Appendix — District of Columbia v. Hansford

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland (January 14,

1993) la

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland (Sep-

tember 5, 1990) lb

Order of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County,

Maryland, entering final judgment against the District of

Columbia (December 4, 1989) le

Order of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County,

Maryland, amending the final judgment to provide that it

is for the District of Columbia (February 5, 1990) 2c

Excerpts from the proceedings in the Circuit Court for Prince

George’s County, Maryland, in which the Court announced

that the case was dismissed as to the District of Columbia.

(September 8, 1989) 5c

Other statvtes ld

In The

Court of Appeals of Maryland

No. 150

SEPTEMBER TERM, 1990

THOMAS T. HANSFORD, Sr. et al.

Vv.

District OF COLUMBIA

Murphy, C.J., Eldridge, Rodowsky, McAuliffe, Chasanow,

Hinkel, J. William, (Specially assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Eldridge, J.

Filed: January 14, 1993

The principal issues in this case concern the authority of

a Maryland court to exercise jurisdiction in a tort suit against

the District of Columbia, where the District’s allegedly

tortious conduct occurred on a federal enclave within the

State of Maryland, over which enclave the State had ceded

‘exclusive jurisdiction’’ to the United States.

In June 1987 Carl Sewanti Richardson escaped from the

juvenile detention facility known as Oak Hill Youth Center,

located near Laurel, in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. The

facility is operated by the District of Columbia. During the

time after his escape and before his recapture, Richardson

killed Thomas T. Hansford, Jr., in Prince George’s County,

Maryland. Richardson was convicted in the Circuit Court for

Prince George’s County, on August 3, 1988, of felony murder.

On August 15, 1988, the decedent’s parents, Thomas T.

Hansford, Sr., individually and as personal representative

la

2a

of the decedent's estate, and Mary Dell Hansford, instituted

the present suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's

County against the District of Columbia, Mr. J. E. Neil

Ollivierra, then Acting Superintendent of Oak Hill Youth

Center, and Carl Sewanti Richardson. In their complaint, the

plaintiffs alleged that the District of Columbia through its

employees failed to ‘‘properly supervise and maintain cus-

tody and control’ over Richardson and thereby negligently

allowed him to escape from the Oak Hill Youth Center. It

was also alleged that the District, by its employees at Oak

Hill, was negligent in failing to ‘‘recapture [Richardson] in

a timely manner.”’ The District was alleged to be responsi-

ble, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the

negligent acts of its employees.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that, at the time of

Richardson's escape, the District of Columbia had a policy

or custom of permitting escapees from the Oak Hill Youth

Center to remain at large. The complaint stated that one of

every three detainees was permitted to be missing from the

facility. The plaintiffs argued that the District’s negligent

policy or custom of allowing Richardson to remain at large

violated the decedent’s civil rights by depriving him of his

life without due process of law. The plaintiffs, therefore,

claimed damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Finally, the complaint included an ‘‘assault and battery”’

count which applied only to the action against Richardson.

The plaintiffs, in asserting that the Circuit Court for Prince

George’s County could exercise jurisdiction in the case, relied

on, inter alia, Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl. Vol.), §§ 3-902,

3-904, 6-101 and 6-103 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings

Article.! They also stated that they had complied with the

' Sections 3-902 and 3-904 are parts of the Wrongful Death Act. Sec-

tion 6-101 provides that, ‘‘[f]jor purposes of personal jurisdiction, venue,

and service of process,’’ any federal enclave or reservation is part of the

State and county in which it is located and that the ‘‘personal jurisdic-

tion and venue of’’ Maryland courts, ‘‘and the power to serve process of

those courts,’’ extends to persons on federal enclaves or reservations ‘‘to

the fullest extent permitted by the Constitution and laws of the United

States.’’ Section 6-103 is part of the Long Arm Statute.

3a

provision of District of Columbia law which requires that

notice of intent to sue the District be filed within six months

of the incident alleged. D.C. Code § 12-309 (1981).

The District filed, on the same day, both a motion to

dismiss and an answer to the complaint. The motion to

dismiss asserted, with regard to the District, a lack of

jurisdiction over the person. The motion also claimed that

Mr. Ollivierra was immune from suit and that the complaint

failed to state a cause of action against either the District

or Mr. Ollivierra.

Although the plaintiffs in their opposition to the motion

to dismiss did not raise the issue, the circuit court, at the

hearing on the motion to dismiss, sua sponte raised a ques-

tion about the timeliness of the motion. Maryland Rule 2-322

provides in pertinent part as follows:

‘‘PRELIMINARY MOTIONS

‘(a) Mandatory. — The following defenses shall

be made by motion to dismiss filed before the

answer, if an answer is required: (1) lack of jurisdic-

tion over the person, (2) improper venue, (3) insuffi-

ciency of process, and (4) insu ficiency of service of

process. If not so made and the answer is filed, these

defenses are waived.

‘‘(b) Permissive. — The following defenses may be

made by motion to dismiss filed before the answer,

if an answer is required: (1) lack of jurisdiction over

the subject matter, (2) failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, (3) failure to join a party

under Rule 2-211, and (4) governmental immunity.

If not so made, these defenses and objections may

be made in the answer, or in any other appropriate

manner after answer is filed.’’

Counsel for the District of Columbia and for Mr. Ollivierra

told the court that he had filed the motion to dismiss prior

to filing the answer. The docket entries, however, read as

if the answer were filed first. The circuit court found that

counsel had in fact filed the motion to dismiss before filing

the answer.

4a

The circuit court then heard arguments on the motion to

dismiss. The attorney in the Office of the Corporation

Counsel of the District of Columbia, who represented both

the District and Mr. Ollivierra, contended that, under

Maryland law, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the

District of Columbia, a foreign municipal corporation.

Counsel, relying on Phillips v. Baltimore, 110 Md. 431, 72

A. 902 (1909), argued that a municipal corporation can be

sued only in the courts of the jurisdiction where it is situated.

It was also claimed that Mr. Ollivierra was immune from

suit because he was a public official engaged in discretionary

duties.

The District and Mr. Ollivierra further argued that the

complaint failed to state a cause of action because there was

no special relationship between the plaintiffs and these two

defendants giving rise to a special duty. They also main-

tained that there was no causal connection between the

alleged negligence of these defendants and the death of

Thomas T. Hansford, Jr., and that there was no basis in law

for the § 1983 claim.

On September 8, 1989, the circuit court dismissed the

action against the District of Columbia, holding that a

municipal corporation could not be sued, in transitory

actions, outside the jurisdiction in which it is located. The

circuit court’s holding was based entirely on Phillips v.

Baltimore City, supra, 110 Md. 431, 72 A. 902, which involved

venue principles and the construction of a venue statute.

The circuit court refused to dismiss any part of the action

against Mr. Ollivierra. The court stated that more factual

development was required before it could render a decision

on Mr. Ollivierra’s defense of governmental immunity. The

court also held that more factual development was needed

before it could rule on the arguments that Mr. Ollivierra and

the District owed no duty to the plaintiffs, that there was

no causal connection between the death and alleged negli-

oa

gence of these defendants, and that there was no basis in

law for the § 1983 claim.

The plaintiffs noted an appeal to the Court of Special

Appeals on October 6, 1989. On December 4, 1989 the cir-

cuit court certified as final the judgment in favor of the

District of Columbia. Rule 2-602(b).?

