Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District v. United States
Supreme Court brief1993
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
1993 Term
\
LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY
METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT
PETITIONER
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL
RESPONDENT
On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
LAURENCE J. ZIELKE
PEDLEY, ROSS, ZIELKE
GORDINIER & PORTER
1150 STARKS BUILDING
Louisville, KY 40202
(502) 589-4600
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
DOES THE UNITED STATES' ENTRY INTO A
CONSENT DECREE WHICH STAYS
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL LAW BAR THE
UNITED STATES FROM FURTHER
ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE
SAME LAW UNTIL THE PURPOSES OF THE
CONSENT DECREE HAVE BEEN MET.
PARTIES
Petitioner:
Louisville and Jefferson County
Metropolitan Sewer District
400 South Sixth Street
Louisville, KY 40202
li
Respondents:
The United States of America
Office of the United States
Attorney
10th Floor, 501 West Broadway
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
City of Louisville
Department of Law
Room 200, City Hall
601 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Cabinet for Financial Resources
and Environmental Protection
Law Department
Fifth Floor, Capital Plaza Tower
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
111
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. . 1
FARSAbO@ © + he 6 6 se eh hlUuhlUhlUhhUh hhh hlUr 11
SABLE OF CUBTENS@ «© 6 © © © © &@ 6 lV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...... . Vv
I. REPORTS AND OPINIONS OF
OTHER COURTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES . 1
Il. JURISDICTION ... 4
ct. APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
PROVISIGONGS «© «© © © « «& » 4
V. STATEMENT OF CASE... . 5
V. BASIS FOR ALLOWANCE OF
tem WRB 20+ el ltltlktl ll 15
Vi. CONCLUSION 22
lv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cited:
ITT Continental Baking Co.,
420 U.S. 223, 95 S.Ct. 926,
43 L.Ed.2a@ 148 (1975) ........ 16
Keith v. Volpe,
784 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1986) .... 17
Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland,
478 U.S. 501, 106 &.Ct. 3063,
92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986)
=
VU
Pasadena City Board of Education Vv.
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 96 S.Ct. 2697,
49 L.E@.2d@ S99 (1976) . » «© «© «= «© «© « Ad
United States v. Armour & Co,
402 U.S. 6732, Ba S.tCe. ifsd,
29 L.Be.2@ 256 (197i) «©§ «© «© © «© © « st 616
United States v. Rogers,
960 F2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1992) .... 19
Williams v. Vukovich,
720 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1983) i «ee eee
Statutes:
>
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)
"6 0.9.0. © U0 «nk ene ee eh * OO
33. U.S.C. $1251, ot eee... . 4, 3, 7
So Uses Bbaae «6 6) 6) 6 iw se 4 Ss Be *
REPORTS AND OPINIONS OF OTHER COURTS
AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Order entered by Chief Judge Thomas
A. Ballantine, Jr., of the United
States District Court for the
Western District ‘of Kentucky at
Louisville in the matter of the
United States of America and City of
Louisville Vv. Louisville and
Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer
District, Civil Action No. C 78-
0130-L(B), entered July 3, 1991.
Memorandum entered by Chief Judge,
Thomas A. Ballantine, Jr., of the
United States District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky at
Louisville in the matter of the
United States of America and City of
Louisville Vv. Louisville and
Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer
District, Civil Action No. C 78-
WwW
>
0130-L(B), entered November 8, 1991.
Order entered by Chief Judge, Thomas
A. Ballantine, Jr., of the United
States District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky at
Louisville in the matter of the
United States of America and City of
Louisville Vv. Louisville and
Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer
District, Civil Action No. C 78-
0130-L(B), entered November 8, 1991.
Mandate entered by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit on appeal from the United
States District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky in the
matter of the United States of
America and City of Louisville v.
Louisville and Jefferson County
Metropolitan Sewer District and
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Civil
Action No. 91-6461, entered January
12, 1993.
Entered as Mandate March 23, 1993.
Order denying Petition for Rehearing
and Rehearing En Banc entered by the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit in the matter of
the United States of America and
City of Louisville v. Louisville and
Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer
District and Commonwealth of
Kentucky, Civil Action No. 91-6461,
entered March 12, 1993.
II. JURISDICTION
A final and appealable decree was
entered by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on January
12, 1993. An Order denying the Petition
for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc was
entered on March 12, 1993. The decree
was issued as a Mandate on March 23,
1993.
Jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court is invoked pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1).
III. APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY
AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS.
33 U.S.C. §1251, et. seg.
33 U.S.C. §14329.
IV. STATEMENT OF CASE
This case involves a Consent Decree
entered in 1981 which suspended
enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 3
U.S.C. §1251 et seq; and 33 U.S.C. §1319
against the Louisville and Jefferson
County Metropolitan Sewer District until
construction defects in the Morris Forman
Wastewater Treatment Plant were
corrected. Under the Consent Decree, the
Environmental Protection Agency was
required to timely review, approve, and
then fund all remedial work necessary to
correct the defects so that the Morris
Forman Wastewater Treatment Plant could
treat effluent within its permit limit
it the plant's design capacit f
million gallons per day 105 mgd he
Environmental Protection Agency “EPA”
arbitrarily delayed approval of the last
corrective action needed for over four
(4) years and then moved the District
Court to terminate the Consent Decree.
The EPA knew that the purpose of the
Consent Decree was to rectify the defects
in the Treatment Plant to allow it to
treat effluent at its design capacity of
105 mgd. The EPA knew that the last
remedial work, approved by the EPA, was
no yet completed and would not be
completed until 1995 due to the delay in
approval by the EPA. The EPA knew that,
until that remedial work was completed,
the Treatment Plant could not meet
effluent standards, thereby subjecting
MSD to enforcement actions for
inpreventable violations. The District
-OUrt terminated the Consent Decree at
the request of the United States
[The Louisville and Jefferson County
Metropolitan Sewer District ("MSD") is a
political subdivision of the Commonwealth
of Kentucky, responsible for providing
Sanitary sewer collection and treatment
for Jefferson County, Kentucky. In the
1970's, MSD, with EPA approval and
funding, contracted for the design and
construction of the 105 mgd Morris Forman
Waste Water Treatment Plant ("Treatment
Plant"). Unfortunately due to defective
design and construction, the Treatment
Plant was not able to treat effluent
within the limits set by the permit
issued by the EPA, even at a volume
substantially less than 105 mgd.
