Appendix — Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. Ruffin

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

GREAT DANE TRAILERS, INC.

Petitioner,

versus

RONALD RUFFIN,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

James 8B. Spears, Jr.

Counsel of Record

HAYNSWORTH, BALDWIN,

JOHNSON & GREAVES, P.A.

901 West Trade Street

Suite 1050

Charlotte, NC 28202

(704) 342-2588

October 1992

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;

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IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

Southern Division

Civil Action No. CV 89-P-1951-S

RONALD RUFFIN,

Plaintiff,

-VS.-

GREAT DANE TRAILERS, INC.

i i i a a a

Defendant.

COMPLAINT

I. JURISDICTION

1. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

pursuant to the Act of Congress known as 28 U.S.C.

Section 1331, 1343(4) and 28 U.S.C. Sections 2201 and

2202, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seg. This is a suit in

equity authorized and instituted pursuant to Title VII of

the Act of Congress known as the "Civil Rights Act of

1964," as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq, 42

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U.S.C. Section 1981. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked to secure protection of and redress deprivation of

rights secured by 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seg. providing

for injunctive and other relief against race discrimination

and retaliation.

ys Plaintiff has fulfilled all conditions precedent

to the institution of this action under Title VII of the Act

of Congress known as the "Civil Rights Act of 1964," as

amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seg. Plaintiff timely

filed his charge of race discrimination within 180 days of

occurrence of the last discriminatory act. Plaintiff also

timely filed his race claim within 90 days of the receipt of

his right-to-sue letter from the E.E.O.C.

Il. PARTIES

3 Plaintiff, Ronald Ruffin, is a citizen of the

United States, and is a resident of the State of Alabama.

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The plaintiff is employed by the defendant at its

Birmingham location.

4. Defendant, Great Dane Trailers, is a

corporate entity subject to suit under Title VII of the Act

of Congress known as the "Civil Rights Act of 1964," as

amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq. The defendant

employs at least fifteen (15) persons.

III. A N

S. The plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by

reference paragraphs 1-4 above with the same force and

effect as if fully set out in specific detail hereinbelow.

6. The defendant discriminated on the basis of

race against the plaintiff with respect to the promotions,

wages, discipline, job assignments, and other terms,

conditions, and privileges of employment.

LA The plaintiff was denied the opportunity to

contract with the defendant for the position of Class A

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mechanic. The plaintiff is rated a Class B mechanic, even

though he has all the experience and knowledge as the

white mechanics who have contracted with the defendant

to be rated Class A.

8. The defendant assigns the best assignments

of work to white employees. Whereas, the plaintiff is

given the most difficult assignments of work even though

plaintiff has more seniority that the white employees. For

example, the plaintiff has not been allowed to drive even

though he is qualified to do so.

9. The plaintiff is required to perform tasks in

less time than white employees who have a helper in

doing the same tasks.

10. _—‘ The plaintiff is not disciplined in the same

manner as the white employees.

11. The plaintiff has had to suffer racial slurs

and derogatory actions from co-employees without any

relief from supervision. The plaintiff has reported these

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incidents to his supervisor without any corrective action

being taken.

12. The plaintiff has no plain, adequate, or

complete remedy at law to redress the wrongs alleged

herein and this suit for back-pay, an injunctive and a

declaratory judgment is his only means of securing

adequate relief. The plaintiff is now suffering and will

continue to suffer irreparable injury from the defendant's

unlawful policies and practices as set forth herein unless

enjoined by this Court.

IV. R FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff respectfully prays that

this Court assume jurisdiction of this action and after trial:

l. Issue a declaratory judgment that the

employment policies, practices, procedures, conditions and

customs of the defendant are violative of the rights of the

plaintiff as secured by Title VII of the Act of Congress

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known as the "Civil Rights Act of 1964," as amended, 42

U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq.

r Grant plaintiff a permanent injunction

enjoining the defendant, its agents, successors, employees,

attorneys and those acting in concert with the defendant

and at the defendant's request from continuing to violate

and Title VII of the Act of Congress known as the "Civil

Rights Act of 1964," as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e

et seq.

3. Enter an Order requiring the defendant to

make the plaintiff whole by awarding him the position he

would have had occupied in the absence of race

discrimination, back-pay (plus interest), compensatory

damages, lost seniority, benefits, and loss of pension.

The plaintiff further prays for such other relief and

benefits as the cause of justice may require, including, but

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not limited to, an award of costs, attorney's fees and

expenses.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/

Melinda Lawrence Denham

OF COUNSEL:

GORDON, SILBERMAN, WIGGINS & CHILDS, P.C.

1400 SouthTrust Tower

Birmingham, Alabama 35203

(205) 328-0640

D D ADDRESS:

Great Dane Trailers

78 Bankhead Highway

Birmingham, Alabama

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THE COURT: The Court will now dictate findings

of fact and conclusions of law. These findings are based

upon the evidence that's been presented during the trial

of the case. The evidence consists of testimony of the

various witnesses together with a number of exhibits that

have been received into evidence.

This case has been brought by Ronald Ruffin

against Great Dane Trailers, Incorporated, his employer.

Mr. Ruffin, for the last thirteen years, has been employed

as a mechanic by Great Dane. At the present time, his

rate of pay is generally in the mid range of rates of pay

that mechanics are being paid by Great Dane.

In this action under Title VII, Mr. Ruffin, a black

male, asserts that he has been discriminated against

because of his race by the defendant in essentially the four

particulars. First, he says that he has been discriminated

against because of his race in his pay and in particular in

TMT) +

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his not being treated as a Class-A mechanic

notwithstanding the fact that he has been employed for

some thirteen years.

