Appendix — Coleman v. Nationwide Life Insurance
Supreme Court brief1993
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92-953 J FILED.
"NO. 92- OCT 22 1992
IN THE 'DEEICE OF THE Cit
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED steTes—
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
JOANNE W. COLEMAN,
Petitioner,
Vv.
NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
APPENDICES
John B. Mann
(Counsel of Record)
LEVIT & MANN
419 North Boulevard
Richmond, Virginia 23220
(804) 355-7766
Stephen R. Bruce
Attorney at Law
727 15th St., NW, Ste. 900
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 371-8013
Attorneys for Petitioner
Dated: November 10, 1992
an |
APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. The opinion of the United States
District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia 1
B. The unreported opinion of the
U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia 25
C. The opinion of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit with order amending
opinion 99
Cc. The denial of rehearing and
suggestion for rehearing
en banc 140
D. Statutes and regulations of
this case 142
E. Pertinent documents 161
APPENDIX A
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
RICHMOND DIVISION
JOANNE W. COLEMAN, Plaintiff,
CASE NUMBER
Vv. CA-90-00019-R
NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant,
Vv.
ROOFING CONCEPTS, INC., Third-
Party Defendant
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
—_X Decision by Court. This action
came to trial or hearing before the
Court. The issues have been tried or
heard and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
Pplaintiff’s motion for Summary judgment
is GRANTED. The plaintiff, Joanne W.
Coleman, shall recover of the defendant,
NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, the
sum of SIX THOUSAND FORTY EIGHT AND
EIGHTY SIX/100 DOLLARS ($6,048.86) plus
App. 1
reasonable costs and reasonable
attorneys fees incurred in this
litigation. Entered this 16th day of
October 1990 at Richmond, Virginia.
For the Court
[signed]
Clerk
App. 2
sina ia i
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
RICHMOND DIVISION
JOANNE W. COLEMAN, Plaintiff,
CASE NUMBER
Vv. CA-90-00019-R
NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on
cross-motions for summary judgment. For
the reasons stated below, defendant’s
motion for summary judgment will be
granted, and judgment will be entered
for plaintiZf.
I
The plaintiff in this case is
Joanne W. Coleman. The defendant is
Nationwide Life Insurance Company
("Nationwide"). Coleman has brought an
ERISA action against Nationwide, seeking
payment for the hospitalization expenses
she incurred while giving birth to a
App. 3
son. Nationwide asserts that it is not
liable to Coleman for those expenses
because the policy under which she
claims coverage was not in effect at the
time she incurred those expenses.
The material facts of this case are
undisputed. Coleman and her husband
participated in a group health insurance
plan provided by her husband’s employer,
Roofing Concepts, Inc. ("Roofing
Concepts"). Aetna Life and Casualty had
been the insurer for this plan, but in
late 1988 Roofing Concepts terminated
its coverage with that company and
applied for coverage with Nationwide.
Roofing Concepts submitted its
application to Nationwide on November 1,
1988. Nationwide accepted th
application and sent Roofing Concepts a
certificate of insurance with a November
1, 1988 effective date. Roofing
Concepts agreed to pay one hundred
‘ App. 4
percent of the premiums due on the
policy.
Roofing Concepts paid Nationwide a
monthly premium deposit of $3,665.63 for
issuance of the certificate of
insurance. Soon afterward, Nationwide’s
underwriters calculated Roofing
Concepts’ actual monthly premium to be
$3,709.42. Nationwide billed Roofing
Concepts an additional $43.79 for the
balance of the first month’s premium, as
well as $3,709.42 for the next month’s
premium. Roofing Concepts never the
paid the $43.79 balance and never made
any other premium payments. Roofing
Concepts went out of business on
February 15, 1989.
Coleman was pregnant when Roofing
Concepts began its coverage with
Nationwide in November of 1988. Over
the next two months. Coleman made
several inquiries to assure herself that
App. 5
she would be covered under the
Nationwide plan for the hospitalization
expenses that she would incur in
connection with the delivery of her
child. In response to one of those
inquiries, Cheryl A. Reinecke, a
Nationwide account representative, sent
Coleman a letter dated December 1, 1988.
In the letter Reinecke informed Coleman
of the benefits that she was eligible
to receive under the Nationwide policy.
Reinecke also attached to the letter a
brief summary of those benefits. In
addition, Reinecke advised Coleman as to
what her Nationwide policy and
certificate numbers were.
On December 5, 1988, Coleman
received a letter from Capp Care, Inc.
("Capp Care"), a "cost containment
organization” used by Nationwide. In
this letter Capp Care authorized Coleman
for a two-day hospital stay for
App. 6
‘ |
childbirth and gave her an authorization
number. Capp Care listed Nationwide as
the "Payor" for the hospitalization.
Coleman made additional telephone
calls to Nationwide and Capp Care
in December 1988 and January 1989. Each
time, the Nationwide employees to whom
she spoke advised her that she had
hospitalization coverage and the Capp
Care employees advised her that her
hospitalization was approved.
On January 25, 1989, Coleman gave
birth to a son at Chippenham Hospital in
Richmond, Virginia. As of that date, no
one at Nationwide had given her any
indication that Roofing Concepts had
failed to make its premium payments or
that her coverage might be jeopardized
as a result. Nor had anyone at Capp
Care or Roofing Concepts so informed
her.
App. 7
|
As noted above, Roofing Concepts”
went out of business on February 15,
1989. The next day, Roofing Concepts
informed Nationwide of this development
and asked that it "cancel the insurance
policy in effect with Roofing concepts,
Inc. at the earliest possible date."
Affidavit of Joanne W. Coleman,
Plaintiff’s Exhibit D, Coleman v.
Nationwide Life Ins. Co., C.A. No. 90-
00019-R (E.D. Va. filed Jan. 12, 1990).
On March 6, 1989, Nationwide sent a
veply letter indicating that because
Roofing Concepts had made no payments of
premium other than the initial partial
deposit, Nationwide would cancel Roofing
Concepts’ coverage as of the policy’s
effective date, November 1, 1988. When
Nationwide later received bills for
Coleman’s hospitalization at Chippenham,
it informed Coleman’s husband that it
would not pay those bills because the
App. 8
Colemans’ coverage under the Roofing
Concepts plan had been canceled
effective november 1, 1988.
II
The court will grant Coleman’s
motion for summary judgment. The Court
rejects Nationwide’s argument that it
cannot be liable for the hospitalization
expenses Coleman incurred in January
1989. Nationwide bases its argument on
the assertion that the Roofing concepts
plan, and thus Coleman’s coverage, was
void from inception due to Roofing
Concepts’ failure to make even one
complete payment of premium.
The Court need not decide whether
the Roofing Concepts policy was void
from inception. Even if the policy were
void from inception, Nationwide would
still be liable to Coleman under
theories of breach of fiduciary duty and
estoppel.
App. 9
A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Nationwide breached its fiduciary
duty to Coleman by neglecting to inform
her that Roofing Concepts had failed to
pay premiums due under the plan.
Nationwide has argued that it had no
fiduciary duty to inform Coleman of
nonpayment because it was neither the
“administrator” nor the "sponsor" of the
Roofing Concepts plan. The Court agrees
that Nationwide was neither the
administrator nor the sponsor of the
plan; under the applicable ERISA
definitions, see 29 U.S.C. §§1002(16) (A)
and (B) (1988), Roofing Concepts filled
both of those roles.
The Court finds, however, that
although Nationwide was not a sponsor or
administrator of the plan, it was
nonetheless a fiduciary for the plan.
Under ERISA,
App. 10
eerie
a person is a fiduciary with
respect to a plan to the
extent (i) he exercises any
discretionary authority or
discretionary control respecti
ng management of such plan or
exercises any authority or
control respecting management
or disposition of its assets;
(ii) he renders investment
advice for a fee or other
compensation, direct or
indirect, with respect to any
moneys or other property of
such plan, or has any authorit
y or responsibility to do so,
or (iii) he has any
discretionary authority or
discretionary responsibility
in the administration of such
plan.
29 U.S.C. §1002(21)(A) (1988); see also
F 8 - V. ’
109 S. Ct. 948, 955 (1989).
The ERISA definition of fiduciary,
itself broadly worded, is to be
construed liberally by the courts. See,
Inc., 647 F. Supp. 981, 983-984 (N.D.
Ala. 1986) ("Congress intended that this
definition be broadly construed and
‘include persons who have authority and
App. li
responsibility with respect to the
matter in question, regardless of their
formal title.’") (quoting Donovan v.
Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir.
1984). A person need not be denominated
a fiduciary in order to be one. Id.
"If the person exercises management over
assets, renders investment advice or
exercises discretionary administrative
control he is a fiduciary for purposes
of ERISA." Id. (citing Anderson v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 759 F.2d 1518, 1522
(llth Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 995
(1985)). Moreover, "an insurer [such as
Nationwide] dows not have to have total
discretionary powers over a plan’s
assets before it becomes a fiduciary."
Id.
Nationwide falls within the
expansive ERISA definition of fiduciary.
The Roofing Concepts plan did not name
Nationwide as a fiduciary or explicitly
App. 12
place fiduciary duties upon it. The
Court finds, however, that Nationwide
possessed considerable authority,
discretion and administrative control
with respect to the plan. This is
sufficient to confer fiduciary status
upon Nationwide under ERISA’s broad
conception of that term.’
‘Nationwide relies upon two cases
which, it asserts, suggest that it had no
fiduciary duty to notify Coleman of
Roofing Concepts’ nonpayment of premiums.
See Moran v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 872
F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1989); Vv v.
__€Co., 871 F.2d 1134
(D.C. Cir. 1989). Neither of those cases
Supports that position, however. The
insureds in Moran and Davis brought suit
on the ground that the insurers had
failed to provide them with summary plan
descriptions. Under ERISA, plan
administrators must furnish all plan
participants with summary plan
descriptions. 29 U.S.C. §§1024(b) (1),
1132(c) (1988). The courts ruled for the
insurers in both cases because the
insurers were not the administrators of
the plans at issue. Nationwide has
correctly pointed out that it was not the
administrator of the Roofing Concepts
plan. This disposes of Coleman’s claim
based on failure to provide a summary
Plan description. It does not, however,
affect Coleman’s claim that Nationwide
App. 13
As a fiduciary, Nationwide was
obligated to notify insureds such as
Coleman of roofing Concepts’ nonpayment
of premiums. See McNeese, 647 F. Supp.
at 985 ("Several courts have held that
at a minimum, the fiduciary under ERISA
has an obligation to notify the
employees of the employer’s failure to
contribute to the pension fund as
required by the pension agreement.").
Without such notice, Coleman lost the
opportunity she otherwise would have had
to seek out alternative sources of
insurance. See Rodriquez v. MEBA
Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir.
failed to notify her of Roofing Concepts’
nonpayment of premiums. As the Mora,
court noted, a claim based on failure to
provide a summary plan description is
distinct from a claim based on failure to
give notice of an employer’s nonpayment
of premiums. Moran, 882 F.2d at 300.
The latter claim does not depend on
Nationwide’s being an administrator of
the plant; it is sufficient that
Nationwide was a fiduciary for the plan.
App. 14
1989) ("Plan participants should not
lose pension benefits through mistakes
and misunderstandings."). By failing to
inform Coleman of Roofing Concepts’
nonpayment, Nationwide breached its
fiduciary obligation. See id. at 986
(Where “[the defendant] did not make an
effort to notify any of the claimants
- concerning the financial problems
with [the plan], .. . this failure
constituted a breach of the defendants’
fiduciary obligations to the plaintiffs
because without notice they were not
able to make other arrangements for
insurance coverage.").
In v. Ho Restaurant
Employees & Bartenders Union Local 274,
637 F.2d 592 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 898 (1981), the court found
that a union pension fund had breached
its fiduciary duty by failing to inform
a union employee that his employer’s
App. 15
contributions to the fund were in
arrears and by failing to take action
against the employer for its continued
refusal to contribute to the fund. The
court noted that -
If a trustee’s fiduciary duty
requires anything in the
administration of the trust,
it requires him to inform the
pensioners of their employer’s
failure to make the required
contributions to the fund.
Continued eligibility is the
core of the trustee
beneficiary relationship and
those responsible for the
administration of the fund are
required to notify pensioners
when their employer
jeopardizes their eligibility.
Id. at 600; see also Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. Greene, 570 F. Supp.
1483, 1499 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (defendant
trustees breached fiduciary duties by
failing to notify pensioners of
employer’s delinquent contributions to
pension fund), aff'd, 727 F.2d 1100 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820
(1984).
App. 16
Because Nationwide breached its
fiduciary duty, Summary judgment will be
granted in Coleman’s favor. Although
Nationwide has not argued the contrary,
it should again be noted that a clear
causal connection exists between
Nationwide’s breach and coleman’s loss.
Had Nationwide notified Coleman of
Roofing Concepts’ nonpayment of
premiums, she could have made other
arrangements to obtain insurance
covering her hospitalization.
toppe
The Court further finds that even
if Nationwide has not breached any
fiduciary duty owed to Coleman, it is
still liable to her under principles of
estoppel. The "[{e]lements necessary to
establish equitable estoppel, absent a
Showing of fraud and deception, are a
representation, reliance, a change of
position, and detriment." T... v. T..
App. 17
+, 216 Va. 867, 873, 224 S.E.2d 148, 152
(1976). "“[{T]he party relying on
estoppel must prove each element by
‘clear, precise and unequivocal
evidence.’" Harris v. Criterion Ins.
Co., 222 Va. 495, 502, 281 S.E.2d 878,
881 (1981) (quoting Employers Ins. Co.
v. Great American Ins. Co., 214 Va. 410,
415, 200 S.E.2d 560, 564 (1973)).
Although Coleman’s burden of proof
is a heavy one, she has made a
sufficient showing on each estoppel
element to obtain summary judgment.
First, the evidence clearly shows that
Nationwide—through a letter and
telephone conversations~—represented to
Coleman that her hospitalization
expenses would be covered.* See City
of Bedford v. James Leffel & Co., 558
Capp Care made similar
representations to Coleman through
Correspondence and telephone
conversations.
App. 18
TT
F.2d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 1977) ("one may
be misled as much by implication as by
express statement"). It is undisputed
that Coleman reasonably relied on these
representations, that she changed her
position in reliance (i.e., by not
switching coverage), and that she
incurred a detriment as a result.
Nationwide’s primary argument with
estoppel is that when Cheryl Reinecke,
its account representative, made the
representations to Coleman, she
(Reinecke) was justifiably assuming that
Roofing Concepts would pay premiums on
the policy as required. Even if
Reinecke were making such an assumption,
however, this would not affect the
estoppel analysis. The only requirement
under the first element of estoppel is
that a representation be made; it is not
necessary that the representation be
fraudulent, deceitful or unreasonable.
