Reply Brief — Exxon Shipping Co. v. Ellenwood
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th \ Bupreme Court, WS.
Sears
No. 92-1589 ,
JUN 7 1993
FICE f
a DFFICE OF THE CLERK
Siuprene Cott of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
EXXON SHIPPING COMPANY,
Petitioner,
V.
THEODORE M. ELLENWOoOD and ANN M. ELLENWOOD,
— Respondents,
STATE OF MAINE,
Intervenor-Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
CHARLES G. BAKALY, JR. ROBERT M. HAYES
(Counsel of Record) Moon, Moss, MCGILL &
ALBERT J. SOLECKI, JR. BACHELDER
O’MELVENY & MYERS Ten Free Street
400 South Hope Street P.O. Box 7250
15th Floor Portland, ME 04112-7250
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899 (207) 775-6001
(213) 669-6000
Attorneys for Petitioner
WILSON - EPes PRINTING Co.,. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
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"BEST AVAILABLE COPY
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT W000...
i
THE FIRST CIRCUIT APPLICATION OF
STATE HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION
LAWS TO MARITIME EMPLOYMENT
SHOULD BE REVIEWED BY THE COURT.
A. Both the State and Ellenwood Misconstrue
the Disruptive Effect the First Circuit’s De
cision Will Have on the Maritime Industry..
B. In the Absence of a Substantial Single State
Interest, Supreme Court Precedent Prohibits
Disruption of Maritime Uniformity .............
THERE IS A MATERIAL SPLIT BETWEEN
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AND THE FIRST
CIRCUIT ON THE PREEMPTIVE EFFECT
OF SECTION 503 OF THE REHABILITA-
SE EE aldeinnccicadsaasapaibianidaainitinctouen
ELLENWOOD’S CONTRACT CLAIMS WERE
BASED ON EXXON SHIPPING’S EMPLOYEE
SUBSTANCE ABUSE POLICY .....000000.
CONCLUSION ............... pesdsmaceaaes Sei sccuaueetgagaaans
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.,
RE Rah Se I esescosntncateres cde deed 5
Coiorado Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v. Con-
tinental Airlines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963) —.............. 4
Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 719 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir.
STEED cccsceneleisbéanacen anamianccncedem stapes a 1,6
Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961).. 5
Peterson v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 759 F.2d
1161 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946
A ele eens aa RCS) Ee NII NORE iy tte ben BNF ocs 6
Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S.
354 (1958) -...000.0.. ee... ae 5
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council + v. Garmon, “359
RE NE IID ss. deoovvvnsccsncicesvuantcestrresereretaeanees 6
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jenson, 244 U.S. 205
Ej Seperate eae eT a Tyee igi 4
Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1931) 4
Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715
RIES -ctccastricthsaccnuiswareecciannevnanabandigncis saan 5
Statutes and Regulations
American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
es | SR ER ROD ter dct A 2,3
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 503, 29 U.S. C.
WPMD sacaconccccsacacuayseniuaeteaen eed RE Rn tS AAS 4.4%, 6,7
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
No. 92-1589
EXXON SHIPPING COMPANY,
i Petitioner,
THEODORE M. ELLENWOOD and ANN M. ELLENWOOD,
espondents,
and Respond
STATE OF MAINE,
Intervenor-Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Respondents’ opposition to the petition for a writ of
certiorari discounts the disruption the First Circuit’s de-
cision poses to the maritime industry. As a result, re-
spondents dismiss the importance of this case to an
industry critical to the national interest. Respondents
also ignore the impact of Supreme Court precedent hold-
ing that where no particular state has a significant in-
terest in a maritime dispute, there is no “local but mari-
time” rationale to apply state law and undermine the
uniformity of admiralty law.
In addition, analysis of Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 719
F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1983), shows that the Eleventh
2
Circuit—in conflict with the First Circuit—has held that
Congress intended to require uniform standards of con-
duct in the area of handicap discrimination for federal
contractors. Respondents’ efforts to distingiush the two
cases are off point.
Finally, Ellenwood unabashedly distorts the trial record
in contending that his contract claims were based on
something other than an employee substance abuse policy.
Such distortions may not avoid the question for which
review is sought: should maritime law recognize an excep-
tion to the at-will employment doctrine based on repre-
sentations contained in an employee policy statement.
I. THE FIRST CIRCUIT APPLICATION OF STATE
HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION LAWS TO MARI-
TIME EMPLOYMENT SHOULD BE REVIEWED BY
THE COURT
A. Both the State and Ellenwood Misconstrue the Dis-
ruptive Effect the First Circuit’s Decision Will Have
on the Maritime Industry
Both the State of Maine (the “State’) and Theodore
and Ann Ellenwood (‘‘Ellenwood’’) misconstrue the dis-
ruptive effect the First Circuit’s decision will have on the
maritime industry. For its part, the State contends that
the Americans With Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42
U.S.C. $ 12101 et seqg., somehow “totally undercuts”
concerns about inconsistent and uncertain standards
governing handicap discrimination in maritime employ-
ment. See State of Maine’s Brief in Opposition at 5
(“State Br.”’). From that proposition, the State argues
that this case is no longer important to the maritime
industry. /d. But enforcement of a federal statute, be it
the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 503, 29
U.S.C. § 793, is enforcement of a single standard of
conduct, not enforcement of up to 50 disparate standards
of conduct. The fact that the ADA does not, by its
terms, preempt state discrimination laws is irrelevant to
3
the issue posed by the decision of the First Circuit: is
there a need to disrupt the harmony of admiralty by
requiring maritime enforcement of various state handicap
discrimination statutes.’