The second aspect is his claim that he has been

given work assignments as a mechanic involving

particularly dirty or difficult tasks and that his assignments

of work have been affected by his race.

Third, he asserts that he has been subjected to

disciplinary action both in terms of warnings and in terms

of certain suspensions that were discriminatory against him

because of his race.

And the fourth claim is that the work environment

in and around the shop at Great Dane is racially offensive

by reason of racial slurs, epithets, jokes and other

incidents that make it offensive to a black person to work

there.

The defendant noting that this charge giving rise to

this case was filed with the EEOC in April 1988 has

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asserted that the Court should not consider various

matters that have occurred in the last year and a half that

the plaintiff would say demonstrate unequal assignments,

improper discipline or racially offensive matters. The

defendant's position is that those should have been the

subject of additional EEOC charges and ultimately

additional cases or amendments to the complaint. I reject

that contention by the defendant.

Where a charge involves claims of discriminatory

treatment relating to the discipline and job assignments

and the like and clearly is one that is claimed to be of a

continuing nature subject to being repeated or manifested

from time to time in different ways, it is clear to me that

the initial charge vests the Court with jurisdiction to

consider the additional incidents that are claimed to be

simply new manifestations of the same complaint that are

a part of the EEOC charge.

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Accordingly, I do look in this case not only at those

matters that may have occurred within 180 days prior to

the filing of the charge in April of 1988 but, also, to those

matters that have occurred since then that are closely

related to and really a part of simply a claim of continuing

repetitions of the matters contained in the charge.

I also consider evidence of matters that may have

occurred long before 180 days prior to the filing of this

action as perhaps circumstantial evidence that assists the

Court in determining what went on during the period of

time that is before the Court in terms of the charge and

its 180 day period.

I now move into the recital of the facts as I find

them to be under this evidence. I do note that counsel in

their arguments have attempted to draw very fine lines

between what is direct evidence and what is circumstantial

evidence and what is McDonnell Douglas scutiny and what

is scutiny under some other form of decision. I find those

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arguments largely to be an exercise of intellectual curiosity

more than helpful to the ultimate resolution of the case.

There is a dispute in this evidence as to whether or

not Mr. Ruffin was assigned the more difficult jobs that

mechanics were assigned. And there is a dispute in the

testimony as to whether any such variation in job

assignments might be attributed to Mr. Ruffin's race.

While recognizing the difference in the evidence, the

dispute in the evidence, I conclude on this issue favorable

to the defendant. I conclude that the evidence has not

shown that Mr. Ruffin was assigned jobs as a mechanic

that were more difficult or more dirty than white

mechanics were being assigned.

Much of the evidence has dwelt on particular

assignments. It's clear that certain whites have been

assigned the same jobs that Mr. Ruffin says were the

worst. There are disputes as to whether assignments of

whites to those jobs were of the same frequency that Mr.

i

3

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Ruffin was assigned. At least as to one white employee,

the evidence it seems to me is clear that that employee

was assigned perhaps even a higher percentage or

frequency of those “bad jobs” than was Mr. Ruffin. On

that claim, then, I am ruling in favor of the company and

against the plaintiff.

The second matter to be addressed relates to the

claim of disparate treatment in the imposition of discipline

both in terms of oral reprimands and indeed in terms of

suspensions. As already indicated, I do not limit my

attention to those matters that may have predated within

180 days the filing of the EEOC charge but I look to the

variety of those matters as they have come up even to the

date of the trial.

There is evidence that some of the matters for

which Mr. Ruffin received either a warning or a

suspension might, when compared with what some white

employees have received in the way of reprimands or

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suspensions, be considered as unequal and, hence,

discriminatory--at least presumptively discriminatory.

The evidence also indicates on the other side that

there are other matters for which Mr. Ruffin may have

received only a reprimand or indeed be talked to but not

recorded as even a reprimand for which white employees

doing much of the same thing have been given even more

severe punishments and discipline than has Mr. Ruffin.

Indeed the evidence indicates that the company's

dissatisfaction with Mr. Ruffin's performance and certain

aspects of his work, particularly in slow production, has

with respect to white employees or at least to two of

those, resulted in their discharge, whereas at most, in Mr.

Ruffin's case it has resulted in a suspension. I say the

same thing with respect to certain violations of safety

rules. I find in favor of the company on that claim as to

the discipline. I find that Mr. Ruffin has not been

as Aitinaladleest “++

dete

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disciplined in a way disparate from whites as it relates to

his race.

The more difficult issues before the Court are the

last two. Those are ones dealing with pay and the

consequential effect of pay raises that would have resulted

in his classification as an A-mechanic rather than a B-

mechanic, and the issues relating to the use within this

workplace of racial slurs and jokes and incidents that

certainly could be treated and viewed as offensive to black

persons. These two matters are somewhat related as I will

indicate in these findings.

The policy of this company is that pay increases to

the mechanics, who generally number about fifteen at any

particular time, are ordinarily handled by considering at

roughly six month intervals the potential increase in hourly

rates of individuals. On a few occasions, the company has

granted the equivalent of a general increase to all

employees by simply giving a one time payment in lieu of

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individual hourly increases and has treated that one time

payment as simply replacing any possible raises for that

period of time, and as to those matters it appears that

Mr. Ruffin = shared with the white mechanics in those

payments.