App. 19
= ——- ’
£
Ls
See id. (" .. . deceit is not an
essential element of estoppel. It is
sufficient that the aggrieved party
reasonably relied on the words and
conduct of the person to be
estopped .. .") (citation omitted).
“ Nationwide also argues that
estoppel is disfavored in the ERISA
scheme and cannot be a basis for
recovery under that statute. There is
some support for this position. The
Ninth Circuit appears to have rejected
the use of estoppel theories in at least.
some ERISA suits. See Davidian v.
Southern Cal. Meat Cutters Union & Food
Employees Benefit Fund, 859 F.2d 134,
136 (9th Cir. 1988) ("([Wje applied a no-
estoppel rule in a suit for employees
benefits against a jointly-sponsored
trust fund. There are no contrary
holdings in this circuit.").
App. 20
On the other hand, the Third
Circuit has allowed ERISA plaintiffs to
recover on estoppel theories. In Rose ’
the Third Circuit stated that A"the
application of estoppel in pension cases
is not altogether novel." Rosen, 637
F.2d at 598. It also quoted an opinion,
which held -
The sui generis nature of the
pension agreement ... should
not immunize it from the
equitable principles that
govern similar agreements.
The rising ethical standards
in business relations which
the estoppel doctrine is
designed to enforce are no
less needed in the
administration of pension
funds... If anything,
estoppel is appropriate here."
Id. (quoting Scheuer v. Central States
Pension Fund, 358 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D.
Wis. 1975).
The parties have cited no Fourth
Circuit authority on this issue, and the
Court has discovered none. Under these
circumstances, the Court declines to
App. 21
rule that the equitable remedy of
estoppel is unavailable to plaintiffs,
such as Coleman, who sue under ERISA.
Coleman’s motion for summary judgment
will therefore be granted on grounds of
estoppel as well as breach of fiduciary
duty.
App. 22
Iir
In accordance with the foregoing,
defendant Nationwide Life Insurance
Company’s motion for summary judgment is
hereby DENIED and plaintiff Joanne wW.
Coleman’s motion for summary judgment is
hereby GRANTED.
Nationwide is hereby ORDERED to pay
Coleman the amount of $6,048.86, which
represents hospitalization expenses for
which Coleman did not receive
reimbursement, plus the reasonable costs
she incurred in this litigation,
including reasonable attorney’s fees.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Coleman may
have until October 26, 1990 to file an
itemization of attorney’s fees and costs
incurred in this litigation. Nationwide
may have until November 9, 1990 in which
to file an opposition to Coleman’s
submitted itemization of costs and
attorney’s fees.
App. 23
The Court notes that Nationwide
filed a third party complaint against
Roofing Concepts, Inc. on February 7,
1990. Roofing Concepts does not appear
to have responded to that pleading. The
Court hereby DIRECTS Nationwide to
advise it of the status of the third
party complaint.
And it is SO ORDERED.
[signed]
United States District
Judge
Date: October 16, 1990.
App. 24
, APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
RICHMOND DIVISION
JOANNE W. COLEMAN,
Plaintiff
Vv. JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant & Third-Party Plaintiff
Vv. CASE NUMBER: CA-90-00019-R
ROOFING CONCEPTS, INC.,
Third-Party Defendant
X Decision by Court. This action came
to trial or hearing before the Court.
The issues have been tried or heard and
a decision has been rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
default judgment is entered in favor of
the defendant and third-party plaintiff,
NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
against the third-party defendant,
ROOFING CONCEPTS, INC., in the sum of
EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINETY
ONE AND 60/100 ($18,591.60) DOLLARS with
interest thereon at the rate of 6.39%
until paid. Entered this 18th day of
July 1991 at Richmond, Virginia.
App. 25
July 18, 1991 DORIS R. CASEY
Date [ SIGNED]
App. 26
anata
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
RICHMOND DIVISION
JOANNE W. COLEMAN,
Plaintiff
v- Givil Action No. 90-00019-R
NATIONWIDE LIFE INS. COMPANY,
Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
ROOF ING CONCEPTS, INC.,
Third-Party Defendant.
ORDER
. This matter is before the Court on
Nationwide Life Insurance Company ’s
motion to alter or amend judgment
previously entered, Coleman’s
application for reasonable costs and
attorney fees pursuant to this Court’s
earlier order, and Nationwide Life
Insurance Company’s motion for a default
judgment against Roofing Concepts, Inc.,
a third-party to this action. For the
reasons stated in the accompanying
App. 27
memorandum opinion, Nationwide Life
Insurance Company’s motion to alter or
amend judgment is hereby GRANTED as it
pertains to the liability imposed upon
it under an estoppel cause of action; it
is DENIED as it relates to the
imposition of liability as a result of
its breach of a fiduciary duty owed to
Coleman. Consequently, Nationwide Life
Insurance Company is hereby ORDERED to
pay Coleman the amount of $6,048.86
which represents hospitalization
expenses for which Coleman did not
receive reimbursement.
Coleman’s application for
reasonable costs and attorney’s fees is
GRANTED and Nationwide Life Insurance
Company is hereby ORDERED to pay Coleman
$12,542.74 which represents reasonable
attorney’s fees in the amount of $12,252
and reasonable costs of $2 3.74 incurred
in this litigation. In ad tion,
App. 28
a ee AE Me ie Sea
Nationwide Life Insurance Company ’s
motion for a default judgment is GRANTED
and the Clerk of the Court is hereby
DIRECTED to enter judgment against
Roofing Concepts, Inc. in the amount of
$18,591.60 which represents the sim
total of Nationwide Life Insurance
Company’s liability to Joanne w.
Coleman.
And it is SO ORDERED.
s R. e
United States District Judge
Date: July 18, 1991
App. 29
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
RICHMOND DIVISION
JOANNE W. COLEMAN,
Plaintiff,
Vv. Civil Action No. 90-00019-R
NATIONWIDE LIFE INS. COMPANY,
Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,
Vv.
ROOFING CONCEPTS, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on
defendant’s motion to alter or amend
judgment, plaintiff’s application for
costs and attorney’s fees, and
defendant’s motion for a default
judgment. For the following reasons,
defendant’s motion will be granted in
part and denied in part, plaintiff’s
application will be granted with
modifications, and defendant’s motion
for default judgment will be granted as
well.
App. 30
‘ie
ashe Peddie arte
PACTS
The plaintiff in this case brought
an ERISA action against defendant.
Plaintiff sought payment for the
hospitalization expenses she incurred
during the delivery of her child.
Defendant contended that it is not
responsible for those expenses because
the policy under which plaintiff claims
coverage was not in effect at the time
the expenses were incurred.
Plaintiff and her husband
participated in a group health insurance
plan provided by her husband’s employer,
Roofing Concepts, Inc. [hereinafter
"Roofing Concepts"]. Roofing Concepts
had been insured by another company but,
at some point, Roofing Concepts
terminated its coverage with that
company and applied for coverage with
defendant. The application was
submitted to defendant on November as
App. 31
1988. Defendant accepted the
application and sent Roofing Concepts a
certificate of insurance with a November
1, 1988 effective date. Roofing
Concepts agreed to pay one hundred
percent of the premiums due on the
policy.
Roofing Concepts paid defendant a
monthly premium deposit of $3,665.63 for
the issuance of the certificate of
insurance. Thereafter, defendant
calculated Roofing Concepts’ actual
monthly premiums to be $3,709.42.
Defendant therefore billed Roofing
Concepts $43.79 for the balance of the
first month’s premium, as well as
$3,709.42 for the next month’s premiun.
Roofing Concepts never paid the $43.79
balance and never made any other premium
payments. Roofing Concepts went out of
business on February 15, 1989.
App. 32
BREAN Yow PASS eR a iG AS
Plaintiff was pregnant at the time
Roofing Concepts began its coverage with
defendant. During the next two months,
plaintiff made several inquiries to
assure herself that she would be covered
under the defendant’s plan for the
hospitalization expenses that she would
incur in connection with the delivery of
her son. An account representative
employed by defendant sent plaintiff a
letter dated December 1, 1988. In the
letter, plaintiff was informed of the
benefits she was entitled to receive
under defendant’s policy. Moreover,
plaintiff was advised of her policy and
certificate numbers.
Additionally, on December 5, 1988,
plaintiff received a letter from Capp
Care, Inc. [hereinafter "Capp Care"], a
“cost containment organization" used by
defendant. In this letter Capp Care
authorized plaintiff for a two-day
App. 33
hospital stay for childbirth and gave
her an authorization number. Capp Care
listed defendant as the "Payor" for the
hospitalization.
Plaintiff made additional telephone
calls to defendant and Capp Care in
December 1988 and January 1989. Each
time, the defendant’s employees to whom
she spoke advised her that she had
hospitalization coverage and the Capp
Care employees advised her that her
hospitalization was approved.
On January 25, 1989, plaintiff gave
birth to a son at Chippenham Hospital in
Richmond, Virginia. As of that date,
none of defendant’s employees had given
plaintiff any indication that Roofing
Concepts had failed to make its premium
payments or that her coverage might be
jeopardized as a result. Nor had anyone
at either Capp Care. or Roofing Concepts
so informed her.
App. 34
RGSS.
As previously stated, Roofing
Concepts ceased doing business on
February 15, 1989. on February 16,
1989, Roofing Concepts informed
defendant of this development and asked
defendant to "cancel the insurance
policy in effect with Roofing Concepts,
Inc. at the earliest possible date."
See Affidavit of Joanne w. coleman,
Plaintiff’s Exhibit pD, Coleman v.
Nationwide Life Ins. Co., CA No. 90-
00019-R (E.D.Va. Jan. 12, 1990).
On March 6, 1989, defendant sent a
reply letter indicating that because
Roofing Concepts bat not made any
premium payments other than the initial
partial deposit, defendant would cancel
Roofing Concepts’ coverage as of
November 1, 1988, the policy’s effective
date. Hence, when defendant thereafter
received bills for plaintiff’s
hospitalization, it informed plaintiff’s
App. 35
husband that it would not pay those
bills because the Colemans’ coverage
under the Roofing Concepts policy had
been cancelled as of November 1, 1988.
Subsequently, plaintiff brought an
action against defendant under ERISA
codified at 29 U.S.C. S88 1132(a)(3) and
1132(e)(1). Thereafter, the parties
filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The Court denied defendant’s
motion and granted plaintiff’s motion
under theories of breach of fiduciary
duty and estoppel. In addition, the
Court held that plaintiff was entitled
to reasonable costs and attorney’s fees
as well as a payment in the amount of
$6,046.86 which represents
hospitalization expenses for which
plaintiff did not receive reimbursement.
Defendant then filed a motion to
alter or amend judgment and a response
in opposition to plaintiff’s application
App. 36
for attorney’s fees and costs.
Defendant contends that this Court
committed a manifest error of law when
it entered judgment in favor of
plaintiff. According to defendant, the
Court awarded plaintiff extra-
contractual damages, an award defendant
asserts is contrary to Fourth Circuit
precedent and "the clear import of
recent Supreme Court authority." See
Defendant’s memorandum in Support of its
motion, p. 4. Further, defendant claims
that the civil enforcement scheme of
ERISA has been construed to preempt
State law actions such as estoppel.
Consequently, defendant argues,
plaintiff cannot prevail on an estoppel
theory.
On April 17, 1991, the Court heard
arguments on defendant’s motion. The
Court concludes that defendant correctly
States the position of the Appeals Court
App. 37
of the Fourth Circuit on the issue of
federal preemption of state law claims
such as estoppel in the context of ERISA
actions. As a result, plaintiff’s award
cannot stand under an estoppel theory.
Hence, defendant’s motion will be
granted as it relates to the judgment
entered in plaintiff’s favor under
principles of estoppel.
Defendant further contends that
plaintiff is not entitled to the award
received because, allegedly in light of
the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit
opinion in Powell v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Telephone Co.', a party filing
a claim under ERISA may not recover an
award of extra-contractual damages. It
is the position of this Court that the
Court’s reasoning in Powell is
inapplicable to the facts of this case.
' 708 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
App. 38
Consequently, defendant's motion will be
denied as it pertains to the liability
that was imposed upon it because it
breached its fiduciary duty to plaintiff
by neglecting to inform her that Roofing
Concepts failed to pay premiums due
under the plan.
I
Defendant claims that plaintiff may
not recover benefits allegedly due under
the benefit plan in issue because such
an award would constitute extra-
contractual damages. According to
defendant, the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in usetts Mut. if s. Co. v.
Russell* adapted by the Fourth Circuit
in v. a c
Telephone Co., prevents an award of
extra-contractual benefits in ERISA
Claims.
¢ 473 U.S. 134, 105 S.ct. 3085
(1985).
App. 39
The cases cited by defendant do not
support defendant’s claim that plaintiff
is precluded from recouping an award
under ERISA. In Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Russell, supra, the Supreme
Court expressly declined to construe the
provisions of 8 502, 29 U.S.C. 8
1132(a)(3) and limited its holding to a
determination that an individual
beneficiary may not recover extra-
contractual damages, such as
compensatory or punitive damages, where
an improper delay in processing the -
benefits claim is caused by a breach of
duty owed under 29 U.S.C. 8 1109 by a
plan fiduciary.
In Russell, the plaintiff-
respondent [hereinafter "Respondent" ]
sought damages to compensate her for the
alleged aggravation of a psychological
and physical condition resulting, she
claimed, from the plan administrator’s
App. 40
interference with her benefits. aA back
ailment was the cause of respondent ’s
disability and, as a result of the
debilitating back ailment, respondent
received plan benefits for a period of
time until the defendant-petitioner’s
[hereinafter "Petitioner" ] disability
committee made a decision to terminate
those benefits. Thereafter, respondent
requested an internal review of the
committee’s decision and, after a
subsequent examination confirmed that
she remained temporarily disabled,
respondent’s benefits were reinstated
some five months after their
termination. Retroactive benefits were
later paid to respondent in full.
Subsequently, respondent filed suit
Claiming damages for injuries allegedly
wrought by petitioner’s improper refusal
to pay benefits for the five month
period during which her benefits were
App. 41
terminated. Respondent sought, inter
alia, both compensatory damages for the
aggravated psychological condition and
punitive damages. Eventually,
petitioner moved for summary judgment
and the district court granted the
motion in favor of petitioner. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Although the appellate court agreed with
the district court that respondent’s
state law claims were preempted by
ERISA, the court held that respondent’s
complaint alleged a cause of action
under ERISA.