Both the State and Ellenwood wrongly argue that
choice of law rules will immunize maritime employers
from inconsistent application of state laws. See Ellen-
wood Br. at 14 n.9, 17-18; State Br. at 7 n.3. It may
well be true that, under the First Circuit decision, an
individual seaman may recover under only one state
handicap discrimination law on a given claim. But years
into this litigation it is still undecided as to which of the
State statutes alleged by Ellenwood (Maine, New Jersey
or Texas) apply, and the First Circuit decision guarantees
such uncertainty will become an abiding characteristic of
maritime law. Choice of law principles offer no relief to
the maritime employer.
Factors applied in any given interest analysis will differ
among crew members on board a single ship. A crew
will consist of residents of many different states; hiring
locations will vary; crew members will sail on different
voyages at different times. For each crew member on
board a ship a different result may well flow from the
application of conflict rules, even to the extent that such
1 Ellenwood asserts that state handicap discrimination laws “al-
ready play a large role” in the development of rules of conduct for
employers under federal handicap discrimination statutes. Ellen-
wood Brief in Opposition at 15-16 (“Ellenwood Br.’’). From this
truism, Ellenwood argues that application of 50 state laws will
pose no danger to the harmony and uniformity of maritime law.
Id. Of course, it is one thing to apply the amalgam of laws derived
from various sources to create a single comprehensive federal
standard governing handicap discrimination. It is something else
to apply each of those differing sources of law to specific disputes.
It is relevant that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act already
protect seamen from handicap discrimination—without any injury
to maritime uniformity. Contrary to Ellenwood’s argument, Ellen-
wood Br. at 18, there is no practical or humanitarian need to ex-
tend that protection by application of disparate state laws.
4
rules are themselves uniform. The maritime employer
will face the regulatory nightmare of complying with
inconsistent handicap discrimination standards and pro-
cedures on board a single ship. See Petition for Certiorari
at_t0-14. This illustrates what makes the maritime in-
dustry different from land-based industries. On _ land,
even a muiti-national employer usually will face common
obligations to employees at a single plant. Choice of law
rules do not, by any measure, lessen the impact of the
First Circuit decision on the maritime industry.
The heavy reliance placed by Ellenwood on Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, 372
U.S. 714 (1963), underscores his misunderstanding of
the chaotic effect application of state handicap discrimina-
tion laws will have here. In Continental Airlines the Court
held that a Colorado race discrimination statute would
not place an unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
merce.. The Court correctly found that in the area of
racial discrimination (in sharp contrast to handicap dis-
crimination) “the threat of diverse and conflicting regu-
lation is virtually non-existent.” 7d. at 721. Should the
First Circuit decision stand, maritime employers will in-
evitably face the diverse and conflicting regulation that
maritime law seeks to avoid.
B. In the Absence of a Substantial Single State Inter-
est, Supreme Court Precedent Prohibits Disruption
of Maritime Uniformity
Most of the discussion of cases by the respondents on
the principles governing state law supplementation of
maritime law is unobjectionable save for one fatal in-
firmity. Respondents fail to note that this Court will not
permit substantial disruptions of admiralty’s uniformity by
application of a state law unless that state has a localized
2The commerce clause has never demanded the same degree of
harmony and uniformity that has been the hallmark of maritime
law. Compare Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1931) with South-
ern Pacific Co. v. Jenson, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
5
and important interest in the application of its law. The
First Circuit’s adoption into maritime law of disparate
state handicap discrimination laws, when no single state
has a local interest to be served, has no support in the
precedents of the Court.
There is no disagreement that maritime law has room
to accommodate state law. But it is also undisputed “that
state law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal
maritime law when this Court finds inroads on a har-
monious system.”” Romero v. Intl Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373 (1958). The wooden application
of state law advanced here by respondents—and adopted
by the First Circuit—ignores “the highly intricate inter-
play of the States and the National Government in their
regulation of maritime commerce.” /d. In each case dis-
cussed by the respondents, this Court identified localized
state interests before permitting application of a state
law to a situation that would disrupt admiralty’s uni-
formity. It is not enough to say that states generally have
an interest in the subject of employment discrimination.