As it relates, however, to the essentially semi-

annual consideration of raises, it is clear that the company

has made those decisions on an individual-by-individual

basis, considering the mechanics, their work performance,

their productivity, any problems with discipline and indeed

their rates of pay in comparison with other mechanics

given their apparent abilities, demonstrated particularly

during the preceding six months. Typically, these raises to

individuals have not exceeded twenty-five cents per hour

and the persons to whom the raises have been given have

not always received the full twenty-five cents per hour.

The company has from time to time given smaller hourly

increases.

.

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There are four particular increases that the Court

looks at particularly during this lawsuit. One is increases

that were give in October or November of 1987. Mr.

Ruffin did not receive any increase at that time in his

hourly rate. There is next the increase that was given to

some employees in March of 1988 approximately a month

before the filing of Mr. Ruffin's charge. Mr. Ruffin did

not receive any pay increase at that time. Two subsequent

hourly increases were given mechanics. Mr. Ruffin did

receive hourly increases during those latter two times, one

in the amount of fifteen cents per hour and one in the

amount of twenty cents per hour. These wete not as high

as some employees but they were not, at the same time,

the lowest, as I recall. o

The manner by which the company made the

determinations about pay increases was that the branch

manager of the defendant, in conjunction with the service

manager, would review the status of the mechanic. One

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of the things that would be considered in that connection

would be certain ratings or what was referred to here as

"flex" or "flexibility charts" that had been prepared with

respect to each of the mechanics by the service manager

or the shop foreman and the two lead men. These

appraisals averaged, would attempt to assess, particularly

within the preceding six months how the various

mechanics were doing in terms of various job skills,

particular types of welding, particular functions that

people had to perform in grading the individuals with

respect to whether they were untrainable subject to being

trained, good or satisfactory or indeed skilled. In addition

to those attributes, attempted to be rated in this manner,

there would be an assessment of a person's attitude during

the preceding six months and attendance record during the

preceding six months.

These flex charts would be considered by the two

individuals making the decision about pay raises. They

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were not the only thing to be considered and indeed as

the Court attempted to compare those flex ratings with

what happened in the way of actual granting of raises, it's

apparent that the flex ratings certainly have no high

correlation to the actual raises given but at most had some

influence on those.

The branch manager and service manager in

making these semi-annual decisions on raises would also

consider their views of the various employee's productivity,

safety matters, disciplinary record during the preceding six

months' period of time and how the person's pay

compared with other employees, particularly those who

were reflecting the same level of skill.

Obviously a system like this creates a substantial

opportunity for persons with racial biases to let those

biases be reflected in the increases being given. There is

no evidence to indicate-that either of the two individuals

involved in making those decisions, either Mr. Aycock, the

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branch manager, or Mr. Woods, the service manager, were

themselves infected with any kind of racial bias that would

perhaps affect their decisions on pay raises.

However, one of the elements or items being

considered by them were these flex charts and one of the

four individuals involved in preparing the flex charts was

a lead man, Mr. Webb, about whom there is evidence to

certainly indicate a likelihood of racial bias or prejudice.

There is some evidence to indicate that a second of

the people involved in making those flex charts ratings,

Mr. Willoughby, who was a shop foreman, had or may

have had racial bias. I reject the plaintiff's evidence as to

evidence of Mr. Willoughby's racial bias and do not find

the evidence to support any such determination or

conclusion.

It does leave me with the point that one of the four

individuals involved in making the flex ratings was at least

potentially subject to racial bias and prejudices that could

i

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have affected those ratings. Indeed as I've looked through

the flex ratings and with particular emphasis to those

given by Mr. Webb, at least I believe it's the latter two as

to which I had the information, indicate an unusually low

rating of Mr. Ruffin by Mr. Webb.

At the same time, the ratings give to Mr. Ruffin by

the other three, as to whom I find no racial bias, also

indicate a lower rating for Mr. Ruffin than might

otherwise have been suspected in the light of his

experience of, at that time, ten to eleven years. The

evidence indicates that during this period of time, Mr.

Ruffin was having, periodically, difficulties in production,

in being slow in getting work out. This is not to say that

all mechanics do not, from time to time, have jobs

assigned to them where they take more time than the goal

in terms of hours that were prescribed at the time the job

was taken on or assigned.

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The evidence indicates a repeated problem,

however, with Mr. Ruffin beyond simply the one or two

incidents of his having exceeded a goal as set at the time

of a job assignment. The records of the service manager

reflecting the admonitions to Mr. Ruffin concerning his

lack of productivity, not attending to the work, at times

not being prompt in reporting to the job to begin promptly

to work, reflect, as the company has here described it, a

roller coaster effect in Mr. Ruffin's job performance.

Namely the company's position is that, although Mr.

Ruffin has the various skills to be able to do this work and

can do it, he frequently has not done it.

The evidence reflects problems with Mr. Ruffin's

attendance. Here again, this is not to say that other

employees and white employees have not had attendance

problems as well. One of the interesting things about this

case is that the company has been able to demonstrate

that it has taken more severe disciplinary action with

AD IRR DY SOT

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respect to certain white individuals than it has with Mr.

Ruffin as it relates to essentially the same problems.

I put aside for the moment this discussion about

pay. I do note, however, that the two times in which Mr.

Ruffin did not receive a pay increase, the fall of 1987 and

the spring of 1988 occasions, although he did not receive

a pay increase neither did most white employees. The

evidence indicates that the fall of 1987 pay increase, there

were pay increases given to only three of the fifteen

mechanics. The evidence indicates that in the spring 1988

pay increases, there were increases given to only two of

the fifteen mechanics. So that the failure in this respect

of Mr. Ruffin to receive an increase has to also be

considered in light of the fact that most white employees

did not receive an increase either. I leave this matter for

the moment to discuss the work environment.