In its brief in the Court of Special Appeals, the District

argued that it had complied with the filing requirements of

Rule 2-322(a), and that the circuit court correctly held that,

because the District was a municipal corporation, it could

not be sued outside its boundaries. Although not raised in

the circuit court, the District contended in the Court of

Special Appeals that there was another rationale for affirm-

ing the dismissal of the complaint against the District. The

District argued that Maryland's cession of exclusive jurisdic-

tion over the land upon which Oak Hill Youth Center rests

deprived the circuit court of its ability to exercise jurisdic-

tion over acts and omissions occurring on that land. The

District maintained that, although in 1943 Maryland ex-

pressly reserved jurisdiction over lands leased or ceded to

the United States, this reservation expressly did not

* ‘affect the jurisdiction and authority of the State

over land or persons, roperty, and transactions on

land that the United States or its unit has acquired

on or before May 31, 1943 to the extent that the

* Although the plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal before the judg-

ment was certified as final, Maryland Rule 8-602(e)(1)(D) provides:

“If the appeiiate court determines that the order from which

the appeal is taken was not a final judgment when the notice

of appeal was filed but that the lower court had discretion to

direct the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 2-602(b),

the appellate court may, as it finds appropriate, . . . if a final

judgment was entered by the lower court after notice of appeal

was filed, treat the notice of appeal as if filed on the same day

as, but after, the entry of the judgment.”’

We will exercise this discretion and treat the plaintiffs’ notice of appeal

as if it had been filed on the same day as, but after, the certification as

final of the judgment in favor of the District of Columbia.

6a

State ceded jurisdiction under . . . Chapter 743, $$

2 and 3, of the Acts of the General Assembly of

1906.’ ”’

(District’s brief at 14, quoting, Code (1984, 1992 Cum. Supp.),

§ 14-102(b) of the State Government Article.) |

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment,

although for a different reason than that relied upon by the

circuit court. Hansford v. District of Columbia, 84 Md.App.

301, 578 A.2d 844 (1990). The intermediate appellate court

held that a Maryland court could not exercise jurisdiction

over the District of Columbia in this case because the

District’s alleged negligence occurred on a federal enclave

which was ceded prior to 1943.

The plaintiffs filed in this Court a petition for a writ of

certiorari raising the following three issues (although in a

somewhat different order): (1) whether the trial court erred

in granting the District’s ‘‘motion to dismiss due to lack of

personal jurisdiction where’”’ the District had allegedly filed

the motion after filing its answer; (2) whether the trial court

erred in holding that the District, as a municipal corpora-

tion, could not be sued outside of the jurisdiction in which

it is located; (3) whether the Court of Special Appeals errone-

ously affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint

against the District on the ground that the trial court could

not exercise jurisdiction where the District’s alleged tortious

conduct occurred on a federal enclave ceded prior to 1943.

The District did not file a cross-petition or a conditional cross-

petition for a writ of certiorari. Thereafter this Court granted

the plaintiffs’ petition, 321 Md. 709, 584 A.2d 708 (1991).

I.

The plaintiffs continue to insist in this Court that, because

the docket entries state that the District's answer was filed

before its motion to dismiss was filed, the District has waived

its right to argue issues which must be raised in a preliminary

ry

fa

motion. As previously stated, Rule 2-322(a) requires that the

defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper

venue, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service

of process, be made in a motion to dismiss before an answer

is filed. If not so made, the right to assert these defenses

is waived.

The District’s counsel represented to the trial judge that

the motion to dismiss was filed prior to the answer. The trial

judge indicated that the order of entries on the docket does

not necessarily reflect the order in which the documents were

filed. The trial judge stated: ‘I’m not going to conclude that

you have waived the right to raise the matters contained in

the motion raising preliminary objection merely because the

clerk in shuffling papers put one ahead of the other.”’

Assuming arguendo that the contemporaneous filing of the

motion and the answer would not satisfy the requirement

of Rule 2-322(a), the trial court’s finding that the motion was

filed first is not clearly erroneous. Moreover, we note that

the trial court’s conclusion is supported by the date and time

stamps on the pleadings. The plaintiffs’ argument that the

District waived its right to assert the defense of lack of

jurisdiction over the person is without merit.

Il.

The District’s sole ‘‘lack of jurisdiction” argument in the

circuit court was that, as a matter of Maryland law, the

District of Columbia may not be sued in a Maryland court

for transitory actions because the District is a municipal cor-

poration which may not be sued outside of the District of

Columbia. The District’s argument is based upon one case,

involving venue principles and the construction of a

Maryland venue statute, which supports the proposition that

a Maryland municipal corporation can be sued only in the

county where it is situated. Phillips v. Baltimore City, supra,

110 Md. 431, 72 A. 902.

i

SS Se a Sess sh ss elses essences

Sa

Prior to Phillips v. Baltimore City, this Court in Baltimore

City v. Turnpike Co., 104 Md. 351, 65 A. 35 (1906), held that

an action against Baltimore City, based on the City’s alleged

trespass upon the plaintiff's land located in Baltimore

County, was properly brought in the Circuit Court for

Baltimore County. Rejecting the City’s assertion that the

suit should have been brought in Baltimore City, the Court

relied upon the principle that local actions should be brought

in the jurisdiction where the land lies. See Gunther v. Dran-

bauer, 86 Md. 1, 6, 38 A. 33 (1897). In the Turnpike Co. case,

the City’s entire reliance in this Court was upon the rule,

set forth in several out-of-state cases, that ‘‘a municipal cor-

poration [can] be sued in its own Courts only, even in the

case of a local action.’’ 104 Md. at 351. This Court rejected

the rule, stating (104 Md. at 357, 65 A. at 36):

‘We have been referred to no decision in this

State, that holds that a municipal corporation should

not be bound by the rules of law, which are applicable

to other litigants and no sound reason can ~ given

why they should be excepted. The contention of the

appellant, if carried to its logical conclusion, would

result in depriving municipalities in the State, which

have no Courts, hem suing or being sued ... .”

Nevertheless, a few years later in Phillips v. Baltimore City,

the Court did apply, in a transitory action against Baltimore

City, the venue rule that a municipal corporation could be

sued only in its own courts. 110 Md. at 436, 72 A. at 904.

The Court held that this general rule was applicable to tran-

sitory actions in the absence of a statute modifying the rule.

The Phillips Court limited the holding in Baltimore City v.

Turnpike Co. to local actions only.

The Phillips Court then considered whether the venue

statute relating to bringing suit against a corporation, which

was then in effect, had changed this general rule. The Court

held that the venue statute, which declared inter alia that

a ‘‘corporation of this State’’ could be sued in any county

9a

where it regularly transacted business,* did not apply to a

municipal corporation. 110 Md. at 437, 72 A. at 905.

Phillips has no application to the present case. The rule

that was applied in Phillips is that a Maryland municipality,

sued in a Maryland court in a transitory action, should be

sued where it is situated. The District of Columbia is not

a Maryland municipal corporation and is not situated in a

Maryland county. In the context of this case, it is a nonresi-

dent corporate defendant.‘ Adoption of the District’s argu-

ment would lead to the adoption of a venue rule which would

grant foreign municipal corporations the unique privilege of

being immunized from suit in the State of Maryland.

The Supreme Court of Kansas addressed this issue in

Hillhouse v. City of Kansas City, 221 Kan. 369, 373, 559 P.2d

1148, 1151 (1977), stating: ‘‘there is no sound reason why

a foreign municipal corporation should be treated any dif-

ferently from foreign private corporations.’ We agree with

the Supreme Court of Kansas and hold that a foreign

municipal corporation is subject to the same venue rules as

any private corporation.

Phillips has no application to this case for another reason.

In Phillips, this Court construed a venue statute which stated

that a ‘corporation of this State may be sued in any coun-

ty . . . where it regularly transacts business.’’ This venue

statute no longer exists. The comparable general venue

statute now reads in pertinent part as follows (Code (1974,

1989 Repl. Vol.), § 6-201 of the Courts and Judicial Pro-

ceedings Article):

‘Ch. 240 of the Acts of 1908, later codified as Code (1957), Art. 23, § 62.

‘ As the Court pointed out in Eck v. State Tax Comm. of Md., 204 Md.

245, 250, 103 A.2d 850, 853 (1954), when there is a nonresident defen-

dant, Maryland venue restrictions are generally inapplicable and a tran-

sitory action can be brought wherever the nonresident defendant can be

reached with process. See also Alcarese v. Stinger, 197 Md. 236, 244, 78

A.2d 651, 655 (1951).

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‘{A] civil action shall be brought in a county where

the defendant resides, carries on a regular business,

is employed, or habitually engages in a vocation.”

