Appendix — Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.

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Bupreme Court, US

92.945 FILED

DEC_3__1999

IN THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Supreme Court of Che United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,

Petitioner

V.

AMERICAN AIRLINES AND

AMR CORPORATION,

Respondents

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To

The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Fifth Circuit

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT CHARLES W. WOLFRAM

Counsel of Record Cornell Law School

727 East 26th Street 106 Myron Taylor Hall

Austin, Texas 78705 Ithaca, New York 14853

(512) 471-7188 (607) 255-9668

FIARRY M. REASONER JOHN F. SUTTON, JR.

JOHN L. MURCHISON, JR. P.O. Box 49700

MARGARET C. LING Austin, Texas 78765

EDWARD A. CARR (512) 471-3293

Vinson & Elkins L.L.P.

1001 Fannin Street W. JAMES KRONZER

Suite 2500 1900 Memorial Drive

Houston, Texas 77002-6760 Houston, Texas 77007

(713) 758-2358 (713) 862-5821

Counsel for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinion Granting Writ of Mandamus

og fF rer aa rere . A-1

Order Denying Motions To Disqualify Counsel

(United States District Court) ...... see ae

Denial Of Suggestion For Rehearing En Banc

(Court of Appeals) .... as C-1

A PRS 2 Sh Ae nA RRS ONY POI. 4 DIO A Ae NG RRR OE OP BESET”

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 92-7493

IN RE: AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC

AMR CORPORATION,

Petitioners

Petition for Writ of Mandamus

to the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

( September 4, 1992 )

sefore POLITZ, Chief Judge, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BARKSDALE,

Circuit Judges

HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

American Airlines, Inc. petitions for a writ of mandamus

directing the district court to disqualify its forrmer counsel Vinson

& Elkins from representing plaintiff Northwest Airlines, Inc. We

hold that the district court erred in denying American's motion

and issue the requested writ

A-2

I

Continental Airlines filed a complaint against American in

the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

on June 8, 1992, charging American with attempted monopoliza-

tion by predatory pricing in violation of the Sherman Act.

American filed a declaratory judgment action against Continenial

and Northwest in the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois the following day. Three days later, Northwest

sued American in the Southern District of Texas. The Continental

and Northwest suits have been consolidated by order of the

district court.

On June 9, 1992, the day after Continental filed its com-

plaint, David Schwarte, American's in-house counsel, asked

Alison Smith, a VE partner, if VE would represent American in this

case. Smith accepted the American representation on June 10,

unaware that four days earlier Harry Reasoner, another VE partner,

had promised Joe Jamail, Northwest's counsel, that VE would not

consider representing another airline until Jamail and Reasoner

had discussed joining forces. When Smith informed Reasoner of

her acceptance of the American representation, Reasoner directed

her to inform Schwarte that "there might be a problem with

Northwest" and that Reasoner would make the final decision the

next day. On June 11 Reasoner accepted the Northwest represen-

tation.

American asserted that VE's prior representation of

American and its agreement to do so in this case made its

representation of Northwest improper. It requested that VE

withdraw from the case in letters sent on June 12 and June 19.

Northwest refused and on July 1 American moved to disqualify

VE. The parties at this time became aware that Weil, Gotshal &

Manges, American's lead counsel, had previously represented

Northwest and Continental. An exchange of "conflicts" was briefly

considered. When American indicated that it would not withdraw

its motion to disqualify VE, Northwest moved to disqualify Weil,

Gotshal on July 13.

American rests its motion to disqualify Vinson & Elkins on

VE's representation of American in prior antitrust matters and its

alleged agreement to represent it in this case. According to Ameri-

can, Vinson & Elkins has served as its "Houston antitrust counsel

since 1987." In this role VE defended American in suits by

Continental and a Continental affiliate. VE also provided antitrust

advice in connection with American's possible acquisition of

Continental.

On July 24, after extensive briefing and the submission of

numerous affidavits, the district court denied both motions to

disqualify counsel. The court held that VE's initial acceptance of

the American representation was a "mixup," that the past matters

in which VE had represented American were only “tangentially

related to this litigation," and that any confidential information

possessed by VE was "not sufficient to <ause any material

prejudice to [American]." The court directed the parties to submit

a plan for a Chinese Wall to safeguard against adverse use of

A-4

confidential information in the case. American then filed the

petition for writ of mandamus now before us.

I]

We must first determine our jurisdiction. Orders denying

motions to disqualify counsel are not appealable before final

judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.

Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375, 101 S. Ct. 669, 674, 66 L. Ed.2d 571

(1981); see also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 105

S. Ct. 2757, 86 L. Ed.2d 340 (1985) (extending rule to orders

granting motions to disqualify). While holding that disqualification

orders are not immediately appealable as a matter of course, the

Firestone Court indicated that a writ of mandamus might be

available "in the exceptional circumstances for which it was de-

signed." Firestone, 449 U.S. at 378 n. 13, 101 S.Ct. at 676 n. 13;

Koller, 472 U.S. at 435, 105 S. Ct. at 2763. American contends

that this case presents the requisite "exceptional circumstances."

The standards are well established: "|Pletitioners must

show that they lack adequate alternative means to obtain the relief

they seek . . . and carry the 'burden of showing that [their] right

to issuance of the writ is "clear and indisputable."'" Mallard v.

United States Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 309, 199

S. Ct. 1814, 1822, 104 L. Ed.2d 318 (1989) (citations omitted); Jn

re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 707 (Sth Cir. 1990); In re Wily,

831 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1987). The test contains two prongs,

one procedural and one substantive, and unless American demon-

strates that it lacks an adequate alternative means to obtain relief,

A-5

we need not consider whether its right to a writ of mandamus is

“clear and indisputable."

Courts confronting this question have suggested that

"[djenial of a motion to disqualify counsel will rarely justify the

issuance of a writ of mandamus." Jn re Ford Motor Co., 751 F.2d

274, 275 (8th Cir. 1984); see also In re Mechem, 880 F.2d 872, 873

(6th Cir. 1989); In re Bushkin Assocs., Inc., 864 F.2d 241, 243-44

(Ist Cir. 1989). We agree that frequent use of the writ would

“undermine || the policy against piecemeal appellate review,"

Mechem, 880 F.2d at 875 (quoting Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon,

Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S. Ct. 188, 191, 66 L. Ed.2d 193 (1980)

(per curiam)), and thus we have stressed that “mandamus may not

serve as a substitute for appeal." Warren v. Bergeron, 831 F.2d 101,

103 (5th Cir. 1987). We also have recognized, however, that the

standard governing the availability of mandamus is not "never,"

but "hardly ever." Allied Chemical, 101 S. Ct. at 190. Thus, this

court has recently held that a writ of mandamus will be available

in certain cases to obtain immediate review of a district court's

denial of a disqualification motion. In re Dresser Industries, 972

F.2d 540 (Sth Cir. 1992). See also In re American Cable Publications,

Inc., 768 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1985) (issuing writ on petition to

review a grant of disqualification motion); Merle Norman Cosmetics,

Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., Central Dist. of Cal., 856 F.2d 98, 101

(9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that “if petitioners' claims were

wellfounded [sic], the damage would be irremediable," but

denying writ on other grounds). As in Dresser, we find the special

A-6

circumstances of the present dispute sufficient to place it within

that narrow class of cases warranting mandamus review.

American claims that immediate review of its disqualifica-

tion motion is appropriate because it will otherwise suffer

“irreparable harm" and also because “attorneys and clients

throughout Texas need the benefit of this Court's guidance on this

issue of grave importance." We agree. First, the nature and size of

this litigation would seem to preclude effective appellate review

upon final judgment. In addition, this case raises several questions

pertaining to the proper interpretation and application of ethical

standards in disqualification cases. As illustrated by our recent

Dresser opinion, it is relevant to mandamus review that the “district

court's order was not a mere discretionary one but rather turns on

legal questions appropriate for appeilate review." In re Burlington

N., Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 523 (Sth Cir. 1987). it is also relevant that,

as in Dresser and Burlington, "|t|he issues here also have impor-

tance beyond the immediate lawsuit." Jd. at 523; In re EEOC, 709

F.2d 392, 394-95 (5th Cir. 1983). For these reasons, we hold that

American has demonstrated the absence of an adequate alterna-

tive to mandamus review.

Having met the "procedural" requirement for a writ of

mandamus, American must also demonstrate that its right to the

issuance of the writ is "clear and indisputable." This test goes to

the merits, and we pause only to set out the standard of review.

The Supreme Court has indicated that "[w|here a matter is

committed to discretion, it cannot be said that a litigant's right to

A-7

a particular result is ‘clear and undisputable."" Allied Chemical, 101

S. Ct. at 191. In accord with these dictates, this court has held that

a writ of mandamus should not issue merely because we believe

that "we might have exercised the discretion vested in that court

differently than the district court exercised it." Matter of Hester, 899

F.2d 361, 367 (5th Cir. 1990).

In this circuit, however, a district court's ruling upon a

disqualification motion is not a matter of discretion. Rather, the

appellate court "review(s] findings of fact for clear error ‘while

carefully examining the district court's application of relevant

ethical standards." Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869

F.2d 1565, 1569 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Cossette v. Country Style

Donuts, Inc. 647 F.2d 526, 531 (5th Cir. 1981)). Conceding that

abuse of discretion review is not appropriate, Northwest asserts

that this case centers on disputed factual matters, and that the

district court's findings deserve deference. Assuming arguendo that

the district court made findings on these contested questions of

fact, it is clear that the court was guided by a particular reading

of the Texas Disciplinary Rules in making these relevant factual

determinations. Whatever deference due the court's factual

findings, little or no deference is proper in reviewing its interpreta-

tion of ethical rules. We have recently held that a “district court's

interpretation of the state disciplinary rules [is] an interpretation of

law, subject essentially to de novo consideration." Dresser, at 543.