See Ellenwood Br. at 14. For a state law to intrude into
admiralty’s harmony. a specific state must have a sig-
nificant and important localized interest in the conduct
being regulated. See, ¢.g., Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,
147 U.S. 715 (1980) (holding that Pennsylvania’s work-
ers compensation law may be applied in. case of land-
based iniury) (see Ellenwood Br. at 16); Askew v. Amer-
ican Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 343
(1973) (holding that Florida’s shoreline oil spill clean-
up requirements may be applied in a case involving “sea-
to-shore pollution” on Florida’s coast) (see State Br. at
11-12): Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 741
(1961) (refusing to apply New York’s statute of frauds
where the contract at issue was not one “peculiarly a
matter of state law and local concerns”) (see Ellenwood
Br. at 13). Where there is no localized single state in-
terest, there is no place in admiralty for application of a
particular state’s law.
6
II. THERE IS A MATERIAL SPLIT BETWEEN THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AND THE FIRST CIRCUIT
ON THE PREEMPTIVE EFFECT OF SECTION 503
OF THE REHABILITATION ACT
Both Ellenwood and the State misconstrue the con-
flict between the decision of the First Circuit and the de-
cision of the Eleventh Circuit in Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
supra. Here, the First Circuit interpreted the Congres-
sional intent underlying section 503 of the Rehabilitation
Act and concluded that Congress was unconcerned over
consistency in the standards of conduct for federal con-
tractors. 984 F.2d at 1270. As a consequence, the First
Circuit found no federal preemption of Ellenwood’s state
handicap discrimination or state contract claims. In sharp
conflict was the Eleventh Circuit’s finding that Congress
intended a uniform rule of conduct for federal contrac-
tors. As a consequence of that interpretation, the Howard
court held that Congress preempted state contract claims
based on the same conduct regulated by section 503.
Howard, 719 F.2d at 1561.
Neither Exxon Shipping nor the district court contended
that there is a complete identity of claims between How-
ard and this case. Preemption of state claims is deter-
mined by analysis of the conduct regulated by federal
law, not by reference to the legal theories advanced to
attack such conduct. See Peterson v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n,
Intl, 759 F.2d 1161, 1168 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 946 (1985), citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Coun-
cil v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). The con-
duct at issue underlying Ellenwood’s claims based on
statute (unlike Howard) and contract (like Howard) is
the identical conduct underlying Ellenwood’s claim filed
with the federal government under section 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act. That this action is based on “unre-
lated causes of action,” Ellenwood Br. at 6, is arguable.
That this action is based on the identical conduct regu-
lated by section 503 is not .
4
/
Either section 503 is preemptive of state claims based
on conduct regulated by the Rehabilitation Act or it is
not. On that point, the First Circuit and the Eleventh
Circuit are in conflict. This is an issue of significant im-
portance to federal contractors nation-wide. The Court
should resolve that conflict.
Ill. ELLENWOOD’S CONTRACT CLAIMS WERE
BASED ON EXXON SHIPPING’S EMPLOYEE SUB-
STANCE ABUSE POLICY
Ellenwood grossly distorts the basis of his contract
claims which, at trial, were unquestionably based on
Exxon . Shipping’s employee substance abuse policies.’
Transparently, Ellenwood seeks to avoid review by the
Court of the First Circuit’s first impression ruling permit-
ting a maritime at-will employee to infer an employment
contract from an employee policy statement. That im-
portant question of law should not be lost by Ellenwood’s
recasting of his contract claims.
In his opening statement, see Tr. Vol. I at 29-47, and
his closing statement, see Tr. Vol. XI at 76-77, Ellen-
wood referred solely to Exxon Shipping’s substance abuse
policy as a basis for his contract claims. The district
court’s jury instruction could not be clearer:
“Contract. The first claim is pursued by Mr. Ellen-
wood alone. He claims that Exxon Shipping entered
into a contract with him that it would not relieve
him of his duties as a chief engineer for seeking
alcohol rehabilitation .. .
“The language focused on by the parties is that con-
tained in the various Exxon Shipping policy provi-
3 There was some dispute at trial whether a 1987 or a 1984 sub-
stance abuse policy was in effect during 1988 when Ellenwood was
hospitalized for alcohol abuse. That dispute is immaterial here: in
either case, Ellenwood’s contract claims were based on Exxon
Shipping’s substance abuse policy. Both the district court and the
First Circuit were well aware of this. See A.3, A.21, A.28.
8
sions concerning employee use of alcohol and
rehabilitation.”
Tr. Vol. XI at 43-44. Diversionary assertions by Ellen-
wood should not distract the Court from reviewing the
First Circuit’s recognition of an implied maritime employ-
ment contract based on an employee policy statement.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
CHARLES G. BAKALY, JR. ROBERT M. HAYES
(Counsel of Record) Moon, Moss, McGILh &
ALBERT J. SOLECKI, JR. BACHELDER
O’MELVENY & MYERS Ten Free Street
400 South Hope Street P.O. Box 7250
15th Floor Portland, ME 04112-7250
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899 (207) 775-6001
(213) 669-6000
Attorneys for Petitioner
Dated: June 7, 1993
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