Thus, with respect to suits where regular business is carried

on, the broader term ‘‘defendant’”’ is used to encompass per-

sons and corporations. The District of Columbia is certainly

a ‘‘defendant.’’ The Phillips Court’s analysis of whether the

former venue statute concerning ‘corporations’ included

Maryland municipal corporations has little relevance to an

action brought against the ‘‘defendants’’ under the present

venue statute.

EK ven if the venue statute had not been changed, this Court

in Eck v. State Tax Comm. of Md., 204 Md. 245, 252, 103

A.2d 850, 854 (1954), pointed out that ‘‘the [venue] rule

applied in the Phillips case . . . is not universal and has

been subject tocriticism . . . .’’ The court in Eck declined

to apply the Phillips holding with respect to suits against

public officials relating to the performance of their official

duties. 204 Md. at 253-254, 103 A.2d at 854-855.

The majority of jurisdictions which have reassessed the

issue reject the notion that a municipal corporation is not

subject to the same venue rules as other corporations. See,

e.g., Cacho v. Superior Court, 170 Ariz. 30, 32, 821 P.2d 721,

723 (1991); Lawless v. Village of Park Forest South, 108

Ill. App.3d 191, 195-196, 438 N.E.2d 1299, 1302 (1982); Guy

v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 87 N.E.2d 712, 714 (Ohio Ct. of App..,

Cuyahoga Cty., 1949); City of Cushing v. Coryell, 400 P.2d

174, 175-176 (Okl. 1965). But see, Ex parte City of Birm-

ingham, 507 So.2d 471, 473-474 (Ala. 1987). Moreover, as

previously discussed, this Court prior to Phillips had rejected

the special venue rule for municipal corporations and had

stated, in the context of venue principles, that a municipal

corporation should be treated like any other litigant.

Baltimore City v. Turnpike Co., supra, 104 Md. at 357, 65

A. at 36. In addition, there have been Maryland cases since

lla

Phillips where, without discussion, a municipal corporation

has been subjected to suit outside of its county's boundaries.

See, e.g., Alexander v. Montgomery County, 87 Md.App. 275,

589 A.2d 563 (1991) (Montgomery County sued in the Cir-

cuit Court for Prince George’s County).

We agree with the majority of jurisdictions which today

reject the notion that a municipal corporation is exempt from

the venue principles governing other corporations. Conse-

quently, for several reasons, the District's reliance upon

Phillips v. Baltimore is misplaced.

ITI.

The Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court did

not have jurisdiction over the District of Columbia because

the allegedly tortious activities, giving rise to the suit against

the District, occurred on a federal enclave which was acquired

by the United States between the years 1906 and 1943. The

land upon which Oak Hill Youth Center is situated was

acquired in 1923 for governmental use by the District of

Columbia. Act of February 29, 1923, ch. 148, 42 Stat. 1360.”

* The land was acquired pursuant to a congressional directive, for use

by the District of Columbia for municipal purposes. The directive pro-

vided (Act of February 29, 1923, ch. 148, 42 Stat. 1360):

‘The Commissioners of the District of Columbia are authoriz-

ed and directed to acquire a site for a home and school for feeble-

minded persons, said site to be located in the District of Co-

lumbia or in the State of Maryland or in the State of Virginia,

and to erect thereon suitable buildings . . . . If the land pro-

posed to be acquired is without the District of Columbia and

can not be purchased at a satisfactory price the Attorney

General of the United States, at the request of the Commis-

sioners of the District of Columbia, shall institute condemna-

tion proceedings to acquire such land as may be selected for

said site either in the State of Maryland or in the State of

Virginia in accordance with the laws of said States, the title

of said land to be taken directly to and in the name of the United

States, but the land so acquired shall be under the jurisdiction

of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia as agents of

the United States .

At the time of the acquisition of the land upon which Oak

Hill Youth Center rests, Chapter 743, § 2, of the Acts of 1906,

later codified as Maryland Code (1957), Art. 96, $ 36,

provided:

‘‘Exclusive jurisdiction in and over land so acquired

by the United States shall be and the same hereby

is ceded to the United States for all purposes except

the service upon such sites of all civil and criminal

process of the courts of this State, but the jurisdic-

tion so ceded shall continue no longer than the said

United States shall own such lands.”’

In 1943, the General Assembly limited any cession of

jurisdiction over lands held by the United States to concur-

rent jurisdiction. Code (1984), § 14-102 of the State Govern-

ment Article.

The Court of Special Appeals in its opinion stated that

Maryland, between 1906 and 1943, ‘‘ ‘ceded exclusive

jurisdiction to the United States for all purposes except

service of process.’ '’ Hansford v. District of Columbia, supra,

84 Md. App. at 306, 578 A.2d at 846, quoting 63 Att'y Gen.

Ops. 332, 333 (1978); 61 Att’y Gen. Ops. 441, 446 (1976). The

Court of Special Appeals appeared to view § 6-101 of the

Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and § 14-102 of the

State Government Article as somewhat in conflict, and it

attempted to reconcile the two statutes. Section 6-101 of the

Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides:

‘‘Definitions; jurisdiction as to federal land.

‘‘(a) For the purposes of personal jurisdiction,

venue, and service of process, the following terms

have the meanings indicated:

‘‘(b) “County” includes any federal enclave, reser-

vation, or land within the geographical limits of the

county.

‘‘(c) ‘‘Resident’’ includes a person residing on a

federal enclave, reservation, or land in the State or

a county.

l3a

“(d) “State” includes any federal enclave, reser-

vation, or land within the geographical limits of the

State.

‘(e) Legislative intent.—It is the intention of the

General Assembly to extend the personal jurisdic-

tion and venue of courts of the State and the power

to serve process of those courts to any person on

federal enclaves, reservations, or lands within the

State to the fullest extent permitted by the Constitu-

tion and laws of the United States.”

Section 14-102 of the State Government Article provides:

‘“(a) In general.—With respect to land that the

United States or any of its units leases or otherwise

holds in the State, the State reserves jurisdiction and

authority over the land and over persons, property,

and transactions on the land to the fullest extent

that is permitted by the United States Constitution

and that is not inconsistent with the governmental

purpose for which the land is held.

‘“(b) Previous grants.—This section does not affect

the jurisdiction and authority of the State over land

or persons, property, and transactions on land that

the United States or its unit has acquired on or

before May 31, 1943 to the extent that the State

ceded jurisdiction under:

* * *

(4) Chapter 743, §§ 2 and 3, of the Acts of the

General Assembly of 1906... .”

The Court of Special Appeals concluded that, while ‘‘the

legislature intended to ‘extend jurisdiction . . . of courts

of the state . . . to any person on federal enclaves . . . to

the fullest extent permitted by the Constitution and laws

of the United States,’ it is apparent that it did not intend

the extension to apply to ‘transactions on land that the

United States . . . has acquired on or before May 31,

1943.’ Hansford v. District of Columbia, supra, 84 Md. App.

at 308-309, 578 A.2d at 848 (emphasis added). Therefore, ac-

cording to the intermediate appellate court, because

Maryland had ceded exclusive jurisdiction to the United

l4a

States, the District of Columbia could not be subject to suit

in a Maryland court based upon its activities at Oak Hill

Youth Center.*®

In our view, there is no conflict between § 6-101 of the

Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and § 14-162 of the

State Government Article, and, therefore. there is no need

to ‘‘reconcile’’ the statutes or adopt a strained construction

of either. Furthermore, in dealing with the two statutes and

the issues in this case, it is important to differentiate among

the separate concepts of (1) a court’s jurisdiction over the

person, (2) a court’s authority in civil cases to resolve disputes

growing out of transactions occurring outside of the ter-

ritorial jurisdiction in which the court is located, and (3) a

state government's legislative, executive and administrative

authority within its territorial limits.

Section 6-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Ar-

ticle deals entirely with personal jurisdiction, service of pro-

cess, and venue. A Maryland court is clearly entitled to serve

process on and exercise jurisdiction over the person of the

District of Columbia under the circumstances of this case.

