road in
the manner described at trial iS amply
Supported by the record.
rik
The District contends on _ cross-
appeal that it presented sufficient evidence
of trespass and damages.
The District sought treble damages
of. about $1.5 million under Civil Code
section 3346, subdivision eer which
provides in relevant part: "For wrongful
injuries to timber, trees, or underwood upon
the land of another, or removal thereof, the
measure of damages is three times as much as
would compensate for the actual detriment,
except that where the trespass was casual or
34
involuntary, or that the defendant in any
action brought under this section had
probable cause to bel ieve that the land on
which the trespass was committed was his own
land or the land of the person in whose
service or by whose direction the act was
done, the measure of damages shall be twice
the sum as would compensate for actual
detriment...."
The trial court refused to award
damages, stating that the District had
failed to prove that the Johnsons were at
fault for the loss of trees on _ the
District’s property. The Johnsons had a
right to maintain the road, and it was
conceded that the fire and droughts which
hit the property caused damage to the trees.
The trial court stated: "Now I’m not at all
Sure that the actions of the Johnsons
contributed one hundred p[er]cent to the
damages claimed.... There has been a change
in the weather, for want of a better word,
2
in this community since 1902. (new para. ]
You talk about the [tree] canopy. You talk
about reverting to the desert. All you had
to do last night was look at the weather
report if you wanted to find that we are
five inches below norma l for the rain,
average rainfall in this state at this time.
That’s surely not the fault of the
Johnsons....[new para.]... [new para.] I’m
not sure that, by the preponderance of the
evidence on the cross-complaint that
trees...were cut down by Johnson....
Having reviewed the record, we are
not persuaded the evidence is insufficient
to support the trial court’s determination.
Mark Newton, one of the District’s
witnesses, admitted that most of the trees
were damaged by natural causes, and that it
was impossible to say what exactly which
trees were damaged by nature and which were
not. Ronald Bigelow, another District
witness, testified that when he surveyed the
36
District’s property for cut trees, he could
not tell when the trees were cut or why.
Bigelow admitted that some of the cut trees
may have been dead trees. Moreover, Bigelow
testified that a large pine trees.
Moreover, Bigelow testified that a large
pone tree which he believed to be healthy
iespite being blackened in the 1975 fire,
suddenly fell over onto the roof of the
District’s building, much to Bigelow’s
surprise.
The Johnsons presented witnesses who
testified that all of the trees on the
District’s property were damaged by the 1975
fire and 1978 and 1983 floods. Joe Brown,
who owns property below the District’s
property near the country road, testified
that the 1978 flood washed away all of the
trees in the creek channel and destroyed the
District’s road. Mr. Johnson testified that
his removal of the remaining trees along the
channel was necessary to protect the road
37
and did not cause the devastation and
flooding in 1983, because most of the trees
had been washed away in the 1978 flood.
Although the District presented a
Survey listing 60 or so trees which its
experts believed were unnecessarily cut
down, the trial court was not required to
accept that survey at face value. There was
substantial evidence that the three natural
disasters had caused heavy damage to the
trees, and the trial court was entitled to
conclude there was insufficient evidence to
determine which trees, if any, were
unnecessarily removed by the Johnsons.
In effect, the District is asking us
to reweigh the conflicting evidence. A
"’reviewing court is without power to
substitute its decisions for those of the
trial court.’ ...’In resolving the issue of
sufficiency of the evidence, we are bound by
the established rules of appellate review
that all factual matters will be viewed most
38
favorably to the prevailing party
(citations ] and in Support o f the
L
judgment.... “in brief, the appellate court
ordinarily looks only at the evidence
supporting the success ul party, and
disregards the contrary showing. ve
(Citation. ] All conflicts, therefore must
be resolved in favor of the respondent.’
(Citations. ]" (Campbell v. Southern Pacific
Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 51, 60.) ""’When a
finding of fact is attacked on the ground
that there is not any substantial evidence
to sustain it, the power of an appellate
court begins and ends with the determination
as to whether there is any substantial
evidence contradicted or uncontradicted
which will support the finding of fact.’
(Citations. ]" (Foreman & Clark Corp. v.
Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.)
"Except where additional evidence is
required by statute, the direct evidence of
one witness who is entitled to full credit
39
is sufficient for proof of any fact." (Evid.
Code, section 411; see 3 Witkin, Cal.
Evidence (3d ed. 1986) Introduction of
Evidence at Trial, sections 1750-1756, pp.
1704-1711.) "’Although an appellate court
will not uphold a judgment or verdict based
upon evidence inherently improbable,
testimony which merely discloses’ unusual
circumstances does not come within that
category. (Citation. ] To warrant’ the
rejection of the statements given by a
witness who has been believed by a trial
court, there must exist either a physical
impossibility that they are true, or their
faisity must be apparent without resorting
to inferences or deductions. [Citations. ]
Conflicts and even testimony which is
subject to justifiable suspicion do not
justify the reversal of a judgment, for it
is the exclusive province of the trial judge
or jury to determine the credibility of a
witness and the truth or falsity of the
40
¢
i
a+
upon which a determination depends.
(Citation. }’ (Citations. ]" (People v.
Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738 754
disapproved on other grounds in People v.
We affirm the judgment. Each party is to
hear its own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ORTEGA, J.
We concur:
SPENCER, P.J.
ARANDA, J.*
*Assigned by the Chairman of the Judicial
Council.
—)
>
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
BURBANK JUDICIAL DISTRICT
JACK P. JOHNSON, et al.,
Plaintiff’s, Cross-Defendants,
Case No.
NCC
V. 25594B
LOS ANGELES COMMUNITY Oral
COLLEGE DISTRICT, Opinion
Of Trial
Defendant, Cross-Complainant court
eee
By Hon. Thomas C. Murphy, Judge, Superior
Court:
THE COURT: All right. Then let the record
show that the Court has made a study of the
exhibits over the weekend and again last night,
that the Court has had an opportunity to review
the trial briefs that have been filed and the
declarations in support of some of the motions,
that the matter has been before the court for
some seven days and before the district for
about five years.
>
N
We have proceeded on the second
amended complaint for plaintiffs and on the
cross-complaint for the Los Angeles
Community College District
With reference to_- what the
Court is saying at this time, it will be
construed as a statement of decision. The
person who prevails will prepare a statement
of decision to reflect the Court’s thinkinc
and prepare judgment that would be
supportive of it.