Concluded that petitioner violated
its fiduciary obligation to process
claims in good faith and in a fair and
diligent manner, the Ninth Circuit
determined that this alleged violation
gave rise to a cause of action under 29 7
U.S.C. 8 1109(a) which a plan
App. 42
beneficiary may assert under 8
502(a)(2). Thus, the court read the |
409(a) authorization of "such other
equitable or remedial relief as the
court may deem appropriate" as giving
the court "wide discretion as to the
damages to be awarded," including
compensatory and punitive damages.
According to the court, the award of
compensatory damages was intended to
“remedy the wrong and make the aggrieved
individual whole," which meant not
° tu or loss of
plan benefits, but relief "that will
compensate the injured party for all
losses and injuries sustained as a
direct and proximate cause of the breach
of fiduciary duty," including "damages
for mental or emotional distress."
Russell, 473 U.S. at ==, 105 8.Ct. at
3088. (emphasis added).
App. 43
The appellant court’s logic was
|
rejected and its decision reversed upon
petitioner’s appeal to the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court, in an
examination of the statutory provisions
of ERISA, noted that the statute says
nothing about either the recovery of
extra-contractual damages or the
possible consequences of delay in the
plan administrator’s processing of a
disputed claim. Russell, Id. at -——-,
105 S$.Ct. at 3091. Hence, according to
the Court, there is nothing contained in
the text of the statute to support the
conclusion that a delay in the
processing of an individual benefit
claim gives rise to a private right of
action for compensatory or punitive
relief. Id. (emphasis added.) Under
the Court’s analysis of the statute,
both the text and the context of 8 409
demonstrate that Congress did not intend
App. 44
8 409 to authorize any relief except for
that which might inure to the benefit of
the plan itself. Id. The Court
expressly noted that "because respondent
relies entirely on sg 409(a) and
expressly disclaims reliance on 8
502(a)(3), we have no occasion to
consider whether any other provision of
ERISA authorizes recovery of
extracontractual [sic] damages." Id. at
3008 n.5.
Justice Brennan wrote a concurring
Opinion in which he was joined by
Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun.
Justice Brennan emphasized that the case
before the Court involved a single,
narrow question-——-whether the 8 409
“appropriate relief" provision referred
to in 8402(a) (2) encompasses recovery by
an individual participant or beneficiary
of extra-contractual damages for breach
of fiduciary duty. Id. at 3094. The
App. 45
concurring Justices agreed that 8 409
should be read as providing remedies
that protect the entire plan rather than
individuals since it appears within the
context of the statute pertaining to
remedies available to the plan and
because 8 502(a)(3) affords plan
participants and beneficiaries with
personal, or individual, relief. Id.
(emphasis added).
Justice Brennan wrote the
concurring opinion to stress the limited
scope of the decision in Russell.
Indeed, Justice Brennan noted that sh
Russell should not be read as suggesting
that "administrators might not be fully
subject to strict fiduciary duties to
participants and beneficiaries in the
processing of their claims and to
traditional trust-law remedies for
App. 46
breaches of those duties." Id. at
3095.° _
Subsequent to the Court’s decision
in Russell the circuit courts reached
varying conclusions when applying the
principles enumerated in Russell to the
facts of the sundry ERISA Claims before
them. The Fourth Circuit, in Powell
v.Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.,
Supra, applied the reasoning of Russell
to its construction of sg 502(a)(3).
— well-recognized that the
legislative history of ERISA establishes
that Congress intended by 8 404(a) to
incorporate the fiduciary standards of
trust law into ERISA. Russell, 473 U.s.
at -——, 105 S.ct. at 3095. (footnote
omitted). Consequently, under black-
letter trust law, fiduciaries owe strict
duties running directly to the
beneficiaries in the administration and
payment of trust benefits. Id. supra,
105 S.Ct. at 3096. (footnote omitted).
In addition, a fundamental concept of
trust law is that courts "will give to
the beneficiaries of a trust such
remedies as are necessary for the
protection of their interests." Id.
Supra, 105 S.Ct. at 3098. (footnotes
omitted) .
App. 47
The plaintiff in Powell was a
former employee of and beneficiary under
defendant’s self-insured benefit plan.
She sued defendant and the plan’s
administrator for breaching various
fiduciary duties under ERISA in the
handling of her claim for disability
benefits. Powell, 780 F.2d at 420.
Although plaintiff had previously
received all of the benefits to which
she was entitled, she sought $5,000,000
in extra-contractual and punitive
damages under ERISA 2s ws'® as the
court’s jurisdiction over several
pendent state claims. Id. (emphasis
added).
Plaintiff collected disability
benefits under defendant’s plan for
approximately five years. Thereafter,
she received a substantial social
security award and when the award was
combined with the plan benefits, the
App. 48
benefits exceeded the amount to which
plaintiff was entitled under the plan.
Consequently, defendant terminated
plaintiff’s benefits and requested a
refund of the overpayment. Plaintiff
refused and filed suit against the plan
administrators charging constant
harassment by defendants during the five
year period in which she received
benefits. Plaintiff further contended
that the harassment caused both her and
her son emotional distress and
precipitated her divorce. The complaint
was subsequently dismissed and plaintiff
appealed.
The Fourth Circuit framed the issue
as a question of whether plaintiff,
having received all the benefits to
which she was entitled, could recover
extra~contractual and punitive relief
under ERISA to compensate her for
various alleged physical ailments, the
App. 49
decline of her marriage, her son’s
emotional distress, and the
deterioration of her mental health,
allegedly resulting from defendant’s
mishandling of her disability claim.
Id. at 424.
The Powell court noted that in
Russell the Supreme Court expressly
reserved the question of whether and to
what extent "“extra-contractual and
punitive relief is authorized by way of
the catchall provision in 8 1132(a)(3).
Id. Plaintiff argued that
notwithstanding the use of the word
“equitable” in 8 1132(a)(3), she was
entitled to monetary damages in
appropriate situations because ERISA
incorporated the fiduciary standards and
principles of trust law. Id. The
Fourth Circuit disagreed and held that,
in light of applicable trust principles,
the provision for "other appropriate
App. 50
equitable relief" did not authorize
extra-contractual or punitive damages
for a plan administrator’s breach of
fiduciary duties under ERISA. Id. As
the court explained, under the common
law of trusts, "where the trustee is not
under an immediate and unconditional
duty to pay money to the beneficiary,
the cannot intain an
action at law against him." Id.
(quoting A. Scott, The Law of Trusts, 8
198.1.1 (1967)).
Plaintiff in the instant matter
brought her action pursuant to 8
902(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. 8 1132(a) (3)
alleging defendant breached its
fiduciary duty by refusing to pay
hospitalization costs incurred during
the birth of her son. The statute
provides:
A civil action may be brought-—
App. 51
by a participant, beneficiary,
or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any
act or practice which violates
any provision of this
subchapter or the terms of the
plan, or (B) to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief
(i) to redress such violations
or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter
or the terms of the plan[.]
29 U.S.C.A. 8 1132(a) (3).
Courts have held that "[g]jliven that
Congress intended to incorporate the
fiduciary standards of trust law into
ERISA," a ‘beneficiary is entitled to a
remedy which will put him in the
position in which he would have been if
the trustee had not committed the breach
of trust." Warren v. Society Nat. Bank,
905 F.2d 975, 981 (6th Cir. 1990), reh.
denied, en banc, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS
16,686 (6th Cir. 1990), later
proceeding, 111 S.Ct. 948 (1991), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 2256 (1991). In
Warren the plaintiff participated in two
retirement plans and was advised that it
App. 52
would be advantageous for him to "roll
over" his interests in the plans into a
self-directed IRA. Plaintiff followed
the advice given and thereafter
instructed the trustee to transfer all
of the assets in the plans to an
investment banking firm. Because the
transfer-was accomplished in two
separate and distinct stages, plaintiff
claimed he faced a higher tax
consequence as well as a loss of
favorable rollover treatment.
Consequently, plaintiff sued the trustee
for breach of fiduciary duty and sought
compensatory damages.
The trustee filed a motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The basis of
the motion was defendant’s argument that
Plaintiff sought extra-contractual
damages which, it was asserted, could
App. 53
oe
not be recovered under ERISA. Support
for this contention was allegedly found
in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Mass tu sife _ oo. #.
Russell, supra. The district court
agreed and granted the trustee’s motion
to dismiss.
The Sixth Circuit reversed and
distinguished the facts of the case
before it from the facts of Russell.
According to the Sixth Circuit, the
beneficiary in Russell received all the
disability benefits to which she was
contractually entitled and, in addition,
sought compensatory and punitive
damages. Hence, the court noted, the
damages plaintiff hoped to recover were
extra-contractual because relief in the
form of compensatory and punitive
damages was not within the terms of the
ERISA-governed benefit plan. Society
Nat. Bank, 905 F.2d at 980. To the
App. 54
contrary, the Warren plaintiff was
seeking to recover damages allegedly due
because the trustee did not follow
plaintiff’s instructions as required by
the contractual provisions of the
benefit plan.
Furthermore, according to the
court, the essence of the complaint
filed in Russell differed from that of
the complaint filed in the Warren case.
In Russell the action was brought
pursuant to 8 502(a)(2) claiming a cause
of action under sg 409(a) whereas the
Warren plaintiff brought the action
under 8 502(a)(3) and sumehe relief
under 8 404(a)(1). Id. at 980-81.
As & result of the foregoing, the
Sixth Circuit found that under trust
law, a beneficiary is entitled to a
remedy that will put him in the position
he would have been in if the fiduciary
had not committed a breach of trust.
App. 55
Such a remedy, according to the court,
includes contractual money damages. Id.
at 982. As the court explained,
equitable relief includes monetary
damages where necessary to afford
complete relief as it is “the historic
purpose of equity to secure complete
justice, and courts may adjust their
remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief." Id. Thus, a plaintiff is
entitled to monetary damages where a
breach of fiduciary duty results in the
loss or denial of benefits to which
plaintiff is contractually entitled.
In the within litigation, defendant
argues that plaintiff was not
contractually entitled to benefits
because the contract for coverage was
void from the inception for want of
consideration. Defendant’s claim is
based on the fact that the employer
failed to pay the entire premium
App. 56
required for coverage. As a result,
defendant avers, the contract was void
from the date it would have otherwise
been effective.
Regarding the duties of a
fiduciary, the applicable statute
provides in pertinent part:
(1) Subject to sections
1103(c) and (d), 1342, and
1344 of this title, a
fiduciary shall discharge his
duties with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries
and-——
(A) for the exclusive purpose
of:
(i) providing benefits to
participants and their
beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable
expenses of administering the
plan;
(B) with the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under
the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and
familiarity with such matters
would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character
and with like aims;
App. 57
(C) by diversifying the
investments of the plan so as
to minimize the risk of large
losses, unless under the
circumstances it is clearly
prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the
documents and instruments
governing the plan insofar as
such documents and instruments
are consistent with the
provisions of this subchapter
or subchapter III of this
chapter.
29 U.S.C.A. 8 1104.
Under the statute, the fiduciary
shall discharge its duties with respect
to the plan solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries and
for the exclusive purpose of providing
benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. 8 1104(1)(A).
(emphasis added). In order to meet this
standard, the fiduciary is required to
act with the "care, skill, prudence, and
diligence under the circumstances” that
a prudent person acting in like capacity
and familiarity with such matters would
App. 58
use in the conduct of a comparable
enterprise. 29 U.S.C. 8 1104(B). In
the matter at hand, defendant failed to
meet the fiduciary standards enunciated
in 29 U.S.C. 8 1104.
There is case law to the effect
that a fiduciary breaches a duty owed by
failing to notify a plan participant or
beneficiary of information that is
material to one’s eligibility for
benefits under the particular plan.
See, e.g. Cent tates out
° t e i Fund v. tra
Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 105 8s.Cct.
2833 (1985), reh. denied, 473 U.S. 926
(1985); Vv. onia i ns. Co.,
919 F.2d 747 (D.C.App. 1990); Berlin v.
Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 858 F.2d
1154 (6th Cir. 1988); en v. Hote
Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union,
637 F.2d 592 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 898 (1981).
App. 59
In t t v. Central
Transport, Inc., the Court found that a
fiduciary has a duty to fully inform
plan participants and beneficiaries of
their rights and status under the plan.
472 U.S. at 580, 105 S.Ct. at 2845.
Failure to do so may result in fiduciary
liability. Likewise, in Eddy v.
Colonial Life Ins. Co., the court held
that under the principles of trust law,
"[t]he duty to disclose material
information is the core of the
fiduciary’s responsibility." 919 F.2d
at 750. Hence, a fiduciary, at times on
his own initiative, has a duty to convey
complete and correct material
information to a beneficiary. Id.
According to the Eddy court, since
trust law provides the foundation for
ERISA, plaintiff was entitled to
benefits which were denied because the
fiduciary breached its duty to plaintiff
App. 60
by its failure to give plaintiff
complete and correct material
information about his status and his
option to convert his group health
insurance. As the court noted:
[The trustee] is under a duty
to communicate to the
beneficiary material facts
affecting the interest of the
beneficiary which he knows the
beneficiary does not know and
which the beneficiary needs to
know for his protection in
dealing with a third person .
Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Trusts 8 173, comment d (1959).
Similarly, in Berlin v. Michigan
Bell Telephone Co., the Sixth Circuit
reversed the lower court’s decision
denying plaintiffs’ claim for retirement
benefits which had been withheld because
the fiduciary had given plaintiffs
inaccurate information. The Court of
appeals realized that,
courts must always bear in
mind the ultimate
App. 61
eee
consideration whether
allowance or disallowance of
particular relief would best
effectuate the underlying
purposes of ERISA-~enforcement
of strict fiduciary standards
of care in the administration
of all aspects of [] plans and
promotion of the best
interests of participants and
beneficiaries.
858 F.2d at 1162. (quoting
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. at 158, 105 S.Ct. at
3098 (Brennan, J., concurring).
In the Berlin case the plan
fiduciaries gave plaintiffs incorrect
information about plaintiffs’ rights
under the benefit plan. As a result,
the Sixth Circuit held that a fiduciary
may be personally liable for materially
misleading those to whom the duties of
loyalty and prudence described in 29
U.S.C. 8 1104 are owed. Michigan Bell,
858 F.2d at 1163. Such a duty
encompasses an obligation to refrain
from making mis-representations, either
App. 62
negligently or intentionally, to plan
participants. Id.
