Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District v. United States

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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

1993 Term

\

LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY

METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT

PETITIONER

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL

RESPONDENT

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

For the Sixth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LAURENCE J. ZIELKE

PEDLEY, ROSS, ZIELKE

GORDINIER & PORTER

1150 STARKS BUILDING

Louisville, KY 40202

(502) 589-4600

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

DOES THE UNITED STATES' ENTRY INTO A

CONSENT DECREE WHICH STAYS

ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL LAW BAR THE

UNITED STATES FROM FURTHER

ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE

SAME LAW UNTIL THE PURPOSES OF THE

CONSENT DECREE HAVE BEEN MET.

PARTIES

Petitioner:

Louisville and Jefferson County

Metropolitan Sewer District

400 South Sixth Street

Louisville, KY 40202

li

Respondents:

The United States of America

Office of the United States

Attorney

10th Floor, 501 West Broadway

Louisville, Kentucky 40202

City of Louisville

Department of Law

Room 200, City Hall

601 West Jefferson Street

Louisville, Kentucky 40202

Cabinet for Financial Resources

and Environmental Protection

Law Department

Fifth Floor, Capital Plaza Tower

Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. . 1

FARSAbO@ © + he 6 6 se eh hlUuhlUhlUhhUh hhh hlUr 11

SABLE OF CUBTENS@ «© 6 © © © © &@ 6 lV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...... . Vv

I. REPORTS AND OPINIONS OF

OTHER COURTS AND

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES . 1

Il. JURISDICTION ... 4

ct. APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY

PROVISIGONGS «© «© © © « «& » 4

V. STATEMENT OF CASE... . 5

V. BASIS FOR ALLOWANCE OF

tem WRB 20+ el ltltlktl ll 15

Vi. CONCLUSION 22

lv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Cited:

ITT Continental Baking Co.,

420 U.S. 223, 95 S.Ct. 926,

43 L.Ed.2a@ 148 (1975) ........ 16

Keith v. Volpe,

784 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1986) .... 17

Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland,

478 U.S. 501, 106 &.Ct. 3063,

92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986)

=

VU

Pasadena City Board of Education Vv.

Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 96 S.Ct. 2697,

49 L.E@.2d@ S99 (1976) . » «© «© «= «© «© « Ad

United States v. Armour & Co,

402 U.S. 6732, Ba S.tCe. ifsd,

29 L.Be.2@ 256 (197i) «©§ «© «© © «© © « st 616

United States v. Rogers,

960 F2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1992) .... 19

Williams v. Vukovich,

720 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1983) i «ee eee

Statutes:

>

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

"6 0.9.0. © U0 «nk ene ee eh * OO

33. U.S.C. $1251, ot eee... . 4, 3, 7

So Uses Bbaae «6 6) 6) 6 iw se 4 Ss Be *

REPORTS AND OPINIONS OF OTHER COURTS

AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Order entered by Chief Judge Thomas

A. Ballantine, Jr., of the United

States District Court for the

Western District ‘of Kentucky at

Louisville in the matter of the

United States of America and City of

Louisville Vv. Louisville and

Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer

District, Civil Action No. C 78-

0130-L(B), entered July 3, 1991.

Memorandum entered by Chief Judge,

Thomas A. Ballantine, Jr., of the

United States District Court for the

Western District of Kentucky at

Louisville in the matter of the

United States of America and City of

Louisville Vv. Louisville and

Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer

District, Civil Action No. C 78-

WwW

>

0130-L(B), entered November 8, 1991.

Order entered by Chief Judge, Thomas

A. Ballantine, Jr., of the United

States District Court for the

Western District of Kentucky at

Louisville in the matter of the

United States of America and City of

Louisville Vv. Louisville and

Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer

District, Civil Action No. C 78-

0130-L(B), entered November 8, 1991.

Mandate entered by the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit on appeal from the United

States District Court for the

Western District of Kentucky in the

matter of the United States of

America and City of Louisville v.

Louisville and Jefferson County

Metropolitan Sewer District and

Commonwealth of Kentucky, Civil

Action No. 91-6461, entered January

12, 1993.

Entered as Mandate March 23, 1993.

Order denying Petition for Rehearing

and Rehearing En Banc entered by the

United States Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit in the matter of

the United States of America and

City of Louisville v. Louisville and

Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer

District and Commonwealth of

Kentucky, Civil Action No. 91-6461,

entered March 12, 1993.

II. JURISDICTION

A final and appealable decree was

entered by the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on January

12, 1993. An Order denying the Petition

for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc was

entered on March 12, 1993. The decree

was issued as a Mandate on March 23,

1993.

Jurisdiction of the United States

Supreme Court is invoked pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).

III. APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY

AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS.

33 U.S.C. §1251, et. seg.

33 U.S.C. §14329.

IV. STATEMENT OF CASE

This case involves a Consent Decree

entered in 1981 which suspended

enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 3

U.S.C. §1251 et seq; and 33 U.S.C. §1319

against the Louisville and Jefferson

County Metropolitan Sewer District until

construction defects in the Morris Forman

Wastewater Treatment Plant were

corrected. Under the Consent Decree, the

Environmental Protection Agency was

required to timely review, approve, and

then fund all remedial work necessary to

correct the defects so that the Morris

Forman Wastewater Treatment Plant could

treat effluent within its permit limit

it the plant's design capacit f

million gallons per day 105 mgd he

Environmental Protection Agency “EPA”

arbitrarily delayed approval of the last

corrective action needed for over four

(4) years and then moved the District

Court to terminate the Consent Decree.

The EPA knew that the purpose of the

Consent Decree was to rectify the defects

in the Treatment Plant to allow it to

treat effluent at its design capacity of

105 mgd. The EPA knew that the last

remedial work, approved by the EPA, was

no yet completed and would not be

completed until 1995 due to the delay in

approval by the EPA. The EPA knew that,

until that remedial work was completed,

the Treatment Plant could not meet

effluent standards, thereby subjecting

MSD to enforcement actions for

inpreventable violations. The District

-OUrt terminated the Consent Decree at

the request of the United States

[The Louisville and Jefferson County

Metropolitan Sewer District ("MSD") is a

political subdivision of the Commonwealth

of Kentucky, responsible for providing

Sanitary sewer collection and treatment

for Jefferson County, Kentucky. In the

1970's, MSD, with EPA approval and

funding, contracted for the design and

construction of the 105 mgd Morris Forman

Waste Water Treatment Plant ("Treatment

Plant"). Unfortunately due to defective

design and construction, the Treatment

Plant was not able to treat effluent

within the limits set by the permit

issued by the EPA, even at a volume

substantially less than 105 mgd.