With reference to the second amended
complaint, the Court finds that there 1s no
evidence as to interference with economic
advantage, damages for injuries to property
right, intentional infliction of emotiona
distress, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and any punitive damages based on
the second amended complaint.
The issues that the Court will
discuss when it gets to them is declaratory
relief, quiet title, pre
permanent injunction.
With reference to the cross-
complaint, the Court will direct its
attention to the quiet title, the question
of trespass, declaratory relief,
determinative injunction, and again I must
discuss again damages, but the Court is not
inclined on the evidence that it has heard
from either side to consider punitive
damages.
With reference to quiet title, I
don’t think the case will ever settle in the
minds of the people, although it will settle
with the judgment of the Court, as to where
the boundaries are. As late as yesterday,
there was discussion as to whether or not
barrels which have been moved from time to
time outline the boundary on the part of the
property that is not even involved in this
particular case. So the Court is inclined
to, and will order that a survey be made by
a competent licensed surveyor of the
44
property, particularly in connection with
the well and the underground reservoir, so
that, once and for all, the Johnsons and the
District will have an outline of their
property and know exactly what’s within
those boundaries. That must be done within
the next ninety days. The expense will be
borne equally by the parties at the present
time.
With reference to the causes of
action which both parties are maintaining,
the first cause of action in the cross-
complaint for quiet title, with reference to
the quiet title first cause of action in the
second amended complaint, the Court has
heard the evidence. The Court knows that
the intentions of the parties in any
agreement are important. I’ve heard both
those intentions. I’ve heard the evidence
from both sides. I’ve heard the evidence of
what took place.
The question is, is there a fee
45
title to that road? The court finds no.
The court finds that there is an easement.
Both the Johnsons and the Community College
have a right to cross each other’s property.
They have an easement of ingress and egress
within the scope of things as they existed.
Now I know we can’t limit people to
a 1902 traffic pattern, but at the same time
when you have evidence from the parties that
there was no commercial intent intended in
this, it was more or less a place for the
Bodles and others to go and rest and relax,
and if they could get some honey from the
Wild bees and make, as he referred to, a
dollar, he would do so. But this does not
permit either the community -- nor does it
permit you to open a road for public use,
turning them into camp sites, turning them
into weekend resorts. It has to be kept in
the position that it was in the wild-life
period. It may hurt some people. That’s
fine. But it will go along with that
46
particular consent of the parties.
With reference to the quiet title,
Gold Creek Ecological Reserve is going to be
used aS an instructional, training and
natural science by the students and faculty.
That’s their purpose and any change in
purpose on that would have to be effected in
some manner.
The question of -- I want to keep
these in balance as we go along -- trespass.
The Court is not convinced that the issue of
trespass has been carried. I Know trespass
is sort of an intentional type of action. I
don’t think the Johnsons intentionally did
anything. I think they believed that they
had a right to proceed as they were
proceeding, so much so that they have
pursued this case through a rather long and
tortuous litigation career without
attorneys.
The question of preliminary and
permanent injunction will be addressed and
47
it will sort of be directed to both sides,
because your neighbors and you are going to
live together and you are going to maintain,
I assume, a relationship under the Court’s
Supervision if necessary that will maintain
and keep the peace.
So, having ruled on trespass, I will
then move on to the question that is in my
mind as to the permanent injunction or
declaratory relief which we will base it on.
The Court is going to declare the right of
the parties and will set forth in more
detail in just a few minutes after I can get
to my notes.
All right, I’m going to, inasmuch as
I have ruled that this is not a fee title
and that the Johnsons have got nothing more
than an easement for ingress and egress,
that, with all the right to cross that road,
I am going to say that the judgment will be
for the cross-complainant, and find that
they are the owner in fee simple of the
48
roperty described; that the right-of-way
4
r
easement across it is for the sole purpose
of ingress and egress to the adjacent
property as more fully set forth.
I. am going to declare that the
cross-complainants own all of the property
described in Paragraph 2 of the first cause
of action, again subject to a private and
noncommercial right of way and easement to
cross the road for the sole purpos of
ingress and egress.
I am going to declare that the
cross-defendants and each of them or any of
the parties do not own any of the property
described in Paragraph 2 of the first cause
of action.
I am going to make a declaration
that the cross-defendants may not make
improvements without prior notice in writing
to the district.
You must cooperate. There must be a
meeting or a declaration that the cross-
49
defendants will not engage in maintenance
and repair without prior written notice, and
they are not entitled to alter the course
and width of the easement. And from the
evidence presented to this Court, the
guidelines will not be less than 8 feet and
not more than 18, from the evidence that has
been presented to me, period.
This easement will not be opened by
either side to the public or for use of the
easement for commercial purposes other than
as confined to students, period.
And we must address the question of
damages. Now I’m not sure at all that the
actions of the Johnsons’ contributed one
hundred precent [sic] to the damages
claimed. I have remarked many times during
the trial that this Court is stupid but
sometimes not dumb. There has been a change
in the weather, for want of a better word,
in this community since 1902.
You talk about canopy. You talk
io
0
——— SC Ee
about reverting to the desert. All you had
to do last night was look at the weather
report if you wanted to find that we are
five inches below normal for the rain,
average rainfall in this. state at this
particular time. That’s surely not the
fault of the Johnsons. It’s affecting the
whole -- we are reverting back to the
desert, at least eighty per cent of it. We
have grave concerns on a nat ional level.
The environmentalists have great concerns,
and it was addressed by President Bush as to
what steps are going to be taken to relieve
this effect.
From what I_ read, perhaps we‘re
getting to a point where the ozone layer 1s
being penetrated and we’re losing our
atmosphere. T don’t think the Johnsons are
a hundred percent at fault for that.
I’m not sure that, by the
preponderance of the evidence on the cross~
complaint that trees that were cut were cut
51
by Johnson. Somebody cut then. I’m a
Suspicious man. I would think so, but I’m
not going to assess anyone a million dollars
to refurnish with trees in this particular
area.
I’m going to say, with all due
respect to all of the parties, that there is
going to have to be a cooperation and a
community between you from here on in.
We’re going to have a survey to outline the
boundaries. You are going to have to live
with the fact that you have an easement and
not a direct right to do what you want, when
you want, where you want with the alleged
road. It will be within limits of 8 to 18
feet. You will not take it upon yourselves,
either one or both of you, to go on other
people’s property to maintain or to repair,
without first having conferred, meet and
confer and have written agreement such that
it will or will not be done or it will not
be done. And you are permanently enjoined
52
from doing otherwise.
I am not going to assess damages.
