Appendix — Coleman v. Nationwide Life Insurance

Supreme Court brief1993

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

. >

ed

¢e€-

(2 urt, |

92-953 J FILED.

"NO. 92- OCT 22 1992

IN THE 'DEEICE OF THE Cit

]

|

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED steTes—

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

JOANNE W. COLEMAN,

Petitioner,

Vv.

NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

APPENDICES

John B. Mann

(Counsel of Record)

LEVIT & MANN

419 North Boulevard

Richmond, Virginia 23220

(804) 355-7766

Stephen R. Bruce

Attorney at Law

727 15th St., NW, Ste. 900

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 371-8013

Attorneys for Petitioner

Dated: November 10, 1992

an |

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. The opinion of the United States

District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia 1

B. The unreported opinion of the

U.S. District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia 25

C. The opinion of the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit with order amending

opinion 99

Cc. The denial of rehearing and

suggestion for rehearing

en banc 140

D. Statutes and regulations of

this case 142

E. Pertinent documents 161

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

RICHMOND DIVISION

JOANNE W. COLEMAN, Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER

Vv. CA-90-00019-R

NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE

COMPANY, Defendant,

Vv.

ROOFING CONCEPTS, INC., Third-

Party Defendant

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

—_X Decision by Court. This action

came to trial or hearing before the

Court. The issues have been tried or

heard and a decision has been rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

Pplaintiff’s motion for Summary judgment

is GRANTED. The plaintiff, Joanne W.

Coleman, shall recover of the defendant,

NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, the

sum of SIX THOUSAND FORTY EIGHT AND

EIGHTY SIX/100 DOLLARS ($6,048.86) plus

App. 1

reasonable costs and reasonable

attorneys fees incurred in this

litigation. Entered this 16th day of

October 1990 at Richmond, Virginia.

For the Court

[signed]

Clerk

App. 2

sina ia i

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

RICHMOND DIVISION

JOANNE W. COLEMAN, Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER

Vv. CA-90-00019-R

NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE

COMPANY,

Defendant.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on

cross-motions for summary judgment. For

the reasons stated below, defendant’s

motion for summary judgment will be

granted, and judgment will be entered

for plaintiZf.

I

The plaintiff in this case is

Joanne W. Coleman. The defendant is

Nationwide Life Insurance Company

("Nationwide"). Coleman has brought an

ERISA action against Nationwide, seeking

payment for the hospitalization expenses

she incurred while giving birth to a

App. 3

son. Nationwide asserts that it is not

liable to Coleman for those expenses

because the policy under which she

claims coverage was not in effect at the

time she incurred those expenses.

The material facts of this case are

undisputed. Coleman and her husband

participated in a group health insurance

plan provided by her husband’s employer,

Roofing Concepts, Inc. ("Roofing

Concepts"). Aetna Life and Casualty had

been the insurer for this plan, but in

late 1988 Roofing Concepts terminated

its coverage with that company and

applied for coverage with Nationwide.

Roofing Concepts submitted its

application to Nationwide on November 1,

1988. Nationwide accepted th

application and sent Roofing Concepts a

certificate of insurance with a November

1, 1988 effective date. Roofing

Concepts agreed to pay one hundred

‘ App. 4

percent of the premiums due on the

policy.

Roofing Concepts paid Nationwide a

monthly premium deposit of $3,665.63 for

issuance of the certificate of

insurance. Soon afterward, Nationwide’s

underwriters calculated Roofing

Concepts’ actual monthly premium to be

$3,709.42. Nationwide billed Roofing

Concepts an additional $43.79 for the

balance of the first month’s premium, as

well as $3,709.42 for the next month’s

premium. Roofing Concepts never the

paid the $43.79 balance and never made

any other premium payments. Roofing

Concepts went out of business on

February 15, 1989.

Coleman was pregnant when Roofing

Concepts began its coverage with

Nationwide in November of 1988. Over

the next two months. Coleman made

several inquiries to assure herself that

App. 5

she would be covered under the

Nationwide plan for the hospitalization

expenses that she would incur in

connection with the delivery of her

child. In response to one of those

inquiries, Cheryl A. Reinecke, a

Nationwide account representative, sent

Coleman a letter dated December 1, 1988.

In the letter Reinecke informed Coleman

of the benefits that she was eligible

to receive under the Nationwide policy.

Reinecke also attached to the letter a

brief summary of those benefits. In

addition, Reinecke advised Coleman as to

what her Nationwide policy and

certificate numbers were.

On December 5, 1988, Coleman

received a letter from Capp Care, Inc.

("Capp Care"), a "cost containment

organization” used by Nationwide. In

this letter Capp Care authorized Coleman

for a two-day hospital stay for

App. 6

‘ |

childbirth and gave her an authorization

number. Capp Care listed Nationwide as

the "Payor" for the hospitalization.

Coleman made additional telephone

calls to Nationwide and Capp Care

in December 1988 and January 1989. Each

time, the Nationwide employees to whom

she spoke advised her that she had

hospitalization coverage and the Capp

Care employees advised her that her

hospitalization was approved.

On January 25, 1989, Coleman gave

birth to a son at Chippenham Hospital in

Richmond, Virginia. As of that date, no

one at Nationwide had given her any

indication that Roofing Concepts had

failed to make its premium payments or

that her coverage might be jeopardized

as a result. Nor had anyone at Capp

Care or Roofing Concepts so informed

her.

App. 7

|

As noted above, Roofing Concepts”

went out of business on February 15,

1989. The next day, Roofing Concepts

informed Nationwide of this development

and asked that it "cancel the insurance

policy in effect with Roofing concepts,

Inc. at the earliest possible date."

Affidavit of Joanne W. Coleman,

Plaintiff’s Exhibit D, Coleman v.

Nationwide Life Ins. Co., C.A. No. 90-

00019-R (E.D. Va. filed Jan. 12, 1990).

On March 6, 1989, Nationwide sent a

veply letter indicating that because

Roofing Concepts had made no payments of

premium other than the initial partial

deposit, Nationwide would cancel Roofing

Concepts’ coverage as of the policy’s

effective date, November 1, 1988. When

Nationwide later received bills for

Coleman’s hospitalization at Chippenham,

it informed Coleman’s husband that it

would not pay those bills because the

App. 8

Colemans’ coverage under the Roofing

Concepts plan had been canceled

effective november 1, 1988.

II

The court will grant Coleman’s

motion for summary judgment. The Court

rejects Nationwide’s argument that it

cannot be liable for the hospitalization

expenses Coleman incurred in January

1989. Nationwide bases its argument on

the assertion that the Roofing concepts

plan, and thus Coleman’s coverage, was

void from inception due to Roofing

Concepts’ failure to make even one

complete payment of premium.

The Court need not decide whether

the Roofing Concepts policy was void

from inception. Even if the policy were

void from inception, Nationwide would

still be liable to Coleman under

theories of breach of fiduciary duty and

estoppel.

App. 9

A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Nationwide breached its fiduciary

duty to Coleman by neglecting to inform

her that Roofing Concepts had failed to

pay premiums due under the plan.

Nationwide has argued that it had no

fiduciary duty to inform Coleman of

nonpayment because it was neither the

“administrator” nor the "sponsor" of the

Roofing Concepts plan. The Court agrees

that Nationwide was neither the

administrator nor the sponsor of the

plan; under the applicable ERISA

definitions, see 29 U.S.C. §§1002(16) (A)

and (B) (1988), Roofing Concepts filled

both of those roles.

The Court finds, however, that

although Nationwide was not a sponsor or

administrator of the plan, it was

nonetheless a fiduciary for the plan.

Under ERISA,

App. 10

eerie

a person is a fiduciary with

respect to a plan to the

extent (i) he exercises any

discretionary authority or

discretionary control respecti

ng management of such plan or

exercises any authority or

control respecting management

or disposition of its assets;

(ii) he renders investment

advice for a fee or other

compensation, direct or

indirect, with respect to any

moneys or other property of

such plan, or has any authorit

y or responsibility to do so,

or (iii) he has any

discretionary authority or

discretionary responsibility

in the administration of such

plan.

29 U.S.C. §1002(21)(A) (1988); see also

F 8 - V. ’

109 S. Ct. 948, 955 (1989).

The ERISA definition of fiduciary,

itself broadly worded, is to be

construed liberally by the courts. See,

Inc., 647 F. Supp. 981, 983-984 (N.D.

Ala. 1986) ("Congress intended that this

definition be broadly construed and

‘include persons who have authority and

App. li

responsibility with respect to the

matter in question, regardless of their

formal title.’") (quoting Donovan v.

Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir.

1984). A person need not be denominated

a fiduciary in order to be one. Id.

"If the person exercises management over

assets, renders investment advice or

exercises discretionary administrative

control he is a fiduciary for purposes

of ERISA." Id. (citing Anderson v.

Ciba-Geigy Corp., 759 F.2d 1518, 1522

(llth Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 995

(1985)). Moreover, "an insurer [such as

Nationwide] dows not have to have total

discretionary powers over a plan’s

assets before it becomes a fiduciary."

Id.

Nationwide falls within the

expansive ERISA definition of fiduciary.

The Roofing Concepts plan did not name

Nationwide as a fiduciary or explicitly

App. 12

place fiduciary duties upon it. The

Court finds, however, that Nationwide

possessed considerable authority,

discretion and administrative control

with respect to the plan. This is

sufficient to confer fiduciary status

upon Nationwide under ERISA’s broad

conception of that term.’

‘Nationwide relies upon two cases

which, it asserts, suggest that it had no

fiduciary duty to notify Coleman of

Roofing Concepts’ nonpayment of premiums.

See Moran v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 872

F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1989); Vv v.

__€Co., 871 F.2d 1134

(D.C. Cir. 1989). Neither of those cases

Supports that position, however. The

insureds in Moran and Davis brought suit

on the ground that the insurers had

failed to provide them with summary plan

descriptions. Under ERISA, plan

administrators must furnish all plan

participants with summary plan

descriptions. 29 U.S.C. §§1024(b) (1),

1132(c) (1988). The courts ruled for the

insurers in both cases because the

insurers were not the administrators of

the plans at issue. Nationwide has

correctly pointed out that it was not the

administrator of the Roofing Concepts

plan. This disposes of Coleman’s claim

based on failure to provide a summary

Plan description. It does not, however,

affect Coleman’s claim that Nationwide

App. 13

As a fiduciary, Nationwide was

obligated to notify insureds such as

Coleman of roofing Concepts’ nonpayment

of premiums. See McNeese, 647 F. Supp.

at 985 ("Several courts have held that

at a minimum, the fiduciary under ERISA

has an obligation to notify the

employees of the employer’s failure to

contribute to the pension fund as

required by the pension agreement.").

Without such notice, Coleman lost the

opportunity she otherwise would have had

to seek out alternative sources of

insurance. See Rodriquez v. MEBA

Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir.

failed to notify her of Roofing Concepts’

nonpayment of premiums. As the Mora,

court noted, a claim based on failure to

provide a summary plan description is

distinct from a claim based on failure to

give notice of an employer’s nonpayment

of premiums. Moran, 882 F.2d at 300.

The latter claim does not depend on

Nationwide’s being an administrator of

the plant; it is sufficient that

Nationwide was a fiduciary for the plan.

App. 14

1989) ("Plan participants should not

lose pension benefits through mistakes

and misunderstandings."). By failing to

inform Coleman of Roofing Concepts’

nonpayment, Nationwide breached its

fiduciary obligation. See id. at 986

(Where “[the defendant] did not make an

effort to notify any of the claimants

- concerning the financial problems

with [the plan], .. . this failure

constituted a breach of the defendants’

fiduciary obligations to the plaintiffs

because without notice they were not

able to make other arrangements for

insurance coverage.").

In v. Ho Restaurant

Employees & Bartenders Union Local 274,

637 F.2d 592 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,

454 U.S. 898 (1981), the court found

that a union pension fund had breached

its fiduciary duty by failing to inform

a union employee that his employer’s

App. 15

contributions to the fund were in

arrears and by failing to take action

against the employer for its continued

refusal to contribute to the fund. The

court noted that -

If a trustee’s fiduciary duty

requires anything in the

administration of the trust,

it requires him to inform the

pensioners of their employer’s

failure to make the required

contributions to the fund.

Continued eligibility is the

core of the trustee

beneficiary relationship and

those responsible for the

administration of the fund are

required to notify pensioners

when their employer

jeopardizes their eligibility.

Id. at 600; see also Pension Benefit

Guar. Corp. v. Greene, 570 F. Supp.

1483, 1499 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (defendant

trustees breached fiduciary duties by

failing to notify pensioners of

employer’s delinquent contributions to

pension fund), aff'd, 727 F.2d 1100 (3d

Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820

(1984).

App. 16

Because Nationwide breached its

fiduciary duty, Summary judgment will be

granted in Coleman’s favor. Although

Nationwide has not argued the contrary,

it should again be noted that a clear

causal connection exists between

Nationwide’s breach and coleman’s loss.

Had Nationwide notified Coleman of

Roofing Concepts’ nonpayment of

premiums, she could have made other

arrangements to obtain insurance

covering her hospitalization.

toppe

The Court further finds that even

if Nationwide has not breached any

fiduciary duty owed to Coleman, it is

still liable to her under principles of

estoppel. The "[{e]lements necessary to

establish equitable estoppel, absent a

Showing of fraud and deception, are a

representation, reliance, a change of

position, and detriment." T... v. T..

App. 17

+, 216 Va. 867, 873, 224 S.E.2d 148, 152

(1976). "“[{T]he party relying on

estoppel must prove each element by

‘clear, precise and unequivocal

evidence.’" Harris v. Criterion Ins.

Co., 222 Va. 495, 502, 281 S.E.2d 878,

881 (1981) (quoting Employers Ins. Co.

v. Great American Ins. Co., 214 Va. 410,

415, 200 S.E.2d 560, 564 (1973)).

Although Coleman’s burden of proof

is a heavy one, she has made a

sufficient showing on each estoppel

element to obtain summary judgment.

First, the evidence clearly shows that

Nationwide—through a letter and

telephone conversations~—represented to

Coleman that her hospitalization

expenses would be covered.* See City

of Bedford v. James Leffel & Co., 558

Capp Care made similar

representations to Coleman through

Correspondence and telephone

conversations.

App. 18

TT

F.2d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 1977) ("one may

be misled as much by implication as by

express statement"). It is undisputed

that Coleman reasonably relied on these

representations, that she changed her

position in reliance (i.e., by not

switching coverage), and that she

incurred a detriment as a result.

Nationwide’s primary argument with

estoppel is that when Cheryl Reinecke,

its account representative, made the

representations to Coleman, she

(Reinecke) was justifiably assuming that

Roofing Concepts would pay premiums on

the policy as required. Even if

Reinecke were making such an assumption,

however, this would not affect the

estoppel analysis. The only requirement

under the first element of estoppel is

that a representation be made; it is not

necessary that the representation be

fraudulent, deceitful or unreasonable.