Additionally, in Rosen v. Hotel and
Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union,
the court found that ERISA imposes
strict fiduciary obligations on those
who have discretion or responsibility
respecting the management, handling, or
disposition of plans governed by the
statute. Thus, at a minimum, the
fiduciary must notify a plan participant
or beneficiary of the employer’s failure
to contribute to the fund as required by
the plan agreement. 637 F.2d at 599-
600. This is true because,
[i]f a trustee’s fiduciary
duty requires anything in the
administration of the trust,
it requires him to inform the
{plan participants] of their
employer’s failure to make the
required contributions to the
[plan]. Continued eligibility
is the core of the trustee
beneficiary relationship and
those responsible for the
administration of the [plan]
are required to notify [plan
App. 63
participants] when their
employer jeopardizes their
eligibility.
Id. (citation omitted).
Applying this reasoning, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court’s decision and held that
plaintiff was entitled to his pension
benefits because the pension trustee’s
failure, as required by the pension
agreement, to notify plaintiff of his
employer’s neglect in contributing to
the plan constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty. This failure to
contribute resulted it plaintiff’s lack
of the length of credited service
necessary for entitlement to pension
benefits. The court therefore held
plaintiff was entitled to full pension
benefits despite the fact that because
of his employer’s failure to contribute
to the plan, plaintiff he did not have
App. 64
the requisite number of years of
credited service.
Defendant’s reliance on Russell and
Powell is misplaced. This Court finds
that plaintiff simply sought to enforce
the terms of the benefit plan, e.g., the
payment of hospitalization expenses she
was contractually entitled to receive
pursuant to the terms of the plan.
Furthermore, as case law indicates, a
fiduciary is trusted by the beneficiary
to act on behalf of the beneficiary and
a serious breach of that duty may give
rise to a cause of action.* In
addition, "[]the duty to disclose
* If this were simply a claim under
an estoppel theory, defendant’s motion
would be granted because courts have held
that statements made by plan
representatives contrary to the express
provisions of the plan in issue may not
estop the plan from later denying the
payments of benefits. See e.g., Moore v.
u o., 856 F.2d
488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988); chw er v.
Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 959-60 (11th Cir.
1986).
App. 65
material information is the core of a
fiduciary’s responsibility." See Eddy,
919 F.2d at 70.
Originally, in its motion for
summary judgment, defendant argued that
it did not have a fiduciary duty to
inform plaintiff of nonpayment of
premiums due under the plan because it
was not the administrator or the sponsor
of the Roofing Concepts plan. This
Court held, however, that although
defendant was neither a sponsor nor an
administrator of the plan, it was
nonetheless a fiduciary of the plan.
Consequently, it had an ensuing duty to
disclose material information to
plaintiff. Clearly, Roofing Concepts’
failure to pay the premiums required
under the plan constitutes material
information of which plaintiff should
have been aware. See e.g. McNeese v.
Health Plan Marketing, Inc., 647 F.Supp.
App. 66
981, 986 (N.D.Ala. 1986) ("Several
courts have held that at a minimum, the
fiduciary under ERISA has an obligation
to notify the employees of the
employer’s failure to contribute to the
pension fund as required by the pension
agreement.") Hence, as this Court
earlier found, by failing to notify
plaintiff of Roofing Concepts’
nonpayment, defendant breached its
fiduciary obligation to plaintiff.
Moreover, plaintiff merely seeks an
award of contractual damages, not extra-
contractual damages. Under the terms of
the plan, plaintiff is entitled to the
benefits claimed despite defendant’s
argument to the contrary. This is
especially true because defendant acted
as though the desire hospitalization
coverage was fully in force despite the
alleged shortage in the premium payment.
App. 67
For example, the policy issued by
defendant to Roofing Concepts had an
effective date of November 1, 1988. See
Defendant’s Exhibit 1.° Roofing
Concepts presented defendant with a
check in the amount of $3665.63 which
was to be applied toward the first
premium. Thereafter, it was determined
that the actual amount of the premium
should have been $3,709.42; thus,
Roofing Concepts owed $43.79 on the
first month’s premium. See Defendant’s
Exhibits 3 and 4. Despite this apparent
shortage, defendant only billed Roofing
Concepts $3,709.42 for the premium due
December 1, 1988 even though defendant
> All references to defendant’s
exhibits are to those items attached to
defendant’s memorandum in support of its
motion for summary judgment unless
otherwise specified. Similarly,
references to plaintiff’s exhibits are
made with respect to documents attached
to plaintiff’s memorandum in response to
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
App. 68
claims that the $43.79 shortage
effectively negated Roofing Concepts’
coverage. See Defendant’s Exhibit 5.
On December 1, 1988, plaintiff
received a letter from defendant’s
account representative. The letter
indicated that plaintiff was entitled to
coverage under the fore-mentioned plan.
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit A. According to
plaintiff’s affidavit, plaintiff made
several calls to defendant after
December 1, 1988 regarding the terms of
the coverage. See Plaintiff’s
SO tae Se
Memorandum in Response to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff
was advised each time that she was
entitled to hospitalization coverage and
the terms of the coverage were discussed
with her. Id.
Subsequent to the birth of
plaintiff’s son, several bills were
submitted to defendant for payment.
App. 69
ae
—— aan
Defendant accepted and paid bills for
charges incurred on December 9, 1988 and
processed on January 24, 1989 and for {
charges incurred on January 25-26, 1989
and processed on May 8, 1989. Defendant
did not, however, pay bills for
additional charges that were incurred on
January 25-27, 1989 and processed on May
3 and March 25, 1989. See Plaintiff’s
Affidavit.
On February 10, 1989, defendant’s
internal correspondence indicates that
“[t]he policyholder [Roofing Concepts]
has not paid their 12/1, 1/1 or 2/1/89
premiums." See Plaintiff’s Exhibit C
(emphasis added). Thus, the policy was
to be terminated for non-payment of
premiums. Id. Nevertheless, defendant
continued to act as though Roofing
Concepts had coverage because the | |
correspondence neither mentions the
November 1, 1988 premium payment
App.- 70
shortage nor the possibility of
termination because of the alleged
shortage. On February 12, 1989,
defendant attempted to reach Roofing
Concepts to find out "what the problem
was." See Plaintiff’s Exhibit Cc. It
was then learned that the phone was
disconnected but it was not until
February 14, 1989 that the November l,
1988 shortage was mentioned. At that
time, however, defendant continued to
act as if the policy were in effect
because the correspondence states
This case is effective
11/1/88. They only paid
$3665.63 for their premium
deposit, leaving $43.79 short.
We need this premium and the
12/1, 1/1 and 2/1/89 premium
by 2/15/89 or we will
terminate this case.
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit C.
On February 15, 1989, Roofing
Concepts informed defendant that it was
no longer in business and that the
App. 71
ie ee
insurance policy should be cancelled “at
the earliest possible date." See
Plaintiff’s Exhibit D. On March 27,
1989, defendant informed plaintiff that
since the coverage had been cancelled
effective November 1, 1988, benefits
would not be provided for plaintiff’s
hospitalization of January 25 and 26,
1989.
A "fiduciary shall discharge his
duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interests of the participants and
beneficiaries and for the exclusive
purpose of providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries."
29 U.S.C. 8 404(a)(1)(i). Accord Vogel
v. Inde eo vi P
728 F.Supp. 1210, 1229 (D.Md. 1990).
Thus, where a fiduciary breaches a duty
owed to a beneficiary, the beneficiary
may be entitled to damages pursuant to
the contractual agreement established by
App. 72
the benefit plan. Alternatively, a
beneficiary is entitled to damages
necessary to put the beneficiary in the
position he or she would have been in
but for the trustee’s breach of duty.
Accordingly, defendant’s motion to alter
or amend the judgment will be denied
with respect to its liability for
breaching its fiduciary obligation to
plaintiff and plaintiff’s judgment of
October 16, 1990 allowed to stand.
II
Plaintiff’s Application for
Attorney Fees And Costs
In the Court’s order of October 16,
1990, plaintiff was awarded reasonable
costs and attorney’s fees incurred in
connection with this litigation. On
October 26, 1990, plaintiff’s counsel
filed an application and supporting
affidavit for fees and costs totalling
$15,178.20. Plaintiff also seeks an
App. 73
enhancement of 20% bringing his total
request to $18,156.70. This application
is based on a rate of $175.00 per hour
and an expenditure of "a minimum of
85.10 hours” of time on plaintiff’s
case. See Plaintiff’s Application for
Attorney Fees, time-sheet for Coleman v.
Nationwide. Plaintiff contends the
enhancement is justified “in light of
these factors stated" in Barber v.
6
Kimbrell’s, Inc.” and Espinoza v.
Hillwood Square Mut. Assoc.’ See
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s
Application for Attorney’s Fees.
Defendant opposes plaintiff’s fee
request on the grounds that neither the
reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rate
nor the "“after-the-fact exhibit
purporting to reflect the time spent by
6 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 934 (1978).
’ 532 F.Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1982).
App. 74
plaintiff’s attorney on the case"
adequately support the requested award.
See Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney’s
Fees .®
Furthermore, defendant contends
that expenses for items such as parking
and postal charges may not be recovered
as costs.
Pursuant to the ERISA statute, “in
any action under this subchapter .
by a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary, the court in its discretion
8 At the time defendant filed its
opposition to plaintiff’s application for
fees, plaintiff’s counsel had merely
submitted his own affidavit in support of
his request. According to defendant,
this "self-serving" affidavit was
insufficient to establish the
reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rate.
See Memorandum in Opposition.
Subsequently, plaintiff attempted to
remedy this alleged deficiency by
submitting the affidavits of three
attorneys who confirm that, upon
information and belief, the hourly rate
counsel charges is indeed reasonable.
See Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s
Objection to Fee Award.
App. 75
may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee
and costs of action to either party.”
29 U.S.C.A. 8 1132(g)(1). The Fourth
Circuit has held that the district
courts are to consider and make detailed
findings with regard to twelve factors
relevant to the determination of what
constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees.
See Barber v. Kimbrell’s, Inc., 577 F.2d
216, 226 (4th Cir. 1978). The twelve
factors, first enunciated in Johnson v.
orgia Highwa s, Inc.’,
include: 1) the time and labor expended;
2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions raised; 3) the skill required
to properly perform the legal services
rendered; 4) the attorney’s opportunity
costs in pressing the instant
litigation; 5) the customary fee for
like work; 6) the attorney’s
9 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
App. 76
expectations at the outset of the
litigation; 7) the time limitations
imposed by the client or circumstances;
8) the amount in controversy and the
results obtains; 9) the experience,
reputation and ability of the attorney;
10) the undesirability of the case
within the legal community in which the
suit arose; 11) the nature and length of
the professional relationship between
attorney and client; and 12) attorneys’
fees awards in similar cases. Barber v.
Kimbrell’s, Inc., 577 F.2d at 226 and
a.28.”
The Johnson analysis was
subsequently refined by the Fourth
Circuit in Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d
‘0 It is well-recognized that the
applicable law for determining attorneys’
fee awards in ERISA cases is analogous to
the law on fee awards in other
substantive areas of the law. Accord
Dav on_v. Cook, 594 F.Supp. 418, 421
(E.D.Va. 1984). (citations omitted).
App. 77
246 (4th Cir. 1981}. In Anderson the
court explained that the district court
should first
ascertain the nature and
extent of the services
supplied by the attorney from
a statement showing the number
of hours worked and an
explanation of how these hours
were spent. The court next
determine the customary hourly
rate of compensation. . .
The court should then multiply
the number of hours reasonably
expended by the customary
hourly rate to determine the
initial amount of the fee
award. Finally, the court
should adjust the fee on the
basis of the other factors,
briefly explaining how they
affected the award.
Id. at 249. (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
Consequently, the court must
determine what constitutes a reasonable
expenditure of time and what rate of
compensation should be allowed. Id.
determining the time and rate, the court
must “evaluate the quality as well as
the quantity of the attorney’s work.”
App. 78
Id. The court is expressly instructed
to “begin with a figure based on the
number of hours reasonably expended
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate
and then explain any adjustment of these
figures either up or down because of the
other Johnson factors listed in Barber."
Id. Accord Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
886, 104 S.Ct. 1541 (1984) (the initial
estimate of a reasonable attorney’s fee
is properly calculated by multiplying
the number of hours reasonably expended
on the litigation times a reasonable
hourly rate). The initial query is what
is a "reasonable hourly rate"?
Likewise, how does the court determine
whether the length of time expended is
"reasonable"?
The party seeking the fee award
bears the burden of providing evidence
sufficient to support its claim of the
hours worked and the rate which should
App. 79
be awarded. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (1983); Depuy
v. Depuy, 686 F.Supp. 568, 570 (E.D. Va.
1988). Once the fee applicant has
provided support for the requested rate,
the burden falls on the party opposing
the request to go forward with evidence
that the rate is erroneous. National
° t v.
Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319,
1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982). By the same
measure, the party opposing the fee
application must also submit specific
and detailed objections. Just as the
fee applicant cannot merely submit a
categorical application, an opposing
party does not meet its burden by simply
asserting broad challenges to the
petition. Id. at 1338 (Tamm, J.,
concurring).
In a case where plaintiff is held
to be entitled to attorney’s fees,
App. 80
should the plaintiff fail to prevail on
claims that are unrelated to the claims
on which the plaintiff succeeds, the
court should not award fees for services
rendered in prosecuting the
unsuccessful, unrelated claim. Hensley,
461 U.S. at ——, 103 S.Ct. at 1940;
Davidson, 594 F.Supp. at 422. In
addition, the court should consider
whether plaintiff’s level of success
makes the hours reasonably expended a
satisfactory basis for making a fee
award. Davidson, 594 F.Supp. at 422.
Courts have held that a reasonable
hourly rate is that "prevailing in the
community for similar work." National
Association, 675 F.2d at 1323.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted,
the burden is on the fee
applicant to produce
satisfactory evidence
that the requested rates are
in line with those prevailing
in the community for similar
services by lawyers of
App. 81
reasonably comparable skill,
experience and reputation.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, -—-—-, 104 S.Ct.
1541, 1547 n.1l.
Generally, the actual billing rates
of the plaintiff’s attorney is
considered the best possible indicator
of the market rates in the community
“for similar services by lawyers of
reasonably comparable skill, experience
and reputation." Accord Davidson, 594
F.Supp. at 422. See also National
Association of Concerned Veterans, 675
F.2d at 1324. In the instant case,
plaintiff’s counsel has not submitted
evidence of his actual billing rates nor
any indication of the prevailing market
rates other than the general and
conclusional affidavits of the
forementioned attorneys. It has been
held that "generalized and conclusory
[sic] ‘information and belief’
App. 82
affidavits from friendly attorneys" do
not establish the prevailing market
rate. Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380.