Some might be warranted, but not by the
preponderance of the evidence that I am
satisfied myself as to the nature and the
extent of them, and it would be unfair to
assess a million one plus $275 million [sic]
for this type of thing.
There will be no further damage, no
further cutting, no further repairs, no
further movement, period.
You, young lady, will prepare the
statement of decision and _ prepare the
judgment to support it.
The prevailing party will get their
costs as evidenced by a cost bill.
I thank you for a very interesting
case and a very interesting seven days.
I apologize to you that this
district took five years to try this case.
It should have never taken that long, but I
shall not comment on it other than the fact
53
that, no matter what you say, you’ve now had
your day in court.
Thank you.
MS. BENBEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Proceedings in the above-entitled
matter were concluded. )
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
JOSEPH A. LANE, CLERK
DIVISION: 1 DATE: 11/19/92
iam J. Cleary, Jr.
1/2 N. Canyon Drive
Angeles, CA. 90028
li
3
Doe
Wi
185
Lo
RE: Johnson, Jack P.
vs.
Los Angeles Community College
District
2 Civil BO50096
Los Angeles NO. NCC25594B
THE COURT:
Petition for rehearing denied.
~ }"
Second Appellate District, Division One,
No. BO50096
S016472
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
IN BANK
JACK P. JOHNSON Et Al., Appellants
V.
LOS ANGELES COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT,
Appellant
Petition for review DENIED.
The request for an order directing
publication of the opinion is denied.
LUCAS
Chief Justice
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. A-692
Jack P. Johnson, et al.,
Petitioners
Los Angeles Community College District,
et al.
ORDER
UPON CONSIDERATION of the application of
counsel for the petitioner,
IT IS ORDERED that the time for filing a
petition for a writ of certiorari in the
above-entitled case, be and the same is
hereby extended to and including April 29,
1993.
/s/ Sandra D. O’Connor
Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States
Dated this 15th
day of March, 1993.
57
Constitutions, Statutes and Rules Cited
Ra) California Civil Code Section 1647:
Contracts explained by circumstance.
A contract may be explained by reference to
the circumstances under which it was made,
and the matter to which it relates.
2.) California Civil Code Section 1641:
Effect to be given to every part of
contract. The whole of a contract 1s to be
taken together, so as to give effect to
every part, if reasonably practicable, each
Clause helping to interpret the other.
3.) California Civil Code Section 1644:
Words to be understood in usual
sense. The words of a contract are to be
understood in their ordinary and popular
sense, rather than according to their strict
legal meaning; unless used by the parties in
a technical sense, or unless ae special
meaning 1S given to them by usage, in which
8
Oy
case the latter must be followed.
4.) California Civil Code Section 1638:
Interpretation to be ascertained
from language. The language of a contract
is to govern its interpretation, if the
language is clear and explicit, and does not
involve an absurdity.
<a California Civil Code Section 1636:
81)
Contracts, how to be interpreted. A
contract must be so interpreted as to give
effect to the mutual intention of the
parties as it existed at _ the time of
contracting, Te) far as the same as
ascertainable and lawful.
6.) California Civil Code Section 1070:
Irreconcilable provisions. If
several parts of a grant are absolutely
irreconcilable, the former part prevails.
59
‘re California Civil Code Section 1105:
When fee simple title is presumed to
pass. A fee simple title is presumed to be
intended to pass by aegrant of real
property, unless it appears from the grant
that a lesser estate was intended.
8.) California Civil Code Section 1069:
Interpretation against grantor. -A
grant is to be interpreted in favor of the
grantee, except that a reservation in any
grant, and every grant by a public officer
or body, as such, to a private party, is to
be interpreted in favor of the grantor.
9.) California Civil Code Section 1104:
What easements pass with property.
A transfer of real property passes all
easements attached thereto, and creates in
favor thereof an easement to use other real
property of the person whose estate is
transferred in the same: manner and to the
60
same extent as such property was obviously
and permanently used by the person whose
estate is transferred, for the benefit
thereof, at the time when the transfer was
agreed upon or completed.
10.) California Civil Code Section 685:
Interest in common. An interest in
common is one owned by several persons, not
in joint ownership or partnership.
z2.? California Civil Code Section 3522:
One who grants a thing is presumed
to grant also whatever is essential to its
use.
Zs} Article . Section 10, re
Constitution. 1. No state shall
enter into any treaty, alliance, or
confederation: grant letters of marque and
reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit;
make anything but gold and silver coin a
61
tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of
attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligations of contracts, or
grant any title of nobility.
bo
ae Amendment V, U.S. Constitution. No
person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the militia,
when in actual service in time of war or
public danger; nor shall any person be
Subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or iimb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use without
compensation.
Sections 1 and 2. The
Article III,
judicial power of the United
States, shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The judges, both of the Supreme
and inferior courts, shall hold their
offices during the good behavior, and shall
at stated times, receive for their services,
a compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in
office.
Section 2. 1. The judicial power
shall extend to all cases, in law and
equity, arising under this Constitution, the
laws of the United States, and treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their
authority; to all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls; to all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to
which the United States shall be a party; to
63
EEE
controversies between two or more States;
between a State and citizens of another
State; between citizens of the same State
Claiming lands under grants of different
States, and between a State, or the citizens
thereof, and foreign states, citizens or
Subjects. (This section is modified by
Amendment XI).
15.) Article VI, U.S. Constitution.
2. This Constitution, and he
laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the
Supreme law of the land; and the judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, anything
in the Constitution or iaws of any State to
the contrary notwithstanding....
16.) Amendment XIV, U.S. Constitution.
l....7 [N]Jor shall any State deprive
64
any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
17.) California Constitution, Article I,
Section 19. Private property may be
taken or damaged for public use only when
just compensation, ascertained by a jury
unless waived, has first been paid to, or
into court for, the owner. The Legislature
may provide for possession by the condemnor
following commencement of eminent domain
proceedings upon deposit in court and prompt
release to the owner of money determined by
the court to be the probable amount of just
compensation.
18.) California Code of Civil Procedure
Section 1060. Any person interested
under a deed, will or other written
instrument, or under a contract, or who
65
desires a declaration of his rights or
duties with respect to another, or in
respect to, in, over or upon property, or
with respect to the location of the natural
channel of a watercourse, may, in cases of
actual controversy relating to the legal
rights and duties of the respective parties,
bring an original action in the superior
court...including a determination of § any
question of construction or validity arising
under such instrument or contract.