In accord with Dresser, our review of the district court's reading of

the relevant ethical standards will be de novo

Ill

We turn to the applicable law. The Local Rules of the

Southern District of Texas provide that "|t]/he Code of Professional

Responsibility adopted by this court is the Code of Professional

Responsibility of the State Bar of Texas, as amended from time to

time." Tex. Rules of Court, Federal App. A, Rule 4B. Texas

replaced the Texas Disciplinary Code with the Texas Disciplinary

Rules of Professional Conduct in 1990. Recognizing the new Rules

as an amendment of the old Code, this Court has applied the

Rules. See In re Medrano, 956 F.2d 101, 162 n. 3 (Sth Cir. 1992).

The parties do not contest application of the Rules.

We have recently held, however, that the Texas Rules, as

adopted by the Southern District of Texas, are not the "'sole'

authority governing a motion to disqualify." Dresser, at 543. In

reviewing a motion to disqualify, “we consider the motion

governed by the ethical rules announced by the national profes-

sion in light of the public interest and the litigants' rights." Jd. As

Dresser indicates, our precedents have applied the ethical canons

contained in the ABA Model Code. See, e.g., Brennan's Inc. v.

Brennan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1979); Woods v.

Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (Sth Cir. 1976).

The parties' extensive citation of this court's precedents

applying the ABA Model Code suggests their recognition that the

Texas Rules, as adopted by the Southern District of Texas, are not

the "sole" authority governing this case. Moreover, we do not

believe that our holding in Dresser has rendered the parties'

A-9

arguments grounded in the Texas Rules irrelevant to our decision.

The Texas Rules were patterned after the ABA Model Rules of

Professional Conduct, which the Dresser court cited along with the

Model Code as the national standards utilized by this circuit in

ruling on disqualification motions. Since the relevant ABA Rules

do not differ materially from the corresponding Texas Rules, the

parties' interpretations of the Texas Rules are equally applicable

in this case. Our discussion will therefore center on the Texas

Rules.

As we confirmed in Dresser, "|mJotions to disqualify are

substantive motions affecting the rights of the parties and are

determined by applying standards developed under federal law."

Dresser, at 543; see also In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 105 S. Ct. 2874,

2881 n. 6, 86 L. Ed.2d 504 (1985); In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d

1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d

1198, 1200 (3d Cir. 1980); Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th

Cir. 1964). Federal courts may adopt state or ABA rules as their

ethical standards, but whether and how these rules are to be

applied are questions of federal law. We stress this because

Northwest contends that the Texas Rules control the discretion of

a district court. According to Northwest, “a trial court is not forced

by literalism or mechanical standards to do injustice serving the

mere litigation tactics of a party. Rather, a trial court, according to

the Rules, is to determine if there is actual prejudice or threatened

interference with the fair administration of justice." See Texas Rule

1.06 Comment 17; ABA Rule 1.7 Comment.

A-10

As we have indicated, disqualification cases are governed

by state and national ethical standards adopted by the court. We

disagree with Northwest's suggestions that these sources also

determine the discretion of a district court applying these rules.

That issue is one governed by federal law.

Some courts have taken the position Northwest advances,

namely that "[t]he business of the court is to dispose of litigation

and not to act as a general overseer of the ethics of those who

practice here unless the questioned behavior taints the trial of the

cause before it." W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d

Cir. 1976); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir.

1979); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1980).

See also SUTTON, HOW VULNERABLE IS THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY?, 57 N.C. L. Rev. 497, 514-16 (1979). An attorney's

ethical violation by itself does not warrant disqualification under

this approach. Rather, disqualification is proper only in cases

where a court also finds that the unethical conduct threatens to

taint the trial. This more limited test largely rests on a belief that

disqualification motions are often made for tactical reasons such

as delay or harassment. While the "taint" standard "fails to correct

all possible ethical conflicts," Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 445, it is

argued that this limited disqualification rule serves to deter many

meritless, tactical motions that would otherwise be filed.

This circuit, however, has struck a different balance,

electing to remain “sensitive to preventing conflicts of interest."

Matter of Consolidated Bankshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249, 1256 (5th

A-11

Cir. 1986). We have squarely rejected this hands-off approach in

which ethical rules "guide" whether counsel's presence will "taint"

a proceeding, holding instead that a "[dlistrict [clourt is obliged to

take measures against unethical conduct occurring in connection

with any proceeding before it." Woods v. Covington County Bank,

537 F.2d 804, 810 (Sth Cir. 1976) (emphasis added); Musicus v.

Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 621 F.2d 742, 744 (5th Cir. 1980); EF.

Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F.Supp. 371, 376-77 (S.D.Tex. 1969);

see also Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 847 (1st Cir. 1984) (“the

district court has the duty and responsibility of supervising the

conduct of attorneys who appear before it"); Trust Corp. v. Piper

Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); United States

v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 1982) (same). For this

reason, we have emphasized that "[a] motion to disqualify counsel

is the proper method for a party-litigant to bring the issues of

conflict or breach of ethical duties to the attention of the court."

Musicus, 621 F.2d at 744. We recognize of course that disqualifi-

cation motions may be used as "procedural weapons" to advance

purely tactical purposes. But we do not believe that a priori

assumptions concerning the motivations underlying disqualifica-

tion motions in general justify a more relaxed ethical rule. Our

prior cases disclose that a careful and exacting application of the

rules in each case will separate proper and improper disqualifica-

tion motions.

Our rejection of the “taint" standard finds additional

support in the questionable nature of the assumptions underlying

A-12

the test. First, the “taint" standard rests on a belief that “ethical

conflicts surfacing during a litigation are generally better

addressed by the ‘comprehensive disciplinary machinery' of the

state and federal bar." Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 446 (quoting Nyquist,

590 F.2d at 1246)). It is not clear that the vitality of state enforce-

ment is relevant to the judicial duty of the federal courts to clean

its own house. Policy aside, it is equally uncertain that the

disciplinary boards have performed this role. Moreover, clients

and fellow attorneys have little incentive to file formal complaints

with disciplinary boards, and the evidence suggests that they in

fact do not. This is especially true in cases of alleged conflicts of

interest. See DAVID B. WILKINS, WHO SHOULD REGULATE LAWYERS?,

105 Harv.L.Rev. 799, 827-28 (1992); Note, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE

LAW -- CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 94 Harv. L.

Rev. 1244, 1496-1500 (1981). To a very large extent, unless a

conflict is addressed by courts upon a motion for disqualification,

it may not be addressed at all. More to the point, it is our business

-- our responsibility.

Second, we believe that today there is less reason to

suspect tactical motivations behind disqualification motions than

at the time the “taint” standard was initially formulated in the

1970's. This is not due to any moral transformation of the bar, but

to the relative absence of tactical advantages that might be

secured by disqualification orders under today's law. At that time,

disqualification orders were immediately appealable; the greatest

tactical advantage offered by these motions was delay, as the trial

A-13

proceedings were halted while the motion went up on appeal. See,

e.g., Nyquist, 590 F.2d at 1246. Under the Firestone regime,

however, disqualification motions are not appealable prior to final

judgment, thus severely limiting any advantages a party might

have achieved through delay. See Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 452 n. 2

(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Accordingly, we will rigorously apply the relevant ethical

standards in reviewing American's disqualification motion, just as

we have done in the past. See, e.g., Johnston v. Harris County Flood

Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Sth Cir. 1989); Doe v. A Corp.,

709 F.2d 1043, 1046 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Corrugated Container

Antitrust Litigation, 659 F.2d 1341 (Sth Cir. Unit A Oct.1981);

Duncan v. Mernill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020

(5th Cir. Unit B June 1981). We will now examine the three argu-

ments offered by American in support of its motion to disqualify

Vinson & Elkins from representing Northwest.

IV

American first argues that VE must be disqualified from

representing Northwest because a law firm may not switch sides

in the same case. According to American, a binding attorney-

client relationship between VE and American was formed when

Alison Smith, a VE partner, agreed to represent American on June

10. VE's withdrawal from the American representation and

acceptance of the Northwest representation on June 11 was a

switch of sides in the same case, a clear violation of legal ethics.

A-14

Texas Rule 1.06(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not

represent opposing parties to a litigation." As American indicates,

this rule applies even in cases where an attorney-client relation-

ship has not been formed: A lawyer may not "switch|| sides and

represent] a party whose interests are adverse to a person who

sought in good faith to retain the lawyer." Texas Rule 1.09 Com-

ment 4A; see also HAZARD & HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING §

1.9:111 (1991). The parties agree that Alison Smith agreed to

represent American on behalf of VE on June 10, and that Harry

Reasoner formally agreed to represent Northwest on June 11.

There are significant differences, however, on several points that

bear on the dispositive question of whether American sought to

retain VE in good faith.

On June 5, 1992, Northwest, through Joe Jamail, spoke to

Harry Reasoner, managing partner of VE, about ihe possibility of

VE serving as Northwest's co-counsel in a suit against American.

After checking to see whether American was a current client and

reviewing the matters that VE had handled for American in the

past, Reasoner promised jJamail that VE would accept no other

representation of an airline until he had the chance to discuss the

matter further.

On june 9, David Schwarte of American, after first

attempting to reach Reasoner, called Alison Smith, another VE

partner. Schwarte asked Smith if VE would represent American in

a suit that Continental had filed against it in Galveston. Unaware

of the previous discussion between Jamail and Reasoner, Smith

A-15

stated that she would be “delighted" to take on the case, but

added that she would first have to run a conflicts check. American

sent VE copies of the complaints filed against it later that day

Smith called Schwarte at around 9:00 a.m. the next

morning, June 10. When Smith stated that the conflicts question

had not yet been resolved, Schwarte asked if there was a problem

with Northwest. Smith responded that no such conflict was

apparent. Smith and Schwarte then discussed American s possible

litigation strategy, focusing on American's desire to transfer the

Galveston case to Chicavo

\ dispute d conversation between | david Boies of Cravath

vaine & Moore, lead counsel for Continental, and Ira Millsts

ot Weil, Gotshal & Manges, lead counsel for American, occurred

at about 9:30 a.m. According to Boies, Millstein stated that he

hoped to retain VE to represent American in the Galveston case

30ies responded that this probably was not possible, for it was his

understanding that VE would be representing Northwest in a suit

against American. Millstein, however, asserts that he told Boies

that VE would be representing American in Galveston, and that

Boies responded that VE might have a conflict with Northwest, not

that VE was going to sue American on Northwest's behalf

At 10:30 a.m., Smith informed Schwarte that there were no

conflicts that might prevent VE from representing American. Upon

hearing this, Schwarte asked Smith if there was any reason why

"we" could not begin to act as a team. Smith responded that she

did not see why not. The two again spoke of American's desire to

A-16

transfer the Galveston case to Chicago. Schwarte asked Smith to

begin thinking about this question and told her that he would

send her a memorandum on the subject prepared by Weii,

Gotshal attorneys. After the call, Smith left Reasoner a note in his

office, stating that she had accepted the American representation

in the Galveston case.

