Appendix — Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.
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Bupreme Court, US
92.945 FILED
DEC_3__1999
IN THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Supreme Court of Che United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,
Petitioner
V.
AMERICAN AIRLINES AND
AMR CORPORATION,
Respondents
Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To
The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Fifth Circuit
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT CHARLES W. WOLFRAM
Counsel of Record Cornell Law School
727 East 26th Street 106 Myron Taylor Hall
Austin, Texas 78705 Ithaca, New York 14853
(512) 471-7188 (607) 255-9668
FIARRY M. REASONER JOHN F. SUTTON, JR.
JOHN L. MURCHISON, JR. P.O. Box 49700
MARGARET C. LING Austin, Texas 78765
EDWARD A. CARR (512) 471-3293
Vinson & Elkins L.L.P.
1001 Fannin Street W. JAMES KRONZER
Suite 2500 1900 Memorial Drive
Houston, Texas 77002-6760 Houston, Texas 77007
(713) 758-2358 (713) 862-5821
Counsel for Petitioner
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Opinion Granting Writ of Mandamus
og fF rer aa rere . A-1
Order Denying Motions To Disqualify Counsel
(United States District Court) ...... see ae
Denial Of Suggestion For Rehearing En Banc
(Court of Appeals) .... as C-1
A PRS 2 Sh Ae nA RRS ONY POI. 4 DIO A Ae NG RRR OE OP BESET”
APPENDIX A
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-7493
IN RE: AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC
AMR CORPORATION,
Petitioners
Petition for Writ of Mandamus
to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
( September 4, 1992 )
sefore POLITZ, Chief Judge, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BARKSDALE,
Circuit Judges
HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
American Airlines, Inc. petitions for a writ of mandamus
directing the district court to disqualify its forrmer counsel Vinson
& Elkins from representing plaintiff Northwest Airlines, Inc. We
hold that the district court erred in denying American's motion
and issue the requested writ
A-2
I
Continental Airlines filed a complaint against American in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
on June 8, 1992, charging American with attempted monopoliza-
tion by predatory pricing in violation of the Sherman Act.
American filed a declaratory judgment action against Continenial
and Northwest in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois the following day. Three days later, Northwest
sued American in the Southern District of Texas. The Continental
and Northwest suits have been consolidated by order of the
district court.
On June 9, 1992, the day after Continental filed its com-
plaint, David Schwarte, American's in-house counsel, asked
Alison Smith, a VE partner, if VE would represent American in this
case. Smith accepted the American representation on June 10,
unaware that four days earlier Harry Reasoner, another VE partner,
had promised Joe Jamail, Northwest's counsel, that VE would not
consider representing another airline until Jamail and Reasoner
had discussed joining forces. When Smith informed Reasoner of
her acceptance of the American representation, Reasoner directed
her to inform Schwarte that "there might be a problem with
Northwest" and that Reasoner would make the final decision the
next day. On June 11 Reasoner accepted the Northwest represen-
tation.
American asserted that VE's prior representation of
American and its agreement to do so in this case made its
representation of Northwest improper. It requested that VE
withdraw from the case in letters sent on June 12 and June 19.
Northwest refused and on July 1 American moved to disqualify
VE. The parties at this time became aware that Weil, Gotshal &
Manges, American's lead counsel, had previously represented
Northwest and Continental. An exchange of "conflicts" was briefly
considered. When American indicated that it would not withdraw
its motion to disqualify VE, Northwest moved to disqualify Weil,
Gotshal on July 13.
American rests its motion to disqualify Vinson & Elkins on
VE's representation of American in prior antitrust matters and its
alleged agreement to represent it in this case. According to Ameri-
can, Vinson & Elkins has served as its "Houston antitrust counsel
since 1987." In this role VE defended American in suits by
Continental and a Continental affiliate. VE also provided antitrust
advice in connection with American's possible acquisition of
Continental.
On July 24, after extensive briefing and the submission of
numerous affidavits, the district court denied both motions to
disqualify counsel. The court held that VE's initial acceptance of
the American representation was a "mixup," that the past matters
in which VE had represented American were only “tangentially
related to this litigation," and that any confidential information
possessed by VE was "not sufficient to <ause any material
prejudice to [American]." The court directed the parties to submit
a plan for a Chinese Wall to safeguard against adverse use of
A-4
confidential information in the case. American then filed the
petition for writ of mandamus now before us.
I]
We must first determine our jurisdiction. Orders denying
motions to disqualify counsel are not appealable before final
judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375, 101 S. Ct. 669, 674, 66 L. Ed.2d 571
(1981); see also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 105
S. Ct. 2757, 86 L. Ed.2d 340 (1985) (extending rule to orders
granting motions to disqualify). While holding that disqualification
orders are not immediately appealable as a matter of course, the
Firestone Court indicated that a writ of mandamus might be
available "in the exceptional circumstances for which it was de-
signed." Firestone, 449 U.S. at 378 n. 13, 101 S.Ct. at 676 n. 13;
Koller, 472 U.S. at 435, 105 S. Ct. at 2763. American contends
that this case presents the requisite "exceptional circumstances."
The standards are well established: "|Pletitioners must
show that they lack adequate alternative means to obtain the relief
they seek . . . and carry the 'burden of showing that [their] right
to issuance of the writ is "clear and indisputable."'" Mallard v.
United States Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 309, 199
S. Ct. 1814, 1822, 104 L. Ed.2d 318 (1989) (citations omitted); Jn
re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 707 (Sth Cir. 1990); In re Wily,
831 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1987). The test contains two prongs,
one procedural and one substantive, and unless American demon-
strates that it lacks an adequate alternative means to obtain relief,
A-5
we need not consider whether its right to a writ of mandamus is
“clear and indisputable."
Courts confronting this question have suggested that
"[djenial of a motion to disqualify counsel will rarely justify the
issuance of a writ of mandamus." Jn re Ford Motor Co., 751 F.2d
274, 275 (8th Cir. 1984); see also In re Mechem, 880 F.2d 872, 873
(6th Cir. 1989); In re Bushkin Assocs., Inc., 864 F.2d 241, 243-44
(Ist Cir. 1989). We agree that frequent use of the writ would
“undermine || the policy against piecemeal appellate review,"
Mechem, 880 F.2d at 875 (quoting Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon,
Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S. Ct. 188, 191, 66 L. Ed.2d 193 (1980)
(per curiam)), and thus we have stressed that “mandamus may not
serve as a substitute for appeal." Warren v. Bergeron, 831 F.2d 101,
103 (5th Cir. 1987). We also have recognized, however, that the
standard governing the availability of mandamus is not "never,"
but "hardly ever." Allied Chemical, 101 S. Ct. at 190. Thus, this
court has recently held that a writ of mandamus will be available
in certain cases to obtain immediate review of a district court's
denial of a disqualification motion. In re Dresser Industries, 972
F.2d 540 (Sth Cir. 1992). See also In re American Cable Publications,
Inc., 768 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1985) (issuing writ on petition to
review a grant of disqualification motion); Merle Norman Cosmetics,
Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., Central Dist. of Cal., 856 F.2d 98, 101
(9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that “if petitioners' claims were
wellfounded [sic], the damage would be irremediable," but
denying writ on other grounds). As in Dresser, we find the special
A-6
circumstances of the present dispute sufficient to place it within
that narrow class of cases warranting mandamus review.
American claims that immediate review of its disqualifica-
tion motion is appropriate because it will otherwise suffer
“irreparable harm" and also because “attorneys and clients
throughout Texas need the benefit of this Court's guidance on this
issue of grave importance." We agree. First, the nature and size of
this litigation would seem to preclude effective appellate review
upon final judgment. In addition, this case raises several questions
pertaining to the proper interpretation and application of ethical
standards in disqualification cases. As illustrated by our recent
Dresser opinion, it is relevant to mandamus review that the “district
court's order was not a mere discretionary one but rather turns on
legal questions appropriate for appeilate review." In re Burlington
N., Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 523 (Sth Cir. 1987). it is also relevant that,
as in Dresser and Burlington, "|t|he issues here also have impor-
tance beyond the immediate lawsuit." Jd. at 523; In re EEOC, 709
F.2d 392, 394-95 (5th Cir. 1983). For these reasons, we hold that
American has demonstrated the absence of an adequate alterna-
tive to mandamus review.
Having met the "procedural" requirement for a writ of
mandamus, American must also demonstrate that its right to the
issuance of the writ is "clear and indisputable." This test goes to
the merits, and we pause only to set out the standard of review.
The Supreme Court has indicated that "[w|here a matter is
committed to discretion, it cannot be said that a litigant's right to
A-7
a particular result is ‘clear and undisputable."" Allied Chemical, 101
S. Ct. at 191. In accord with these dictates, this court has held that
a writ of mandamus should not issue merely because we believe
that "we might have exercised the discretion vested in that court
differently than the district court exercised it." Matter of Hester, 899
F.2d 361, 367 (5th Cir. 1990).
In this circuit, however, a district court's ruling upon a
disqualification motion is not a matter of discretion. Rather, the
appellate court "review(s] findings of fact for clear error ‘while
carefully examining the district court's application of relevant
ethical standards." Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869
F.2d 1565, 1569 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Cossette v. Country Style
Donuts, Inc. 647 F.2d 526, 531 (5th Cir. 1981)). Conceding that
abuse of discretion review is not appropriate, Northwest asserts
that this case centers on disputed factual matters, and that the
district court's findings deserve deference. Assuming arguendo that
the district court made findings on these contested questions of
fact, it is clear that the court was guided by a particular reading
of the Texas Disciplinary Rules in making these relevant factual
determinations. Whatever deference due the court's factual
findings, little or no deference is proper in reviewing its interpreta-
tion of ethical rules. We have recently held that a “district court's
interpretation of the state disciplinary rules [is] an interpretation of
law, subject essentially to de novo consideration." Dresser, at 543.