On or about April 7, 1978, EPA filed
a Complaint in the ited States District
Court for the Western District of
Kentucky against MSD and the Commonwealth
of Kentucky under 33 U.S.C. § 1319 of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq.
The City of Louisville, Kentucky,
intervened in the action.
Extensive negotiations ensued to
resolve the litigation and to diagnose
the cause of the failure of the Treatment
Plant to meet permit limitations. In an
effort to determine the measures that MSD
Should take to correct the problems, the
EPA created a review team. The review
team's inspection and analysis of the
Treatment Plant resulted in a EPA report
dated October 31, 1980 which set forth
The recommendations of the review team.
These recommendations formed the basis
for the Memorandum of Understanding
between the parties which was
subsequently incorporated into the
consent Decree. Under the Consent
Decree, MSD was to undertake two steps to
bring the Treatment Plant into compliance
with its permit. First MSD was to
conduct an "Interim Corrective Action
Program" to make limited corrective
improvements to the Treatment Plant.
Secondly MSD was to perform an evaluation
to determine whether or not additional
remedial work was required to fully
rectify the defects in the Treatment
Plant. If the Treatment Plant could not
achieve compliance with applicable
effluent limitations without additional
improvements, MSD was to submit a "Final
Plan and Schedule" detailing the
additional remedial work required to
achieve compliance with the applicable
effluent limitations at design capacity.
The EPA agreed to timely review and
approve all necessary remedial work
Submitted under the Final Plan and
Schedule to correct the defects. The EPA
also agreed to suspend enforcement of the
Clean Water Act until all remedial
9
actions were taken. Once the Final Plan
and Schedule was approved by the EPA, MSD
was required to carry out the Final Plan
and Schedule to bring the Treatment Plant
into compliance.
MSD proceeded to undertake the
actions required by the Consent Decree
and completed the Interim Corrective
Action Program and the Evaluation Program
as scheduled. MSD submitted its Final
Plan and Schedule to the EPA in 1984.
MSD's evaluation revealed that an
additional UNOX reactor, also referred to
aS Battery D, was needed to achieve
compliance at design capacity. The EPA
arbitrarily and without basis disagreed
with the necessity of this item.
Furthermore, it unnecessarily delayed
approving the Final Plan and Schedule for
over four years, thereby delaying MSD's
ability to correct the defects. Finally
in 1988, the EPA approved the Final Plan
and Schedule including the additional
UNOX reactor. (It should be noted that
the majority opinion of the 2-1 panel
erroneously states that approval came
after the EPA sought to terminate the
Consent Decree).
Shortly after approving the Final
Plan and Schedule, the EPA contacted MSD,
seeking to terminate the Consent Decree
by agreement. This contact was made
despite the fact that the remedial work
contained in the Final Plan and Schedule
had not yet been approved, funded, and
constructed as required by the Consent
Decree. Furthermore, EPA's delay in
approving the remedial work, which was in
breach of its duties under the Consent
Decree, also delayed the completion of
the remedial work.
The EPA unilaterally decided to
11
ee eee el alee een een eS
change the purpose of the Consent Decree
to only achieve compliance with effluent
limitations at a level less than the
plant's design capacity of 105 mgd. This
was because the Treatment Plant had met
effluent limitations at a volume less
than 105 mgd for a period of three (3)
years. The lower volume was due to two
(2) factors: (1) an unfortunate
explosion which destroyed a substantial
portion of the_ systen, and (2) a
reduction in industrial waste. Those
factors coupled with the limited
corrective actions taken under’ the
Consent ecree resulted in compliance.
Compliance was never achieved at normal
levels, nor at design capacity.
The EPA moved for termination of the
Consent Decree based on false assertions
that temporary compliance fulfilled the
purposes of the Consent Decree. MSD
l2
opposed that Motion for the reason that
all remedial work was not yet completed.
It was only in 1989, the EPA finally
authorized a grant to MSD through the
Commonwealth of Kentucky for the
construction of UNOX towers as provided
for by the Final Plan and Schedule.
Later, MSD proposed to construct
Bioroughing Towers in lieu of the
additional capacity to the UNOX reactors
that would be provided by Battery D.
That construction was subsequently
approved, has been funded, and is now
under construction, with completions
scheduled for 1995.
The Bioroughing Towers are the final
phase of the work to be done under the
Final Plan and Schedule of the Consent
Decree. Once the Bioroughing Towers are
completed, MSD should be able to treat
105 mgd within the effluent limitations
i3
imposed by the EPA-issued discharge
permit. Had the EPA not wrongfully
delayed approving the Final Plan and
Schedule, the work would have been
completed by now.
Furthermore, during the construction
phase of the Bioroughing Towers, the
effluent limits will be increasingly
exceeded, as all of the parties were
aware. Despite that knowledge, the EPA
moved for termination of the Consent
Decree.
On July 3, 1991, the District Court
entered an Order terminating the Consent
Decree. MSD and the City of Louisville
moved for reconsideration. On November
8, 1991, the District Court issued a
Memorandum and a final appealable Order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by MSD and the City of Louisville.
Notice of Appeal was timely filed and an
14
appeal taken to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit under 28
U.S.C. § A2Pa«
On January 12, 1993, the Sixth
Circuit, in a 2-1 opinion, affirmed the
District Court's Order. On March 12,
1993, an order was entered denying MSD's
Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for
Rehearing En Banc. On March 23, 1993,
the opinion was issued as a mandate.
Vv. BASIS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT
The District Court erred in
terminating the Consent Decree before
compliance with the Clean Water Act was
achieved.
The issues in this Petition focus on
the interpretation to be given the
Consent Decree entered by the District
Court on November 24, 1981. The question
is whether or not all the conditions of
the Consent Decree were fulfilled,
15
thereby justifying its termination.
The Court has stated that because
the terms of Consent Decree arrived
through the mutual consent of the
parties, they closely resemble contracts
and may provide for broad relief or terms
than could have been awarded at trial.
Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478
U.S. 501, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405
(1986).