Reasoner learned of Smith's acceptance of the American

representation when he called his office around 12:30 p.m. He

advised Smith to explain to Schwarte that until Smith and

Reasoner were able to discuss the matter, it was uncertain

whether VE would be able to accept. Smith called Schwarte at

2:20 p.m. The contents of this conversation are in dispute.

According to Smith, she told Schwarte that Reasoner had informed

her that there was a_ problem with VE representing American.

Schwarte responded that he was not surprised, for he had learned

from Millstein that Reasoner had spoken to Northwest about suing

American. According to Schwarte, however, Smith stated only that

she had received a "cryptic note" from Reasoner indicating that

"there might be a problem with Northwest." Schwarte swears that

he made no mention of the possibility that VE might represent

Northwest. At 3:45 p.m., VE received a copy of the memorandum

prepared by Weil, Gotshal that Smith and Schwarte had discussed

earlier.

Schwarte and Smith spoke again at 5:30 p.m. Smith

informed Schwarte that the "problem with Northwest" had not yet

been resolved. Schwarte stated that he needed to know as soon

A-17

as possible in order to make other arrangements if it turned out

that VE could not represent American. At 5:45 p.m., Reasoner told

Smith that he planned to read the complaints in the case and

would speak to American the next day. Smith called Schwarte to

convey this information.

Northwest alleges that Irv Terrell, a partner at Baker &

Botts, informed Joe Jamail this same afternoon that Baker & Botts

would be representing American. Both Terrell and Schwarte,

however, sharply contradict this account, asserting that American

did not retain Baker & Botts until the afternoon of June 11, after

VE told American that it would be representing Northwest.

The next afternoon, June 11, Reasoner and Jamail agreed

that VE would serve as co-counsel for Northwest. Reasoner then

called various members of American's legal team with this news.

Millstein at this time asked Reasoner if he could recommend other

Houston counsel. Reasoner told him that Baker & Botts would be

a good choice. On Reasoner's instructions, Smith returned unread

the Weil, Gotshal memorandum she had received the day before.

According to American, American retained Baker & Botts later that

afternoon.

The parties' respective accounts of these events diverge at

several significant points. The rule barring lawyers from switching

sides in the same case applies only where the complaining party

sought in good faith to retain the lawyer. Texas Rule 1.09 Com-

ment 4A. Northwest's version of events might lead a court to

question American's good faith. According to Northwest,

A-18

American's lead counsel was informed that VE would be repre-

senting Northwest in a suit against American before Alison Smith,

who, unlike American, had no knowledge of VE's previous

commitment to Northwest, agreed to represent American.

Northwest also contends that American hired Baker & Botts during

the afternoon of June 10, before VE's final decision that it would

not represent American. Northwest alleges that American sent VE

the confidential memorandum prepared by Weil, Gotshal after

these two events, that is, with knowledge that VE would likely be

representing Northwest and after it had hired Baker & Botts. These

alleged facts, if accepted as true, might establish that American's

efforts were motivated primarily by a desire not to secure repre-

sentation from VE, but to ensure that VE would not, or could not,

represent Northwest.

American, of course, contests Northwest's account,

insisting that it had no knowledge of VE's prior commitment to

Northwest and that it hired Baker & Botts on June 11, only after

it was informed that VE would be representing Northwest. When

American learned of VE's commitment to Northwest is a factual

issue crucial to determining whether American sought VE's

representation in good faith, as Texas Rule 1.06 requires. The

district court made no factual findings on this issue. We need not

remand for further fact finding because we hold that VE must be

disqualified on other grounds.

American's final two contentions rest on VE's prior repre-

sentations of the airline in antitrust matters. American contends

that VE must be disqualified because VE has represented American

in matters substantially related to the present case and VE's repre-

sentation of Northwest in this case will likely involve the use to

American's disadvantage of confidential information obtained

during this earlier representation. We will first discuss the applica-

ble ethical standards. We will then apply these standards to the

prior representations alleged by American to warrant \/E's

disqualification.

A.

American contends that VE's prior representations of

American make disqualification appropriate under this court's

precedents and the Texas Rules. Our review in previous Cases

involving prior representations has been governed by the "substan-

tial relationship" test:

A party seeking to disqualify opposing counsel on

the ground of a former representation must estab-

lish two elements: 1) an actual attorney-client

relationship between the moving party and the

attorney he seeks to disqualify and 2) a substantial

relationship between the subject matter of the

former and present representations.

Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1569

(5th Cir. 1989); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659

F.2d 1341, 1345 (Sth Cir. 1981); Duncan v. Mernill Lynch, Pierce,

Fenner &¥ Smith, 646 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied 454

A-20

U.S. 895, 102 S. Ct. 394, 70 L. Ed.2d 211 (1981). Because it is

not disputed that VE represented American in the matters under

consideration, the sole issue is whether these prior representations

are substantially related to the present case. Our inquiry may be

narrowed to this single question because the substantial relation-

ship test is governed by an irrebuttable presumption. Once it is

established that the prior matters are substantially related to the

present case, "the court will irrebuttably presume that relevant

confidential information was disclosed during the former period

of representation." Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1028; Corrugated, 659 F.2d

at 1347,'

The test is categorical in requiring disqualification upon

the establishment of a substantial relationship between past and

current representations. But we have never applied the test in a

mechanical way that might "prevent || an attorney from ever

representing an interest adverse to that of a former client." Duncan,

646 F.2d at 1027-28. Rather, a substantial relathionship may be

found only after "the moving party delineates with specificity the

subject matters, issues and causes of action" common to prior and

current representations and the court engages in a "'painstaking

analysis of the facts and precise application of precedent."

Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1029 (quoting Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan’s

' A second irrebuttable presumption is that confidences obtained

by an individual lawyer will be shared with the other members of his

firm. See Corrugated, 659 F.2d at 1346. This presumption is not at issue

in this case, for all of the VE lawyers involved have previously repre-

sented American.

A-21

testaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 174 (5th Cir. 1979)) Finally, the

party seeking disqualification bears the burden of proving that the

present and prior representations are substantially related. Duncan,

646 F.2d at 1028

[his circuit adopted the substantial relationship test before

the promulgation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. We must

decide the application of the substantial relationship test under

these new Rules. Texas Rule 1.09 provides in relevant part

a) Without prior consent, a lawyer who personally

has formally represented a client in a matter shall

not thereafter represent another person in a matter

idverse to the former client

if the representation in reasonable probability will

involve a violation of Rule 1.05: of

(4 if it is the same or a substantially related matter

Rule 1.09(a)(2) incorporates Rule 1.05, which prohibits a lawyer's

use of confidential information obtained from a former client to

that former client's disadvantage. Rule 1.09 thus on its face forbids

a lawyer to appear against a former client if the current represen

tation in reasonable probability will involve the use of confidentia

information or if the current matter is substantially related to the

matters in which the lawyer has represented the former client.’

A-22

In providing two distinct grounds for disqualification, the

Rules expand the protections for former clients beyond those

afforded by the substantial relationship test. The Rules are not,

however, broader than the protections provided by our prece-

dents. While the focus of our cases has been on the substantial

relationship test, we have indicated that a former client could also

disqualify counsel by showing that his former attorney possessed

relevant confidential information in the manner contemplated by

Rule 1.09(a)(2). As Duncan, for example, stated: "[The moving

party may disqualify counsel on the basis of prior representations]

either by establishing that the prevent and previous representations

are substantially related or by pointing to specific instances where

it revealed confidential information regarding its practices and

procedures." Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1032. Thus, it does not appear

that the Texas Rules make material addition to the basic approach

we have used in the past.

(a) A lawyer who has formally represented a client in a

matter shall not thereafter represent another person in

the same or a substantially related matter in which that

person's interests are materially adverse to the interests

of the former client unless the former client consents

after consultation ....

(c) A lawyer who has formally represented a client in a matter

. . . Shall not thereafter:

(1) use information relating to the representation to the

disadvantage of the former client... .

ABA Rule 1.9.

A-23

But do the Rules take something away? That is, do the

Rules offer less protection to former clients than our precedents?

Northwest offers two related arguments on this score. First,

Northwest contends that a substantial relationship between past

and current matters exists only where the two cases are so closely

related that the risk of adverse use of the former client's confi-

dences threatens to “taint" the trial. Northwest also agues that a

close relation between a past and current representation is

irrelevant if the attorney relied on publicly available information

in advising the former client. These two arguments are rooted in

Northwest's larger assertion that the substantial relationship test is

solely concerned with protecting a former client's confidences.

Northwest offers three distinct grounds in support of its

“taint" standard. It first makes a brief attempt to locate this more

demanding standard in Duncan. According to Northwest, Duncan

provides that a party may establish a substantial relationship

between past and current representations only be demonstrating

that the two matters are so closely related that there is a "genuine

threat that confidences revealed to his former counsel will be

divulged to his present adversary." Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1028.

Duncan, however, stands for a different proposition, for we held

that a “genuine threat" of adverse use of confidences is established

by showing that a prior representation is substantially related to

the present case. Jd. Under Duncan, a party demonstrates a

“genuine threat" by establishing a substantial relationship between

A-24

past and present cases, not, as Northwest would have it, the other

way around.