In accord with Dresser, our review of the district court's reading of
the relevant ethical standards will be de novo
Ill
We turn to the applicable law. The Local Rules of the
Southern District of Texas provide that "|t]/he Code of Professional
Responsibility adopted by this court is the Code of Professional
Responsibility of the State Bar of Texas, as amended from time to
time." Tex. Rules of Court, Federal App. A, Rule 4B. Texas
replaced the Texas Disciplinary Code with the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct in 1990. Recognizing the new Rules
as an amendment of the old Code, this Court has applied the
Rules. See In re Medrano, 956 F.2d 101, 162 n. 3 (Sth Cir. 1992).
The parties do not contest application of the Rules.
We have recently held, however, that the Texas Rules, as
adopted by the Southern District of Texas, are not the "'sole'
authority governing a motion to disqualify." Dresser, at 543. In
reviewing a motion to disqualify, “we consider the motion
governed by the ethical rules announced by the national profes-
sion in light of the public interest and the litigants' rights." Jd. As
Dresser indicates, our precedents have applied the ethical canons
contained in the ABA Model Code. See, e.g., Brennan's Inc. v.
Brennan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1979); Woods v.
Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (Sth Cir. 1976).
The parties' extensive citation of this court's precedents
applying the ABA Model Code suggests their recognition that the
Texas Rules, as adopted by the Southern District of Texas, are not
the "sole" authority governing this case. Moreover, we do not
believe that our holding in Dresser has rendered the parties'
A-9
arguments grounded in the Texas Rules irrelevant to our decision.
The Texas Rules were patterned after the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which the Dresser court cited along with the
Model Code as the national standards utilized by this circuit in
ruling on disqualification motions. Since the relevant ABA Rules
do not differ materially from the corresponding Texas Rules, the
parties' interpretations of the Texas Rules are equally applicable
in this case. Our discussion will therefore center on the Texas
Rules.
As we confirmed in Dresser, "|mJotions to disqualify are
substantive motions affecting the rights of the parties and are
determined by applying standards developed under federal law."
Dresser, at 543; see also In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 105 S. Ct. 2874,
2881 n. 6, 86 L. Ed.2d 504 (1985); In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d
1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d
1198, 1200 (3d Cir. 1980); Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th
Cir. 1964). Federal courts may adopt state or ABA rules as their
ethical standards, but whether and how these rules are to be
applied are questions of federal law. We stress this because
Northwest contends that the Texas Rules control the discretion of
a district court. According to Northwest, “a trial court is not forced
by literalism or mechanical standards to do injustice serving the
mere litigation tactics of a party. Rather, a trial court, according to
the Rules, is to determine if there is actual prejudice or threatened
interference with the fair administration of justice." See Texas Rule
1.06 Comment 17; ABA Rule 1.7 Comment.
A-10
As we have indicated, disqualification cases are governed
by state and national ethical standards adopted by the court. We
disagree with Northwest's suggestions that these sources also
determine the discretion of a district court applying these rules.
That issue is one governed by federal law.
Some courts have taken the position Northwest advances,
namely that "[t]he business of the court is to dispose of litigation
and not to act as a general overseer of the ethics of those who
practice here unless the questioned behavior taints the trial of the
cause before it." W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d
Cir. 1976); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir.
1979); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1980).
See also SUTTON, HOW VULNERABLE IS THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY?, 57 N.C. L. Rev. 497, 514-16 (1979). An attorney's
ethical violation by itself does not warrant disqualification under
this approach. Rather, disqualification is proper only in cases
where a court also finds that the unethical conduct threatens to
taint the trial. This more limited test largely rests on a belief that
disqualification motions are often made for tactical reasons such
as delay or harassment. While the "taint" standard "fails to correct
all possible ethical conflicts," Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 445, it is
argued that this limited disqualification rule serves to deter many
meritless, tactical motions that would otherwise be filed.
This circuit, however, has struck a different balance,
electing to remain “sensitive to preventing conflicts of interest."
Matter of Consolidated Bankshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249, 1256 (5th
A-11
Cir. 1986). We have squarely rejected this hands-off approach in
which ethical rules "guide" whether counsel's presence will "taint"
a proceeding, holding instead that a "[dlistrict [clourt is obliged to
take measures against unethical conduct occurring in connection
with any proceeding before it." Woods v. Covington County Bank,
537 F.2d 804, 810 (Sth Cir. 1976) (emphasis added); Musicus v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 621 F.2d 742, 744 (5th Cir. 1980); EF.
Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F.Supp. 371, 376-77 (S.D.Tex. 1969);
see also Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 847 (1st Cir. 1984) (“the
district court has the duty and responsibility of supervising the
conduct of attorneys who appear before it"); Trust Corp. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); United States
v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 1982) (same). For this
reason, we have emphasized that "[a] motion to disqualify counsel
is the proper method for a party-litigant to bring the issues of
conflict or breach of ethical duties to the attention of the court."
Musicus, 621 F.2d at 744. We recognize of course that disqualifi-
cation motions may be used as "procedural weapons" to advance
purely tactical purposes. But we do not believe that a priori
assumptions concerning the motivations underlying disqualifica-
tion motions in general justify a more relaxed ethical rule. Our
prior cases disclose that a careful and exacting application of the
rules in each case will separate proper and improper disqualifica-
tion motions.
Our rejection of the “taint" standard finds additional
support in the questionable nature of the assumptions underlying
A-12
the test. First, the “taint" standard rests on a belief that “ethical
conflicts surfacing during a litigation are generally better
addressed by the ‘comprehensive disciplinary machinery' of the
state and federal bar." Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 446 (quoting Nyquist,
590 F.2d at 1246)). It is not clear that the vitality of state enforce-
ment is relevant to the judicial duty of the federal courts to clean
its own house. Policy aside, it is equally uncertain that the
disciplinary boards have performed this role. Moreover, clients
and fellow attorneys have little incentive to file formal complaints
with disciplinary boards, and the evidence suggests that they in
fact do not. This is especially true in cases of alleged conflicts of
interest. See DAVID B. WILKINS, WHO SHOULD REGULATE LAWYERS?,
105 Harv.L.Rev. 799, 827-28 (1992); Note, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
LAW -- CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 1244, 1496-1500 (1981). To a very large extent, unless a
conflict is addressed by courts upon a motion for disqualification,
it may not be addressed at all. More to the point, it is our business
-- our responsibility.
Second, we believe that today there is less reason to
suspect tactical motivations behind disqualification motions than
at the time the “taint” standard was initially formulated in the
1970's. This is not due to any moral transformation of the bar, but
to the relative absence of tactical advantages that might be
secured by disqualification orders under today's law. At that time,
disqualification orders were immediately appealable; the greatest
tactical advantage offered by these motions was delay, as the trial
A-13
proceedings were halted while the motion went up on appeal. See,
e.g., Nyquist, 590 F.2d at 1246. Under the Firestone regime,
however, disqualification motions are not appealable prior to final
judgment, thus severely limiting any advantages a party might
have achieved through delay. See Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 452 n. 2
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Accordingly, we will rigorously apply the relevant ethical
standards in reviewing American's disqualification motion, just as
we have done in the past. See, e.g., Johnston v. Harris County Flood
Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Sth Cir. 1989); Doe v. A Corp.,
709 F.2d 1043, 1046 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Corrugated Container
Antitrust Litigation, 659 F.2d 1341 (Sth Cir. Unit A Oct.1981);
Duncan v. Mernill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020
(5th Cir. Unit B June 1981). We will now examine the three argu-
ments offered by American in support of its motion to disqualify
Vinson & Elkins from representing Northwest.
IV
American first argues that VE must be disqualified from
representing Northwest because a law firm may not switch sides
in the same case. According to American, a binding attorney-
client relationship between VE and American was formed when
Alison Smith, a VE partner, agreed to represent American on June
10. VE's withdrawal from the American representation and
acceptance of the Northwest representation on June 11 was a
switch of sides in the same case, a clear violation of legal ethics.
A-14
Texas Rule 1.06(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
represent opposing parties to a litigation." As American indicates,
this rule applies even in cases where an attorney-client relation-
ship has not been formed: A lawyer may not "switch|| sides and
represent] a party whose interests are adverse to a person who
sought in good faith to retain the lawyer." Texas Rule 1.09 Com-
ment 4A; see also HAZARD & HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING §
1.9:111 (1991). The parties agree that Alison Smith agreed to
represent American on behalf of VE on June 10, and that Harry
Reasoner formally agreed to represent Northwest on June 11.
There are significant differences, however, on several points that
bear on the dispositive question of whether American sought to
retain VE in good faith.
On June 5, 1992, Northwest, through Joe Jamail, spoke to
Harry Reasoner, managing partner of VE, about ihe possibility of
VE serving as Northwest's co-counsel in a suit against American.
After checking to see whether American was a current client and
reviewing the matters that VE had handled for American in the
past, Reasoner promised jJamail that VE would accept no other
representation of an airline until he had the chance to discuss the
matter further.
On june 9, David Schwarte of American, after first
attempting to reach Reasoner, called Alison Smith, another VE
partner. Schwarte asked Smith if VE would represent American in
a suit that Continental had filed against it in Galveston. Unaware
of the previous discussion between Jamail and Reasoner, Smith
A-15
stated that she would be “delighted" to take on the case, but
added that she would first have to run a conflicts check. American
sent VE copies of the complaints filed against it later that day
Smith called Schwarte at around 9:00 a.m. the next
morning, June 10. When Smith stated that the conflicts question
had not yet been resolved, Schwarte asked if there was a problem
with Northwest. Smith responded that no such conflict was
apparent. Smith and Schwarte then discussed American s possible
litigation strategy, focusing on American's desire to transfer the
Galveston case to Chicavo
\ dispute d conversation between | david Boies of Cravath
vaine & Moore, lead counsel for Continental, and Ira Millsts
ot Weil, Gotshal & Manges, lead counsel for American, occurred
at about 9:30 a.m. According to Boies, Millstein stated that he
hoped to retain VE to represent American in the Galveston case
30ies responded that this probably was not possible, for it was his
understanding that VE would be representing Northwest in a suit
against American. Millstein, however, asserts that he told Boies
that VE would be representing American in Galveston, and that
Boies responded that VE might have a conflict with Northwest, not
that VE was going to sue American on Northwest's behalf
At 10:30 a.m., Smith informed Schwarte that there were no
conflicts that might prevent VE from representing American. Upon
hearing this, Schwarte asked Smith if there was any reason why
"we" could not begin to act as a team. Smith responded that she
did not see why not. The two again spoke of American's desire to
A-16
transfer the Galveston case to Chicago. Schwarte asked Smith to
begin thinking about this question and told her that he would
send her a memorandum on the subject prepared by Weii,
Gotshal attorneys. After the call, Smith left Reasoner a note in his
office, stating that she had accepted the American representation
in the Galveston case.