When construing a Consent Decree,
you may rely upon certain aids to
construction, including the circumstances
Surrounding the formation of the Decree
and any documents incorporated into the
Decree, without violation of the "four
corners" rule of United States v _Armour
& Co, 402 U.S. 673, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 29
L.Ed.2d 256 (1971). ITT Continental
Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 95 S.Ct. 926,
43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975).
16
Furthermore a Decree must be
strictly construed to preserve the
bargained for position of the parties,
Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909 (6th
Cir. 1983). Consideration must be given
to the original expectations of the
parties. Keith v. Volpe, 784 F.2d 1457
(9th Cir. 1986). Any vague or confusing
language should be interpreted in a way
that implements the purposes of the
Decree. Pasadena City Board of Education
Vv. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 96 S.Ct. 2697,
49 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976).
The Consent Decree entered in this
action, does not specifically describe
all the corrective work to be done to
accomplish the purpose of the Consent
Decree, thereby allowing the Consent
Decree to be terminated. The Consent
Decree set forth certain specific
corrective actions to be taken and
ae
required an evaluation to determine what
additional remedial work would be needed
to bring the Treatment Plant into
compliance with the effluent limits of
the EPA issued permit at the design
capacity of 105 mgd. That additional
corrective construction was, and is, the
Bioroughing Towers.
The corrective construction was
submitted by MSD with the Final Plan and
Schedule which was approved by the EPA in
1988. Therefore, it is clear that the
Consent Decree contemplated the
construction of remedial construction
Such as the Bioroughing Towers. The
Consent Decree further contemplated that
it would remain in effect until that
construction was completed. The EPA
Specifically agreed to suspend
enforcement of the Clean Water Act until
Such time as all corrective actions were
18
taken. That element of the Consent
ecree had a res judicata / estoppel
effect on all enforcement actions while
the decree was in effect. United States
Rogers, 960 F2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1992).
It allowed MSD to focus its energy on
ow
‘ectifying the defects in the Treatment
Plant as quickly as possible, so that
compliance with t Clean Water Act coul
be achieved. By term: ating the Consent
Decree before all the defects were
corrected, the United States can ignore
its agreement to not bring any
enforcement action until the defects are
corrected.
This situation 1s analogous to a
defective dam. Suppose a dam was F-ing
constructed to protect a town from a 100
cuments germane to this are under
seal with the Sixth Circuit.
19
year flood. Suppose further that there
was a Dam Protection Agency ("DPA") which
1andated that the Dam owner provide flood
protection to the town. But it is
rmined that the dam that was
constructed was defective and unable to
even protect against a 10 year flood.
herefore a corrective action plan is
required by the DPA to correct the
problem. At some point, the dam is
sufficiently high to protect against a 10
year flood, but not yet high enough to
protect against the 100 year flood. The
DPA decided that since there have been no
floods over the past few years, the dam
lS in compliance and no further work is
needed. But a 100 year flood has not yet
Struck. If it does there will be a
flood. oa
Like the Dam Protective Agency, the
OF
ct
O
EPA has stated that MSD had compliec
Se ET
the Consent Decree because the Treatment
Plant was able to stay within its
effluent limits during the three (3) year
period. But that compliance was due to
the Treatment Plant not yet receiving
effluent in the volume it was designed to
receive: 105 mgd.
The Consent Decree was a contract
between EPA and MSD. MSD bargained to
rectify the defects of the Treatment
Plant without threat of penalties while
So doing; and get what it had contracted
for: a treatment plant that would treat
105 mgd of effluent within MSD's permit
limits. The EPA review team made
recommendations to achieve that goal.
The EPA agreed to suspend enforcement of
the Clean Water Act until the repairs
were completed. The EPA should not have
been permitted to prematurely terminate
the Consent Decree before all the
21
corrective work has been completed,
Simply because its own purposes may have
been satisfied. As stated by Chief Judge
Merritt in his well-reasoned dissent, "It
maybe administratively more convenient
for EPA to have the agreement terminated
now. It may be unfair to some cities
which have no comparable agreement to
require them to pay penalties when they
fail to meet effluent limitations. It
may be that EPA made a bad deal when it
Signed this Consent Decree. But none of
these are reasons which justify
termination of the settlement agreement."
Merritt Dissent, Appendix D at page 27.
Perhaps the benefits to MSD did go
beyond that which would have been
achieved at trial. But such relief is
permitted. Local 93, supra, at 525.
VI. CONCLUSION
The District Court erred in
22
terminating the Consent Decree before the
defects in the Treatment Plant were fully
corrected by the construction of the
Bioroughing Towers. The District Court
and the Court of Appeals 2-1 majority
opinion misinterpreted the portions of
the Consent Decree which called for
construction of additional corrective
measures deemed necessary to bring the
plant in compliance under the Final Plan
and Schedule. That additional work was
submitted with the Final Plan and
Schedule, which was approved by the EPA,
and now construction has begun on those
measures. The Consent Decree should not
have been terminated until those measures
are completed. The EPA should not now be
allowed to institute enforcement actions
under the same federal law for the same
problem which resulted in the Consent
Decree, when the defects are not yet
23
rectified. This is especially true where
the delay in achieving compliance is
solely due to the inexcusable delay of
the EPA in approving the Final Plan and
Schedule. The Courts should not allow
the EPA to terminate this Consent Decree
for that purpose.
Wherefore, for the foregoing
reasons, Louisville and Jefferson County
Metropolitan Sewer District respectfully
Petitions the United States Supreme Court
for a Writ of Certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
Ci
LAURENCE J. on a,
PEDLEY ROSS ZIELKE & GORDINIER
1150 Starks Building
455 South Fourth Avenue
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
(502) 589-4600
Counsel for Petitioner
Nh
>
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff
and
CITY OF LOUISVILLE
Intervenor Plaintiff
Vv. No. C 78-0130-L(B)
LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY
METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT, et al.
Defendants
O R DE R
This matter has come before the
Court on the Motion of the United States
of America to terminate the Consent
Decree. entered in this action and the
motion of the Louisville and Jefferson
County Metropolitan Sewer District to
amend the Consent Decree to terminate in
the future. The Court has reviewed the
parties' memoranda and is sufficiently
advised and therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that the defendants
have fully complied with all provisions
of the Consent Decree and it is the
judgment of the Court that the Consent
Decree is terminated as of the date of
this Order.