1402 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub
nom., Fayetteville v. Spell, 484 U.S.
1027 (1988); National Association of
Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1325.
The court’s decision in National
Association of Concerned Veterans is
particularly instructive. There the
court stated that in order to provide
the Court with guidance,
an affidavit stating an
attorney’s opinion as to the
market rate should be as
specific as possible. For
example, it should state
whether the stated hourly rate
is a present or past one,
whether the rate is for a
specific type of litigation or
for litigation in general, and
whether the rate is an average
one or one specifically for an
attorney with a particular
type of experience or
qualifications. The affidavit
should also state the factual
basis for the affiant’s
opinion. The best evidence
would be the hourly rate
Ww
App. 83
usto a e
tiie. Alternatively, the
affidavit might state that the
stated rate is based on the
affiant’s personal knowledge
about specific rates charged
by other lawyers or rates for
similar litigation.
Natio s a oncerned
Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1325-26 (emphasis
added).
The court further noted that its
determination of the approximate market
rate is not aided by an affidavit which
merely offers an attorney’s conclusory
[sic] and general opinion of what the
approximate rate is. Id. at 1326.
Moreover, an affidavit provides little
assistance where the affiant simply
states that he is familiar with the
attorney and the litigation and thinks
the fee request is reasonable. Id.
Plaintiff’s counsel in the matter
at hand has failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating that the $175.00 hourly
App. 84
rate he seeks is reasonable. The
affidavits he submits along with his own
are conclusional, general in nature, and
do not establish that the rate he claims
is the prevailing market rate in this
community for an attorney with a
comparable level of skill and
experience. As a result, counsel for
plaintiff has not demonstrated his
entitlement to an hourly rate of
$175.00. Consequently, this Court finds
that an hourly rate of $120.00 an hour
constitutes a reasonable rate for an
attorney possessing the equivalent skill
and experience as plaintiff’s counsel.
Turning to the issue of whether the
hours claimed by plaintiff’s counsel are
reasonable, the courts agree that an
application for attorney’s fees must
also contain “sufficiently detailed
information about the hours logged and
the work done." National Association of
App. 85
Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1327;
Depuy, 686 F.Supp. at 570; Davidson, 594
F.Supp. at 424. Additionally, a
determination of reasonable hours
includes “some exercise of ‘billing
judgment’ to eliminate hours that are
‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary.’" Hensley, 461 U.S. at -——-
, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40.
Generally, attorneys who anticipate
making a fee application are required to
maintain contemporaneous, complete and
standardized time records which
accurately reflect the work done by the
attorney. Accord National Association
of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1327.
Nonetheless, the failure to maintain
contemporaneous records does not
preclude an attorney from being awarded
his or her fees. Yohay v. Alexandria
Employees Credit Union, Inc., 827 F.2d
967, 974 (4th Cir. 1987). Such failure
App. 86
does not necessarily require the
district court to deny an award of fees
entirely if there was an adequate
reconstruction of time spent on the
litigation. Id. (citation omitted).
Further, as fees are not recoverable for
non—productive time or for time expended
on issues on which plaintiff does not
ultimately prevail, the fee application
should indicate whether such time was
excluded and, if time was excluded, the
nature of the work and the number of
hours involved should be stated.
National Association of Concerned
Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1327-28. Cf.
Davidson, 594 F.Supp. 418. Again, the
documsnatation submitted by plaintiff’s
counsel in support of his fee
application is bereft of any statement
that non-productive time has been
excluded. Further, counsel has
maintained contemporaneous records in
App. 87
some instances but not all.
Nevertheless, it appears that the
itemized list submitted is an accurate
reconstruction of the hours expended on
the Coleman matter.
Additionally, it is within the
court’s discretion to make a downward
adjustment of the request submitted if
the court is of the opinion that the
hours claimed are excessive. See Depuy,
686 F.Supp. at 570. Factors the court
should consider in determining whether
the hours expended were reasonable
include: 1) the simplicity or complexity
of the case; 2) the result counsel
sought and did obtain; 3) and the length
of time between the filing of the suit
and the entry of judgment. Accord
Depuy, 686 F.Supp. at 570 (Court found
the number of hours claimed unreasonable
in light of inter alia, the simplicity
of the case and the short period of time
App. 88
between the filing of the suit and the
entry of a default judgment); Davidson,
594 F.Supp. at 424 (Court found
excessive the number of hours claimed
for drafting a complaint, preparation of
various fee motions and supporting data,
and preparation of the bill of costs).
Plaintiff’s counsel contends in the
instant case that, "at a minimum," at
least 85.10 hours were spent on
plaintiff’s case. See Application for
Attorney’s Fees. The complaint, which
alleges a cause of action under ERISA
for breach of fiduciary duty, was filed
on January 20, 1990. Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment was filed on May 7,
1990.
Defendant notes that some of the
hours claimed by plaintiff’s claim
appear excessive. Defendant, however,
fails to support its categorical
Statement. Accordingly, the Court finds
App. 89
that the hours claimed by plaintiff’s
counsel are reasonable.
Cases hold that when the Court is
attempting to determine the reasonable
fees to which counsel is entitled, the
importance of the results obtained is
properly emphasized. Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. ---, 103 S.Ct. at
1940; Davidson, 594 F.Supp. at 422.
Herein, plaintiff was very successful in
that she received a judgment from this
Court awarding her all the relief she
sought.
Once the court ascertains the
lodestar rate, additional considerations
may support either an enhancement or
downward adjustment of that rate.
Pen vania v. Delaware Valle
Citizens’ Counsel for Clean Air, 483
U.S. 711, 107 S.Ct. 3078 (1987); Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at ———, 103 S.Ct.
at 1940. The burden of proving that an
App. 90
upward adjustment is necessary is on the
fee applicant. Stenson, 465 U.S. ——-,
104 S.Ct. at 1548.
To assist the Court in determining
whether an enhancement is justified,
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in
the Delaware Valley case has been found
to be controlling with respect to
delineating the circumstances under
which a “contingency multiplier" may be
appropriate. See Spell v. McDaniel, 824
F.2d at 1404 n.23. Justice O’Connor
wrote than an enhancement for risk is
inappropriate “unless the applicant can
establish that without an adjustment for
risk the prevailing party ‘would have
faced substantial difficulties in
finding counsel in the local or other
relevant market.’”" Delaware Valley
Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483
U.S. at -—--, 107 S.Ct. at 3089-92.
App. 91
ee
Additionally, an enhancement for
risk should not be allowed on the basis
of legal risks or risks peculiar to the
case since these risks are adequately
taken into account in fixing the
lodestar figure. Id. at ——, 107 S.Ct.
at 3091. Thu3, the Delaware Valley
Court reversed the allowance of the
multiplier in that case on the ground
that it was inappropriate. The Court
emphasized that there was no finding
that an enhancement for risk was
necessary in the relevant market to
insure that “poor clients with good
claims [could] secure competent help."
Id. at -———, 107 S.Ct. at 3089. Rather,
the lower courts had found enhancement
appropriate on the impermissible basis
of the legal and practical risks
peculiar to the particular case, rather
than on the basis of any general
difference in relevant market treatment
App. 92
of all comparable contingent fee cases.
Id. at ——, 107 S.Ct. at 3089-92.
Similarly, in Spell v. McDaniel,
Supra, the Fourth Circuit found that
enhancement of the fee award was
improper because the prevailing party
did not show that "enhancement was
necessary to insure that competent
counsel would nevertheless be willing to
undertake contingency representation in
such cases." Spell v. McDaniel, 824
F.2d at 1405. According to the McDaniel
court, under the analysis of Delaware
Valley, "“case-specific risks [such as
the case’s complexity, dubiety of
success on the merits, and difficulty of
proving damages, uncompensated time and
expense assumed by counsel in
undertaking representation, and the
delay in receiving payment] may not
properly be drawn upon to enhance a
‘lodestar’ fee with a ‘contingency
App. 93
multiplier.’" Id. (quoting Pennsylvania
v. Delaw Valle itizens’ Co i °
Clean Air, Id. at -———-, 107 S.Ct. at
3079-87 (plurality opinion); Id. at ---,
107 S.Ct. at 3089 (concurring opinion) ).
See also Stenson, 465 U.S. at -—-, 104
S.Ct. at 1549 (Neither complexity nor
novelty of the issues is an appropriate
factor in determining whether to
increase the basic fee award).
Plaintiff’s counsel in the instant
matter merely states that "a 20% fee
enhancement is appropriate in light of
these factors stated in Barber, supra,
and Espinoza, supra.” See Memorandum of
Law Supporting Attorney’s Fee Request.
Unaided by counsel as to why an
enhancement is appropriate in this
matter, the Court finds that there is no
support for the requested 20%
enhancement. Consequently, plaintiff’s
motion will be denied.
App. 94
In addition, counsel for plaintiff
seeks to recover costs for copying,
postage, and parking. It has been held
that costs such as postage and parking
are not properly taxed as costs by the
court. Sun Pub. v. Mecklenburg News,
inc., 594 F.Supp. 1512, 1524 (E.D.Va.
1984), aff’d, 823 F.2d 818 (4th Cir.
1987). Consequently, counsel may not
recover such charges. Hence, the
application for reasonable costs will be
denied to the extent it seeks
reimbursement of such charges. As it is
impossible for the Court to ascertain
what amount of the request constitutes
postage charges, the Court will reduce
the amount of "xerox and postage" sought
by 10%.
App. 95
Itt
Supplemental Application for
Attorney’s Fees
On April 19, 1991, plaintiff’s
counsel filed a supplemental application
for additional attorney’s fees for work
done responding to defendant’s motion to
alter or amend the Court’s judgment of
October 16, 1990. Plaintiff’s counsel
contends that a total of 17 hours were
expended in preparing for and responding
to defendant’s motion. Again,
plaintiff’s counsel seeks $175.00 an
hour and reimbursement of charges for
copying, postage, and telephone tolls.
And again, the hourly rate awarded will
be $120.00 an hour and the application
for such charges will be denied to the
extent the application seeks
reimbursement for postage charges.
Accordingly, the Court will reduce the
amount sought for the reimbursement of
charges by 10%.
IV
Defendant’s Motion for Default Judgment
In the Court’s order of October 16,
1990, defendant was directed to apprise
the Court of the status of the third-
party complaint filed against Roofing
Concepts. On January 7, 1990, defendant
filed its answer and a third-party
complaint against Roofing Concepts
seeking judgment against Roofing
Concepts "in such sums as it may be
found liable to plaintiff." See
Memorandum of Points & Authorities in
Support of Defendant and Third-Party
Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment.
According to the Court’s records,
the third-party complaint was served on
the wife of the president of Roofing
Concepts’ on February 12, 1990. Roofing
Concepts has not filed any responsive
App. 97
pleadings. Consequently, a default
judgment against defendant is
appropriate pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.’
An appropriate Order shall issue.
[signed] James R. Spencer
United States District Judge
Date: July 18, 1991
“The Rules provide that when a
party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed
to plead or otherwise defend as provided
by these rules and that fact is made to
appear by affidavit or otherwise, the
party entitled to judgment by default
shall apply to the court therefor. FED.
R. CIV. P. 55(a) and FED. R. CIV. P.
55(b) (2).
App. 98
APPENDIX C
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
JOANNE W. COLEMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Vv. No. 91-2646
NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant & Third-Party Plaintiff-
Appellant,
Vv.
ROOFING CONCEPTS, INCORPORATED,
Third-Party Defendant.
JOANNE W. COLEMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v. No. 91-2652
NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant—Appellee,
Vv.
ROOFING CONCEPTS, INCORPORATED,
Third-Party Defendant.
Appeals from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, at Richmond.
James R. Spencer, District Judge.
(CA-90-19)
Argued: April 18, 1992
Decided: July 1, 1992
App. 99
Before WILKINSON, HAMILTON, and LUTTIG,
Circuit Judges.
Reversed by published opinion. Judge
Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which
Judge Hamilton and Judge Luttig joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Edwin Lewis Kincer, Jr.,
MEZZULLO & MCCANDLISH, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellant. John Bertram
Mann, LEVIT & MANN, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: David D.
Hopper, MEZZULLO & MCCANDLISH, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellant.
OPINION
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
In this case plaintiff seeks
benefits under a group health insurance
plan, the award of which would violate
important provisions of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
29 U.S.C. 8 1001 et seq. Plaintiff
Joanne Coleman seeks to recover under a
contract between her husband’s employer
and Nationwide Life Insurance Company,
which had terminated automatically due
App. 100
to the employer’s failure to pay the
premiums. Coleman has offered the court
three rationales for ruling in her
favor. First, she .contends that while
the contract of insurance gave the right
to cancel the policy for non-payment of
premiums, such cancellation required an
affirmative act by Nationwide and could
not be exercised retroactively. Second,
she urges by way of estoppel that
statements made to her by Nationwide
personnel indicating that she had
coverage preclude Nationwide from
denying her benefits due to the
termination of the plan. Finally, she
argues that Nationwide breached its
fiduciary duty under ERISA by failing to
notify plan beneficiaries that her
husband’s employer had not paid the
necessary premiums to keep the policy in
force.
App. 101
At first glance, these appear to be
three unrelated theories of recovery,
but acceptance of any of them would
require this court to rewrite the
contract of insurance. While a court
should be hesitant to depart from the
written terms of a contract under any
circumstances, it is particularly
inappropriate in a case involving ERISA,
which places great emphasis upon
adherence to the written provisions in
an employee benefit plan. Plaintiff’s
theories, though packaged in different
wrappers, all would lead to the same
result ~— the written plan would no
longer be the benchmark in an action
under ERISA. Accordingly, we must
reverse the judgment of the district
court and direct it to dismiss the
complaint.
I.
Plaintiff Joanne Coleman and her
husband participated in a group health
insurance plan sponsored by: her
husband’s employer, Roofing Concepts,
Inc. After terminating its group_health
coverage with another insurer in late
1988, Roofing Concepts was issued a
group health policy by Nationwide Life
Insurance Company, which took effect on
November 1, 1988. The Nationwide policy
fell within ERISA’s definition of an
employee welfare benefit plan, and was
thereby subject to regulation under the
statute. 29 U.S.C. 8 1002(1). The plan
documents consisted of the insurance
policy and Roofing Concepts’
application.
In the contract of insurance,
Roofing Concepts agreed to pay 100
percent of the premiums due on the
policy. The written provisions of the
App. 103
plan also stated that the policy would
"continue for as long as premiums are
paid or until it is cancelled.” The
plan allowed for a-3l-day grace period
after a premium due date, during which
time insurance coverage would continue
for the plan participants. The policy
provided, however, that "[i]f all the
premium is not paid prior to the
expiration of the grace period, the
Policy will terminate on the last day of
the grace period."
