Opposition Brief — Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District 21

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No. 92-1377 | OEFICE OF THe 2

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

ROBERT IAN SHERMAN, for himself and as natural

guardian for RICHARD HARRY SHERMAN, a minor son,

Petitioners,

Ve

COMMUNITY CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT 21

OF WHEELING TOWNSHIP, LLOYD DESCARPENTRIE,

School District Superintendent, and DR. FERNE GARRETT,

Principal of Riley School, individually and as representatives

of the State of Illinois, and ROLAND W. BURRIS,

Attorney General of the State of Illinois,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United

States Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

ROBERT P. RESKE

Counsel of Record

JEROME G. McSHERRY & ASSOCIATES

500 West Madison Street, Suite 890

Chicago, Illinois 60661-2511

(312) 930-5500

Attorney for Respondents Community

Consolidated School District 21 of

Wheeling Township, Lloyd Descarpentre

and Dr. Ferne Garrett

Midwest Law Printing Co., Chicago 60611, (312) 321-0220

Ge i,

A ae Oe

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LIST OF ALL PARTIES

ROBERT IAN SHERMAN,

(for himself and as natural

guardian of Richard Harry Sherman)

RICHARD HARRY SHERMAN,

a Minor,

Petitioners and Plaintiffs below

COMMUNITY CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT 21

OF WHEELING TOWNSHIP,

LLOYD DESCARPENTRIE

(SCHOOL DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT),

DR. FERNE GARRETT

(PRINCIPAL OF RILEY SCHOOL),

ROLAND BURRIS,

(ATTORNEY GENERAL

FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS)

Respondents and Defendants below

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Ric) i ee 8 4 yi >. rr i

TAD OF COUNTERING $< incnsncunatuneeneee il

TABLE OF AUTHORETUBD c.ccccccvivenaven ili

SLALULUEE PRU EOROONS 6c nscccccinuununs 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............... 3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................ 6

PU fa) 4.» eee rere ie C8 eee 7

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT:

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS

CONSISTENT WITH LEMON v. KURTZMAN,

403 U.S. 602 (1971) AND LEE v. WEISMAN, 112

S. CT. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) .........

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DID NOT ADOPT

THE DOCTRINE OF “CEREMONIAL DEISM”’

IN PLACE OF THE LEMON TEST ........ 9

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CONSIDERED THE

SPECIAL INTERESTS OF SCHOOL-AGED

CHILDREN WHEN RENDERING ITS DE-

CCEA Sa cecnnescueba th eeee ea aneh Seaman 9

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF AP-

PEALS DID NOT REWRITE THE PLEDGE

39 gly y rare er ery err 11

~]

ot) rrr s sores re 13

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases PAGE(s)

Abbington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S.

etn Se 6 oa hdc bua eaedcens 8

Andrews v. Foxworthy, 71 Ill. 2d 13, 373 N.E.2d

A RE rr ean 11

Aquilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 105 S. Ct. 3232

a SL Gs ee 5

Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 106 S. Ct. 3159

RADE 10

Board of Education of Westside Community Schools

v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990) ......... 10

Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491,

OE 11, 12

Country Mutual Insurance Company v. Knight,

40 Ill. 2d 423, 240 N.E.2d 612 (1968) ...... 4,11

County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086

eee oe eed kwaentiansce 5; 8

Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) ..... 8

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) .......... 8

Grand Rapids School District v. Bell, 437 U.S. 373

eek CK RA A based awkwc es 8

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. , 120 L.Ed.2d 467

a SSI SSA GR a 5, 6, 7,8

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 6022, 91 S. Ct. 2105

es OG ca bunk os kkk bea 4,6, 7,8

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 1355

eee Ls ibaa ) vas ec we con's 8

Palmer v. Board of Education of the City of Chi-

cago, 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979) ........ 10

iV

Sherman v. Community Consol. Dist. 21, 714 F.

ae ree 3

Sherman v. Community Consol. Dist. 21, 745 F.

UN. Dd CED ec kscctobevisccenceseavss 3

Sherman v. Community Consol. Dist. 21, 758 F.

NL Re COED 9 US Rw Rika ae Ae eae hone ees 3,4

Sherman v. Community Consolidated District 21,

980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992) ............ 4, 5, 6,9

St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran v. South Dakota,

451 U.S. 772, 101 S. Ct. 2142 (1981) ....... 11

Van Zandt v. Thompson, 839 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir.