Northwest's other two arguments rest on its interpretation

of Texas Rule 1.09's substantial relationship language. First,

Northwest contends that the commentary to Rule 1.09 makes

“abundantly clear’ that the Rule's substantial relationship language

is directed to “actual and genuine threats to the integrity of the

trial process." Comment 8 to Rule 1.09 provides:

Although not required to do so by Rule 1.05 or

this Rule, some courts, as > procedural decision,

disqualify a lawyer for representing a present client

against a former client when the subject matter of

the present representation is so closely related to

the subject matter of the prior representation that

confidences obtained from the former client might

be useful in the representation of the present

client. See Comment 17 to Rule 1.06.

Comment 17 provides that alleged conflicts should be raised by

an opposing party only where the alleged “conflict is such as

clearly to call in question the fair or efficient administration of

justice." Northwest concludes that this commentary reveals that

“the substantial relationship language of Rule 1.09 is bottomed on

a concern about the actual fairness of the proceedings in which

disqualification is sought."

Northwest also contends that the Texas Rules' conscious

omission of the "appearance of unpropriety” standard contained in

Canon 9 of the Model Code independently establishes "taint" as

the appropriate disqualification standard. Northwest points out

that some of our broader substantial relationship cases, notably Jn

A-25

re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir.

1981), were decided under Canon 9. Northwest asserts that

Corrugated's broad language intimately tied to Canon 9's “appear-

ance of impropriety" standard. Since the Texas Rules eliminated

this rule, “disqualification is no longer appropriate unless counsel's

continued involvement threatens to taint the underlying trial: a

mere appearance of impropriety will not suffice."

We reject both of Northwest's arguments. A party seeking

to disqualify counsel under the substantial relationship test need

not prove that the past and present matters are so similar that a

lawyer's continued involvement threatens to taint the trial. Rather,

the former client must demonstrate that the two matters are

substantially related. Second, we adhere to our precedents in

refusing to reduce the concerns underlying the substantial relation-

ship test to a client's interest in preserving his confidential

information. The second fundamental concern protected by the

test is not the public interest in lawyers avoiding “even the

appearance of impropriety," but the client's interest in the loyalty

of his attorney.

Northwest's argument that the Texas Rules’ commentary

bottoms Rule 1.09's substantial relationship language on a

concern for "actual fairness" rests on its general interpretation of

the Texas Rules. Northwest suggests that courts' use of disciplinary

standards in disqualification matters is “understandable in courts

that have not yet developed their own specific procedural

disqualification rules or standards." Courts may borrow from the

rules, with two important qualifications: "First, any violation of a

disciplinary standard must be demonstrated by movant to have

been actually prejudicial to movant; and, second, disqualification

should be denied unless the litigation will be ‘tainted’ by the

continued participation of a lawyer or firm that may have violated

a disciplinary standard."

This argument is closely related to Northwest's larger

assertion that the Texas Rules are "guides" for courts and are not

to be "literally" applied in disqualification cases. We addressed,

and rejected this general argument in Part Ill. We understand this

particular argument concerning the substantial relationship test to

be something more than a reiteration of this general point.

Northwest's initial argument was that a breach of an ethical

standard does not by itself require disqualification; an additional

showing of taint is needed. Here, Northwest appears to concede

that such a breach requires disqualification, but asserts that the

rule barring representation in substantially related matters is not

violated unless the cases are so similar that there is a genuine

threat of taint. We reject this argument. The substantial relation-

ship test, as applied in this circuit and elsewhere, does not have

its source in disciplinary rules. To the contrary, the test was devel-

oped at common law. Our precedents did not rely on the Model

Code or Model Rules in formulating the substantial relationship

test, but on the landmark 7.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,

Inc., 113 F.Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), which predated the Model

Code and of course the Model Rules. See, e.g., Wilson P. Abraham

A-27

Construction Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.

1977); In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83,

89 (5th Cir. 1976).

The actual development of Rule 1.09's substantial relation-

ship provision is the just the opposite of the version Northwest

gives. The initial drafts of both the ABA and Texas Rules did not

include a rule barring representation in substantially related

matters. In both cases, the substantial relationship rule was added

as a reflection of case law. See ROBERT P. SCHUWERK & JOHN F. SUTTON,

JR., A GUIDE TO THE TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT, 27A Hous. L. Rev. 1, 152 n. 20, 153 n. 34 (1990); Note,

IN DEFENSE OF THE DOUBLE STANDARD IN THE RULES OF ETHICS: A

CRITICAL REEVALUATION OF THE CHINESE WALL AND ViICARIOUS DISQUALI-

FICATION, 20 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 245, 257 & n. 66 (1986) (ABA

Rules). Schuwerk and Sutton's account is instructive:

[T]he Texas committee originally avoided [the sub-

stantial related matter language] in proposed Texas

Rule 1.09. . . Subsequently, however, a difficulty

emerged as a result of failure to employ the sub-

stantial relationship test in a disciplinary context.

A lawyer might accept or continue employment in

a matter against a former client believing (cor-

rectly) that no disciplinary violation was involved

under the initially proposed version of Rule 1.09,

only to be disqualified subsequently -- perhaps at

great cost and expenses to the client ---by a court

employing the traditional substantial relationship

test .. . . The drafting committee, therefore, con-

cluded that the danger of having its narrowly

drawn Rule 1.09 turn into a trap for the unwary

outweighed its objections to the substantial rela-

A-28

tionship test as a standard of discipline. It would

be in keeping with the committee's thinking, how-

ever, to construe "substantially related" narrowly

for disciplinary purposes.

Schuwerk & Sutton, supra, at 153 n. 34 (emphasis added); see also

Rule 1.09 Comment 9.

As this account suggests, the difficulty posed by Rule 1.09

does not concern the "literal and mechanical" application of a

disciplinary rule in disqualification cases. Rather, the concern is

the transfer of the substantial relationship test developed by courts

to the disciplinary context. See also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN

LEGAL ETHICS 366 (1986) (discussing ABA Rules' “adoption of the

substantial relationship standard as a disciplinary rule"). Contrary

to Northwest's contentions, the Rules did not supplant, but

adopted, the common law substantial relationship test. The

argument thus provides no basis for applying the substantial

relationship test through the "taint" filter it proposes.

Northwest's argument concerning the Rules' deletion of

Canon 9's appearance of impropriety standard has more purchase.

Northwest argues that the Model Rules' omission of the "appear-

ance of impropriety" standard contained in the Model Code

indicates that the substantial relationship test should be solely

concerned with ensuring "actual fairness" in the proceedings. But

Northwest does not mention loyalty, itself a substantial addition

under the Rules. As several commentators have noted, the Model

Code provided no express protection to the former client's interest

in loyalty. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE

LAW OF LAWYERING 292 (1991); Wolfram, supra, at 363 (1986). This

interest is singled out only under the Rules. See Texas Rule 1.06

Comment 1 ("Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's

relationship to a client"); ABA Rule 1.9 Comment ("The second

aspect of loyalty to a client is the lawyer's obligation to decline

subsequent representations involving positions adverse to a former

client arising in substantially related matters"); Hazard & Hodes,

supra, at 292-93; Wolfram, supra, at 361; Sutton, supra, at 147;

STEPHEN GILLERS, WHAT WE TALKED ABOUT WHEN WE TALKED ABOUT

ETHICS: A CRITICAL VIEW OF THE MODEL RULES, 46 Ohio St.L.J. 243,

250-55 (1985).

The Rules' express establishment of loyalty and confidenti-

ality as the interests protected by the substantial relationship test

is a return to 7.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113

F.Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), where the court held that

once it is established that the two representations are substantially

related,

[t]he court will assume that during the course of

the former representation confidences were dis-

closed to the attorney bearing on the subject

matter of the representation. It will not inquire into

their nature and extent. Only in this manner can the

lawyer's duty of absolute fidelity be enforced and the

spint of the rule relating to privileged communications

be maintained.

Id. (emphasis added).

We believe the replacement of the "appearance of

impropriety" with loyalty provides no basis for altering the

A-30

substantial relationship test found in our precedents. This is

because we read our cases involving Canon 9 as protecting the

same interest in loyalty now explicitly provided for under the

Rules. As the Comment to ABA Rule 1.9 notes, "[rlepresentation

adverse to a former client was sometimes dealt with under the

rubric of Canon 9 of the Model Code." This was true of this court

as well as others.

The link between loyalty and the appearance of impropri-

ety is most evident in Brennan’s Inc. v. Brennan’s Restaurants, Inc.,

590 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1979), where the court disqualified a

former counsel even though there was no chance that confidential

information might be used against the former client. We held:

The obligation of an attorney not to misuse infor-

mation acquired in the course of representation

serves to vindicate the trust and reliance that

clients place in their attorneys. A client would feel

wronged if an opponent prevailed against him with

the aid of an attorney who formerly represented

the clients in the same matter. As the court recog-

nized in E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F.Supp.

371, 395 (S.D. Tex. 1969), this would undermine

public confidence in the legal system as a means

for adjudicating disputes.

590 F.2d at 172. As Professors Hazard and Koniak observe: “In

Brennan’s, the Court recognizes two underlying concerns of the

substantial relationship test: the duty to preserve confidences and

the duty of loyalty to a former client." GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & SUSAN

P. KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 658 (1990). See also

E.R Hutton & Company v. Brown, 305 F.Supp. 371, 395 (S.D.Tex.

A-31

1969) ("If courts protect only a client's disclosures to his attorney,

and fail to safeguard the attorney-client relationship itself -- a

relationship which must be one of trust and reliance -- they can

only undermine the public's confidence in the legal system as a

means for adjudicating disputes."); Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1027 ("the

integrity of the judicial system would be sullied if courts tolerated

such abuses by those who profess and owe undivided loyalty to

their clients"); In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530

F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1976) (prohibition of representation of

conflicting interests rests on lawyers duties of loyalty and confi-

dentiality); Cf In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litigation, 748 F.2d

157, 161-62 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Agent Orange Product Liability

Litigation, 800 F.2d 14, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1986).

