Opposition Brief — United Transportation Union v. Cuyahoga Valley Railway Co.

No.

In The

Supreme Court of the Hnited States

+

October Term, 1992

UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION,

Petitioner,

VS.

CUYAHOGA VALLEY RAILWAY COMPANY,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

RONALD J. JAMES

Counsel of Record

SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY

Attorneys for Respondent

4900 Society Center

127 Public Square

Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1304

(216) 479-8500

340)

utz

a ellate (800) 3 APPEAL ¢ (800) 5S APPEAL. * (800) BRIEF 21

Services, inc

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Supreme Court of the United States should granta

Petition for Writ of Certiorari solely to reapply undisputed facts to

well-established and recognized judicial precedent regarding the

classification of a major dispute under the Railway Labor Act, 45

U.S.C. § 151 et seq., as appropriately decided by the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirming the opinion of the

United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Reasons for Denying the Writ ...............ceee00- 2

I. The Sixth Circuit applied appropriate judicial

precedent to the particular facts of the present case.

OUTSET TERT OCT CTO ee 2

II. The Sixth Circuit properly found the UTU’s

challenge to the validity of the Steelworkers’

agreement was a major dispute. ............... 5

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TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Cited:

Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 869 F.2d

SIBLE. TIRE) io i Risa 0s nea weraaseeees 3

Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. United Air Lines, 874 F.2d 439 (7th

CO. OOOe Sa kcvd ven dade ess esa n eee eenere ee 5

if

a, TT |

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Contents

Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United

Transportation Union, 734 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1984) ...

Brotherhood of Railroad of Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S.

ew cau wees eeccuaace

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Smith, 251 F.2d 282

ek cnc cc cs vececesen

Brotherhood Railway Carmen v. Norfolk and Western

Railway Co., 745 F.2d 370 (6th Cir. 1984) ..........

Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives’

oe Re. 1)

Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711

ar

International Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local 158 v. Toledo

Lakefront Dock & Pellet Co., 776 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir.

es Ga ehh Gab Sb uN eb ee cacsecees

Local 1477 United Transp. Union v. Baker, 482 F.2d 228

ES eee eee

Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Pitney, 326

Bt eg b As Gibbs bn a 00s sac sk dns

Order of Railway Conductors and Brakemen v.

Switchmen’s Union of North America, 269 F.2d 726

AE ae STE SR ec

Page

a

iv

Contents

Page

Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’] Ass’n v. Burlington Northern

Railroad Co., 893 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1990) .......... 3

Transportation Communication Employees v. Union

go Me IR et.) ere 4

Statute Cited:

Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § I5l,etseq. ............ passim

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner United Transportation Union (“UTU”) filed an

action in the United States District Court for the Northern District

of Ohio seeking to set aside the award of the Public Law Board (the

“Board”) denying jurisdiction over its dispute with respondent

Cuyahoga Valley Railway Company (the “Carrier’”’). The Board

correctly denied jurisdiction on the basis the dispute did not

involve contract interpretation, but rather involved the Carrier’s

alleged refusal to bargain. The United States District Court for the

Northern District of Ohio and the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit agreed that the UTU’s dispute alleged the

Carrier’s failure to bargain with the UTU and presented a challenge

to the validity of an agreement negotiated between Carrier and a

separate union, the United Steelworkers of America (the

“Steelworkers”), and, thus, is a major dispute outside the

jurisdiction of the Board. (See App. 1-8, App. 10-18 to Petition for

Writ of Certiorari).'

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case presents neither an important statutory issue nor a

conflict between any United States Court of Appeals. As there are

no issues of material fact nor any questions as to the applicable law,

this case presents only petitioner’s request that the Supreme Court

of the United States repeat the Sixth Circuit’s task of applying

particular facts to the law. The Sixth Circuit appropriately applied

the undisputed facts of the present case to well-established and

recognized judicial precedent regarding major and minor disputes

1. The UTU represents three of the four departments in the Carrier's

diesel shop, whereas the Car Department employees are represented by the

Steelworkers. The Carrier was statutorily required to bargain with the

Steelworkers over terms and conditions of employment relative to Car

Department employees for whom it is the exclusive bargaining representative.

2

under the Railway Labor Act (the “RLA”). The Sixth Circuit

properly determined that the facts in the present case supported a

finding of a major dispute which was outside the jurisdiction of the

Public Law Board. For the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s Petition

for Writ of Certiorari fails to meet the requirements for a grant of

such review and must be denied.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I.

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT APPLIED APPROPRIATE

JUDICIAL PRECEDENT TO THE PARTICULAR FACTS

OF THE PRESENT CASE.

In the present case, there are no issues of material fact, nor are

there questions as to applicable law. Under the Railway Labor Act,

minor disputes are within the jurisdiction of the Public Law Board

(“the Board’’), while major disputes are to be decided by the Court.