The evidence indicates that in the shop, the various

mechanics, most of whom were white, engaged on a

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regular basis in making racially tainted jokes, slurs and

epithets. They at times would refer to Mr. Ruffin and

other black employees in a derogatory and offensive way.

There were matters of horseplay that went on. Not all

blacks necessarily were offended by those but at least Mr.

Ruffin was and there certainly was a basis for his being

offended by those.

Mr. Ruffin also took offense at his being referred

to on a fairly regular basis as "Rondo". There is nothing

in that term that has a racial connotation to it. It

apparently was used in light of Mr. Ruffin's name being

Ron or Ronald and in light of the fact that the service

manager's name also was Ron or Ronnie, and somehow

the coin of the nickname of “Rondo” to refer to

Mr. Ruffin, at least that would appear to have been

perhaps the initial foundation for it. At the same time, at

least at some point, Mr. Ruffin no longer liked being

referred to as Rondo, didn't understand the term perhaps,

Se alata aa etna ot Otten

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and made an inquiry about it and was told it meant "dumb

ass". Well, even so, though it may have been offensive,

that has no racial connotations to it, unless one also

assumes that a person making that cuimment is saying that

black people more than white people could be dumb

asses. There's nothing to suggest that.

At the same time, certainly the Court must be

sensitive to the fact that given the historical basis of black

people frequently being referred to either by first names

when others were not or by being called "boy" when others

were not called in that way, that there is more reason for

a black person to be offended by the use of a nickname

than perhaps a white person might under similar

circumstances. Mr. Ruffin did make it known that the

didn't like being called "Rondo". As it relates to that

particular matter, the company made no effort to see that

the co-workers, the mechanics, ceased using a term that

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Mr. Ruffin didn't like although it, in and of itself, has no

racial overtones.

There is an incident that occurred in or around the

close of the year 1987 certainly as to which this Court

would be concerned and is concerned. An incident in

which a noose was prepared using heavy rope by white

mechanics and ultimately the noose was put around Mr.

Ruffin's neck by one of these white mechanics. These are

co-workers and not supervisors.

Mr. Ruffin made a complaint to management about

what had occurred and management did immediately

make an inquiry investigation into it. Management got

conflicting stories with the whites who were involved

having indicated that, number one, it had not originally

been prepared in any way as something directed to Mr.

Ruffin and that in any event it was a matter simply of a

joke and no offense taken in the eyes of the whites and

that Mr. Ruffin, himself, had engaged in some horseplay

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or joking use of the noose at the same time. Mr. Ruffin's

version, of course, was different as to what happened and

it has been different in this trial.

Management, confronted with the two different

stories, without making a decision as to which story or

which version to believe, said that certainly an apology

was due to Mr. Ruffin from the whites who were involved

and indeed that apology was given. So far as management

was aware, that had satisfied Mr. Ruffin. Obviously it did

not satisfy him, but at least in terms of responding later to

management, he did not indicate that he was still unhappy

with what had occurred or what action management had

taken or failed to take of a more severe nature.

Since that incident in late 1987 it's clear to the

Court that management has taken a more active role in

reducing the amount of offensive language and joking that

had been going on prior to that time. It's also clear that

the action that management has taken from time to time

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in terms of correcting individuals who might be involved

in using racial slurs or names or jokes has not totally

stopped that kind of activity from going on within the

workplaces among co-workers.

Management has taken disciplinary action since

that time with respect to individuals, where it was reported

to management, that these things had occurred. It is not

unexpected that these matters have gone on periodically

and have not been reported to management persons.

It is very difficult, obviously, for management to

directly address matters when it's not reported, where they

have no knowledge of it, and it is clear to the Court based

on the evidence presented that management does view

that as inappropriate behavior and is prepared to impose

appropriate. discipline when called to its attention.

I digressed to this area because one of the aspects

that is most difficult for the Court to deal with here is that

a determination as to whether this racially hostile

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environment that would periodically be there when Mr.

Ruffin was working contributed to or caused the

inadequacies in performance which in turn have resulted

in the failure to get pay increases. To the extent the work

environment is sufficiently hostile so that an individual is

adversely affected in job performance by his response to

it and that's a reasonable response, not an unduly sensitive

response, then, as I view it, that becomes an act of

discrimination that can carry over into decisions that flow

from it, for example, in the decision about pay increases.

So, that is where the Court's struggle is in this

particular case. I've heard, of course, from other black

employees or former employees and the mere fact that

some of them may take greater offense or lesser offense

at these same activities is not controlling on the Court but

it is helpful in trying to assess the extent to which these

matters that were going on among co-workers constituted

such a pervasive environment that it could reasonably be

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expected to have caused inadequate job performance

which, in turn, could flow over into the area of pay

increases.

I do conclude that there were sporadic instances of

slurs, jokes, going on during the critical time period that

we're looking at from late 1987 forward. I do conclude

that that constituted a violation of the plaintiff's rights

under Title VII and that although the company was not

aware of all of those matters, it did become aware of

enough of them that some affirmative and effective

corrective action was appropriate and was required of the

company. It has taken some action. But during that

period of time Mr. Ruffin was exposed to those matters

and having to work under those conditions, the question

is how substantial and severe were they and to what

degree as it relates to Mr. Ruffin did that actually cause

the problems he was having which led to his poor or

relatively poor job performance? My conclusion is that

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though Mr. Ruffin was justifiably and understandably

upset and offended from time to time by the work of some

of these co-workers, that was not the basis or reason for

the inadequacies in job performance that led to his not

having received the pay increases in the fall of '87 or the

spring of '88.