Roofing Concepts defaulted on its
payments almost from the start. At the
time of its application to Nationwide,
Roofing Concepts paid a premium deposit
of $3665.63, which equaled the estimated
premium on the policy for the first
month. WNationwide’s underwriters
thereafter calculated the actual monthly
premium to be $3709.42, $43.79 more than
Roofing Concepts’ deposit. Nationwide
App. 104
billed Roofing Concepts for this
difference, which was due on November Be
1988. Roofing Concepts, however, never
paid the $43.79, nor did it ever make
another monthly premium payment.
Roofing Concepts also failed to notify
its employees that it had ceased paying
the premiums on the policy.
Roofing Concepts went out of
business on February 15, 1989. On
February 16, Roofing Concepts informed
Nationwide of this event and asked
Nationwide to cancel the health
insurance policy. On March 6, 1989,
Nationwide sent a reply letter
indicating that because Roofing Concepts
had paid no premiums except for the
initial deposit, the policy was
cancelled as of its effective date,
November 1, 1988.
Plaintiff Coleman was pregnant at
the time of the Nationwide policy’s
App. 105
inception. In response to a telephone
inquiry, Coleman received a letter from
a Nationwide account representative
dated December 1, 1988, which included
her policy number as well as a brief
summary of group benefits. On December
5, 1988, Coleman was sent an
authorization for a two-day hospital
stay for her childbirth that she
requested from Capp Care, a cost
containment organization paid by, but
not affiliated with, Nationwide. The
authorization letter contained the
following disclaimer. "“CAPP CARE’S
AUTHORIZATION OF ADMISSION, CONTINUED
STAY OR SURGICAL PROCEDURE DOES NOT
GUARANTEE PAYMENT. PAYMENT IS ALSO
SUBJECT TO ELIGIBILITY AND COVERAGE AT
THE TIME SERVICES ARE RENDERED AND MUST
BE VERIFIED BY THE EMPLOYER OR INSURANCE
CARRIER."
Coleman claims in her affidavit
that she was advised by unnamed
Nationwide employees on several
occasions after December 1, 1988 that
she had coverage. In her deposition,
however, Coleman indicated that the only
time she spoke to Nationwide personnel
between December 1 and the birth of her
child was in January 1989 when she was
told during a telephone inquiry that a
tubal ligation would be covered under
the policy. Coleman did contend that
she spoke to Capp Care employees on
numerous occasions during the same time
period regarding her authorization for
hospitalization.
Coleman gave birth to a son on
January 25, 1989. Although Nationwide
paid two of the medical expenses
associated with the childbirth totalling
$481.60, it notified Coleman in a letter
dated March 27, 1989, that the bulk of
App. 107
her expenses would not be paid because
her coverage had been cancelled as of
November 1, 1988. These uncovered
expenses totalled $6976.07. When
Coleman’s husband contacted Kenneth
Harris, president of Roofing Concepts,
to find out why the policy had been
cancelled, Harris professed ignorance
despite the fact that he had signed the
February 16 letter to Nationwide
requesting the cancellation of coverage.
Coleman filed this suit against
Nationwide on January 12, 1990, seeking
payment of the medical expenses plus
attorney’s fees. Both parties
subsequently filed motions for summary
judgment. On October 16, 1990, the
district court denied Nationwide’s
motion for summary judgment and granted
Coleman’s on alternative theories of
estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty.
748 F.Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1990). After
App. 108
Nationwide filed a motion to alter or
amend the judgment, the district court
on July 18, 1991, reversed its earlier
ruling that plaintiff was entitled to
judgment on an estoppel theory. The
court, however, upheld the grant of
Summary judgment for Coleman on
fiduciary duty grounds. Both parties
now appeal to this Court.
App. 109
II.
Coleman argues that she was covered
under the health insurance plan because
Nationwide had no right to retroactively
cancel her benefits. Although she
apparently concedes that the failure of
Roofing Concepts to pay the policy
premiums gave Nationwide the right to
cancel the policy, she contends that her
coverage was in full force and effect
when her child was born because
Nationwide had taken no affirmative
action to cancel the policy as of that
date.
We believe, however, that Coleman
misreads the plain language of the
policy, which provides for automatic
termination of the coverage if the
policy’s grace period expires without
payment of an overdue premium having
been made. The written plan expressly
states that "[i]f all the premium is not
App. 110
paid prior to the expiration of the
grace period, the Policy will terminate
on the last day of the grace period"
(emphasis added). The policy also
states that coverage "will continue for
as long as premiums are paid or until it
is cancelled." Thus, the policy itself
draws a distinction between automatic
termination if Nationwide is not paid a
premium and a cancellation for some
other reason. On the facts of this
case, Coleman’s coverage terminated no
later than December 2, 1988, when the
grace period for payment of the $43.79
portion of the November premium expired.
The language of this plan indicating
that coverage terminates automatically
for failure to pay premiums is
unambiguous. Courts are not at liberty
to disregard the plain language of a
plan in order to demand that insurers
App. 111
provide coverage for which no premium
has been — or ever will be - paid.’
Attempts to circumvent this policy
language on behalf of an admittedly
appealing plaintiff would regrettably
reprove the adage that hard cases make
bad law. For example, adoption of
Coleman’s position that the insurer has
to make some affirmative acknowledgement
of termination in order for such
termination to have effect would not
only conflict with the plain language of
the plan, but might also inure to the
detriment of beneficiaries in the long
run. An insurer that has an automatic
termination provision in its policy is
not presently precluded from making the
‘ We also note that Nationwide
breached no fiduciary duty by regarding
the policy as cancelled according to its
own terms. "To adhere to the plan is not
a breach of fiduciary duty.”
vy. Weirton Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 1075,
1080 (4th Cir. 1989).
App. 112
business decision to accept payment of
premiums after the grace period has
expired and to treat the policy as an
uninterrupted one. The decision to do
this, of course, does not alter the
terms of the contract, but it certainly
works to the benefit of plan
participants whose coverage would remain
in effect. Coleman’s affirmative
acknowledgement rule would create an
incentive for an insurer to declare a
policy terminated as soon as the grace
period expires in order to protect its
rights. Once such a declaration is made
by the insurer, tendering and acceptance
of the overdue premiums to reinstate the
policy seem less likely to occur.
Consequently, plan participants as a
whole are likely to be harmed by
Coleman’s rule.
Coleman’s additional contention
that the automatic termination provision
App. 113
constitutes an illegal “escape” clause
also misses the mark. She seems to
suggest that a termination clause such
as this is unenforceable because it
disrupts legitimate expectations of
coverage or renders the insurer’s
promise of coverage illusory. A
contractual provision such as the one at
issue here that conditions performance
upon payment, however, is the essence of
consideration and is in no way improper
or unconscionable. See, e.g., American
Fami Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 739 F.2d
1259, 1262 (7th Cir. 1984).
rrr.
Coleman next argues that Nationwide
is estopped from denying her the
requested medical benefits. She alleges
that at various points between December
1, 1988, and the birth of her child,
Nationwide employees and agents
indicated that she was still covered by
App. 114
the Roofing Concepts health insurance
policy. She claims that these
representations estop Nationwide from
asserting that her coverage had
terminated pursuant to the terms of the
plan and that, as a result of this
estoppel, she is entitled to payment of
her medical expenses notwithstanding the
plan’s plain language.
Although Coleman apparently
concedes that a state common law cause
of action based upon equitable estoppel
has been preempted by ERISA, see 29
U.S.C. 8 1144; Hololand v. Burlington
Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1146-47
(4th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem. sub nom.
Brooks v. Burlington Indus., Inc.,-477
U.S. 901 (1986), she nonetheless
contends that these very same estoppel
principles may be imported into ERISA in
the name of federal common law. Federal
common law, however, does not grant
App. 115
federal courts "carte blanche authority
federal statute.’" rovident fe
Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d
985, 992 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956,
960 (llth Cir. 1986).
Use of estoppel principles to
effect a modification of a written
employee benefit plan would conflict
with "ERISA’s emphatic preference for
written agreements." e v °
Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir.
1989). The statute requires that all
ERISA plans be “established and
maintained pursuant to a written
instrument," 29 U.S.C. 8 1102(a)(1), and
that the written instrument describe the
formal procedures by which the plan can
be amended, id. 8 1102(b)(3). Based
upon this statutory scheme, any
modification to a plan must be
App. 116
implemented in conformity with the
formal amendment procedures and must be
in writing. Oral or informal written
modifications to a plan, such as those
alleged by Coleman in this case, are of
no effect. Equitable estoppel
principles, whether denominated as state
or federal common law, have not been
permitted to vary the written terms of a
plan. Indeed, this circuit has said
that "resort to federal common law
generally is inappropriate when its
application would ... threaten to
override the explicit terms of an
established ERISA benefit plan." inger
F Cc e Oorp., No. 91-1669,
slip op. at 5 (4th Cir. May 27, 1992);
accord Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners,
Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1165 n. 10 (3d Cir.
1990); Cefalu v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 871
F.2d 1290, 1296-97 (5th Cir. 1989);
Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d
App. 117
897, 910 (6th Cir. 1988); Straub v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 851 F.2d 1262,
1265-66 (10th Cir. 1988); Nachwalter,
805 F.2d at 959-61; see also Pizlo v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 884 F.2d 116, 120
(4th Cir. 1989) (rejecting claims
because "they rest on an allegation that
the pension plan was modified by
informal and unauthorized amendment
which, as a matter of law, is
impermissible”).
In an effort to avoid the
prohibition against using equitable
estoppel to modify the written terms of
a plan, Coleman claims that Nationwide’s
statements constitute an interpretation,
not a modification, of the written plan.
Based upon this construction of the
facts, she argues that we should adopt
the view of the Eleventh Circuit that
estoppel principles may be invoked in
ERISA cases when the statements at issue
App. 118
ar2 interpretations of ambiguous plan
provisions. See National Cos. Health
Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. of
Atlanta, Inc., 929 F.2d 1558, 1571-72
(llth Cir. 1991); Kane v. Aetna Life
ins., 893 F.2d 1283, 1286 (llth Cir.
1990). We need not decide whether we
agree with the view of the Eleventh
Circuit, however, because this case
involves an outright modification, not
an interpretation of the plan. In Kane,
the Eleventh Circuit recognized that
"estoppel may not be involved to enlarge
or extend coverage specified in a
contract." 893 F.2d at 1285 n.3. In
this case, estopping Nationwide from
terminating the contract of insurance
when no premiums were paid would have
the effect of providing Coleman benefits
even though the contract unambiguously
indicates that she was entitled to none.
We can only regard such a result a
App. 119
modification of the plan’s termination
provision and, therefore, as being in
direct conflict with the statutory
requirements.
We are unpersuaded by Coleman’s
view that estoppel principles are
available in cases involving employee
welfare benefits plans, but not in
pension plan cases. According to
Coleman, the reason for denying use of
equitable estoppel principles in pension
plan cases is to protect the actuarial
soundness of those plans. See Armistead
v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1300
(6th Cir. 1991); Black v. TIC Inv.
Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 115 (7th Cir.
1990). Since welfare benefit plans are
unfunded and lack the stringent accrual
and vesting requirements of pension
plans, Coleman believes the reason for
not allowing estoppel is absent.
App. 120
We do not think, however, that the
statutory emphasis on adherence to the
written terms of ERISA plans leaves room
for this distinction between pension and
welfare benefit plans. Section 1102
requires that "[e]very employee benefit
plan shall be established and maintained
pursuant to a written instrument," 29
U.S.C. 8 1102(a)(1) (emphasis added),
and the requirement that formal
amendment procedures be included in the
written document similarly applies to
“"[e]very employee benefit plan," id. 8
1102(b). According to ERISA’s
definition, the term “employee benefit
plan" includes both welfare benefit and
pension plans. Id. 8 1102(3). We also
note that Congress knew how to exempt
welfare benefit plans from ERISA
requirements when it wished to do so.
See id. 8 1051(1) (exempting welfare
benefit plans from ERISA’s participation
App. 121
and vesting requirements); id. 8 1081(1)
(exempting welfare benefit plans from
ERISA’s funding requirements); Hozier,
908 F.2d at 1164 (noting these
provisions); see also Moore v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d
488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988) (refusing to
apply estoppel to case involving
informal modification of welfare benefit
plan). Given the language of the
statute, we are unable to discern any
basis for holding that estoppel
principles are available to effectively
amend the written terms of a welfare
benefit plan. Indeed, in rejecting the
view that common law estoppel is freely
available to modify ERISA plans, this
circuit has drawn no distinction between
pension and welfare benefit plans. See
Salomon v. Transamerica Occidental Life
Ins. Co., 801 F.2d 659, 660-661 (4th
Cir. 1986) (monthly income benefit
App. 122
plan); Holland, 772 F.2d at 1147
(severance pay plan).
We also note that several important
purposes of ERISA would be impeded
through use of estoppel principles in
welfare benefit plan cases. ERISA is
designed "to promote the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries in
employee benefit plans,” wiv. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983),
as well as “to protect contractually
defined benefits," sett ¥
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134,
148 (1985). It requires a crabbed
reading of these purposes to suggest
that they are directed solely at the
actuarial soundness of pension plans.
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has recently
recognized that "[o]ne of ERISA’s
purposes is to protect the financial
integrity of pension and welfare plans
by confining benefits to the terms of
App. 123
the plans as written." Pohl v. National
Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d
126, 128 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis
added). The financial integrity of a
group health insurer could be quickly
compromised if courts compelled the
insurer to assume risks for which no
premium was ever paid. Moreover, if
courts allowed estoppel to be used to
modify ERISA plans, plan assets could
also be chewed up in costly, litigious
disputes over what informal
modifications may have been made to a
written instrument .*
. Coleman also urges that
Nationwide breached a fiduciary duty that
it owed her when it misrepresented that
she had coverage even though it knew that
Roofing Concepts was delinquent in the
premium payments. We note, however, that
the alleged misrepresentations to which
Coleman seeks to hold Nationwide were
mainly made by Capp Care employees. As
noted above, Capp Care’s written
communication to Coleman explicitly
stated that its authorization for
hospitalization did not guarantee payment
and that it was subject to the insurer’s
App. 124
In sum, we think the district court
Was correct to conclude that estoppel
was unavailable to alter the unambiguous
terms of an ERISA benefit plan.
verification of coverage. Coleman’s
effort to sidestep this disclaimer cannot
succeed. This theory of recovery,
moreover, seems to us to be little more
than a repackaging of the equitable
estoppel argument made by Coleman. Even
if the theory were valid, however,
Coleman must still come to terms with the
plain language of the plan. She brings
this action under 29 U.S.C. g 1132(a)(3),
which provides that courts may award
“other appropriate equitable relief." As
noted above, Coleman was entitled to no
benefits under the contract, and this
circuit has indicated that
extracontractual damages are generally
not available as "other appropriate
equitable relief" under gs 1132(a) (3).