On or about April 7, 1978, EPA filed

a Complaint in the ited States District

Court for the Western District of

Kentucky against MSD and the Commonwealth

of Kentucky under 33 U.S.C. § 1319 of the

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq.

The City of Louisville, Kentucky,

intervened in the action.

Extensive negotiations ensued to

resolve the litigation and to diagnose

the cause of the failure of the Treatment

Plant to meet permit limitations. In an

effort to determine the measures that MSD

Should take to correct the problems, the

EPA created a review team. The review

team's inspection and analysis of the

Treatment Plant resulted in a EPA report

dated October 31, 1980 which set forth

The recommendations of the review team.

These recommendations formed the basis

for the Memorandum of Understanding

between the parties which was

subsequently incorporated into the

consent Decree. Under the Consent

Decree, MSD was to undertake two steps to

bring the Treatment Plant into compliance

with its permit. First MSD was to

conduct an "Interim Corrective Action

Program" to make limited corrective

improvements to the Treatment Plant.

Secondly MSD was to perform an evaluation

to determine whether or not additional

remedial work was required to fully

rectify the defects in the Treatment

Plant. If the Treatment Plant could not

achieve compliance with applicable

effluent limitations without additional

improvements, MSD was to submit a "Final

Plan and Schedule" detailing the

additional remedial work required to

achieve compliance with the applicable

effluent limitations at design capacity.

The EPA agreed to timely review and

approve all necessary remedial work

Submitted under the Final Plan and

Schedule to correct the defects. The EPA

also agreed to suspend enforcement of the

Clean Water Act until all remedial

9

actions were taken. Once the Final Plan

and Schedule was approved by the EPA, MSD

was required to carry out the Final Plan

and Schedule to bring the Treatment Plant

into compliance.

MSD proceeded to undertake the

actions required by the Consent Decree

and completed the Interim Corrective

Action Program and the Evaluation Program

as scheduled. MSD submitted its Final

Plan and Schedule to the EPA in 1984.

MSD's evaluation revealed that an

additional UNOX reactor, also referred to

aS Battery D, was needed to achieve

compliance at design capacity. The EPA

arbitrarily and without basis disagreed

with the necessity of this item.

Furthermore, it unnecessarily delayed

approving the Final Plan and Schedule for

over four years, thereby delaying MSD's

ability to correct the defects. Finally

in 1988, the EPA approved the Final Plan

and Schedule including the additional

UNOX reactor. (It should be noted that

the majority opinion of the 2-1 panel

erroneously states that approval came

after the EPA sought to terminate the

Consent Decree).

Shortly after approving the Final

Plan and Schedule, the EPA contacted MSD,

seeking to terminate the Consent Decree

by agreement. This contact was made

despite the fact that the remedial work

contained in the Final Plan and Schedule

had not yet been approved, funded, and

constructed as required by the Consent

Decree. Furthermore, EPA's delay in

approving the remedial work, which was in

breach of its duties under the Consent

Decree, also delayed the completion of

the remedial work.

The EPA unilaterally decided to

11

ee eee el alee een een eS

change the purpose of the Consent Decree

to only achieve compliance with effluent

limitations at a level less than the

plant's design capacity of 105 mgd. This

was because the Treatment Plant had met

effluent limitations at a volume less

than 105 mgd for a period of three (3)

years. The lower volume was due to two

(2) factors: (1) an unfortunate

explosion which destroyed a substantial

portion of the_ systen, and (2) a

reduction in industrial waste. Those

factors coupled with the limited

corrective actions taken under’ the

Consent ecree resulted in compliance.

Compliance was never achieved at normal

levels, nor at design capacity.

The EPA moved for termination of the

Consent Decree based on false assertions

that temporary compliance fulfilled the

purposes of the Consent Decree. MSD

l2

opposed that Motion for the reason that

all remedial work was not yet completed.

It was only in 1989, the EPA finally

authorized a grant to MSD through the

Commonwealth of Kentucky for the

construction of UNOX towers as provided

for by the Final Plan and Schedule.

Later, MSD proposed to construct

Bioroughing Towers in lieu of the

additional capacity to the UNOX reactors

that would be provided by Battery D.

That construction was subsequently

approved, has been funded, and is now

under construction, with completions

scheduled for 1995.

The Bioroughing Towers are the final

phase of the work to be done under the

Final Plan and Schedule of the Consent

Decree. Once the Bioroughing Towers are

completed, MSD should be able to treat

105 mgd within the effluent limitations

i3

imposed by the EPA-issued discharge

permit. Had the EPA not wrongfully

delayed approving the Final Plan and

Schedule, the work would have been

completed by now.

Furthermore, during the construction

phase of the Bioroughing Towers, the

effluent limits will be increasingly

exceeded, as all of the parties were

aware. Despite that knowledge, the EPA

moved for termination of the Consent

Decree.

On July 3, 1991, the District Court

entered an Order terminating the Consent

Decree. MSD and the City of Louisville

moved for reconsideration. On November

8, 1991, the District Court issued a

Memorandum and a final appealable Order

denying the Motion for Reconsideration

filed by MSD and the City of Louisville.

Notice of Appeal was timely filed and an

14

appeal taken to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit under 28

U.S.C. § A2Pa«

On January 12, 1993, the Sixth

Circuit, in a 2-1 opinion, affirmed the

District Court's Order. On March 12,

1993, an order was entered denying MSD's

Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for

Rehearing En Banc. On March 23, 1993,

the opinion was issued as a mandate.

Vv. BASIS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT

The District Court erred in

terminating the Consent Decree before

compliance with the Clean Water Act was

achieved.

The issues in this Petition focus on

the interpretation to be given the

Consent Decree entered by the District

Court on November 24, 1981. The question

is whether or not all the conditions of

the Consent Decree were fulfilled,

15

thereby justifying its termination.

The Court has stated that because

the terms of Consent Decree arrived

through the mutual consent of the

parties, they closely resemble contracts

and may provide for broad relief or terms

than could have been awarded at trial.

Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478

U.S. 501, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405

(1986).

When construing a Consent Decree,

you may rely upon certain aids to

construction, including the circumstances

Surrounding the formation of the Decree

and any documents incorporated into the

Decree, without violation of the "four

corners" rule of United States v _Armour

& Co, 402 U.S. 673, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 29

L.Ed.2d 256 (1971). ITT Continental

Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 95 S.Ct. 926,

43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975).

16

Furthermore a Decree must be

strictly construed to preserve the

bargained for position of the parties,

Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909 (6th

Cir. 1983). Consideration must be given

to the original expectations of the

parties. Keith v. Volpe, 784 F.2d 1457

(9th Cir. 1986). Any vague or confusing

language should be interpreted in a way

that implements the purposes of the

Decree. Pasadena City Board of Education

Vv. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 96 S.Ct. 2697,

49 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976).

The Consent Decree entered in this

action, does not specifically describe

all the corrective work to be done to

accomplish the purpose of the Consent

Decree, thereby allowing the Consent

Decree to be terminated. The Consent

Decree set forth certain specific

corrective actions to be taken and

ae

required an evaluation to determine what

additional remedial work would be needed

to bring the Treatment Plant into

compliance with the effluent limits of

the EPA issued permit at the design

capacity of 105 mgd. That additional

corrective construction was, and is, the

Bioroughing Towers.

The corrective construction was

submitted by MSD with the Final Plan and

Schedule which was approved by the EPA in

1988. Therefore, it is clear that the

Consent Decree contemplated the

construction of remedial construction

Such as the Bioroughing Towers. The

Consent Decree further contemplated that

it would remain in effect until that

construction was completed. The EPA

Specifically agreed to suspend

enforcement of the Clean Water Act until

Such time as all corrective actions were

18

taken. That element of the Consent

ecree had a res judicata / estoppel

effect on all enforcement actions while

the decree was in effect. United States

Rogers, 960 F2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1992).

It allowed MSD to focus its energy on

ow

‘ectifying the defects in the Treatment

Plant as quickly as possible, so that

compliance with t Clean Water Act coul

be achieved. By term: ating the Consent

Decree before all the defects were

corrected, the United States can ignore

its agreement to not bring any

enforcement action until the defects are

corrected.

This situation 1s analogous to a

defective dam. Suppose a dam was F-ing

constructed to protect a town from a 100

cuments germane to this are under

seal with the Sixth Circuit.

19

year flood. Suppose further that there

was a Dam Protection Agency ("DPA") which

1andated that the Dam owner provide flood

protection to the town. But it is

rmined that the dam that was

constructed was defective and unable to

even protect against a 10 year flood.

herefore a corrective action plan is

required by the DPA to correct the

problem. At some point, the dam is

sufficiently high to protect against a 10

year flood, but not yet high enough to

protect against the 100 year flood. The

DPA decided that since there have been no

floods over the past few years, the dam

lS in compliance and no further work is

needed. But a 100 year flood has not yet

Struck. If it does there will be a

flood. oa

Like the Dam Protective Agency, the

OF

ct

O

EPA has stated that MSD had compliec

Se ET

the Consent Decree because the Treatment

Plant was able to stay within its

effluent limits during the three (3) year

period. But that compliance was due to

the Treatment Plant not yet receiving

effluent in the volume it was designed to

receive: 105 mgd.

The Consent Decree was a contract

between EPA and MSD. MSD bargained to

rectify the defects of the Treatment

Plant without threat of penalties while

So doing; and get what it had contracted

for: a treatment plant that would treat

105 mgd of effluent within MSD's permit

limits. The EPA review team made

recommendations to achieve that goal.

The EPA agreed to suspend enforcement of

the Clean Water Act until the repairs

were completed. The EPA should not have

been permitted to prematurely terminate

the Consent Decree before all the

21

corrective work has been completed,

Simply because its own purposes may have

been satisfied. As stated by Chief Judge

Merritt in his well-reasoned dissent, "It

maybe administratively more convenient

for EPA to have the agreement terminated

now. It may be unfair to some cities

which have no comparable agreement to

require them to pay penalties when they

fail to meet effluent limitations. It

may be that EPA made a bad deal when it

Signed this Consent Decree. But none of

these are reasons which justify

termination of the settlement agreement."

Merritt Dissent, Appendix D at page 27.

Perhaps the benefits to MSD did go

beyond that which would have been

achieved at trial. But such relief is

permitted. Local 93, supra, at 525.

VI. CONCLUSION

The District Court erred in

22

terminating the Consent Decree before the

defects in the Treatment Plant were fully

corrected by the construction of the

Bioroughing Towers. The District Court

and the Court of Appeals 2-1 majority

opinion misinterpreted the portions of

the Consent Decree which called for

construction of additional corrective

measures deemed necessary to bring the

plant in compliance under the Final Plan

and Schedule. That additional work was

submitted with the Final Plan and

Schedule, which was approved by the EPA,

and now construction has begun on those

measures. The Consent Decree should not

have been terminated until those measures

are completed. The EPA should not now be

allowed to institute enforcement actions

under the same federal law for the same

problem which resulted in the Consent

Decree, when the defects are not yet

23

rectified. This is especially true where

the delay in achieving compliance is

solely due to the inexcusable delay of

the EPA in approving the Final Plan and

Schedule. The Courts should not allow

the EPA to terminate this Consent Decree

for that purpose.

Wherefore, for the foregoing

reasons, Louisville and Jefferson County

Metropolitan Sewer District respectfully

Petitions the United States Supreme Court

for a Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Ci

LAURENCE J. on a,

PEDLEY ROSS ZIELKE & GORDINIER

1150 Starks Building

455 South Fourth Avenue

Louisville, Kentucky 40202

(502) 589-4600

Counsel for Petitioner

Nh

>

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

AT LOUISVILLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff

and

CITY OF LOUISVILLE

Intervenor Plaintiff

Vv. No. C 78-0130-L(B)

LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY

METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT, et al.

Defendants

O R DE R

This matter has come before the

Court on the Motion of the United States

of America to terminate the Consent

Decree. entered in this action and the

motion of the Louisville and Jefferson

County Metropolitan Sewer District to

amend the Consent Decree to terminate in

the future. The Court has reviewed the

parties' memoranda and is sufficiently

advised and therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the defendants

have fully complied with all provisions

of the Consent Decree and it is the

judgment of the Court that the Consent

Decree is terminated as of the date of

this Order.

