Opposition Brief — Environmental Protection Agency v. Coalition for Clean Air
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Court, U.S.
FILED
| DEC. 18 1992
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No. 92-798 | OFRICE OF THE GLERK
in THE SUPREME COURT OF THE WRITER STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, et al., PETITIONERS,
v.
COALITION FOR CLEAN AIR, INC., et ai.,
RESPONDENTS
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To the United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO FILE
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
ALAN C. WALTNER*
Law Offices of Alan Waltner
1736 Franklin Street, 8th Floor
Oakland, CA 94612
(510) 465-4494
TRENT ORR
96 Manchester Street
San Francisco, CA 94110
(415) 206-0898
Counsel for Respondents
*Counsel of Record
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.:
§110(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (Supp. II
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§110(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(i) (Supp. I]
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§302(y), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(y) (Supp. II
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MISCELLANEOUS
55 Fed. Reg. (1990)
1h THE SUPREME COURT OF THE HITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
No. 92-798
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, et al., PETITIONERS,
Vv,
COALITION FOR CLEAN AIR, INC., e¢ al.,
RESPONDENTS
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To the United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO FILE
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
The Coalition for Clean Air and Sierra Club (jointly, the
“Coalition")' oppose the motion for leave to file a brief amicus
curiae filed by the law firm of Latham & Watkins, counsel for
Respondent Southern California Edison Company in these
proceedings, on behalf of the Los Angeles Area Chamber of
Commerce ("Chamber").
‘Respondents Coalition for Clean Air and Sierra Club are not-for-profit
corporations that do not have publicly traded stock, or parent or subsidiary
corporations. Sup. Ct. R. 29.1.
2
Southern California Edison Company ("Edison"), a major
utility company in the Southern California area and a party to the
proceedings below, which we are informed is a member of the
Chamber, elected not to file a brief in support of the
Environmental Protection Agency’s ("EPA") petition for writ of
certiorari within the twenty day period required under Supreme
Court Rule 12.4. Instead, after the Coalition’s brief had been
dispatched to the printer,” the Coalition was informed that the
Chamber, represented by the same law firm as Edison, intended
to file a brief on behalf of its members, including Edison. The
practical effect of this approach was to prevent the Coalition
from addressing in the brief in opposition the points made by
Southern California industrial interests, including Edison. For
that reason, this opposition is being filed.
Moreover, the Chamber presents essentially the same
arguments as does EPA regarding the potential impacts of air
quality regulation on the Southern California economy. Not
surprisingly, the Chamber’s brief suffers from the same
fundamental flaws as does EPA’s. First, the Chamber assumes
without providing any direct support that partial federal planning
will be more expensive and less efficient than planning based
solely on state and local authorities. Indeed, the South Coast Air
Quality Management District has provided clear evidence to the
contrary in its brief in opposition -- that the least costly set of
regulations will need to include federal measures. Pure
argument, rather than citation to evidence, by EPA, the
Chamber, and by the Southern California Association of
The Coalition was informed the afternoon of Friday, December 4 that
the Chamber intended to file its brief the next Monday. No previous
notice had been provided and the Coalition had relied upon Edison’s failure
to file a supporting brief within the twenty day period in selecting the
issues to present in its opposition.
3
Governments ("SCAG"), does not support the proposition that
the federal implementation plan ("FIP") will be inefficient.
Second, as with EPA and SCAG, the Chamber assumes that
the FIP will need to be complete in and of itself, rather than
filling gaps and building upon the state plan that has already been
submitted to EPA. This argument ignores the added flexibility
built into the definition of FIPs by the 1990 Amendments, as
well as the nature of the FIP that EPA actually proposed in
September, 1990. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(y) (Supp. II 1990); 55 Fed.
Reg. 36,458 (1990):
The term "Federal implementation plan" means a plan (or
portion thereof) promulgated by the Administrator to fill all
or a portion of a gap or otherwise correct all or a portion
of an inadequacy in a State implementation plan, and which
includes enforceable emissions limitations or other control
measures, means or techniques (including economic
incentives, such as marketable permits or auctions of
emissions allowances), and provides for attainment of the
relevant national ambient air quality standard.
The Chamber’s repeated reference to “two layers of
environmental regulations" and "an across-the-board strategy . .
. adopted in addition to existing state and local standards" is a
straw man. Chamber Brief at 3, 6, 9 (emphasis in original).
Under the new FIP definition, EPA clearly does not need to
include controls already included in the state plan, and the FIP
*The Southern California Association of Governments, party to the
proceedings below, filed a second petition for writ of certiorari in this
case, rather than filing a brief in support of EPA’s petition within the
twenty day period under Rule 12.4. In order to move this matter forward,
the Coalition’s opposition to SCAG’s petition is being filed this same date. |
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4
can be partial and supportive, rather than complete in and of
itself.
Similarly, the Chamber’s argument that the federal plan will
be required before state planning efforts can take place ignores
the fact that a state plan has already been submitted and is
presently pending before the EPA. 55 Fed. Reg. 36,458 (1990).
EPA proposed to approve the control measures in this state plan
in September, 1990, but has not yet finalized that action. Jd.
The Chamber’s suggestion (Chamber Brief at 7), that EPA can
or should ignore this pending state plan submission until 1994
when additional matters must be addressed, inappropriately seeks
to continue the implementation plan gap in the South Coast that
underlies this action. The 1994 deadline for additional state plan
submissions under the 1990 Amendments is an outside limit and
there is absolutely no support in the statute for the suggestion
that presently pending state plan submissions should be ignored
until that date. c
The Chamber’s concern that the FIP will be hastily
developed (Chamber Brief at 8) ignores the role of the District
Court in setting an appropriate schedule, and the mutual interest
of all parties, including the Coalition, that EPA be given
sufficient time to develop an efficient, well documented and
appropriate plan based upon full public participation. The
Chamber’s suggestions to the contrary are pure speculation.
Also speculative and incorrect is the Chamber’s suggestion
that EPA’s direct FIP regulations will be less susceptible to
change than comparable state-initiated implementation plan
provisions. Chamber Brief at 8. However, once approved by
EPA as part of an implementation plan, state measures can only
be changed or removed through a subsequent EPA rulemaking or
order -- just the same as with federally-adopted measures. 42
5
U.S.C. §§ 7410(i), 7602(q) (Supp. II 1990). Adopted state
implementation plan provisions are no more or less flexible than
federal implementation plan requirements. In fact, EPA’s
proposed FIP primarily contained measures that, “would be
rescinded or their requirements lessened if State and local efforts
suffice . . . ," making clear that obsolete measures would not be
retained. 55 Fed. Reg. at 36,500 (1990).
Finally, the nature of the Chamber’s arguments illustrates
that this is fundamentally a political matter that was resolved by
Congress in the 1990 Amendments through the compromise
language selected in Section 110(c), continuing EPA’s FIP
obligations where SIP disapproval occurs, but relaxing the
requirements of the FIP through the new FIP definition. The
only appropriate lobbying, however, was that lobbying directed
to Congress, and the Chamber’s lobbying efforts before this
Court should be disregarded.
Respectfully submitted,
ALAN WALTNER*
Law Offices of Alan C. Waltner
1736 Franklin Street, 8th Floor
Oakland, CA 94612
(510) 465-4494
TRENT ORR
96 Manchester Street
San Francisco, CA 94110
(415) 206-0898
Counsel for Respondents
*Counsel of Record
December 18, 1992
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.