Reasoner learned of Smith's acceptance of the American
representation when he called his office around 12:30 p.m. He
advised Smith to explain to Schwarte that until Smith and
Reasoner were able to discuss the matter, it was uncertain
whether VE would be able to accept. Smith called Schwarte at
2:20 p.m. The contents of this conversation are in dispute.
According to Smith, she told Schwarte that Reasoner had informed
her that there was a_ problem with VE representing American.
Schwarte responded that he was not surprised, for he had learned
from Millstein that Reasoner had spoken to Northwest about suing
American. According to Schwarte, however, Smith stated only that
she had received a "cryptic note" from Reasoner indicating that
"there might be a problem with Northwest." Schwarte swears that
he made no mention of the possibility that VE might represent
Northwest. At 3:45 p.m., VE received a copy of the memorandum
prepared by Weil, Gotshal that Smith and Schwarte had discussed
earlier.
Schwarte and Smith spoke again at 5:30 p.m. Smith
informed Schwarte that the "problem with Northwest" had not yet
been resolved. Schwarte stated that he needed to know as soon
A-17
as possible in order to make other arrangements if it turned out
that VE could not represent American. At 5:45 p.m., Reasoner told
Smith that he planned to read the complaints in the case and
would speak to American the next day. Smith called Schwarte to
convey this information.
Northwest alleges that Irv Terrell, a partner at Baker &
Botts, informed Joe Jamail this same afternoon that Baker & Botts
would be representing American. Both Terrell and Schwarte,
however, sharply contradict this account, asserting that American
did not retain Baker & Botts until the afternoon of June 11, after
VE told American that it would be representing Northwest.
The next afternoon, June 11, Reasoner and Jamail agreed
that VE would serve as co-counsel for Northwest. Reasoner then
called various members of American's legal team with this news.
Millstein at this time asked Reasoner if he could recommend other
Houston counsel. Reasoner told him that Baker & Botts would be
a good choice. On Reasoner's instructions, Smith returned unread
the Weil, Gotshal memorandum she had received the day before.
According to American, American retained Baker & Botts later that
afternoon.
The parties' respective accounts of these events diverge at
several significant points. The rule barring lawyers from switching
sides in the same case applies only where the complaining party
sought in good faith to retain the lawyer. Texas Rule 1.09 Com-
ment 4A. Northwest's version of events might lead a court to
question American's good faith. According to Northwest,
A-18
American's lead counsel was informed that VE would be repre-
senting Northwest in a suit against American before Alison Smith,
who, unlike American, had no knowledge of VE's previous
commitment to Northwest, agreed to represent American.
Northwest also contends that American hired Baker & Botts during
the afternoon of June 10, before VE's final decision that it would
not represent American. Northwest alleges that American sent VE
the confidential memorandum prepared by Weil, Gotshal after
these two events, that is, with knowledge that VE would likely be
representing Northwest and after it had hired Baker & Botts. These
alleged facts, if accepted as true, might establish that American's
efforts were motivated primarily by a desire not to secure repre-
sentation from VE, but to ensure that VE would not, or could not,
represent Northwest.
American, of course, contests Northwest's account,
insisting that it had no knowledge of VE's prior commitment to
Northwest and that it hired Baker & Botts on June 11, only after
it was informed that VE would be representing Northwest. When
American learned of VE's commitment to Northwest is a factual
issue crucial to determining whether American sought VE's
representation in good faith, as Texas Rule 1.06 requires. The
district court made no factual findings on this issue. We need not
remand for further fact finding because we hold that VE must be
disqualified on other grounds.
American's final two contentions rest on VE's prior repre-
sentations of the airline in antitrust matters. American contends
that VE must be disqualified because VE has represented American
in matters substantially related to the present case and VE's repre-
sentation of Northwest in this case will likely involve the use to
American's disadvantage of confidential information obtained
during this earlier representation. We will first discuss the applica-
ble ethical standards. We will then apply these standards to the
prior representations alleged by American to warrant \/E's
disqualification.
A.
American contends that VE's prior representations of
American make disqualification appropriate under this court's
precedents and the Texas Rules. Our review in previous Cases
involving prior representations has been governed by the "substan-
tial relationship" test:
A party seeking to disqualify opposing counsel on
the ground of a former representation must estab-
lish two elements: 1) an actual attorney-client
relationship between the moving party and the
attorney he seeks to disqualify and 2) a substantial
relationship between the subject matter of the
former and present representations.
Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1569
(5th Cir. 1989); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659
F.2d 1341, 1345 (Sth Cir. 1981); Duncan v. Mernill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner &¥ Smith, 646 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied 454
A-20
U.S. 895, 102 S. Ct. 394, 70 L. Ed.2d 211 (1981). Because it is
not disputed that VE represented American in the matters under
consideration, the sole issue is whether these prior representations
are substantially related to the present case. Our inquiry may be
narrowed to this single question because the substantial relation-
ship test is governed by an irrebuttable presumption. Once it is
established that the prior matters are substantially related to the
present case, "the court will irrebuttably presume that relevant
confidential information was disclosed during the former period
of representation." Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1028; Corrugated, 659 F.2d
at 1347,'
The test is categorical in requiring disqualification upon
the establishment of a substantial relationship between past and
current representations. But we have never applied the test in a
mechanical way that might "prevent || an attorney from ever
representing an interest adverse to that of a former client." Duncan,
646 F.2d at 1027-28. Rather, a substantial relathionship may be
found only after "the moving party delineates with specificity the
subject matters, issues and causes of action" common to prior and
current representations and the court engages in a "'painstaking
analysis of the facts and precise application of precedent."
Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1029 (quoting Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan’s
' A second irrebuttable presumption is that confidences obtained
by an individual lawyer will be shared with the other members of his
firm. See Corrugated, 659 F.2d at 1346. This presumption is not at issue
in this case, for all of the VE lawyers involved have previously repre-
sented American.
A-21
testaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 174 (5th Cir. 1979)) Finally, the
party seeking disqualification bears the burden of proving that the
present and prior representations are substantially related. Duncan,
646 F.2d at 1028
[his circuit adopted the substantial relationship test before
the promulgation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. We must
decide the application of the substantial relationship test under
these new Rules. Texas Rule 1.09 provides in relevant part
a) Without prior consent, a lawyer who personally
has formally represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter represent another person in a matter
idverse to the former client
if the representation in reasonable probability will
involve a violation of Rule 1.05: of
(4 if it is the same or a substantially related matter
Rule 1.09(a)(2) incorporates Rule 1.05, which prohibits a lawyer's
use of confidential information obtained from a former client to
that former client's disadvantage. Rule 1.09 thus on its face forbids
a lawyer to appear against a former client if the current represen
tation in reasonable probability will involve the use of confidentia
information or if the current matter is substantially related to the
matters in which the lawyer has represented the former client.’
A-22
In providing two distinct grounds for disqualification, the
Rules expand the protections for former clients beyond those
afforded by the substantial relationship test. The Rules are not,
however, broader than the protections provided by our prece-
dents. While the focus of our cases has been on the substantial
relationship test, we have indicated that a former client could also
disqualify counsel by showing that his former attorney possessed
relevant confidential information in the manner contemplated by
Rule 1.09(a)(2). As Duncan, for example, stated: "[The moving
party may disqualify counsel on the basis of prior representations]
either by establishing that the prevent and previous representations
are substantially related or by pointing to specific instances where
it revealed confidential information regarding its practices and
procedures." Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1032. Thus, it does not appear
that the Texas Rules make material addition to the basic approach
we have used in the past.
(a) A lawyer who has formally represented a client in a
matter shall not thereafter represent another person in
the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person's interests are materially adverse to the interests
of the former client unless the former client consents
after consultation ....
(c) A lawyer who has formally represented a client in a matter
. . . Shall not thereafter:
(1) use information relating to the representation to the
disadvantage of the former client... .
ABA Rule 1.9.
A-23
But do the Rules take something away? That is, do the
Rules offer less protection to former clients than our precedents?
Northwest offers two related arguments on this score. First,
Northwest contends that a substantial relationship between past
and current matters exists only where the two cases are so closely
related that the risk of adverse use of the former client's confi-
dences threatens to “taint" the trial. Northwest also agues that a
close relation between a past and current representation is
irrelevant if the attorney relied on publicly available information
in advising the former client. These two arguments are rooted in
Northwest's larger assertion that the substantial relationship test is
solely concerned with protecting a former client's confidences.
Northwest offers three distinct grounds in support of its
“taint" standard. It first makes a brief attempt to locate this more
demanding standard in Duncan. According to Northwest, Duncan
provides that a party may establish a substantial relationship
between past and current representations only be demonstrating
that the two matters are so closely related that there is a "genuine
threat that confidences revealed to his former counsel will be
divulged to his present adversary." Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1028.
Duncan, however, stands for a different proposition, for we held
that a “genuine threat" of adverse use of confidences is established
by showing that a prior representation is substantially related to
the present case. Jd. Under Duncan, a party demonstrates a
“genuine threat" by establishing a substantial relationship between
A-24
past and present cases, not, as Northwest would have it, the other
way around.