This 3rd day of July, 1991.
THOMAS A. BALLANTINE, JR.
Chief Judge, U. S. District
Court
Copies to counsel
Entered July 3, 199]
N
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff
and
CITY OF LOUISVILLE
Intervening Plaintiff
Vv. No. C 78-0130-L(B)
LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY
METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT and
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Defendants
O R DE R
For the reasons set forth in the
memorandum filed this date,
IT IS ORDERED that the motions of
the defendant, Louisville and Jefferson
County Metropolitan Sewer District and
the intervening plaintiff, City of
Louisville, for reconsideration of the
Court's Order of July 3, 1991 be and it
hereby is denied.
ce naaeneeeeeeenee ee et
This a final order.
This 8th day of November, 1991.
THOMAS A.
BALLANTINE, JR.
Chief Judge, U. S. District
Court
Copies to counsel
Entered Nov 9 1991
Nh
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff
CITY OF LOUISVILLE
Intervening Plaintiff
Vv. No. C 78-0130-L(B)
LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY
METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT and
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Defendants
MEMORANDUM
This matter is before the Court on
the motions of the defendant, Louisville
and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer
District (MSD), and the intervening
plaintiff, City of Louisville (City), for
reconsideration of the Court's Order of
July » 199] terminating a Consent
Decree. The Consent Decree was entered
as a final judgment on November 24, 1981.
The Environmental Protection Agency
Ua ENE ESI SSE EERE SEnE REE
(EPA) brought this action in April, 1978,
seeking civil penalties against MSD for
violations of effluent limits imposed by
National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) Permit No. KY 0022411 at
the Morris Forman Wastewater Treatment
Plant (MFWTP). Title 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
The NPDES permit had been issued to MFWTP
in 1977 pursuant to the provisions of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the
Clean Water Act).' waves 33 U.S.C.
Sections 1251 et seq. Prior to the
execution of the Consent Decree, the EPA
and MSD entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) in which the parties
stated their intention to resolve the
litigation and discussed the provisions
Subsequently embodied in the Consent
NPDES permits are valid for no more
than five years.
N
Decree.
MSD stipulated that it had violated
the permit. The Consent Decree provided
that MSD would initiate an Interim
Corrective Action Program (ICAP) and an
Evaluation Program (EP) as the first
steps of a “phased approach" to bring
MFWTP into compliance with “applicable
effluent limitations." Pursuant to those
programs MSD was to implement limited
improvements to the MFWTP and evaluate
the operation of the facility, using
certain tests outlined in Appendix A to
the Consent Decree. MSD was to submit to
EPA written notification of each
corrective action indicated as necessary
during the evaluation period and state
whether the action constituted a major
modification, a minor modification or an
operational improvement. MSD was also to
submit a "final design report identifying
the performance improvements of minor
modifications and operational
improvements, and the cost effectiveness
of major physical modifications that may
improve the performance of the final
settling tanks," along with a summary
report of the test results. Similarly,
MSD was to initiate and complete a
performance test of the oxygen
dissolution capacity of the UNOX reactors
and equipment and submit a summary report
along with recommendations for "any
required structural/equipment
modifications." After completion of the
ICAP and the EP, MSD was to complete a
cost effectiveness analysis of any major
modifications and then submit a Finai
Plan and Schedule (FP&S) "for achieving
compliance with all applicable effluent
limitations" to the EPA for its approval.
According to the terms of the Consent
Decree, MSD was to carry out the FP&S
only after its approval by EPA.
Section V of the Consent Decree
providing for MSD's interim
compliance states in pertinent part:
(B) The parties recognize that MSD's
current NPDES permit is scheduled to
expire on June 30, 1982. It is the
intent of the parties that in the
NPDES permit renewal process for the
(MFWTP}]} the terms of this Consent
Decree shall be taken into account
and that, to the extent permitted by
law, the [EPA] shall propose a
renewed permit, the terms of which
are not inconsistent with those of
this Decree.?*
Section VII provides:
The parties have agreed that certain
elements of the current Corrective
Action Program at eligible for
federal funding under the provisions
of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, as amended; that they
disagree as to the eligibility of
other elements of the program and
¢ MFWTP's permit was renewed and the
renewed permit expired in 1987. As of
1990, MSD was still operating under the
expired permit.
————— an
that these elements will be the
subject of an appeal as provided for
under Subpart J, Part 30 of Title 40
of the Code of Federal Regulations;
and that other elements of the
program will be eligible for federal
funding if they are found to be
necessary under the Interim
Corrective Action and Evaluation
Program
5 The MOU’ separated into four
categories the items in MSD's Revised
Corrective Action Program for which
funding was sought. The UNOX reactor was
included in Category C:
"Those items which EPA believes to
be grant eligible, but for which EPA
questions the necessity pending the
evaluations noted above in Section
III. The parties agree that should
the evaluations indicate that these
items are necessary to meet
applicable effluent limitations, EPA
will fund them promptly, contingent
6
Fina -y, the Consent Decree provides
chat the -ourt will retain jurisdiction
"for such further orders as may be
necessary or appropriate for the
construction or implementation of this
Decree or for the enforcement or
compliance therewith" and that the
Decree "shall terminate upon application
of the parties."
On June 10, 1983, MSD submitted the
FP&S to EPA for approval and funding.
The FP&S provided for the addition of a
UNOX Battery ("Battery D" or "UNOX") to
the MFWTP. In March, 1985, EPA informed
MSD that it "was not convinced" of the
necessity for Battery D and that its
eligibility would not be onsidered
"unless its need is demonstrated after
upon the availability of federal
funds."
~
m BEST AVAILAE
other phases are completed." In
response, MSD retained Camp, Dresser &
McKee, Inc. (CDM), specialists in sewer
plant design, construction and operation
to evaluate the need for Battery D. In
June, 1985, CDM's report, supporting
MSD's position, was submitted to EPA. In
August, 1985, EPA notified MSD that it
had "considerable doubt" as to the
necessity of Battery D and that it
believed compliance with effluent limits
could be met with the items already
funded. However, EPA added that it might
reconsider its decision if the funded
items did not bring MFWTP in compliance.