I go back and I note that only three of

approximately fifteen mechanics got pay raises in the fall

of ‘87, only two of fifteen got pay raises in the spring of

‘88. Their "inadequacies of performance" that were

essentially similar to those, in many respects, of Mr.

Ruffin, were not for them in any way the result of racially

offensive environment. And from hearing from other

black employees in trying to assess as best I can what was

the real impact in the ability to perform work, I don't

believe that the offensive conduct that was going on

among co-workers was the cause of the inadequacies of

job performance that Mr. Ruffin was experiencing at that

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time. I am going to reject Mr. Ruffin's claim that lack of

pay increases with the consequent lack of promotion from

B-mechanic to A was racially motivated or came from or

is attributed to anything racially.

I have found and do find that the company did not

provide a sufficiently racially neutral environment for Mr.

Ruffin and other blacks to perform their work in, that I

declare, as a declaratory judgment, that Mr. Ruffin's rights

were violated back during that period of time. The

company has taken some action since late 1987 to correct

that and it's certainly made it clear to the co-employees

that it does not tolerate that and does not view that type

of conduct as permissible. It's also true that given the

extent to which that had been going on for such a number

of years, that it has been ineffective in really correcting

adequately that situation.

I am going to enjoin the company to take active

steps to reduce and eliminate the racial joking and slurs

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and episodes in the shop area. The wording of an

injunction of this sort is very difficult. And it is, as I say,

clear to me that the company has attempted or started in

that area, has undei.aken from time to time disciplinary

action. But I think the Court is essentially requiring now,

given this evidence, the company to be more affirmative

and more aggressive in its efforts to correct that Situation,

that environment in the shop. Only in that respect is the

Court granting relief to the plaintiff. While important, it

is not really a central aspect of what has been the claim

presented by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, I'm sure must feel like he has lost in

the case. I think it is fair to say in general he has lost in

this case even though the Court does find on this area an

entitlement to relief.

In my view, each side--or the costs should be taxed

against the defendant but in my view the plaintiff is not

entitled to attorney's fees in this case having won on no

es

A-34

central or major or significant issue being presented. The

result, then, is a decision that will enjoin the company to

take affirmative action to prevent the existence of

conditions within the shop that are racially offensive.

The costs of the action will be taxed against the

company but those costs will not include attorney's fees.

I'm sure that neither side agrees with the Court's

conclusions or findings. And there are some areas that I

have not touched on. The matters are still clear in my

mind and if counsel believe I have failed to cover a

subject matter that I should have covered and perhaps

could do so while the evidence still is clear in mind, I

would appreciate your advice on something that I've

overlooked. If you think I made a misstatement that

perhaps I would want to correct, I would also like to be

told that. Again, I'm not asking for any waiver of the right

for post judgment motions. Does plaintiff know of

anything that perhaps I should deal with?

A-35

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

Southern Division

Case No. CV 89-P-1951-S

RONALD RUFFIN,

Plaintiff;

“V5.°

GREAT DANE TRAILERS, INC.,

ee ON eee me

Defendant.

JUDGMENT

Pursuant to the findings of fact and conclusions of

law dictated into the record, it is hereby ORDERED that

defendant, Great Dane Trailers, Inc., be hereby enjoined

to take appropriate steps to create a work environment at

its shop in Birmingham, Alabama, that will not be racially

offensive to its black employees, and more particularly

that the defendant, Great Dane Trailers, Inc., take

appropriate steps to assure that its employees at such job

site cease using racial slurs, epithets, Slang, and jokes that

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might be reasonably expected to be offensive to its black

employees. In other respects, the claims of the plaintiff

are DENIED.

Costs, but not including attorneys’ fees, are taxed

against the defendant.

This the 19th day of April, 1991.

/s/ Sam C, Pointer

United States District Judge

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Ronald RUFFIN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GREAT DANE TRAILERS,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 91-7423.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 20, 1992.

Appeal from the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Alabama.

Before KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge, CLARK’,

Senior Circuit Judge, and PITTMAN”, Senior District

Judge.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:

" See Rule 34-2(b), Rules of the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

‘” Honorable Virgil Pittman, Senior U.S. District

Judge for the Southern District of Alabama, sitting by

designation.

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Plaintiff-appellant Ronald Ruffin appeals the

district court's denial of plaintiff's request for attorney's

fees. Ruffin sued his employer, defendant-appellee Great

Dane Trailers ("Great Dane"), seeking damages and

injunctive relief for violations of Title VII. The district

court found in favor of the defendant on plaintiff's claims

for damages, but held in favor of the plaintiff on his claim

for injunctive relief, ordering the defendant to take

appropriate steps to make its Birmingham, Alabama shop

a racially neutral workplace. The district court denied

plaintiff's request for attorney's fees on the ground that he

had failed to prevail on any significant issue in the

litigation. Piaintiff appeals the district court's decision not

to award plaintiff attorney's fees. We reverse and remand

to the district court.

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I. BACKGROUND AND COURSE

OF PROCEEDINGS

Ruffin was employed at Great Dane's Birmingham,

Alabama shop as a Class B mechanic. On November 15,

1989, Ruffin sued Great Dane for violations of Title VII,

claiming discrimination on account of race. Specifically,

Ruffin alleged the following violations: (1) that Great

Dane had failed to promote Ruffin to the Position of

Class A mechanic on account of race; (2) that Great Dane

had discriminated against Ruffin in terms of job

assignments, giving him more difficult and less attractive

work than white mechanics received; (3) that Great Dane

had disciplined Ruffin differently than it disciplined white

workers; and (4) that Ruffin had been subjected to a

racially hostile work environment.