66
Excerpts From Johnsons’ Opening Brief In
The Court of Appeal
Page 24: "For the District to argue a
dedication of its property the effect of
which is to eliminate the -lawful uses of the
Johnsons’ property is to effectively condemn
the Johnson property without paying just
compensation."
Page 27: "Conclusion" - "And, finally,
it must be said that what the District is
effectively doing is limiting the Johnsons’
use of their 160 acres to a single family
residence when the pertinent zoning codes
allow campgrounds and filming locations.
The effect is both retroactive and
confiscatory."
Excerpt From Amended Complaint Filed
On January 10, 1985 by Johnsons
Against School District
i3. Defendants are also attempting
to violate plaintiff’s property rights and
rights incidental to ownership of
plaintiff’s property.
14. Defendants conspired to breach the
contract and property rights of plaintiffs.
Defendants have attempted to compromise
plaintiff’s rights in the road and rights
related to the road several times and in a
numbers of ways. Defendants are intimately
familiar with the circumstances, events,
numerous meetings and confrontations
connected with a conspiracy to breach the
contract and interfere with the rights of
plaintiffs. Defendants breach of contract
was not accidental or inadvertent, but by
Studied design, deliberate, and willful.
Defendants breach of contract was not
68
confined to a single act or event, but to
several related acts and events, involving
several individuals. Defendants’ have
superior knowledge of the facts concerning
the conspiracy than plaintiff has.
Defendants were deliberately negligent in
maintaining the road and related areas. The
Los Angeles Community College District
knowingly allowed unauthorized persons to
harass, intimidate, obstruct, interfere with
and damage plaintiffs. Unauthorized persons
and the Gold Creek Ad Hoc Committee were
allowed to interfere with plaintiff’s use
and maintenance of plaintiff’s road and
property. Defendants mailed threatening
letters to plaintiffs demanding that
plaintiffs acquiesce to defendant’s terms
and threatening litigation. Defendant’s
violations of plaintiff’s rights are not
isolated acts, but part of a series and
pattern of related acts and confrontations,
all of which are well known to defendants,
69
and some of which are better known to
defendants than to plaintiffs.
Excerpt From Second Amended Complaint
Filed May 14, 1985 by Johnsons Against
School District
9. laintiff’s are informed and believe
that from 1929 to 1975, plaintiff’s
predecessor in title, Floyd M. Bodle, and
those coming to plaintiffs’ land when owned
by Bodle similarly openly and notoriously
used the road for ingress to and egress from
the land, and that Bodle repaired and
maintained the road and cleared the road
the creek of debris, foliage and other
things for access and travel over the road.
LS. Defendants unreasonably
70
interfered with or obstructed plaintiffs’
use of the road by encouraging, permitting
and allowing defendants’ invitees on its
land to park their vehicles on the road, by
threatening to narrow and reroute the road,
to close the road to plaintiffs and those
coming to plaintiffs’ land, and to prevent
plaintiffs from repairing or maintaining the
road from clearing the road and the creek
from debris, foliage and other things that
interfere with or obstruct plaintiffs’ use
of or ingress and egress over the road, by
its campus police trespassing on plaintiffs’
land and harassing, bullying and
intimidation plaintiffs’ guests. and
invitees, and by trespassing by helicopter
which flew over plaintiff’s land at low
altitude and which frightened, harassed and
annoyed plaintiffs, their guests-= and
invitees.
16. Plaintiffs’ land has been and
7a
ee _
is used as a personal residence and
commercially for meetings and gatherings,
and for filming of commercials.
ee Unless and until restrained by
order of this court, defendants’
interference with or obstruction of
plaintiffs’ rights in and use, repair and
maintenance of the road and the creek will
cause great and irreparable injury to
plaintiffs, in that, closure or narrowing of
the road will prevent plaintiffs’ use of and
access to their land and will endanger
plaintiffs’ land and property and prevent
ingress to and egress from plaintiffs’ land
by fire trucks in case of fire and by other
trucks and vehicles which need to reach
plaintiffs’ land in case of other emergency
Or disaster, and will prevent such ingress
and egress by trucks and vehicles which come
oe “ - o } ~~ -4 } , - -
to plaintiffs’ land for commercial purposes
with resultant loss Oo f income, and
plaintiffs will be unable to repair and
maintain road and to clear it and the creek
of debris, foliage and other things, and
plaintiffs’ property will depreciate in
value in amount according to proof at trial.
20. Plaintiff timely served a
notice of claim for money damages. on
defendants who rejected the claim and filed
this action within 6 months of said
rejection, and plaintiffs complied with the
Tort Claims Act, Government Code Section
900, et. seq.
Ra Within 3 years) past, an
economic relationship between plaintiffs and
religious organizations and the film makers
ho used plaintiffs’ land for religious
meetings and retreats and for making films,
which relationship had the probability of
future economic benefit to plaintiffs.
<p a Defendants were aware of the
existence of such relationship.
The acts of the defendants were
intentionally and deliberately designed to
disrupt the relationship which defendants
disrupted.
26. AS a proximate result of
defendants’ conduct, within 3 years past,
plaintiffs were prevented from. using,
repairing and maintaining the road and lost
earnings and time from their business to
maintain ingress and egress over the road to
plaintiffs’ damage in an amount according to
proof at trial.
Excerpt From Respondent School] |
District’s Brief in the California
Court of Appeal
"Tl. Statement Of The Case ..-AS one
leaves the pvblic road and travels onto
"Gold Creek Road," the first part of the
road traverses property owned by the United
States Forest Service. In fact, both
parcels of property in question are
Surrounded by National Forest lands. After
leaving United States Forest Service
property, one encounters’ the District’s
western boundary..." (District’s Brief,
p.4.)