Because a federal enclave is included in the definition of

‘‘State,’’ § 6-101(d), and because of the activities conducted

by the District of Columbia at the Oak Hill Youth Center

in this State, the circuit court had the power to exercise

jurisdiction over the ‘‘person’”’ of the District of Columbia.’

* There is nothing in the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion which in-

dicates that the result would have been different if a private, rather than

a public, corporation had been sued based upon its activities on a federal

enclave.

’ Section 6-102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides:

‘(a) Basis of personal jurisdiction.—A court may exercise

personal jurisdiction as to any cause of action over a person

domiciled in, served with process in, organized under the laws

of, or who maintains his principal place of business in the State.

(b) Exercise of jurisdiction on other basis.—This section does

not limit any other basis of personal jurisdiction of a court of

the State.”

[Footnote continued on next page]

l5a

We now turn to the holding of the Court of Special Ap-

peals, namely that the cession of ‘‘exclusive’’ jurisdiction by

the State of Maryland limits the authority of the courts of

this State so that a Maryland court cannot exercise jurisdic-

tion over ‘‘ ‘transactions on land that the United

States . . . has acquired on or before May 31,1943 .. .

Hansford v. District of Columbia, supra, 84 Md. App. at

308-309, 578 A.2d at 848, quoting § 14-102(b) of the State

Government Article.

Section 14-102(b) of the State Government Article deals

entirely with the governing authority of the State of

Maryland over enclaves ceded between 1906 and 1943. The

section does not in any manner restrict the ability of courts

to acquire in personam jurisdiction over persons and entities

on federal enclaves. In fact, § 14-102(b) refers to Ch. 743 of

[Footnote continued from the previous page]

The District of Columbia was served with process in the State of

Maryland, and, in light of the District’s activities within the State, this

service conformed to the requirements of due process.

Alternatively, the District may be subject to suit in this State because

of several of the acts enumerated in the Long Arm Statute, § 6-103 of

the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The District transacts

business and performs work or service in the State, § 6-103 (b)(1); the

District allegedly caused tortious injury in the State by an act or omis-

sion in the State, § 6-103(b)(3); the District uses real property in the State,

§ 6-103(b)(5).

As this Court has repeatedly stated, the purpose of the Maryland Long

Arm Statute is to permit a Maryland court to exercise jurisdiction over

the person to the full extent authorized by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Androutsos

v. Fairfax Hospital, 323 Md. 634, 637, 594 A.2d 574, 576 (1991); Camelback

Ski Corporation v. Behning, 312 Md. 330, 342-343, 539 A.2d 1107, 1113,

cert. denied, 488 U.S 849, 109 S.Ct. 130, 102 L.Ed.2d 103 (1988); Curtis

v. State, 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978); Mohamed v. Michael, 279 Md.

653, 370 A.2d 551 (1977); Geelhoed v. Jenson, 277 Md. 220, 352 A.2d 818

(1976); Krashes v. White, 275 Md. 549, 341 A.2d 798 (1975); Harris v. Arlen

Properties, Inc., 256 Md. 185, 260 A.2d 22 (1969). The District's activities

on the federal enclave upon which Oak Hill Youth Center rests are suffi-

cient to subject it to the jurisdiction of the Maryland courts.

l6a

the Acts of 1906 which excepted from the cession of jurisdic-

tion ‘‘the service upon such sites of all civil and criminal pro-

cess of the courts of this State.’’ Consequently, there is no

conflict between § 14-102(b) and § 6-101 of the Courts and

Judicial Proceedings Article.

Section § 14-102(b) also does not purport to restrict the

traditional authority of Maryland courts to resolve disputes

between plaintiffs and defendants over whom in personam

jurisdiction has been acquired, regardless of where the tran-

saction giving rise to such disputes occurred. Section

14-102(b) simply purports to restrict the applicability of

Maryland law and Maryland executive and administrative

governmental authority over federal enclaves ceded prior to

1943. The District’s argument, and the position of the Court

of Special Appeals, ‘“‘confuses the political jurisdiction of a

State with its judicial jurisdiction.’ Gulf Offshore v. Mobil

Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 482, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 2877, 69 L.Ed.2d

784, 794 (1981).°

The courts have uniformly upheld a state court’s exercise

of jurisdiction over personal injury and wrongful death

actions arising from activities occurring on federal enclaves

under the “‘exclusive’’ jurisdiction of the federal government.

The Supreme Court has stated that there is ‘‘[nJothing in-

herent in exclusive federal sovereignty over a territory [that]

precludes a state court from entertaining a personal injury

suit concerning events occurring in the territory and gov-

erned by federal law.’’ Gulf Offshore v. Mobil Oil Corp., supra,

453 U.S. at 481, 1010 S.Ct. at 2877-2877, 69 L.Ed.2d at

* While § 14-102(b) and Ch. 743 of the Acts of 1906 may literally pur-

port to relinquish all Maryland political jurisdiction over federal enclaves

ceded between 1906 and 1943, the effect of the cessions during that period

is not quite as far reaching as the statutory language would indicate. For

example, numerous Maryland laws concerning voting, education, other

individual rights, taxation, licensing, appropriations, employment, divorce,

etc., are applicable to such ‘“‘exclusive’’ federal enclaves. See the discus

sion in Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 90 S.Ct. 1752, 26 L.Ed.2d 370

(1970)

17a

793. The Supreme Court in Gulf Offshore continued (453 U.S.

at 481-482, 101 S.Ct. at 2877, 69 L.Ed.2d at 793-794):

‘‘The judiciary power of every government looks

beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in civil

cases lays hold of all subjects of litigation between

parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of

dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant

part of the globe. The Federalist No. 82, p. 514 (H.

Lodge ed. 1908) (Hamilton), quoted in Claflin v.

Houseman, 93 U.S., at 138. State courts routinely

exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over civil cases

arising from events in other States and governed by

the other States’ laws. See, e.g., Dennick v. Railroad

Co., 103 U.S. 11, 26 L.Ed.439 (1881). Cf. Allstate Ins.

Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 101 S.Ct. 633, 66

L.Ed.2d 521 (1981). That the location of the event

giving rise to the suit is an area of exclusive federal

jurisdiction rather than another State, does not in-

troduce any new limitation on the forum State’s sub-

ject matter-jurisdiction.”’

a, e.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 424, 90 S.Ct.

1752, 1756, 26 L.Ed.2d 370, 375 (1970) (persons on exclusive

federal enclaves ‘‘are subject to the process and jurisdiction

of state courts’’); Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 244

U.S. 68, 72, 37 S.Ct. 599, 601, 61 L.Ed 997, 1000 (1917) (an

action for personal injury suffered on a reservation under

the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States may be main-

tained in a state court which has personal jurisdiction over

the defendant); Stokes v. Adair, 265 F.2d 662, 666 (4th Cir.),

cert. denied, 361 U.S. 816, 80 S.Ct. 56, 4 L.Ed.2d 62 (1959);

Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1952); Brennan v.

Shipe, 414 Pa. 258, 199 A.2d 467, app. dismissed, 379 U.S.

20, 85 S.Ct. 156, 13 L.Ed.2d 91 (1964); In re Air Crash Disaster

at Gander, Newfoundland, 660 F.Supp. 1202, 1207-1208

(W.D.Ky 1987). See also Swanson Painting Company v.

Painters Local Union No. 260, 391 F.2d 523, 525 (9th Cir.,

1968) (‘‘the fact that business is transacted within a federal

enclave . . . does nct immunize the persons engaged therein

l8a

from liability for breach of any duty arising from such

activity’); Knott Corporation v. Furman, 163 F.2d 199, 202

(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 809, 68 S.Ct. 111, 92 L.Ed.

387 (1947) (‘‘the doing of business . . . [ona federal enclave]

amounts to . . . consent to be sued in the federal court of

the district as well as in the state courts with respect to a

cause of action which has arisen there’’).

Although a state court clearly can exercise jurisdiction in

cases based on injuries occurring on a federal enclave within

the state, the state court may be required under traditional

choice of law principles to apply federal law in the tort suit.

