Opposition Brief — Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Babbitt

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No. 929-84 ; .

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

SAVE OUR CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS. INC... PETITIONER

BRUCE BABBITT, SECRETARY O HE INTERIOR, ]

>

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS

IN OPPOSTTION

MARTIN W. MA N

J InN 1. oO \

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Section 520(c)(1) of the Surface Mining Control

and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C.

1270(c) (1), provides that “[a]ny action respecting

a violation of [SMCRA] or the regulations thereunder

may be brought only in the judicial district in which

the surface coal mining operation complained of is

located.” The question presented is:

Whether the court of appeals properly concluded

that Section 520(c)(1) precludes a citizen suit

brought under SMCRA in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia, a judicial district

in which no surface coal mining operation is located.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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ae TRE eee ns a A eS 1

SES ees ae a eee 2

Argument ............. stdin Laetabanateasbdbesiaabbntidnnkabidbseswcnienideses 5

nd Ee NE 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S.

EC a ee ee 12

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)... 5

Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Costle, 515 F. Supp.

I CS Bie UD nsec cscneveccccestvenceneseseeeess...... 8

Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, 735 F.2d 469 (11th

a ehhh clare ihc ose 6

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 | Sn 11

Lujan V. National Wildlife Fed’n, 110 3. Ct. 3177

A iiiidiied tis titanic -cnhesdtaereceinionnbaecihaoiesighshshossd-nacloinds 9,10,11

National Wildlife Fed’n v. Hodel, 661 F. Supp. 473

8: RAE cpanel I 10

New Mexico ex rel. Energy & Minerals Dep’t,

Mining & Minerals Div. v. U.S. Dep’t of the

Interior, 820 F.2d 441 (D.C. Cir. 1987) .... 5

Oklahoma Wildlife Fed’n vy. Hodel, 642 F. Supp.

PP eR MIs BOD a csececcccecsecccececcacnensearsesse...... 9

Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark :

725 F.2d 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1984)... 4

22 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1217 (D.D.C.

EE EES A DO ET 4

Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel,

622 F. Supp. 1160 (D.D.C. 1985) 4

Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Ine. v. Watt,

558 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1982) _..... 3

TVA V. Hill, 487 U.S. 158 (1978) 12

(III)

IV

Cases—Continued : Page

Township of Long Beach v. City of New York,

445 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1978) ...........2000000000... 8

United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.

EE I are ee sk ee 5

Virginia ex rel. Virginia Dep’t of Conservation &

Economic Dev. Vv. Watt, 741 F.2d 37 (4th Cir.

1984), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1198 (1985)... 6

Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906

a Te CR MA BID vcncecnenttnnnnscccscntcosensccenecss 11

Statutes:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.:

§ 304(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. 7604 (a) (1) -..00000.....

§ 304 (a) (2), 42 U.S.C. 7604(a) (2) -..000.....

§ 304(c) (1), 42 U.S.C. 7604(c) (1) 2000.

Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean

Water Act), 33 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.:

§ 505 (a) (1), 33 U.S.C. 1365 (a) (1) 2.0...

§ 505 (a) (2), 33 U.S.C. 1365 (a) (2) 20...

§ 505 (c) (1), 33 U.S.C. 1865 (c) (1)...

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of

1977, 30 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.:

Oe is Ge Ee BED eeectenccsaccnsecocnnsnvnnctonntrnsenes 1

RAR OE I

§ 520(a) (1), 30 U.S.C. 1270 (a) (1) -...0 2,5,6

§ 520(a) (2), 30 U.S.C. 1270 (a) (2) —..00 i... 2, 6,

§ 520(b) (2), 30 U.S.C. 1270 (b) (2) -..0 ee...

§ 520(c) (1), 30 U.S.C. 1270(c) (1) ~.......... 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,

7,8, 10,12

§ 526(a) (1), 30 U.S.C. 1276 (a) (1) -0 6, 7

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of

1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 520(c) (1), 91 Stat.

SU DiscisndanserhcsmcnnlaccaidensaaaastasnsedeatemaieaiandaAg aaa taaaad 2

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

No. 92-843

SAVE OUR CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS, INC., PETITIONER

VU.

BRUCE BABBITT, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS

IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-

22a) is reported at 963 F.2d 1541. The opinion of

the district court (Pet. App. 23a-32a) is not officially

reported, but is reprinted at 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.