WE An aah eR AAA Rae bree eaeeeewinee 12

Illinois Statutes

105 ILCS 5/27-3 (Formerly Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 122,

WE EE hua sa ea cceuLecaeeaeakaeee boa ens 2

Legislative History

Ill. Gen. Assembly, Senate Fioor Debates,

May ZB, 1979, pp. ZTBRIG .......0cescceees 10

Ill. Gen. Assembly, House Floor Debates,

fF @ . SS rere rer eee 10

Ill. Gen. Assembly, Senate Floor Debates,

Ce SES Rr eer eee 10

Ill. Legislative Service, PA 81-959, 1979 ...... 10

No. 92-1377

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

ROBERT IAN SHERMAN, for himself and as natural

guardian for RICHARD HARRY SHERMAN, a minor son,

Petitioners,

_-

COMMUNITY CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT 21

OF WHEELING TOWNSHIP, LLOYD DESCARPENTRIE,

School District Superintendent, and DR. FERNE GARRETT,

Principal of Riley School, individually and as representatives

of the State of Illinois, and ROLAND W. BURRIS,

Attorney General of the State of Illinois,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United

States Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Patriotism and principles of representative government—

Proper use of the flag—Method of voting—Pledge of Alle-

giance.

Section 27-3. Patriotism and principles of representative

government—Proper use of flag—Method of voting—Pledge

of Allegiance. American patriotism and the principles of

representative government, as enunciated in the American

Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United

States of America and the Constitution of the State of

Illinois, and the proper and display of the American flag,

shall be taught in all public schools (Emphasis added) and

other educational institutions supported or maintained in

whole or in part by public funds. No student shall receive

a certificate of graduation without passing the satisfac-

tory examination upon such subjects.

Instructions shall be given in all such schools and institu-

tions in the method of voting at elections by means of

the Australian Ballot System and the method of the count-

ing of votes for candidates.

The Pledge of Allegiance shall be recited each school day

by peoples in elementary educational institutions sup-

ported or maintained in whole or in part by public funds.

105 ILCS 5/27-3 (Formerly Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 122, Par. 27-3).

=

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 28, 1988, plaintiff Robert Ian Sherman, for

himself and as natural guardian for Richard Harry Sher-

man and the Society of Separationists, Inc. filed a pro se

complaint, in the United States District Court in Northern

District of Illinois, against the Community Consolidated

School District 21 of Wheeling Township, Lloyd Des Car-

pentries, School District Superintendent and Dr. Ferne

Garrett, Principal of Riley School (School Defendants) al-

leging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Plaintiffs contend that the last paragraph of the Illinois

Pledge Law, 105 ILCS 5/27-3 (formerly Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch.

122, Par. 27-3) was unconstitutional in that it required

plaintiff, Richard Harry Sherman, an Atheist, to recite

the pledge of allegiance including the phrase “under God”

(R. 1). Later the attorney general of the State of Illinois

was added as a defendant. (R. 64 Re-Amended Complaint

Par. 7.)

In the District Court, all defendants filed a Motion to

Dismiss which was denied. Sherman v. Community Consol.

Dist. 21, 714 F.Supp. 932 (N.D III.1989). Plaintiffs were

allowed to amend their Complaint two times. Defendants

filed another Motion to Dismiss which was similarly de-

nied. Sherman v. Community Consol. Dist. 21, 745 F.Supp.

1371 (1990). Defendants made Motions for Summary Judg-

ment which were granted. Sherman v. Community Consol.

Ist. 21, 758 F.Supp. 1244 (1991). The District Court found

1 The Society of Separationists was dismissed from this suit for

lack of standing by order dated August 17, 1990. Sherman, Supp.

1371 (1990).

voile:

that there was no genuine issues of material fact as to

whether the Illinois Pledge Law passes all three prongs

of the Lemon test.

The Court held that the Illinois Pledge Law satisfied

the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602

(1991). It has a secular purpose, does not advance religion

and does not entangle the government in religion. Forced

readings of the Pledge would pose difficulties under the

Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses, but the Court

concluded that the Statute is not coercive as written or

applied. Although the pledge law states that the pledge

“shall be recited each school day by pupils’, it does not

say by all pupils, in the absence of any penalty implies

that the pupils are entitled to keep silent. Sherman v.

Community Consol. Dist. 21, 758 F.Supp. 1244 (1991).

Plaintiffs appeal to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed

the District Court’s granting of Summary Judgment, find-

ing that neither the Illinois Pledge Law nor the practice of

the School District violated the Free Exercise or Establish-

ment Clauses. The Pledge Law states that the Pledge “shall

be recited each school day by pupils” in public schools.