In November, 1988, while the renewed
NPDES permit was still in effect for
MFWTP, MSD received a letter from the EPA
stating:
(T]he Final Plan and Schedule (FPS)
developed under Grant No. C210553-03
was conditionally accepted by EPA,
COPY
but never officially approved :
Since EPA's initial receipt and
review of the FPS, the proposed
option to increase the capacity of
unit processes in the plant has been
implemented in accordance with EPA
comments. The implemented plan is
providing wastewater treatment in
accordance with the limits of the
NPDES’ permit. Therefore, this
letter constitutes EPA approval of
the Final Plan and Schedule.
Only July 20, 1989, Russell Wright, an
EPA representative, contacted William
Gatewood, Manager of the Construction
Grants Branch of the Division of Water
for the Kentucky Department of Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet (KNREPC). Wright informed
Gatewood of a June 29th meeting with MSD
in which the EPA and the _ Kentucky
Division of Water agreed to MSD's request
for a “reevaluation of their proposed
project of adding another unox
oxygenation battery, known as Battery D,
to their existing plant."
—————— — ne
+
(Emphasis added).”
On November 6, 1989, MSD contacted
KNREPC to set up a time to discuss issues
related to "remaining aspects of the
Final Plan and Schedule Construction
Projects," including Battery D. In the
letter, MSD stated that all necessary
improvements to the MFWTP had been
implemented or were currently under
construction except for Battery D. MSD
During this time, EPA was
delegating responsibility for wastewater
regulations to the State and a new
discharge permit had been proposed for
MFWTP by KNREPC. The proposed permit
contained stricter effluent limitations.
MSD asserted to KNREPC that it would not
be able to meet the more stringent
standards in the proposed permit without
the addition of Battery D.
10
d 7
i cn
also noted that MSD's service area was
expanding, "additional sludge flows were
not included or anticipated in the
development of the FP&S" and that the
proposed NPDES permit "includes
additional effluent criteria" not
provided for or anticipated in the FP&S.
On July 17, 1990, the United States,
on behalf of the EPA and joined by the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, filed a motion
to terminate the Consent Decree on the
basis of MSD's compliance with its NPDES
permit from 1986 through 1990. On August
17, 1990, MSD submitted to KNREPC for
approval a design for bioroughing towers
to be constructed at MFWTP in lieu of
Battery D and on October 1, 1990, EPA
notified MSD that a federal grant for the
bioroughing towers had been approved. On
July 3, 1991, this Court terminated the
Consent Decree, finding that the
11
underlying purpose of the Decree had been
satisfied.
The parties agree that a Consent
Decree must remain in effect so long as
its continued enforcement is necessary to
effectuate its purposes. The purpose of
the Consent Decree in the case at hand
was to bring MFWTP into compliance with
the law. The parties' argument over
"The authority of a federal
district court to adopt a consent decree
comes only from the statute which the
decree is intended to enforce. If there
is a 'purpose' to be effectuated, it is
the purpose of the statute pursuant to
which the government seeks relief.
Within that framework the parties strike
their bargain." United States v. Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Assoc. of the
United States, 643. F.2d 644, 650 (9th
12
when the Consent Decree may properly
terminate stems from conflicting
interpretations of critical terms of the
Decree. MSD argues that all the work
identified in the FP&S has not been
completed and therefore, the Consent
Decree may not be terminated. The United
States argue that MFWTP's compliance with
effluent limitations at any stage of
major modifications, set forth in the
FP&S and approved by | EPA, required
termination of the Consent Decree.
Consent decrees have been recognized
as having attributes of both contracts
and judicial acts. United States v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236
n. LO, 37> SeCEe 926, 934 Nn. 10, 4
L.Ed.2d 148 (1975); United States v.
Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82, 91
13
——————
~~
Y
—
,
Y
i
S.C. , 29 L.Ed.2dad 256 (1971).
Principles of contract law are used for
purposes of interpreting the meaning of a
consent decree. Only when the language
of a consent decree is not clear on its
face, have courts been forced to resort
to equituble considerations to define the
limits of a consent decree. Chrysler
Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 62
S.Ct 1146, 86 L.Ed. 1668 (1942).
We find that the language of the
decree is quite clear and that its
purposes have been accomplished.
Appendix A of the Consent Decree
provides for MSD to undertake a series of
interim steps to determine whether
limited improvements would bring about
compliance with "applicable effluent
limitations." A cost effectiveness
analysis of suggested major plant
modifications was to be implemented in
the event that the interim steps did not
result in compliance and only then was
the FP&S to be developed by MSD. Nothing
in the language of the Consent Decree or
the Memorandum of Understanding compels
the conclusion that the EPA was required
to approve the entire FP&S as initially
submitted by MSD. It appears from the
face of the Consent Decree that MSD's
requirement to implement any of the FP&S
was contingent on EPA's approval of any
part of the FP&S. The record shows that
MSD formally approved the FP&S and found
MSD to be in compliance with "applicable
effluent limitations" in November of
1988. MSD does not deny that it was in
compliance with the renewed NPDES permit
in November of 1988 and it had been in
compliance until 1990. Therefore, the
duties of EPA and MSD under the terms of
the Consent Decree ended as of November,
15
1988. The July 20th, 1989, letter to
KNREPC from the EPA does not suggest that
the EPA changed its position as to the
requirements of the Consent Decree.
In addition, Section V of the
Consent Decree contemplates that the
"applicable effluent limitations"
referred to throughout the Consent Decree
are those limitations imposed by the
NPDES permit issued in 1977 and the
renewed permit which expired in 1987.
MSD requested approval of Battery D from
the KNREPC based on a projected increase
in effluent flow and the heightened
requirements of a proposed NPDES permit.
The City and MSD argue that the
Consent Decree may only be terminated on
the agreement of all parties and
therefore, the Court did not have
jurisdiction to terminate the Consent
Decree.
Section XII provides: "This Decree
shall terminate upon application of the
parties." This provision simply allows
the parties to terminate the Decree by
agreement; it does not divest the Court
of jurisdiction to end the Decree upon
the motion of any party and a finding
that the purposes of the Decree have been
fulfilled.
An appropriate order has been
entered this 8th day of November, 991.