Cr rt
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
- For a declaration that plaintiffs
have an undivided 1/2 ownership interest in
75
Gold Creek Road, a permanent right of way in
the road, appurtenant and prescriptive
easements, the right to make repairs upon
and maintain the road, and the right to
clear the road and the right to clear the
road and the creek of debris, foliage and
other things that interfere with or obstruct
plaintiffs’ use of the road for ingress and
egress, that defendants have no right to
close and narrow the road nor to diminish or
interfere with plaintiffs’ rights in the
use, repair and maintenance of the road, and
that plaintiffs and defendants are under a
duty to share reasonable costs of repair and
maintenance of the road;
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
6. For a preliminary and permanent
injunction restraining and enjoining
defendants, and each of then, their
officers, administrators, trustees, agents,
servants, employees and representatives, all
76
persons upon defendant’s land, by
invitation, license or permission, and all
other persons acting in concert with or on
behalf of defendants, or any of them, from
committing or engaging, directly or
indirectly, in any of the following acts in
regard to Gold Creek Road and Gold Creek:
a. from closing the road;
Dis from narrowing the road;
CG. from preventing or in any way
interfering with or obstructing plaintiffs
from:
Ak repairing and maintaining the road;
ii. clearing the road and the creek of
debris, foliage or any other objects or
things.
da. from parking vehicles on the road;
e. from trespassing on plaintiffs’ land
by helicopter, by foot, by vehicle or any
other means;
Es from annoying, harassing or
molesting plaintiffs and persons travelling
Ce
on the road to and from plaintiffs’
property;
g. from preventing or impeding ingress
and egress over the road by plaintiffs and
persons travelling the road to and from
plaintiffs’ land;
h. from otherwise interfering with or
obstructing plaintiffs’ use and rights in
Road Agreement
(CT Exhibit 2)
AGREEMENT
Dated July 21, 1908.
Between
R.S. WATT, First Party
and
EDWARD D. SILENT and
FRANK J. THOMAS
Second Parties.
KKK KKK KKK KEKE EEE KEKE KEKE EERREKEEEEKEEEEEEE
(Recorded in Book 3440 Page 115 of Deeds.
KK KK KKK KKK KKK KKK EKEEEKEKEEEKEKEREEEREEEEREEER
This Agreement, made this 21st day of July,
1908, by and between R.S. Watt, first party,
of Los Angeles County, California, and
Edward D. Silent and Frank J. Thomas, of the
Same place, parties of the second part,
Whereas, said parties of the second part
are, in common with others, the owners of a
certain parcel of land situated in the said
county of Los Angeles, being known as the
Fast One Half (E.1/2) of the South-West
Quarter (S.W. 1/4) and the North One Half
(N.1/2) of the South-East Quarter of Section
Twenty Four (24) in Township Three (3)
North, Range Fourteen (14) West, San
Bernardino Meridian, and
Whereas, the old road that led to
the above described land is still open for
travel, and a certain portion has fallen
into disuse through neglect, and
Whereas, said first party did build
and construct a new piece of road in 1902,
and has used, maintained and kept the same
80
in repair from time to time, and has
maintained the gate on the same, it being a
private road to and on certain lands owned
by said first party, located in Section
Twenty Three (23) Twenty Four (23) and
Twenty Six (26) of the above designated
Township, and all rights in said road are
vested solely in said first party, and
Whereas, the said second parties
desire to obtain a permanent interest in
said road, and a permanent right of way over
the said land of said first party for
themselves and co-owners their heirs and
assigns forever, under the following
conditions and stipulations,
Now, therefore, this is to witness:
That the said first party, in consideration
of the promises and agreements on the part
of said second parties, and in further
consideration of the sum of $250. cash to be
paid by said second parties to said first
party, receipt whereof is hereby
81
acknowledged, and in further consideration
of the promises herein contained on the part
of said second parties, the said first party
does hereby grant, convey and assign to said
second parties and their co-owners, their
heirs, executors, administrators and
assigns, owners of the above described land,
and undivided One Half (1/2) interest in and
to the said road, so built and constructed
ct
by said first party in 1902, and also righ
of way over the land of the said first party
of the first part, along the line of said
road so constructed in 1902, and over and
along- the road to be constructed by said
first party over his said lands and the
lands of the said second parties, which said
road to be so constructed shall follow the
line laid as now laid out out and upon which
work has been done, Together with the right
at all times of ingress and egress over and
along the same for the purpose of passage to
and from the lands owned by said second
parties and their co-owners, with the right
at all times to enter into and upon the said
road, make repairs thereon and to maintain
and assist in the maintenance of the same.
Said second nertios further agree to
expend the sum of Three Hundred Dollars
($300.00) on said road so built by said
first party and designated "Watt Grade" and
running to a point opposite the house of
said first party, in making cuts and fills,
particularly at the upper portion of said
grade, in outtine off corners, improving
grade and widening same, leaving ro portion
narrower than nine feet, and to finish the
[un]finished portion thereof in conformity
with the grade already established.
It is mutually agreed that each of
the parties hereto, shall, from time to
time, when needed, and from year to year, do
their portion or pro rata of the work or
costs thereof necessary for the maintenance
of said piece of road, and that the same
8 3
will be kept in repair.
It is further agreed that’ the
parties hereto shall have duplicate keys to
the lock on the gate heretofore maintained
at the bottom of said Watt Grade by the
party of the first part, and that the
parties hereto shall mutually cooperate in
the maintenance of said gate.
It is further agreed that’ the
parties hereto will mutually cooperate in
the establishment if a code of signals, or
the maintenance of safety signals, in order
to render the use of said road as safe as
the circumstances will permit.
It is further agreed and understood
that the party of the first part, by the
Granting herein contained, has in nowise
deprived himself of the right to the use of
Said road in any manner whatsoever, but that
he shall have the right to the use of the
Same jointly with the parties hereto.
It is further agreed that said first
84
party grants the right and privilege to said
second parties to erect and maintain a shed
or store-room at or on the point known as
"Alder Flats" on said first party’s land in
the canyon situated below the gate
heretofore built by said first party in said
canyon, and that said second parties shall
have the right to establish and maintain a
fence and gate below Alder Flats, said first
party to have the right of ingress and
egress thru the same.
It is further agreed that said first
party shall have the right to enter into and
upon the land of said second parties for a
distance of at least sixty feet where the
land of said second parties crosses said
canyon, to lift any water to which he may be
entitled, and nothing herein. shall _ be
considered directly or indirectly as a
waiver on the part of said first party of
any rights to water or the use of water now
claimed by him under water location or
85
appropriation heretofore made by him.
In Witness Whereof, the parties
hereto have hereunder set their hands the
day and year first above written.
R.S. Watt
Edward D. Silent
Frank J. Thomas
State of California) ss
County of Los Angeles ) On this 22 day of
July in the year One Thousand, Nine Hundred
and Eight A D before me Irving M Walker a
Notary Public in and for said county,
residing therein, duly commissioned _ and
Sworn personally appeared R B Watt, Edward
D. Silent and Frank J. Thomas’ personally
Known to me to be the person whose names are
Subscribed to the within instrument, and
acknowledged to me that they executed the
same.
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto
set my hand and affixed my official seal the
86
day and year in this certificate first above
written.
