Opposition Brief — Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Babbitt
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No. 929-84 ; .
Iu the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
SAVE OUR CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS. INC... PETITIONER
BRUCE BABBITT, SECRETARY O HE INTERIOR, ]
>
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS
IN OPPOSTTION
MARTIN W. MA N
J InN 1. oO \
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QUESTION PRESENTED
Section 520(c)(1) of the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C.
1270(c) (1), provides that “[a]ny action respecting
a violation of [SMCRA] or the regulations thereunder
may be brought only in the judicial district in which
the surface coal mining operation complained of is
located.” The question presented is:
Whether the court of appeals properly concluded
that Section 520(c)(1) precludes a citizen suit
brought under SMCRA in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, a judicial district
in which no surface coal mining operation is located.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ea ee ee 1
ae TRE eee ns a A eS 1
SES ees ae a eee 2
Argument ............. stdin Laetabanateasbdbesiaabbntidnnkabidbseswcnienideses 5
nd Ee NE 13
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S.
EC a ee ee 12
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)... 5
Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Costle, 515 F. Supp.
I CS Bie UD nsec cscneveccccestvenceneseseeeess...... 8
Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, 735 F.2d 469 (11th
a ehhh clare ihc ose 6
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 | Sn 11
Lujan V. National Wildlife Fed’n, 110 3. Ct. 3177
A iiiidiied tis titanic -cnhesdtaereceinionnbaecihaoiesighshshossd-nacloinds 9,10,11
National Wildlife Fed’n v. Hodel, 661 F. Supp. 473
8: RAE cpanel I 10
New Mexico ex rel. Energy & Minerals Dep’t,
Mining & Minerals Div. v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, 820 F.2d 441 (D.C. Cir. 1987) .... 5
Oklahoma Wildlife Fed’n vy. Hodel, 642 F. Supp.
PP eR MIs BOD a csececcccecsecccececcacnensearsesse...... 9
Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark :
725 F.2d 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1984)... 4
22 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1217 (D.D.C.
EE EES A DO ET 4
Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel,
622 F. Supp. 1160 (D.D.C. 1985) 4
Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Ine. v. Watt,
558 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1982) _..... 3
TVA V. Hill, 487 U.S. 158 (1978) 12
(III)
IV
Cases—Continued : Page
Township of Long Beach v. City of New York,
445 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1978) ...........2000000000... 8
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.
EE I are ee sk ee 5
Virginia ex rel. Virginia Dep’t of Conservation &
Economic Dev. Vv. Watt, 741 F.2d 37 (4th Cir.
1984), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1198 (1985)... 6
Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906
a Te CR MA BID vcncecnenttnnnnscccscntcosensccenecss 11
Statutes:
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.:
§ 304(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. 7604 (a) (1) -..00000.....
§ 304 (a) (2), 42 U.S.C. 7604(a) (2) -..000.....
§ 304(c) (1), 42 U.S.C. 7604(c) (1) 2000.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean
Water Act), 33 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.:
§ 505 (a) (1), 33 U.S.C. 1365 (a) (1) 2.0...
§ 505 (a) (2), 33 U.S.C. 1365 (a) (2) 20...
§ 505 (c) (1), 33 U.S.C. 1865 (c) (1)...
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, 30 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.:
Oe is Ge Ee BED eeectenccsaccnsecocnnsnvnnctonntrnsenes 1
RAR OE I
§ 520(a) (1), 30 U.S.C. 1270 (a) (1) -...0 2,5,6
§ 520(a) (2), 30 U.S.C. 1270 (a) (2) —..00 i... 2, 6,
§ 520(b) (2), 30 U.S.C. 1270 (b) (2) -..0 ee...
§ 520(c) (1), 30 U.S.C. 1270(c) (1) ~.......... 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7,8, 10,12
§ 526(a) (1), 30 U.S.C. 1276 (a) (1) -0 6, 7
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 520(c) (1), 91 Stat.
SU DiscisndanserhcsmcnnlaccaidensaaaastasnsedeatemaieaiandaAg aaa taaaad 2
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In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
No. 92-843
SAVE OUR CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS, INC., PETITIONER
VU.
BRUCE BABBITT, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS
IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-
22a) is reported at 963 F.2d 1541. The opinion of
the district court (Pet. App. 23a-32a) is not officially
reported, but is reprinted at 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 20,121. A previous opinion of the court of
appeals (Pet. App. 46a-53a) is reported at 725 F.2d
1434. A previous opinion of the district court (Pet.
App. 33a-41a) is reported at 550 F. Supp. 979.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on May 22, 1992. A petition for rehearing was denied
(1)
2
on August 18, 1992. The petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari was filed on November 16, 1992. The juris-
diction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).