See generally Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor

Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299 (1989); Elgin, Joliet & Eastern

Railway Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945). In Consolidated Rail,

the Supreme Court clarified the standard for determining whether a

dispute is major or minor under the Act:

The formal demarcation line between major

and minor disputes ... looks to whether a

claim has been made that the terms of the

existing agreement either establish or refute

the presence of a right to take the disputed

action. The distinguishing feature of such a

case is that the dispute may be conclusively

resolved by interpreting the _ existing

agreement.

3

Id. at 305 (emphasis added). This Court described a minor dispute

as one where the Carrier asserts its actions are “arguably justified

by the terms of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.” Jd. at

307.* Thus, for a dispute to be minor under the RLA, a claim must

be made that the Carrier’s actions are arguably justified by the

terms of the agreement, and the dispute must be able to be

conclusively resolved by interpreting the agreement. Jd. at 305-07.

See also Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Burlington Northern

Railroad Co., 893 F.2d 199, 204 (8th Cir. 1990).(“‘dispute may be

conclusively resolved by interpreting the scope clause of the

existing collective bargaining agreement [between the

parties]. ... Accordingly, the dispute is minor.”); Air Line Pilots

Ass’n v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 869 F.2d 1518, 1522 (D.C. Cir.

1989) (similarly).

In the present case, neither the UTU nor Carrier asserted the

alleged unilateral change of seniority rights of employees outside

of the Car Department was arguably justified by the UTU’s

collective bargaining agreement. Rather, the Carrier’s actions

were supported by its statutory duty to bargain with the

Steelworkers as the exclusive bargaining representative of the Car

Department employees regarding Car Department rights.

Moreover, there are no conflicting collective bargaining

agreement provisions which trigger this dispute and it cannot be

conclusively resolved by interpreting any agreement. The dispute

in the present case, as recognized by the Sixth Circuit, is not the

applicability or interpretation of either the UTU or the

Steelworkers’ agreement, but the fact that the Carrier negotiated

2. Pre-Consolidated Rail cases in the Sixth Circuit support its holding.

See, e.g., International Longshoremen’s Ass'n, Local 158 v. Toledo Lakefront

Dock & Pellet Co., 776 F.2d 1341, 1343 (6th Cir. 1985); Brotherhood Railway

Carmen v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co., 745 F.2d 370, 375 (6th Cir. 1984);

Local 1477 United Transp. Union v. Baker, 482 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1973).

4

Car Department seniority rights with their exclusive bargaining

representative, the Steelworkers. (App. 7-8).

Unlike Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Pitney, 326

U.S. 561 (1946) and Transportation Communication Employees v.

Union Pacific R.R., 385 U.S. 157 (1966) as urged by petitioner, the

present case has nothing to do with assignment of work or a

jurisdictional dispute between two unions. This case involves the

exclusive representative of Car Department employees which has

negotiated Car Department rights that are solely Car Department

rights. The UTU’s challenge is to the alleged refusal of the Carrier

to bargain with it regarding Car Department rights which are

within the sole representational jurisdiction of the Steelworkers.

Finally, contrary to petitioner’s suggestion, Atchison, Topeka

and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United Transportation Union, 734

F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1984) is distinguishable and presents no conflict

between courts of appeal. In Santa Fe, from the onset of its dispute,

the Firemen’s union specifically argued the agreement between the

Engineers’ union and the carrier violated existing agreements

between the Firemen and the carrier. The UTU, contrary to Santa

Fe and Consolidated Rail, failed to characterize its dispute as

anything except a dispute relating to an alleged refusal to bargain

and violation of the status quo. The UTU’s challenge is to the

Carrier’s bargaining with the Steelworkers, not to an interpretation

of any agreement. For the foregoing reasons, the Sixth Circuit

properly affirmed the decision of the district court and found the

UTU’s dispute was major under the Railway Labor Act.

5

Il.

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY FOUND THE

UTU’S CHALLENGE TO THE VALIDITY OF THE

STEELWORKERS’ AGREEMENT WAS A MAJOR

DISPUTE.

A challenge to the validity of an agreement, such as the one

asserted by the UTU, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the

district court under the RLA. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.

Smith, 251 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1958).° In Smith, the Sixth Circuit

resolved a similar dispute where the carrier negotiated a union

shop agreement with the Trainmen’s union and a collective

bargaining agreement with the Conductor’s union. The

Conductor’s union brought an action in federal court seeking

injunctive relief against the Trainmen’s agreement because it

allegedly destroyed the Conductor’s seniority rights contained in

its collective bargaining agreement. The district court asserted

jurisdiction and found the dispute did not involve the interpretation

or application of the Conductor’s agreement, but rather presented a

challenge to the validity of the Trainmen’s agreement. Jd. at 284.