This 3rd day of July, 1991.

THOMAS A. BALLANTINE, JR.

Chief Judge, U. S. District

Court

Copies to counsel

Entered July 3, 199]

N

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

AT LOUISVILLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff

and

CITY OF LOUISVILLE

Intervening Plaintiff

Vv. No. C 78-0130-L(B)

LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY

METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT and

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Defendants

O R DE R

For the reasons set forth in the

memorandum filed this date,

IT IS ORDERED that the motions of

the defendant, Louisville and Jefferson

County Metropolitan Sewer District and

the intervening plaintiff, City of

Louisville, for reconsideration of the

Court's Order of July 3, 1991 be and it

hereby is denied.

ce naaeneeeeeeenee ee et

This a final order.

This 8th day of November, 1991.

THOMAS A.

BALLANTINE, JR.

Chief Judge, U. S. District

Court

Copies to counsel

Entered Nov 9 1991

Nh

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

AT LOUISVILLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff

CITY OF LOUISVILLE

Intervening Plaintiff

Vv. No. C 78-0130-L(B)

LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY

METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT and

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Defendants

MEMORANDUM

This matter is before the Court on

the motions of the defendant, Louisville

and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer

District (MSD), and the intervening

plaintiff, City of Louisville (City), for

reconsideration of the Court's Order of

July » 199] terminating a Consent

Decree. The Consent Decree was entered

as a final judgment on November 24, 1981.

The Environmental Protection Agency

Ua ENE ESI SSE EERE SEnE REE

(EPA) brought this action in April, 1978,

seeking civil penalties against MSD for

violations of effluent limits imposed by

National Pollution Discharge Elimination

System (NPDES) Permit No. KY 0022411 at

the Morris Forman Wastewater Treatment

Plant (MFWTP). Title 33 U.S.C. § 1342.

The NPDES permit had been issued to MFWTP

in 1977 pursuant to the provisions of the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the

Clean Water Act).' waves 33 U.S.C.

Sections 1251 et seq. Prior to the

execution of the Consent Decree, the EPA

and MSD entered into a Memorandum of

Understanding (MOU) in which the parties

stated their intention to resolve the

litigation and discussed the provisions

Subsequently embodied in the Consent

NPDES permits are valid for no more

than five years.

N

Decree.

MSD stipulated that it had violated

the permit. The Consent Decree provided

that MSD would initiate an Interim

Corrective Action Program (ICAP) and an

Evaluation Program (EP) as the first

steps of a “phased approach" to bring

MFWTP into compliance with “applicable

effluent limitations." Pursuant to those

programs MSD was to implement limited

improvements to the MFWTP and evaluate

the operation of the facility, using

certain tests outlined in Appendix A to

the Consent Decree. MSD was to submit to

EPA written notification of each

corrective action indicated as necessary

during the evaluation period and state

whether the action constituted a major

modification, a minor modification or an

operational improvement. MSD was also to

submit a "final design report identifying

the performance improvements of minor

modifications and operational

improvements, and the cost effectiveness

of major physical modifications that may

improve the performance of the final

settling tanks," along with a summary

report of the test results. Similarly,

MSD was to initiate and complete a

performance test of the oxygen

dissolution capacity of the UNOX reactors

and equipment and submit a summary report

along with recommendations for "any

required structural/equipment

modifications." After completion of the

ICAP and the EP, MSD was to complete a

cost effectiveness analysis of any major

modifications and then submit a Finai

Plan and Schedule (FP&S) "for achieving

compliance with all applicable effluent

limitations" to the EPA for its approval.

According to the terms of the Consent

Decree, MSD was to carry out the FP&S

only after its approval by EPA.

Section V of the Consent Decree

providing for MSD's interim

compliance states in pertinent part:

(B) The parties recognize that MSD's

current NPDES permit is scheduled to

expire on June 30, 1982. It is the

intent of the parties that in the

NPDES permit renewal process for the

(MFWTP}]} the terms of this Consent

Decree shall be taken into account

and that, to the extent permitted by

law, the [EPA] shall propose a

renewed permit, the terms of which

are not inconsistent with those of

this Decree.?*

Section VII provides:

The parties have agreed that certain

elements of the current Corrective

Action Program at eligible for

federal funding under the provisions

of the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act, as amended; that they

disagree as to the eligibility of

other elements of the program and

¢ MFWTP's permit was renewed and the

renewed permit expired in 1987. As of

1990, MSD was still operating under the

expired permit.

————— an

that these elements will be the

subject of an appeal as provided for

under Subpart J, Part 30 of Title 40

of the Code of Federal Regulations;

and that other elements of the

program will be eligible for federal

funding if they are found to be

necessary under the Interim

Corrective Action and Evaluation

Program

5 The MOU’ separated into four

categories the items in MSD's Revised

Corrective Action Program for which

funding was sought. The UNOX reactor was

included in Category C:

"Those items which EPA believes to

be grant eligible, but for which EPA

questions the necessity pending the

evaluations noted above in Section

III. The parties agree that should

the evaluations indicate that these

items are necessary to meet

applicable effluent limitations, EPA

will fund them promptly, contingent

6

Fina -y, the Consent Decree provides

chat the -ourt will retain jurisdiction

"for such further orders as may be

necessary or appropriate for the

construction or implementation of this

Decree or for the enforcement or

compliance therewith" and that the

Decree "shall terminate upon application

of the parties."

On June 10, 1983, MSD submitted the

FP&S to EPA for approval and funding.

The FP&S provided for the addition of a

UNOX Battery ("Battery D" or "UNOX") to

the MFWTP. In March, 1985, EPA informed

MSD that it "was not convinced" of the

necessity for Battery D and that its

eligibility would not be onsidered

"unless its need is demonstrated after

upon the availability of federal

funds."

~

m BEST AVAILAE

other phases are completed." In

response, MSD retained Camp, Dresser &

McKee, Inc. (CDM), specialists in sewer

plant design, construction and operation

to evaluate the need for Battery D. In

June, 1985, CDM's report, supporting

MSD's position, was submitted to EPA. In

August, 1985, EPA notified MSD that it

had "considerable doubt" as to the

necessity of Battery D and that it

believed compliance with effluent limits

could be met with the items already

funded. However, EPA added that it might

reconsider its decision if the funded

items did not bring MFWTP in compliance.