Northwest's other two arguments rest on its interpretation
of Texas Rule 1.09's substantial relationship language. First,
Northwest contends that the commentary to Rule 1.09 makes
“abundantly clear’ that the Rule's substantial relationship language
is directed to “actual and genuine threats to the integrity of the
trial process." Comment 8 to Rule 1.09 provides:
Although not required to do so by Rule 1.05 or
this Rule, some courts, as > procedural decision,
disqualify a lawyer for representing a present client
against a former client when the subject matter of
the present representation is so closely related to
the subject matter of the prior representation that
confidences obtained from the former client might
be useful in the representation of the present
client. See Comment 17 to Rule 1.06.
Comment 17 provides that alleged conflicts should be raised by
an opposing party only where the alleged “conflict is such as
clearly to call in question the fair or efficient administration of
justice." Northwest concludes that this commentary reveals that
“the substantial relationship language of Rule 1.09 is bottomed on
a concern about the actual fairness of the proceedings in which
disqualification is sought."
Northwest also contends that the Texas Rules' conscious
omission of the "appearance of unpropriety” standard contained in
Canon 9 of the Model Code independently establishes "taint" as
the appropriate disqualification standard. Northwest points out
that some of our broader substantial relationship cases, notably Jn
A-25
re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir.
1981), were decided under Canon 9. Northwest asserts that
Corrugated's broad language intimately tied to Canon 9's “appear-
ance of impropriety" standard. Since the Texas Rules eliminated
this rule, “disqualification is no longer appropriate unless counsel's
continued involvement threatens to taint the underlying trial: a
mere appearance of impropriety will not suffice."
We reject both of Northwest's arguments. A party seeking
to disqualify counsel under the substantial relationship test need
not prove that the past and present matters are so similar that a
lawyer's continued involvement threatens to taint the trial. Rather,
the former client must demonstrate that the two matters are
substantially related. Second, we adhere to our precedents in
refusing to reduce the concerns underlying the substantial relation-
ship test to a client's interest in preserving his confidential
information. The second fundamental concern protected by the
test is not the public interest in lawyers avoiding “even the
appearance of impropriety," but the client's interest in the loyalty
of his attorney.
Northwest's argument that the Texas Rules’ commentary
bottoms Rule 1.09's substantial relationship language on a
concern for "actual fairness" rests on its general interpretation of
the Texas Rules. Northwest suggests that courts' use of disciplinary
standards in disqualification matters is “understandable in courts
that have not yet developed their own specific procedural
disqualification rules or standards." Courts may borrow from the
rules, with two important qualifications: "First, any violation of a
disciplinary standard must be demonstrated by movant to have
been actually prejudicial to movant; and, second, disqualification
should be denied unless the litigation will be ‘tainted’ by the
continued participation of a lawyer or firm that may have violated
a disciplinary standard."
This argument is closely related to Northwest's larger
assertion that the Texas Rules are "guides" for courts and are not
to be "literally" applied in disqualification cases. We addressed,
and rejected this general argument in Part Ill. We understand this
particular argument concerning the substantial relationship test to
be something more than a reiteration of this general point.
Northwest's initial argument was that a breach of an ethical
standard does not by itself require disqualification; an additional
showing of taint is needed. Here, Northwest appears to concede
that such a breach requires disqualification, but asserts that the
rule barring representation in substantially related matters is not
violated unless the cases are so similar that there is a genuine
threat of taint. We reject this argument. The substantial relation-
ship test, as applied in this circuit and elsewhere, does not have
its source in disciplinary rules. To the contrary, the test was devel-
oped at common law. Our precedents did not rely on the Model
Code or Model Rules in formulating the substantial relationship
test, but on the landmark 7.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 113 F.Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), which predated the Model
Code and of course the Model Rules. See, e.g., Wilson P. Abraham
A-27
Construction Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.
1977); In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83,
89 (5th Cir. 1976).
The actual development of Rule 1.09's substantial relation-
ship provision is the just the opposite of the version Northwest
gives. The initial drafts of both the ABA and Texas Rules did not
include a rule barring representation in substantially related
matters. In both cases, the substantial relationship rule was added
as a reflection of case law. See ROBERT P. SCHUWERK & JOHN F. SUTTON,
JR., A GUIDE TO THE TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, 27A Hous. L. Rev. 1, 152 n. 20, 153 n. 34 (1990); Note,
IN DEFENSE OF THE DOUBLE STANDARD IN THE RULES OF ETHICS: A
CRITICAL REEVALUATION OF THE CHINESE WALL AND ViICARIOUS DISQUALI-
FICATION, 20 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 245, 257 & n. 66 (1986) (ABA
Rules). Schuwerk and Sutton's account is instructive:
[T]he Texas committee originally avoided [the sub-
stantial related matter language] in proposed Texas
Rule 1.09. . . Subsequently, however, a difficulty
emerged as a result of failure to employ the sub-
stantial relationship test in a disciplinary context.
A lawyer might accept or continue employment in
a matter against a former client believing (cor-
rectly) that no disciplinary violation was involved
under the initially proposed version of Rule 1.09,
only to be disqualified subsequently -- perhaps at
great cost and expenses to the client ---by a court
employing the traditional substantial relationship
test .. . . The drafting committee, therefore, con-
cluded that the danger of having its narrowly
drawn Rule 1.09 turn into a trap for the unwary
outweighed its objections to the substantial rela-
A-28
tionship test as a standard of discipline. It would
be in keeping with the committee's thinking, how-
ever, to construe "substantially related" narrowly
for disciplinary purposes.
Schuwerk & Sutton, supra, at 153 n. 34 (emphasis added); see also
Rule 1.09 Comment 9.
As this account suggests, the difficulty posed by Rule 1.09
does not concern the "literal and mechanical" application of a
disciplinary rule in disqualification cases. Rather, the concern is
the transfer of the substantial relationship test developed by courts
to the disciplinary context. See also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS 366 (1986) (discussing ABA Rules' “adoption of the
substantial relationship standard as a disciplinary rule"). Contrary
to Northwest's contentions, the Rules did not supplant, but
adopted, the common law substantial relationship test. The
argument thus provides no basis for applying the substantial
relationship test through the "taint" filter it proposes.
Northwest's argument concerning the Rules' deletion of
Canon 9's appearance of impropriety standard has more purchase.
Northwest argues that the Model Rules' omission of the "appear-
ance of impropriety" standard contained in the Model Code
indicates that the substantial relationship test should be solely
concerned with ensuring "actual fairness" in the proceedings. But
Northwest does not mention loyalty, itself a substantial addition
under the Rules. As several commentators have noted, the Model
Code provided no express protection to the former client's interest
in loyalty. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE
LAW OF LAWYERING 292 (1991); Wolfram, supra, at 363 (1986). This
interest is singled out only under the Rules. See Texas Rule 1.06
Comment 1 ("Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's
relationship to a client"); ABA Rule 1.9 Comment ("The second
aspect of loyalty to a client is the lawyer's obligation to decline
subsequent representations involving positions adverse to a former
client arising in substantially related matters"); Hazard & Hodes,
supra, at 292-93; Wolfram, supra, at 361; Sutton, supra, at 147;
STEPHEN GILLERS, WHAT WE TALKED ABOUT WHEN WE TALKED ABOUT
ETHICS: A CRITICAL VIEW OF THE MODEL RULES, 46 Ohio St.L.J. 243,
250-55 (1985).
The Rules' express establishment of loyalty and confidenti-
ality as the interests protected by the substantial relationship test
is a return to 7.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113
F.Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), where the court held that
once it is established that the two representations are substantially
related,
[t]he court will assume that during the course of
the former representation confidences were dis-
closed to the attorney bearing on the subject
matter of the representation. It will not inquire into
their nature and extent. Only in this manner can the
lawyer's duty of absolute fidelity be enforced and the
spint of the rule relating to privileged communications
be maintained.
Id. (emphasis added).
We believe the replacement of the "appearance of
impropriety" with loyalty provides no basis for altering the
A-30
substantial relationship test found in our precedents. This is
because we read our cases involving Canon 9 as protecting the
same interest in loyalty now explicitly provided for under the
Rules. As the Comment to ABA Rule 1.9 notes, "[rlepresentation
adverse to a former client was sometimes dealt with under the
rubric of Canon 9 of the Model Code." This was true of this court
as well as others.
The link between loyalty and the appearance of impropri-
ety is most evident in Brennan’s Inc. v. Brennan’s Restaurants, Inc.,
590 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1979), where the court disqualified a
former counsel even though there was no chance that confidential
information might be used against the former client. We held:
The obligation of an attorney not to misuse infor-
mation acquired in the course of representation
serves to vindicate the trust and reliance that
clients place in their attorneys. A client would feel
wronged if an opponent prevailed against him with
the aid of an attorney who formerly represented
the clients in the same matter. As the court recog-
nized in E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F.Supp.
371, 395 (S.D. Tex. 1969), this would undermine
public confidence in the legal system as a means
for adjudicating disputes.
590 F.2d at 172. As Professors Hazard and Koniak observe: “In
Brennan’s, the Court recognizes two underlying concerns of the
substantial relationship test: the duty to preserve confidences and
the duty of loyalty to a former client." GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & SUSAN
P. KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 658 (1990). See also
E.R Hutton & Company v. Brown, 305 F.Supp. 371, 395 (S.D.Tex.
A-31
1969) ("If courts protect only a client's disclosures to his attorney,
and fail to safeguard the attorney-client relationship itself -- a
relationship which must be one of trust and reliance -- they can
only undermine the public's confidence in the legal system as a
means for adjudicating disputes."); Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1027 ("the
integrity of the judicial system would be sullied if courts tolerated
such abuses by those who profess and owe undivided loyalty to
their clients"); In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530
F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1976) (prohibition of representation of
conflicting interests rests on lawyers duties of loyalty and confi-
dentiality); Cf In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litigation, 748 F.2d
157, 161-62 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Agent Orange Product Liability
Litigation, 800 F.2d 14, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1986).
As these decision suggest, the existence of a lawyer's duty
of loyalty means that the substantial relationship test is not solely
concerned with the adverse use of confidential information. What
the duty of loyalty adds to the duty of confidentiality is clearly
presented in Corrugated:
Container's complaint is that the district court
failed to explain how [the lawyer's] advice would
be relevant or substantially related to this action.