L. Inst.) 20,121. A previous opinion of the court of

appeals (Pet. App. 46a-53a) is reported at 725 F.2d

1434. A previous opinion of the district court (Pet.

App. 33a-41a) is reported at 550 F. Supp. 979.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on May 22, 1992. A petition for rehearing was denied

(1)

2

on August 18, 1992. The petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari was filed on November 16, 1992. The juris-

diction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

STATEMENT

This action arises under the “citizen suit” provision

of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act

of 1977 (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. 1270, which establishes

two categories of civil actions. Section 520(a) (1)

authorizes actions against any “person who is alleged

to be in violation of any rule, regulation, order or

permit issued pursuant to [SMCRA].” 30 U.S.C.

1270(a)(1). Section 520(a)(2) authorizes citizen

suits against the Secretary for the failure ‘‘to perform

any act or duty under [the Act] which is not discre-

tionary with the Secretary.” 30 U.S.C. 1270(a) (2).

As to the proper forum for citizen suits, Section

520(c) (1) states that “[a]ny action respecting a vio-

lation of this chapter or the regulations thereunder

may be brought only in the judicial district in which

the surface coal mining operation complained of is

located.” 30 U.S.C. 1270(c)(1). The words “this

chapter” refer to the entire Act. Pet. App. 14a; see

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,

Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 520(c)(1), 91 Stat. 504.

1. Petitioner filed this action pursuant to Section

520(a) (2) in 1981, seeking to enjoin the Secretary of

the Interior and the Director of the Office of Surface

Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (the federal

respondents) from failing to enforce SMCRA. Peti-

tioner alleged that the federal respondents had vio-

lated mandatory duties under SMCRA to collect civil

penalties and take alternative enforcement measures

against some 700 coal operators that were, according

3

to petitioner, in violation of SMCRA. Petitioner filed

suit in the United States District Court for the Dis-

trict of Columbia, a judicial district in which no sur-

face coal mining operations are located. Pet. App.

33a-35a. The federal respondents moved to dismiss

the action on the ground that Section 520(c)(1) is

a jurisdictional limitation that allows suits only in

those judicial districts where the relevant mining

operations are located. The district court denied the

motion, holding that Section 520(c)(1) “is a venue,

not a jurisdictional provision,” and that it allows

plaintiffs “to choose their forum.” Pet. App. 34a, 35a.

2. A panel of the court of appeals reversed, holding

that “all actions against the Secretary for failure to

perform duties required by [SMCRA] are governed

by the specific venue provision in section 520(c) (1)

of the Act,” which requires that “any claim alleging a

violation of the Act or its regulations must be brought

in the district where the mine operation complained of

is located.” Pet. App. 50a. The court concluded that

because “‘none of [the complained-of] mines is located

in the District of Columbia, venue is improper in this

district.” Jd. at 52a. The full court then voted to

rehear the case, and it vacated the panel’s judgment

and opinion pending rehearing en banc. The parties

reached a settlement prior to argument before the

en banc court; pursuant to the parties’ request, the

court of appeals remanded the case to the district

court for settlement proceedings. See id. at 8a.

1A different judge had granted the Secretary’s motion to

dismiss another lawsuit brought by petitioner on the ground

that, under Section 520(c) (1), the case was improperly

brought in the District of Columbia. Save Our Cumberland

Mountains, Inc. v. Watt, 558 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1982). A

4

3. On remand, the district court entered a consent

order implementing the parties’ agreement in this

case. Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark,

22 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1217 (D.D.C. 1985). That

order was to expire by its terms on January 31, 1990.

In 1989, the parties negotiated a new settlement and

presented it to the district court. The National Coal

Association.and the American Mining Congress (the

private respondents) moved to intervene to oppose

court approval of the settlement. The district court

granted the private respondents limited intervention,

but ultimately approved the settlement. Pet. App.

23a-32a.

4, On the appeal taken by the private respondents,

the court of appeals reversed, holding that Section

520(c)(1) “precludes locating a citizen suit in a

district where no mining operations occur.” Pet. App.

10a. The court concluded that petitioner must file

“situation-specific litigation” in the judicial district

“in which questioned mining activity is located,” and

that petitioner may not bring a “far-reaching” action

for nationwide review in the District of Columbia,

where no mining is found. Jd. at 20a-2la. The court

accordingly vacated the district court’s order approv-

ing the settlement and remanded for dismissal without

prejudice to further proceedings elsewhere. Jd. at 22a.

panel of the court of appeals affirmed that dismissal in a

decision issued at the same time as the first opinion in this

case. Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark, 725

F.2d 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1984). That opinion and judgment were

also vacated by the en banc court, see Pet. App. 8a, and the

case was settled separately, Save Our Cumberland Mountains,

Inc. V. Hodel, 622 F. Supp. 1160 (D.D.C. 1985). That case is

not at issue here.