In this wrongful death case, the Congress has enacted legisla-

tion mandating the law to be applied, as 16 U.S.C. § 457

provides:

‘‘Action for death or personal injury within na-

tional park or other place under jurisdiction of

United States; application of State laws

In the case of the death of any person by the

neglect or wrongful act of another within a na-

tional park or other place subject to the exclu-

sive jurisdiction of the United States, within the

exterior boundaries of any State, such right of

action shall exist as though the place were under

the jurisdiction of the State within whose ex-

terior boundaries such place may be... .

The recent cases hold that § 457 requires the application of

state law as it exists at the time of the tort rather than state

law at the time of the cession of the land. See, e.g., Ferebee

v. Chevron Chemical Company, 736 F.2d 1529, 1533-1534

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 545, 83

L.Ed.2d 432 (1984) (§ 457 envisions application of current

law of surrounding state); Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644

F.2d 112, 117-118 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); Greene v. Vantage

Steamship Corporation, 466 F.2d 159, 166 n. 9 (4th Cir. 1972)

(implicitly interpreting $ 457 to apply current state law);

Mathis v. General Electric Corporation, 580 F.2d 192, 194

(5th Cir. 1978) (same).

es ae At A ee ee

19a

The District relies upon Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592, 133

A. 729 (1926), for the argument that the cession of exclusive

jurisdiction over land transfers to the federal government

exclusive authority and jurisdiction for all purposes, and

deprives a state court of authority to entertain litigation

growing out of a transaction on the federal enclave. Lowe

involved an action for divorce filed by residents of a federal

enclave in Cecil County, Maryland. This Court held that the

Lowes, as residents of an ‘“‘exclusive’’ federal enclave, were

not residents of the State of Maryland and that, therefore,

a Maryland state court had no authority to entertain their

divorce action. Lowe v. Lowe, supra, 150 Md. at 600-601,

113 A. at 733. In support of its holding, the Court pointed

to some old cases purportedly standing for the principle that

the “inhabitants of [a federal enclave] cease to be inhabitants

of the state and can no longer exercise any civil or political

rights under the laws of the state.’’ 150 Md. at 598, 133 A.

at 732. The holdings in the cases cited in Lowe included the

following: that residents on a federal enclave could not vote

at state elections, that residents of a federal enclave could

not send their children to the state public schools, and that

residents of federal enclaves are exempt from all county and

state taxes. The views expressed in Lowe were reiterated by

this Court in Royer v. Bd. of Elec. Sups., 231 Md. 561, 191

A.2d 446, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921, 84 S.Ct. 267, 11 L.Ed.2d

165 (1963).

The Supreme Court in Evans v. Cornman, supra, 398 U.S.

at 421-426, 90 S.Ct. at 1754-1757, 26 L.Ed.2d at 373-377,

expressly disapproved of the holding in Royer v. Bd. of Elec.

Sups., supra, and disapproved of the principles set forth in

both Royer and Lowe. Evans v. Cornman, also involving

residents of an ‘‘exclusive’’ federal enclave in Maryland, held

that such persons were residents of the State of Maryland,

were entitled to vote in Maryland elections, were subject to

Maryland taxes, and were subject to numerous other Mary-

land laws. The Supreme Court explicitly stated that residents

20a

of federal enclaves in Maryland ‘‘are subject to the process

and jurisdiction of state courts; they themselves can resort

to those courts in divorce . . . proceedings; and they send

their children to Maryland public schools.’’ 398 U.S. at 424,

90 S.Ct. at 1756, 26 L.Ed.2d at 376. The Court also pointed

out that the view taken by numerous older cases concern-

ing ‘‘the relationship between federal enclaves and the States

in which they are located”’ is no longer accurate. 398 U.S.

at 423, 90 S.Ct. at 1755, 26 L.Ed.2d at 375. See also Howard

v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund of City of Louisville, 344

U.S. 624, 73 S.Ct. 465, 97 L.Ed. 617 (1953).°

Lowe v. Lowe and Royer v. Bd. of Elec. Sups. are not only

inconsistent with controlling Supreme Court authority, but

they are inconsistent with the policy of the Maryland General

Assembly embodied in § 14-102 of the State Government

Article and §§ 2-101 et seg. and 6-101 of the Courts and

Judicial Proceedings Article. Consequently, the Lowe and

Royer cases are overruled.

RY.

The District of Columbia argues that even if a Maryland

court could exercise jurisdiction over a tort suit based on

activities of an individual or of a private corporation occur-

ring on a federal enclave, it cannot exercise jurisdiction over

the District, a public corporation. The District claims that

it is entitled to the same governmental immunity as the

United States. The District asserts that requiring it to

answer in a Maryland court would “‘interfere with the

* It is noteworthy that the specific holding in the Lowe case would leave

the residents of a federal enclave without a remedy, as the federal courts

have no jurisdiction over divorce actions. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504

U.S. ——, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992); Barber v. Barber, 21

How. 582 (1859). The Supreme Court, however, has made it clear that

‘‘no area however small will be left without a developed legal system for

private rights,’’ James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100, 60

S.Ct. 431, 434, 84 L.Ed. 596, 600 (1940).

2la

District’s governmental functions.”’ (District of Columbia

brief at 11).

In support of its immunity argument, the District relies

on several Supremacy Clause cases. See, e.g., Pacific Coast

Dairy v. Department of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285, 295, 63

S.Ct. 628, 631, 87 L.Ed 761, 767 (1943); Unites States |

McGee, 714 F.2d 607, 612 (6th Cir. 1983); Uniivd States |

Bellevue, 474 F.2d 473, 476 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.

827, 94 S.Ct. 46, 38 L.Ed.2d 60 (1973); United States v. Dreos,

156 F. Supp. 200, 206 (D. Md. 1957). In these cases, the

courts held that federal employees on federal enclaves could

not be subjected to state legislation in the face of a conflict-

ing federal law or federal function. Thus, the Supreme Court

has stated (James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94,

103-104, 60 S.Ct. 431, 436, 84 L.Ed. 596, 603 (1940)):

“(T]he authority of state laws or their administra-

tion may not interfere with the carrying out of a na-

tional purpose. Where enforcement of the state law

would handicap efforts to carry out the plans of the

United States, the state enactment must, of course,

give way.”

In the context of this case, however, the District of Co-

lumbia is not the United States, is not carrying out a national

purpose, and is not entitled to the governmental immunity

or supremacy of the United States. The District is ‘‘a body

corporate for municipal purposes,’’ D.C. Code Ann. (1981,

1992 Repl. Vol.), § 1-102(a), and it has been treated as a

municipality by the courts. See, e.g., Haynesworth v. Miller,

820 F.2d 1245, 1271-1272 (D.C.Cir. 1987). The District is not

treated like the United States, but rather is treated like any

other municipality for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See,

Dorman v. District of Columbia, 888 F.2d 159, 162 (D.C. Cir.

1989); Best v. District of Columbia, 743 F.Supp. 44, 45-47

(D.D.C. 1990); O'Callaghan v. District of Columbia, 741 F.

Supp. 273, 276 (D.D.C. 1990); Propert v. District of Colum-

bia, 741 F.Supp. 959, 960 (D.D.C. 1990).

»9)

22a

It has been held that the District's governmental immunity

is not derived from the United States but rather has

developed in the case law of the District of Columbia as a

common law theory of municipal governmental immunity.

Wade v. District of Columbia, 310 A.2d 857, 861-862 (D.C

App. 1973). Moreover, a Maryland court need not recognize

the governmental immunity of another state or of a municipal

corporation or political subdivision outside of Maryland. See

Nevada v. Hall, 440 US. pre 417-425, 99 S.Ct. 1182,

1186-1190, 59 L.Ed.2d 416, 422-428 (1979); Biscoe v. Arl-

ington County, 738 F.2d ee 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.

denied, 469 U.S. 1159, 105 S.Ct. 909, 83 L.Ed.2d 923 (1985);

Peterson v. State of Texas, 635 P.2d 241, 242-243 (Colo. App.