The advice does not need to be "relevant" in the
evidentiary sense to be "substantially related." It
need only be akin to present action in a way
reasonable persons would understand as important
to the issues involved.
Corrugated, 659 F.2d at 1346 (emphasis added).
ry gos. Napa 5 PE A ea SERS Eee aD
We emphasize "advice" because a court solely concerned
with the possible adverse use of confidential information might
not be obliged to protect legal advice. As at least one court has
noted, "the concern of the Confidentiality Rule and the case law
is the protection of what the clients tells his attorney, not what the
attormey tells the client." Laker Atrways Ltd. v. Pan Amencan World
Airways, 103 F.R.D. 22, 40 (D.D.C. 1984) (emphasis added). We
agree that the confidentiality rule was historically concerned with
disclosures, but we are also persuaded that the substantial
relationship test cannot be reduced to a confidentiality rule. See
Texas Rule 1.07. That is, because the substantial relationship test
is concerned with both a lawyer's duty of confidentiality and his
duty of loyalty, a lawyer who has given advice in a substantially
related matter must be disqualified, whether or not he has gained
confidences.
We agree with Northwest that the "appearance of impro-
priety" has no relevance to our probe of ethical restraints. It does
not follow, however, that the focus of the substantial relationship
test now becomes the “actual fairness" of the trial. Such a shift is
premised on the view that eliminating the appearance of impro-
priety reduces the substantial relationship test to a concern for
confidential information. We believe that such a reduction is
precluded by a lawyer's duty of loyalty. Because Canon 9 was pri-
marily interpreted by the court as a way to protect a client's
loyalty interests, we believe that our application of the substantial
relationship test under the Rules is the same as it was under the
Code.
We believe that disqualification of VE would be appropri-
ate even under the relaxed “actual prejudice" or "taint" standard
Northwest urges this court to adapt. As we explain below, the
relationship between the matters in which VE has represented
American and the instant litigation is so intimate that VE's con-
tinued involvement does threaten to compromise the integrity of
the present trial. Our continued adherence to the substantial
relationship test rests on our belief that the ethical prohibition
against successive representation cannot be reduced to the
protection of clients' confidences, let alone protecting these
confidences only to the extent that their adverse use might "taint"
the trial, as Northwest's proposal would provide. Rather, a
lawyer's obligation of confidentiality must be seen as part of the
lawyer's primary duty of loyalty, a duty that is not exhausted by
the preservation of a former client's secrets. We believe that a
single inquiry into whether past and present representations are
substantialiy related provides the best means to protect these two
interests of clients.
Because it recognizes these two interests, the substantial
relationship test serves not only to ensure the fairness of particular
trials, but also to safeguard the integrity of the attorney-client
relationship. If the sole focus of the substantial relationship test
was the possible adverse use of confidences, prior representations
in which the attorney advised the client but received no confiden-
A-34
tial information would not warrant disqualification. Even if the
subject matter of case one and case two is identical, a former
client's adversary is not inevitably advantaged by virtue of his
attorney's prior representation of the client. And yet this court has
held that the provision of legal advice on a substantially related
matter by itself requires disqualification. See Corrugated, 659 F.2d
at 1346-47; Brennan's, 590 F.2d at 171-72.
Disqualification rules not only preserve the purity of
particular trials but also unavoidably affect relationships among
attorneys and clients in general. This court bars attorneys from
appearing in substantially related matters not only to protect
individual parties against the adverse use of information but also
“to aid the frank exchange between attorney and client." Wilson P.
Abraham Const. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 252 (5th
Cir. 1977); see also In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation,
530 F.2d 83, 90 (Sth Cir. 1976). A post hoc inquiry into whether
a particular attorney's involvement in a particular suit might "taint"
the case in no way provides the breadth and "predictability of
confidence [that] is central to the role of the attorney." Jn re LTV
Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595, 602 (N.D.Tex. 1981); cf. Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S. Ct. 677, 683-84, 66 L.
Ed. 584 (1981). The trust a lawyer's duty of loyalty inspires in
clients encourages them freely to confide in the lawyer and freely
to rely on the advice provided by the lawyer. The substantial
relationship test aims to protect the adversary process but also, or
as part of this concern, seeks to provide conditions for the
A-35
attorney-client relationship. What credence, for example, might
American have attached to VE's December 1990 counsel that the
airline's interests would be better served by postponing the
acquisition of Continental for at least a year if it even suspected
that VE itself might soon be representing one of its competitors in
a suit against Amevican, charging that it had abused its market
power to the detriment of competition in the airline passenger
service markets?
These considerations preclude us from accepting North-
west's final argument. Northwest claims that because VE relied
primarily on public, not confidential, information in advising
American, these prior matters cannot be considered substantially
related to the present case. It contends that "'[flacts that are
community knowledge or that are not material to a determination
of the issues litigated do not constitute "matters involved" wfthin
the meaning of the law' governing the substantial relationship test"
(quoting J/.K. © Susie L. Wadley Research Inst. & Blood Bank v.
Morns, 776 S.W.2d 271, 278 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, orig.
proceeding)). The record sharply contradicts Northwest's claim
that all of the material obtained by VE was publicly available. As
we discuss below, VE was privy to many of American's secrets.
But Northwest's argument would fail even if it could show that all
of the information provided by American was public knowledge.
Our precedents, the Texas Rules, and the ABA Rules all reject the
position Northwest advances. This court has held that "[i]nformat-
ion [provided by a client] is sheltered from use by the attorney
A-36
against his client by virtue of the existence of the attorney-client
relationship. This is true without regard to whether someone else
may be privy to it." Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants, Inc.,
590 F.2d 168, 172 (Sth Cir. 1979). "'This ethical precept
exists without regard to the nature or source of information or the
fact that others share the knowledge." Jd. (quoting Model Code
EC 4-4); Doe v. A Corp., 709 F.2d 1043, 1046 (5th Cir. 1983)
(same). See also Emle Industries, Inc. v. Pantentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562,
572-73 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[t]he client's privilege in confidential
information disclosed to his attorney ‘is not nullified by the fact
that the circumstances to be disclosed are part of a public record,
or that there are other available sources for such information")
(quoting HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 135 (1953)); NCK Organi
zation Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1976) (same).
The Texas and ABA Rules supply the same standard. The
Rules do contain an exception for public information, but in each
case this exception applies only to the provision prohibiting use
of confidential information, not the rule prohibiting the successive
representation in substantially related matters. Texas Rule 1.05
provides that "a lawyer shall not knowingly
(3) [ulse confidential information of a former client to the
disadvantage of the former client after the representation
is concluded unless the former client consents after
consultation or the confidential information has become
generally known."
Texas Rule 1.05 (b) (3) (emphasis added). This provision, however,
is incorporated by Rule 1.09(a) (2), not the substantial relationship
rule contained in Rule 1.09 (a) (3). The same distinction exists
between Rules 1.9(a) and 1.9(c) of the ABA Rules, as commenta-
tors have indicated. See, eg., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS 360, 365 (1986).
We believe that our application of the substantial relation-
ship test under the Rules is the same as it was under the Code
Thus, as in our past cases, our inquiry is limited to the single
question of whether VE's prior representations of American are
substantially related to the present case.
B.
VE represented American in several matters in recent
years, earning fees in excess of $676,000. Our review will be
limited to three of VE's prior representations. VE defended
American in two suits brought by Continental in Texas. The focus
of each case, as in the larger California litigation to which they
were related, was SABRE, American's computerized reservation
system. The first case, System One Direct Access, Inc. v. American
Airlines Inc., was an antitrust suit brought by a Continental affiliate
in Houston federal court. VE served as counsel from November
1987 until withdrc-ving in July 1988 when the case was trans-
ferred to Dallas.
VE also served as lead counsel in Continental Airlines, Inc.
v. Amencan Airlines, Inc., a Texas state court case. Continental
alleged that American had breached contractual relationships and
committed other acts of misconduct in operating its CRS. VE
represented American from March 1989 until the case was settled
A-38
as part of the global settlement between Continental and Ameri-
can in May 1990.
In late 1990, VE advised American concerning whether the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice would approve
“Project Armadillo," a proposed acquisition of Continental Airlines.
The primary question was whether a merger of the two airlines
would run afoul of the Department's merger guidelines. The
representation ended in January 1991, when American apparently
chose not to pursue the merger.
The two Texas cases were related and subsidiary to a
larger suit by Continental and Northwest, among others, against
American and United Airlines in California federal district court in
1985. Continental and Northwest charged American and United
with monopolization of both computerized reservation systems
and various air transportation markets.’ In particular, they charged
predatory pricing of CRS systems and air transportation, closely
related to the claim advanced by Northwest and Continental here.
American asserts, and Northwest appears to concede, that
the California case is substantially related to the present case.
However, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, not VE, represented Ameri-
can in California, so the similarities between the California case
and the present one provide no basis for disqualification. Ameri-
See In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Systems Antitrust
Litigation, 694 F.Supp. 1443 (C.D.Cal. 1988); aff'd Alaska Airlines, Inc. v.
United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, _ US.
___, 112 S. Ct. 1603, 118 L. Ed.2d 316 (1992).
A-39
can's argument that VE's prior representations are substantially
related to this case rests largely upon its claim that the Texas cases
are substantially related to the California case.
Northwest argues that the Texas cases are not substantially
related to this case because the allegations in these cases, unlike
in California, pertained only to CRS services, not air transportation
services. We disagree. While the focus was certainly CRS systems,
the plaintiffs also raised claims involving air transportation
markets. Moreover, as we will explain, the Texas cases involved
two particular matters at issue in the present Case.