As these decision suggest, the existence of a lawyer's duty

of loyalty means that the substantial relationship test is not solely

concerned with the adverse use of confidential information. What

the duty of loyalty adds to the duty of confidentiality is clearly

presented in Corrugated:

Container's complaint is that the district court

failed to explain how [the lawyer's] advice would

be relevant or substantially related to this action.

The advice does not need to be "relevant" in the

evidentiary sense to be "substantially related." It

need only be akin to present action in a way

reasonable persons would understand as important

to the issues involved.

Corrugated, 659 F.2d at 1346 (emphasis added).

ry gos. Napa 5 PE A ea SERS Eee aD

We emphasize "advice" because a court solely concerned

with the possible adverse use of confidential information might

not be obliged to protect legal advice. As at least one court has

noted, "the concern of the Confidentiality Rule and the case law

is the protection of what the clients tells his attorney, not what the

attormey tells the client." Laker Atrways Ltd. v. Pan Amencan World

Airways, 103 F.R.D. 22, 40 (D.D.C. 1984) (emphasis added). We

agree that the confidentiality rule was historically concerned with

disclosures, but we are also persuaded that the substantial

relationship test cannot be reduced to a confidentiality rule. See

Texas Rule 1.07. That is, because the substantial relationship test

is concerned with both a lawyer's duty of confidentiality and his

duty of loyalty, a lawyer who has given advice in a substantially

related matter must be disqualified, whether or not he has gained

confidences.

We agree with Northwest that the "appearance of impro-

priety" has no relevance to our probe of ethical restraints. It does

not follow, however, that the focus of the substantial relationship

test now becomes the “actual fairness" of the trial. Such a shift is

premised on the view that eliminating the appearance of impro-

priety reduces the substantial relationship test to a concern for

confidential information. We believe that such a reduction is

precluded by a lawyer's duty of loyalty. Because Canon 9 was pri-

marily interpreted by the court as a way to protect a client's

loyalty interests, we believe that our application of the substantial

relationship test under the Rules is the same as it was under the

Code.

We believe that disqualification of VE would be appropri-

ate even under the relaxed “actual prejudice" or "taint" standard

Northwest urges this court to adapt. As we explain below, the

relationship between the matters in which VE has represented

American and the instant litigation is so intimate that VE's con-

tinued involvement does threaten to compromise the integrity of

the present trial. Our continued adherence to the substantial

relationship test rests on our belief that the ethical prohibition

against successive representation cannot be reduced to the

protection of clients' confidences, let alone protecting these

confidences only to the extent that their adverse use might "taint"

the trial, as Northwest's proposal would provide. Rather, a

lawyer's obligation of confidentiality must be seen as part of the

lawyer's primary duty of loyalty, a duty that is not exhausted by

the preservation of a former client's secrets. We believe that a

single inquiry into whether past and present representations are

substantialiy related provides the best means to protect these two

interests of clients.

Because it recognizes these two interests, the substantial

relationship test serves not only to ensure the fairness of particular

trials, but also to safeguard the integrity of the attorney-client

relationship. If the sole focus of the substantial relationship test

was the possible adverse use of confidences, prior representations

in which the attorney advised the client but received no confiden-

A-34

tial information would not warrant disqualification. Even if the

subject matter of case one and case two is identical, a former

client's adversary is not inevitably advantaged by virtue of his

attorney's prior representation of the client. And yet this court has

held that the provision of legal advice on a substantially related

matter by itself requires disqualification. See Corrugated, 659 F.2d

at 1346-47; Brennan's, 590 F.2d at 171-72.

Disqualification rules not only preserve the purity of

particular trials but also unavoidably affect relationships among

attorneys and clients in general. This court bars attorneys from

appearing in substantially related matters not only to protect

individual parties against the adverse use of information but also

“to aid the frank exchange between attorney and client." Wilson P.

Abraham Const. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 252 (5th

Cir. 1977); see also In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation,

530 F.2d 83, 90 (Sth Cir. 1976). A post hoc inquiry into whether

a particular attorney's involvement in a particular suit might "taint"

the case in no way provides the breadth and "predictability of

confidence [that] is central to the role of the attorney." Jn re LTV

Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595, 602 (N.D.Tex. 1981); cf. Upjohn

Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S. Ct. 677, 683-84, 66 L.

Ed. 584 (1981). The trust a lawyer's duty of loyalty inspires in

clients encourages them freely to confide in the lawyer and freely

to rely on the advice provided by the lawyer. The substantial

relationship test aims to protect the adversary process but also, or

as part of this concern, seeks to provide conditions for the

A-35

attorney-client relationship. What credence, for example, might

American have attached to VE's December 1990 counsel that the

airline's interests would be better served by postponing the

acquisition of Continental for at least a year if it even suspected

that VE itself might soon be representing one of its competitors in

a suit against Amevican, charging that it had abused its market

power to the detriment of competition in the airline passenger

service markets?

These considerations preclude us from accepting North-

west's final argument. Northwest claims that because VE relied

primarily on public, not confidential, information in advising

American, these prior matters cannot be considered substantially

related to the present case. It contends that "'[flacts that are

community knowledge or that are not material to a determination

of the issues litigated do not constitute "matters involved" wfthin

the meaning of the law' governing the substantial relationship test"

(quoting J/.K. © Susie L. Wadley Research Inst. & Blood Bank v.

Morns, 776 S.W.2d 271, 278 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, orig.

proceeding)). The record sharply contradicts Northwest's claim

that all of the material obtained by VE was publicly available. As

we discuss below, VE was privy to many of American's secrets.

But Northwest's argument would fail even if it could show that all

of the information provided by American was public knowledge.

Our precedents, the Texas Rules, and the ABA Rules all reject the

position Northwest advances. This court has held that "[i]nformat-

ion [provided by a client] is sheltered from use by the attorney

A-36

against his client by virtue of the existence of the attorney-client

relationship. This is true without regard to whether someone else

may be privy to it." Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants, Inc.,

590 F.2d 168, 172 (Sth Cir. 1979). "'This ethical precept

exists without regard to the nature or source of information or the

fact that others share the knowledge." Jd. (quoting Model Code

EC 4-4); Doe v. A Corp., 709 F.2d 1043, 1046 (5th Cir. 1983)

(same). See also Emle Industries, Inc. v. Pantentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562,

572-73 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[t]he client's privilege in confidential

information disclosed to his attorney ‘is not nullified by the fact

that the circumstances to be disclosed are part of a public record,

or that there are other available sources for such information")

(quoting HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 135 (1953)); NCK Organi

zation Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1976) (same).

The Texas and ABA Rules supply the same standard. The

Rules do contain an exception for public information, but in each

case this exception applies only to the provision prohibiting use

of confidential information, not the rule prohibiting the successive

representation in substantially related matters. Texas Rule 1.05

provides that "a lawyer shall not knowingly

(3) [ulse confidential information of a former client to the

disadvantage of the former client after the representation

is concluded unless the former client consents after

consultation or the confidential information has become

generally known."

Texas Rule 1.05 (b) (3) (emphasis added). This provision, however,

is incorporated by Rule 1.09(a) (2), not the substantial relationship

rule contained in Rule 1.09 (a) (3). The same distinction exists

between Rules 1.9(a) and 1.9(c) of the ABA Rules, as commenta-

tors have indicated. See, eg., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN

LEGAL ETHICS 360, 365 (1986).

We believe that our application of the substantial relation-

ship test under the Rules is the same as it was under the Code

Thus, as in our past cases, our inquiry is limited to the single

question of whether VE's prior representations of American are

substantially related to the present case.

B.

VE represented American in several matters in recent

years, earning fees in excess of $676,000. Our review will be

limited to three of VE's prior representations. VE defended

American in two suits brought by Continental in Texas. The focus

of each case, as in the larger California litigation to which they

were related, was SABRE, American's computerized reservation

system. The first case, System One Direct Access, Inc. v. American

Airlines Inc., was an antitrust suit brought by a Continental affiliate

in Houston federal court. VE served as counsel from November

1987 until withdrc-ving in July 1988 when the case was trans-

ferred to Dallas.

VE also served as lead counsel in Continental Airlines, Inc.

v. Amencan Airlines, Inc., a Texas state court case. Continental

alleged that American had breached contractual relationships and

committed other acts of misconduct in operating its CRS. VE

represented American from March 1989 until the case was settled

A-38

as part of the global settlement between Continental and Ameri-

can in May 1990.

In late 1990, VE advised American concerning whether the

Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice would approve

“Project Armadillo," a proposed acquisition of Continental Airlines.

The primary question was whether a merger of the two airlines

would run afoul of the Department's merger guidelines. The

representation ended in January 1991, when American apparently

chose not to pursue the merger.

The two Texas cases were related and subsidiary to a

larger suit by Continental and Northwest, among others, against

American and United Airlines in California federal district court in

1985. Continental and Northwest charged American and United

with monopolization of both computerized reservation systems

and various air transportation markets.’ In particular, they charged

predatory pricing of CRS systems and air transportation, closely

related to the claim advanced by Northwest and Continental here.

American asserts, and Northwest appears to concede, that

the California case is substantially related to the present case.

However, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, not VE, represented Ameri-

can in California, so the similarities between the California case

and the present one provide no basis for disqualification. Ameri-

See In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Systems Antitrust

Litigation, 694 F.Supp. 1443 (C.D.Cal. 1988); aff'd Alaska Airlines, Inc. v.

United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, _ US.

___, 112 S. Ct. 1603, 118 L. Ed.2d 316 (1992).

A-39

can's argument that VE's prior representations are substantially

related to this case rests largely upon its claim that the Texas cases

are substantially related to the California case.

Northwest argues that the Texas cases are not substantially

related to this case because the allegations in these cases, unlike

in California, pertained only to CRS services, not air transportation

services. We disagree. While the focus was certainly CRS systems,

the plaintiffs also raised claims involving air transportation

markets. Moreover, as we will explain, the Texas cases involved

two particular matters at issue in the present Case.