Ruffin sought the following relief: (1) a declaratory

judgment that Great Dane's employment policies and

practices violated Title VII; (2) a permanent injunction

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ordering Great Dane to cease violating Title VII; and (3)

"an Order requiring the defendant to make the plaintiff

whole by awarding him the position he would have

occupied in the absence of race discrimination,

compensatory damages, lost seniority, benefits, and loss of -

pension."

This case was tried before the United States

District Court for the Nerbere District of Alabama on

April 15-16, 1991. At the end of the trial, the court read

its findings of fact and conclusions of law into the record,

analyzing separately each of the four components of

Ruffin's Title VII claim.

The court ruled in favor of the defendant on the

first three components of Ruffin's claim. The court held

that Ruffin's work performance justified both the failure

of the company to promote him to a Class A mechanic

and the disciplinary measures taken by the company

against Ruffin. The district court also found to be without

A-41

merit Ruffin's allegations that he was treated unfairly in

terms of work assignments.

With respect to Ruffin's claim of a racially hostile

work environment, the court made two determinations.

First, the court rejected plaintiff's contention that Great

Dane's allegedly racially offensive work environment

adversely affected Ruffin's work performance and had

therefore caused the above-mentioned deficiencies in

Ruffin's performance that resulted in his failure to gain

advancement in the company. Second, however, the court

found that "the company did not provide a sufficiently

racially neutral environment for Mr. Ruffin and other

blacks to perform their work in." The court found that “in

the shop the various mechanics, most of whom were white,

engaged on a regular basis in making racially tainted

jokes, slurs and epithets." In making this determination,

the court pointed in particular to one 1987 incident,

highlighted by the plaintiff at trial, in which Ruffin's co-

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workers had placed around his neck a hangman's noose

made out of thick rope and had stated that they intended

to “hang us a nigger." The court recognized that Great

Dane had taken some action since 1987 to correct such

problems, but also recognized that "given the extent to

which [the offensive behavior] had been going on for such

a number of years, . . . [Great Dane] has been ineffective

in really correcting adequately the situation."

The court therefore (1) issued a declaratory

judgment that Ruffin's rights had been violated by virtue

of the behavior at the Great Dane shop, and (2) issued an

injunction requiring Great Dane to “take active steps to

reduce and eliminate the racial joking and slurs and

episodes in the shop area." In explaining its injunction,

the court noted that it was "essentially requiring . . . the

company to be more affirmative and more aggressive in its

efforts to correct that situation, that environment in the

shop."

ed

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The court taxed costs against the defendant, but

held that the plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the civil rights attorney's fees

Statute, because he had not prevailed on any "central or

major or significant issue." In its earlier discussion of the

injunction issue, the court had indicated that "[w]hile [the

district court's ruling on the injunction issue is] important,

it is not really a central aspect of what has been the claim

presented by the plaintiff."

Ruffin appeals the district court's determination

that he is not entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] We review a district court's determination

that a civil rights plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees

for abuse of discretion. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 ( 1983);

en

A-44

Taylor v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 810 F.2d 1551, 1556

(11th Cir. 1987).

Ill. ANALYSIS

A. The "Prevailing Party" Standard

42 U.S.C. § 1988 states, in relevant part: "In any

action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections

1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of

Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing

party, other than the United States, a reasonable

attorney's fee as part of the costs." Thus, the question in

this case is whether Ruffin was a prevailing party under 42

U.S.C. § 1988.

[2] The parties agree that the Supreme Court's

decision in Texas State Teacher's Ass'n v, Garland

Independent School District, 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486,

103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989), is controlling on the "prevailing

ee

cinta Jectabgtetduhedtins nose ee ee

A-45

party" issue. In Garland, the Court resolved a conflict

between the circuits as to the proper standard for

determining whether a civil rights plaintiff was a prevailing

party, rejecting the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ "central

issue" test in favor of a more lenient standard.! The

Garland Court held that "[iJf a civil rights plaintiff has

succeeded on ‘any significant issue in litigation which

achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in

bringing suit,’ the plaintiff has crossed the threshold to a

fee award of some kind." Garland, 489 U.S. at 791-92, 109

S.Ct. at 1493 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275,

278-79 (1st Cir. 1978).) The Court further held:

[w]here the plaintiffs success on a legal

claim can be characterized as purely

‘Prior to Garland, the Fifth and Eleventh circuits had

required a civil rights plaintiff to succeed on the "central

issue" in the litigation and achieve the "primary relief

sought” to be eligible for an award of attorney's fees under

42 U.S.C. § 1988. Simien v. San Antonio, 809 F.2d 255,

258 (Sth Cir. 1987); Martin v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145,

1149 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

|

A-46

technical or de minimis, a district court

would be justified in concluding that even

the "generous formulation" we adopt today

has not been satisfied. [Citations omitted].

The touchstone of the prevailing party

inquiry must be the material alteration of

the legal relationship of the parties in a

manner which Congress sought to promote

in the fee statute. Where such a change has

occurred, the degree of the plaintiff's overall

success goes to the reasonableness of the

award under Hensley [y, Eckerhart, supra],

not to the availability of a fee award vel

non.

Id, at 792-93, 109 S.Ct. at 1493.

Appellant claims that because the district court's

injunction materially altered the legal relationship between

himself and Great Dane, he has satisfied the Garland test

and has prevailed on a significant issue in the litigation

that achieved some of the benefits he sought in bringing

suit. Appellee contends, conversely, that Ruffin did not

*Specifically, Ruffin argues that the district court erred

by applying the "central issue” test rejected in Garland.