(1) Fort Bend
Fort Bend involved the state-law claims over which the
California district court, upon American's motion to dismiss, had
declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction. Continental alleged
breach of contract, duress, tortious interference, misrepresentation,
and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. As in
California, Continental's petition focused on American's CRS
operations. But also as in California, Continental asserted that
American's power in the CRS market could not be considered
apart from its position in the air transportation market. Continental
claimed that "American and United, by leveraging their domi-
nance as air carriers and the enormous secret profits they received
from bias-diverted revenues, established themselves as the
dominant CRS providers." Continental charged that American,
having achieved dominance in the CRS market, in turn used
SABRE to “exclude[| Continental in whole or in part from specific
A-40
airline passenger markets." Continental's claims were stated in a
similar manner. Continental claimed that American had breached
its contract by "secretly accessing TXI'S [a Continental affiliate]
data base and using it to study passenger traffic flow through the
Dallas/Fort Worth hub. Reports developed by American through
the use of the TXI data contributed to American's successful exclu-
sion of TX! from the Dallas/Fort Worth hub and elsewhere." In its
tortious interference claim Continental alleged that American had
"interfered with Continental's prospective contractual relations
with its travel agents and air passengers," causing damages in the
form of “lost airline bookings through bias diversions and total
exclusion from certain air passenger markets." Finally, Continental
noted that the California district court had cited American
President Robert Crandall's alleged 1982 price- fixing solicitation
of Braniff as "a textbook example of anticompetitive conduct" in
ruling that “Continental could proceed to trial on its claim that
American illegally attempted to monopolize the Dallas-Fort Worth
airport."
Continental's allegations and its reference to Crandall's
alleged price-fixing solicitation apparently supplied the basis for
the belief among VE and Gibson, Dunn lawyers that American's
alleged attempted monopolization of DFW would be at issue in
the case and that Continental might seek to introduce the
price-fixing incident as evidence on this score. As such, they
believed that Fort Bend was intimately related to the California
case. For example, a VE partner stated at the time that the
A-41
California and Fort Bend suits “involve the same parties, the same
alleged acts, and the same alleged damages." Another VE lawyer
noted that the two suits could be seen as "largely identical": "[The
Fort Band petition] asserts that AA and UA used their purported
CRS monopolies to obtain monopoly power in certain air
transportation markets. This claim is intertwined with both the
CRS monopolization and DFW attempted monopolization claims
pending in California." The perceived similarities between Fort
Bend and the California case led VE and Gibson, Dunn to spend
considerable time exploring the possibility of an abatement of the
Fort Bend case until the California proceedings had concluded.
VE argues that Crandall's alleged price-fixing solicitation
and Continental's claim that American had used its CRS to
exclude it from the DFW market were not at issue in Fort Bend.
This contention in contradicted by the accounts of Gibson, Dunn
lawyers and by notes taken by a VE lawyer during one meeting
between VE and Gibson, Dunn. While it is difficult to reconstruct
a conversation from this distance, we are struck by the first two
comments on the first page of notes: 1) "There is no admissible
evidence of the Crandall telephone conversation on Braniff; may
use it on a consequential damages theory that Continental
excluded from DFW market." 2) "We should argue that the
exclusion claim is being litigated in California and should not be
litigated in Texas." Given the allegations in the complaint, the
statements of VE's lawyers at the time, and this evidence it is
A-42
difficult to maintain that these matters were not at issue in Fort
Bend.
The charges of monopolization of DFW and Crandall's
alleged solicitation are prominently featured in Northwest's
current complaint. Northwest alleges that American has monopo-
lized or attempted to monopolize five different air transportation
markets. Dallas-Fort Worth is included as an "illustrative example"
in three of the five markets cited by Northwest: origin and
destination city pair markets, 0 & D airport-airport pair markets,
and 0 & D based hub markets. It cannot be denied that one focus
of the case will be American's DFW operations, the very market
at issue in Fort Bend.
Similarly, Northwest contends in its complaint that "AA
and its current chief executive officer have previously engaged in
anticompetitive conduct with open contempt for the antitrust
laws." Northwest prominently cites Crandall's alleged price-fixing
solicitation, the same allegation that VE lawyers were charged
with excluding in the Fort Bend case. VE suggested at oral
argument that Crandall's alleged solicitation is not substantially
related to the present case because this ten-year old incident
would not be admitted as evidence. This is helpful but not
dispositive. As the Corrugated court stated, the subject matter "does
not need to be ‘relevant' in the evidentiary sense to be 'substan-
tially related.' It need only be akin to the present action in a way
reasonable persons would understand as important to the issues
.
involved." Corrugated, 659 F.2d at 1346. Northwest included the
A-43
incident under the heading "Conduct Giving Rise to Violations
Alleged" in its complaint. This is not easily explained away,
especially given Northwest's heavy reliance on the location of the
Crandall allegation in the Fort Bend petition's "procedural history"
in attempting to prove that the incident was not at issue in that
case.
We are persuaded that VE's representation of American in
the Fort Bend case is substantially related to the present case.
(2) System One
In System One, Continental affiliate System One, a CRS
vendor, charged that American had violated antitrust laws in its
provision of CRS services. System One alleged that American had
engaged in a variety of acts designed to exclude it from the CRS
market. But as in Fort Bend, plaintiff presented the CRS and air
transportation markets as inextricably linked. The System One
complaint alleged that "AA has used its monopoly power in the
provision of air carrier services in various geographic markets to
obtain, retain, and enhance its power in the provision of CRS
systems." Again, “AA has achieved its dominant position in the
market for CRS services, and continues to enforce anticompetitive
practices in an effort to maintain that position, not only to reap
monopoly profits from the sale and use of CRS systems, but to
enhance profits from the provision of air transportation services."
The record reflects extensive discovery regarding SABRE's
effects on air transportation revenues. System One requested all
documents relating to the “incremental revenues," the general
A-44
effect of "airline ownership of a CRS on the airline's sale of air
transportation services," and “any actual or possible loss of
revenue or other detriment to any commercial air carrier as a
result of the operation or installation of SABRE." In response,
American agreed to produce all documents "that discuss, study, or
analyze whether, and the extent to which, any airline (including
American) which owns a CRS obtains incremental airline revenue
as a consequence of automating travel agencies with its CRS" as
well as "documents discussing whether American has a 'premium
share' of the traffic in a particular region or market and whether
this is attributable to the presence of SABRE in that region or
market."
In the absence of this prior litigation, there in little doubt
that Northwest would seek to introduce evidence of the incremen-
tal revenues generated by SABRE in support of the predatory
pricing claims it raises in this case. Northwest's General Counsel
recently asserted in congressional testimony that American's
ability
to restructure and reduce its fares dramatically is
directly related to American's long-term, advanta-
geous use of its CRS .. . . DOT studies repeatedly
have documented the flow of hundreds of millions
of dollars of incremental revenue diverted from
other carriers to American and United as a result
of their CRS market power ... "[I]n a very rea!
sense, American has launched its predatory attack
on the industry using our own money.
It is the case that challenges by Northwest and Continental
of American's CRS use have been earlier terminated in ways
A-45
restricting their present assertion, Continental by settlement and
Northwest by a final judgment. Pointing to these outcomes, VE
states that it will not, because it cannot, raise any issues relating
to CRS in this case. Any attempts to redress perceived CRS abuses
by American will be confined, as the congressional testimony
suggests, to the legislature. Since American's CRS operation will
not be at issue, VE contends that its representation of American on
this matter cannot be substantially related to this case. Northwest
in particular claims that the issues of incremental revenue and
costs addressed in System One relate to CRS use and are quite
different from the general airline revenue and cost issues at the
center of this case.
We recognize that several possible claims relating to CRS
might be barred by res judicata and we do not question North-
west's representations in this court and below that the present
litigation will involve no attacks on American's CRS use. We are
not persuaded, however, by Northwest's argument that a party's
representation that matters in which a lawyer represented a former
client cannot, or will not, be introduced in the present case
precludes a court from finding these matters substantially related
to the prior representations. The exact scope of categories such as
"CRS matters," especially at the early stage of the litigation when
motions to disqualify are often considered, is unclear, and leaves
much room for good faith dispute among the parties. The party
who either lost in the previous case or represented to the court
that certain matters will not be raised will attempt to define the
A-46
sphere of these issues narrowly, while the party who prevailed in
the earlier case or filed an unsuccessful disqualification notion
will naturally attempt to define the precluded matters quite
broadly. In the particular case of res judicata, it places the former
counsel in the position of attempting to minimize the beneficial
results of her prior representations by limiting their effect in the
present Case.
The facts of this case disclose how such a dispute might
arise. Northwest claims that System One involved the particular
matter of incremental revenues obtained by American through
ownership of a CRS. Northwest states that the focus in this case
will be on wholly different matters such as American's marketing
strategy ticket pricing, and general airline costs and revenues. The
line between incremental revenues and general revenues,
however, does not appear as distinct as VE suggests. Moreover,
American hotly disputes VE's contention that discovery in System
One was limited to the narrow issue of incremental revenues. To
the contrary, American asserts that the VE lawyers reviewed and
discussed documents relating to marketing strategy and general air
transportation revenues and costs, the very matters Northwest
identifies as the heart of the instant case.
There is another matter involved in System One that
Northwest has indicated will be at issue in this case. Northwest
must focus at trial upon barriers to entry into the relevant markets.
Ir its complaint, Northwest lists among these barriers "the role of
| agents in the industry and incentive commissions paid by
A-47
airlines to travel agents and other marketing programs and
devices." Incentive or override commissions in particular were at
the center of the System One case.
System One charged that American used override commis-
SIONS as a means to exclude it from the CRS market: "AA condi-
tioned the payment to travel agents of commissions on AA ticket
sales on their agreement to use the SABRE system." As System
One explained, this arrangement worked especially well in those
areas where American was the dominant air carrier. In connection
with this claim, American agreed to produce and searched for
"[djocuments that describe or discuss American's policies and
procedures regarding participation by travel agencies in any
override, special incentive or ‘soft dollar' commissions program
offered by American." American asserts, and Northwest does not
appear to contest, that VE lawyers reviewed much of this material.