(Notarial Seal) Irving M. Walker, Notary
Public in and for the County of Los Angeies,
State of California.
Excerpts From Reporter’s Transcripts
Claude Rucker: 1RT 112:4-19
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. JOHNSON:
Q. You previously stated that routine
maintenance needed to be done on this road
and: this environment. Is that because
nature ‘would reclaim the road if this is not
done?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And with that process of reclaiming the
road, would that involve the creek eroding
one side, and material coming down the hill
and building up on the other side?
A. That’s correct.
87
Q. And the maintaining of the road is a
constant -- something of a battle between
striking a balance with the forces of nature
and the need to maintain a road in that
environment?
A. Whenever the road 1s a canyon, that’s all
you can do.
JACK JOHNSON CROSS: 2RT 306
Q. Now, Mr. Johnson, when did you become
aware, if ever, that the District utilized
its property as an ecological preserve?
A. I have never become aware that they do
that. I don’t admit that they do that.
Q. But you are aware that students) are
brought to the property by the District- for
nature “walks?
A. That doesn’t make it an ecological
Lesacrve.
Testimony of Laurel Woodley, District Gold
Creek ad hoc committee, Cross Examination:
2RT~497: 10-16
Q. The road from the Brown Ranch to and on
your property, has that ever been oiled with
liquid ashpalt?
A. Yes, it has.
Q. Prior to my coming to the area?
A. Yes, it has. Pierce College did it.
Q. And after my coming; correct?
A. Correct.
TESTIMONY OF FLOYD BODLE, Johnson’s
predecessor in interest (direct examination)
IRT 209: 21-28; 210:1-18:
Q. Did you know the Watts, your neighbors,
the property the road went through, which is
now the District property?
A. Pardon me?
Q. Did you know the Watts, the Watt
brothers, who were the owners of the
property?
89
A. Oh, very well. Naturally, yes.
Q. How did the Watts earn their living?
A. They had pear trees, apple trees and a
large number of bee hives.
Q. Would you estimate the number of fruit
trees that they had?
A. Robert Watt told me at one time that they
had planted about 2,000 fruit trees on their
property.
Q. How did they earn their living?
A.-Selling apples, pears, and whatever the
bees produced.
Q. Did they earn money in any other ways?
A. Only to the extent when hunting season--
as I remember it, they charged a fee to
hunt on their property. How much, I can’t
remember. I believe they charged $5, or
something like that, to hunt on their
property. And they would have four or five
hunters up there, particularly on opening
day.
Q. Did they do this from year to year?
90
TESTIMONY OF FLOYD BODLE, Johnson’s
predecessor in interest (direct examination)
IRT 217:14-22; (cross examination) 219; 28;
2103 i=-1i%
Q. One last Question -- I am sorry. I
forgot. Did you ever raise bees in large
numbers on your property?
A. Well, I had at one time about 125
colonies there during the thirties and
during the second world war.
Q. Did you sell that honey, and did you do
that as a business or as a hobby?
A. Everything was so tough in those days
that it didn’t pay a whole lot, but
everybody was scrounging for a dollar, and
yes, I made a little money on it.
.- - (Cross )
Q. Did you consistently utilize the property
in that manner from the time you took
91
ownershly f t, unt the time you sold it
A. Ye rh n thing, as I mentioned, lf!
the thirties, had 1] colonle of bee: up
there because thing: were ( very, er
tough in those days that they didn’t earn a
lot of mone But that’ the nl
commercial thing had up there
Q. But the bees didn’t require a whole lot
of maintenance, did they?
A. Well, that’s hard to say I had a man
that took care of them. Years when you were
taking honey off, it required a lot of work
The rest of the time, off and on.
But there would be probably six months
out of the year when there wouldn’t be any
maintenance at all.
FLOYD BODLE, 1RT 216:28; 217:1-5:
Q. Did you ever ask permission from Los
Angeles Community College District when you
wanted to do maintenance?
.
A. No. I never had any contact from the
time they bought it, until around 20 years
later, whenever it was when you bought it.
CLARENCE JOE BROWN, commercial user of Bodle
Ranch (direct examination LRT 190:2-14;
198:i-9°:
Q. BY MR. JOHNSON: Did you have a business
arrangement with Mr. Bodle of some kind?
A. Certainly.
Q. Would you describe that arrangement?
A. Well, yeah. In order for me to graze my
cows up there, I was supposed to keep his
place fenced off around his house, and stuff
like that, out, in exchange for my cattle
being there.
Q. Did you have your cattle there for
purposes of selling them and making a profit
on them?
A. Absolutely.
A. Did you give people permission to pass
93
through that gate to go up and down the road
ind proceed to the Bodle Ranch to hunt and
to hike, ind did they give you a
consideration or favor in return?
A Yes, Ll?
THE COURT: Are you talking about the hunters
and hikers giving him consideration?
MR. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
DENNIS LEE, L.A.C.C. District custodian of
Q. Can you tell me, based upon your review
of the file, what was done with that Gold
Creek property from the ’50’s until 1970?
A. So it was acquired back in March of 1950.
And I believe the records show that
beginning in 1954 through 1972, the property
waS leased out to a Mr. Archer and a Mr.
Witzel.
94
And the interest of the District at
that time is they did not really have the
funding to, I think, use the property in its
original intention. So they really wanted
to have the property occupied.
And if you look at the leases that
we -- that were transacted at the time, the
amount of the lease was very small. But it
did require that the lessee would provide a
watchman, and would also maintain the water
lines and, I believe, the fencing around the
property.
So, really we were looking for a
custodian of the property during that time
period.
Q. I see. There are leases executed every
so often?
A. Yes. The leases were generally for a
period of every three years.
Q. And, as I understand it, there is a lease
agreement in existence for the years 1954 to
1972?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. Occupied by the same people?
A. By the same people, yes.
(cross examination) 2RT 375:19-24:
QO. You mentioned that the District leased
)
its property. Was there a fee
Q. Was the District paid some amount of
money by the lessee?
ee, District Custodian of Records,
Cross Examination, 2RT 371: 7-14:
QO. BY MR. JOHNSON: So that we are clear, I
will repeat one question, and then move
along.
Do you have any written request for
permission to work on or maintain this road
either from myself, or Mr. Floyd Bodle, in
your records?
A. No, I do not see a request in the file
96
from Mr. Bodle, nor have I seen a request in
writing from you, Mr. Johnson.
Dennis Lee, District Custodian of Records,
Cross Examination, 2RT 371: 20-28; 372:1-3:
Q. Did the District ever pave the road with
liquid asphalt, road oil?