1981); Struebin v. State, 322 N.W.2d 84, 85-86 (Iowa), cert

denied, 459 U.S. 1087, 103 S.Ct. 570, 74 L.Ed.2d 933 (1982);

Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 658 P.2d 422, 423

(Nev.), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 806, 104 S.Ct. 195, 78

L.Ed.2d 71 (1983). The District of Columbia cannot avoid

this result by relying on cases involving conflicts between

state law and federal law or federal functions which are

governed by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Con-

stitution.

Therefore, we hold that a Maryland court has the authority

to exercise jurisdiction in a case where the District of Co-

lumbia is sued for its allegedly tortious activities on a federal

enclave located in Maryland.'°

As previously stated, the District alternatively argued in the trial

court that the plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a cause of action because

there was no special relationship between the plaintiffs and the District

giving rise to a duty, because there was no causal conection between

the alleged negligence of these defendants and the death of Thomas T

Hansford, Jr., and because there was no basis in law for the § 1983 con-

stitutional claims. The District did not file a cross-petition or a conditional

cross-petition for a writ of certiorari raising these issues. Consequently,

the District does not in its brief seek to sustain the trial court's judg-

ment by pressing the duty, proximate cause, and § 1983 arguments

Therefore, we express no opinion on these issues; they are for the trial

court on remand

23a

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL AP-

PEALS REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED

TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO

REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT

COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY

AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIR-

CUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUN-

TY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT

INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS

IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF

SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE

RESPONDENT:

Reported

In The Court of Special Appeals

of Maryland

No. 1764

SEPTEMBER TERM, 1989

THOMAS T. HANSForD. Sr.

Vv.

District or CoLUMBIA

Alpert, Bloom, Cathell, JJ.

Opinion by Alpert, J.

Filed: September 5, 1990

In this case of first impression, we must decide whether

Maryland courts may exercise jurisdiction over a non-

resident who ‘‘causes tortious injury in the state by an act

or omission . . .”’ on a federal enclave located within the

geographical boundaries of Maryland. Under the cir-

cumstances set forth below, we answer in the negative.

On August 15, 1988, appellants, Thomas T. Hansford, Sr.

and his wife, Mary Dell Hansford, filed a complaint in the

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County against the District

of Columbia (appellee), a District of Columbia employee, J.E.

Neil Olliviera (Olliviera), and Carl Sewanti Richardson, Jr.

(Richardson), due to their son's murder. In their complaint,

appellants ailege that, in 1987, appellee and its employee

Olliviera, were negligent in the operation of their maximum

security prison for juvenile delinquents and, as a result,

Richardson was able to escape from their custody and con-

lb

2b

trol. The prison, known as Oak Hill, is located in Laurel,

Maryland. Richardson escaped from the facility during the

summer of 1987. On August 16, 1987, Richardson murdered

Thomas T. Hansford, Jr., the oldest child of appellants.

Appellants live in Prince George’s County.

On October 17, 1988, appellee and Olliviera filed a motion

for additional time to answer the complaint. The court

granted this motion on October 21, 1988.

On March 13, 1989, the District filed both a motion ‘“‘rais-

ing preliminary objections and to dismiss complaints,”’ and

an answer to the complaint. The clerk's office docketed both

on March 13th, numbering the answer ahead of the motion.

On June 15, 1989, appellants filed their opposition to ap-

pellee’s motion.

On September 8, 1989, the trial court granted appellee's

motion based on lack of personal jurisdiction and dismiss-

ed the complaint against appellee. Appellants filed a timely

appeal. On December 4, 1989, the trial court granted appel-

lant’s motion for entry of a final judgment.

Appellant asks this court to consider whether the trial

court erroneously:

I. granted appellee’s motion to dismiss insofar as

it found no Maryland statute authorized the ex-

ercise of jurisdiction over appellee as a ‘‘foreign

municipal corporation’ even though it maintains

a full time presence in this state by operating a

maximum security detention facility.

Il. considered and granted appellee’s motion to

dismiss due to leak of personal jurisdiction where

appellee had, five (5) months prior to filing such

motion, entered its general appearance in the case,

and where appellee filed an answer, including ten

(10) defenses, a set-off, a cross-claim, and a jury

trial demand, before filing its motion raising

preliminary objections.

III. granted appellee’s motion to dismiss insofar as

it found sovereign immunity barred liability in

3b

Maryland courts based on appellee’s negligent

operation in Maryland of a maximum security

prison for violent juvenile delinquents.

I. Personal Jurisdiction

Appellee contends that the lower court properly granted

its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction since

the District of Columbia’s alleged negligence in allowing

Richardson to escape and in not assisting in his recapture

occurred at Oak Hill, a federal enclave,' over which the

District and the United States have been ceded exclusive

jurisdiction. Appellant counters that, regardless of Oak Hill’s

status as a federal enclave, the lower court still has jurisdic-

tion over appellee pursuant to the Maryland Code, Courts

and Judicial Proceeding, § 6-101 and § 6-103. Appellee is cor-

rect. We explain.

The land on which Oak Hill is located was acquired by the

United States in 1923, pursuant to a congressional directive,

for use by the District of Columbia for municipal purposes.

42 Stat. 1360, ch. 148 (1923).? At the time of this acquisi-

tion, Chapter 743, § 2 of the Maryland Sessions Laws of 1906,

later codified as Md. Ann. Code Art. 96, § 36 (1957), granted

'*‘TA]reas in which a state has ceded jurisdiction to the United States

are known as ‘Federal Enclaves’ or ‘Federai Islands’ within the state.”’

16 Words and Phrases 486 (1959).

* The law provided:

The Commissioners of the District of Columbia are authorized

and directed to acquire a site for a home and school for feeble-

minded persons, said site to be located in the District of Columbia

or in the State of Maryland or in the State of Virginia, and to

erect thereon suitable buildings . . . . If the land proposed to

be acquired is without the District of Columbia and can not be

urchased at a satisfactory price, the Attorney General of the

nited States, at the request of the Commissioners of the District

of Columbia, shall institute condemnation proceedings to acquire

such land as may be selected for said site either in the State of

Maryland or in State of Virginia in accordance with the laws of

said States, the title of said land to be taken directly to and in

the name of the United States, but the land so acquired shall

be under the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of the District

of Columbia as agents of the United States. .. .

4b

the United States exclusive jurisdiction of land acquired by it:

Exclusive jurisdiction in and over any land so ac-

quired by the United States shall be and the same

is hereby ceded to the United States for all purposes

except the service upon such sites of all civil and

criminal process of the courts of this State, but the

jurisdiction so ceded shall continue no longer than

the said United States shall own such lands.

(Emphasis added).

Later, Section 47, enacted in 1943, limited any cession of

jurisdiction over “‘lands hereafter acquired by the United

States”’ to concurrent jurisdiction at most. That section pro-

vides that the State retains jurisdiction over lands acquired

by the United States to the fullest extent possible under the

Constitution. Thus, we conclude that Maryland, for land ac-

quired by the United States between 1906 and 1943, has

‘‘ceded exclusive jurisdiction to the United States for all pur-

poses except the service of process.’’ 63 Ops. Md. Att’y Gen.

332, 333 (1978); 61 Ops. Md. Att’y Gen. 441, 446 (1976).

Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render

judgment in personam was grounded on their de

facto power over the defendant’s person. Hence, his

presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court

was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment per-

sonally binding him.

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316

(1945) (citation omitted). In International Shoe, the Court

held that due process requires only that, in order to subject

a defendant to a judgment in personam if he is not present

within the territory of the forum, he must have ‘“‘certain

minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the

suit does not offend, ‘traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.’ ’’ Jd. The Court’s reasoning in upholding

the jurisdiction of the State of Washington over the Inter-

national Shoe Company was that

it would be unfair to one who has a cause of action

based on activities within a state to be compelled

5b

to go outside the state to make his claim. On the

other hand, it would not be unfair to compel the

foreign corporation to defend the case in the state

in view of its contacts there.

