Reply Brief — Exxon Shipping Co. v. Ellenwood

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th \ Bupreme Court, WS.

Sears

No. 92-1589 ,

JUN 7 1993

FICE f

a DFFICE OF THE CLERK

Siuprene Cott of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

EXXON SHIPPING COMPANY,

Petitioner,

V.

THEODORE M. ELLENWOoOD and ANN M. ELLENWOOD,

— Respondents,

STATE OF MAINE,

Intervenor-Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

CHARLES G. BAKALY, JR. ROBERT M. HAYES

(Counsel of Record) Moon, Moss, MCGILL &

ALBERT J. SOLECKI, JR. BACHELDER

O’MELVENY & MYERS Ten Free Street

400 South Hope Street P.O. Box 7250

15th Floor Portland, ME 04112-7250

Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899 (207) 775-6001

(213) 669-6000

Attorneys for Petitioner

WILSON - EPes PRINTING Co.,. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

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"BEST AVAILABLE COPY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT W000...

i

THE FIRST CIRCUIT APPLICATION OF

STATE HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION

LAWS TO MARITIME EMPLOYMENT

SHOULD BE REVIEWED BY THE COURT.

A. Both the State and Ellenwood Misconstrue

the Disruptive Effect the First Circuit’s De

cision Will Have on the Maritime Industry..

B. In the Absence of a Substantial Single State

Interest, Supreme Court Precedent Prohibits

Disruption of Maritime Uniformity .............

THERE IS A MATERIAL SPLIT BETWEEN

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AND THE FIRST

CIRCUIT ON THE PREEMPTIVE EFFECT

OF SECTION 503 OF THE REHABILITA-

SE EE aldeinnccicadsaasapaibianidaainitinctouen

ELLENWOOD’S CONTRACT CLAIMS WERE

BASED ON EXXON SHIPPING’S EMPLOYEE

SUBSTANCE ABUSE POLICY .....000000.

CONCLUSION ............... pesdsmaceaaes Sei sccuaueetgagaaans

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.,

RE Rah Se I esescosntncateres cde deed 5

Coiorado Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v. Con-

tinental Airlines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963) —.............. 4

Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 719 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir.

STEED cccsceneleisbéanacen anamianccncedem stapes a 1,6

Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961).. 5

Peterson v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 759 F.2d

1161 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946

A ele eens aa RCS) Ee NII NORE iy tte ben BNF ocs 6

Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S.

354 (1958) -...000.0.. ee... ae 5

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council + v. Garmon, “359

RE NE IID ss. deoovvvnsccsncicesvuantcestrresereretaeanees 6

Southern Pacific Co. v. Jenson, 244 U.S. 205

Ej Seperate eae eT a Tyee igi 4

Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1931) 4

Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715

RIES -ctccastricthsaccnuiswareecciannevnanabandigncis saan 5

Statutes and Regulations

American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

es | SR ER ROD ter dct A 2,3

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 503, 29 U.S. C.

WPMD sacaconccccsacacuayseniuaeteaen eed RE Rn tS AAS 4.4%, 6,7

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

No. 92-1589

EXXON SHIPPING COMPANY,

i Petitioner,

THEODORE M. ELLENWOOD and ANN M. ELLENWOOD,

espondents,

and Respond

STATE OF MAINE,

Intervenor-Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Respondents’ opposition to the petition for a writ of

certiorari discounts the disruption the First Circuit’s de-

cision poses to the maritime industry. As a result, re-

spondents dismiss the importance of this case to an

industry critical to the national interest. Respondents

also ignore the impact of Supreme Court precedent hold-

ing that where no particular state has a significant in-

terest in a maritime dispute, there is no “local but mari-

time” rationale to apply state law and undermine the

uniformity of admiralty law.

In addition, analysis of Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 719

F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1983), shows that the Eleventh

2

Circuit—in conflict with the First Circuit—has held that

Congress intended to require uniform standards of con-

duct in the area of handicap discrimination for federal

contractors. Respondents’ efforts to distingiush the two

cases are off point.

Finally, Ellenwood unabashedly distorts the trial record

in contending that his contract claims were based on

something other than an employee substance abuse policy.

Such distortions may not avoid the question for which

review is sought: should maritime law recognize an excep-

tion to the at-will employment doctrine based on repre-

sentations contained in an employee policy statement.

I. THE FIRST CIRCUIT APPLICATION OF STATE

HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION LAWS TO MARI-

TIME EMPLOYMENT SHOULD BE REVIEWED BY

THE COURT

A. Both the State and Ellenwood Misconstrue the Dis-

ruptive Effect the First Circuit’s Decision Will Have

on the Maritime Industry

Both the State of Maine (the “State’) and Theodore

and Ann Ellenwood (‘‘Ellenwood’’) misconstrue the dis-

ruptive effect the First Circuit’s decision will have on the

maritime industry. For its part, the State contends that

the Americans With Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42

U.S.C. $ 12101 et seqg., somehow “totally undercuts”

concerns about inconsistent and uncertain standards

governing handicap discrimination in maritime employ-

ment. See State of Maine’s Brief in Opposition at 5

(“State Br.”’). From that proposition, the State argues

that this case is no longer important to the maritime

industry. /d. But enforcement of a federal statute, be it

the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 503, 29

U.S.C. § 793, is enforcement of a single standard of

conduct, not enforcement of up to 50 disparate standards

of conduct. The fact that the ADA does not, by its

terms, preempt state discrimination laws is irrelevant to

3

the issue posed by the decision of the First Circuit: is

there a need to disrupt the harmony of admiralty by

requiring maritime enforcement of various state handicap

discrimination statutes.’