A. Pave the road with oil?
Q. Liquid asphalt, road oil.
A. I know they have done some paving with
some oil materials. Now whether it is
liquid asphalt, I cannot respond to that.
QO. You would use contractors for that
purpose, would you not?
A. Yes. We would contract out for that
service.
Q. Professionals in that field?
A. Yes.
97
JACK JOHNSON (direct examination) 1RT 20:
2026; €1%i1724?
THE WITNESS: I will restate the question.
Are some uses’ permitted without
requisite of a Conditional Use Permit and so
shown and identified as permitted uses?
The answer is: Yes.
Next question: Is campground use so
permitted as a permissive use?
And the answer iS: yes.
I forget the cite in there. Linda
may provide that under "campground" and show
what section. I think it is point 2.
MRS. JOHNSON: I am =e sorry. What is the
question?
THE WITNESS: On the first or second page of
the Zoning Code as submitted, it shows
Campgrounds, and it is listed under
"permitted uses."
MRS. JOHNSON: Yes. That’s Item No. OD,
Campgrounds.
THE BAILIFF: L.A. County Zoning Code, A-2,
98
Oak [Gold] Creek Ranch.
MRS. JOHNSON: That is Item No. 6&8, Your
Honor, L.A. Zoning Ordinance.
THE WITNESS: Next question: Are other
activities which may be engaged in for the
production of profit permitted by the
zoning?
The answer is: Yes.
Next question is: State briefly some of
those activities.
The answer is: Motion picture, nudist camps,
churches, a wide variety covering the
spectrum of uses that would be permitted in
A-2 5.
Next question: How many aifferent kinds of
activities are permitted of a different
type, other than agriculture?
The answer: Over a hundred.
RECORDING REQUESTED sv 18 ( C 6 5.3270963
|
|
[Tack P. JORNSN AND LINDA GAIL sunkgay
909 North Normandie Ave, Apt 2 [ RECORDED WW OFFICIAL necons
aes ~Los Angeles, California 90029 OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
“te | JAN 20 1975 AT 8 AM |
Nene — |
an et oe } | Recorder's Office J
me above named addressee;
wee
ented
Cw 4
| |
i —
| FEE
SPACE ABOVE THIS UNE FOR RECORDER'S USE | $3
_C
Grant Deed
seers om =e Tere FOus FVRNISHES GY TITLE (HOVUGANRCE Ane TRYUET COmPany
re oo8 1 Ge 10. Fhe
The undersigned grantor(s) deciare(s)
Documentary transfer tax is & §3.25
|
( 99 computed on full value of property conveyed, or |
( ) computed on full velue less value of liens and encumbrances remaining at time of sale. |
Cp Gaeegens couse ( ) City of and |
FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION receipt of which @ hereby ecknowledged,
FLOYD W. BOOLE, a .-. widower who acquired title as a married man
hereby CRANT(S) to
}
JACK P. JCHNSON AND LIDDA GAIL JOHNSON, Husband end wife az joint tenants
the following desenbed real property in the / mm gq
| County of Los Angeles , State of California )
The East Half of the Southwest quarter and the North Half of th
Southeast quarter of Section 24, Township 3 North, Range 14 West, -
San Bernardino Meri dian, in the office of the camty recorder of .
said county. ’ rey
SUBJECT TO: Covenants, conditions, restrictions, reservations. rights,
rights of rwcord, easements of record.
Dated January 12.1975 b _ Ln ert Le Cc,
/" floyd © Bodlé
STATE OF CALIFCANIA =
COUNTY OF. I hy |
Os LOiZ7s weiere me. the eader-
cigned. « Nevery Pela im and fer cord Stote. peramncily eppeered |
Floyd bl Borile :
—————=~ tnewe 10 me eye CFFICIAL SEAL {
te he the person, whose mame 1S subrecvoleed ty the withen a quer = CA ORY |
merremenm and echaowledaed th + he ____ereewies she seme 1H F3 4 3S ANGELES COUN: uf |
WITNESS my head ena frets! see! ) 3 4 rv Communonre Exprwe >< 8? :
7 /f a 78S ot. 2 ‘? Ss }
seen Al > gt LoD __ a soi
= — Sak pi
: mips seeay
7 lh i ee ee Soran
Name 1 Typew or i’rimted) \ eas yf “a i "
CSsn59
Title Order No Re REL ST Focrew or Lee ws {
=
= + wee © ‘
MAIL TAX STATEMENTS AS DIRECTED ABOVE ~~
EXHIBIT No. 1. Grant deed with zoning
marked and certified by L. A. County.
100
BEST AVAILA
p= &.A.C.C. DISTRICT
JOHNSON
Trem a and 01 @et o~f> hee
, , vanishes
—
Ames (
UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
TOPOGRAPHIC MAP
1900
SAN FERNANDO CALIFORNIA
(SUNLAND QUADRANT IN CURRENT EDITIONS)
EXHIBIT No. 40
101
Oe
UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
TOPOGRAPHIC MAP
1924
SAN FERNANDO CALIFORINA
(SUNLAND QUADRANT IN CURRENT EDITIONS)
EXHIBIT No. 39
102
aD" BEST AVAIL
w VS \ ~ “1 yh ; ,
GC 1 =f R . With /\i ‘ of \ *&
Pa t h ‘
, ; ‘ { RG veg ol
wag hid ~~ , x '
vats en Pes ' h ae
any sees | BE ge ot SA 7a
‘ (we ’ } ’ . S)
‘ La! G ~ “se 'W diet.
ase Mao Prepered by the U S Geological Survey 4 ; 7 t bf .
ontrot By USGS. USC4&GS ane Los Angeies City ena County me ine ae ee he gy ee
OpograeDny by photogrem™metne methods trom eerie se i ] ie \ af
Notograpns taken 1964. Fig checked 1966 § Se = a v PN
on L = ‘ 4
vperseces ap survered 1925-35. revised 1953 5 , < Ae
Olycone proyection §=61927 North Amencen catum 4 i.
C.000-foot grid Desed on Californie coordinate system. rome 7 me, "Se
OOO meter Uniwerse! Transverse Mercator grid ticks ¢ By
~e ll *
- was
lo@hcaLon to USGS base map oy Ine Geometromcs Service ¢ ; gre. or. 3
erter trom 1978 aenai pnotogragny enc 1979 correcnon 5 A ni le SS om
Wes 'UTWEME@C Dy Ihe Pacihc Soutnwest Region oe Te al
SUNLAND, CALIF
UNITED STATES sE Sam PEBRANDD 19 QuaBeanoLe
a a © ‘ rae ok? ~ ar mmr N3415— } $/?