In November, 1988, while the renewed

NPDES permit was still in effect for

MFWTP, MSD received a letter from the EPA

stating:

(T]he Final Plan and Schedule (FPS)

developed under Grant No. C210553-03

was conditionally accepted by EPA,

COPY

but never officially approved :

Since EPA's initial receipt and

review of the FPS, the proposed

option to increase the capacity of

unit processes in the plant has been

implemented in accordance with EPA

comments. The implemented plan is

providing wastewater treatment in

accordance with the limits of the

NPDES’ permit. Therefore, this

letter constitutes EPA approval of

the Final Plan and Schedule.

Only July 20, 1989, Russell Wright, an

EPA representative, contacted William

Gatewood, Manager of the Construction

Grants Branch of the Division of Water

for the Kentucky Department of Natural

Resources and Environmental Protection

Cabinet (KNREPC). Wright informed

Gatewood of a June 29th meeting with MSD

in which the EPA and the _ Kentucky

Division of Water agreed to MSD's request

for a “reevaluation of their proposed

project of adding another unox

oxygenation battery, known as Battery D,

to their existing plant."

—————— — ne

+

(Emphasis added).”

On November 6, 1989, MSD contacted

KNREPC to set up a time to discuss issues

related to "remaining aspects of the

Final Plan and Schedule Construction

Projects," including Battery D. In the

letter, MSD stated that all necessary

improvements to the MFWTP had been

implemented or were currently under

construction except for Battery D. MSD

During this time, EPA was

delegating responsibility for wastewater

regulations to the State and a new

discharge permit had been proposed for

MFWTP by KNREPC. The proposed permit

contained stricter effluent limitations.

MSD asserted to KNREPC that it would not

be able to meet the more stringent

standards in the proposed permit without

the addition of Battery D.

10

d 7

i cn

also noted that MSD's service area was

expanding, "additional sludge flows were

not included or anticipated in the

development of the FP&S" and that the

proposed NPDES permit "includes

additional effluent criteria" not

provided for or anticipated in the FP&S.

On July 17, 1990, the United States,

on behalf of the EPA and joined by the

Commonwealth of Kentucky, filed a motion

to terminate the Consent Decree on the

basis of MSD's compliance with its NPDES

permit from 1986 through 1990. On August

17, 1990, MSD submitted to KNREPC for

approval a design for bioroughing towers

to be constructed at MFWTP in lieu of

Battery D and on October 1, 1990, EPA

notified MSD that a federal grant for the

bioroughing towers had been approved. On

July 3, 1991, this Court terminated the

Consent Decree, finding that the

11

underlying purpose of the Decree had been

satisfied.

The parties agree that a Consent

Decree must remain in effect so long as

its continued enforcement is necessary to

effectuate its purposes. The purpose of

the Consent Decree in the case at hand

was to bring MFWTP into compliance with

the law. The parties' argument over

"The authority of a federal

district court to adopt a consent decree

comes only from the statute which the

decree is intended to enforce. If there

is a 'purpose' to be effectuated, it is

the purpose of the statute pursuant to

which the government seeks relief.

Within that framework the parties strike

their bargain." United States v. Motor

Vehicle Manufacturers Assoc. of the

United States, 643. F.2d 644, 650 (9th

12

when the Consent Decree may properly

terminate stems from conflicting

interpretations of critical terms of the

Decree. MSD argues that all the work

identified in the FP&S has not been

completed and therefore, the Consent

Decree may not be terminated. The United

States argue that MFWTP's compliance with

effluent limitations at any stage of

major modifications, set forth in the

FP&S and approved by | EPA, required

termination of the Consent Decree.

Consent decrees have been recognized

as having attributes of both contracts

and judicial acts. United States v. ITT

Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236

n. LO, 37> SeCEe 926, 934 Nn. 10, 4

L.Ed.2d 148 (1975); United States v.

Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82, 91

13

——————

~~

Y

—

,

Y

i

S.C. , 29 L.Ed.2dad 256 (1971).

Principles of contract law are used for

purposes of interpreting the meaning of a

consent decree. Only when the language

of a consent decree is not clear on its

face, have courts been forced to resort

to equituble considerations to define the

limits of a consent decree. Chrysler

Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 62

S.Ct 1146, 86 L.Ed. 1668 (1942).

We find that the language of the

decree is quite clear and that its

purposes have been accomplished.

Appendix A of the Consent Decree

provides for MSD to undertake a series of

interim steps to determine whether

limited improvements would bring about

compliance with "applicable effluent

limitations." A cost effectiveness

analysis of suggested major plant

modifications was to be implemented in

the event that the interim steps did not

result in compliance and only then was

the FP&S to be developed by MSD. Nothing

in the language of the Consent Decree or

the Memorandum of Understanding compels

the conclusion that the EPA was required

to approve the entire FP&S as initially

submitted by MSD. It appears from the

face of the Consent Decree that MSD's

requirement to implement any of the FP&S

was contingent on EPA's approval of any

part of the FP&S. The record shows that

MSD formally approved the FP&S and found

MSD to be in compliance with "applicable

effluent limitations" in November of

1988. MSD does not deny that it was in

compliance with the renewed NPDES permit

in November of 1988 and it had been in

compliance until 1990. Therefore, the

duties of EPA and MSD under the terms of

the Consent Decree ended as of November,

15

1988. The July 20th, 1989, letter to

KNREPC from the EPA does not suggest that

the EPA changed its position as to the

requirements of the Consent Decree.

In addition, Section V of the

Consent Decree contemplates that the

"applicable effluent limitations"

referred to throughout the Consent Decree

are those limitations imposed by the

NPDES permit issued in 1977 and the

renewed permit which expired in 1987.

MSD requested approval of Battery D from

the KNREPC based on a projected increase

in effluent flow and the heightened

requirements of a proposed NPDES permit.

The City and MSD argue that the

Consent Decree may only be terminated on

the agreement of all parties and

therefore, the Court did not have

jurisdiction to terminate the Consent

Decree.

Section XII provides: "This Decree

shall terminate upon application of the

parties." This provision simply allows

the parties to terminate the Decree by

agreement; it does not divest the Court

of jurisdiction to end the Decree upon

the motion of any party and a finding

that the purposes of the Decree have been

fulfilled.