THOMAS A. BALLANTINE, JR.
Chief Judge, U.S. District
Court
ct
O
Copies counsel
Entered Nov 8, 1991
a
NO. 91-6461
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
JAN 12 1993
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
CITY OF LOUISVILLE,
Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee,
On Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Western District
of Kentucky
LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY
METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT
Defendant-Appellant,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
Defendant-Appellee
/
Before: MERRITT, Chief Judge; and
GUY and RYAN, Circuit Judges.
Ralph BB. Guy, Js, Circuit Judge.
Defendant, Metropolitan Sewer District,
appeals the district coure*s order
terminating a 1981 consent decree. On
appeal, defendant argues that the purpose
of the consent decree has not. been
achieved and therefore the court should
not have terminated the decree. We agree
with the district court that the purpose
of the consent decree has been
accomplished and therefore affirm.
I.
Louisville and Jefferson County
Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD) was
created pursuant to enactments of the
Kentucky Legislature, Ky. Rev. Stat. §
76.010, to develop and operate a sanitary
and storm sewer system in Jefferson
County, Kentucky. In the late 1970s,
defendant contracted with Blount Brothers
to build the Morris-Foreman Waste Water
Treatment Plant (MFWTP), which was
completed in 1974. The design plans,
approved by the Environmental Protection
Agency, anticipated sewage flow of 105
million gallons per day. MFWTP was
issued a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit by the
EPA in 1977 pursuant to applicable
provisions of the Clean Water Act. This
permit required MSD to meet specific
effluent limitations for biochemical
oxygen demand (BOD) and total suspended
solids (TSS). Unfortunately, substantial
defects in design caused the plant's
effluent to exceed its permit limits.
Major litigation ensued between MSD and
Blount Brothers, resulting in a multi-
million dollar settlement. However, MSD
was still faced with a plant that was not
complying with its permit requirements.
In April 1978, the EPA brought an
enforcement action against MSD for
violating the plant's permit. MSD faced
Civil penalties of $10,000 per day for
violating its permit. a2. 2s, §
1319(d) (1986). Over the next two years,
the parties came to an agreement,
memorialized in a "Memorandum of
Understanding," and entered into a
consent decree. According to appendix A
of the consent’ decree, MSD was to
undertake two steps to bring the plant
into compliance with its permit. MSD was
to conduct an "Interim Corrective Action
Program" to ascertain if limited
improvements to the plant could bring
about compliance with applicable effluent
limitations and an "Evaluation Program"
to determine the relative feasibility and
economic efficiency of alternative
improvements. If these steps showed that
the MFWTP could not achieve compliance
with applicable effluent limitations
without major physical modifications,
then MSD was to submit a "Final Plan and
Schedule" detailing the major physical
modifications and equipment modification
required. According to the consent
decree, "{u]pon approval by EPA Region
IV, MSD shall carry out that Final Plan
and Schedule." (App.62). The agreement
also established those items EPA would
fund and would not fund, those items the
parties disagreed on funding, and those
items the EPA felt were eligible for
funding but would not approve unless
shown to be necessary. The consent
decree provided:
Although § 1319(d) of 33 U.S.C.
provides that penalties may be
sought for violation of applicable
effluent limitations, EPA has
elected not to seek such penalties
in this instance in light of MSD's
substantial efforts including both
studies and physical work to correct
the deficiencies which have
prevented MF WTP from achieving
applicable effluent limitations.
(App.54).
MSD proceeded to undertake the
actions required by the consent decree,
completing the Interim Corrective Action
Program and Evaluation Program. The
Final Plan and Schedule was submitted to
the EPA in 1984. One item MSD felt was
needed was an additional UNOX reactor,
also referred to as Battery D. The EPA
disagreed with the necessity of this
item. In 1985, the EPA approved the
Final Plan and Schedule, except for the
additional UNOX reactor.
While the various studies were being
conducted, events were changing the
volume and quality of the sewage coming
ints the plant. In 1981, a substantial
portion of MSD's sewer system was
destroyed by a series of explosions.
Additionally, industrial sewage began to
diminish in the area. Carl Neumayer, the
director of operations and maintenance of
MSD, stated in his affidavit:
————————
As a result of the decrease in
industrial sewage discharged into
MSD's system, coupled with the
Interim Corrective Actions
undertaken by MSD in compliance with
the Consent Decree, the quality of
MSD's discharge effluent began to
consistently meet the BOD and TSS
effluent limitations set forth in
MSD's EPA-issued discharge permit.
(App.116). The parties agree that, from
1986 until 1989 and for several months in
1990, the plant was meeting the permit
requirements. In July 1990, the EPA
moved for a termination of the consent
decree, "certif[{[ying] that the defendants
have fully complied with the provisions
of the Consent Decree." (App.64).
In the meantime, in 1989, MSD had
requested the EPA to re-evaluate the need
for the additional UNOX reactor that the
EPA omitted from its approval of the
Final Plan and Schedule. Under the Clean
Water Act, the EPA can give grants to
assist the construction of wastewater
treatment plants. 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g)
(1986 & Supp. 1992). But, under the
complex procedures for grants, the EPA
must wait until the state has certified a
project and has determined that the
project has priority over other works
within the state. 33 U.S.C. § 1284(a) (3)
(1986). On July 20, 1989, the EPA,
following the established procedures for
grants under the Clean Water Act,
authorized the Commonwealth of Kentucky
to review MSD's’ request for ae re-
evaluation of the need for the additional
UNOX reactor. On August 17, 1990, after
the EPA filed its motion for termination
of the consent decree, MSD submitted a
proposal for bioroughing towers, in lieu
of UNOX reactor, to the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, arguing it was required because
of additional sludge flows that were not
included or anticipated in the
development of the Final Plan. As Carl
Neumayer explained in his affidavit:
MSD has been consistently expanding
its sewer lines throughout Jefferson
County in compliance with the
mandate imposed by KRS 76.010 in
order to accommodate area
development, population expansion
and public health needs. In
addition, MSD has assumed
responsibility for treating sewage
previously treated by private
package sewage treatment plants so
as to eliminate discharge of
inadequately treated sewage into
Kentucky's waterways. In the last
several years industrial discharges
into MSD's sewer system have
increased. As a result, despite
MSD's application of its best
efforts, the MFWTP during
Significant portions of 1989 and
1990 has failed to achieve the
effluent limitations imposed by the
EPA-issued discharged permit.