The court did state that plaintiff “won on no central or

major or significant issue being presented," and that

(continued...)

A-47

satisfy the Garland standard for several reasons: _ first,

appellee notes that Ruffin received none of the financial

benefits he sought from bringing his lawsuit, such as a

promotion or back pay; second, appellee argues that the

court did not order Great Dane to initiate any further

action with respect to the specific incidents of racial

harassment out of which Ruffin's lawsuit arose; third,

Great Dane contends that, given the district court's finding

that Great Dane had take some steps to eliminate the

offensive racial atmosphere in its Birmingham shop, the

court's injunction merely directed the appellee to "do

(...continued)

Ruffin's claim for injunctive relief "[was] not really a

central aspect of plaintiff's claim," thereby arguably

implicating the discredited "central issue" test. We

believe, however, that the court's language, taken as a

whole, reveals that the district court looked to see whether

the plaintiff prevailed on any significant issue in the

litigation, thereby applying the correct legal standard. The

question remains, however, whether the court incorrectly

applied that standard, and abused it discretion by

concluding that Ruffin was not entitled to attorney's fees.

A-48

more of what the evidence established [it] had already

done in the past." Ultimately, argues Great Dane, Ruffin

achieved no more than a "technical victory” in district

court, and lost on "every significant claim presented to the

court."

We disagree with the appellee, and hold that the

district court abused its discretion in determining that

Ruffin was not a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988

and Garland, supra.

B. The Right

[3,4] The district court's findings /conclusions

make clear that the defendant violated the plaintiff's civil

rights by not providing a sufficiently racially neutral work

environment for Ruffin and other blacks at Great Dane,

and by failing to take "some affirmative and effective

corrective action" in light of the racially offensive

environment at the Great Dane shop. Although it is true

A-49

that a mere determination that a civil rights plaintiff's

rights have been violated does not per se make the

plaintiff a prevailing party for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §

1988, see Rhodes v, Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4, 109 S.Ct. 202.

203, 102 L.Ed.2d. 1 (1988); Hewitt v, Helms, 482 U.S. 755,

762, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 2676, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987); Walker

v. Anderson Electrical Connectors, 944 F.2d 841, 846-47

(11th Cir. 1991), pet. for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3862

(May 8, 1992), the district court's ruling in this case

provided Ruffin with more than a bare declaration that his

rights had been violated.

C. The Remedy

[5S] In an attempt to preclude future violations

of Ruffin's rights, the court in this case fashioned

affirmative injunctive relief, mandating that Great Dane

take affirmative steps to improve its response to worksite

racism. The court's decision to issue the injunction arose

A-S0

out of its recognition that although Great Dane had since

1987 taken some corrective action to redress the racism

suffered by Ruffin, "the action management has taken

from time to time in terms of correcting individuals who

might be involved in using racial slurs or names or jokes

has not totally stopped that kind of activity from going on

within the workplaces among co-workers." Thus, because

of what it perceived to be a less-than-full commitment on

the part of Great Dane to eradicate the racial taunts and

comments that permeated the appellee's shop, the court

saw fit to use its injunctive powers to require Great Dane

to be more aggressive in providing black workers with a

racially neutral work environment. Ruffin clearly sought

such injunctive relief in his complaint.

The district court's judgment sniliieiilty affected

the behavior of Great Dane toward the defendant, and

altered the legal relationship between Ruffin and his

employer. By virtue of the court's grant of injunctive

A-51

relief, Great Dane is now under a legal obligation to

correct the racist behavior at its jobsite. Accordingly,

Ruffin may now protect his rights through a civil contempt

proceeding in the event that Great Dane's compliance

with the court's injunction is not forthcoming. See Mercer

v. Mitchell, 908 F.2d 763, 768 (11th Cir. 1990). Given the

alteration of Ruffin's legal rights and Great Dane's legal

obligations that resulted from the court's grant of

injunctive relief, there is no question that Ruffin prevailed

on this issue before the district court, or that,

consequently, he satisfied the Garland standard and is

entitled to an award of attorney's fees.

D. The Incompleteness of the Remedy

[6] | That Ruffin only partially prevailed in his

Suit against Great Dane in no way precludes him from

receiving attorney's fees in this case. Indeed, the very

import of Garland is that a plaintiff need only prevail on

A-52

one significant issue to qualify as a prevailing party under

42 U.S.C. § 1988. Garland, 489 U.S. at 789, 109 S.Ct. at

1492. A plaintiff may be said to have prevailed if the

relief granted altered his or her legal relationship with the

defendant. Our discussion in Section II.C, supra, reveals

that the relief afforded Ruffin materially altered his

relationship with Great Dane. Thus, the fact that Ruffin

obtained relief on no other issue is irrelevant.’

3Both parties analogize this case to one in which the

plaintiff received nominal damages and nothing else out

of his or her civil rights action. Several circuits, including

this one, have held that an award of nominal damages,

without more, suffices as a basis for an award of attorney's

fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Garner v, Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc,, 807 F.2d 1536, 1539-40 (11th Cir. 1987); Scofield v.

, 862 F.2d 759, 766 (9th Cir. 1988);

inski, 928 F.2d 558, 564 (2d Cir. 1991);

Allen v. Higgins, 902 F.2d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 1990). The

Fifth Circuit, however, has held that an award of nominal

damages, without more, represents the kind of technical,

de minimis victory that the Supreme Court in Garland,

Hewitt and Rhodes held should not furnish a basis for

attorney's fees. Estate of Farrar v, Cain, 941 F.2d 1311,

1313-17 (Sth Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court recently

granted certiorari in Farrar, —Ss«US. ___, 112 S.Ct.