Auerbach, The “Long Arm’’ Comes to Maryland, 26 Md. L.

Rev. 13, 17 (1966).

After International Shoe, “states began to enact ‘long arm’

or ‘single act’ statutes asserting jurisdiction on the basis of

acts within the state.”’ Jd. at 19. In 1964, Maryland enacted

a ‘long arm”’ statute intended to extend the jurisdiction of

the state courts to the fullest possible limit under the state

and federal constitution. See 1964 Md. Laws 95. See also

Legislative Council of Maryland, Report to the Gen.

Assembly 1964, at 179-180.

In the case sub judice, however, we do not believe that per-

sonal jurisdiction can be secured through Maryland's “long

arm”’ statute. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. $§ 6-103,

6-101 (1989). Section 6-103(b)(3) authorizes a court to exer-

cise personal jurisdiction over a person who “‘causes tortious

injury in the state by an act or omission in the State.’’ (Em-

phasis added). We note that § 6-101(d) defines “‘State” as

including ‘‘any federal enclave, reservation, or land within

the geographical limits of the State.’’ We further note the

legislative intent of this statute set forth in § 6-101/(e):

It is the intention of the General Assembly to

extend the personal jurisdiction and venue of courts

of the State and the power to serve process of those

courts to any person on federal enclaves, reserva-

tions, or lands within the State to the fullest extent

permitted by che Constitution and laws of the

United States.

The Court of Appeals in Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592, 598

(1926), while considering the right of a resident of Perry

Point, a federal enclave, to sue for divorce in a state court,

stated that ‘courts have, with practical unanimity, held that

the power of exclusive legislation carries with it exclusive

6b

jurisdiction, and in many cases have treated the cession as

accomplishing a thorough separation of the land and its

inhabitants from the state.’’ The Supreme Court, however,

in Evans v. Corman, 398 U.S. 419, 421-22 (1970), clearly

rejected ‘‘the fiction of a state within a state,’’ and held that

individuals living on the grounds of National Institutes of

Health (N.I.H.), a federal enclave within the geographical

boundaries of Maryland, could not be denied the right to vote

in Maryland elections. See also Howard v. Commissioners

of Sinking Fund, 344 U.S. 624, 627 (1953).

In the instant case, were we to consider the issue of

whether the alleged tortious act of appellee was committed

‘‘in the state”’ on the basis of the preceding authorities and

the definition of ‘‘state’’ provided in § 6-101(d), we would be

inclined to accept appellant’s contention that Maryland

courts have personal jurisdiction in the present matter.

Section 6-101 must be read, however, together with

Maryland statutes which limit jurisdiction. ‘‘It is [ ] an

established principle that. all statutory provisions which

relate to the same subject matter and are thus in pari materia

should be construed together and harmonized as far as possi-

ble.” Unnamed Physician v. Commission on Medical

Discipline of Maryland, 285 Md. 1, 10 (1979).

Although the State has statutorily reserved jurisdiction

over lands that the United States has acquired since 1943,

under Maryland State Government Code Annotated §

14-102(b) (1984), this reservation does not

affect the jurisdiction and authority of the State

over land or persons, property, and transactions on

land that the United States or its unit has acquired

on or before May 31, 1943 to the extent that the

State ceded jurisdiction under * * * Chapter 743,

§§2 and 3, of the Acts of the General Assembly of

1906 * * *,

(Emphasis added).

7b

The legislature in 1988 added subsection (c) to § 14-102,

which provided that:

Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, for

the purpose of skedinn the civil or criminal laws

of the State, the governor may enter into

agreements with the United States to establish full

or partial concurrent jurisdiction by the State and

the United States over any lands in the State held

by the United States.

Md. State Gov’t $§ 14-102(c) (Supp. 1990).

The legislature chose not to amend subsection (b) (above).

We conclude, then, that whereas the legislature intended

to ‘extend jurisdiction . . . of courts of the state . . . to any

person on federal enclaves . . . to the fullest extent permit-

ted by the Constitution and laws of the United States,” it

is apparent that it did not intend the extension to apply to

‘transactions on land that the United States . . . has acquired

on or before May 31, 1943... .” “It is well settled that when

two statutes, one general and one specific, are found to con-

flict, the specific statute will be regarded as an exception to

the general statute.’ Farmers & Merchants Bank v.

Schlossberg, 306 Md. 48, 63 (1986).

We hold that the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

lacked jurisdiction and that the trial court properly granted the

Motion to Dismiss, albeit for different reasons than those dis-

cussed above.’ See Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 503 (1979).

>We are cognizant of the fact that appellee's entire jurisdiction argu-

ment on this point is dependent on the fact that the federal government

acquired the land in question between 1906 and 1943. Appellee

acknowledges that the deed to the subject ‘federal enclave,’’ authen-

ticating that the land acquisition occurred in 1923, is not part of the record

before the circuit court. A copy of the deed was annexed to a motion to

supplement the record, which motion was both filed and denied after oral

argument. Since appellant does not dispute the existence of the deed,

however, or, more important, the fact that the United States acquired the

land in 1923 and still owns it, we have assumed, for the purpose of our

analysis, that the United States acquired the land then and still owns it.

8b

Il. Rule 2-322(a) — Waiver of Certain Defenses

Appellant contends that appellee waived its claim of lack

of personal jurisdiction by (1) filing its October 17, 1988

motion for an extension of time in which to answer or other-

wise respond to the complaint and (2) failing to file its motion

raising preliminary objections before filing its answer. We

find no merit in these contentions.

Appellant cites authorities which hold that if a defense

under Rule 323, the predecessor of the present Maryland Rule

2-322, is asserted as part of a pleading which goes to the

merits, there has been a ‘‘general appearance’”’ which con-

stitutes a waiver of preliminary objections. See Eastham v.

Young, 250 Md. 516, 522 (1968); McCormick v. Church, 219

Md. 422 (1959). Appellants argue that appellee’s motion for

an extension of time in which to answer or otherwise respond

to the complaint dealt with the substance of the complaint

on its merits and thereby waives appellee’s right to contest

the court’s jurisdiction. We reject this contention outright.

A request for an extension of time in which to answer or res-

pond does not in any manner go to the merits of the case.

In addition, appellant cortends that appellee has waived

its preliminary objection to jurisdiction since it failed to file

its motion raising its objections “‘before’’ filing its answer.‘

Although both the motion to dismiss and the answer were

filed by appellee and placed on the docket by the court clerk

on the same day, appellant asserts that appellee has failed

to comply with Rule 2-322 and thus has waived the jurisdic-

tional defense.

In considering this issue at the motions hearing, the trial

judge stated:

Both filed on the same day. It probably would have

been better had you made sure that the motion rais-

. Maryland Rule 2-322 provides that the defense of lack of jurisdic tion

‘shall be made by motion to dismiss filed before the answer... .

(Emphasis added).

Ob

ing preliminary objections was docketed in first, but

[ think that is a super technical matter and I’m not

going to conclude that you have waived the right

to raise the matters contained in the motion rais-

ing “hry objection a because the clerk

in shuffling papers put one ahead of the other,

although I have, if my memory serves me, seen in-

stances in which some higher court concluded that

was fatal, but to me that’s... .

We agree with the trial judge’s conclusion. The purpose of

Rule 2-322(a) is to have a legal question decided before the

trial of the action on its merits and this purpose has been

accomplished. /rvine v. Montgomery County, 239 Md. 113,

117 (1965). ‘‘Compliance with procedural requlations is essen-

tial to the fair and efficient administration of justice, but

it is the substance of the compliance and fair treatment of

the parties which are determinative.” Jd. (Citations omitted).

IIT.

Given our decision on the first issue, we need not decide

this one.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED;

APPELLEE TO PAY

THE COSTS.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND

CAL No. 88-13309

THOMAS T. HANSFORD, SR.,

INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

OF THE ESTATE OF THOMAS T. HANSFORD, JR.

DECEASED, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

V.