STATEMENT
This action arises under the “citizen suit” provision
of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977 (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. 1270, which establishes
two categories of civil actions. Section 520(a) (1)
authorizes actions against any “person who is alleged
to be in violation of any rule, regulation, order or
permit issued pursuant to [SMCRA].” 30 U.S.C.
1270(a)(1). Section 520(a)(2) authorizes citizen
suits against the Secretary for the failure ‘‘to perform
any act or duty under [the Act] which is not discre-
tionary with the Secretary.” 30 U.S.C. 1270(a) (2).
As to the proper forum for citizen suits, Section
520(c) (1) states that “[a]ny action respecting a vio-
lation of this chapter or the regulations thereunder
may be brought only in the judicial district in which
the surface coal mining operation complained of is
located.” 30 U.S.C. 1270(c)(1). The words “this
chapter” refer to the entire Act. Pet. App. 14a; see
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 520(c)(1), 91 Stat. 504.
1. Petitioner filed this action pursuant to Section
520(a) (2) in 1981, seeking to enjoin the Secretary of
the Interior and the Director of the Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (the federal
respondents) from failing to enforce SMCRA. Peti-
tioner alleged that the federal respondents had vio-
lated mandatory duties under SMCRA to collect civil
penalties and take alternative enforcement measures
against some 700 coal operators that were, according
3
to petitioner, in violation of SMCRA. Petitioner filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, a judicial district in which no sur-
face coal mining operations are located. Pet. App.
33a-35a. The federal respondents moved to dismiss
the action on the ground that Section 520(c)(1) is
a jurisdictional limitation that allows suits only in
those judicial districts where the relevant mining
operations are located. The district court denied the
motion, holding that Section 520(c)(1) “is a venue,
not a jurisdictional provision,” and that it allows
plaintiffs “to choose their forum.” Pet. App. 34a, 35a.
2. A panel of the court of appeals reversed, holding
that “all actions against the Secretary for failure to
perform duties required by [SMCRA] are governed
by the specific venue provision in section 520(c) (1)
of the Act,” which requires that “any claim alleging a
violation of the Act or its regulations must be brought
in the district where the mine operation complained of
is located.” Pet. App. 50a. The court concluded that
because “‘none of [the complained-of] mines is located
in the District of Columbia, venue is improper in this
district.” Jd. at 52a. The full court then voted to
rehear the case, and it vacated the panel’s judgment
and opinion pending rehearing en banc. The parties
reached a settlement prior to argument before the
en banc court; pursuant to the parties’ request, the
court of appeals remanded the case to the district
court for settlement proceedings. See id. at 8a.
1A different judge had granted the Secretary’s motion to
dismiss another lawsuit brought by petitioner on the ground
that, under Section 520(c) (1), the case was improperly
brought in the District of Columbia. Save Our Cumberland
Mountains, Inc. v. Watt, 558 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1982). A
4
3. On remand, the district court entered a consent
order implementing the parties’ agreement in this
case. Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark,
22 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1217 (D.D.C. 1985). That
order was to expire by its terms on January 31, 1990.
In 1989, the parties negotiated a new settlement and
presented it to the district court. The National Coal
Association.and the American Mining Congress (the
private respondents) moved to intervene to oppose
court approval of the settlement. The district court
granted the private respondents limited intervention,
but ultimately approved the settlement. Pet. App.
23a-32a.
4, On the appeal taken by the private respondents,
the court of appeals reversed, holding that Section
520(c)(1) “precludes locating a citizen suit in a
district where no mining operations occur.” Pet. App.
10a. The court concluded that petitioner must file
“situation-specific litigation” in the judicial district
“in which questioned mining activity is located,” and
that petitioner may not bring a “far-reaching” action
for nationwide review in the District of Columbia,
where no mining is found. Jd. at 20a-2la. The court
accordingly vacated the district court’s order approv-
ing the settlement and remanded for dismissal without
prejudice to further proceedings elsewhere. Jd. at 22a.
panel of the court of appeals affirmed that dismissal in a
decision issued at the same time as the first opinion in this
case. Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark, 725
F.2d 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1984). That opinion and judgment were
also vacated by the en banc court, see Pet. App. 8a, and the
case was settled separately, Save Our Cumberland Mountains,
Inc. V. Hodel, 622 F. Supp. 1160 (D.D.C. 1985). That case is
not at issue here.