App. 19

= ——- ’

£

Ls

See id. (" .. . deceit is not an

essential element of estoppel. It is

sufficient that the aggrieved party

reasonably relied on the words and

conduct of the person to be

estopped .. .") (citation omitted).

“ Nationwide also argues that

estoppel is disfavored in the ERISA

scheme and cannot be a basis for

recovery under that statute. There is

some support for this position. The

Ninth Circuit appears to have rejected

the use of estoppel theories in at least.

some ERISA suits. See Davidian v.

Southern Cal. Meat Cutters Union & Food

Employees Benefit Fund, 859 F.2d 134,

136 (9th Cir. 1988) ("([Wje applied a no-

estoppel rule in a suit for employees

benefits against a jointly-sponsored

trust fund. There are no contrary

holdings in this circuit.").

App. 20

On the other hand, the Third

Circuit has allowed ERISA plaintiffs to

recover on estoppel theories. In Rose ’

the Third Circuit stated that A"the

application of estoppel in pension cases

is not altogether novel." Rosen, 637

F.2d at 598. It also quoted an opinion,

which held -

The sui generis nature of the

pension agreement ... should

not immunize it from the

equitable principles that

govern similar agreements.

The rising ethical standards

in business relations which

the estoppel doctrine is

designed to enforce are no

less needed in the

administration of pension

funds... If anything,

estoppel is appropriate here."

Id. (quoting Scheuer v. Central States

Pension Fund, 358 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D.

Wis. 1975).

The parties have cited no Fourth

Circuit authority on this issue, and the

Court has discovered none. Under these

circumstances, the Court declines to

App. 21

rule that the equitable remedy of

estoppel is unavailable to plaintiffs,

such as Coleman, who sue under ERISA.

Coleman’s motion for summary judgment

will therefore be granted on grounds of

estoppel as well as breach of fiduciary

duty.

App. 22

Iir

In accordance with the foregoing,

defendant Nationwide Life Insurance

Company’s motion for summary judgment is

hereby DENIED and plaintiff Joanne wW.

Coleman’s motion for summary judgment is

hereby GRANTED.

Nationwide is hereby ORDERED to pay

Coleman the amount of $6,048.86, which

represents hospitalization expenses for

which Coleman did not receive

reimbursement, plus the reasonable costs

she incurred in this litigation,

including reasonable attorney’s fees.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Coleman may

have until October 26, 1990 to file an

itemization of attorney’s fees and costs

incurred in this litigation. Nationwide

may have until November 9, 1990 in which

to file an opposition to Coleman’s

submitted itemization of costs and

attorney’s fees.

App. 23

The Court notes that Nationwide

filed a third party complaint against

Roofing Concepts, Inc. on February 7,

1990. Roofing Concepts does not appear

to have responded to that pleading. The

Court hereby DIRECTS Nationwide to

advise it of the status of the third

party complaint.

And it is SO ORDERED.

[signed]

United States District

Judge

Date: October 16, 1990.

App. 24

, APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

RICHMOND DIVISION

JOANNE W. COLEMAN,

Plaintiff

Vv. JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant & Third-Party Plaintiff

Vv. CASE NUMBER: CA-90-00019-R

ROOFING CONCEPTS, INC.,

Third-Party Defendant

X Decision by Court. This action came

to trial or hearing before the Court.

The issues have been tried or heard and

a decision has been rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

default judgment is entered in favor of

the defendant and third-party plaintiff,

NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

against the third-party defendant,

ROOFING CONCEPTS, INC., in the sum of

EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINETY

ONE AND 60/100 ($18,591.60) DOLLARS with

interest thereon at the rate of 6.39%

until paid. Entered this 18th day of

July 1991 at Richmond, Virginia.

App. 25

July 18, 1991 DORIS R. CASEY

Date [ SIGNED]

App. 26

anata

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

RICHMOND DIVISION

JOANNE W. COLEMAN,

Plaintiff

v- Givil Action No. 90-00019-R

NATIONWIDE LIFE INS. COMPANY,

Defendant and

Third-Party Plaintiff,

v.

ROOF ING CONCEPTS, INC.,

Third-Party Defendant.

ORDER

. This matter is before the Court on

Nationwide Life Insurance Company ’s

motion to alter or amend judgment

previously entered, Coleman’s

application for reasonable costs and

attorney fees pursuant to this Court’s

earlier order, and Nationwide Life

Insurance Company’s motion for a default

judgment against Roofing Concepts, Inc.,

a third-party to this action. For the

reasons stated in the accompanying

App. 27

memorandum opinion, Nationwide Life

Insurance Company’s motion to alter or

amend judgment is hereby GRANTED as it

pertains to the liability imposed upon

it under an estoppel cause of action; it

is DENIED as it relates to the

imposition of liability as a result of

its breach of a fiduciary duty owed to

Coleman. Consequently, Nationwide Life

Insurance Company is hereby ORDERED to

pay Coleman the amount of $6,048.86

which represents hospitalization

expenses for which Coleman did not

receive reimbursement.

Coleman’s application for

reasonable costs and attorney’s fees is

GRANTED and Nationwide Life Insurance

Company is hereby ORDERED to pay Coleman

$12,542.74 which represents reasonable

attorney’s fees in the amount of $12,252

and reasonable costs of $2 3.74 incurred

in this litigation. In ad tion,

App. 28

a ee AE Me ie Sea

Nationwide Life Insurance Company ’s

motion for a default judgment is GRANTED

and the Clerk of the Court is hereby

DIRECTED to enter judgment against

Roofing Concepts, Inc. in the amount of

$18,591.60 which represents the sim

total of Nationwide Life Insurance

Company’s liability to Joanne w.

Coleman.

And it is SO ORDERED.

s R. e

United States District Judge

Date: July 18, 1991

App. 29

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

RICHMOND DIVISION

JOANNE W. COLEMAN,

Plaintiff,

Vv. Civil Action No. 90-00019-R

NATIONWIDE LIFE INS. COMPANY,

Defendant and

Third-Party Plaintiff,

Vv.

ROOFING CONCEPTS, INC.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on

defendant’s motion to alter or amend

judgment, plaintiff’s application for

costs and attorney’s fees, and

defendant’s motion for a default

judgment. For the following reasons,

defendant’s motion will be granted in

part and denied in part, plaintiff’s

application will be granted with

modifications, and defendant’s motion

for default judgment will be granted as

well.

App. 30

‘ie

ashe Peddie arte

PACTS

The plaintiff in this case brought

an ERISA action against defendant.

Plaintiff sought payment for the

hospitalization expenses she incurred

during the delivery of her child.

Defendant contended that it is not

responsible for those expenses because

the policy under which plaintiff claims

coverage was not in effect at the time

the expenses were incurred.

Plaintiff and her husband

participated in a group health insurance

plan provided by her husband’s employer,

Roofing Concepts, Inc. [hereinafter

"Roofing Concepts"]. Roofing Concepts

had been insured by another company but,

at some point, Roofing Concepts

terminated its coverage with that

company and applied for coverage with

defendant. The application was

submitted to defendant on November as

App. 31

1988. Defendant accepted the

application and sent Roofing Concepts a

certificate of insurance with a November

1, 1988 effective date. Roofing

Concepts agreed to pay one hundred

percent of the premiums due on the

policy.

Roofing Concepts paid defendant a

monthly premium deposit of $3,665.63 for

the issuance of the certificate of

insurance. Thereafter, defendant

calculated Roofing Concepts’ actual

monthly premiums to be $3,709.42.

Defendant therefore billed Roofing

Concepts $43.79 for the balance of the

first month’s premium, as well as

$3,709.42 for the next month’s premiun.

Roofing Concepts never paid the $43.79

balance and never made any other premium

payments. Roofing Concepts went out of

business on February 15, 1989.

App. 32

BREAN Yow PASS eR a iG AS

Plaintiff was pregnant at the time

Roofing Concepts began its coverage with

defendant. During the next two months,

plaintiff made several inquiries to

assure herself that she would be covered

under the defendant’s plan for the

hospitalization expenses that she would

incur in connection with the delivery of

her son. An account representative

employed by defendant sent plaintiff a

letter dated December 1, 1988. In the

letter, plaintiff was informed of the

benefits she was entitled to receive

under defendant’s policy. Moreover,

plaintiff was advised of her policy and

certificate numbers.

Additionally, on December 5, 1988,

plaintiff received a letter from Capp

Care, Inc. [hereinafter "Capp Care"], a

“cost containment organization" used by

defendant. In this letter Capp Care

authorized plaintiff for a two-day

App. 33

hospital stay for childbirth and gave

her an authorization number. Capp Care

listed defendant as the "Payor" for the

hospitalization.

Plaintiff made additional telephone

calls to defendant and Capp Care in

December 1988 and January 1989. Each

time, the defendant’s employees to whom

she spoke advised her that she had

hospitalization coverage and the Capp

Care employees advised her that her

hospitalization was approved.

On January 25, 1989, plaintiff gave

birth to a son at Chippenham Hospital in

Richmond, Virginia. As of that date,

none of defendant’s employees had given

plaintiff any indication that Roofing

Concepts had failed to make its premium

payments or that her coverage might be

jeopardized as a result. Nor had anyone

at either Capp Care. or Roofing Concepts

so informed her.

App. 34

RGSS.

As previously stated, Roofing

Concepts ceased doing business on

February 15, 1989. on February 16,

1989, Roofing Concepts informed

defendant of this development and asked

defendant to "cancel the insurance

policy in effect with Roofing Concepts,

Inc. at the earliest possible date."

See Affidavit of Joanne w. coleman,

Plaintiff’s Exhibit pD, Coleman v.

Nationwide Life Ins. Co., CA No. 90-

00019-R (E.D.Va. Jan. 12, 1990).

On March 6, 1989, defendant sent a

reply letter indicating that because

Roofing Concepts bat not made any

premium payments other than the initial

partial deposit, defendant would cancel

Roofing Concepts’ coverage as of

November 1, 1988, the policy’s effective

date. Hence, when defendant thereafter

received bills for plaintiff’s

hospitalization, it informed plaintiff’s

App. 35

husband that it would not pay those

bills because the Colemans’ coverage

under the Roofing Concepts policy had

been cancelled as of November 1, 1988.

Subsequently, plaintiff brought an

action against defendant under ERISA

codified at 29 U.S.C. S88 1132(a)(3) and

1132(e)(1). Thereafter, the parties

filed cross-motions for summary

judgment. The Court denied defendant’s

motion and granted plaintiff’s motion

under theories of breach of fiduciary

duty and estoppel. In addition, the

Court held that plaintiff was entitled

to reasonable costs and attorney’s fees

as well as a payment in the amount of

$6,046.86 which represents

hospitalization expenses for which

plaintiff did not receive reimbursement.

Defendant then filed a motion to

alter or amend judgment and a response

in opposition to plaintiff’s application

App. 36

for attorney’s fees and costs.

Defendant contends that this Court

committed a manifest error of law when

it entered judgment in favor of

plaintiff. According to defendant, the

Court awarded plaintiff extra-

contractual damages, an award defendant

asserts is contrary to Fourth Circuit

precedent and "the clear import of

recent Supreme Court authority." See

Defendant’s memorandum in Support of its

motion, p. 4. Further, defendant claims

that the civil enforcement scheme of

ERISA has been construed to preempt

State law actions such as estoppel.

Consequently, defendant argues,

plaintiff cannot prevail on an estoppel

theory.

On April 17, 1991, the Court heard

arguments on defendant’s motion. The

Court concludes that defendant correctly

States the position of the Appeals Court

App. 37

of the Fourth Circuit on the issue of

federal preemption of state law claims

such as estoppel in the context of ERISA

actions. As a result, plaintiff’s award

cannot stand under an estoppel theory.

Hence, defendant’s motion will be

granted as it relates to the judgment

entered in plaintiff’s favor under

principles of estoppel.

Defendant further contends that

plaintiff is not entitled to the award

received because, allegedly in light of

the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit

opinion in Powell v. Chesapeake &

Potomac Telephone Co.', a party filing

a claim under ERISA may not recover an

award of extra-contractual damages. It

is the position of this Court that the

Court’s reasoning in Powell is

inapplicable to the facts of this case.

' 708 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1985),

cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).

App. 38

Consequently, defendant's motion will be

denied as it pertains to the liability

that was imposed upon it because it

breached its fiduciary duty to plaintiff

by neglecting to inform her that Roofing

Concepts failed to pay premiums due

under the plan.

I

Defendant claims that plaintiff may

not recover benefits allegedly due under

the benefit plan in issue because such

an award would constitute extra-

contractual damages. According to

defendant, the Supreme Court’s reasoning

in usetts Mut. if s. Co. v.

Russell* adapted by the Fourth Circuit

in v. a c

Telephone Co., prevents an award of

extra-contractual benefits in ERISA

Claims.

¢ 473 U.S. 134, 105 S.ct. 3085

(1985).

App. 39

The cases cited by defendant do not

support defendant’s claim that plaintiff

is precluded from recouping an award

under ERISA. In Massachusetts Mut. Life

Ins. Co. v. Russell, supra, the Supreme

Court expressly declined to construe the

provisions of 8 502, 29 U.S.C. 8

1132(a)(3) and limited its holding to a

determination that an individual

beneficiary may not recover extra-

contractual damages, such as

compensatory or punitive damages, where

an improper delay in processing the -

benefits claim is caused by a breach of

duty owed under 29 U.S.C. 8 1109 by a

plan fiduciary.

In Russell, the plaintiff-

respondent [hereinafter "Respondent" ]

sought damages to compensate her for the

alleged aggravation of a psychological

and physical condition resulting, she

claimed, from the plan administrator’s

App. 40

interference with her benefits. aA back

ailment was the cause of respondent ’s

disability and, as a result of the

debilitating back ailment, respondent

received plan benefits for a period of

time until the defendant-petitioner’s

[hereinafter "Petitioner" ] disability

committee made a decision to terminate

those benefits. Thereafter, respondent

requested an internal review of the

committee’s decision and, after a

subsequent examination confirmed that

she remained temporarily disabled,

respondent’s benefits were reinstated

some five months after their

termination. Retroactive benefits were

later paid to respondent in full.

Subsequently, respondent filed suit

Claiming damages for injuries allegedly

wrought by petitioner’s improper refusal

to pay benefits for the five month

period during which her benefits were

App. 41

terminated. Respondent sought, inter

alia, both compensatory damages for the

aggravated psychological condition and

punitive damages. Eventually,

petitioner moved for summary judgment

and the district court granted the

motion in favor of petitioner. The

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Although the appellate court agreed with

the district court that respondent’s

state law claims were preempted by

ERISA, the court held that respondent’s

complaint alleged a cause of action

under ERISA.