(App. 116-17). Kentucky certified the
bioroughing towers on August 22
, 1990,
one month after the government sought to
terminate the consent decree. On October
1, 1990, the EPA approved funding for the
project. MSD projects the bioroughing
towers' completion date to be sometime in
On July 3, 1991, the district court
entered its order terminating the consent
decree. After MSD moved the court to
reconsider its order, the court entered
its final order terminating the consent
decree on November 8, 1991. MSD argued,
as it does on appeal, that until the
bioroughing towers are completed the
Final Plan and Scheduie has not been
carried out" because the UNOX reactor
(substituted with the bioroughing towers)
was in MSD's proposed Final Plan. In
it's memorandum, the court explained:
The parties agree that a
Consent Decree must remain in effect
o long as its continued enforcement
is necessary to effectuate its
purposes. The purpose of the
Consent Decree in the case at hand
was to bring MFWTP into compliance
with the law.’ The parties'
argument over when the Consent
Decree may properly terminate stems
from conflicting interpretations of
critical terms of the Decree. MSD
argues that all the work identified
in the FP&S has not been completed
and therefore, the Consent Decree
may not be terminated. The United
States argues that MFWTP's
compliance with effluent limitations
at any stage of major modifications,
set forth in the FP&S and approved
by EPA, require termination of the
Consent Decree.
Consent decrees have been
recognized as having attributes >-f
both contracts and judicial ac
United States v. ITT Continental
Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 n. 10,
95 $.Ct. 926, 934 A. 19, 43 bc BG. 2G
148 (1975); United States v. Armour
.* €o., 402 U.S. 673, GBi-G2, Fi
S.Ct. ivsa2., i@*a?, 29 tsa. 2a 29
(1971). Principles of contract law
are used for purposes of
interpreting the meaning of a
consent decree. Only when the
language of a consent decree is not
clear on its face, have courts been
forced to resort to equitable
considerations to define the limits
of a consent decree. Chrysler Corp.
v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 62
S.Ct. 1146, 86 L.Ed. 1668 (1942).
We find that the language of
the decree is quite clear ana that
its purposes have been accomplished.-
Appendix A of the Consent
Decree provides for MSD to undertake
a series of interim steps’ to
determine whether limited
improvements would bring about
compliance with "applicable effluent
11
limitations." A cost effectiveness
analysis of suggested major plant
modifications was to be implemented
in the event that the interim steps
did not result in compliance and
only then was the FP&S to be
developed by MSD. Nothing in the
language of the Consent Decree or
the Memorandum of Understanding
compels the conclusion that the EPA
was required to approve the entire
FP&S as initially submitted by MSD.
It appears from the face of the
Consent Decree that MSD's
requirement to implement any of the
FP&S was contingent on EPA's
approval of any part of the FP&S.
The record shows that MSD formally
approved the FP&S and found MSD to
be in compliance with "applicable
effluent limitations" in November of
1988. MSD does not deny that it was
in compliance with the renewed NPDES
permit in November of 1988 and it
had been in compliance until 1990.
Therefore, the duties of EPA and MSD
under the terms of the Consent
Decree ended as of November 1988.
The July 20th, 1989, letter to
KNREPC from the EPA does not suggest
that the EPA changed its position as
to the requirements of the Consent
Decree.
In addition, Section V of the
Consent Decree contemplates that the
"applicable effluent limitations"
referred to throughout the Consent
Decree are those limitations imposed
by the NPDES permit issued in 1977
and the renewed permit which expired
12
in 1987. MSD requested approval of
Battery D from the KNREPC based on a
projected increase in effluent flow
and the heightened requirements of a
proposed NPDES permit.
> "The authority of a federal
district court to adopt a consent
decree comes only from the statue
which the decree is intended to
enforce. If there is a ‘purpose* to
the effectuated, it is the purpose
of the statue pursuant to which the
government seeks relief. Within
that framework the parties strike
their bargain." United States v.
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assoc.
of the United States, 643 F.2d 644,
650 (9th Cir. 1981).
(App. 176-178) footnote 6 omitted).
II.
On appeal, defendants dispute the
government's assertion and the district
court's conclusion that the purpose of
the consent decree has been met. MSD
argues that the purpose of the consent
decree was to bring the MFWTP into
compliance with its permit limits while
~
LW
operating at its design capacity of 105
million gallons of sewage flow per day.
Defendant initially opposed the
entering of the consent decree, taking
“the position that the more appropriate
means of resolving the issues would be an
extension of its existing NPDES permit.
Or an administrative order." (App.
86). Thus, we confront the _ facial
anomaly, recognized by the district court
in its memorandum and order denying
defendant's request for a stay, issued
July 2, 1992, of a defendant arguing it
has not completed all the requirements of
the consent decree and therefore the
decree should not be terminated.
Normally, liability under the Clean Water
Act ls Strict, regardless of how
efficiently an individual operates a
plant. see United States _ v. Texas
Pipeline Co., 611 F.2d 345 (10th Cir.
4
>
1979). Through the consent decree,
defendant was allowed to avoid penalties
so long as it, in good faith, used its
best efforts to run the plant as
efficiently ; possible and take the
required tex in the consent decree.
Althouda! iant did consistently meet
its permit requirements for several years
in a _ row, it seeks to maintain the
protection from the potential $25,000 a
day in civil penalties until installation
and testing of the bioroughing towers is
completed. '
Defendant argues that the only
When this action was first brought,
the civil penalties were $10,000 per day.
The Clean Water Act has_ since been
amended to provide for civil penalties up
WwW
LA
WY
eC. §1L31i9 (4)
to $25,000 per day.
(Supp. 1992).
reason the plant was able to meet its
permit requirements for those years was
due to decrease in sewage flow and a
concurrent increase in the "quality" of
incoming sewage. MSD asserts that the
government's position taken to’ the
extreme is ludicrous: the plant could
have met the permit requirements from day
one by reducing its intake. However, MSD
fails to see the parallel in its
argument; taken to its extreme, MSD's
position is_' untenable. What if the
bioroughing towers fail to bring the
plant within its permit limits while
operating at the design capacity? Under
MSD's proposed analysis of the consent
decree, the purpose of the decree would
not be achieved, so it must remain in
force until additional measures are
taken.°
Presumably, in the interim, MSD
could continue to take on more and more
customers, thus making the effluent
requirements harder to attain.