5
ARGUMENT
The decision of the court of appeals is correct and
does not conflict with any decision of this Court or
of any other court of appeals. Further review is there-
fore not warranted.
1. SMCRA’s citizen suit provision is precise and
clear. It requires that “[a]ny action” respecting
SMCRA violations be brought “only” in the judicial
district ‘in which the surface coal mining operation
complained of is located.” 30 U.S.C. 1270(c) (1).
Reading this plain language, the court properly
“f[ou]nd most sensible a literal reading of SMCRA
§ 520 that locates ‘[a]ny’ citizen suit in a place where
offending [mine] operations are ongoing.” Pet. App.
16a. Moreover, by directing that citizen suits be filed
“only” as specified, the provision “is directive, not
permissive,” and must be “equated with a limitation
of subject matter jurisdiction.” Jd. at 18a-19a (quot-
ing New Mexico ex rel. Energy & Minerals Dep’t,
Mining & Minerals Div. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
820 F.2d 441, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Because no
surface coal mines, much less the ones about which
petitioner had complained, are located in the District
of Columbia, this suit was brought in the wrong court
and the court of appeals properly ordered it dismissed.
“[WJhere, as here, the statute’s language is plain,
‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it accord-
ing to its terms.’” United States v. Ron Pair Enters.,
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti
v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ).
In its limited discussion of SMCRA’s actual lan-
guage (Pet. 7 & n.5), petitioner argues that because
Section 520(c) (1) refers to any action respecting “a
violation” of the Act, and because Section 520(a) (1)
6
uses the term “violation” while Section 520(a) (2)
does not, the forum requirement applies solely to Sec-
tien 520(a)(1) actions. Had Congress desired such
a result, it could easily have said so. As the court of
appeals correctly held, however, a statute “is violated
when one transgresses its terms,” and when the Secre-
tary fails to perform a duty required by SMCRA, “he
has ‘violated’ the Act.” Pet. App. 15a. Petitioner’s
complaint, which asserts jurisdiction under Section
520(a) (2), repeatedly alleges that the Secretary has
“violated” and is in “violation” of SMCRA and its
regulations. See Pet. App. 16a. Moreover, Section
520(b) (2) specifically uses the term “violation” in
referring to notice requirements for Section 520
(a)(2) actions. See Pet. App. 56a. The court of
appeals therefore correctly held that the forum rule
prescribed by Section 520(c) (1) applies to this action.
This plain reading of the citizen-suit provision com-
ports with the overall structure of the Act as well. The
sole instance in which SMCRA provides for litiga-
tion in the District of Columbia is under Section
526(a) (1), 30 U.S.C. 1276(a)(1), which provides
that any action by the Secretary “promulgating na-
tional rules or regulations” shall be subject to judicial
review in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. See Pet. App. 17a; Virginia
ex rel. Virginia Dep’t of Conservation & Economic
Dev. v. Watt, 741 F.2d 37, 40 (4th Cir. 1984), cert.
dismissed, 469 U.S. 1198 (1985); Drummond Coal
Co. v. Watt, 735 F.2d 469, 472-476 (11th Cir. 1984).
Section 526(a)(1) also directs that review of state
SMCRA programs shall be in the judicial district
“which includes the capital of the State whose pro-
gram is at issue,” and that review of any other rule-
a
7
making action shall be in the district “in which the
surface coal mining operation is located.” 30 U.S.C.
1276(a) (1); see Pet. App. 18a.
Thus, except where regulations of nationwide or
statewide scope are concerned, Congress has by law
expressed a preference for local judicial review under
SMCRA. Pet. App. 16a. Petitioner’s attempt to find
in Section 520(c)(1) an authorization for “nation-
wide pattern and practice lawsuits” (Pet. 9), un-
fettered by the need to address any “site-specific
facts” concerning a particular surface mining oper-
ation, has no basis in the language or structure of
SMCRA. Indeed, the fact that Congress specifically
provided only for certain suits challenging rules of
nationwide effect to be brought in the District of Co-
lumbia reinforces the court of appeals’ conclusion
that the Act requires all enforcement-related suits to
be brought in the district in which the complained-of
mine is located.