See e el.
, , 780 F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir.
1985); cf. Massachusetts Mutual, 473 U.S.
at 144 (analysis of similar equitable
relief provision in 29 U.S.C. sg 1109
(indicates that “Congress did not intend
that section to authorize any relief
except for the plan itself. In short,
we do not find in [8 1109] express
authority for an award of
extracontractual damages to a
beneficiary.").
App. 125
Iv.
A.
In entering summary judgment in
Coleman’s favor, the district court
accepted her theory that Nationwide owed
her benefits due to a breach of
fiduciary duty. The alleged breach
stems from Nationwide’s failure to
notify all plan beneficiaries that
Roofing Concepts had threatened their
eligibility for benefits due to the
failure to pay premiums. We believe,
however, that in concluding that
Nationwide was fiduciary who had
committed a breach, the district court
failed to follow the allocation of
responsibilities that the plan documents
themselves provided.
Before one can conclude that a
fiduciary duty has been violated, it
must be established that the party
charged with the breach meets the
App. 126
Statutory definition of "fiduciary."
The statute defines the term as follows:
[A] person is a fiduciary with
respect to a plan to the
extent (i) he exercises any
discretionary authority or
discretionary control
respecting management of such
plan or exercises any
authority or control
respecting management or
disposition of its assets,
(ii) he renders investment
advice for a fee or other
compensation, direct or
indirect, with respect to any
moneys or other property of
such plan, or has any
authority or responsibility to
do so, or (iii) he has any
discretionary authority or
discretionary responsibility
in the administration of such
plan.
29 U.S.C. 8 1002(21)(A). As the basis
for its conclusion that this definition
has been satisfied, the district court
made the broad assertion that
“Nationwide possessed considerable
authority, discretion and administrative
control with respect to the plan." 748
F.Supp. at 432.
App. 127
We believe the district court’s
conclusion that Nationwide was a
“fiduciary” failed to come to terms with
the statutory definition. The district
court seemed to regard fiduciary status
as an all-or-nothing concept. However,
the inclusion of the phrase "to the
extent" in 8 1002(21)(A) means that a
party is a fiduciary only as to the
activities which bring the person within
the definition. The statutory language
plainly indicates that the fiduciary is
not an indivisible one. In other words,
a court must ask whether a person is a
fiduciary with respect to the particular
activity at issue. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R.
8 2509.75-8, FR-16 (1991); Licensed Div.
°. v. De , 943
F.2d 474, 477-78 (4th Cir. 1991);
Hozier, 908 F.2d at 1158; Local Union
2134, United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Powhatan Fuel, Inc., 828 F.2d 710, 714
App. 128
(11th Cir. 1987); Sommers Drug Stores
e ° ha . 2,
Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456,
1459-60 (5th Cir. 1986); Leigh v. Engle,
727 F.2d 113, 133 (7th Cir. 1984).
The discretionary authority or
responsibility which is pivotal to the
statutory definition of "fiduciary" is
allocated by the plan documents
themselves. Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989)
(looking to plan documents to determine
whether plan administrator exercised
discretionary powers in interpreting
plan provisions). In this case, we must
ask whether Nationwide possessed
discretionary authority or
responsibility to notify all plan
beneficiaries of circumstances, such as
the failure of a plan sponsor to pay
policy premiums, that would affect the
availability of benefits to all.
App. 129
Nothing in the plan itself suggests that
Nationwide has any authority or
responsibility to provide such
notification. Indeed, Nationwide is not
directed by the plan to provide notice
to all beneficiaries under any
circumstances. To the extent that the
relevant documents make an allocation of
a duty to provide notification of major
changes or events, that duty plainly
rests with Roofing Concepts. In its
preliminary application for insurance,
Roofing Concepts agreed as plan sponsor
to assume notice and recordkeeping
responsibilities in accordance with the
terms of the policy. Consistent with
this view, the final policy also
assigned notice and recordkeeping
responsibilities to Roofing Concepts,
including the obligation to keep
complete records with regard to each
person’s insurance, to distribute to
App. 130
each eligible employee information
regarding the program, and to report
changes in eligibility status to
Nationwide.
While we find nothing in the formal
allocation of responsibilities to
conclude that Nationwide possessed the
necessary discretionary authority to
render it a fiduciary, we must also look
beyond the formalities to see if
Nationwide in fact exercised authority
over these sorts of notifications. See
Leigh, 727 F.2d at 134, n.33. Our
review of the record, however, reveals
no such voluntary assumption of this
function by Nationwide.
There simply is no basis in the
plan documents or Nationwide’s actions
to conclude that Nationwide possessed or
exercised discretionary authority or
responsibility with respect to the
notification at issue. We cannot
App. 131
blindside Nationwide by implying the
existence of obligations when the only
source of such obligations is judicial
inventiveness. If an insurer, or any
other party, could be held to have
discretion over an activity simply
because it is not prohibited from
performing such activity, breaches of
fiduciary duty and the consequent
litigation would be omnipresent. the
costs of ERISA plans would surely surge
as parties sought cover from the
inevitable barrage of claims. Unable to
locate any legal basis in the statute or
plan documents for the duty that Coleman
would impose on Nationwide, we cannot
conclude that Nationwide was a
“fiduciary” as to this particular
function of notification or that it
breached a fiduciary duty.
App. 132
Coleman also urges that Nationwide
failed to fulfill the notification
duties assigned in the statute to the
plan administrator. ERISA allocates to
the plan administrator the
responsibility for providing notice of
plan provisions and changes that affect
the benefits of all. The plan
administrator must provide a detailed
Summary plan description to all
participants, as well as notification of
any material modifications that are made
to a plan. 29 U.S.C. ss 1102,
1024(b)(1). Coleman alleges that
Nationwide did not provide an adequate
summary plan description detailing the
cancellation procedures. The district
court did not reach that question,
however, because it found that
“‘Wethnuiiiie wan neither the
administrator nor the sponsor of the
App. 133
plan,” and that “Roofing Concepts filled
both of those roles." 748 F.Supp. at
431.
The statute unambiguously supports
the district court’s determination that
Roofing Concepts, not Nationwide, was
the plan administrator. ERISA provides
that if a plan administrator is not
designated in the written plan
documents, then the plan sponsor is the
plan administrator. 29 U.S.C. 8 1002
(16)(A). The statute further indicates
that the plan sponsor is "the employer
in the case of an employee benefit plan
established or maintained by a single
employer." Id. 8 1002(16)(B)(i). The
written plan in this case did not
designate a plan administrator, but it
did indicate that Roofing Concepts was
the plan sponsor. Thus, by virtue of 8
1002(16)(A), Roofing Concepts was the
plan administrator, and as such, it bore
App. 134
the primary duty of notification with
regard to the plan participants. Id. 8
1024(b); see also 29 C.F.R. 8 2509.75-8,
FR 12-Q (1991) (plan administrator is
also a named fiduciary). While it is
true that an insurer will usually have
administrative responsibilities with
respect to the review of claims under
the policy, that does not give this
court license to ignore the statute’s
definition of plan administrator and to
impose on Nationwide the plan
administrator’s notification duties.
See Moran v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 872
F.2d 296, 298-300 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that group health insurer who
was not plan administrator did not bear
reporting and disclosure
responsibilities); Davis v. Liberty Mut.
ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1134, 1138-39 & n.5
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that group
health insurer was not a plan
App. 135
administrator within the meaning of
ERISA and did not have the duty to
provide summary plan information) .°
We, therefore, conclude that Nationwide
was not the plan administrator and
consequently could not have breached the
administrator’s statutory duties.
° Nationwide’s agreement in the
written plan to provide Roofing Concepts
with individual certificates to be
distributed to each employee eligible for
coverage did not constitute an assumption
by Nationwide of Roofing Concepts’ duty
to provide a summary plan description.
These certificates were to include an
explanation of "the main benefits and
requirements" of the policy. ERISA
provides a lengthy, detailed list of what
must be included in a summary plan
description. 29 U.S.C. 8 1022(b). An
agreement to provide a description of
"the main benefits and requirements"
cannot be reasonably regarded as_ the
equivalent of the summary plan
description, which the statute requires
to be far broader in icope and detail.
See Girdley v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co.,
924 F.2d 1310, 1316 (3d Cir. 1991).
App. 136
Vv.
We thus reverse the judgment of the
district court, including its award of
attorney’s fees, and remand the case
with directions to grant summary “
judgment for Nationwide and dismiss the
complaint. It would be improper - and
legally insupportable - to require an
insurer to pay on a policy where no
ERISA duties were transgressed and on
which the premiums were never paid.
Coleman’s unfortunate situation resulted
not from any fault of Nationwide, but
from the failure of her employer to
fulfill its obligations. In resolving
claims under the statute, a court must
follow Congress’ command for adherence
to the provisions of the written plan -
lest ERISA become an administrator’s
nightmare and a litigator’s dream.
REVERSED
App. 137
Filed: July 17, 1992
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 91-2646(L)
(CA-90-19)
Joanne W. Coleman,
Plaintiff -— Appellee,
versus
Nationwide Life Insurance Co.,
Defendant & Third-Party Plaintiff -
Appellant.
ORDER
The Court amends its opinion filed
July 1, 1992, as follows:
On page 15, first paragraph, line 6
— the word "“husband’s" is inserted —
"the failure of her husband’s employer.”
For the Court - By Direction >
/s/ Bert M. Montague
Clerk
App. 139
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
NO. 91-2646
CA-90-19
JOANNE W. COLEMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant & Third Party
Plaintiff —- Appellant
Vv.
ROOFING CONCEPTS, INCORPORATED,
Third Party Defendant
No. 91-2652
CA-90-19
JOANNE W. COLEMAN,
Plaintiff —- Appellant
v.
NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
Defendant - Appellee
App. 140
V.
ROOFING CONCEPTS, INCORPORATED,
Third Party Defendant.
On Petition for Rehearing with
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc
Appellee filed a petition for
rehearing with suggestion for rehearing
en banc. No member of the Court
requested a poll on the suggestion for
rehearing en banc, and the original
judicial panel voted to deny the
petition for rehearing.
The Court denies the petition for
rehearing with suggestion for rehearing
en banc.
Entered at the direction of Judge
Wilkinson, with the concurrence of Judge
Hamilton and Judge Luttig.
For the Court,
/s/ Bert M. Montague
CLERK
APPENDIX E
Statutes and Regulations
of this Case
29 U.S.C. $1
§1104. Fiduciary Duties
(a) Prudent man standard of care
(1) Subject to sections 1103(c) and
(d), 1342, and 1344 of this title, a
fiduciary shall discharge his duties
with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and
beneficiaries and--
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to
participants and their
beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable
expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence,
and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and familiar
App. 142
with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments
of the plan so as to minimize the risk
of large losses, unless under the
circumstances it is clearly prudent not
to do so; and
(d) in accordance with the
documents and instruments governing the
plan insofar as such documents and
instruments are consistent with the
provisions of this subchapter and
subchapter III of this chapter.
(2) In the case of an eligible
individual account plan (as defined in
section 1107(d)(3) of this title), the
diversification requirement of paragraph
(1)(C) and the prudence requirement
(only to the extent that it requires
diversification) of paragraph (1)(B) is
not violated by acquisition or holding
App. 143
of qualifying employer real property or
qualifying employer securities (as
defined in section 1107(d)(4) and (5) of
this title). |
(b) Indicia of ownership of assets
utside juris t t courts
~ Bxcept as authorized by the
Secretary by regulations, no fiduciary
may maintain the indicia of ownership of
any assets of a plan outside the
jurisdiction of the district courts of
the United States.
(c) oh assets b a c nt
or beneficiary
In the case of a pension plan which
provides for individual accounts and
permits a participant or beneficiary to
exercise control over the assets in his
account, if a participant or beneficiary
exercises control over the assets in his
account (as determined under regulations
of the Secretary)-——
App. 144
(1) such participant or beneficiary
shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary by
reason of such exercise, and
(2) no person who is otherwise a
fiduciary shall be liable under this
part for any loss, or by reason of any
breach, which results from such
participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise
of control.
(ad) Plan terminations
(1) If, in connection with the
termination of a pension plan which is a
single-employer plan, there is an
election to establish or maintain a
qualified replacement plan, or to
increase benefits, as provided under
section 4980(d) of Title 26, a fiduciary
shall discharge the fiduciary’s duties
under this subchapter and subchapter III
of this chapter in accordance with the
following requirements:
App. 145
(A) In the case of a fiduciary
of the terminated plan, any
requirement—
(i) under section
4980(d)(2)(B) of Title 26 with
respect to the transfer of assets
from the terminated plan to a
qualified replacement plan, and
(ii) under section
4980(d) (2) (B) (ii) or
4980(d)(3) of Title 26 with
respect to any increase in
benefits under tie +>rminated
plan.
(B) In the case of a fiduciary
of a qualified replacement plan,
any requirement—
(i) under section
4980(d)(2)(A) of Title 26 with
respect to participation in
the qualified replacement plan
App. 145
of active participants in the
terminated plan,
(ii) Under section
4980(d)(2)(B) of Title 26 with
respect to the receipt of
assets from the terminated
plan, and
(iii) under section
4980(d)(2)(C) of Title 26 with
respect to the allocation of
assets to participants of the
qualified replacement plan.
(2) For purposes of this
subsection—
{A) any term used in this
subsection which is also used in
section 4980(d) of Title 26 shall
have the same meaning as when used
in such section, and
(B) any reference in this
subsection to Title 26 shall be a
reference to Title 26 as in effect
App. 147
immediately after the enactment of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990.
§1105. Liability for breach of co-
fiduciary
(a) vi ise to
liability
In addition to any liability which
he may have under any other provisions
of this part, a fiduciary with respect
to a plan shall be liable for a breach
of fiduciary responsibility of another
fiduciary with respect to the same plan
in the following circumstances:
(1) if he participates knowingly
in, or knowingly undertakes to conceal,
an act or omission of such other
fiduciary, knowing such act or omission
is a breach;
(2) if, by his failure to comply
with section 1104(a)(1) of this title in
App. 148
the administration of his specific
responsibilities which give rise to his
Status as a fiduciary, he has enabled
such other fiduciary to commit a breach;
or
(3) if he has knowledge of a breach
by such other fiduciary, unless he makes
reasonable efforts under the
circumstances to remedy the breach.