The parties agree that the consent
decree should terminate when the purpose
of the decree has been fulfilled. They
differ significantly on what that purpose
‘... The "four corners" of a consent
‘"The whole purpose of the Consent
Yecree was to correct [the plant's]
defects. It follows that until all the
defects are corrected, the purpose of the
Consent Decree has not been met." (Def's
Brief at 16). To counteract the
extremity of their position, defendant,
in response to the government's motion to
terminate the consent decree, moved for
modification of the decree setting a date
certain for its termination.
~~
r?
decree are examined to determine its
scope. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 574 (1984). We
agree with the district court that the
purpose of the consent decree was to
bring the plant into compliance with the
law; indeed, its violation of the law is
wnat prompted the EPA to bring the
initial enforcement action. There is no
indication in the consent decree that
compliance while processing 105 million
gallons of sewage was required.
This conclusion is further bolstered
by an examination of the Clean Water
Act's purposes. A consent decree should
e construed against the background of
the statute under which the action was
brought. Las Vegas v. Clark County, 75
F.2d 697, 702 (9th Cir. 1985); United
states v. Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
650 (9th Cir. 1981). The Clean Water Act
does not contemplate compliance with
NPDES permits while operating at design
capacity; it requires compliance with
permits, period. If a plant must reduce
its sewage intake to comply, then that
step must be taken. Further, the NPDES
permits have a duration of five years, 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B) (1986), and, as a
general rule, Subsequent permits are
Supposed to be no less stringent than the
one before it. 33 UsB.C. § €23342) (0) (1)
(Supp. 1992). Through continued
enforcement of the consent decree, MSD is
seeking to be held to the effluent
limitations of a permit issued fifteen
years ago.
MSD argues that, because the
additional UNOX reactor was in MSD's
original Final Plan and Schedule and that
because the EPA eventually approved its
19
construction, MSD should be allowed to
complete it without the risk of civil
penalties. When the parties entered into
the consent decree, the additional UNOX
reactor was in the category of those
items that were eligible for funding but
would not be funded unless their
necessity was shown. It was not until
after the MFWTP has’ been meeting its
permit limits for several years that an
increase in sewage quantity caused the
EPA, through the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, to find the additional UNOX
reactor (substituted by the bioroughing
towers) necessary. The 1978 consent
decree's purpose was not to correct the
design problems of the MFWTP for future
increase sewage flow, but to correct the
problems SO that the then current
effluents met the permit limits. Indeed,
the EPA seemed correct in its evaluation
20
of the need for the additional UNOX
reactor. The modifications the EPA
approved without the UNOX reactor helped
the MFWTP to finally achieve its permit
limits, and to do so for several years.
Additionally, this litigation is
primarily between two institutions -- the
Environmental Protection Agency and the
Louisville and Jefferson County
Metropolitan Sewer District.?°
[C]onsent decrees which regulate
institutional conduct are
fundamentally different from consent
decrees between private parties. .
([Tj)hey affect more than the rights
of the immediate litigants. The
decrees reach beyond the parties
involved directly in the suit and
impact on the public's right to the
sound and efficient operation of its
“Also party to this litigation are
the Commonwealth of Kentucky, defendant
now aligned with the plaintiff, and the
City of Louisville, intervening
plaintiff.
a
ee
institutions.
Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1109
[oth ‘Cir. 1989). Considering’ the
public's interest in compliance with the
Clean Water Act, we are not prepared to
Say that a plant that was able to comply
with its required effluent limitations
for several years should now be allowed
to again violate its permit with impunity
while constructing new equipment. For 11
years, MSD has been allowed to use its
“best efforts" to fix the problems at the
plant without the fear of stiff civil
penalties, and for several years the
plant was able to comply with its permit.
As the district court recognized, the
purpose of the consent decree was
achieved.
AFFIRMED.
Filed 1/12/93
Issued as Mandate 3/23/93
No.92-6461
INITED STATES v. METROPOLITAN SEWER
DISTRICT
MERRITT, Chief Judge, dissenting.
The consent decree is a contract between
the government and the sewer district. I
disagree with the Court's holding that
"the purpose of the consent decree was
achieved" and that the decree should,
therefore, be terminated. The "effluent
limitations" were met for only a short
period at very low levels of iischarge.
The sewer district is now building two
oxygenation towers to correct the
problem. This work will cause part of
the plant to remain shut down until
completion. These additions are the type
of improvements contemplated in the
decree. The decree was entered to give
the sewer district a chance to make such
improvements. While this new
OES fae hr ed ~
construction is going on, the plant
cannot meet effluent limitations.
Although the agreement is more than a
decade old, -the plant cannot meet the
Standards in part because the EPA did not
authorize construction of the new towers
until 1990.
There is no suggestion in the” record
that the district has not done everything
it can under the consent decree to comply
with the effluent standards. The sewer
district advised EPA years ago that the
towers would be needed, but EPA
disapproved until two years ago. With
construction incomplete, why should the
decree end now? Why row subject the
district to another lawsuit and to
$25,000 a day in penalties. If the
district is breaching the decree, it
Should be required to comply, but there
lis no such clain. And
there is no claim that the plant has ever
met effluent limitations at its design
capacity or at its present levels of
effluent discharge.
It may be administratively more
convenient for EPA to have the agreement
terminated now. It may be unfair to some
cities which have no comparable agreement
to require them to pay penalties when
they fail to meet effluent limitations.
It may be that EPA made a bad deal when
it signed this consent decree. But none
of these are reasons which justify
termination of the settlement agreement.
The only reason the government gives as a
justification for seeking termination --
"the purpose of the decree has been
satisfied" --is simply not the case.
There may be other reasons to terminate
the agreement, but this one is a legal
fiction. It sets a bad precedent to
25
allow the contract to be set aside on
this basis. I would not simply defer to
the government in such matters of
contract construction and enforcement.
The government is, after all, a party to
the contract.
26
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.