An appropriate order has been

entered this 8th day of November, 991.

THOMAS A. BALLANTINE, JR.

Chief Judge, U.S. District

Court

ct

O

Copies counsel

Entered Nov 8, 1991

a

NO. 91-6461

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FILED

JAN 12 1993

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

CITY OF LOUISVILLE,

Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee,

On Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Western District

of Kentucky

LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY

METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT

Defendant-Appellant,

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,

Defendant-Appellee

/

Before: MERRITT, Chief Judge; and

GUY and RYAN, Circuit Judges.

Ralph BB. Guy, Js, Circuit Judge.

Defendant, Metropolitan Sewer District,

appeals the district coure*s order

terminating a 1981 consent decree. On

appeal, defendant argues that the purpose

of the consent decree has not. been

achieved and therefore the court should

not have terminated the decree. We agree

with the district court that the purpose

of the consent decree has been

accomplished and therefore affirm.

I.

Louisville and Jefferson County

Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD) was

created pursuant to enactments of the

Kentucky Legislature, Ky. Rev. Stat. §

76.010, to develop and operate a sanitary

and storm sewer system in Jefferson

County, Kentucky. In the late 1970s,

defendant contracted with Blount Brothers

to build the Morris-Foreman Waste Water

Treatment Plant (MFWTP), which was

completed in 1974. The design plans,

approved by the Environmental Protection

Agency, anticipated sewage flow of 105

million gallons per day. MFWTP was

issued a National Pollutant Discharge

Elimination System (NPDES) permit by the

EPA in 1977 pursuant to applicable

provisions of the Clean Water Act. This

permit required MSD to meet specific

effluent limitations for biochemical

oxygen demand (BOD) and total suspended

solids (TSS). Unfortunately, substantial

defects in design caused the plant's

effluent to exceed its permit limits.

Major litigation ensued between MSD and

Blount Brothers, resulting in a multi-

million dollar settlement. However, MSD

was still faced with a plant that was not

complying with its permit requirements.

In April 1978, the EPA brought an

enforcement action against MSD for

violating the plant's permit. MSD faced

Civil penalties of $10,000 per day for

violating its permit. a2. 2s, §

1319(d) (1986). Over the next two years,

the parties came to an agreement,

memorialized in a "Memorandum of

Understanding," and entered into a

consent decree. According to appendix A

of the consent’ decree, MSD was to

undertake two steps to bring the plant

into compliance with its permit. MSD was

to conduct an "Interim Corrective Action

Program" to ascertain if limited

improvements to the plant could bring

about compliance with applicable effluent

limitations and an "Evaluation Program"

to determine the relative feasibility and

economic efficiency of alternative

improvements. If these steps showed that

the MFWTP could not achieve compliance

with applicable effluent limitations

without major physical modifications,

then MSD was to submit a "Final Plan and

Schedule" detailing the major physical

modifications and equipment modification

required. According to the consent

decree, "{u]pon approval by EPA Region

IV, MSD shall carry out that Final Plan

and Schedule." (App.62). The agreement

also established those items EPA would

fund and would not fund, those items the

parties disagreed on funding, and those

items the EPA felt were eligible for

funding but would not approve unless

shown to be necessary. The consent

decree provided:

Although § 1319(d) of 33 U.S.C.

provides that penalties may be

sought for violation of applicable

effluent limitations, EPA has

elected not to seek such penalties

in this instance in light of MSD's

substantial efforts including both

studies and physical work to correct

the deficiencies which have

prevented MF WTP from achieving

applicable effluent limitations.

(App.54).

MSD proceeded to undertake the

actions required by the consent decree,

completing the Interim Corrective Action

Program and Evaluation Program. The

Final Plan and Schedule was submitted to

the EPA in 1984. One item MSD felt was

needed was an additional UNOX reactor,

also referred to as Battery D. The EPA

disagreed with the necessity of this

item. In 1985, the EPA approved the

Final Plan and Schedule, except for the

additional UNOX reactor.

While the various studies were being

conducted, events were changing the

volume and quality of the sewage coming

ints the plant. In 1981, a substantial

portion of MSD's sewer system was

destroyed by a series of explosions.

Additionally, industrial sewage began to

diminish in the area. Carl Neumayer, the

director of operations and maintenance of

MSD, stated in his affidavit:

————————

As a result of the decrease in

industrial sewage discharged into

MSD's system, coupled with the

Interim Corrective Actions

undertaken by MSD in compliance with

the Consent Decree, the quality of

MSD's discharge effluent began to

consistently meet the BOD and TSS

effluent limitations set forth in

MSD's EPA-issued discharge permit.

(App.116). The parties agree that, from

1986 until 1989 and for several months in

1990, the plant was meeting the permit

requirements. In July 1990, the EPA

moved for a termination of the consent

decree, "certif[{[ying] that the defendants

have fully complied with the provisions

of the Consent Decree." (App.64).

In the meantime, in 1989, MSD had

requested the EPA to re-evaluate the need

for the additional UNOX reactor that the

EPA omitted from its approval of the

Final Plan and Schedule. Under the Clean

Water Act, the EPA can give grants to

assist the construction of wastewater

treatment plants. 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g)

(1986 & Supp. 1992). But, under the

complex procedures for grants, the EPA

must wait until the state has certified a

project and has determined that the

project has priority over other works

within the state. 33 U.S.C. § 1284(a) (3)

(1986). On July 20, 1989, the EPA,

following the established procedures for

grants under the Clean Water Act,

authorized the Commonwealth of Kentucky

to review MSD's’ request for ae re-

evaluation of the need for the additional

UNOX reactor. On August 17, 1990, after

the EPA filed its motion for termination

of the consent decree, MSD submitted a

proposal for bioroughing towers, in lieu

of UNOX reactor, to the Commonwealth of

Kentucky, arguing it was required because

of additional sludge flows that were not

included or anticipated in the

development of the Final Plan. As Carl

Neumayer explained in his affidavit:

MSD has been consistently expanding

its sewer lines throughout Jefferson

County in compliance with the

mandate imposed by KRS 76.010 in

order to accommodate area

development, population expansion

and public health needs. In

addition, MSD has assumed

responsibility for treating sewage

previously treated by private

package sewage treatment plants so

as to eliminate discharge of

inadequately treated sewage into

Kentucky's waterways. In the last

several years industrial discharges

into MSD's sewer system have

increased. As a result, despite

MSD's application of its best

efforts, the MFWTP during

Significant portions of 1989 and

1990 has failed to achieve the

effluent limitations imposed by the

EPA-issued discharged permit.