Concluded that petitioner violated

its fiduciary obligation to process

claims in good faith and in a fair and

diligent manner, the Ninth Circuit

determined that this alleged violation

gave rise to a cause of action under 29 7

U.S.C. 8 1109(a) which a plan

App. 42

beneficiary may assert under 8

502(a)(2). Thus, the court read the |

409(a) authorization of "such other

equitable or remedial relief as the

court may deem appropriate" as giving

the court "wide discretion as to the

damages to be awarded," including

compensatory and punitive damages.

According to the court, the award of

compensatory damages was intended to

“remedy the wrong and make the aggrieved

individual whole," which meant not

° tu or loss of

plan benefits, but relief "that will

compensate the injured party for all

losses and injuries sustained as a

direct and proximate cause of the breach

of fiduciary duty," including "damages

for mental or emotional distress."

Russell, 473 U.S. at ==, 105 8.Ct. at

3088. (emphasis added).

App. 43

The appellant court’s logic was

|

rejected and its decision reversed upon

petitioner’s appeal to the Supreme

Court. The Supreme Court, in an

examination of the statutory provisions

of ERISA, noted that the statute says

nothing about either the recovery of

extra-contractual damages or the

possible consequences of delay in the

plan administrator’s processing of a

disputed claim. Russell, Id. at -——-,

105 S$.Ct. at 3091. Hence, according to

the Court, there is nothing contained in

the text of the statute to support the

conclusion that a delay in the

processing of an individual benefit

claim gives rise to a private right of

action for compensatory or punitive

relief. Id. (emphasis added.) Under

the Court’s analysis of the statute,

both the text and the context of 8 409

demonstrate that Congress did not intend

App. 44

8 409 to authorize any relief except for

that which might inure to the benefit of

the plan itself. Id. The Court

expressly noted that "because respondent

relies entirely on sg 409(a) and

expressly disclaims reliance on 8

502(a)(3), we have no occasion to

consider whether any other provision of

ERISA authorizes recovery of

extracontractual [sic] damages." Id. at

3008 n.5.

Justice Brennan wrote a concurring

Opinion in which he was joined by

Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun.

Justice Brennan emphasized that the case

before the Court involved a single,

narrow question-——-whether the 8 409

“appropriate relief" provision referred

to in 8402(a) (2) encompasses recovery by

an individual participant or beneficiary

of extra-contractual damages for breach

of fiduciary duty. Id. at 3094. The

App. 45

concurring Justices agreed that 8 409

should be read as providing remedies

that protect the entire plan rather than

individuals since it appears within the

context of the statute pertaining to

remedies available to the plan and

because 8 502(a)(3) affords plan

participants and beneficiaries with

personal, or individual, relief. Id.

(emphasis added).

Justice Brennan wrote the

concurring opinion to stress the limited

scope of the decision in Russell.

Indeed, Justice Brennan noted that sh

Russell should not be read as suggesting

that "administrators might not be fully

subject to strict fiduciary duties to

participants and beneficiaries in the

processing of their claims and to

traditional trust-law remedies for

App. 46

breaches of those duties." Id. at

3095.° _

Subsequent to the Court’s decision

in Russell the circuit courts reached

varying conclusions when applying the

principles enumerated in Russell to the

facts of the sundry ERISA Claims before

them. The Fourth Circuit, in Powell

v.Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.,

Supra, applied the reasoning of Russell

to its construction of sg 502(a)(3).

— well-recognized that the

legislative history of ERISA establishes

that Congress intended by 8 404(a) to

incorporate the fiduciary standards of

trust law into ERISA. Russell, 473 U.s.

at -——, 105 S.ct. at 3095. (footnote

omitted). Consequently, under black-

letter trust law, fiduciaries owe strict

duties running directly to the

beneficiaries in the administration and

payment of trust benefits. Id. supra,

105 S.Ct. at 3096. (footnote omitted).

In addition, a fundamental concept of

trust law is that courts "will give to

the beneficiaries of a trust such

remedies as are necessary for the

protection of their interests." Id.

Supra, 105 S.Ct. at 3098. (footnotes

omitted) .

App. 47

The plaintiff in Powell was a

former employee of and beneficiary under

defendant’s self-insured benefit plan.

She sued defendant and the plan’s

administrator for breaching various

fiduciary duties under ERISA in the

handling of her claim for disability

benefits. Powell, 780 F.2d at 420.

Although plaintiff had previously

received all of the benefits to which

she was entitled, she sought $5,000,000

in extra-contractual and punitive

damages under ERISA 2s ws'® as the

court’s jurisdiction over several

pendent state claims. Id. (emphasis

added).

Plaintiff collected disability

benefits under defendant’s plan for

approximately five years. Thereafter,

she received a substantial social

security award and when the award was

combined with the plan benefits, the

App. 48

benefits exceeded the amount to which

plaintiff was entitled under the plan.

Consequently, defendant terminated

plaintiff’s benefits and requested a

refund of the overpayment. Plaintiff

refused and filed suit against the plan

administrators charging constant

harassment by defendants during the five

year period in which she received

benefits. Plaintiff further contended

that the harassment caused both her and

her son emotional distress and

precipitated her divorce. The complaint

was subsequently dismissed and plaintiff

appealed.

The Fourth Circuit framed the issue

as a question of whether plaintiff,

having received all the benefits to

which she was entitled, could recover

extra~contractual and punitive relief

under ERISA to compensate her for

various alleged physical ailments, the

App. 49

decline of her marriage, her son’s

emotional distress, and the

deterioration of her mental health,

allegedly resulting from defendant’s

mishandling of her disability claim.

Id. at 424.

The Powell court noted that in

Russell the Supreme Court expressly

reserved the question of whether and to

what extent "“extra-contractual and

punitive relief is authorized by way of

the catchall provision in 8 1132(a)(3).

Id. Plaintiff argued that

notwithstanding the use of the word

“equitable” in 8 1132(a)(3), she was

entitled to monetary damages in

appropriate situations because ERISA

incorporated the fiduciary standards and

principles of trust law. Id. The

Fourth Circuit disagreed and held that,

in light of applicable trust principles,

the provision for "other appropriate

App. 50

equitable relief" did not authorize

extra-contractual or punitive damages

for a plan administrator’s breach of

fiduciary duties under ERISA. Id. As

the court explained, under the common

law of trusts, "where the trustee is not

under an immediate and unconditional

duty to pay money to the beneficiary,

the cannot intain an

action at law against him." Id.

(quoting A. Scott, The Law of Trusts, 8

198.1.1 (1967)).

Plaintiff in the instant matter

brought her action pursuant to 8

902(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. 8 1132(a) (3)

alleging defendant breached its

fiduciary duty by refusing to pay

hospitalization costs incurred during

the birth of her son. The statute

provides:

A civil action may be brought-—

App. 51

by a participant, beneficiary,

or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any

act or practice which violates

any provision of this

subchapter or the terms of the

plan, or (B) to obtain other

appropriate equitable relief

(i) to redress such violations

or (ii) to enforce any

provisions of this subchapter

or the terms of the plan[.]

29 U.S.C.A. 8 1132(a) (3).

Courts have held that "[g]jliven that

Congress intended to incorporate the

fiduciary standards of trust law into

ERISA," a ‘beneficiary is entitled to a

remedy which will put him in the

position in which he would have been if

the trustee had not committed the breach

of trust." Warren v. Society Nat. Bank,

905 F.2d 975, 981 (6th Cir. 1990), reh.

denied, en banc, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS

16,686 (6th Cir. 1990), later

proceeding, 111 S.Ct. 948 (1991), cert.

denied, 111 S.Ct. 2256 (1991). In

Warren the plaintiff participated in two

retirement plans and was advised that it

App. 52

would be advantageous for him to "roll

over" his interests in the plans into a

self-directed IRA. Plaintiff followed

the advice given and thereafter

instructed the trustee to transfer all

of the assets in the plans to an

investment banking firm. Because the

transfer-was accomplished in two

separate and distinct stages, plaintiff

claimed he faced a higher tax

consequence as well as a loss of

favorable rollover treatment.

Consequently, plaintiff sued the trustee

for breach of fiduciary duty and sought

compensatory damages.

The trustee filed a motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which

relief could be granted. The basis of

the motion was defendant’s argument that

Plaintiff sought extra-contractual

damages which, it was asserted, could

App. 53

oe

not be recovered under ERISA. Support

for this contention was allegedly found

in the Supreme Court’s decision in

Mass tu sife _ oo. #.

Russell, supra. The district court

agreed and granted the trustee’s motion

to dismiss.

The Sixth Circuit reversed and

distinguished the facts of the case

before it from the facts of Russell.

According to the Sixth Circuit, the

beneficiary in Russell received all the

disability benefits to which she was

contractually entitled and, in addition,

sought compensatory and punitive

damages. Hence, the court noted, the

damages plaintiff hoped to recover were

extra-contractual because relief in the

form of compensatory and punitive

damages was not within the terms of the

ERISA-governed benefit plan. Society

Nat. Bank, 905 F.2d at 980. To the

App. 54

contrary, the Warren plaintiff was

seeking to recover damages allegedly due

because the trustee did not follow

plaintiff’s instructions as required by

the contractual provisions of the

benefit plan.

Furthermore, according to the

court, the essence of the complaint

filed in Russell differed from that of

the complaint filed in the Warren case.

In Russell the action was brought

pursuant to 8 502(a)(2) claiming a cause

of action under sg 409(a) whereas the

Warren plaintiff brought the action

under 8 502(a)(3) and sumehe relief

under 8 404(a)(1). Id. at 980-81.

As & result of the foregoing, the

Sixth Circuit found that under trust

law, a beneficiary is entitled to a

remedy that will put him in the position

he would have been in if the fiduciary

had not committed a breach of trust.

App. 55

Such a remedy, according to the court,

includes contractual money damages. Id.

at 982. As the court explained,

equitable relief includes monetary

damages where necessary to afford

complete relief as it is “the historic

purpose of equity to secure complete

justice, and courts may adjust their

remedies so as to grant the necessary

relief." Id. Thus, a plaintiff is

entitled to monetary damages where a

breach of fiduciary duty results in the

loss or denial of benefits to which

plaintiff is contractually entitled.

In the within litigation, defendant

argues that plaintiff was not

contractually entitled to benefits

because the contract for coverage was

void from the inception for want of

consideration. Defendant’s claim is

based on the fact that the employer

failed to pay the entire premium

App. 56

required for coverage. As a result,

defendant avers, the contract was void

from the date it would have otherwise

been effective.

Regarding the duties of a

fiduciary, the applicable statute

provides in pertinent part:

(1) Subject to sections

1103(c) and (d), 1342, and

1344 of this title, a

fiduciary shall discharge his

duties with respect to a plan

solely in the interest of the

participants and beneficiaries

and-——

(A) for the exclusive purpose

of:

(i) providing benefits to

participants and their

beneficiaries; and

(ii) defraying reasonable

expenses of administering the

plan;

(B) with the care, skill,

prudence, and diligence under

the circumstances then

prevailing that a prudent man

acting in a like capacity and

familiarity with such matters

would use in the conduct of an

enterprise of a like character

and with like aims;

App. 57

(C) by diversifying the

investments of the plan so as

to minimize the risk of large

losses, unless under the

circumstances it is clearly

prudent not to do so; and

(D) in accordance with the

documents and instruments

governing the plan insofar as

such documents and instruments

are consistent with the

provisions of this subchapter

or subchapter III of this

chapter.

29 U.S.C.A. 8 1104.

Under the statute, the fiduciary

shall discharge its duties with respect

to the plan solely in the interest of

the participants and beneficiaries and

for the exclusive purpose of providing

benefits to participants and their

beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. 8 1104(1)(A).

(emphasis added). In order to meet this

standard, the fiduciary is required to

act with the "care, skill, prudence, and

diligence under the circumstances” that

a prudent person acting in like capacity

and familiarity with such matters would

App. 58

use in the conduct of a comparable

enterprise. 29 U.S.C. 8 1104(B). In

the matter at hand, defendant failed to

meet the fiduciary standards enunciated

in 29 U.S.C. 8 1104.

There is case law to the effect

that a fiduciary breaches a duty owed by

failing to notify a plan participant or

beneficiary of information that is

material to one’s eligibility for

benefits under the particular plan.

See, e.g. Cent tates out

° t e i Fund v. tra

Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 105 8s.Cct.

2833 (1985), reh. denied, 473 U.S. 926

(1985); Vv. onia i ns. Co.,

919 F.2d 747 (D.C.App. 1990); Berlin v.

Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 858 F.2d

1154 (6th Cir. 1988); en v. Hote

Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union,

637 F.2d 592 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,

454 U.S. 898 (1981).

App. 59

In t t v. Central

Transport, Inc., the Court found that a

fiduciary has a duty to fully inform

plan participants and beneficiaries of

their rights and status under the plan.

472 U.S. at 580, 105 S.Ct. at 2845.

Failure to do so may result in fiduciary

liability. Likewise, in Eddy v.

Colonial Life Ins. Co., the court held

that under the principles of trust law,

"[t]he duty to disclose material

information is the core of the

fiduciary’s responsibility." 919 F.2d

at 750. Hence, a fiduciary, at times on

his own initiative, has a duty to convey

complete and correct material

information to a beneficiary. Id.

According to the Eddy court, since

trust law provides the foundation for

ERISA, plaintiff was entitled to

benefits which were denied because the

fiduciary breached its duty to plaintiff

App. 60

by its failure to give plaintiff

complete and correct material

information about his status and his

option to convert his group health

insurance. As the court noted:

[The trustee] is under a duty

to communicate to the

beneficiary material facts

affecting the interest of the

beneficiary which he knows the

beneficiary does not know and

which the beneficiary needs to

know for his protection in

dealing with a third person .

Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of

Trusts 8 173, comment d (1959).

Similarly, in Berlin v. Michigan

Bell Telephone Co., the Sixth Circuit

reversed the lower court’s decision

denying plaintiffs’ claim for retirement

benefits which had been withheld because

the fiduciary had given plaintiffs

inaccurate information. The Court of

appeals realized that,

courts must always bear in

mind the ultimate

App. 61

eee

consideration whether

allowance or disallowance of

particular relief would best

effectuate the underlying

purposes of ERISA-~enforcement

of strict fiduciary standards

of care in the administration

of all aspects of [] plans and

promotion of the best

interests of participants and

beneficiaries.

858 F.2d at 1162. (quoting

Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.

Russell, 473 U.S. at 158, 105 S.Ct. at

3098 (Brennan, J., concurring).

In the Berlin case the plan

fiduciaries gave plaintiffs incorrect

information about plaintiffs’ rights

under the benefit plan. As a result,

the Sixth Circuit held that a fiduciary

may be personally liable for materially

misleading those to whom the duties of

loyalty and prudence described in 29

U.S.C. 8 1104 are owed. Michigan Bell,

858 F.2d at 1163. Such a duty

encompasses an obligation to refrain

from making mis-representations, either

App. 62

negligently or intentionally, to plan

participants. Id.