2. Petitioner errs in asserting (Pet. 9-13) that the
decision below conflicts with decisions involving other
environmental statutes. The citizen suit provisions of
the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (Clean Water Act) are, as petitioner
notes (Pet. 12), “virtually identical” in certain re-
spects to the citizen suit provisions of SMCRA. Com-
pare 30 U.S.C. 1270(a) (1) and (2) (SMCRA), with
42 U.S.C. 7604(a) (1) and (2) (Clean Air Act) and 33
U.S.C. 1865(a) (1) and (2) (Clean Water Act). Each
statute authorizes, in parallel “(a)(1)” sections, ac-
tions against persons alleged to be in violation of the
relevant Act and, in parallel “(a)(2)” sections, suits
against the relevant Secretary or Administrator for
failure to perform nondiscretionary acts. See Pet.
App. 10a-12a.
8
With respect to forum selection provisions, however,
SMCRA differs significantly from the other statutes.
See Pet. App. 12a (‘“‘at this juncture, the provisions
diverge’). Both the Clean Water Act and the Clean
Air Act ‘“‘contain ‘(¢c)(1)’ forum prescriptions spe-
cifically linked to unlawful operations or activities,
i.e., to ‘(a)(1)’ suits.” Jbid. Section 505(c)(1) of
the Clean Water Act specifies the forum requirements
for actions “respecting a violation by a discharge
source of an effluent standard or limitation.” 33
U.S.C. 1865(c) (1) (emphasis added). Similarly, Sec-
tion 304(c) (1) of the Clean Air Act addresses actions
“respecting a violation by a stationary source of an
emission standard or limitation.” 42 U.S.C. 7604
(c) (1) (emphasis added). Because these forum selec-
tion provisions by their terms do not include suits
against the Secretary or Administrator, courts have
held them inapplicable to “(a)(2)” suits. See, e.g.,
Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Costle, 515 F. Supp. 264,
277 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (Clean Air Act); Township of
Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 12038,
1207-1208 (D.N.J. 1978) (Clean Water Act).
Section 520(c)(1) of SMCRA, by contrast, con-
tains no such qualification: ‘““Any action respecting a
violation of this chapter or the regulations thereunder
may be brought only in the judicial district in which
the surface coal mining operation complained of is
located.” 30 U.S.C. 1270(c) (1); see Pet. App. 13a-
14a (contrasting “generality” of SMCRA’s language
with “particularity” of language in Clean Air Act and
Clean Water Act). Because the forum provision of
SMCRA is significantly different from the forum pro-
visions of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act,
petitioner’s prediction (Pet. 15-16) that the court’s
9
decision will lead to the elimination of “nationwide”
suits under other environmental statutes is unfounded.
Petitioner attempts to draw a distinction between
violations of SMCRA and violations of other environ-
mental laws. See Pet. 15-16 n.10. While it is true
that “SMCRA involves many differing kinds of viola-
tions” (Pet. 16 n.10), they are all grounded in actions
by mine operators and the Secretary’s response
thereto. See, e.g., Oklahoma Wildlife Fed’n v. Hodel,
642 F. Supp. 569, 571-572 (N.D. Okla. 1986). Con-
gress could easily have limited the forum provision of
SMCRA in the same way as it did in the Clean Air
Act (“by a stationary source”) and the Clean Water
Act (“by a discharge source’). The fact that Con-
gress provided different forum provisions in other
environmental statutes shows that it knows how to
allow non-site-specific suits when it wants to; Con-
gress simply did not see fit to do so in SMCRA. Cf.
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 110 S. Ct. 3177,
3191 (1990) (case-by-case approach “is the tradi-
tiona], and remains the normal, mode of operation of
the murts * * * [e]xcept where Congress explicitly
provides for [judicial] correction of the administra-
tive process at a higher level of generality”). By not
lim ting site-specific litigation to ‘“(a)(1)” suits,
Congress has directed litigants to file (and courts to
entertain) all SMCRA citizen suits “only in the judi-
cial district in which the surface coal mining opera-
tion complained of is located.”
3. Petitioner repeatedly complains (see, e.g., Pet.
18) that the court’s decision will require it to file
many lawsuits instead of just one. This argument is
properly addressed to Congress, not to the courts. As
this Court aptly observed in an analogous case:
:
10
[Petitioner] alleges that violation of the law is
rampant within this program * * *. Perhaps so.
But [petitioner] cannot seek wholesale improve-
ment of this program by court decree, rather
than in the offices of the Department or the halls
of Congress, where programmatic improvements
are normally made.
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 110 S. Ct. 3177,
3190 (1990).
Petitioner mistakenly claims (Pet. 14-16) that the
court’s decision will overburden the federal court sys-
tem. The decision below, by the court’s own analysis,
has no applicability beyond Section 520(c)(1) of
SMCRA. See Pet. App. 12a-14a. And Congress, not
the court of appeals, determined that claims under
SMCRA must be site-specific. Such actions will not,
as petitioner contends, lead to “identical lawsuits that
could (and should) be resolved in a single action.”