(1) Fort Bend

Fort Bend involved the state-law claims over which the

California district court, upon American's motion to dismiss, had

declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction. Continental alleged

breach of contract, duress, tortious interference, misrepresentation,

and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. As in

California, Continental's petition focused on American's CRS

operations. But also as in California, Continental asserted that

American's power in the CRS market could not be considered

apart from its position in the air transportation market. Continental

claimed that "American and United, by leveraging their domi-

nance as air carriers and the enormous secret profits they received

from bias-diverted revenues, established themselves as the

dominant CRS providers." Continental charged that American,

having achieved dominance in the CRS market, in turn used

SABRE to “exclude[| Continental in whole or in part from specific

A-40

airline passenger markets." Continental's claims were stated in a

similar manner. Continental claimed that American had breached

its contract by "secretly accessing TXI'S [a Continental affiliate]

data base and using it to study passenger traffic flow through the

Dallas/Fort Worth hub. Reports developed by American through

the use of the TXI data contributed to American's successful exclu-

sion of TX! from the Dallas/Fort Worth hub and elsewhere." In its

tortious interference claim Continental alleged that American had

"interfered with Continental's prospective contractual relations

with its travel agents and air passengers," causing damages in the

form of “lost airline bookings through bias diversions and total

exclusion from certain air passenger markets." Finally, Continental

noted that the California district court had cited American

President Robert Crandall's alleged 1982 price- fixing solicitation

of Braniff as "a textbook example of anticompetitive conduct" in

ruling that “Continental could proceed to trial on its claim that

American illegally attempted to monopolize the Dallas-Fort Worth

airport."

Continental's allegations and its reference to Crandall's

alleged price-fixing solicitation apparently supplied the basis for

the belief among VE and Gibson, Dunn lawyers that American's

alleged attempted monopolization of DFW would be at issue in

the case and that Continental might seek to introduce the

price-fixing incident as evidence on this score. As such, they

believed that Fort Bend was intimately related to the California

case. For example, a VE partner stated at the time that the

A-41

California and Fort Bend suits “involve the same parties, the same

alleged acts, and the same alleged damages." Another VE lawyer

noted that the two suits could be seen as "largely identical": "[The

Fort Band petition] asserts that AA and UA used their purported

CRS monopolies to obtain monopoly power in certain air

transportation markets. This claim is intertwined with both the

CRS monopolization and DFW attempted monopolization claims

pending in California." The perceived similarities between Fort

Bend and the California case led VE and Gibson, Dunn to spend

considerable time exploring the possibility of an abatement of the

Fort Bend case until the California proceedings had concluded.

VE argues that Crandall's alleged price-fixing solicitation

and Continental's claim that American had used its CRS to

exclude it from the DFW market were not at issue in Fort Bend.

This contention in contradicted by the accounts of Gibson, Dunn

lawyers and by notes taken by a VE lawyer during one meeting

between VE and Gibson, Dunn. While it is difficult to reconstruct

a conversation from this distance, we are struck by the first two

comments on the first page of notes: 1) "There is no admissible

evidence of the Crandall telephone conversation on Braniff; may

use it on a consequential damages theory that Continental

excluded from DFW market." 2) "We should argue that the

exclusion claim is being litigated in California and should not be

litigated in Texas." Given the allegations in the complaint, the

statements of VE's lawyers at the time, and this evidence it is

A-42

difficult to maintain that these matters were not at issue in Fort

Bend.

The charges of monopolization of DFW and Crandall's

alleged solicitation are prominently featured in Northwest's

current complaint. Northwest alleges that American has monopo-

lized or attempted to monopolize five different air transportation

markets. Dallas-Fort Worth is included as an "illustrative example"

in three of the five markets cited by Northwest: origin and

destination city pair markets, 0 & D airport-airport pair markets,

and 0 & D based hub markets. It cannot be denied that one focus

of the case will be American's DFW operations, the very market

at issue in Fort Bend.

Similarly, Northwest contends in its complaint that "AA

and its current chief executive officer have previously engaged in

anticompetitive conduct with open contempt for the antitrust

laws." Northwest prominently cites Crandall's alleged price-fixing

solicitation, the same allegation that VE lawyers were charged

with excluding in the Fort Bend case. VE suggested at oral

argument that Crandall's alleged solicitation is not substantially

related to the present case because this ten-year old incident

would not be admitted as evidence. This is helpful but not

dispositive. As the Corrugated court stated, the subject matter "does

not need to be ‘relevant' in the evidentiary sense to be 'substan-

tially related.' It need only be akin to the present action in a way

reasonable persons would understand as important to the issues

.

involved." Corrugated, 659 F.2d at 1346. Northwest included the

A-43

incident under the heading "Conduct Giving Rise to Violations

Alleged" in its complaint. This is not easily explained away,

especially given Northwest's heavy reliance on the location of the

Crandall allegation in the Fort Bend petition's "procedural history"

in attempting to prove that the incident was not at issue in that

case.

We are persuaded that VE's representation of American in

the Fort Bend case is substantially related to the present case.

(2) System One

In System One, Continental affiliate System One, a CRS

vendor, charged that American had violated antitrust laws in its

provision of CRS services. System One alleged that American had

engaged in a variety of acts designed to exclude it from the CRS

market. But as in Fort Bend, plaintiff presented the CRS and air

transportation markets as inextricably linked. The System One

complaint alleged that "AA has used its monopoly power in the

provision of air carrier services in various geographic markets to

obtain, retain, and enhance its power in the provision of CRS

systems." Again, “AA has achieved its dominant position in the

market for CRS services, and continues to enforce anticompetitive

practices in an effort to maintain that position, not only to reap

monopoly profits from the sale and use of CRS systems, but to

enhance profits from the provision of air transportation services."

The record reflects extensive discovery regarding SABRE's

effects on air transportation revenues. System One requested all

documents relating to the “incremental revenues," the general

A-44

effect of "airline ownership of a CRS on the airline's sale of air

transportation services," and “any actual or possible loss of

revenue or other detriment to any commercial air carrier as a

result of the operation or installation of SABRE." In response,

American agreed to produce all documents "that discuss, study, or

analyze whether, and the extent to which, any airline (including

American) which owns a CRS obtains incremental airline revenue

as a consequence of automating travel agencies with its CRS" as

well as "documents discussing whether American has a 'premium

share' of the traffic in a particular region or market and whether

this is attributable to the presence of SABRE in that region or

market."

In the absence of this prior litigation, there in little doubt

that Northwest would seek to introduce evidence of the incremen-

tal revenues generated by SABRE in support of the predatory

pricing claims it raises in this case. Northwest's General Counsel

recently asserted in congressional testimony that American's

ability

to restructure and reduce its fares dramatically is

directly related to American's long-term, advanta-

geous use of its CRS .. . . DOT studies repeatedly

have documented the flow of hundreds of millions

of dollars of incremental revenue diverted from

other carriers to American and United as a result

of their CRS market power ... "[I]n a very rea!

sense, American has launched its predatory attack

on the industry using our own money.

It is the case that challenges by Northwest and Continental

of American's CRS use have been earlier terminated in ways

A-45

restricting their present assertion, Continental by settlement and

Northwest by a final judgment. Pointing to these outcomes, VE

states that it will not, because it cannot, raise any issues relating

to CRS in this case. Any attempts to redress perceived CRS abuses

by American will be confined, as the congressional testimony

suggests, to the legislature. Since American's CRS operation will

not be at issue, VE contends that its representation of American on

this matter cannot be substantially related to this case. Northwest

in particular claims that the issues of incremental revenue and

costs addressed in System One relate to CRS use and are quite

different from the general airline revenue and cost issues at the

center of this case.

We recognize that several possible claims relating to CRS

might be barred by res judicata and we do not question North-

west's representations in this court and below that the present

litigation will involve no attacks on American's CRS use. We are

not persuaded, however, by Northwest's argument that a party's

representation that matters in which a lawyer represented a former

client cannot, or will not, be introduced in the present case

precludes a court from finding these matters substantially related

to the prior representations. The exact scope of categories such as

"CRS matters," especially at the early stage of the litigation when

motions to disqualify are often considered, is unclear, and leaves

much room for good faith dispute among the parties. The party

who either lost in the previous case or represented to the court

that certain matters will not be raised will attempt to define the

A-46

sphere of these issues narrowly, while the party who prevailed in

the earlier case or filed an unsuccessful disqualification notion

will naturally attempt to define the precluded matters quite

broadly. In the particular case of res judicata, it places the former

counsel in the position of attempting to minimize the beneficial

results of her prior representations by limiting their effect in the

present Case.

The facts of this case disclose how such a dispute might

arise. Northwest claims that System One involved the particular

matter of incremental revenues obtained by American through

ownership of a CRS. Northwest states that the focus in this case

will be on wholly different matters such as American's marketing

strategy ticket pricing, and general airline costs and revenues. The

line between incremental revenues and general revenues,

however, does not appear as distinct as VE suggests. Moreover,

American hotly disputes VE's contention that discovery in System

One was limited to the narrow issue of incremental revenues. To

the contrary, American asserts that the VE lawyers reviewed and

discussed documents relating to marketing strategy and general air

transportation revenues and costs, the very matters Northwest

identifies as the heart of the instant case.

There is another matter involved in System One that

Northwest has indicated will be at issue in this case. Northwest

must focus at trial upon barriers to entry into the relevant markets.

Ir its complaint, Northwest lists among these barriers "the role of

| agents in the industry and incentive commissions paid by

A-47

airlines to travel agents and other marketing programs and

devices." Incentive or override commissions in particular were at

the center of the System One case.

System One charged that American used override commis-

SIONS as a means to exclude it from the CRS market: "AA condi-

tioned the payment to travel agents of commissions on AA ticket

sales on their agreement to use the SABRE system." As System

One explained, this arrangement worked especially well in those

areas where American was the dominant air carrier. In connection

with this claim, American agreed to produce and searched for

"[djocuments that describe or discuss American's policies and

procedures regarding participation by travel agencies in any

override, special incentive or ‘soft dollar' commissions program

offered by American." American asserts, and Northwest does not

appear to contest, that VE lawyers reviewed much of this material.