A VE lawyer and several VE paralegals spent more than ten weeks
reviewing documents at American's offices. Gibson, Dunn lawyers
who were involved claim that a VE lawyer personally reviewed
documents relating to marketing strategy and air transportation
issues. The materials submitted with the Gibson, Dunn affidavits
provide additional support for these claims. VE 's description of its
work on the case does little to contradict these accounts. Its
response is limited to a statement by the ‘awyer that he has no
specific recollection of documents reviewed and that he does not
believe, “given the nature of the case," that he "reviewed any
documents relating to American's pricing of airline transportation."
ll A
Northwest contends that the presence of the issue of
override commissions in System One and the instant case does
not make the two representations substantially related. Northwest
argues that the two cases are not related because in System One
the commissions were alleged to be a barrier to entry into the CRS
market, while here they represent a barrier to entry into the air
transportation market. Regardless of the direction of the block the
trial must focus on the exclusionary force of CRS--its power to
exclude competition in CRS is the handmaiden of its exclusionary
force on airline passenger service
We therefore find Northwest's purported distinction
unavailing. Corrugated and Duncan provide that two representa
tions need only involve the same “subject matter’ in order to be
substantially related. See Corrugated, supra; Dun upra. As the
summary of the document request quoted above J ~ ~ ses, VE
lawyers reviewed documents relating to travel agency commis
sions in general, not simply those documents referring to the
alleged practice of tying such commissions to CRS use. A
substantial relationship exists when the prior representation
concerns “the particular practices and procedures which are the
subject matter of [Northwest's] suit." Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1032
Both System One and the present case involve American's travel
agency commission "practices and procedures." Given that the
two cases sharing this “subject matter’ allege similar antitrust
violaiions, we find VE's representation of American in System One
substantially related to its present representation of Northwest
A-49
(3) Project Armadillo
VE represented American most recently in "Project
Armadillo," an American proposai to acquire Continental. VI
provided American with antitrust analysis of the proposal, focusing
on whether a merger of the two airlines could avoid challenge
under the Department of Justice antitrust merger guidelines. VE's
representation began in late November 1990 and concluded in
early January 1991, when American chose not to pursue the
acquisition
As a memorandum prepared by American explained, the
Ueparntment of Justice merger guidelines’ main concern 4s
‘whether the merger will likely create, enhance or fac ilitate the
exercise of market power--the ability to raise prices to supracomp
etitive levels--by the remaining participants in the relevant
market." Market power is more easily inferred under narrowly
defined markets, and it was therefore in American's interest to
avoid “la] market definition that is improperly narrow," for this
would “result in such a high level of concentration that, inevitably,
a court will conclude the merger poses an incipient threat to
competition.
Ihese same issues are at the hear of the present case
Northwest alleges that American has monopolized or attermpted
to monopolize the national air transportation market as well as
four smaller geographic markets involving city pairs and regions
secause American enjoys a greater share of particular regional
markets, Northwest will no doubt attempt to prove at tral that
these smaller markets are relevant. To this end, Northwest cites
four instances where American has allegedly indicated that O &
D and regional passenger markets are relevant markets
\ + ; r , lie , ett
VE asserts that its "narrow, limited, and brief" r
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f t Armada vali t serve as the basis tor disqualificati n
al rye ryt . wtih t ntend t} t me \ f | vA
pre iS¢ yortnwest conte 1S rat some \ lawyers
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minal te Rew to have worked ct Armad
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An if U { t! ne il 1S were not ¢
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tatements submitted | Eto Amer however, d s
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that h of the i rin qu | n devoted time to é
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materials turnisned by (the nent
We have no reason to suggest that VE's misstatements are
other than oversights, and, because they pertain only to the degree
of its involvement in Project Armadillo, are secondary to the main
question of the subject matter of VE's representation. Northwest
contends that VE's representation of American does not warrant
disqualification for two related reasons. Northwest asserts that VI
was Charged with a single "narrow, straightforward question" to
which the answer was “obvious": Would the Justice Department
oppose a complete merger of Continental and American on
A-51
antitrust grounds? Northwest claims that the problem posed to VE
required little detailed analysis and that all the information needed
by VE to reach its conclusion "was and is publicly available."
Because VE required no confidential information to determine that
the merger would not be approved by the Justice Department,
Northwest contends that VE's representation provides no basis for
disqualification.
The record sharply contradicts Northwest's claim that all
of the material supplied by American to VE was publicly avail-
able. But Northwest's argument would fail even if it could show
that all of the information provided by American was a matter of
public knowledge. As we explained above, the substantial
relationship test, as set out in our precedents and the Rules,
contains no exception for prior representations in which an
attorney's advice was based on public information. Accordingly,
the question is not whether VE's representation of American in
Project Armadillo involved matters of public knowledge but
whether the subject matter of the prior representation in substan-
tially related to the present case.
American argues that the primary issue in Project
Armadillo, as in this case, was market definition. Not only did VE
represent American on this same issue, but VE was also in a
position to obtain information regarding American's views on the
proper measure of markets, views which Northwest's complaint
suggests are relevant to the present case. Northwest recognizes
that market definition will be crucial in this case, but argues that
A-52
VE's treatment of this issue in Project Armadillo was superficial
and limited. While conceding that "[mlore difficult questions
could have been raised had American been interested in a partial
acquisition," Northwest contends that the “only issue with which
American was concerned was whether it would be challenged if
it attempted to acquire all of Continental's operations." According
to Northwest, "[t]he answer to American's question was obvious
. . .Anyone familiar with American's hub operations in Dallas and
Continental's Houston hub operations would realize that Ameri-
can and Continental are major competitors in this region and that
their combination would be subject to challenge."
The record demonstrates, however, that the subject matter
was far more complex, and VE's analysis far more extensive, than
Northwest's account suggests. A VE partner's notes from the first
meeting between VE and American indicate that American was
interested in a partial acquisition from the very start: "AA would
be interested in the entire company but there are certain opera-
tions that are particularly important . . . They would be willing to
divest some operations." VE's investigation could not have "rested
largely" on Continental's strong Houston presence, for when this
question was brought up in the first meeting, VE noted that "AA
could sell the Houston hub." Thus, sometime after the meeting a
VE partner sent a memo to American explaining that he had
“spoke(n] at some length" with American's economist and asked
that the market share data be rerun on the assumption that
American would not acquire Continental's Houston hub. While
$e
——
>
'
wn
_a
Northwest now asserts that VE's advice was based largely on the
Houston hub, a VE partner at the time stated in yet another memo
that even when Houston is removed from consideration, “substan-
tial problems are created by Continental's other hubs particularly
New York City, Chic ago, Cleveland, and Denver." as well as by
the “substantial overlaps between Continental and American on
flights to Mexico." Northwest's contention that Pri ject Armadillo
involved the single question of a con plete merger and required
study of only a few markets is simply belied by the ree ord
Similarly, it does not appear that market definition and the
Justice Department's opposition to the merger were as "obvious"
as Northwest now asserts. Northwest argues that market definition
cannot be a common issue between this matter and the present
case because unlike in the present case, where market definition
will be hotly disputed, the Department of Justice merger guide-
lines left little room for discussion. A VE law yer's notes from the
first Project Armadillo meeting, however, discloses a different
picture:
[American is] reluctant to take positions in connec-
tion with a Continental merger that might be
inconsistent with the positions they are taking
elsewhere. This issue came up in connection with
the discussions of markets. Apparently they have
developed a variety of different views about what
are relevant markets. (It appears to me that maybe
their argument is there are no relevant markets).
Evidently the material that they will be sending us
discusses relevant markets, discusses the “city pair
analysis and competition among hubs. . . . Appar-
A-54
ently they have taken the position that hubs are
not markets... .
In addition, Northwest contends that the Department of Justice's
merger guidelines made the answer obvious. This is not the
position that VE took during the representation, however. Upon
receiving a memo prepared by American setting out the difficu!ties
to merger under the city-pair analysis, a VE partner responded that
the memo was “only the beginning of the analysis in my view."
The VE lawyer then went on to suggest that American might be
able to acquire Continental even though the merger might
"violate" the guidelines.
We are forced to the conclusion that the question of
market definition in Project Armadillo was more complex than
Northwest now asserts. VE's representation of American neces-
sarily required a detailed evaluation of American's operations in
the various markets that might be deemed relevant. The instant
case will involve similar issues.
VE was also privy to American's views of the relevant air
transportation markets, a related matter that will also be at issue
in the present case. American provided VE with materials
reflecting AA's position on antitrust issues in prior merger/
acquisition cases. Included in these materials were confidential
“white papers" filed by American with the Justice Depdrtment.
In support of its claim that markets other than the national
market are relevant in the present case, Northwest's complaint
asserts that American “has repeatedly urged that O & D markets
A-55
and regional airline passenger markets are relevant economic
markets." Three of the examples cited by Northwest in support of
this allegation appear to be taken from public testimony. The
fourth is different: "AA argued to the Department of Justice in
1989 that city pair markets to and from O'Hare Airport constitute
relevant markets." Northwest does not deny that this statement is
contained in the materials obtained by VE from American during
Project Armadillo. Nor does Northwest claim that this statement
is a matter of public knowledge. Rather, Northwest states that it
simply copied Continental's complaint in drafting its own. Since
Northwest's complaint did not involve any independent research
by VE, the argument seems to run, the allegation cannot possibly
be based on confidential information supplied by American. We
would first point out that Northwest's explanation remains
plausible only so long as the complaint remains the sole docu-
ment involved in the case. Northwest will eventually have to
address the issues, including American's alleged views on the
relevant market, on its own. More importantly, the answer given
by Northwest is precisely one the substantial relationship test
forbids. Once a substantial relationship has been established,
former counsel is precluded from attempting to prove that he did
not receive confidences. See, e.g., Corrugated, 659 F.2d at 1347.
Northwest's response here--that VE might have obtained the
information, but did not use it--is plainly barred by our prece-
dents
A-56
We appreciate Northwest's concern that an overly broad
reading of "subject matter’ can leave antitrust counselors with one
client per industry--a result with little redemptive value. The nexus
here is far more than case one and case two both presenting
claims of attempted monopolization. Northwest contends that
cases like Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 103
F.R.D. 22 (D.D.C 1984), preclude us from disqualifying VE. But
American's showing in this case goes far beyond the same field,
same party "points of contact" found insufficient in that case. See
id. at 40. Rather, American has succeeded in "delineatling with
specificity the subject matters, issues and causes of action"
common to prior and present representations in the manner
demanded by our precedents. Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1029.