(b) Assets held by two or more trustees
(1) Except as otherwise provided in
subsection (d) of this section and in
section 1103(a)(1) and (2) of this
title, if the assets of a plan are held
by two or more trustees-
(A) each shall use reasonable
care to prevent a co-trustee from
committing a breach; and
(B) they shall jointly manage
and control the assets of the plan,
except that nothing in this
subparagraph (B) shall preclude any
App. 149
agreement, authorized by the trust
instrument, allocating specific
responsibilities, obligations, or
duties among trustees, in which
event a trustee to whom certain
responsibilities, obligations, or
duties have not been allocated
shall not be liable by reason of
this subparagraph (B) either
individually or as a trustee for
any loss resulting to the plan
arising from the acts or omissions
on the part of another trustee to
whom such responsibilities,
obligations, or duties have been
allocated.
(2) Nothing in this subsection
shall limit any liability that a
fiduciary may have under subsection (a)
of this section or any other provision
of this part.
App. 150
(3) (A) In the case of a plan the
assets of which are held in more than
one trust, a trustee shall not be liable
under paragraph (1) except with respect
to an act or omission of a trustee of a
trust of which he is a trustee.
(B) No trustee shall be liable
under this subsection for following
instructions referred to in section
1103(a)(1) of this title.
(c) Allocation of fiduciary
(1) The instrument under which a
plan is maintained may expressly provide
for procedures (A) for allocating
fiduciary responsibilities (other than
trustee responsibilities) among named
fiduciaries, and (B) for named
fiduciaries to designate persons other
than named fiduciaries to carry out
fiduciary responsibilities (other than
App. 151
trustee responsibilities) under the
plan.
(2) If a plan expressly provides
for a procedure described in paragraph
(1), and pursuant to such procedure any
fiduciary responsibility of a named
fiduciary is allocated to any person, or
a person is designated to carry out any
such responsibility, then such named
fiduciary shall not be liable for an act
or omission of such person in carrying
out such responsibility except to the
extent that-—
(A) the named fiduciary
violated section 1104(a) (1) of this
title—
(i) with respect to such
allocation or designation,
(ii) with respect to the
establishment or
implementation of the :
App. 152
procedure under this paragraph
(1), or
(iii) in continuing the
allocation or designation; or
(B) the named fiduciary would
otherwise be liable in accordance
with subsection (a) of this
section.
(3) For purposes of this
subsection, the term "trustee
responsibility” means any responsibility
provided in the plan’s trust instrument
(if any) to manage or control the assets
of the plan, other than a power under
the trust instrument of a named
fiduciary to appoint an investment
manager in accordance with section
1102(c)(3) of this title.
(d) Investment managers
(1) If an investment manager or
managers have been appointed under
section 1102(c)(3) of this title, then,
App. 153
notwithstanding subsections (a)(2) and
(3) and subsection (b) of this section,
no trustees shall be liable for the acts
or omissions of such investment manager
or managers, or be under an obligation
to invest or otherwise manage any asset
of the plan which is subject to the
management of such investment manager.
(2) Nothing in this subsection
shall relieve any trustee of any
liability under this part for any act of
such trustee.
29 CFR Ch. XXV
§2509.75-8
FR-13 Q: If the named fiduciaries of an
employee benefit plan allocate their
fiduciary responsibilities among
themselves in accordance with a
procedure set forth in the plan for the
allocation of responsibilities for
App. 154
operation and administration of the
plan, to what extent will a named
fiduciary be relieved of liability for
acts and omissions of other named
Sténctaetas in carrying out fiduciary
responsibilities allocated to them?
A: if named fiduciaries of a plan
allocate responsibilities in accordance
with a procedure for such allocation set
forth in the plan, a named fiduciary
will not be liable for acts and
omissions of other named fiduciaries in
carrying out fiduciary responsibilities
which have been allocated to then,
except as provided in section 405(a) of
the Act, relating to the general rules
of co-fiduciary responsibility, and
section 405(c)(2)(A) of the Act,
relating in relevant part to standards
for establishment and implementation of
allocation procedures.
App. 155
However, if the instrument under
which the plan is maintained does not
provide for a procedure for the
allocation of fiduciary responsibilities
among named fiduciaries, any allocation
which the named fiduciaries may make
among themselves will be ineffective to
relieve a named fiduciary from
responsibility or liability for the
performance of fiduciary
responsibilities allocated to other
named fiduciaries.
FR-14 Q: If the named fiduciaries of an
employee benefit plan designate a person
who is not a named fiduciary to carry
out fiduciary responsibilities, to what
extent will the named fiduciaries be
relieved of liability for the acts and
omissions of such person in the
performance of his duties?
App. 156
A: If the instrument under which
the plan is maintained provides for a
procedure under which a named fiduciary
may designate persons who are not named
fiduciaries to carry out fiduciary
responsibilities, named fiduciaries of
the plan will not be liable for acts and
omissions of a person who is not a named
fiduciary in carrying out the fiduciary
responsibilities which such person has
been designated to carry out, except as
provided in section 405(a) of the Act,
relating to the general rules of co-
fiduciary liability, and section
405(c)(2)(A) of the Act, relating in
relevant part to the designation of
persons to carry out fiduciary
responsibilities.
However, if the instrument under
which the plan is maintained does not
provide for a procedure for the
designation of persons who are not named
App. 157
fiduciaries to carry out fiduciary
responsibilities, then any such
designation which the named fiduciaries
may make will not relieve the named
fiduciaries from responsibility or
liability for the acts and omissions of
the persons so designated.
FR-16 Q: Is a fiduciary who is not a
named fiduciary with respect to an
employee benefit plan personally liable
for all phases of the management and
administration of the plan?
A: A fiduciary with respect to the
plan who is not a named fiduciary is a
fiduciary only to the extent that he or
she performs one or more of the
functions described in section 3(21) (A)
of the Act. The personal liability of a
fiduciary who is not a named fiduciary
is generally limited to the fiduciary
functions, which he or she performs with
App. 158
respect to the plan. With respect to
the extent of liability of a named
fiduciary of a plan where duties are
properly allocated among named
fiduciaries or where named fiduciaries
properly designate other persons to
carry out certain fiduciary duties, see
question FR-13 and FR-14.
In addition, any fiduciary may
become liable for breaches of fiduciary
responsibility committed by another
fiduciary of the same plan under my
circumstances giving rise to co-
fiduciary liability, as provided in
section 405(a) of the Act.
FR-17 Q: What are the ongoing
responsibilities of a fiduciary who has
appointed trustees or other fiduciaries
with respect to these appointments?
A: At reasonable intervals the
performance of trustees and other
App. 159
fiduciaries should be reviewed by the
appointing fiduciary in such manner as
may be reasonably expected to ensure
that their performance has been in
compliance with the terms of the plan
and statutory standards, and satisfies
the needs of the plan. No single
procedure will be appropriate in all
cases; the procedure adopted may vary in
accordance with the nature of the plan
and other facts and circumstances
relevant to the choice of the procedure.
App. 160
NATIONWIDE
INSURANCE
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT A
December 1, 1988
Mrs. Joanne Coleman
1013 Greystone Avenue
Richmond, VA 23224
Dear Mrs. Coleman:
Please find attached a brief
summary of the benefits you will receive
under your group health insurance
coverage with Nationwide Insurance.
Also, enclosed is a PriorityCare
Information packet. Please read this
material and call the toll free number
and advise them of your upcoming
delivery. They will instruct you from
there.
Roofing Concepts should be
receiving your ID cards and PCS cards
any day now.
Joanne, as you can see from the
attached summary, this policy has a $100
App. 161
i
deductible plan per individual and $200
deductible per family. Once the
deductible is met, Nationwide pays 80%
of eligible expenses. When you have
reached a total out-of-pocket expense of
$600 per individual or $1200 per family,
then Nationwide will pay 100% of
eligible expenses.
Please be aware that Nationwide
will honor whatever portion of your
deductible you satisfied in 1988 with
your prior carrier. When you submit
your first claim to Nationwide, also
attach a copy of the Explanation of
Benefits from your prior carrier
verifying the amount of deductible you
have satisfied and Nationwide will apply
it towards your deductible with us.
Should you have any further
questions or concerns, please feel free
to contact me.
Sincerely
App. 162
/s/ Cheryl A. Reinecke
Account Representative
CAR
Attachments
P.S. Joanne, I just checked the
computer and your policy number is 2531
and your husband’s certificate number is
6. You should now be able to call the
toll free claims number to ask them
further coverage questions.
App. 163
SUMMARY OF GROUP BENEFITS
ROOFING CONCEPTS
Group Policy No. 2531
Life Insurance: All Employees
$10,000
Medical Insurance:
Comprehensive Medical Expense
provides a complete plan of protection
with a $1,000,000 maximun.
If an insured’s family member’s
covered medical expenses exceed the
annual deductible, the plan will pay 80%
of additional expenses for that person
for the rest of the calendar year.
(100% after out-of-pocket limit)
$100 Deductible - Waived for Accidents
Plan pays 80% of covered expenses
Insured pays 20% of covered expenses
until $600 (including deductible) is
paid during the calendar year.
THEN
Plan pays 100% of covered expenses for
remainder of calendar year
App. 164
CO
Maximum Benefit - $1,000,000 Per Person
Room and Board - Semi Private
Calendar Year Deductible — $100 per
person/$200 per family
Out-of-Pocket Limit - $600 per
person/$1200 per family
NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
GROUP INSURANCE POLICY
DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT "1"
ISSUES THIS POLICY TO:
ROOFING CONCEPTS, INC.
(Referred to in the Policy as the "Plan
Sponsor” )
TO INSURE CERTAIN
EMPLOYEES OF THE PLAN SPONSOR
Group Policy Number - 0-2531
State of Delivery - Virginia
Effective Date - November 1, 1988
The First Policy Anniversary is on
November 1, 1989, and all future
anniversaries will be on November 1.
We will pay benefits under the
terms of this Policy in the amounts
shown in the Policy. The first premium
is due on the Effective Date. All other
premiums are due each month on the first
day of the month.
App. 166
This Policy is delivered in the
State of Delivery and subject ee the
laws of that state.
All periods of insurance under this
Policy will be determined by full
calendar days at the local time at the
Plan Sponsor’s address.
The provisions of all Pages of this
policy form a part of this contract as
fully as if the signatures below were on
each page.
This Policy is effective as of the
Effective Date shown above.
/s/ W. E. Fitzpatrick
Secretary
/s/ John L. Marakoa
President
NATIONWIDE GROUP IDENTIFICATION
INSURANCE CARD
ROOFING CONCEPTS, INC.
ID#: 0-2531-1-6
NAME: COLEMAN, GLENN J.
EFF: 11/01/88 DEP COV: FAMILY
MAIL NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANY
CLAIMS TO: 4401 CREEDMORE ROAD
RALEIGH, NC 27612
ATTENTION: GROUP CLAIMS
CLAIM SERVICE INFO: 1-800-824-9486
COVERED PERSONS MUST OBTAIN APPROVAL
PRIOR TO NON-EMERGENCY HOSPITAL
ADMISSION OR WITHIN 48 HOURS OF AN
EMERGENCY. WITHOUT APPROVAL BENEFITS
MAY BE REDUCED FOR HOSPITAL
CONFINEMENTS. (SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR
CLAIM INSTRUCTIONS)
CALL: CAPP CARE 1-800-227-7464
App. 168
CAPP CARE DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT "7"
Chippenham Hospital
7101 Jahnke Road
Richmond, VA 23225
Date: 12/05/88
Authorization No.: 29657640
ICD: V22. NORMAL PREGNANCY
Proc. 59400 OBSTETRICAL DELIV
Admit Date: 2/01/89
Dschg Date: 2/03/89
Policy No:
Patient: Joanne W. Coleman
Payor: NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE co.
Employer: NON ASSIGNED NATIONWIDE
Division:
Employee Certificate #0000000-0000000-
0000-000000000
The Prior Authorization Request for
Joanne W. Coleman has been reviewed and
the admission to CHIPPENHAM HOSPITAL on
2/01/89 has been authorized.
CAPP CARE has assigned an initial
length of stay of 2 days. We will call
Dr. Reutinger to discuss your progress
while in the hospital and the need for
any continued confinement.
App. 169
Dr. Reutinger and the facility’s
business office have been notified of
this authorization.
If you have any questions, please
feel free to call CAPP CARE toll free at
1-800-CAPPING.
Sincerely,
D. M. Eaves, M.D.
Corporate Medical Director
Please provide us with the
patient’s actual date of admit and
discharge and the type of delivery.
In addition, please provide us with
the discharge date of the infant. |
Thank you. |
Please notify us of any change |
in the date of admission / |
procedure or change in the
diagnosis. Thank you.
EMPLOYER; ROOFING CONCEPTS, POLICY
#2531-6
App. 170
Services of an assistant surgeon
are normally not required for this
procedure.
CAPP CARE’S AUTHORIZATION OF ADMISSION,
CONTINUED STAY OR SURGICAL PROCEDURE
DOES NOT GUARANTEE PAYMENT. PAYMENT Is
ALSO SUBJECT TO ELIGIBILITY AND COVERAGE
AT THE TIME SERVICES ARE RENDERED AND
MUST BE VERIFIED BY THE EMPLOYER OR THE
INSURANCE CARRIER. PATIENT CARE REMAINS
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ATTENDING
PHYSICIAN, NOTWITHSTANDING ANY
RECOMMENDATIONS OF CAPP CARE.
Copy to: Physician, Patient
App. 171
PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT C
FILE: ALL
NOTEBOOK A NATIONWIDE CMS - VMC
-MSG: FROM: REINECC --VMC
TO: GABRIEL -—-VMC 2/10/89 11:30:30
FROM: Cheryl Reinecke
Richmond Group Sales
Subject: NO SUBJECT
Laura, I have put in a call to the
broker on this case to see what the
problem is. I will let you know what I
find out.
** Forwarding note from GABRIEL -—-VMC
02/10/89 11:09 **
Date: 10 February 89, 11:08:09 GMT
From: GABRIEL at VMC
TO: REINECC -
Cheryl,
This is in regards to Roofing
Concepts, 0-2531-1. The policyholder
App. 172
tata
has not paid their 12/1, 1/1 or 2/1/89
premiums. Therefore, we are terminating
this case for non—paying of premium.
2/13/89
Sandy (VGB) called Roofing Concepts &
their phone has been disconnected. She
will contact their agt to bird dog this
& find out what happened.
No response rec’d
App. 173
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.