A VE lawyer and several VE paralegals spent more than ten weeks

reviewing documents at American's offices. Gibson, Dunn lawyers

who were involved claim that a VE lawyer personally reviewed

documents relating to marketing strategy and air transportation

issues. The materials submitted with the Gibson, Dunn affidavits

provide additional support for these claims. VE 's description of its

work on the case does little to contradict these accounts. Its

response is limited to a statement by the ‘awyer that he has no

specific recollection of documents reviewed and that he does not

believe, “given the nature of the case," that he "reviewed any

documents relating to American's pricing of airline transportation."

ll A

Northwest contends that the presence of the issue of

override commissions in System One and the instant case does

not make the two representations substantially related. Northwest

argues that the two cases are not related because in System One

the commissions were alleged to be a barrier to entry into the CRS

market, while here they represent a barrier to entry into the air

transportation market. Regardless of the direction of the block the

trial must focus on the exclusionary force of CRS--its power to

exclude competition in CRS is the handmaiden of its exclusionary

force on airline passenger service

We therefore find Northwest's purported distinction

unavailing. Corrugated and Duncan provide that two representa

tions need only involve the same “subject matter’ in order to be

substantially related. See Corrugated, supra; Dun upra. As the

summary of the document request quoted above J ~ ~ ses, VE

lawyers reviewed documents relating to travel agency commis

sions in general, not simply those documents referring to the

alleged practice of tying such commissions to CRS use. A

substantial relationship exists when the prior representation

concerns “the particular practices and procedures which are the

subject matter of [Northwest's] suit." Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1032

Both System One and the present case involve American's travel

agency commission "practices and procedures." Given that the

two cases sharing this “subject matter’ allege similar antitrust

violaiions, we find VE's representation of American in System One

substantially related to its present representation of Northwest

A-49

(3) Project Armadillo

VE represented American most recently in "Project

Armadillo," an American proposai to acquire Continental. VI

provided American with antitrust analysis of the proposal, focusing

on whether a merger of the two airlines could avoid challenge

under the Department of Justice antitrust merger guidelines. VE's

representation began in late November 1990 and concluded in

early January 1991, when American chose not to pursue the

acquisition

As a memorandum prepared by American explained, the

Ueparntment of Justice merger guidelines’ main concern 4s

‘whether the merger will likely create, enhance or fac ilitate the

exercise of market power--the ability to raise prices to supracomp

etitive levels--by the remaining participants in the relevant

market." Market power is more easily inferred under narrowly

defined markets, and it was therefore in American's interest to

avoid “la] market definition that is improperly narrow," for this

would “result in such a high level of concentration that, inevitably,

a court will conclude the merger poses an incipient threat to

competition.

Ihese same issues are at the hear of the present case

Northwest alleges that American has monopolized or attermpted

to monopolize the national air transportation market as well as

four smaller geographic markets involving city pairs and regions

secause American enjoys a greater share of particular regional

markets, Northwest will no doubt attempt to prove at tral that

these smaller markets are relevant. To this end, Northwest cites

four instances where American has allegedly indicated that O &

D and regional passenger markets are relevant markets

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We have no reason to suggest that VE's misstatements are

other than oversights, and, because they pertain only to the degree

of its involvement in Project Armadillo, are secondary to the main

question of the subject matter of VE's representation. Northwest

contends that VE's representation of American does not warrant

disqualification for two related reasons. Northwest asserts that VI

was Charged with a single "narrow, straightforward question" to

which the answer was “obvious": Would the Justice Department

oppose a complete merger of Continental and American on

A-51

antitrust grounds? Northwest claims that the problem posed to VE

required little detailed analysis and that all the information needed

by VE to reach its conclusion "was and is publicly available."

Because VE required no confidential information to determine that

the merger would not be approved by the Justice Department,

Northwest contends that VE's representation provides no basis for

disqualification.

The record sharply contradicts Northwest's claim that all

of the material supplied by American to VE was publicly avail-

able. But Northwest's argument would fail even if it could show

that all of the information provided by American was a matter of

public knowledge. As we explained above, the substantial

relationship test, as set out in our precedents and the Rules,

contains no exception for prior representations in which an

attorney's advice was based on public information. Accordingly,

the question is not whether VE's representation of American in

Project Armadillo involved matters of public knowledge but

whether the subject matter of the prior representation in substan-

tially related to the present case.

American argues that the primary issue in Project

Armadillo, as in this case, was market definition. Not only did VE

represent American on this same issue, but VE was also in a

position to obtain information regarding American's views on the

proper measure of markets, views which Northwest's complaint

suggests are relevant to the present case. Northwest recognizes

that market definition will be crucial in this case, but argues that

A-52

VE's treatment of this issue in Project Armadillo was superficial

and limited. While conceding that "[mlore difficult questions

could have been raised had American been interested in a partial

acquisition," Northwest contends that the “only issue with which

American was concerned was whether it would be challenged if

it attempted to acquire all of Continental's operations." According

to Northwest, "[t]he answer to American's question was obvious

. . .Anyone familiar with American's hub operations in Dallas and

Continental's Houston hub operations would realize that Ameri-

can and Continental are major competitors in this region and that

their combination would be subject to challenge."

The record demonstrates, however, that the subject matter

was far more complex, and VE's analysis far more extensive, than

Northwest's account suggests. A VE partner's notes from the first

meeting between VE and American indicate that American was

interested in a partial acquisition from the very start: "AA would

be interested in the entire company but there are certain opera-

tions that are particularly important . . . They would be willing to

divest some operations." VE's investigation could not have "rested

largely" on Continental's strong Houston presence, for when this

question was brought up in the first meeting, VE noted that "AA

could sell the Houston hub." Thus, sometime after the meeting a

VE partner sent a memo to American explaining that he had

“spoke(n] at some length" with American's economist and asked

that the market share data be rerun on the assumption that

American would not acquire Continental's Houston hub. While

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Northwest now asserts that VE's advice was based largely on the

Houston hub, a VE partner at the time stated in yet another memo

that even when Houston is removed from consideration, “substan-

tial problems are created by Continental's other hubs particularly

New York City, Chic ago, Cleveland, and Denver." as well as by

the “substantial overlaps between Continental and American on

flights to Mexico." Northwest's contention that Pri ject Armadillo

involved the single question of a con plete merger and required

study of only a few markets is simply belied by the ree ord

Similarly, it does not appear that market definition and the

Justice Department's opposition to the merger were as "obvious"

as Northwest now asserts. Northwest argues that market definition

cannot be a common issue between this matter and the present

case because unlike in the present case, where market definition

will be hotly disputed, the Department of Justice merger guide-

lines left little room for discussion. A VE law yer's notes from the

first Project Armadillo meeting, however, discloses a different

picture:

[American is] reluctant to take positions in connec-

tion with a Continental merger that might be

inconsistent with the positions they are taking

elsewhere. This issue came up in connection with

the discussions of markets. Apparently they have

developed a variety of different views about what

are relevant markets. (It appears to me that maybe

their argument is there are no relevant markets).

Evidently the material that they will be sending us

discusses relevant markets, discusses the “city pair

analysis and competition among hubs. . . . Appar-

A-54

ently they have taken the position that hubs are

not markets... .

In addition, Northwest contends that the Department of Justice's

merger guidelines made the answer obvious. This is not the

position that VE took during the representation, however. Upon

receiving a memo prepared by American setting out the difficu!ties

to merger under the city-pair analysis, a VE partner responded that

the memo was “only the beginning of the analysis in my view."

The VE lawyer then went on to suggest that American might be

able to acquire Continental even though the merger might

"violate" the guidelines.

We are forced to the conclusion that the question of

market definition in Project Armadillo was more complex than

Northwest now asserts. VE's representation of American neces-

sarily required a detailed evaluation of American's operations in

the various markets that might be deemed relevant. The instant

case will involve similar issues.

VE was also privy to American's views of the relevant air

transportation markets, a related matter that will also be at issue

in the present case. American provided VE with materials

reflecting AA's position on antitrust issues in prior merger/

acquisition cases. Included in these materials were confidential

“white papers" filed by American with the Justice Depdrtment.

In support of its claim that markets other than the national

market are relevant in the present case, Northwest's complaint

asserts that American “has repeatedly urged that O & D markets

A-55

and regional airline passenger markets are relevant economic

markets." Three of the examples cited by Northwest in support of

this allegation appear to be taken from public testimony. The

fourth is different: "AA argued to the Department of Justice in

1989 that city pair markets to and from O'Hare Airport constitute

relevant markets." Northwest does not deny that this statement is

contained in the materials obtained by VE from American during

Project Armadillo. Nor does Northwest claim that this statement

is a matter of public knowledge. Rather, Northwest states that it

simply copied Continental's complaint in drafting its own. Since

Northwest's complaint did not involve any independent research

by VE, the argument seems to run, the allegation cannot possibly

be based on confidential information supplied by American. We

would first point out that Northwest's explanation remains

plausible only so long as the complaint remains the sole docu-

ment involved in the case. Northwest will eventually have to

address the issues, including American's alleged views on the

relevant market, on its own. More importantly, the answer given

by Northwest is precisely one the substantial relationship test

forbids. Once a substantial relationship has been established,

former counsel is precluded from attempting to prove that he did

not receive confidences. See, e.g., Corrugated, 659 F.2d at 1347.

Northwest's response here--that VE might have obtained the

information, but did not use it--is plainly barred by our prece-

dents

A-56

We appreciate Northwest's concern that an overly broad

reading of "subject matter’ can leave antitrust counselors with one

client per industry--a result with little redemptive value. The nexus

here is far more than case one and case two both presenting

claims of attempted monopolization. Northwest contends that

cases like Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 103

F.R.D. 22 (D.D.C 1984), preclude us from disqualifying VE. But

American's showing in this case goes far beyond the same field,

same party "points of contact" found insufficient in that case. See

id. at 40. Rather, American has succeeded in "delineatling with

specificity the subject matters, issues and causes of action"

common to prior and present representations in the manner

demanded by our precedents. Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1029.