VI
We hold that VE's prior representations of American in
substantially related matters require the disqualification of VE in
this case. We therefore issue a writ of mandamus directing the
district court to vacate its order denying American's motion and
enter an order disqualifying VE from representing Northwest.
B-1
APPENDIX B
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES,
INC.,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,
and AMR CORPORATION,
Defendants,
CONSOLIDATED WITH
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
C.A. NO. G-92-266
Wi
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,
and AMR CORPORATION,
MMMM MOONOMMMOMDAMOMAMM MMM MM
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court are the Defendants’ and the Plaintiff
Northwest Airlines, Inc.'s Motions to Disqualify Counsel. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court is of the opinion that both
motions should be DENIED.
I.
Defendants argue that Vinson & Elkins should be disquali-
fied as Northwest's counsel on three separate grounds: 1) Vinson
& Elkins' prior agreement to represent Defendants in this litigation;
2) Vinson & Elkins' representation of Defendants in other matters;
and 3) Vinson & Elkins' receipt of confidential information related
to this litigation. The Court has carefully examined the dumbfoun-
dingly voluminous pleadings on file regarding these contentions
and finds that each is without sufficient merit to warrant disqualifi-
cation.
There is some evidence in the record that there was some
mixup as to whether Vinson & Elkins would be able to represent
Defendants. Similarly, there is some evidence that Vinson & Elkins
has represented Defendants in regard other, unrelated matters.
And there is some evidence that a confidential memorandum was
sent to Vinson & Elkins.
On the other hand, the mixup concerning Vinson & Elkins'
availability was brief, and the Court finds, based on the totality of
the circumstances, that Vinson & Elkins need not be disqualified.
Similarly, Vinson & Elkins has not represented Defendants for
quite some time, and the matters that it did handle for Defendants
were only tangentially related to this litigation. In this regard, the
Court notes that, for instance, in the admiralty bar on the Texas
Gulf Coast, it is customary, in the aftermath of a maritime
collision, for those firms that represent underwriters to agree to
represent the first client that contacts the firm. Thus, in one case
B-3
the firm may find itself on the opposite side of an underwriter
which was its client in another matter. In the Court's view, this
analogy adequately describes the situation here. Finally, although
the confidential memorandum was undoubtedly sent to Vinson &
Elkins, no one at the firm read the memo, and the Court believes
that, on the facts of this case, the mere sending of the memo by
Defendants' other counsel is not sufficient to require disqualifica-
tion. The Court has read the cases cited by Defendants. They are,
however, not binding on this Court, and the Court respectfully
declines to follow them to the extent that they can be read as
mandating disqualification in this case based solely on the receipt
of an unread memo, regardless of other factors. Moreover, any
information actually received by Vinson & Elkins was not
sufficient to cause any material prejudice to Defendants in this
litigation. Based on the Court's perception of the totality of the
circumstances, the Court concludes that Defendants' motion
should be DENIED.'
' In this regard, the Court notes with pleasure its receipt of the
affidavit of Dean John F. Sutton, Jr., a gentleman personally known to
this Court to be of the highest moral character and integrity, as well as
an acknowledged expert in the fields of professional responsibility and
attorney conduct. Although the Court did not rely on Dean Sutton's
affidavit in reaching any of its conclusions, the Court certainly agrees
with Dean Sutton that “the concept of ‘taint' of a trial involves a
balancing of various interests and goals of the lawyers and the parties to
the litigation. Among these interests are the interests not only of [the]
movant not to be prejudiced . . . but the affirmative interest of a litigant
in being represented by counsel of his choice and the interest of the
public in courts' business not being hampered by tactical maneuvering
with disqualification motions." In ruling on these motions, the Court has
II.
The Court has also considered the submissions regarding
Northwest's Motion to Disqualify Weil, Gotshal & Manges.
Although this motion appears to have more merit than Defen-
dants' Motion to Disqualify, the Court finds, in the totality of
circumstances, that it has not been sufficiently shown that Weil,
Gotshal & Manges must be disqualified from representing
Defendants.’
ITI.
Implicit in any Motion to Disqualify is the notion that
counsel may use confidential information it has obtained for some
improper purpose. The Court is well and personally acquainted
with most, if not all, counsel associated with this litigation, and
been guided by similar notions of the appropriate standards by which to
judge disqualification motions.
? The Court hastens to point out that although it treats both
Motions to Disqualify in summary fashion in this Order, the Court has
gone to great lengths to study all the pleadings and has reached its
decision "“only after painstaking analysis of the facts and precise
application of precedent."" Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 646 F.2d 1020, 1029 (Sth Cir. Unit B June 1981) (quoting
Brennan’s Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 173-74 (Sth
Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F.Supp. 345,
367 (S.D.N.Y. 1955))). In most cases, the Court goes to some lengths to
explain its reasoning process for the benefit of the parties. In this case,
as explained more fully below, the Court is convinced, based on the
submissions, that these motions were filed primarily for tactical reasons.
Therefore, although the Court has considered all the materials offered
and has engaged in substantial deliberations, it has taken the liberty of
reducing its explanation to a more summary form.
phen Shir, Paes Sak
B-5
the Court believes that, given the intelligence and creativity of
counsel, the size and resources of the law firms involved, and the
nature of the events and transactions complained of, the parties
can, through the use of "Chinese walls" and other measures, take
mutually agreeable steps to ensure that no impropriety or appear-
ance of impropriety improperly taints this litigation.
IV.
More to the point, the Court is disturbed by the course this
litigation is taking, even now in its earliest stages. First, the Defen-
dants' Motion to Disqualify Counsel and related Replies and
supporting materials are some of the most condescending
pleadings that have ever been presented to this Court. Defendants
repeatedly state that the rule the Court "must apply" is clear, but
imply that this Court lacks the intelligence to determine and apply
the correct rule. However, although Defendants cite some Fifth
Circuit case law to support general propositions, the bulk of the
authority relied on by Defendants to support their position consists
of nonbinding decisions dealing with substantially different fact
patterns.
Even more disturbing is the sheer tonnage of pleadings and
supporting materials that have been filed regarding these motions.
The Court has instructed the Deputy Clerk to weigh and measure
these materials, and the Clerk reports that the filings, on the
disqualification issue alone, form a stack approximately 45 inches
high and weighing 117 pounds. Jn the Court’s view, rarely has a
court been presen ted with a more blatant exa mple of the use of disqualifi-
B-6
cation motions for tactical purposes. The Court considers the parties’
conduct in filing these pleadings to be a gross abuse of the resources of
this Court. Obviously the Court cannot entertain such filings on every
motion that is filed in this case, or in any case. Otherwise the Court's
entire docket would grind to a halt. More importantly, the Court has no
intention of allowing this litigation to degenerate into a paper war
continuing, like some Dickensian nightmare, until the parties can no
longer afford to pay counsel fees.
The attorneys in this case are among the brightest and
most talented of any bar in this country, many having achieved
national and even international celebrity and professional acclaim.
At least two are former distinguished members of the federal
judiciary. Counsel should therefore be especially aware of the
crushing caseload carried by this Court and the preposterous
imposition pleadings of this magnitude create on the Court's
limited and severely burdened resources. The Court, the parties,
and the federal civil justice system deserve better, and this Court
demands better. In all further pleadings in this proceeding, the
parties and their counsel are instructed that "less is more," and
that brevity is not only a practical aspiration but an absolute
necessity.
¥.
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DE-
CREED that Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Counsel is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff Northwest Airlines,
Inc.'s Motion to Disqualify Counsel is hereby DENIED.
—
B-7
It is further ORDERED that at the August 4, 1992 status
conference, the parties will present to the Court a brief and
concise agreed upon plan for preventing any conflicts of interest
through the use of "Chinese walls" and the like. This plan will be
jointly presented in the form of a Proposed Order which can be
signed and entered by the Court at that time, and it will be both
fair to and binding on all parties.
lt is further ORDERED that the Parties file no further
pleadings in this Court relating to either Motion to Disqualify.
It is further ORDERED that the parities FILE NO FURTHER
MOTIONS OF ANY KIND WHATSOEVER WITHOUT EXPRESS
LEAVE OF THE COURT. NOR WILL THE PARTIES FILE A
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A MOTION WITH THE PROPOSED
MOTION ATTACHED.
It is further ORDERED that_to the extent the Court
expressly allows the parties to file any other motions, SUCH
MOTION SHALL BE LIMITED TO FIFTEEN PAGES IN LENGTH,
INCLUDING BRIEFS AND OTHER SUPPORTING MATERIALS.
THERE WILL BE NO EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RULE. At the
August 4, 1992 status conference, the Court will set out additional
instructions regarding pleadings and discovery. The Court will also
set a trial date and firm docket controls.
It is further ORDERED that any violation of the above
Orders will be severely sanctioned.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DONE at Galveston, Texas this 24th day of July, 1992.
(s/ Samuel B. Kent
Samuel B. Kent
United States District Judge
APPENDIX C
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-7493
IN RE: AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
and AMR CORPORATION,
Petitioners
\ppeal from the United States District Court tor the
Southern District of Texas
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION
FOR REHEARING EN BANC
Opinion 9/4/92 , 5 Cir., 1992, F.2d
September 29, 1992)
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, Judges HIGGINBOTHAM anda
BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges
(V) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and no member of this
panel nor Judge in regular active service on the Court having
requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc, (Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure and Local Rule 35) the Suggestion
for Rehearing En Banc is Dt NIED.
( ) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and the Court having
been polled at the request of one of the members of the Court and
a majority of the Circuit Judges who are in regular active service
not having voted in favor of it, (Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure and Local Rule 35) the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is
also DENIED.
( ) Amember of the Court in active service having requested a
poll on the reconsideration of this cause en banc, and a majority
of the judges in active service not having voted in favor of it,
rehearing en banc is DENIED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT:
(s/ Patrick E. Higginbotham
United States Circuit Judge REHG-6
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