Additionally, in Rosen v. Hotel and

Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union,

the court found that ERISA imposes

strict fiduciary obligations on those

who have discretion or responsibility

respecting the management, handling, or

disposition of plans governed by the

statute. Thus, at a minimum, the

fiduciary must notify a plan participant

or beneficiary of the employer’s failure

to contribute to the fund as required by

the plan agreement. 637 F.2d at 599-

600. This is true because,

[i]f a trustee’s fiduciary

duty requires anything in the

administration of the trust,

it requires him to inform the

{plan participants] of their

employer’s failure to make the

required contributions to the

[plan]. Continued eligibility

is the core of the trustee

beneficiary relationship and

those responsible for the

administration of the [plan]

are required to notify [plan

App. 63

participants] when their

employer jeopardizes their

eligibility.

Id. (citation omitted).

Applying this reasoning, the Third

Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the

district court’s decision and held that

plaintiff was entitled to his pension

benefits because the pension trustee’s

failure, as required by the pension

agreement, to notify plaintiff of his

employer’s neglect in contributing to

the plan constituted a breach of

fiduciary duty. This failure to

contribute resulted it plaintiff’s lack

of the length of credited service

necessary for entitlement to pension

benefits. The court therefore held

plaintiff was entitled to full pension

benefits despite the fact that because

of his employer’s failure to contribute

to the plan, plaintiff he did not have

App. 64

the requisite number of years of

credited service.

Defendant’s reliance on Russell and

Powell is misplaced. This Court finds

that plaintiff simply sought to enforce

the terms of the benefit plan, e.g., the

payment of hospitalization expenses she

was contractually entitled to receive

pursuant to the terms of the plan.

Furthermore, as case law indicates, a

fiduciary is trusted by the beneficiary

to act on behalf of the beneficiary and

a serious breach of that duty may give

rise to a cause of action.* In

addition, "[]the duty to disclose

* If this were simply a claim under

an estoppel theory, defendant’s motion

would be granted because courts have held

that statements made by plan

representatives contrary to the express

provisions of the plan in issue may not

estop the plan from later denying the

payments of benefits. See e.g., Moore v.

u o., 856 F.2d

488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988); chw er v.

Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 959-60 (11th Cir.

1986).

App. 65

material information is the core of a

fiduciary’s responsibility." See Eddy,

919 F.2d at 70.

Originally, in its motion for

summary judgment, defendant argued that

it did not have a fiduciary duty to

inform plaintiff of nonpayment of

premiums due under the plan because it

was not the administrator or the sponsor

of the Roofing Concepts plan. This

Court held, however, that although

defendant was neither a sponsor nor an

administrator of the plan, it was

nonetheless a fiduciary of the plan.

Consequently, it had an ensuing duty to

disclose material information to

plaintiff. Clearly, Roofing Concepts’

failure to pay the premiums required

under the plan constitutes material

information of which plaintiff should

have been aware. See e.g. McNeese v.

Health Plan Marketing, Inc., 647 F.Supp.

App. 66

981, 986 (N.D.Ala. 1986) ("Several

courts have held that at a minimum, the

fiduciary under ERISA has an obligation

to notify the employees of the

employer’s failure to contribute to the

pension fund as required by the pension

agreement.") Hence, as this Court

earlier found, by failing to notify

plaintiff of Roofing Concepts’

nonpayment, defendant breached its

fiduciary obligation to plaintiff.

Moreover, plaintiff merely seeks an

award of contractual damages, not extra-

contractual damages. Under the terms of

the plan, plaintiff is entitled to the

benefits claimed despite defendant’s

argument to the contrary. This is

especially true because defendant acted

as though the desire hospitalization

coverage was fully in force despite the

alleged shortage in the premium payment.

App. 67

For example, the policy issued by

defendant to Roofing Concepts had an

effective date of November 1, 1988. See

Defendant’s Exhibit 1.° Roofing

Concepts presented defendant with a

check in the amount of $3665.63 which

was to be applied toward the first

premium. Thereafter, it was determined

that the actual amount of the premium

should have been $3,709.42; thus,

Roofing Concepts owed $43.79 on the

first month’s premium. See Defendant’s

Exhibits 3 and 4. Despite this apparent

shortage, defendant only billed Roofing

Concepts $3,709.42 for the premium due

December 1, 1988 even though defendant

> All references to defendant’s

exhibits are to those items attached to

defendant’s memorandum in support of its

motion for summary judgment unless

otherwise specified. Similarly,

references to plaintiff’s exhibits are

made with respect to documents attached

to plaintiff’s memorandum in response to

defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

App. 68

claims that the $43.79 shortage

effectively negated Roofing Concepts’

coverage. See Defendant’s Exhibit 5.

On December 1, 1988, plaintiff

received a letter from defendant’s

account representative. The letter

indicated that plaintiff was entitled to

coverage under the fore-mentioned plan.

See Plaintiff’s Exhibit A. According to

plaintiff’s affidavit, plaintiff made

several calls to defendant after

December 1, 1988 regarding the terms of

the coverage. See Plaintiff’s

SO tae Se

Memorandum in Response to Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff

was advised each time that she was

entitled to hospitalization coverage and

the terms of the coverage were discussed

with her. Id.

Subsequent to the birth of

plaintiff’s son, several bills were

submitted to defendant for payment.

App. 69

ae

—— aan

Defendant accepted and paid bills for

charges incurred on December 9, 1988 and

processed on January 24, 1989 and for {

charges incurred on January 25-26, 1989

and processed on May 8, 1989. Defendant

did not, however, pay bills for

additional charges that were incurred on

January 25-27, 1989 and processed on May

3 and March 25, 1989. See Plaintiff’s

Affidavit.

On February 10, 1989, defendant’s

internal correspondence indicates that

“[t]he policyholder [Roofing Concepts]

has not paid their 12/1, 1/1 or 2/1/89

premiums." See Plaintiff’s Exhibit C

(emphasis added). Thus, the policy was

to be terminated for non-payment of

premiums. Id. Nevertheless, defendant

continued to act as though Roofing

Concepts had coverage because the | |

correspondence neither mentions the

November 1, 1988 premium payment

App.- 70

shortage nor the possibility of

termination because of the alleged

shortage. On February 12, 1989,

defendant attempted to reach Roofing

Concepts to find out "what the problem

was." See Plaintiff’s Exhibit Cc. It

was then learned that the phone was

disconnected but it was not until

February 14, 1989 that the November l,

1988 shortage was mentioned. At that

time, however, defendant continued to

act as if the policy were in effect

because the correspondence states

This case is effective

11/1/88. They only paid

$3665.63 for their premium

deposit, leaving $43.79 short.

We need this premium and the

12/1, 1/1 and 2/1/89 premium

by 2/15/89 or we will

terminate this case.

See Plaintiff’s Exhibit C.

On February 15, 1989, Roofing

Concepts informed defendant that it was

no longer in business and that the

App. 71

ie ee

insurance policy should be cancelled “at

the earliest possible date." See

Plaintiff’s Exhibit D. On March 27,

1989, defendant informed plaintiff that

since the coverage had been cancelled

effective November 1, 1988, benefits

would not be provided for plaintiff’s

hospitalization of January 25 and 26,

1989.

A "fiduciary shall discharge his

duties with respect to a plan solely in

the interests of the participants and

beneficiaries and for the exclusive

purpose of providing benefits to

participants and their beneficiaries."

29 U.S.C. 8 404(a)(1)(i). Accord Vogel

v. Inde eo vi P

728 F.Supp. 1210, 1229 (D.Md. 1990).

Thus, where a fiduciary breaches a duty

owed to a beneficiary, the beneficiary

may be entitled to damages pursuant to

the contractual agreement established by

App. 72

the benefit plan. Alternatively, a

beneficiary is entitled to damages

necessary to put the beneficiary in the

position he or she would have been in

but for the trustee’s breach of duty.

Accordingly, defendant’s motion to alter

or amend the judgment will be denied

with respect to its liability for

breaching its fiduciary obligation to

plaintiff and plaintiff’s judgment of

October 16, 1990 allowed to stand.

II

Plaintiff’s Application for

Attorney Fees And Costs

In the Court’s order of October 16,

1990, plaintiff was awarded reasonable

costs and attorney’s fees incurred in

connection with this litigation. On

October 26, 1990, plaintiff’s counsel

filed an application and supporting

affidavit for fees and costs totalling

$15,178.20. Plaintiff also seeks an

App. 73

enhancement of 20% bringing his total

request to $18,156.70. This application

is based on a rate of $175.00 per hour

and an expenditure of "a minimum of

85.10 hours” of time on plaintiff’s

case. See Plaintiff’s Application for

Attorney Fees, time-sheet for Coleman v.

Nationwide. Plaintiff contends the

enhancement is justified “in light of

these factors stated" in Barber v.

6

Kimbrell’s, Inc.” and Espinoza v.

Hillwood Square Mut. Assoc.’ See

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s

Application for Attorney’s Fees.

Defendant opposes plaintiff’s fee

request on the grounds that neither the

reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rate

nor the "“after-the-fact exhibit

purporting to reflect the time spent by

6 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.), cert.

denied, 439 U.S. 934 (1978).

’ 532 F.Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1982).

App. 74

plaintiff’s attorney on the case"

adequately support the requested award.

See Memorandum in Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney’s

Fees .®

Furthermore, defendant contends

that expenses for items such as parking

and postal charges may not be recovered

as costs.

Pursuant to the ERISA statute, “in

any action under this subchapter .

by a participant, beneficiary, or

fiduciary, the court in its discretion

8 At the time defendant filed its

opposition to plaintiff’s application for

fees, plaintiff’s counsel had merely

submitted his own affidavit in support of

his request. According to defendant,

this "self-serving" affidavit was

insufficient to establish the

reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rate.

See Memorandum in Opposition.

Subsequently, plaintiff attempted to

remedy this alleged deficiency by

submitting the affidavits of three

attorneys who confirm that, upon

information and belief, the hourly rate

counsel charges is indeed reasonable.

See Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s

Objection to Fee Award.

App. 75

may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee

and costs of action to either party.”

29 U.S.C.A. 8 1132(g)(1). The Fourth

Circuit has held that the district

courts are to consider and make detailed

findings with regard to twelve factors

relevant to the determination of what

constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees.

See Barber v. Kimbrell’s, Inc., 577 F.2d

216, 226 (4th Cir. 1978). The twelve

factors, first enunciated in Johnson v.

orgia Highwa s, Inc.’,

include: 1) the time and labor expended;

2) the novelty and difficulty of the

questions raised; 3) the skill required

to properly perform the legal services

rendered; 4) the attorney’s opportunity

costs in pressing the instant

litigation; 5) the customary fee for

like work; 6) the attorney’s

9 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).

App. 76

expectations at the outset of the

litigation; 7) the time limitations

imposed by the client or circumstances;

8) the amount in controversy and the

results obtains; 9) the experience,

reputation and ability of the attorney;

10) the undesirability of the case

within the legal community in which the

suit arose; 11) the nature and length of

the professional relationship between

attorney and client; and 12) attorneys’

fees awards in similar cases. Barber v.

Kimbrell’s, Inc., 577 F.2d at 226 and

a.28.”

The Johnson analysis was

subsequently refined by the Fourth

Circuit in Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d

‘0 It is well-recognized that the

applicable law for determining attorneys’

fee awards in ERISA cases is analogous to

the law on fee awards in other

substantive areas of the law. Accord

Dav on_v. Cook, 594 F.Supp. 418, 421

(E.D.Va. 1984). (citations omitted).

App. 77

246 (4th Cir. 1981}. In Anderson the

court explained that the district court

should first

ascertain the nature and

extent of the services

supplied by the attorney from

a statement showing the number

of hours worked and an

explanation of how these hours

were spent. The court next

determine the customary hourly

rate of compensation. . .

The court should then multiply

the number of hours reasonably

expended by the customary

hourly rate to determine the

initial amount of the fee

award. Finally, the court

should adjust the fee on the

basis of the other factors,

briefly explaining how they

affected the award.

Id. at 249. (emphasis added) (citations

omitted).

Consequently, the court must

determine what constitutes a reasonable

expenditure of time and what rate of

compensation should be allowed. Id.

determining the time and rate, the court

must “evaluate the quality as well as

the quantity of the attorney’s work.”

App. 78

Id. The court is expressly instructed

to “begin with a figure based on the

number of hours reasonably expended

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate

and then explain any adjustment of these

figures either up or down because of the

other Johnson factors listed in Barber."

Id. Accord Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.

886, 104 S.Ct. 1541 (1984) (the initial

estimate of a reasonable attorney’s fee

is properly calculated by multiplying

the number of hours reasonably expended

on the litigation times a reasonable

hourly rate). The initial query is what

is a "reasonable hourly rate"?

Likewise, how does the court determine

whether the length of time expended is

"reasonable"?

The party seeking the fee award

bears the burden of providing evidence

sufficient to support its claim of the

hours worked and the rate which should

App. 79

be awarded. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (1983); Depuy

v. Depuy, 686 F.Supp. 568, 570 (E.D. Va.

1988). Once the fee applicant has

provided support for the requested rate,

the burden falls on the party opposing

the request to go forward with evidence

that the rate is erroneous. National

° t v.

Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319,

1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982). By the same

measure, the party opposing the fee

application must also submit specific

and detailed objections. Just as the

fee applicant cannot merely submit a

categorical application, an opposing

party does not meet its burden by simply

asserting broad challenges to the

petition. Id. at 1338 (Tamm, J.,

concurring).

In a case where plaintiff is held

to be entitled to attorney’s fees,

App. 80

should the plaintiff fail to prevail on

claims that are unrelated to the claims

on which the plaintiff succeeds, the

court should not award fees for services

rendered in prosecuting the

unsuccessful, unrelated claim. Hensley,

461 U.S. at ——, 103 S.Ct. at 1940;

Davidson, 594 F.Supp. at 422. In

addition, the court should consider

whether plaintiff’s level of success

makes the hours reasonably expended a

satisfactory basis for making a fee

award. Davidson, 594 F.Supp. at 422.

Courts have held that a reasonable

hourly rate is that "prevailing in the

community for similar work." National

Association, 675 F.2d at 1323.

Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted,

the burden is on the fee

applicant to produce

satisfactory evidence

that the requested rates are

in line with those prevailing

in the community for similar

services by lawyers of

App. 81

reasonably comparable skill,

experience and reputation.

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, -—-—-, 104 S.Ct.

1541, 1547 n.1l.

Generally, the actual billing rates

of the plaintiff’s attorney is

considered the best possible indicator

of the market rates in the community

“for similar services by lawyers of

reasonably comparable skill, experience

and reputation." Accord Davidson, 594

F.Supp. at 422. See also National

Association of Concerned Veterans, 675

F.2d at 1324. In the instant case,

plaintiff’s counsel has not submitted

evidence of his actual billing rates nor

any indication of the prevailing market

rates other than the general and

conclusional affidavits of the

forementioned attorneys. It has been

held that "generalized and conclusory

[sic] ‘information and belief’

App. 82

affidavits from friendly attorneys" do

not establish the prevailing market

rate. Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380.