Pet. 14. Rather, citizen suits will address particular
violations and federal enforcement and abatement ac-
tivities with respect to specific mines, which neces-
sarily involve different facts, statutory and regula-
tory provisions, and requested relief. See Pet. App.
16a.
Site-specific litigation makes particular sense in
the SMCRA context, because each surface coal mine
is unique. See 30 U.S.C. 1201(f). As the court of
appeals pointed out, “‘[t]o have substance, [a claim]
must rest on proof that mine operators, at specific
locations, are evading the terms of the Act, and are
thus ‘adversely affect[ing]’ the interests of the com-
plaining persons.” Pet. App. 16a; see National Wild-
life Fed’n v. Hodel, 661 F. Supp. 473, 476 (E.D.
Ky. 1987) (“plaintiffs are required to identify par-
ticular sites or operations in this district where
[the Secretary has] failed to inspect or enforce
11
[SMCRA]”). Indeed, as the court of appeals ex-
plained, there are “compelling reasons” for bringing
citizen suits in those districts where the relevant sur-
face mining operations are located. Pet. App. 20a.
The statutory forum requirement allows mine opera-
tors, environmental groups, and citizens affected by
the action to become more readily involved in the
litigation, allows for consideration of site- and region-
specific factors, and more evenly distributes the work
load of the federal courts. -/bid.
This conclusion is in accord with general principles
of federal court jurisdiction. Courts sit to resolve
disputes, not to make rules governing the nationwide
enforcement of statutes or to provide ongoing super-
vision of the Executive’s enforcement of the laws
across the board. Pet. App. 20a; see Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Women’s Equity Ac-
tion League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 749 (D.C. Cir.
1990). While Congress may provide otherwise, it has
not done so here, and except where expressly pro-
vided for by Congress such sweeping challenges are
disfavored. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n,
110 S. Ct. at 3191. While certain economies may be
achieved by nationwide litigation, Congress evidently
decided that the virtues of site-specific litigation pre-
vailed in the SMCRA context. The court of appeals’
decision merely gives effect to that legislative de-
termination.’
2 Petitioner errs in relying (Pet. 17) on the fact that Con-
gress has appropriated funds to implement the consent order
in this case. As the court of appeals correctly observed, ‘“‘there
is no indication that [the appropriations measures] stand for
anything more than Congress’ readiness to enable the Secre-
tary to comply with court orders and perhaps the legislature’s
approval of [the terms of the settlement]. Cf. Randall v.
12
In any event, petitioner overstates the effect of the
decision below when it claims that it “dooms the
chances that SMCRA will be enforced.” Pet. 17.
Nothing in the court’s opinion precludes petitioner—
or any other plaintiff—from bringing a lawsuit to
compel the Secretary to enforce the Act. The action
simply must be brought in the district in which the
complained-of mine is located, as the statute provides.
The court of appeals expressly recognized that alter-
native when it ordered dismissal of this action “‘with-
out prejudice to further proceedings elsewhere.” Pet.
App. 22a.*
In sum, the “environmental welfare of this coun-
try” (Pet. 17) is without question an important con-
cern, one Congress has addressed in SMCRA and
other environmental laws. Parties such as petitioner
seeking to compel enforcement of those laws, however,
must follow the procedures Congress provided. See
Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282,
289 (1929) (“When a statute limits a thing to be
done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of
any other mode.’”’). Section 520(c)(1) by its plain
terms requires citizen suits to be brought in the judi-
cial district in which the complained-of mine is lo-
cated. Petitioner failed to do so here, and the court
of appeals properly ordered the case dismissed.
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661 (1986) (repeal of legislative
prescription, in whole or in part, ‘by implication’ is not
favored).” Pet. App. 16a-17a; see also TVA V. Hill, 487 U.S.
153, 189-191 (1978).
3 Petitioner’s argument that “the expenditure of time and
resources to this point may prove fruitless” (Pet. 14) is mis-
placed. Having brought the litigation in the wrong forum,
petitioner can hardly complain that its efforts may come to
naught.
13
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted.
WILLIAM C. BRYSON
Acting Solicitor General
MYiEs E. FLINT
Acting Assistant Attorney General
MARTIN W. MATZEN
JOHN T. STAHR
Attorneys
JANUARY 1993
W ov. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICR; 19903 342479 60139
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