The court acknowledged that “‘when resolving statutory

ambiguities, the Supreme Court of Illinois adopts readings

that save rather than destroy state laws, e.g., Country

Mutual Insurance Company v. Knight, 40 Ill.2d 423, 240

N.E.2d 612 (1968). The Court reasoned that it makes far

more sense to interpretate this Statute to mean “by will-

ing pupils” rather than “by all pupils.”” Sherman v. Com-

munity Consol. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d at 442. The Court went

on to state that school administrators and teachers satis-

fied the “shall” requirement by leading the pledge and

ensuring that at least some pupils recite it. Leading the

pledge is not optional but participation is. Sherman v.

_

—)—

Community Consol. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d at 442. Ultimate-

ly, the Court relied upon the school authorities’ inherent

power to prescribe the curriculum and found no Free Ex-

ercise Clause violation.

In finding No Establishment Clause violation, the Court

was not disposed to resolve this case by parsing Lemon.

The Court reasoned,

Of course “Lemon” was not devised to identify prayers

smuggled into civic exercises, and its status as a gen-

eral purpose tool for administering the establishment

clause is in doubt . . . The Court heard Lee v. Weis-

man, in large part to reconsider Lemon and Lee con-

cluded without renewing Lemon’s lease. The majority

reserved decision on the future of Lemon. _____ US.

, 112 S.Ct. at 2655. Three members of the ma-

jority signed an opinion employing Lemon, US.

___, 112 S.Ct. at 2663-64 (Blackmun, J., joined by

Stevens & O’Connor, J.J.), but one member of this

group has expressed doubts. Aguilar v. Felton, 473

U.S. 402, 426-30, 105 S.Ct. 3232, 3245-47, 87 L.Ed.2d

290 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The author of

the majority opinion in Lee has disparaged Lemon,

see Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655-56, 109 S.Ct. at 3134

(opinion of Kennedy, J.). The fifth member of the ma-

jority in Lee wrote a concurring opinion that did not

rely on or endorse Lemon. U.S. at , iz

S.Ct. at 2667-78 (Stouter, J.). And four Justices pro-

posed to jettison Lemon forthwith. ____ U.S. at ___,

112 S.Ct. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by

Rehnquist, C. J., and White & Thomas, J.J.). Sher-

man v. Community Consol. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d at

445.

Instead the District Court took a more direct approach.

The Court examined what it regarded as the original in-

tent of the founders of the United States regarding ref-

erences to a deity and concluded that our founding fathers

did not consider such references a violation of the Estab-

-

lishment Clause. ‘Unless we are to treat the founders

of the United States as unable to understand their handy

work (or, worse, hypocrites about it) we must ask whether

those present at the creation deemed ceremonial invoca-

tions of God as ‘Establishment.’ They did not.” Sherman,

980 F.2d at 445.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that the 11th Amend-

ment protected the Attorney General of Illinois from suit

in this case. The court affirmed the District Court’s judg-

ment in all other respects.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Seventh Circuit’s decision is consistent with Lemon

v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) and Lee v. Weisman, 112

S.Ct. 2649, 120 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1992). The court did not

adopt the doctrine of ‘““Ceremonial Deism”’ in place of the

Lemon test. Where the court is faced with a state spon-

sored and state directed religious exercise Lemon may be

the appropriate test. However, where the court is faced

with a school sponsored exercise which is clearly a pa-

triotic exercise, the more appropriate analysis is under

the doctrine of “Ceremonial Deism”’.

The Seventh Circuit considered the special interest of

school age children. The purpose of the Illinois pledge law

is to teach school age children American patriotism and

principles of representative government. The state legis-

lature is entitled to establish a curriculum for its schools

which includes teaching the Pledge of Allegiance and con-

forms with the role and purpose of the American Public

School system which includes teaching those fundamen-

om. Sm

tal values necessary to maintain a democratic political

system.

Illinois and federal laws require statutes to be inter-

preted in a Constitutional manner that they can be inter-

preted in a Constitutional and Unconstitutional manner.

The Seventh Circuit was correct in finding that the word

“shall” does not mean “all” students are required to state

the Pledge of Allegiance. Since Richard Sherman was

never forced to recite the Pledge of Allegiance nor threat-

ened with punishment nor punished for failure to par-

ticipate in the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, his

rights under the Free Exercise clause of the First Amend-

ment were not violated.