1402 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub

nom., Fayetteville v. Spell, 484 U.S.

1027 (1988); National Association of

Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1325.

The court’s decision in National

Association of Concerned Veterans is

particularly instructive. There the

court stated that in order to provide

the Court with guidance,

an affidavit stating an

attorney’s opinion as to the

market rate should be as

specific as possible. For

example, it should state

whether the stated hourly rate

is a present or past one,

whether the rate is for a

specific type of litigation or

for litigation in general, and

whether the rate is an average

one or one specifically for an

attorney with a particular

type of experience or

qualifications. The affidavit

should also state the factual

basis for the affiant’s

opinion. The best evidence

would be the hourly rate

Ww

App. 83

usto a e

tiie. Alternatively, the

affidavit might state that the

stated rate is based on the

affiant’s personal knowledge

about specific rates charged

by other lawyers or rates for

similar litigation.

Natio s a oncerned

Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1325-26 (emphasis

added).

The court further noted that its

determination of the approximate market

rate is not aided by an affidavit which

merely offers an attorney’s conclusory

[sic] and general opinion of what the

approximate rate is. Id. at 1326.

Moreover, an affidavit provides little

assistance where the affiant simply

states that he is familiar with the

attorney and the litigation and thinks

the fee request is reasonable. Id.

Plaintiff’s counsel in the matter

at hand has failed to meet his burden of

demonstrating that the $175.00 hourly

App. 84

rate he seeks is reasonable. The

affidavits he submits along with his own

are conclusional, general in nature, and

do not establish that the rate he claims

is the prevailing market rate in this

community for an attorney with a

comparable level of skill and

experience. As a result, counsel for

plaintiff has not demonstrated his

entitlement to an hourly rate of

$175.00. Consequently, this Court finds

that an hourly rate of $120.00 an hour

constitutes a reasonable rate for an

attorney possessing the equivalent skill

and experience as plaintiff’s counsel.

Turning to the issue of whether the

hours claimed by plaintiff’s counsel are

reasonable, the courts agree that an

application for attorney’s fees must

also contain “sufficiently detailed

information about the hours logged and

the work done." National Association of

App. 85

Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1327;

Depuy, 686 F.Supp. at 570; Davidson, 594

F.Supp. at 424. Additionally, a

determination of reasonable hours

includes “some exercise of ‘billing

judgment’ to eliminate hours that are

‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary.’" Hensley, 461 U.S. at -——-

, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40.

Generally, attorneys who anticipate

making a fee application are required to

maintain contemporaneous, complete and

standardized time records which

accurately reflect the work done by the

attorney. Accord National Association

of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1327.

Nonetheless, the failure to maintain

contemporaneous records does not

preclude an attorney from being awarded

his or her fees. Yohay v. Alexandria

Employees Credit Union, Inc., 827 F.2d

967, 974 (4th Cir. 1987). Such failure

App. 86

does not necessarily require the

district court to deny an award of fees

entirely if there was an adequate

reconstruction of time spent on the

litigation. Id. (citation omitted).

Further, as fees are not recoverable for

non—productive time or for time expended

on issues on which plaintiff does not

ultimately prevail, the fee application

should indicate whether such time was

excluded and, if time was excluded, the

nature of the work and the number of

hours involved should be stated.

National Association of Concerned

Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1327-28. Cf.

Davidson, 594 F.Supp. 418. Again, the

documsnatation submitted by plaintiff’s

counsel in support of his fee

application is bereft of any statement

that non-productive time has been

excluded. Further, counsel has

maintained contemporaneous records in

App. 87

some instances but not all.

Nevertheless, it appears that the

itemized list submitted is an accurate

reconstruction of the hours expended on

the Coleman matter.

Additionally, it is within the

court’s discretion to make a downward

adjustment of the request submitted if

the court is of the opinion that the

hours claimed are excessive. See Depuy,

686 F.Supp. at 570. Factors the court

should consider in determining whether

the hours expended were reasonable

include: 1) the simplicity or complexity

of the case; 2) the result counsel

sought and did obtain; 3) and the length

of time between the filing of the suit

and the entry of judgment. Accord

Depuy, 686 F.Supp. at 570 (Court found

the number of hours claimed unreasonable

in light of inter alia, the simplicity

of the case and the short period of time

App. 88

between the filing of the suit and the

entry of a default judgment); Davidson,

594 F.Supp. at 424 (Court found

excessive the number of hours claimed

for drafting a complaint, preparation of

various fee motions and supporting data,

and preparation of the bill of costs).

Plaintiff’s counsel contends in the

instant case that, "at a minimum," at

least 85.10 hours were spent on

plaintiff’s case. See Application for

Attorney’s Fees. The complaint, which

alleges a cause of action under ERISA

for breach of fiduciary duty, was filed

on January 20, 1990. Defendant’s motion

for summary judgment was filed on May 7,

1990.

Defendant notes that some of the

hours claimed by plaintiff’s claim

appear excessive. Defendant, however,

fails to support its categorical

Statement. Accordingly, the Court finds

App. 89

that the hours claimed by plaintiff’s

counsel are reasonable.

Cases hold that when the Court is

attempting to determine the reasonable

fees to which counsel is entitled, the

importance of the results obtained is

properly emphasized. Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. ---, 103 S.Ct. at

1940; Davidson, 594 F.Supp. at 422.

Herein, plaintiff was very successful in

that she received a judgment from this

Court awarding her all the relief she

sought.

Once the court ascertains the

lodestar rate, additional considerations

may support either an enhancement or

downward adjustment of that rate.

Pen vania v. Delaware Valle

Citizens’ Counsel for Clean Air, 483

U.S. 711, 107 S.Ct. 3078 (1987); Hensley

v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at ———, 103 S.Ct.

at 1940. The burden of proving that an

App. 90

upward adjustment is necessary is on the

fee applicant. Stenson, 465 U.S. ——-,

104 S.Ct. at 1548.

To assist the Court in determining

whether an enhancement is justified,

Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in

the Delaware Valley case has been found

to be controlling with respect to

delineating the circumstances under

which a “contingency multiplier" may be

appropriate. See Spell v. McDaniel, 824

F.2d at 1404 n.23. Justice O’Connor

wrote than an enhancement for risk is

inappropriate “unless the applicant can

establish that without an adjustment for

risk the prevailing party ‘would have

faced substantial difficulties in

finding counsel in the local or other

relevant market.’”" Delaware Valley

Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483

U.S. at -—--, 107 S.Ct. at 3089-92.

App. 91

ee

Additionally, an enhancement for

risk should not be allowed on the basis

of legal risks or risks peculiar to the

case since these risks are adequately

taken into account in fixing the

lodestar figure. Id. at ——, 107 S.Ct.

at 3091. Thu3, the Delaware Valley

Court reversed the allowance of the

multiplier in that case on the ground

that it was inappropriate. The Court

emphasized that there was no finding

that an enhancement for risk was

necessary in the relevant market to

insure that “poor clients with good

claims [could] secure competent help."

Id. at -———, 107 S.Ct. at 3089. Rather,

the lower courts had found enhancement

appropriate on the impermissible basis

of the legal and practical risks

peculiar to the particular case, rather

than on the basis of any general

difference in relevant market treatment

App. 92

of all comparable contingent fee cases.

Id. at ——, 107 S.Ct. at 3089-92.

Similarly, in Spell v. McDaniel,

Supra, the Fourth Circuit found that

enhancement of the fee award was

improper because the prevailing party

did not show that "enhancement was

necessary to insure that competent

counsel would nevertheless be willing to

undertake contingency representation in

such cases." Spell v. McDaniel, 824

F.2d at 1405. According to the McDaniel

court, under the analysis of Delaware

Valley, "“case-specific risks [such as

the case’s complexity, dubiety of

success on the merits, and difficulty of

proving damages, uncompensated time and

expense assumed by counsel in

undertaking representation, and the

delay in receiving payment] may not

properly be drawn upon to enhance a

‘lodestar’ fee with a ‘contingency

App. 93

multiplier.’" Id. (quoting Pennsylvania

v. Delaw Valle itizens’ Co i °

Clean Air, Id. at -———-, 107 S.Ct. at

3079-87 (plurality opinion); Id. at ---,

107 S.Ct. at 3089 (concurring opinion) ).

See also Stenson, 465 U.S. at -—-, 104

S.Ct. at 1549 (Neither complexity nor

novelty of the issues is an appropriate

factor in determining whether to

increase the basic fee award).

Plaintiff’s counsel in the instant

matter merely states that "a 20% fee

enhancement is appropriate in light of

these factors stated in Barber, supra,

and Espinoza, supra.” See Memorandum of

Law Supporting Attorney’s Fee Request.

Unaided by counsel as to why an

enhancement is appropriate in this

matter, the Court finds that there is no

support for the requested 20%

enhancement. Consequently, plaintiff’s

motion will be denied.

App. 94

In addition, counsel for plaintiff

seeks to recover costs for copying,

postage, and parking. It has been held

that costs such as postage and parking

are not properly taxed as costs by the

court. Sun Pub. v. Mecklenburg News,

inc., 594 F.Supp. 1512, 1524 (E.D.Va.

1984), aff’d, 823 F.2d 818 (4th Cir.

1987). Consequently, counsel may not

recover such charges. Hence, the

application for reasonable costs will be

denied to the extent it seeks

reimbursement of such charges. As it is

impossible for the Court to ascertain

what amount of the request constitutes

postage charges, the Court will reduce

the amount of "xerox and postage" sought

by 10%.

App. 95

Itt

Supplemental Application for

Attorney’s Fees

On April 19, 1991, plaintiff’s

counsel filed a supplemental application

for additional attorney’s fees for work

done responding to defendant’s motion to

alter or amend the Court’s judgment of

October 16, 1990. Plaintiff’s counsel

contends that a total of 17 hours were

expended in preparing for and responding

to defendant’s motion. Again,

plaintiff’s counsel seeks $175.00 an

hour and reimbursement of charges for

copying, postage, and telephone tolls.

And again, the hourly rate awarded will

be $120.00 an hour and the application

for such charges will be denied to the

extent the application seeks

reimbursement for postage charges.

Accordingly, the Court will reduce the

amount sought for the reimbursement of

charges by 10%.

IV

Defendant’s Motion for Default Judgment

In the Court’s order of October 16,

1990, defendant was directed to apprise

the Court of the status of the third-

party complaint filed against Roofing

Concepts. On January 7, 1990, defendant

filed its answer and a third-party

complaint against Roofing Concepts

seeking judgment against Roofing

Concepts "in such sums as it may be

found liable to plaintiff." See

Memorandum of Points & Authorities in

Support of Defendant and Third-Party

Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment.

According to the Court’s records,

the third-party complaint was served on

the wife of the president of Roofing

Concepts’ on February 12, 1990. Roofing

Concepts has not filed any responsive

App. 97

pleadings. Consequently, a default

judgment against defendant is

appropriate pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.’

An appropriate Order shall issue.

[signed] James R. Spencer

United States District Judge

Date: July 18, 1991

“The Rules provide that when a

party against whom a judgment for

affirmative relief is sought has failed

to plead or otherwise defend as provided

by these rules and that fact is made to

appear by affidavit or otherwise, the

party entitled to judgment by default

shall apply to the court therefor. FED.

R. CIV. P. 55(a) and FED. R. CIV. P.

55(b) (2).

App. 98

APPENDIX C

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JOANNE W. COLEMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Vv. No. 91-2646

NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant & Third-Party Plaintiff-

Appellant,

Vv.

ROOFING CONCEPTS, INCORPORATED,

Third-Party Defendant.

JOANNE W. COLEMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v. No. 91-2652

NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant—Appellee,

Vv.

ROOFING CONCEPTS, INCORPORATED,

Third-Party Defendant.

Appeals from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of

Virginia, at Richmond.

James R. Spencer, District Judge.

(CA-90-19)

Argued: April 18, 1992

Decided: July 1, 1992

App. 99

Before WILKINSON, HAMILTON, and LUTTIG,

Circuit Judges.

Reversed by published opinion. Judge

Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which

Judge Hamilton and Judge Luttig joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Edwin Lewis Kincer, Jr.,

MEZZULLO & MCCANDLISH, Richmond,

Virginia, for Appellant. John Bertram

Mann, LEVIT & MANN, Richmond, Virginia,

for Appellee. ON BRIEF: David D.

Hopper, MEZZULLO & MCCANDLISH, Richmond,

Virginia, for Appellant.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

In this case plaintiff seeks

benefits under a group health insurance

plan, the award of which would violate

important provisions of the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),

29 U.S.C. 8 1001 et seq. Plaintiff

Joanne Coleman seeks to recover under a

contract between her husband’s employer

and Nationwide Life Insurance Company,

which had terminated automatically due

App. 100

to the employer’s failure to pay the

premiums. Coleman has offered the court

three rationales for ruling in her

favor. First, she .contends that while

the contract of insurance gave the right

to cancel the policy for non-payment of

premiums, such cancellation required an

affirmative act by Nationwide and could

not be exercised retroactively. Second,

she urges by way of estoppel that

statements made to her by Nationwide

personnel indicating that she had

coverage preclude Nationwide from

denying her benefits due to the

termination of the plan. Finally, she

argues that Nationwide breached its

fiduciary duty under ERISA by failing to

notify plan beneficiaries that her

husband’s employer had not paid the

necessary premiums to keep the policy in

force.

App. 101

At first glance, these appear to be

three unrelated theories of recovery,

but acceptance of any of them would

require this court to rewrite the

contract of insurance. While a court

should be hesitant to depart from the

written terms of a contract under any

circumstances, it is particularly

inappropriate in a case involving ERISA,

which places great emphasis upon

adherence to the written provisions in

an employee benefit plan. Plaintiff’s

theories, though packaged in different

wrappers, all would lead to the same

result ~— the written plan would no

longer be the benchmark in an action

under ERISA. Accordingly, we must

reverse the judgment of the district

court and direct it to dismiss the

complaint.

I.

Plaintiff Joanne Coleman and her

husband participated in a group health

insurance plan sponsored by: her

husband’s employer, Roofing Concepts,

Inc. After terminating its group_health

coverage with another insurer in late

1988, Roofing Concepts was issued a

group health policy by Nationwide Life

Insurance Company, which took effect on

November 1, 1988. The Nationwide policy

fell within ERISA’s definition of an

employee welfare benefit plan, and was

thereby subject to regulation under the

statute. 29 U.S.C. 8 1002(1). The plan

documents consisted of the insurance

policy and Roofing Concepts’

application.