DistTrRicT OF COLUMBIA,

A MuNICIPAL CORPORATION,

Defendants.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of

a Final Judgment against defendant District of Columbia,

and

It appearing that there is good cause shown and that there

is no just reason for delay and that delay will produce suffi-

cient hardship and unfairness to the plaintiffs to justify an

immediate appeal,

It is by the Court this 4th day of December, 1989,

ORDERED

1. That the Motion be and it is hereby granted, and

2. That the judgment against defendant District of Co-

lumbia rendered September 8, 1989, be and it is a FINAL

JUDGMENT since it disposes of all claims against defen-

dant District of Columbia.

/s/ James F. Couch, Jr.

JUDGE,

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County,

Maryland

[Stamped: FILED December 4, 1989

Clerk of the Circuit Court, Prince George’s County, Maryland]

le

iN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND

CAL No. 88-13309

THOMAS T. HANSFORD, Sr..

VIDUALLY, AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVI

F THE ESTATE OF THOMAS T. HANSFORD., J!

DECEASED, et al.,

ad * £4

Plaintiffs,

\

YISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ef

Defendants

ORDER

Upon consideration of the consent motion to alter or amend

judgment, and it appearing to the Court that there is good

cause shown, it is by the Court this 2nd day of February 1990

ORDERED that the motion be, and hereby is, granted

and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the judgment entered by

order of the Honorable James F. Couch, Jr. on December 4,

1989 is hereby altered so as to change paragraph numbered

two of that order to read:

‘That the judgment for defendant District of Columbia

rendered September 8, 1989, be and it is a FINAL JUDG

MENT since it disposes of all claims against defendant

District of Columbia.”’

s/ James F. Couch, Jr

JUDGE,

Circuit Court for Prince George's County

Maryland

(Stamped: FILED February 5, 1990

Clerk of the Circuit Court, Prince George’s County, Maryland]

3c

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND

CAL No. 88-13309

THOMAS T. HANSFORD, SR.,

INDIVIDUALLY. AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVI

OF THE EstTATE OF THOMAS T. HANSFORD, JR.

DECEASED, et al.,

Plaintiffs

V.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,

Defendants

REPORTER'S OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

OF PROCEEDINGS

(Motions Hearing)

September 8, 1989

Upper Marlboro, Maryland

BEFORE:

HONORABLE JAMES F. Coucu, Jr., Associate Judge

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Plaintiff

GARY SIDELL, Esq.

LESLIE G. FEIN, Esa.

On behalf of the Defendants

WiLLiAM W. Noorter, Esa.

D. F. CooOLAHAN

Official Court Reporter

P. OQ. Box 401

Upper Marlboro, Maryland 20772

4c

PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: CAL 88-13309, Hansford, et al versus

District of Columbia.

* * *

THE COURT: Let me inquire initially, since the motion

attacking jurisdiction is a mandatory motion, has to be fil-

ed before an answer is filed. Was that complied with?

* * *

THE COURT: The docket entries reflect on March 13th,

docket entry number 20, Defendant District of Columbia and

Ollivierra, that was filed and, of course, it also shows docket

entry number 24 filed on the same date, the motion raising

preliminary objections and to dismiss was filed.

MR. NOOTER: That’s correct.

THE COURT: Both filed on the same day. It probably

would have been better had you made sure that the motion

raising preliminary objections was docketed in first, but |

think that is a super technical matter and I’m not going to

conclude that you have waived the right to raise the matters

contained in the motion raising preliminary objection merely

because the clerk in shuffling papers put one ahead of the

other, although I have, if my memory serves me, seen

instances in which some higher court concluded that was

fatal, but to me that’s --—

* * *

THE COURT: I think this day and age —— back in the

old days of common law pleading, which went out before you

were born probably.

MR. SIDELL: I appreciate the comment.

THE COURT: It might have been a real problem, but

in good conscience, I can’t say that the motion has —— it

has to be denied.

Dc

THE COURT: What you’re saying to the Court is that

the District of Columbia law being what you claim it to be

confers jurisdiction on this Court. I disagree with you.

* * *

MR. SIDELL: Let me try to clarify our position. That

is not that that law confers jurisdiction on this Court. That

law merely permits lawsuits against the District of Colum-

bia wherever they may be brought, whether it’s the District

or, if appropriate, elsewhere and what we are suggesting is

that this Court has jurisdiction based on the existence of the

Laurel, Maryland facility, a prison not located in the District

of Columbia, but operated by the District and its officials

in Maryland for indeed conduct which ultimately resulted

in a murder of a twenty-one year old man.

THE COURT: That may be a good argument if this were

an in rem proceeding, which it isn’t. I’m afraid that I have

to disagree with your jurisdictional argument. I've ruled on

it once. I’m persuaded that every court that has touched this

problem has ruled against you, so ——

* * *

THE COURT: I’m going to dismiss the action as to the

District of Columbia. I will deny the motion to dismiss as

to the individual Defendant and wait until it’s been a factual

scenario developed. it may ultimately be shown that the in-

dividual Defendant was engaged in discretionary mattters,

but at this time I don’t feel like I can grant your motion as

to Mr. Ollivierra.

OTHER STATUTES

Md. Code (1989), Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 6-101

(a) For purposes of personal jurisdiction, venue, and service

of process, the following terms have the meanings indicated:

(b) ‘“‘County”’ includes any federal enclave, reservation, or

land within the geographical limits of the county.

(c) ‘‘Resident’”’ includes a person residing on a federal

enclave, reservation, or land in the State or a county.

(d) ‘‘State’’ includes any federal enclave, reservation, or land

within the geographical limits of the State.

(e) Legislative intent. — It is the intention of the General

Assembly to extend the personal jurisdiction and venue of

courts of the State and the power to serve process of those

courts to any person on federal enclaves, reservations, or

lands within the State to the fullest extent permitted by the

Constitution and laws of the United States.

(f) Termination of jurisdiction. — The jurisdiction of the

United States over land acquired by it shall continue only

so long as the United States owns, leases, or occupies the

land.

Md. Code (1989), Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 6-102

(a) Basis of personal jurisdiction. — A court may exercise

personal jurisdiction as to any cause of action over a person

domiciled in, served with process in, organized under the laws

of, or who maintains his principal place of business in the

State.

(b) Exercise of jurisdiction on other basis. — This section

does not limit any other basis of personal jurisdiction of a

court of the State.

Md. Code (1989). Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 6-103

(a) Condition. — If jurisdiction over a person is based sole-

ly upon this section, he may be sued only on a cause of ac-

tion arising from any act enumerated in this section.

(b) Jn general. — A court may exercise personal jurisdiction

over a person, who directly or by an agent:

ld

2d

(1) Transacts any business or performs any

character of work or service in the State;

(2) Contracts to supply goods, food, services, or

manufactured products in the State;

(3) Causes tortious injury in the State by an act or

omission in the State;

(4) Causes tortious injury in the State or outside of

the State by an act or omission outside the State

if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in

any other persistent course of conduct in the State

or derives substantial revenue from goods, food, ser-

vices, or manufactured products used or consumed

in the State;

(5) Has an interest in, uses, or possesses real pro-

perty in the State; or

(6) Contracts to insure or act as surety for, or on,

any person, property, risk, contract, obligation, or

agreement located, executed, or to be performed

within the State at the time the contract is made,

unless the parties otherwise provide in writing.

Maryland Code (1984 & 1992 supp.), State Government

§ 14-102

(a) Jn general. — With respect to land that the United States

or any of its units leases or otherwise holds in the State, the

State reserves jurisdiction and authority over the land and

over persons, property, and transactions on the land to the

fullest extent permitted by the United States Constitution

and that is not inconsistent with the governmental purpose

for which the land is held.

(b) Previous grants. — This section does not affect the

jurisdiction and authority of the State over land or persons,

property, and transactions on land that the United States

or its unit has acquired on or before May 31, 1943, to the

extent that the State ceded jurisdiction under:

* * *

(4) Chapter 743, $§ 2 and 3, of the Acts of the

General Assembly of 1906[.]

* * *