5

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct and

does not conflict with any decision of this Court or

of any other court of appeals. Further review is there-

fore not warranted.

1. SMCRA’s citizen suit provision is precise and

clear. It requires that “[a]ny action” respecting

SMCRA violations be brought “only” in the judicial

district ‘in which the surface coal mining operation

complained of is located.” 30 U.S.C. 1270(c) (1).

Reading this plain language, the court properly

“f[ou]nd most sensible a literal reading of SMCRA

§ 520 that locates ‘[a]ny’ citizen suit in a place where

offending [mine] operations are ongoing.” Pet. App.

16a. Moreover, by directing that citizen suits be filed

“only” as specified, the provision “is directive, not

permissive,” and must be “equated with a limitation

of subject matter jurisdiction.” Jd. at 18a-19a (quot-

ing New Mexico ex rel. Energy & Minerals Dep’t,

Mining & Minerals Div. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,

820 F.2d 441, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Because no

surface coal mines, much less the ones about which

petitioner had complained, are located in the District

of Columbia, this suit was brought in the wrong court

and the court of appeals properly ordered it dismissed.

“[WJhere, as here, the statute’s language is plain,

‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it accord-

ing to its terms.’” United States v. Ron Pair Enters.,

Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti

v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ).

In its limited discussion of SMCRA’s actual lan-

guage (Pet. 7 & n.5), petitioner argues that because

Section 520(c) (1) refers to any action respecting “a

violation” of the Act, and because Section 520(a) (1)

6

uses the term “violation” while Section 520(a) (2)

does not, the forum requirement applies solely to Sec-

tien 520(a)(1) actions. Had Congress desired such

a result, it could easily have said so. As the court of

appeals correctly held, however, a statute “is violated

when one transgresses its terms,” and when the Secre-

tary fails to perform a duty required by SMCRA, “he

has ‘violated’ the Act.” Pet. App. 15a. Petitioner’s

complaint, which asserts jurisdiction under Section

520(a) (2), repeatedly alleges that the Secretary has

“violated” and is in “violation” of SMCRA and its

regulations. See Pet. App. 16a. Moreover, Section

520(b) (2) specifically uses the term “violation” in

referring to notice requirements for Section 520

(a)(2) actions. See Pet. App. 56a. The court of

appeals therefore correctly held that the forum rule

prescribed by Section 520(c) (1) applies to this action.

This plain reading of the citizen-suit provision com-

ports with the overall structure of the Act as well. The

sole instance in which SMCRA provides for litiga-

tion in the District of Columbia is under Section

526(a) (1), 30 U.S.C. 1276(a)(1), which provides

that any action by the Secretary “promulgating na-

tional rules or regulations” shall be subject to judicial

review in the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia. See Pet. App. 17a; Virginia

ex rel. Virginia Dep’t of Conservation & Economic

Dev. v. Watt, 741 F.2d 37, 40 (4th Cir. 1984), cert.

dismissed, 469 U.S. 1198 (1985); Drummond Coal

Co. v. Watt, 735 F.2d 469, 472-476 (11th Cir. 1984).

Section 526(a)(1) also directs that review of state

SMCRA programs shall be in the judicial district

“which includes the capital of the State whose pro-

gram is at issue,” and that review of any other rule-

a

7

making action shall be in the district “in which the

surface coal mining operation is located.” 30 U.S.C.

1276(a) (1); see Pet. App. 18a.

Thus, except where regulations of nationwide or

statewide scope are concerned, Congress has by law

expressed a preference for local judicial review under

SMCRA. Pet. App. 16a. Petitioner’s attempt to find

in Section 520(c)(1) an authorization for “nation-

wide pattern and practice lawsuits” (Pet. 9), un-

fettered by the need to address any “site-specific

facts” concerning a particular surface mining oper-

ation, has no basis in the language or structure of

SMCRA. Indeed, the fact that Congress specifically

provided only for certain suits challenging rules of

nationwide effect to be brought in the District of Co-

lumbia reinforces the court of appeals’ conclusion

that the Act requires all enforcement-related suits to

be brought in the district in which the complained-of

mine is located.