In the contract of insurance,

Roofing Concepts agreed to pay 100

percent of the premiums due on the

policy. The written provisions of the

App. 103

plan also stated that the policy would

"continue for as long as premiums are

paid or until it is cancelled.” The

plan allowed for a-3l-day grace period

after a premium due date, during which

time insurance coverage would continue

for the plan participants. The policy

provided, however, that "[i]f all the

premium is not paid prior to the

expiration of the grace period, the

Policy will terminate on the last day of

the grace period."

Roofing Concepts defaulted on its

payments almost from the start. At the

time of its application to Nationwide,

Roofing Concepts paid a premium deposit

of $3665.63, which equaled the estimated

premium on the policy for the first

month. WNationwide’s underwriters

thereafter calculated the actual monthly

premium to be $3709.42, $43.79 more than

Roofing Concepts’ deposit. Nationwide

App. 104

billed Roofing Concepts for this

difference, which was due on November Be

1988. Roofing Concepts, however, never

paid the $43.79, nor did it ever make

another monthly premium payment.

Roofing Concepts also failed to notify

its employees that it had ceased paying

the premiums on the policy.

Roofing Concepts went out of

business on February 15, 1989. On

February 16, Roofing Concepts informed

Nationwide of this event and asked

Nationwide to cancel the health

insurance policy. On March 6, 1989,

Nationwide sent a reply letter

indicating that because Roofing Concepts

had paid no premiums except for the

initial deposit, the policy was

cancelled as of its effective date,

November 1, 1988.

Plaintiff Coleman was pregnant at

the time of the Nationwide policy’s

App. 105

inception. In response to a telephone

inquiry, Coleman received a letter from

a Nationwide account representative

dated December 1, 1988, which included

her policy number as well as a brief

summary of group benefits. On December

5, 1988, Coleman was sent an

authorization for a two-day hospital

stay for her childbirth that she

requested from Capp Care, a cost

containment organization paid by, but

not affiliated with, Nationwide. The

authorization letter contained the

following disclaimer. "“CAPP CARE’S

AUTHORIZATION OF ADMISSION, CONTINUED

STAY OR SURGICAL PROCEDURE DOES NOT

GUARANTEE PAYMENT. PAYMENT IS ALSO

SUBJECT TO ELIGIBILITY AND COVERAGE AT

THE TIME SERVICES ARE RENDERED AND MUST

BE VERIFIED BY THE EMPLOYER OR INSURANCE

CARRIER."

Coleman claims in her affidavit

that she was advised by unnamed

Nationwide employees on several

occasions after December 1, 1988 that

she had coverage. In her deposition,

however, Coleman indicated that the only

time she spoke to Nationwide personnel

between December 1 and the birth of her

child was in January 1989 when she was

told during a telephone inquiry that a

tubal ligation would be covered under

the policy. Coleman did contend that

she spoke to Capp Care employees on

numerous occasions during the same time

period regarding her authorization for

hospitalization.

Coleman gave birth to a son on

January 25, 1989. Although Nationwide

paid two of the medical expenses

associated with the childbirth totalling

$481.60, it notified Coleman in a letter

dated March 27, 1989, that the bulk of

App. 107

her expenses would not be paid because

her coverage had been cancelled as of

November 1, 1988. These uncovered

expenses totalled $6976.07. When

Coleman’s husband contacted Kenneth

Harris, president of Roofing Concepts,

to find out why the policy had been

cancelled, Harris professed ignorance

despite the fact that he had signed the

February 16 letter to Nationwide

requesting the cancellation of coverage.

Coleman filed this suit against

Nationwide on January 12, 1990, seeking

payment of the medical expenses plus

attorney’s fees. Both parties

subsequently filed motions for summary

judgment. On October 16, 1990, the

district court denied Nationwide’s

motion for summary judgment and granted

Coleman’s on alternative theories of

estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty.

748 F.Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1990). After

App. 108

Nationwide filed a motion to alter or

amend the judgment, the district court

on July 18, 1991, reversed its earlier

ruling that plaintiff was entitled to

judgment on an estoppel theory. The

court, however, upheld the grant of

Summary judgment for Coleman on

fiduciary duty grounds. Both parties

now appeal to this Court.

App. 109

II.

Coleman argues that she was covered

under the health insurance plan because

Nationwide had no right to retroactively

cancel her benefits. Although she

apparently concedes that the failure of

Roofing Concepts to pay the policy

premiums gave Nationwide the right to

cancel the policy, she contends that her

coverage was in full force and effect

when her child was born because

Nationwide had taken no affirmative

action to cancel the policy as of that

date.

We believe, however, that Coleman

misreads the plain language of the

policy, which provides for automatic

termination of the coverage if the

policy’s grace period expires without

payment of an overdue premium having

been made. The written plan expressly

states that "[i]f all the premium is not

App. 110

paid prior to the expiration of the

grace period, the Policy will terminate

on the last day of the grace period"

(emphasis added). The policy also

states that coverage "will continue for

as long as premiums are paid or until it

is cancelled." Thus, the policy itself

draws a distinction between automatic

termination if Nationwide is not paid a

premium and a cancellation for some

other reason. On the facts of this

case, Coleman’s coverage terminated no

later than December 2, 1988, when the

grace period for payment of the $43.79

portion of the November premium expired.

The language of this plan indicating

that coverage terminates automatically

for failure to pay premiums is

unambiguous. Courts are not at liberty

to disregard the plain language of a

plan in order to demand that insurers

App. 111

provide coverage for which no premium

has been — or ever will be - paid.’

Attempts to circumvent this policy

language on behalf of an admittedly

appealing plaintiff would regrettably

reprove the adage that hard cases make

bad law. For example, adoption of

Coleman’s position that the insurer has

to make some affirmative acknowledgement

of termination in order for such

termination to have effect would not

only conflict with the plain language of

the plan, but might also inure to the

detriment of beneficiaries in the long

run. An insurer that has an automatic

termination provision in its policy is

not presently precluded from making the

‘ We also note that Nationwide

breached no fiduciary duty by regarding

the policy as cancelled according to its

own terms. "To adhere to the plan is not

a breach of fiduciary duty.”

vy. Weirton Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 1075,

1080 (4th Cir. 1989).

App. 112

business decision to accept payment of

premiums after the grace period has

expired and to treat the policy as an

uninterrupted one. The decision to do

this, of course, does not alter the

terms of the contract, but it certainly

works to the benefit of plan

participants whose coverage would remain

in effect. Coleman’s affirmative

acknowledgement rule would create an

incentive for an insurer to declare a

policy terminated as soon as the grace

period expires in order to protect its

rights. Once such a declaration is made

by the insurer, tendering and acceptance

of the overdue premiums to reinstate the

policy seem less likely to occur.

Consequently, plan participants as a

whole are likely to be harmed by

Coleman’s rule.

Coleman’s additional contention

that the automatic termination provision

App. 113

constitutes an illegal “escape” clause

also misses the mark. She seems to

suggest that a termination clause such

as this is unenforceable because it

disrupts legitimate expectations of

coverage or renders the insurer’s

promise of coverage illusory. A

contractual provision such as the one at

issue here that conditions performance

upon payment, however, is the essence of

consideration and is in no way improper

or unconscionable. See, e.g., American

Fami Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 739 F.2d

1259, 1262 (7th Cir. 1984).

rrr.

Coleman next argues that Nationwide

is estopped from denying her the

requested medical benefits. She alleges

that at various points between December

1, 1988, and the birth of her child,

Nationwide employees and agents

indicated that she was still covered by

App. 114

the Roofing Concepts health insurance

policy. She claims that these

representations estop Nationwide from

asserting that her coverage had

terminated pursuant to the terms of the

plan and that, as a result of this

estoppel, she is entitled to payment of

her medical expenses notwithstanding the

plan’s plain language.

Although Coleman apparently

concedes that a state common law cause

of action based upon equitable estoppel

has been preempted by ERISA, see 29

U.S.C. 8 1144; Hololand v. Burlington

Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1146-47

(4th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem. sub nom.

Brooks v. Burlington Indus., Inc.,-477

U.S. 901 (1986), she nonetheless

contends that these very same estoppel

principles may be imported into ERISA in

the name of federal common law. Federal

common law, however, does not grant

App. 115

federal courts "carte blanche authority

federal statute.’" rovident fe

Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d

985, 992 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting

Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956,

960 (llth Cir. 1986).

Use of estoppel principles to

effect a modification of a written

employee benefit plan would conflict

with "ERISA’s emphatic preference for

written agreements." e v °

Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir.

1989). The statute requires that all

ERISA plans be “established and

maintained pursuant to a written

instrument," 29 U.S.C. 8 1102(a)(1), and

that the written instrument describe the

formal procedures by which the plan can

be amended, id. 8 1102(b)(3). Based

upon this statutory scheme, any

modification to a plan must be

App. 116

implemented in conformity with the

formal amendment procedures and must be

in writing. Oral or informal written

modifications to a plan, such as those

alleged by Coleman in this case, are of

no effect. Equitable estoppel

principles, whether denominated as state

or federal common law, have not been

permitted to vary the written terms of a

plan. Indeed, this circuit has said

that "resort to federal common law

generally is inappropriate when its

application would ... threaten to

override the explicit terms of an

established ERISA benefit plan." inger

F Cc e Oorp., No. 91-1669,

slip op. at 5 (4th Cir. May 27, 1992);

accord Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners,

Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1165 n. 10 (3d Cir.

1990); Cefalu v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 871

F.2d 1290, 1296-97 (5th Cir. 1989);

Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d

App. 117

897, 910 (6th Cir. 1988); Straub v.

Western Union Tel. Co., 851 F.2d 1262,

1265-66 (10th Cir. 1988); Nachwalter,

805 F.2d at 959-61; see also Pizlo v.

Bethlehem Steel Corp., 884 F.2d 116, 120

(4th Cir. 1989) (rejecting claims

because "they rest on an allegation that

the pension plan was modified by

informal and unauthorized amendment

which, as a matter of law, is

impermissible”).

In an effort to avoid the

prohibition against using equitable

estoppel to modify the written terms of

a plan, Coleman claims that Nationwide’s

statements constitute an interpretation,

not a modification, of the written plan.

Based upon this construction of the

facts, she argues that we should adopt

the view of the Eleventh Circuit that

estoppel principles may be invoked in

ERISA cases when the statements at issue

App. 118

ar2 interpretations of ambiguous plan

provisions. See National Cos. Health

Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. of

Atlanta, Inc., 929 F.2d 1558, 1571-72

(llth Cir. 1991); Kane v. Aetna Life

ins., 893 F.2d 1283, 1286 (llth Cir.

1990). We need not decide whether we

agree with the view of the Eleventh

Circuit, however, because this case

involves an outright modification, not

an interpretation of the plan. In Kane,

the Eleventh Circuit recognized that

"estoppel may not be involved to enlarge

or extend coverage specified in a

contract." 893 F.2d at 1285 n.3. In

this case, estopping Nationwide from

terminating the contract of insurance

when no premiums were paid would have

the effect of providing Coleman benefits

even though the contract unambiguously

indicates that she was entitled to none.

We can only regard such a result a

App. 119

modification of the plan’s termination

provision and, therefore, as being in

direct conflict with the statutory

requirements.

We are unpersuaded by Coleman’s

view that estoppel principles are

available in cases involving employee

welfare benefits plans, but not in

pension plan cases. According to

Coleman, the reason for denying use of

equitable estoppel principles in pension

plan cases is to protect the actuarial

soundness of those plans. See Armistead

v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1300

(6th Cir. 1991); Black v. TIC Inv.

Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 115 (7th Cir.

1990). Since welfare benefit plans are

unfunded and lack the stringent accrual

and vesting requirements of pension

plans, Coleman believes the reason for

not allowing estoppel is absent.

App. 120

We do not think, however, that the

statutory emphasis on adherence to the

written terms of ERISA plans leaves room

for this distinction between pension and

welfare benefit plans. Section 1102

requires that "[e]very employee benefit

plan shall be established and maintained

pursuant to a written instrument," 29

U.S.C. 8 1102(a)(1) (emphasis added),

and the requirement that formal

amendment procedures be included in the

written document similarly applies to

“"[e]very employee benefit plan," id. 8

1102(b). According to ERISA’s

definition, the term “employee benefit

plan" includes both welfare benefit and

pension plans. Id. 8 1102(3). We also

note that Congress knew how to exempt

welfare benefit plans from ERISA

requirements when it wished to do so.

See id. 8 1051(1) (exempting welfare

benefit plans from ERISA’s participation

App. 121

and vesting requirements); id. 8 1081(1)

(exempting welfare benefit plans from

ERISA’s funding requirements); Hozier,

908 F.2d at 1164 (noting these

provisions); see also Moore v.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d

488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988) (refusing to

apply estoppel to case involving

informal modification of welfare benefit

plan). Given the language of the

statute, we are unable to discern any

basis for holding that estoppel

principles are available to effectively

amend the written terms of a welfare

benefit plan. Indeed, in rejecting the

view that common law estoppel is freely

available to modify ERISA plans, this

circuit has drawn no distinction between

pension and welfare benefit plans. See

Salomon v. Transamerica Occidental Life

Ins. Co., 801 F.2d 659, 660-661 (4th

Cir. 1986) (monthly income benefit

App. 122

plan); Holland, 772 F.2d at 1147

(severance pay plan).

We also note that several important

purposes of ERISA would be impeded

through use of estoppel principles in

welfare benefit plan cases. ERISA is

designed "to promote the interests of

employees and their beneficiaries in

employee benefit plans,” wiv. Delta

Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983),

as well as “to protect contractually

defined benefits," sett ¥

Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134,

148 (1985). It requires a crabbed

reading of these purposes to suggest

that they are directed solely at the

actuarial soundness of pension plans.

Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has recently

recognized that "[o]ne of ERISA’s

purposes is to protect the financial

integrity of pension and welfare plans

by confining benefits to the terms of

App. 123

the plans as written." Pohl v. National

Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d

126, 128 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis

added). The financial integrity of a

group health insurer could be quickly

compromised if courts compelled the

insurer to assume risks for which no

premium was ever paid. Moreover, if

courts allowed estoppel to be used to

modify ERISA plans, plan assets could

also be chewed up in costly, litigious

disputes over what informal

modifications may have been made to a

written instrument .*

. Coleman also urges that

Nationwide breached a fiduciary duty that

it owed her when it misrepresented that

she had coverage even though it knew that

Roofing Concepts was delinquent in the

premium payments. We note, however, that

the alleged misrepresentations to which

Coleman seeks to hold Nationwide were

mainly made by Capp Care employees. As

noted above, Capp Care’s written

communication to Coleman explicitly

stated that its authorization for

hospitalization did not guarantee payment

and that it was subject to the insurer’s

App. 124

In sum, we think the district court

Was correct to conclude that estoppel

was unavailable to alter the unambiguous

terms of an ERISA benefit plan.

verification of coverage. Coleman’s

effort to sidestep this disclaimer cannot

succeed. This theory of recovery,

moreover, seems to us to be little more

than a repackaging of the equitable

estoppel argument made by Coleman. Even

if the theory were valid, however,

Coleman must still come to terms with the

plain language of the plan. She brings

this action under 29 U.S.C. g 1132(a)(3),

which provides that courts may award

“other appropriate equitable relief." As

noted above, Coleman was entitled to no

benefits under the contract, and this

circuit has indicated that

extracontractual damages are generally

not available as "other appropriate

equitable relief" under gs 1132(a) (3).