ARGUMENT

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS CONSISTENT

WITH LEMON v. KURTZMAN, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) AND

LEE v. WEISMAN, 112 S. CT. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992).

In Lee the majority opinion reserved decision on the

future of Lemon. The court found “(t]he government in-

volvement with religious activity [the inclusion of invoca-

tions and benedictions in the form of prayer at a gradua-

tion ceremony] in this case is pervasive, to the point of

creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious ex-

ercise in a public school. Coiducting this form of religious

observance conflicts with settled rules pertaining to prayer

exercises for students, and that suffices to determine the

question before us’’. Lee v. Weisman 112 S. Ct. at 2655.

=

Petitioners in support of their position rely upon Abbing-

ton School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 303 (1963), (bible

reading in public schools) County of Allegheny v. ACLU,

492 U.S. 573 (1989) (display of a creche and chanukah me-

norah), Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (teach-

ing of creationism in public school), Grand Rapids School

District v. Bell, 4837 U.S. 373 (1985) (bible reading in public

schools) and Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (in-

vocations and benedictions in the form of prayer at a

graduation ceremony) which clearly are persuasive to the

point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed reli-

gious exercise in public schools. Under such circumstances

the three-part Lemon test may be the appropriate test.

However, where the court is faced with a school-sponsored

exercise which is clearly a patriotic exercise, the more

appropriate analysis is under the doctrine of “Ceremonial

Deism’’. Clearly, the pledge statute’s intent is to inspire

devotion to love of country, to instill in young minds a

healthy respect for history, traditions and values of our

democratic form of government and to prepare our stu-

dents for citizenship. The Seventh Circuit was not bound

to apply Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) because

the issue squarely before the court was one of patriotism

not religion. Lynch v. Donnelly 465 U.S. 668, 676, 104

S. Ct. 1355, 1361, included the Pledge of Allegiance and

a list of civic exercises with religious connotations, which

the court found permissible. The court implicitly approved

the Pledge of Allegiance in other cases. See Engel v.

Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 at 345 N. 21. In School District of

Abington Township, 374 U.S. 303, 83 S. Ct. 1560 (1963)

(Brennan, J. concurring), Justice Brennan stated;

““A reference to divinity in the revised Pledge of Alle-

giance .... may merely recognize the historical fact

that our nation was believed to have been founded

‘under God’ thus reciting the Pledge may be no more

=

of a religious exercise than the reading allowed of

Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, which contains an allu-

sion to the same historical fact.”

“For that reason because of their history and ubiquity,

[these] practices are not understood as conveying approval

of particular religious beliefs.” Sherman v. Community

Consol. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 487, 447 (7th Cir. 1992).

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DID NOT ADOPT THE DOC-

TRINE OF “‘CEREMONIAL DEISM”’ IN PLACE OF THE

LEMON TEST.

It cannot be ignored that the District Court found that

the Illinois Pledge law satisfied all three prongs of the

Lemon test “it has a secular purpose, does not advance

religion and does not entangle the government in reli-

gion’. Sherman v. Community Consol. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d

437, 440. This finding is not inconsistent with nor is it

disputed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CONSIDERED THE SPECIAL

INTERESTS OF SCHOOL-AGED CHILDREN WHEN REN-

DERING ITS DECISION.

Petitioners attempt to circumvent the real issues in this

case. They claim that the Seventh Circuit gave absolutely

no consideration to the special elementary school context

of this case. This simply is not true. When one analyzes

the purpose behind the Illinois Pledge Law and applies

that purpose to school-aged children it becomes clear that

the Illinois Legislature had the school childrens’ welfare

in mind when enacting the Pledge Law. The focus of the

Illinois Pledge Law is on teaching ‘“‘American patriotism

and principals of representative government as enunciated

in the American Declaration of Independence, the Consti-

—~10—

tution of the United States of America, and the Constitu-

tion of the State of Illinois.”” 105 IUCS 5/27-3 (formerly

Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 122, Par. 27-3) In Bethel v. Fraser,

478 U.S. 675, 106 S. Ct. 159 (1986), tse Court recognized

that the role and purpose of the American Public School

System includes the “inclusion of fundamental values nec-

essary to the maintenance of the democratic political sys-

tem’’. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681. The Illinois Pledge Law

embodies the secular educational goals recognized by the

Supreme Court in Bethel and is consistent with the prin-

ciples of the First Amendment. The purpose of this leg-

islation was to teach children to respect their country

and to express the legislature’s concern for “patriotism

in our country”’. Ill. Legislative Service, P.A. 81-959, 1979.