2. Petitioner errs in asserting (Pet. 9-13) that the

decision below conflicts with decisions involving other

environmental statutes. The citizen suit provisions of

the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act (Clean Water Act) are, as petitioner

notes (Pet. 12), “virtually identical” in certain re-

spects to the citizen suit provisions of SMCRA. Com-

pare 30 U.S.C. 1270(a) (1) and (2) (SMCRA), with

42 U.S.C. 7604(a) (1) and (2) (Clean Air Act) and 33

U.S.C. 1865(a) (1) and (2) (Clean Water Act). Each

statute authorizes, in parallel “(a)(1)” sections, ac-

tions against persons alleged to be in violation of the

relevant Act and, in parallel “(a)(2)” sections, suits

against the relevant Secretary or Administrator for

failure to perform nondiscretionary acts. See Pet.

App. 10a-12a.

8

With respect to forum selection provisions, however,

SMCRA differs significantly from the other statutes.

See Pet. App. 12a (‘“‘at this juncture, the provisions

diverge’). Both the Clean Water Act and the Clean

Air Act ‘“‘contain ‘(¢c)(1)’ forum prescriptions spe-

cifically linked to unlawful operations or activities,

i.e., to ‘(a)(1)’ suits.” Jbid. Section 505(c)(1) of

the Clean Water Act specifies the forum requirements

for actions “respecting a violation by a discharge

source of an effluent standard or limitation.” 33

U.S.C. 1865(c) (1) (emphasis added). Similarly, Sec-

tion 304(c) (1) of the Clean Air Act addresses actions

“respecting a violation by a stationary source of an

emission standard or limitation.” 42 U.S.C. 7604

(c) (1) (emphasis added). Because these forum selec-

tion provisions by their terms do not include suits

against the Secretary or Administrator, courts have

held them inapplicable to “(a)(2)” suits. See, e.g.,

Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Costle, 515 F. Supp. 264,

277 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (Clean Air Act); Township of

Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 12038,

1207-1208 (D.N.J. 1978) (Clean Water Act).

Section 520(c)(1) of SMCRA, by contrast, con-

tains no such qualification: ‘““Any action respecting a

violation of this chapter or the regulations thereunder

may be brought only in the judicial district in which

the surface coal mining operation complained of is

located.” 30 U.S.C. 1270(c) (1); see Pet. App. 13a-

14a (contrasting “generality” of SMCRA’s language

with “particularity” of language in Clean Air Act and

Clean Water Act). Because the forum provision of

SMCRA is significantly different from the forum pro-

visions of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act,

petitioner’s prediction (Pet. 15-16) that the court’s

9

decision will lead to the elimination of “nationwide”

suits under other environmental statutes is unfounded.

Petitioner attempts to draw a distinction between

violations of SMCRA and violations of other environ-

mental laws. See Pet. 15-16 n.10. While it is true

that “SMCRA involves many differing kinds of viola-

tions” (Pet. 16 n.10), they are all grounded in actions

by mine operators and the Secretary’s response

thereto. See, e.g., Oklahoma Wildlife Fed’n v. Hodel,

642 F. Supp. 569, 571-572 (N.D. Okla. 1986). Con-

gress could easily have limited the forum provision of

SMCRA in the same way as it did in the Clean Air

Act (“by a stationary source”) and the Clean Water

Act (“by a discharge source’). The fact that Con-

gress provided different forum provisions in other

environmental statutes shows that it knows how to

allow non-site-specific suits when it wants to; Con-

gress simply did not see fit to do so in SMCRA. Cf.

Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 110 S. Ct. 3177,

3191 (1990) (case-by-case approach “is the tradi-

tiona], and remains the normal, mode of operation of

the murts * * * [e]xcept where Congress explicitly

provides for [judicial] correction of the administra-

tive process at a higher level of generality”). By not

lim ting site-specific litigation to ‘“(a)(1)” suits,

Congress has directed litigants to file (and courts to

entertain) all SMCRA citizen suits “only in the judi-

cial district in which the surface coal mining opera-

tion complained of is located.”

3. Petitioner repeatedly complains (see, e.g., Pet.

18) that the court’s decision will require it to file

many lawsuits instead of just one. This argument is

properly addressed to Congress, not to the courts. As

this Court aptly observed in an analogous case:

:

10

[Petitioner] alleges that violation of the law is

rampant within this program * * *. Perhaps so.

But [petitioner] cannot seek wholesale improve-

ment of this program by court decree, rather

than in the offices of the Department or the halls

of Congress, where programmatic improvements

are normally made.

Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 110 S. Ct. 3177,

3190 (1990).

Petitioner mistakenly claims (Pet. 14-16) that the

court’s decision will overburden the federal court sys-

tem. The decision below, by the court’s own analysis,

has no applicability beyond Section 520(c)(1) of

SMCRA. See Pet. App. 12a-14a. And Congress, not

the court of appeals, determined that claims under

SMCRA must be site-specific. Such actions will not,

as petitioner contends, lead to “identical lawsuits that

could (and should) be resolved in a single action.”