(continued...)

A-S3

E. The Prospective Nature of the Remedy

[7] Appellee further argues that because the

court did not order Great Dane to initiate any further

action with respect to the specific incidents of racial

harassment out of which Ruffin's lawsuit arose, such as the

1987 noose incident, the plaintiff was not the prevailing

party for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This argument

implies that the prospective nature of the relief obtained

bv the plaintiff makes such relief an inadequate predicate

for the award of attorney's fees, and, in essence, suggests

that as a general matter injunctive relief, which is by its

‘(...continued)

1159, 117 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), and will presumably resolve

this issue in the near future. In any event, this case is

different in kind from cases involving nominal damages

insofar as the district court's action in this case materially

altered the legal relationship between Ruffin and Great

Dane in a way that an award of nominal damages does

not. See Section II.C, supra. Therefore, regardless of

whether or not the Supreme Court ultimately holds

nominal damages to provide a sufficient predicate for an

attorney's fees award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the district

court erred in denying Ruffin attorney's fees in this case.

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very nature prospective, could not provide an adequate

basis for an attorney's fees award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Appellee's contention, of course, is patently wrong.

In Crowder v, Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta,

908 F.2d 843 (11th Cir. 1990), for example, this court

approved an award of attorney's fees to a group of senior

citizens who had successfully sought an injunction that

would allow them to hold Bible study meetings and to

post notices of such meetings in their public housing

complex. The court issued the requested injunction, which

"put into place specific detailed procedures that

guaranteed the plaintiffs access to meeting space and

bulletin board access." Crowder, 908 F.2d at 849.

[8] Although the relief in this case does not

reach the level of specificity reached by the injunction

issued in Crowder, in both cases the court used its

injunctive powers to address situations which had

previously resulted in violations of the plaintiffs’ rights,

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and to mandate the implementation of procedures that

would ensure against the recurrence of such violations.

The fact that, as in Crowder, specific instances of

misconduct by the defendants were not addressed by the

court's injunction is of no moment.‘ Where, as here,

injunctive relief is requested by a plaintiff and granted by

the district court, the accompanying failure of the court to

provide retrospective relief in the form of compensatory

damages does not negate the court's use of its authority to

mandate Great Dane's increased attention and improved

responses to jobsite racism, and to provide Ruffin with a

remedy in the event increased vigilance is not forthcoming.

See also, Sanchez v, City of Miami Beach, 720 F.Supp. 974

(S.D.Fla. 1989) (Title VII plaintiff entitled to attorney's

“It should be noted that the plaintiffs in Crowder, like

Ruffin, unsuccessfully sought monetary damages for the

defendant's violation of their rights.

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fees after having been granted injunctive relief on her

claims of sexual harassment).

F. The Need For a Remedy

Finally, appellee suggests that because the district

court found that Great Dane had taken some corrective

action to improve the racial situation at Ruffin’s jobsite,

the court's injunction does not materially alter the existing

legal relations between Ruffin and Great Dane, and

therefore cannot serve as the basis for an award of

attorney's fees. This argument is also without merit.

[9] An injunction is inappropriate if the

possibility of future harm to the plaintiff arising out of the

behavior plaintiff seeks to enjoin is purely speculative.

Lopez v. Garriga, 917 F.2d 63, 67 (1st Cir. 1990). The

district court om fit to issue an injunction against Great

Dane because Great Dane had failed to correct

adequately the situation which led to violations of Ruffin's

A-57

rights. The court's decision to issue its injunction reflected

its belief that the possibility of future violations of

plaintiffs rights--and the rights of other blacks employed

by Great Dane--existed, and served to ensure the lack of

recurring violations.

Appellee does not challenge the award of injunctive

relief, nor does it suggest that the court's finding that

Great Dane has failed to address adequately the problem

of jobsite racism is clearly erroneous. Given the district

court's unchallenged findings, we cannot hold that the

court's injunction did not materially alter the relationship

between Ruffin and Great Dane because Great Dane had

already acted to effectuate this changing relationship. To

do so would strip the district court's action of any meaning

whatsoever, and would negate the court's determination

that Great Dane had not adequately corrected the

situation that resulted in a violation of Ruffin's rights.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the

district court abused its discretion in determining that

Ruffin was not a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND this case to

the district court with instructions to hold an evidentiary

hearing on plaintiffs’ entitlement to attorney's fees.

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STATUTORY PROVISIONS

42 U.S.C. §2000e-2. Unlawful employment

practices

[Sec. 703](a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice

for an employer--

(1)

(2)

to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of

such individual's race, color, religion, sex, Or

national original; or

to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or

applicants for employment in any way which would

deprive or tend to deprive any individual of

employment opportunities or otherwise adversely

affect his status as an employee, because of such

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individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin. . .

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Enforcement provisions

In any action or proceeding under this title the

court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing

party, other than the Commission or the United

States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the

costs, and the Commission and the United States

shall be liable for costs the same as a private

person.

42 U.S.C. §1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights;

attorney's fees

_. . In any action or proceeding to enforce

a provision of sections 1977, 1978, 1979,

1980, and 1981 of the Revised Statutes (42

U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, 1985, 1986], title IX of

A-61

Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et

seq.], or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 [42 U.S.C. §§2000d et seq.], the court,

in its discretion, may allow the prevailing

party, other than the United States, a

reasonable attorney's fee as part of the

costs.