Both the State and Ellenwood wrongly argue that

choice of law rules will immunize maritime employers

from inconsistent application of state laws. See Ellen-

wood Br. at 14 n.9, 17-18; State Br. at 7 n.3. It may

well be true that, under the First Circuit decision, an

individual seaman may recover under only one state

handicap discrimination law on a given claim. But years

into this litigation it is still undecided as to which of the

State statutes alleged by Ellenwood (Maine, New Jersey

or Texas) apply, and the First Circuit decision guarantees

such uncertainty will become an abiding characteristic of

maritime law. Choice of law principles offer no relief to

the maritime employer.

Factors applied in any given interest analysis will differ

among crew members on board a single ship. A crew

will consist of residents of many different states; hiring

locations will vary; crew members will sail on different

voyages at different times. For each crew member on

board a ship a different result may well flow from the

application of conflict rules, even to the extent that such

1 Ellenwood asserts that state handicap discrimination laws “al-

ready play a large role” in the development of rules of conduct for

employers under federal handicap discrimination statutes. Ellen-

wood Brief in Opposition at 15-16 (“Ellenwood Br.’’). From this

truism, Ellenwood argues that application of 50 state laws will

pose no danger to the harmony and uniformity of maritime law.

Id. Of course, it is one thing to apply the amalgam of laws derived

from various sources to create a single comprehensive federal

standard governing handicap discrimination. It is something else

to apply each of those differing sources of law to specific disputes.

It is relevant that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act already

protect seamen from handicap discrimination—without any injury

to maritime uniformity. Contrary to Ellenwood’s argument, Ellen-

wood Br. at 18, there is no practical or humanitarian need to ex-

tend that protection by application of disparate state laws.

4

rules are themselves uniform. The maritime employer

will face the regulatory nightmare of complying with

inconsistent handicap discrimination standards and pro-

cedures on board a single ship. See Petition for Certiorari

at_t0-14. This illustrates what makes the maritime in-

dustry different from land-based industries. On _ land,

even a muiti-national employer usually will face common

obligations to employees at a single plant. Choice of law

rules do not, by any measure, lessen the impact of the

First Circuit decision on the maritime industry.

The heavy reliance placed by Ellenwood on Colorado

Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, 372

U.S. 714 (1963), underscores his misunderstanding of

the chaotic effect application of state handicap discrimina-

tion laws will have here. In Continental Airlines the Court

held that a Colorado race discrimination statute would

not place an unconstitutional burden on interstate com-

merce.. The Court correctly found that in the area of

racial discrimination (in sharp contrast to handicap dis-

crimination) “the threat of diverse and conflicting regu-

lation is virtually non-existent.” 7d. at 721. Should the

First Circuit decision stand, maritime employers will in-

evitably face the diverse and conflicting regulation that

maritime law seeks to avoid.

B. In the Absence of a Substantial Single State Inter-

est, Supreme Court Precedent Prohibits Disruption

of Maritime Uniformity

Most of the discussion of cases by the respondents on

the principles governing state law supplementation of

maritime law is unobjectionable save for one fatal in-

firmity. Respondents fail to note that this Court will not

permit substantial disruptions of admiralty’s uniformity by

application of a state law unless that state has a localized

2The commerce clause has never demanded the same degree of

harmony and uniformity that has been the hallmark of maritime

law. Compare Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1931) with South-

ern Pacific Co. v. Jenson, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).

5

and important interest in the application of its law. The

First Circuit’s adoption into maritime law of disparate

state handicap discrimination laws, when no single state

has a local interest to be served, has no support in the

precedents of the Court.

There is no disagreement that maritime law has room

to accommodate state law. But it is also undisputed “that

state law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal

maritime law when this Court finds inroads on a har-

monious system.”” Romero v. Intl Terminal Operating

Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373 (1958). The wooden application

of state law advanced here by respondents—and adopted

by the First Circuit—ignores “the highly intricate inter-

play of the States and the National Government in their

regulation of maritime commerce.” /d. In each case dis-

cussed by the respondents, this Court identified localized

state interests before permitting application of a state

law to a situation that would disrupt admiralty’s uni-

formity. It is not enough to say that states generally have

an interest in the subject of employment discrimination.