Pet. 14. Rather, citizen suits will address particular

violations and federal enforcement and abatement ac-

tivities with respect to specific mines, which neces-

sarily involve different facts, statutory and regula-

tory provisions, and requested relief. See Pet. App.

16a.

Site-specific litigation makes particular sense in

the SMCRA context, because each surface coal mine

is unique. See 30 U.S.C. 1201(f). As the court of

appeals pointed out, “‘[t]o have substance, [a claim]

must rest on proof that mine operators, at specific

locations, are evading the terms of the Act, and are

thus ‘adversely affect[ing]’ the interests of the com-

plaining persons.” Pet. App. 16a; see National Wild-

life Fed’n v. Hodel, 661 F. Supp. 473, 476 (E.D.

Ky. 1987) (“plaintiffs are required to identify par-

ticular sites or operations in this district where

[the Secretary has] failed to inspect or enforce

11

[SMCRA]”). Indeed, as the court of appeals ex-

plained, there are “compelling reasons” for bringing

citizen suits in those districts where the relevant sur-

face mining operations are located. Pet. App. 20a.

The statutory forum requirement allows mine opera-

tors, environmental groups, and citizens affected by

the action to become more readily involved in the

litigation, allows for consideration of site- and region-

specific factors, and more evenly distributes the work

load of the federal courts. -/bid.

This conclusion is in accord with general principles

of federal court jurisdiction. Courts sit to resolve

disputes, not to make rules governing the nationwide

enforcement of statutes or to provide ongoing super-

vision of the Executive’s enforcement of the laws

across the board. Pet. App. 20a; see Heckler v.

Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Women’s Equity Ac-

tion League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 749 (D.C. Cir.

1990). While Congress may provide otherwise, it has

not done so here, and except where expressly pro-

vided for by Congress such sweeping challenges are

disfavored. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n,

110 S. Ct. at 3191. While certain economies may be

achieved by nationwide litigation, Congress evidently

decided that the virtues of site-specific litigation pre-

vailed in the SMCRA context. The court of appeals’

decision merely gives effect to that legislative de-

termination.’

2 Petitioner errs in relying (Pet. 17) on the fact that Con-

gress has appropriated funds to implement the consent order

in this case. As the court of appeals correctly observed, ‘“‘there

is no indication that [the appropriations measures] stand for

anything more than Congress’ readiness to enable the Secre-

tary to comply with court orders and perhaps the legislature’s

approval of [the terms of the settlement]. Cf. Randall v.

12

In any event, petitioner overstates the effect of the

decision below when it claims that it “dooms the

chances that SMCRA will be enforced.” Pet. 17.

Nothing in the court’s opinion precludes petitioner—

or any other plaintiff—from bringing a lawsuit to

compel the Secretary to enforce the Act. The action

simply must be brought in the district in which the

complained-of mine is located, as the statute provides.

The court of appeals expressly recognized that alter-

native when it ordered dismissal of this action “‘with-

out prejudice to further proceedings elsewhere.” Pet.

App. 22a.*

In sum, the “environmental welfare of this coun-

try” (Pet. 17) is without question an important con-

cern, one Congress has addressed in SMCRA and

other environmental laws. Parties such as petitioner

seeking to compel enforcement of those laws, however,

must follow the procedures Congress provided. See

Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282,

289 (1929) (“When a statute limits a thing to be

done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of

any other mode.’”’). Section 520(c)(1) by its plain

terms requires citizen suits to be brought in the judi-

cial district in which the complained-of mine is lo-

cated. Petitioner failed to do so here, and the court

of appeals properly ordered the case dismissed.

Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661 (1986) (repeal of legislative

prescription, in whole or in part, ‘by implication’ is not

favored).” Pet. App. 16a-17a; see also TVA V. Hill, 487 U.S.

153, 189-191 (1978).

3 Petitioner’s argument that “the expenditure of time and

resources to this point may prove fruitless” (Pet. 14) is mis-

placed. Having brought the litigation in the wrong forum,

petitioner can hardly complain that its efforts may come to

naught.

13

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.

Respectfully submitted.

WILLIAM C. BRYSON

Acting Solicitor General

MYiEs E. FLINT

Acting Assistant Attorney General

MARTIN W. MATZEN

JOHN T. STAHR

Attorneys

JANUARY 1993

W ov. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICR; 19903 342479 60139

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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