Senator Nimrod and Representative Pullen stated several

times that the purpose of the law was to instill patriotic

concern and knowledge of American ideals in elementary

school students. See e.g. Ill. Gen. Assembly, Senate Floor

Debates, May 22, 1979, pp. 273-275; June 28, 1979, p. 92,

House Floor Debates, June 25, 1979, p. 65.

A full reading of the Illinois Pledge Statute shows that

it has a patriotic or educational purpose rather than a re-

ligious purpose. Our Supreme Court, “‘is reluctant to at-

tribute unconstitutional motives to this state, particularly

when a plausible, secular purpose for the State’s program

may be discerned from the face of the statute.” (Citations

omitted.) Board of Education of Westside Community

Schools v. Mergens 110 S.Ct. 2356, 2371 (1990).

A state legislature is entitled to establish a curriculum

for its schools which includes teaching the Pledge of Alle-

giance. In Palmar v. Board of Education of the City of

Chicago, 603 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,

444 U.S. 10226 (1980), the Seventh Circuit heid that a

public school teacher who was opposed to the Pledge and

=i

other patriotic exercises on religious grounds could not

“require others to submit to her views and forego a por-

tion of their education they would otherwise be entitled

to enjoy.” The right of the School Board to decide what

the pupils are taught implies to the corresponding right

to require teachers to act accordingly.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT

REWRITE THE PLEDGE STATUTE

Petitioners contend that the word “shall’’ in the Illinois

Pledge Statute is unambiguous and requires compulsory

recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance. Petitioners argu-

ment on Statutory Construction is not as limited as they

wouid have this Court believe. Illinois and Federal laws

require statutes to be interpreted in a constitutional man-

ner if they can be interpreted in a constitutional and un-

constitutional manners. Country Mutual Insurance v.

Knight, 40 Ill.2d 423, 240 N.E.2d, 612, 614 (1968); St.

Martin Evangelical Lutheran v. South Dakota, 451i U.S.

772, 780, 101 S.Ct. 2142, 2147 (1981).

In Andrews v. Foxworthy, 71 Tll.2d, 13, 373 N.E.2d 1332

(1978), the Illinois Supreme Court stated:

“the use of the words ‘shall’ or ‘must’ is generally

regarded as mandatory. However, the term ‘shall’

does not have a fixed or inflexible meaning. It can,

in fact, be construed as meaning ‘may’ depending on

the legislative intent” Andrews, 373 N.E. 2d at 1335.

Thus, Andrews demonstrates that the Illinois Pledge

Law is not mandatory as petitioners argue.

The Court in Brockett v. Spokane Arcadas, Inc., 472

U.S. 491, 105 S.Ct. 2794 stated;

“{njormally, however, we defer to the construction

of a state statute given it by the lower federal courts

=

.. . We do so not only to render unnecessary review

of their decisions in this respect, but also to reflect

our belief that District Courts and Courts of Appeals

are better schooled in and more able to interpret the

law of their respective states.”’ (Citations omitted)

Brockett, 472 U.S. at 499-500.

Petitioners must also be able to show that the statute

is unconstitutional as applied, not merely that it may be

interpreted as unconstitutional. Van Zandt v. Thompson,

839 F.2d 1215, 1218 (7th Cir. 1988). The petitioners are

unable to show that the Illinois Pledge Law has been ap-

plied in an unconstitutional manner. The uncontroverted

Affidavits of the School Defendants state that it is the

policy and practice of the school district not to require

any student to stand during, recite or otherwise partici-

pate in the Pledge of Allegiance, nor is it the policy and

practice to punish or threaten to punish students because

of their refusal to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance.

(R. 62) Likewise, the minor plaintiff has never been forced

to recite the Pledge of Allegiance or threaten with punish-

ment nor punished for failure to participate in the recita-

tion of the Pledge. Clearly, Richard Sherman’s rights un-

der the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment

were not violated.

—13—

CONCLUSION

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit, should be allowed to stand because

the same is in conformity with the applicable facts and

law and this Court should deny the Petitioners’ petition

for the reasons stated herein.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT P. RESKE

Counsel of Record

JEROME G. McSHERRY & ASSOCIATES

500 West Madison Street, Suite 890

Chicago, Illinois 60661-2511

(312) 930-5500

Attorney for Respondents Community

Consolidated School District 21 of

Wheeling Township, Lloyd Descarpentre

and Dr. Ferne Garrett