See Ellenwood Br. at 14. For a state law to intrude into

admiralty’s harmony. a specific state must have a sig-

nificant and important localized interest in the conduct

being regulated. See, ¢.g., Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,

147 U.S. 715 (1980) (holding that Pennsylvania’s work-

ers compensation law may be applied in. case of land-

based iniury) (see Ellenwood Br. at 16); Askew v. Amer-

ican Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 343

(1973) (holding that Florida’s shoreline oil spill clean-

up requirements may be applied in a case involving “sea-

to-shore pollution” on Florida’s coast) (see State Br. at

11-12): Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 741

(1961) (refusing to apply New York’s statute of frauds

where the contract at issue was not one “peculiarly a

matter of state law and local concerns”) (see Ellenwood

Br. at 13). Where there is no localized single state in-

terest, there is no place in admiralty for application of a

particular state’s law.

6

II. THERE IS A MATERIAL SPLIT BETWEEN THE

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AND THE FIRST CIRCUIT

ON THE PREEMPTIVE EFFECT OF SECTION 503

OF THE REHABILITATION ACT

Both Ellenwood and the State misconstrue the con-

flict between the decision of the First Circuit and the de-

cision of the Eleventh Circuit in Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc.,

supra. Here, the First Circuit interpreted the Congres-

sional intent underlying section 503 of the Rehabilitation

Act and concluded that Congress was unconcerned over

consistency in the standards of conduct for federal con-

tractors. 984 F.2d at 1270. As a consequence, the First

Circuit found no federal preemption of Ellenwood’s state

handicap discrimination or state contract claims. In sharp

conflict was the Eleventh Circuit’s finding that Congress

intended a uniform rule of conduct for federal contrac-

tors. As a consequence of that interpretation, the Howard

court held that Congress preempted state contract claims

based on the same conduct regulated by section 503.

Howard, 719 F.2d at 1561.

Neither Exxon Shipping nor the district court contended

that there is a complete identity of claims between How-

ard and this case. Preemption of state claims is deter-

mined by analysis of the conduct regulated by federal

law, not by reference to the legal theories advanced to

attack such conduct. See Peterson v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n,

Intl, 759 F.2d 1161, 1168 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474

U.S. 946 (1985), citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Coun-

cil v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). The con-

duct at issue underlying Ellenwood’s claims based on

statute (unlike Howard) and contract (like Howard) is

the identical conduct underlying Ellenwood’s claim filed

with the federal government under section 503 of the

Rehabilitation Act. That this action is based on “unre-

lated causes of action,” Ellenwood Br. at 6, is arguable.

That this action is based on the identical conduct regu-

lated by section 503 is not .

4

/

Either section 503 is preemptive of state claims based

on conduct regulated by the Rehabilitation Act or it is

not. On that point, the First Circuit and the Eleventh

Circuit are in conflict. This is an issue of significant im-

portance to federal contractors nation-wide. The Court

should resolve that conflict.

Ill. ELLENWOOD’S CONTRACT CLAIMS WERE

BASED ON EXXON SHIPPING’S EMPLOYEE SUB-

STANCE ABUSE POLICY

Ellenwood grossly distorts the basis of his contract

claims which, at trial, were unquestionably based on

Exxon . Shipping’s employee substance abuse policies.’

Transparently, Ellenwood seeks to avoid review by the

Court of the First Circuit’s first impression ruling permit-

ting a maritime at-will employee to infer an employment

contract from an employee policy statement. That im-

portant question of law should not be lost by Ellenwood’s

recasting of his contract claims.

In his opening statement, see Tr. Vol. I at 29-47, and

his closing statement, see Tr. Vol. XI at 76-77, Ellen-

wood referred solely to Exxon Shipping’s substance abuse

policy as a basis for his contract claims. The district

court’s jury instruction could not be clearer:

“Contract. The first claim is pursued by Mr. Ellen-

wood alone. He claims that Exxon Shipping entered

into a contract with him that it would not relieve

him of his duties as a chief engineer for seeking

alcohol rehabilitation .. .

“The language focused on by the parties is that con-

tained in the various Exxon Shipping policy provi-

3 There was some dispute at trial whether a 1987 or a 1984 sub-

stance abuse policy was in effect during 1988 when Ellenwood was

hospitalized for alcohol abuse. That dispute is immaterial here: in

either case, Ellenwood’s contract claims were based on Exxon

Shipping’s substance abuse policy. Both the district court and the

First Circuit were well aware of this. See A.3, A.21, A.28.

8

sions concerning employee use of alcohol and

rehabilitation.”

Tr. Vol. XI at 43-44. Diversionary assertions by Ellen-

wood should not distract the Court from reviewing the

First Circuit’s recognition of an implied maritime employ-

ment contract based on an employee policy statement.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES G. BAKALY, JR. ROBERT M. HAYES

(Counsel of Record) Moon, Moss, McGILh &

ALBERT J. SOLECKI, JR. BACHELDER

O’MELVENY & MYERS Ten Free Street

400 South Hope Street P.O. Box 7250

15th Floor Portland, ME 04112-7250

Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899 (207) 775-6001

(213) 669-6000

Attorneys for Petitioner

Dated: June 7, 1993

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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