The Sixth Circuit also rejected the Trainmen’s assertion that

the dispute was within the jurisdiction of the National Railroad

Adjustment Board:

Since the issue is the validity and not the

meaning of the contract, the court has

jurisdiction. ...

The question posed is whether, under the

3. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has held similarly that a challenge to

validity of collective bargaining agreement between carrier and other employees

is a request to bargain and, thus, a major dispute under the Railway Labor Act.

See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. United Air Lines, 874 F.2d 439, 444 (7th Cir. 1989).

6

Railway Labor Act, which authorizes a union

shop agreement between a labor organization

and a 1ailroad as to the “craft or class”

represented by the labor organization, action

can be taken cutting off seniority rights of

employees in a different craft or class covered

by a separate bargaining agreement. ... The

administrative boards set up under the Act have

no jurisdiction to determine such a question.

Id. at 286 (emphasis added). Instead, the Sixth Circuit specifically

held that a challenge to the validity of an agreement was within the

jurisdiction of the district court. /d.

Like the Conductor’s union in Smith, the UTU challenges the

validity of the Steelworkers’ agreement. It has been the UTU’s

position from the onset of its dispute that the provisions of the

Steelworkers’ agreement are invalid as applied to employees

represented by the UTU. The Sixth Circuit properly found the

UTU’s challenge to the validity of the Steelworkers’ agreement is a

major dispute outside the Board’s jurisdiction under the Railway

Labor Act.

The present case is also squarely on point with Order of

Railway Conductors and Brakemen v. Switchmen’s Union of North

America, 269 F.2d 726 (Sth Cir. 1959) where a union challenged

the validity of a contract entered between the carrier and another

union. In Switchmen’s Union, the BRT was the original agent for

Yardmen as well as for Trainmen. After an election, SUNA was

certified to represent Yardmen, while the BRT continued to

represent Trainmen. The BRT had previously negotiated an

agreement granting Roadmen (Trainmen and Conductors)

considerable rights to perform yard work. After SUNA became the

bargaining representative of the Yardmen, it negotiated an

agreement with the carrier to give all yard work to Yardmen only.

However, Roadmen who were conducting yard work were given

the opportunity to become Yardmen. /d. at 730.

When the BRT challenged SUNA’s agreement, the court

found the only representative with whom the carrier could bargain

regarding yard work was SUNA. 7d. (citing Brotherhood of

Railroad Trainmen v. Smith, 251 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1958)).

Because SUNA held the exclusive right to bargain regarding all

yard work, the court held SUNA represented everyone performing

yard work, including Roadmen who had performed yard work. /d.

at 731-32. The court held the BRT’s challenge was not to the

interpretation of an agreement, but rather to the validity of SUNA’s

agreement which was a major dispute.

Likewise, in the present case, the Steelworkers originally

represented four of Carrier’s departments. After an election, the

Steelworkers remained the exclusive bargaining representative of

the Car Department while the UTU took over as representative for

the other three departments. The Steelworkers, then, within its

exclusive bargaining power, negotiated Car Department rights,

much like SUNA negotiated regarding yard work. UTU members

who held Car Department seniority were given the opportunity to

return to the Car Department, as were BRT members who had

performed yard work. The UTU has no control over and cannot

bargain regarding Car Department work, the same as the BRT

could not bargain regarding yard work. There is no interpretation

or application of an agreement in the present case. The UTU’s

demand to represent its members regarding Car Department

matters, over which the Steelworkers are the exclusive bargaining

representative, is a challenge to the validity of the Steelworkers’

agreement and a major dispute.

Finally, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343

U.S. 768 (1952), this Court held a challenge to the validity of an

agreement is a major dispute. In Howard, the brakemen’s union

8 “

negotiated an agreement whereby the carrier agreed to disallow

train porters from performing brakemen duties. Train porters, who

had been performing brakemen duties, were discharged and

replaced by brakemen. The train porters brought an action

challenging the validity of the brakemen’s agreement with the

carrier, which the court found was a major dispute within the

jurisdiction of the court. As in Howard, the UTU challenges the

validity of the Steelworkers’ agreement as it affects its employees

who previously held seniority rights in the Car Department.

Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit properly held the UTU’s challenge

to the validity of the Steelworkers’ agreement was a major dispute

within the jurisdiction of the court, not the Board.

9

CONCLUSION

Respondent Cuyahoga Valley Railway Company respectfully

requests the Supreme Court of the United States to deny

petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

RONALD J. JAMES

Counsel of Record

SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY

4900 Society Center

127 Public Square

Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1304

(216) 479-8500

MARK KATZ

Co-Counsel

LTV STEEL COMPANY

25 West Prospect Building

Cleveland, Ohio 44115

Attorneys for Respondent