(App. 116-17). Kentucky certified the

bioroughing towers on August 22

, 1990,

one month after the government sought to

terminate the consent decree. On October

1, 1990, the EPA approved funding for the

project. MSD projects the bioroughing

towers' completion date to be sometime in

On July 3, 1991, the district court

entered its order terminating the consent

decree. After MSD moved the court to

reconsider its order, the court entered

its final order terminating the consent

decree on November 8, 1991. MSD argued,

as it does on appeal, that until the

bioroughing towers are completed the

Final Plan and Scheduie has not been

carried out" because the UNOX reactor

(substituted with the bioroughing towers)

was in MSD's proposed Final Plan. In

it's memorandum, the court explained:

The parties agree that a

Consent Decree must remain in effect

o long as its continued enforcement

is necessary to effectuate its

purposes. The purpose of the

Consent Decree in the case at hand

was to bring MFWTP into compliance

with the law.’ The parties'

argument over when the Consent

Decree may properly terminate stems

from conflicting interpretations of

critical terms of the Decree. MSD

argues that all the work identified

in the FP&S has not been completed

and therefore, the Consent Decree

may not be terminated. The United

States argues that MFWTP's

compliance with effluent limitations

at any stage of major modifications,

set forth in the FP&S and approved

by EPA, require termination of the

Consent Decree.

Consent decrees have been

recognized as having attributes >-f

both contracts and judicial ac

United States v. ITT Continental

Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 n. 10,

95 $.Ct. 926, 934 A. 19, 43 bc BG. 2G

148 (1975); United States v. Armour

.* €o., 402 U.S. 673, GBi-G2, Fi

S.Ct. ivsa2., i@*a?, 29 tsa. 2a 29

(1971). Principles of contract law

are used for purposes of

interpreting the meaning of a

consent decree. Only when the

language of a consent decree is not

clear on its face, have courts been

forced to resort to equitable

considerations to define the limits

of a consent decree. Chrysler Corp.

v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 62

S.Ct. 1146, 86 L.Ed. 1668 (1942).

We find that the language of

the decree is quite clear ana that

its purposes have been accomplished.-

Appendix A of the Consent

Decree provides for MSD to undertake

a series of interim steps’ to

determine whether limited

improvements would bring about

compliance with "applicable effluent

11

limitations." A cost effectiveness

analysis of suggested major plant

modifications was to be implemented

in the event that the interim steps

did not result in compliance and

only then was the FP&S to be

developed by MSD. Nothing in the

language of the Consent Decree or

the Memorandum of Understanding

compels the conclusion that the EPA

was required to approve the entire

FP&S as initially submitted by MSD.

It appears from the face of the

Consent Decree that MSD's

requirement to implement any of the

FP&S was contingent on EPA's

approval of any part of the FP&S.

The record shows that MSD formally

approved the FP&S and found MSD to

be in compliance with "applicable

effluent limitations" in November of

1988. MSD does not deny that it was

in compliance with the renewed NPDES

permit in November of 1988 and it

had been in compliance until 1990.

Therefore, the duties of EPA and MSD

under the terms of the Consent

Decree ended as of November 1988.

The July 20th, 1989, letter to

KNREPC from the EPA does not suggest

that the EPA changed its position as

to the requirements of the Consent

Decree.

In addition, Section V of the

Consent Decree contemplates that the

"applicable effluent limitations"

referred to throughout the Consent

Decree are those limitations imposed

by the NPDES permit issued in 1977

and the renewed permit which expired

12

in 1987. MSD requested approval of

Battery D from the KNREPC based on a

projected increase in effluent flow

and the heightened requirements of a

proposed NPDES permit.

> "The authority of a federal

district court to adopt a consent

decree comes only from the statue

which the decree is intended to

enforce. If there is a ‘purpose* to

the effectuated, it is the purpose

of the statue pursuant to which the

government seeks relief. Within

that framework the parties strike

their bargain." United States v.

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assoc.

of the United States, 643 F.2d 644,

650 (9th Cir. 1981).

(App. 176-178) footnote 6 omitted).

II.

On appeal, defendants dispute the

government's assertion and the district

court's conclusion that the purpose of

the consent decree has been met. MSD

argues that the purpose of the consent

decree was to bring the MFWTP into

compliance with its permit limits while

~

LW

operating at its design capacity of 105

million gallons of sewage flow per day.

Defendant initially opposed the

entering of the consent decree, taking

“the position that the more appropriate

means of resolving the issues would be an

extension of its existing NPDES permit.

Or an administrative order." (App.

86). Thus, we confront the _ facial

anomaly, recognized by the district court

in its memorandum and order denying

defendant's request for a stay, issued

July 2, 1992, of a defendant arguing it

has not completed all the requirements of

the consent decree and therefore the

decree should not be terminated.

Normally, liability under the Clean Water

Act ls Strict, regardless of how

efficiently an individual operates a

plant. see United States _ v. Texas

Pipeline Co., 611 F.2d 345 (10th Cir.

4

>

1979). Through the consent decree,

defendant was allowed to avoid penalties

so long as it, in good faith, used its

best efforts to run the plant as

efficiently ; possible and take the

required tex in the consent decree.

Althouda! iant did consistently meet

its permit requirements for several years

in a _ row, it seeks to maintain the

protection from the potential $25,000 a

day in civil penalties until installation

and testing of the bioroughing towers is

completed. '

Defendant argues that the only

When this action was first brought,

the civil penalties were $10,000 per day.

The Clean Water Act has_ since been

amended to provide for civil penalties up

WwW

LA

WY

eC. §1L31i9 (4)

to $25,000 per day.