See e el.

, , 780 F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir.

1985); cf. Massachusetts Mutual, 473 U.S.

at 144 (analysis of similar equitable

relief provision in 29 U.S.C. sg 1109

(indicates that “Congress did not intend

that section to authorize any relief

except for the plan itself. In short,

we do not find in [8 1109] express

authority for an award of

extracontractual damages to a

beneficiary.").

App. 125

Iv.

A.

In entering summary judgment in

Coleman’s favor, the district court

accepted her theory that Nationwide owed

her benefits due to a breach of

fiduciary duty. The alleged breach

stems from Nationwide’s failure to

notify all plan beneficiaries that

Roofing Concepts had threatened their

eligibility for benefits due to the

failure to pay premiums. We believe,

however, that in concluding that

Nationwide was fiduciary who had

committed a breach, the district court

failed to follow the allocation of

responsibilities that the plan documents

themselves provided.

Before one can conclude that a

fiduciary duty has been violated, it

must be established that the party

charged with the breach meets the

App. 126

Statutory definition of "fiduciary."

The statute defines the term as follows:

[A] person is a fiduciary with

respect to a plan to the

extent (i) he exercises any

discretionary authority or

discretionary control

respecting management of such

plan or exercises any

authority or control

respecting management or

disposition of its assets,

(ii) he renders investment

advice for a fee or other

compensation, direct or

indirect, with respect to any

moneys or other property of

such plan, or has any

authority or responsibility to

do so, or (iii) he has any

discretionary authority or

discretionary responsibility

in the administration of such

plan.

29 U.S.C. 8 1002(21)(A). As the basis

for its conclusion that this definition

has been satisfied, the district court

made the broad assertion that

“Nationwide possessed considerable

authority, discretion and administrative

control with respect to the plan." 748

F.Supp. at 432.

App. 127

We believe the district court’s

conclusion that Nationwide was a

“fiduciary” failed to come to terms with

the statutory definition. The district

court seemed to regard fiduciary status

as an all-or-nothing concept. However,

the inclusion of the phrase "to the

extent" in 8 1002(21)(A) means that a

party is a fiduciary only as to the

activities which bring the person within

the definition. The statutory language

plainly indicates that the fiduciary is

not an indivisible one. In other words,

a court must ask whether a person is a

fiduciary with respect to the particular

activity at issue. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R.

8 2509.75-8, FR-16 (1991); Licensed Div.

°. v. De , 943

F.2d 474, 477-78 (4th Cir. 1991);

Hozier, 908 F.2d at 1158; Local Union

2134, United Mine Workers of Am. v.

Powhatan Fuel, Inc., 828 F.2d 710, 714

App. 128

(11th Cir. 1987); Sommers Drug Stores

e ° ha . 2,

Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456,

1459-60 (5th Cir. 1986); Leigh v. Engle,

727 F.2d 113, 133 (7th Cir. 1984).

The discretionary authority or

responsibility which is pivotal to the

statutory definition of "fiduciary" is

allocated by the plan documents

themselves. Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber

Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989)

(looking to plan documents to determine

whether plan administrator exercised

discretionary powers in interpreting

plan provisions). In this case, we must

ask whether Nationwide possessed

discretionary authority or

responsibility to notify all plan

beneficiaries of circumstances, such as

the failure of a plan sponsor to pay

policy premiums, that would affect the

availability of benefits to all.

App. 129

Nothing in the plan itself suggests that

Nationwide has any authority or

responsibility to provide such

notification. Indeed, Nationwide is not

directed by the plan to provide notice

to all beneficiaries under any

circumstances. To the extent that the

relevant documents make an allocation of

a duty to provide notification of major

changes or events, that duty plainly

rests with Roofing Concepts. In its

preliminary application for insurance,

Roofing Concepts agreed as plan sponsor

to assume notice and recordkeeping

responsibilities in accordance with the

terms of the policy. Consistent with

this view, the final policy also

assigned notice and recordkeeping

responsibilities to Roofing Concepts,

including the obligation to keep

complete records with regard to each

person’s insurance, to distribute to

App. 130

each eligible employee information

regarding the program, and to report

changes in eligibility status to

Nationwide.

While we find nothing in the formal

allocation of responsibilities to

conclude that Nationwide possessed the

necessary discretionary authority to

render it a fiduciary, we must also look

beyond the formalities to see if

Nationwide in fact exercised authority

over these sorts of notifications. See

Leigh, 727 F.2d at 134, n.33. Our

review of the record, however, reveals

no such voluntary assumption of this

function by Nationwide.

There simply is no basis in the

plan documents or Nationwide’s actions

to conclude that Nationwide possessed or

exercised discretionary authority or

responsibility with respect to the

notification at issue. We cannot

App. 131

blindside Nationwide by implying the

existence of obligations when the only

source of such obligations is judicial

inventiveness. If an insurer, or any

other party, could be held to have

discretion over an activity simply

because it is not prohibited from

performing such activity, breaches of

fiduciary duty and the consequent

litigation would be omnipresent. the

costs of ERISA plans would surely surge

as parties sought cover from the

inevitable barrage of claims. Unable to

locate any legal basis in the statute or

plan documents for the duty that Coleman

would impose on Nationwide, we cannot

conclude that Nationwide was a

“fiduciary” as to this particular

function of notification or that it

breached a fiduciary duty.

App. 132

Coleman also urges that Nationwide

failed to fulfill the notification

duties assigned in the statute to the

plan administrator. ERISA allocates to

the plan administrator the

responsibility for providing notice of

plan provisions and changes that affect

the benefits of all. The plan

administrator must provide a detailed

Summary plan description to all

participants, as well as notification of

any material modifications that are made

to a plan. 29 U.S.C. ss 1102,

1024(b)(1). Coleman alleges that

Nationwide did not provide an adequate

summary plan description detailing the

cancellation procedures. The district

court did not reach that question,

however, because it found that

“‘Wethnuiiiie wan neither the

administrator nor the sponsor of the

App. 133

plan,” and that “Roofing Concepts filled

both of those roles." 748 F.Supp. at

431.

The statute unambiguously supports

the district court’s determination that

Roofing Concepts, not Nationwide, was

the plan administrator. ERISA provides

that if a plan administrator is not

designated in the written plan

documents, then the plan sponsor is the

plan administrator. 29 U.S.C. 8 1002

(16)(A). The statute further indicates

that the plan sponsor is "the employer

in the case of an employee benefit plan

established or maintained by a single

employer." Id. 8 1002(16)(B)(i). The

written plan in this case did not

designate a plan administrator, but it

did indicate that Roofing Concepts was

the plan sponsor. Thus, by virtue of 8

1002(16)(A), Roofing Concepts was the

plan administrator, and as such, it bore

App. 134

the primary duty of notification with

regard to the plan participants. Id. 8

1024(b); see also 29 C.F.R. 8 2509.75-8,

FR 12-Q (1991) (plan administrator is

also a named fiduciary). While it is

true that an insurer will usually have

administrative responsibilities with

respect to the review of claims under

the policy, that does not give this

court license to ignore the statute’s

definition of plan administrator and to

impose on Nationwide the plan

administrator’s notification duties.

See Moran v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 872

F.2d 296, 298-300 (9th Cir. 1989)

(holding that group health insurer who

was not plan administrator did not bear

reporting and disclosure

responsibilities); Davis v. Liberty Mut.

ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1134, 1138-39 & n.5

(D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that group

health insurer was not a plan

App. 135

administrator within the meaning of

ERISA and did not have the duty to

provide summary plan information) .°

We, therefore, conclude that Nationwide

was not the plan administrator and

consequently could not have breached the

administrator’s statutory duties.

° Nationwide’s agreement in the

written plan to provide Roofing Concepts

with individual certificates to be

distributed to each employee eligible for

coverage did not constitute an assumption

by Nationwide of Roofing Concepts’ duty

to provide a summary plan description.

These certificates were to include an

explanation of "the main benefits and

requirements" of the policy. ERISA

provides a lengthy, detailed list of what

must be included in a summary plan

description. 29 U.S.C. 8 1022(b). An

agreement to provide a description of

"the main benefits and requirements"

cannot be reasonably regarded as_ the

equivalent of the summary plan

description, which the statute requires

to be far broader in icope and detail.

See Girdley v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co.,

924 F.2d 1310, 1316 (3d Cir. 1991).

App. 136

Vv.

We thus reverse the judgment of the

district court, including its award of

attorney’s fees, and remand the case

with directions to grant summary “

judgment for Nationwide and dismiss the

complaint. It would be improper - and

legally insupportable - to require an

insurer to pay on a policy where no

ERISA duties were transgressed and on

which the premiums were never paid.

Coleman’s unfortunate situation resulted

not from any fault of Nationwide, but

from the failure of her employer to

fulfill its obligations. In resolving

claims under the statute, a court must

follow Congress’ command for adherence

to the provisions of the written plan -

lest ERISA become an administrator’s

nightmare and a litigator’s dream.

REVERSED

App. 137

Filed: July 17, 1992

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 91-2646(L)

(CA-90-19)

Joanne W. Coleman,

Plaintiff -— Appellee,

versus

Nationwide Life Insurance Co.,

Defendant & Third-Party Plaintiff -

Appellant.

ORDER

The Court amends its opinion filed

July 1, 1992, as follows:

On page 15, first paragraph, line 6

— the word "“husband’s" is inserted —

"the failure of her husband’s employer.”

For the Court - By Direction >

/s/ Bert M. Montague

Clerk

App. 139

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

NO. 91-2646

CA-90-19

JOANNE W. COLEMAN,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant & Third Party

Plaintiff —- Appellant

Vv.

ROOFING CONCEPTS, INCORPORATED,

Third Party Defendant

No. 91-2652

CA-90-19

JOANNE W. COLEMAN,

Plaintiff —- Appellant

v.

NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

Defendant - Appellee

App. 140

V.

ROOFING CONCEPTS, INCORPORATED,

Third Party Defendant.

On Petition for Rehearing with

Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc

Appellee filed a petition for

rehearing with suggestion for rehearing

en banc. No member of the Court

requested a poll on the suggestion for

rehearing en banc, and the original

judicial panel voted to deny the

petition for rehearing.

The Court denies the petition for

rehearing with suggestion for rehearing

en banc.

Entered at the direction of Judge

Wilkinson, with the concurrence of Judge

Hamilton and Judge Luttig.

For the Court,

/s/ Bert M. Montague

CLERK

APPENDIX E

Statutes and Regulations

of this Case

29 U.S.C. $1

§1104. Fiduciary Duties

(a) Prudent man standard of care

(1) Subject to sections 1103(c) and

(d), 1342, and 1344 of this title, a

fiduciary shall discharge his duties

with respect to a plan solely in the

interest of the participants and

beneficiaries and--

(A) for the exclusive purpose of:

(i) providing benefits to

participants and their

beneficiaries; and

(ii) defraying reasonable

expenses of administering the plan;

(B) with the care, skill, prudence,

and diligence under the circumstances

then prevailing that a prudent man

acting in a like capacity and familiar

App. 142

with such matters would use in the

conduct of an enterprise of a like

character and with like aims;

(C) by diversifying the investments

of the plan so as to minimize the risk

of large losses, unless under the

circumstances it is clearly prudent not

to do so; and

(d) in accordance with the

documents and instruments governing the

plan insofar as such documents and

instruments are consistent with the

provisions of this subchapter and

subchapter III of this chapter.

(2) In the case of an eligible

individual account plan (as defined in

section 1107(d)(3) of this title), the

diversification requirement of paragraph

(1)(C) and the prudence requirement

(only to the extent that it requires

diversification) of paragraph (1)(B) is

not violated by acquisition or holding

App. 143

of qualifying employer real property or

qualifying employer securities (as

defined in section 1107(d)(4) and (5) of

this title). |

(b) Indicia of ownership of assets

utside juris t t courts

~ Bxcept as authorized by the

Secretary by regulations, no fiduciary

may maintain the indicia of ownership of

any assets of a plan outside the

jurisdiction of the district courts of

the United States.

(c) oh assets b a c nt

or beneficiary

In the case of a pension plan which

provides for individual accounts and

permits a participant or beneficiary to

exercise control over the assets in his

account, if a participant or beneficiary

exercises control over the assets in his

account (as determined under regulations

of the Secretary)-——

App. 144

(1) such participant or beneficiary

shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary by

reason of such exercise, and

(2) no person who is otherwise a

fiduciary shall be liable under this

part for any loss, or by reason of any

breach, which results from such

participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise

of control.

(ad) Plan terminations

(1) If, in connection with the

termination of a pension plan which is a

single-employer plan, there is an

election to establish or maintain a

qualified replacement plan, or to

increase benefits, as provided under

section 4980(d) of Title 26, a fiduciary

shall discharge the fiduciary’s duties

under this subchapter and subchapter III

of this chapter in accordance with the

following requirements:

App. 145

(A) In the case of a fiduciary

of the terminated plan, any

requirement—

(i) under section

4980(d)(2)(B) of Title 26 with

respect to the transfer of assets

from the terminated plan to a

qualified replacement plan, and

(ii) under section

4980(d) (2) (B) (ii) or

4980(d)(3) of Title 26 with

respect to any increase in

benefits under tie +>rminated

plan.

(B) In the case of a fiduciary

of a qualified replacement plan,

any requirement—

(i) under section

4980(d)(2)(A) of Title 26 with

respect to participation in

the qualified replacement plan

App. 145

of active participants in the

terminated plan,

(ii) Under section

4980(d)(2)(B) of Title 26 with

respect to the receipt of

assets from the terminated

plan, and

(iii) under section

4980(d)(2)(C) of Title 26 with

respect to the allocation of

assets to participants of the

qualified replacement plan.

(2) For purposes of this

subsection—

{A) any term used in this

subsection which is also used in

section 4980(d) of Title 26 shall

have the same meaning as when used

in such section, and

(B) any reference in this

subsection to Title 26 shall be a

reference to Title 26 as in effect

App. 147

immediately after the enactment of

the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation

Act of 1990.

§1105. Liability for breach of co-

fiduciary

(a) vi ise to

liability

In addition to any liability which

he may have under any other provisions

of this part, a fiduciary with respect

to a plan shall be liable for a breach

of fiduciary responsibility of another

fiduciary with respect to the same plan

in the following circumstances:

(1) if he participates knowingly

in, or knowingly undertakes to conceal,

an act or omission of such other

fiduciary, knowing such act or omission

is a breach;

(2) if, by his failure to comply

with section 1104(a)(1) of this title in

App. 148

the administration of his specific

responsibilities which give rise to his

Status as a fiduciary, he has enabled

such other fiduciary to commit a breach;

or

(3) if he has knowledge of a breach

by such other fiduciary, unless he makes

reasonable efforts under the

circumstances to remedy the breach.