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERI sical
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 137-4C
MODIFIED FOR USDA FOREST SERVICE USE
U.S. Forest Service Map Boundaries
Exhibit 5 Page 1 of 2
ABLE COPY ®
we
Fy hee
~~
, seed,
‘ I -—
cA NRA TN PY
’ \. @ ‘ ‘ , on wee e
= wear OlVing * \ fer! Ba a” nat arma 4 f w yi ~— i*
“~w! a \ na LAAT HOUAA Cah Le] on le esl! “cao ’
~ st nt * oes ue a vee ,
Se adnate oy meetin hn, He ge a Nn as “eee —
’ 7 ak |
* :
~ ‘
1 & “elie
= e " 7
° fr,
— +
hr
"we ye
i fan fads
. . he ee
7 aaa i ern,
TOR ees Powe nee " PA Ara» es e ‘a rae
: haere Lyerew ite i —area ? fit wef a
~ ’ a! BIGITUJUNGA) “4? 0-6
AS STA beet wt
aTONYVALE +
MOLL WOOD PEE wal! 6 mmes
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
FOREST SERVICE
R. MAX PETERSON. CHIEF
ANGELES NATIONAL FOREST
CALIFORNIA
SAN BERNARDINO MERIDIAN 385
U.S. Forest Service Map Boundaries
Exhibit 5 Page 2 of 2
104
Sue a, ne ee
ee on {typ if ae NY
BP 2. CLD maka
hee ONS .
_
:
syaro?
Soe & 2 €
“a ‘ ' >
Tietites or
Sek 8 fs 0
fay ° ~ fe »
Thee Fe ok
ei} a m
ek f Ss ‘zc
5 | > éek ewmst
ats aS Ses
eo ek Sag
ee > =
PraTLLE SoS 5 oe
‘¢ . : 4 >
Sie oar + AF ON
aditig’ e2> + ead
+3 tidy cm Mi ANA
Me o i Fy ‘ v m i, ‘) A Yt
Lip gei ee mag eS RAD
Toe tye <4
He’ (lg *g
; is =
. oO
»
<3 Ro
ee
oe
~ <
< ee AEC
pane LEN wan
= ISP
, 2 Se
25 =
$2 *er
2$_ 4
a >
eee 25
2 3
| -
: 7"
UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
TOPOGRAPHIC MAP
SUNLAND QUADRANT
EXHIBIT No. 4.
page 1 of 4
105
\
\\ \t
! SPW
ey) Miya
S
A
S
.
A
f > OI
i EAB ION GSC
Pe F ») A} WwW J
cN BLOW U . (4 ~, r
aN\ AD. Topo. wap eS. (\NeSS Ly
. J
Sie Ss:
=/ NZ S j
= ~
} 0 ME - eae ¢ = .
\ 7 / : ;
Z \J (f
UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
TOPOGRAPHIC MAP
SUNLAND QUADRANT
EXHIBIT No. 4
page 2 of 4
106
vf
~* c gs \
A) UD
2am
Zs = Mie
IRS
ae \\ \
| \h |
“We i : ' iN “ i]
EE ae ANAS?
Uf FRED NETO NY
IEF DN
VN .* SE: X\
. — of ; ae WW
A) Ve 26 SY 35s
Wo Xe ZENS
(~“~ 3s: We Z
FS) 3 we S 2)
=) ( ‘\
=) ~S DAK “ Ne
© .
ZY) is ci. K =
UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
TOPOGRAPHIC MAP
SUNLAND QUADRANT
EXHIBIT No. 4
page 3 of 4
107
+
-\ @ Cg oT Ge
Indian : Pa ‘7 A 45 \ \
frm 7 ie | Sve
4 +
Pl Wee 4 .
anh / { i
an
; }
&|*. Indian Springs , San J f &
Kw
C
6@v>
*
PL j = >
. x)
“5 Pap i
fA-75! —
iipione < ‘ es ox
— = T° jini. .
"*2ei, gre ond
ruacer® “ WY)
LImM@roct, | rs
MAP
Limerock < - ‘ co
Peek Wore b; oO
r fh Tage UV ' wt
& 8s
poor -careedig gs Sr
' Cen, 25 r4 -
EXHIBIT No.
page 4 of
TOPOGRAPHI
SUNLAND QUADRANT
STATES GEOLOGICAL
“.
a r : : :
n Vo wote is 5
i 6 i
) _£°>
( j ‘
oak — tP»--4
F cieth ; m
t ‘
A woop’,
‘tei je
; a)
“y me
de SUNLAND, CALIF fx
: W3415—wil8is/75
+ [Bart Hotter ew =
a -_
7 HOTOREVISE 972 ¢
4 AMS 2552 '¥ SE. SERIES vees an
VN :
: -
% yy
,s
ie
4
4
|
GOLD CREEK CANYON JUNIOR COLLEGE F
AGRICULTURE AND YOUTH SERVICES SITE
| -~_ ry,
} ——_
o
¢
° 5Ax
(Amawco
ViCini ry MAP }}
SECTION 23 SECTION 2¢4]|
SS Te ARS, Pe AER AEE Cs : |
oy. 4g - z : ae? Pt La 4: =
. om we ms «we @ ye a ’
os -\tae - za AS an
sven oD a 2 >-2: . aed
Loe PMU g lS RS Seis
ot Arete a2" Sy tre FF.)
> A ey yp ee a
te. X S 95. x
i Z2 of SSE: 4G Wg iok SWA2% 4
< -> o° ap gate’ fe “ga: -<
: Fe a. ee Se SEE Bre. -&
oar 280 Acres Pe RO ere +SEE
- « . : > > a . w
Ak Ae a > Se . y tS deed oppo ate ey
ah? Th SOY AT Wad oC eh — 2.7 7. @
‘“_.. in Ye Ce ~~ . ss
c* .
‘*Secfron Ca
de . , re =
|
»
\ ,
alice
SEeET rev 26 SECTION 25
me Ze 1INV/ * ya a MV. Fe. 4 YY, Xv é. S&S & /7.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
CAMB 2847
ad fONE Ae cen: (NEFENDANTS
MAP OF L.A.C.C. DISTRICT PROPERTY
FROM COUNTY ACCESSORS MAP BOOK
EXHIBIT No. 6
109
eae EEE Ne Le eevee — —
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.