VI

We hold that VE's prior representations of American in

substantially related matters require the disqualification of VE in

this case. We therefore issue a writ of mandamus directing the

district court to vacate its order denying American's motion and

enter an order disqualifying VE from representing Northwest.

B-1

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

GALVESTON DIVISION

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES,

INC.,

Plaintiff,

Vv.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

and AMR CORPORATION,

Defendants,

CONSOLIDATED WITH

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

C.A. NO. G-92-266

Wi

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

and AMR CORPORATION,

MMMM MOONOMMMOMDAMOMAMM MMM MM

Defendants.

ORDER

Before the Court are the Defendants’ and the Plaintiff

Northwest Airlines, Inc.'s Motions to Disqualify Counsel. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court is of the opinion that both

motions should be DENIED.

I.

Defendants argue that Vinson & Elkins should be disquali-

fied as Northwest's counsel on three separate grounds: 1) Vinson

& Elkins' prior agreement to represent Defendants in this litigation;

2) Vinson & Elkins' representation of Defendants in other matters;

and 3) Vinson & Elkins' receipt of confidential information related

to this litigation. The Court has carefully examined the dumbfoun-

dingly voluminous pleadings on file regarding these contentions

and finds that each is without sufficient merit to warrant disqualifi-

cation.

There is some evidence in the record that there was some

mixup as to whether Vinson & Elkins would be able to represent

Defendants. Similarly, there is some evidence that Vinson & Elkins

has represented Defendants in regard other, unrelated matters.

And there is some evidence that a confidential memorandum was

sent to Vinson & Elkins.

On the other hand, the mixup concerning Vinson & Elkins'

availability was brief, and the Court finds, based on the totality of

the circumstances, that Vinson & Elkins need not be disqualified.

Similarly, Vinson & Elkins has not represented Defendants for

quite some time, and the matters that it did handle for Defendants

were only tangentially related to this litigation. In this regard, the

Court notes that, for instance, in the admiralty bar on the Texas

Gulf Coast, it is customary, in the aftermath of a maritime

collision, for those firms that represent underwriters to agree to

represent the first client that contacts the firm. Thus, in one case

B-3

the firm may find itself on the opposite side of an underwriter

which was its client in another matter. In the Court's view, this

analogy adequately describes the situation here. Finally, although

the confidential memorandum was undoubtedly sent to Vinson &

Elkins, no one at the firm read the memo, and the Court believes

that, on the facts of this case, the mere sending of the memo by

Defendants' other counsel is not sufficient to require disqualifica-

tion. The Court has read the cases cited by Defendants. They are,

however, not binding on this Court, and the Court respectfully

declines to follow them to the extent that they can be read as

mandating disqualification in this case based solely on the receipt

of an unread memo, regardless of other factors. Moreover, any

information actually received by Vinson & Elkins was not

sufficient to cause any material prejudice to Defendants in this

litigation. Based on the Court's perception of the totality of the

circumstances, the Court concludes that Defendants' motion

should be DENIED.'

' In this regard, the Court notes with pleasure its receipt of the

affidavit of Dean John F. Sutton, Jr., a gentleman personally known to

this Court to be of the highest moral character and integrity, as well as

an acknowledged expert in the fields of professional responsibility and

attorney conduct. Although the Court did not rely on Dean Sutton's

affidavit in reaching any of its conclusions, the Court certainly agrees

with Dean Sutton that “the concept of ‘taint' of a trial involves a

balancing of various interests and goals of the lawyers and the parties to

the litigation. Among these interests are the interests not only of [the]

movant not to be prejudiced . . . but the affirmative interest of a litigant

in being represented by counsel of his choice and the interest of the

public in courts' business not being hampered by tactical maneuvering

with disqualification motions." In ruling on these motions, the Court has

II.

The Court has also considered the submissions regarding

Northwest's Motion to Disqualify Weil, Gotshal & Manges.

Although this motion appears to have more merit than Defen-

dants' Motion to Disqualify, the Court finds, in the totality of

circumstances, that it has not been sufficiently shown that Weil,

Gotshal & Manges must be disqualified from representing

Defendants.’

ITI.

Implicit in any Motion to Disqualify is the notion that

counsel may use confidential information it has obtained for some

improper purpose. The Court is well and personally acquainted

with most, if not all, counsel associated with this litigation, and

been guided by similar notions of the appropriate standards by which to

judge disqualification motions.

? The Court hastens to point out that although it treats both

Motions to Disqualify in summary fashion in this Order, the Court has

gone to great lengths to study all the pleadings and has reached its

decision "“only after painstaking analysis of the facts and precise

application of precedent."" Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &

Smith, 646 F.2d 1020, 1029 (Sth Cir. Unit B June 1981) (quoting

Brennan’s Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 173-74 (Sth

Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F.Supp. 345,

367 (S.D.N.Y. 1955))). In most cases, the Court goes to some lengths to

explain its reasoning process for the benefit of the parties. In this case,

as explained more fully below, the Court is convinced, based on the

submissions, that these motions were filed primarily for tactical reasons.

Therefore, although the Court has considered all the materials offered

and has engaged in substantial deliberations, it has taken the liberty of

reducing its explanation to a more summary form.

phen Shir, Paes Sak

B-5

the Court believes that, given the intelligence and creativity of

counsel, the size and resources of the law firms involved, and the

nature of the events and transactions complained of, the parties

can, through the use of "Chinese walls" and other measures, take

mutually agreeable steps to ensure that no impropriety or appear-

ance of impropriety improperly taints this litigation.

IV.

More to the point, the Court is disturbed by the course this

litigation is taking, even now in its earliest stages. First, the Defen-

dants' Motion to Disqualify Counsel and related Replies and

supporting materials are some of the most condescending

pleadings that have ever been presented to this Court. Defendants

repeatedly state that the rule the Court "must apply" is clear, but

imply that this Court lacks the intelligence to determine and apply

the correct rule. However, although Defendants cite some Fifth

Circuit case law to support general propositions, the bulk of the

authority relied on by Defendants to support their position consists

of nonbinding decisions dealing with substantially different fact

patterns.

Even more disturbing is the sheer tonnage of pleadings and

supporting materials that have been filed regarding these motions.

The Court has instructed the Deputy Clerk to weigh and measure

these materials, and the Clerk reports that the filings, on the

disqualification issue alone, form a stack approximately 45 inches

high and weighing 117 pounds. Jn the Court’s view, rarely has a

court been presen ted with a more blatant exa mple of the use of disqualifi-

B-6

cation motions for tactical purposes. The Court considers the parties’

conduct in filing these pleadings to be a gross abuse of the resources of

this Court. Obviously the Court cannot entertain such filings on every

motion that is filed in this case, or in any case. Otherwise the Court's

entire docket would grind to a halt. More importantly, the Court has no

intention of allowing this litigation to degenerate into a paper war

continuing, like some Dickensian nightmare, until the parties can no

longer afford to pay counsel fees.

The attorneys in this case are among the brightest and

most talented of any bar in this country, many having achieved

national and even international celebrity and professional acclaim.

At least two are former distinguished members of the federal

judiciary. Counsel should therefore be especially aware of the

crushing caseload carried by this Court and the preposterous

imposition pleadings of this magnitude create on the Court's

limited and severely burdened resources. The Court, the parties,

and the federal civil justice system deserve better, and this Court

demands better. In all further pleadings in this proceeding, the

parties and their counsel are instructed that "less is more," and

that brevity is not only a practical aspiration but an absolute

necessity.

¥.

Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DE-

CREED that Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Counsel is DENIED.

It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff Northwest Airlines,

Inc.'s Motion to Disqualify Counsel is hereby DENIED.

—

B-7

It is further ORDERED that at the August 4, 1992 status

conference, the parties will present to the Court a brief and

concise agreed upon plan for preventing any conflicts of interest

through the use of "Chinese walls" and the like. This plan will be

jointly presented in the form of a Proposed Order which can be

signed and entered by the Court at that time, and it will be both

fair to and binding on all parties.

lt is further ORDERED that the Parties file no further

pleadings in this Court relating to either Motion to Disqualify.

It is further ORDERED that the parities FILE NO FURTHER

MOTIONS OF ANY KIND WHATSOEVER WITHOUT EXPRESS

LEAVE OF THE COURT. NOR WILL THE PARTIES FILE A

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A MOTION WITH THE PROPOSED

MOTION ATTACHED.

It is further ORDERED that_to the extent the Court

expressly allows the parties to file any other motions, SUCH

MOTION SHALL BE LIMITED TO FIFTEEN PAGES IN LENGTH,

INCLUDING BRIEFS AND OTHER SUPPORTING MATERIALS.

THERE WILL BE NO EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RULE. At the

August 4, 1992 status conference, the Court will set out additional

instructions regarding pleadings and discovery. The Court will also

set a trial date and firm docket controls.

It is further ORDERED that any violation of the above

Orders will be severely sanctioned.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DONE at Galveston, Texas this 24th day of July, 1992.

(s/ Samuel B. Kent

Samuel B. Kent

United States District Judge

APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 92-7493

IN RE: AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.

and AMR CORPORATION,

Petitioners

\ppeal from the United States District Court tor the

Southern District of Texas

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION

FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Opinion 9/4/92 , 5 Cir., 1992, F.2d

September 29, 1992)

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, Judges HIGGINBOTHAM anda

BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges

(V) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and no member of this

panel nor Judge in regular active service on the Court having

requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc, (Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure and Local Rule 35) the Suggestion

for Rehearing En Banc is Dt NIED.

( ) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and the Court having

been polled at the request of one of the members of the Court and

a majority of the Circuit Judges who are in regular active service

not having voted in favor of it, (Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-

dure and Local Rule 35) the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is

also DENIED.

( ) Amember of the Court in active service having requested a

poll on the reconsideration of this cause en banc, and a majority

of the judges in active service not having voted in favor of it,

rehearing en banc is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

(s/ Patrick E. Higginbotham

United States Circuit Judge REHG-6

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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