(Supp. 1992).

reason the plant was able to meet its

permit requirements for those years was

due to decrease in sewage flow and a

concurrent increase in the "quality" of

incoming sewage. MSD asserts that the

government's position taken to’ the

extreme is ludicrous: the plant could

have met the permit requirements from day

one by reducing its intake. However, MSD

fails to see the parallel in its

argument; taken to its extreme, MSD's

position is_' untenable. What if the

bioroughing towers fail to bring the

plant within its permit limits while

operating at the design capacity? Under

MSD's proposed analysis of the consent

decree, the purpose of the decree would

not be achieved, so it must remain in

force until additional measures are

taken.°

Presumably, in the interim, MSD

could continue to take on more and more

customers, thus making the effluent

requirements harder to attain.

The parties agree that the consent

decree should terminate when the purpose

of the decree has been fulfilled. They

differ significantly on what that purpose

‘... The "four corners" of a consent

‘"The whole purpose of the Consent

Yecree was to correct [the plant's]

defects. It follows that until all the

defects are corrected, the purpose of the

Consent Decree has not been met." (Def's

Brief at 16). To counteract the

extremity of their position, defendant,

in response to the government's motion to

terminate the consent decree, moved for

modification of the decree setting a date

certain for its termination.

~~

r?

decree are examined to determine its

scope. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784

v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 574 (1984). We

agree with the district court that the

purpose of the consent decree was to

bring the plant into compliance with the

law; indeed, its violation of the law is

wnat prompted the EPA to bring the

initial enforcement action. There is no

indication in the consent decree that

compliance while processing 105 million

gallons of sewage was required.

This conclusion is further bolstered

by an examination of the Clean Water

Act's purposes. A consent decree should

e construed against the background of

the statute under which the action was

brought. Las Vegas v. Clark County, 75

F.2d 697, 702 (9th Cir. 1985); United

states v. Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

650 (9th Cir. 1981). The Clean Water Act

does not contemplate compliance with

NPDES permits while operating at design

capacity; it requires compliance with

permits, period. If a plant must reduce

its sewage intake to comply, then that

step must be taken. Further, the NPDES

permits have a duration of five years, 33

U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B) (1986), and, as a

general rule, Subsequent permits are

Supposed to be no less stringent than the

one before it. 33 UsB.C. § €23342) (0) (1)

(Supp. 1992). Through continued

enforcement of the consent decree, MSD is

seeking to be held to the effluent

limitations of a permit issued fifteen

years ago.

MSD argues that, because the

additional UNOX reactor was in MSD's

original Final Plan and Schedule and that

because the EPA eventually approved its

19

construction, MSD should be allowed to

complete it without the risk of civil

penalties. When the parties entered into

the consent decree, the additional UNOX

reactor was in the category of those

items that were eligible for funding but

would not be funded unless their

necessity was shown. It was not until

after the MFWTP has’ been meeting its

permit limits for several years that an

increase in sewage quantity caused the

EPA, through the Commonwealth of

Kentucky, to find the additional UNOX

reactor (substituted by the bioroughing

towers) necessary. The 1978 consent

decree's purpose was not to correct the

design problems of the MFWTP for future

increase sewage flow, but to correct the

problems SO that the then current

effluents met the permit limits. Indeed,

the EPA seemed correct in its evaluation

20

of the need for the additional UNOX

reactor. The modifications the EPA

approved without the UNOX reactor helped

the MFWTP to finally achieve its permit

limits, and to do so for several years.

Additionally, this litigation is

primarily between two institutions -- the

Environmental Protection Agency and the

Louisville and Jefferson County

Metropolitan Sewer District.?°

[C]onsent decrees which regulate

institutional conduct are

fundamentally different from consent

decrees between private parties. .

([Tj)hey affect more than the rights

of the immediate litigants. The

decrees reach beyond the parties

involved directly in the suit and

impact on the public's right to the

sound and efficient operation of its

“Also party to this litigation are

the Commonwealth of Kentucky, defendant

now aligned with the plaintiff, and the

City of Louisville, intervening

plaintiff.

a

ee

institutions.

Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1109

[oth ‘Cir. 1989). Considering’ the

public's interest in compliance with the

Clean Water Act, we are not prepared to

Say that a plant that was able to comply

with its required effluent limitations

for several years should now be allowed

to again violate its permit with impunity

while constructing new equipment. For 11

years, MSD has been allowed to use its

“best efforts" to fix the problems at the

plant without the fear of stiff civil

penalties, and for several years the

plant was able to comply with its permit.

As the district court recognized, the

purpose of the consent decree was

achieved.

AFFIRMED.

Filed 1/12/93

Issued as Mandate 3/23/93

No.92-6461

INITED STATES v. METROPOLITAN SEWER

DISTRICT

MERRITT, Chief Judge, dissenting.

The consent decree is a contract between

the government and the sewer district. I

disagree with the Court's holding that

"the purpose of the consent decree was

achieved" and that the decree should,

therefore, be terminated. The "effluent

limitations" were met for only a short

period at very low levels of iischarge.

The sewer district is now building two

oxygenation towers to correct the

problem. This work will cause part of

the plant to remain shut down until

completion. These additions are the type

of improvements contemplated in the

decree. The decree was entered to give

the sewer district a chance to make such

improvements. While this new

OES fae hr ed ~

construction is going on, the plant

cannot meet effluent limitations.

Although the agreement is more than a

decade old, -the plant cannot meet the

Standards in part because the EPA did not

authorize construction of the new towers

until 1990.

There is no suggestion in the” record

that the district has not done everything

it can under the consent decree to comply

with the effluent standards. The sewer

district advised EPA years ago that the

towers would be needed, but EPA

disapproved until two years ago. With

construction incomplete, why should the

decree end now? Why row subject the

district to another lawsuit and to

$25,000 a day in penalties. If the

district is breaching the decree, it

Should be required to comply, but there

lis no such clain. And

there is no claim that the plant has ever

met effluent limitations at its design

capacity or at its present levels of

effluent discharge.

It may be administratively more

convenient for EPA to have the agreement

terminated now. It may be unfair to some

cities which have no comparable agreement

to require them to pay penalties when

they fail to meet effluent limitations.

It may be that EPA made a bad deal when

it signed this consent decree. But none

of these are reasons which justify

termination of the settlement agreement.

The only reason the government gives as a

justification for seeking termination --

"the purpose of the decree has been

satisfied" --is simply not the case.

There may be other reasons to terminate

the agreement, but this one is a legal

fiction. It sets a bad precedent to

25

allow the contract to be set aside on

this basis. I would not simply defer to

the government in such matters of

contract construction and enforcement.

The government is, after all, a party to

the contract.

26

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