(b) Assets held by two or more trustees

(1) Except as otherwise provided in

subsection (d) of this section and in

section 1103(a)(1) and (2) of this

title, if the assets of a plan are held

by two or more trustees-

(A) each shall use reasonable

care to prevent a co-trustee from

committing a breach; and

(B) they shall jointly manage

and control the assets of the plan,

except that nothing in this

subparagraph (B) shall preclude any

App. 149

agreement, authorized by the trust

instrument, allocating specific

responsibilities, obligations, or

duties among trustees, in which

event a trustee to whom certain

responsibilities, obligations, or

duties have not been allocated

shall not be liable by reason of

this subparagraph (B) either

individually or as a trustee for

any loss resulting to the plan

arising from the acts or omissions

on the part of another trustee to

whom such responsibilities,

obligations, or duties have been

allocated.

(2) Nothing in this subsection

shall limit any liability that a

fiduciary may have under subsection (a)

of this section or any other provision

of this part.

App. 150

(3) (A) In the case of a plan the

assets of which are held in more than

one trust, a trustee shall not be liable

under paragraph (1) except with respect

to an act or omission of a trustee of a

trust of which he is a trustee.

(B) No trustee shall be liable

under this subsection for following

instructions referred to in section

1103(a)(1) of this title.

(c) Allocation of fiduciary

(1) The instrument under which a

plan is maintained may expressly provide

for procedures (A) for allocating

fiduciary responsibilities (other than

trustee responsibilities) among named

fiduciaries, and (B) for named

fiduciaries to designate persons other

than named fiduciaries to carry out

fiduciary responsibilities (other than

App. 151

trustee responsibilities) under the

plan.

(2) If a plan expressly provides

for a procedure described in paragraph

(1), and pursuant to such procedure any

fiduciary responsibility of a named

fiduciary is allocated to any person, or

a person is designated to carry out any

such responsibility, then such named

fiduciary shall not be liable for an act

or omission of such person in carrying

out such responsibility except to the

extent that-—

(A) the named fiduciary

violated section 1104(a) (1) of this

title—

(i) with respect to such

allocation or designation,

(ii) with respect to the

establishment or

implementation of the :

App. 152

procedure under this paragraph

(1), or

(iii) in continuing the

allocation or designation; or

(B) the named fiduciary would

otherwise be liable in accordance

with subsection (a) of this

section.

(3) For purposes of this

subsection, the term "trustee

responsibility” means any responsibility

provided in the plan’s trust instrument

(if any) to manage or control the assets

of the plan, other than a power under

the trust instrument of a named

fiduciary to appoint an investment

manager in accordance with section

1102(c)(3) of this title.

(d) Investment managers

(1) If an investment manager or

managers have been appointed under

section 1102(c)(3) of this title, then,

App. 153

notwithstanding subsections (a)(2) and

(3) and subsection (b) of this section,

no trustees shall be liable for the acts

or omissions of such investment manager

or managers, or be under an obligation

to invest or otherwise manage any asset

of the plan which is subject to the

management of such investment manager.

(2) Nothing in this subsection

shall relieve any trustee of any

liability under this part for any act of

such trustee.

29 CFR Ch. XXV

§2509.75-8

FR-13 Q: If the named fiduciaries of an

employee benefit plan allocate their

fiduciary responsibilities among

themselves in accordance with a

procedure set forth in the plan for the

allocation of responsibilities for

App. 154

operation and administration of the

plan, to what extent will a named

fiduciary be relieved of liability for

acts and omissions of other named

Sténctaetas in carrying out fiduciary

responsibilities allocated to them?

A: if named fiduciaries of a plan

allocate responsibilities in accordance

with a procedure for such allocation set

forth in the plan, a named fiduciary

will not be liable for acts and

omissions of other named fiduciaries in

carrying out fiduciary responsibilities

which have been allocated to then,

except as provided in section 405(a) of

the Act, relating to the general rules

of co-fiduciary responsibility, and

section 405(c)(2)(A) of the Act,

relating in relevant part to standards

for establishment and implementation of

allocation procedures.

App. 155

However, if the instrument under

which the plan is maintained does not

provide for a procedure for the

allocation of fiduciary responsibilities

among named fiduciaries, any allocation

which the named fiduciaries may make

among themselves will be ineffective to

relieve a named fiduciary from

responsibility or liability for the

performance of fiduciary

responsibilities allocated to other

named fiduciaries.

FR-14 Q: If the named fiduciaries of an

employee benefit plan designate a person

who is not a named fiduciary to carry

out fiduciary responsibilities, to what

extent will the named fiduciaries be

relieved of liability for the acts and

omissions of such person in the

performance of his duties?

App. 156

A: If the instrument under which

the plan is maintained provides for a

procedure under which a named fiduciary

may designate persons who are not named

fiduciaries to carry out fiduciary

responsibilities, named fiduciaries of

the plan will not be liable for acts and

omissions of a person who is not a named

fiduciary in carrying out the fiduciary

responsibilities which such person has

been designated to carry out, except as

provided in section 405(a) of the Act,

relating to the general rules of co-

fiduciary liability, and section

405(c)(2)(A) of the Act, relating in

relevant part to the designation of

persons to carry out fiduciary

responsibilities.

However, if the instrument under

which the plan is maintained does not

provide for a procedure for the

designation of persons who are not named

App. 157

fiduciaries to carry out fiduciary

responsibilities, then any such

designation which the named fiduciaries

may make will not relieve the named

fiduciaries from responsibility or

liability for the acts and omissions of

the persons so designated.

FR-16 Q: Is a fiduciary who is not a

named fiduciary with respect to an

employee benefit plan personally liable

for all phases of the management and

administration of the plan?

A: A fiduciary with respect to the

plan who is not a named fiduciary is a

fiduciary only to the extent that he or

she performs one or more of the

functions described in section 3(21) (A)

of the Act. The personal liability of a

fiduciary who is not a named fiduciary

is generally limited to the fiduciary

functions, which he or she performs with

App. 158

respect to the plan. With respect to

the extent of liability of a named

fiduciary of a plan where duties are

properly allocated among named

fiduciaries or where named fiduciaries

properly designate other persons to

carry out certain fiduciary duties, see

question FR-13 and FR-14.

In addition, any fiduciary may

become liable for breaches of fiduciary

responsibility committed by another

fiduciary of the same plan under my

circumstances giving rise to co-

fiduciary liability, as provided in

section 405(a) of the Act.

FR-17 Q: What are the ongoing

responsibilities of a fiduciary who has

appointed trustees or other fiduciaries

with respect to these appointments?

A: At reasonable intervals the

performance of trustees and other

App. 159

fiduciaries should be reviewed by the

appointing fiduciary in such manner as

may be reasonably expected to ensure

that their performance has been in

compliance with the terms of the plan

and statutory standards, and satisfies

the needs of the plan. No single

procedure will be appropriate in all

cases; the procedure adopted may vary in

accordance with the nature of the plan

and other facts and circumstances

relevant to the choice of the procedure.

App. 160

NATIONWIDE

INSURANCE

PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT A

December 1, 1988

Mrs. Joanne Coleman

1013 Greystone Avenue

Richmond, VA 23224

Dear Mrs. Coleman:

Please find attached a brief

summary of the benefits you will receive

under your group health insurance

coverage with Nationwide Insurance.

Also, enclosed is a PriorityCare

Information packet. Please read this

material and call the toll free number

and advise them of your upcoming

delivery. They will instruct you from

there.

Roofing Concepts should be

receiving your ID cards and PCS cards

any day now.

Joanne, as you can see from the

attached summary, this policy has a $100

App. 161

i

deductible plan per individual and $200

deductible per family. Once the

deductible is met, Nationwide pays 80%

of eligible expenses. When you have

reached a total out-of-pocket expense of

$600 per individual or $1200 per family,

then Nationwide will pay 100% of

eligible expenses.

Please be aware that Nationwide

will honor whatever portion of your

deductible you satisfied in 1988 with

your prior carrier. When you submit

your first claim to Nationwide, also

attach a copy of the Explanation of

Benefits from your prior carrier

verifying the amount of deductible you

have satisfied and Nationwide will apply

it towards your deductible with us.

Should you have any further

questions or concerns, please feel free

to contact me.

Sincerely

App. 162

/s/ Cheryl A. Reinecke

Account Representative

CAR

Attachments

P.S. Joanne, I just checked the

computer and your policy number is 2531

and your husband’s certificate number is

6. You should now be able to call the

toll free claims number to ask them

further coverage questions.

App. 163

SUMMARY OF GROUP BENEFITS

ROOFING CONCEPTS

Group Policy No. 2531

Life Insurance: All Employees

$10,000

Medical Insurance:

Comprehensive Medical Expense

provides a complete plan of protection

with a $1,000,000 maximun.

If an insured’s family member’s

covered medical expenses exceed the

annual deductible, the plan will pay 80%

of additional expenses for that person

for the rest of the calendar year.

(100% after out-of-pocket limit)

$100 Deductible - Waived for Accidents

Plan pays 80% of covered expenses

Insured pays 20% of covered expenses

until $600 (including deductible) is

paid during the calendar year.

THEN

Plan pays 100% of covered expenses for

remainder of calendar year

App. 164

CO

Maximum Benefit - $1,000,000 Per Person

Room and Board - Semi Private

Calendar Year Deductible — $100 per

person/$200 per family

Out-of-Pocket Limit - $600 per

person/$1200 per family

NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

GROUP INSURANCE POLICY

DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT "1"

ISSUES THIS POLICY TO:

ROOFING CONCEPTS, INC.

(Referred to in the Policy as the "Plan

Sponsor” )

TO INSURE CERTAIN

EMPLOYEES OF THE PLAN SPONSOR

Group Policy Number - 0-2531

State of Delivery - Virginia

Effective Date - November 1, 1988

The First Policy Anniversary is on

November 1, 1989, and all future

anniversaries will be on November 1.

We will pay benefits under the

terms of this Policy in the amounts

shown in the Policy. The first premium

is due on the Effective Date. All other

premiums are due each month on the first

day of the month.

App. 166

This Policy is delivered in the

State of Delivery and subject ee the

laws of that state.

All periods of insurance under this

Policy will be determined by full

calendar days at the local time at the

Plan Sponsor’s address.

The provisions of all Pages of this

policy form a part of this contract as

fully as if the signatures below were on

each page.

This Policy is effective as of the

Effective Date shown above.

/s/ W. E. Fitzpatrick

Secretary

/s/ John L. Marakoa

President

NATIONWIDE GROUP IDENTIFICATION

INSURANCE CARD

ROOFING CONCEPTS, INC.

ID#: 0-2531-1-6

NAME: COLEMAN, GLENN J.

EFF: 11/01/88 DEP COV: FAMILY

MAIL NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANY

CLAIMS TO: 4401 CREEDMORE ROAD

RALEIGH, NC 27612

ATTENTION: GROUP CLAIMS

CLAIM SERVICE INFO: 1-800-824-9486

COVERED PERSONS MUST OBTAIN APPROVAL

PRIOR TO NON-EMERGENCY HOSPITAL

ADMISSION OR WITHIN 48 HOURS OF AN

EMERGENCY. WITHOUT APPROVAL BENEFITS

MAY BE REDUCED FOR HOSPITAL

CONFINEMENTS. (SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR

CLAIM INSTRUCTIONS)

CALL: CAPP CARE 1-800-227-7464

App. 168

CAPP CARE DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT "7"

Chippenham Hospital

7101 Jahnke Road

Richmond, VA 23225

Date: 12/05/88

Authorization No.: 29657640

ICD: V22. NORMAL PREGNANCY

Proc. 59400 OBSTETRICAL DELIV

Admit Date: 2/01/89

Dschg Date: 2/03/89

Policy No:

Patient: Joanne W. Coleman

Payor: NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE co.

Employer: NON ASSIGNED NATIONWIDE

Division:

Employee Certificate #0000000-0000000-

0000-000000000

The Prior Authorization Request for

Joanne W. Coleman has been reviewed and

the admission to CHIPPENHAM HOSPITAL on

2/01/89 has been authorized.

CAPP CARE has assigned an initial

length of stay of 2 days. We will call

Dr. Reutinger to discuss your progress

while in the hospital and the need for

any continued confinement.

App. 169

Dr. Reutinger and the facility’s

business office have been notified of

this authorization.

If you have any questions, please

feel free to call CAPP CARE toll free at

1-800-CAPPING.

Sincerely,

D. M. Eaves, M.D.

Corporate Medical Director

Please provide us with the

patient’s actual date of admit and

discharge and the type of delivery.

In addition, please provide us with

the discharge date of the infant. |

Thank you. |

Please notify us of any change |

in the date of admission / |

procedure or change in the

diagnosis. Thank you.

EMPLOYER; ROOFING CONCEPTS, POLICY

#2531-6

App. 170

Services of an assistant surgeon

are normally not required for this

procedure.

CAPP CARE’S AUTHORIZATION OF ADMISSION,

CONTINUED STAY OR SURGICAL PROCEDURE

DOES NOT GUARANTEE PAYMENT. PAYMENT Is

ALSO SUBJECT TO ELIGIBILITY AND COVERAGE

AT THE TIME SERVICES ARE RENDERED AND

MUST BE VERIFIED BY THE EMPLOYER OR THE

INSURANCE CARRIER. PATIENT CARE REMAINS

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ATTENDING

PHYSICIAN, NOTWITHSTANDING ANY

RECOMMENDATIONS OF CAPP CARE.

Copy to: Physician, Patient

App. 171

PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT C

FILE: ALL

NOTEBOOK A NATIONWIDE CMS - VMC

-MSG: FROM: REINECC --VMC

TO: GABRIEL -—-VMC 2/10/89 11:30:30

FROM: Cheryl Reinecke

Richmond Group Sales

Subject: NO SUBJECT

Laura, I have put in a call to the

broker on this case to see what the

problem is. I will let you know what I

find out.

** Forwarding note from GABRIEL -—-VMC

02/10/89 11:09 **

Date: 10 February 89, 11:08:09 GMT

From: GABRIEL at VMC

TO: REINECC -

Cheryl,

This is in regards to Roofing

Concepts, 0-2531-1. The policyholder

App. 172

tata

has not paid their 12/1, 1/1 or 2/1/89

premiums. Therefore, we are terminating

this case for non—paying of premium.

2/13/89

Sandy (VGB) called Roofing Concepts &

their phone has been disconnected. She

will contact their agt to bird dog this

& find out what happened.

No response rec’d

App. 173

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Appendix — Coleman v. Nationwide Life Insurance · 506 U.S. 1081 | Frix