Reply Brief — Rock Creek Ltd. Partnership v. California State Water Resources Control Board

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an | Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

No. 92-785

: MAY 20 1993

aso . OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States—————

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

ROCK CREEK LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

Petitioner,

Vs

STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, et al,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO THE

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

OF THE UNITED STATES

TIMOTHY B. DYK

(Counsel of Record)

SARAH L. WANNER

JONES, DAY, REAVIS

& POGUE

1450 G Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 879-3939

LOUIS L. TOUTON

JONES, DAY, REAVIS

Suite 4600

Los Angeles, CA 90013

(213) 489-3939

Counsel for Petitioner

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

No. 92-785

ROCK CREEK LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

Petitioner,

¥.

STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO THE BRIEF

AMICUS CURIAE OF THE UNITED STATES

The Acting Solicitor General’s opposition to the petition for

certiorari ("SG Brief") reflects a wholly idiosyncratic view of the

principles governing the award of attorneys’ fees, not shared by

the courts below or, so far as we are aware, any other court.

Contrary to this Court’s decisions in the area and those of the

lower courts, the Acting Solicitor General suggests that attorneys’

fees for work in collateral proceedings are not recoverable unless

the collateral proceeding is actually litigating the Section 1983

claim or unless the collateral proceeding leads to the entry of a

specific affirmative judgment in the 1983 action. (SG Brief at

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5-9). That is not the law, and the Acting Solicitor General’s

effort to rewrite the statute provides no basis for declining to

review and resolve a persistent conflict.

1. The Acting Solicitor General argues that "the administrative

proceedings at issue here were not proceedings "to enforce’

petitioner’s civil rights claim" (SG Br. at 7), a rationale not

articulated by either the Court of Appeals or the district court

below. While it is quite true that the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission is not charged with adjudicating claims under Section

1983, that agency is charged with adjudicating the identical

federal right that formed the basis of the claim here under Section

1983: the right of a federal licensee to operate its hypdropower

plant in the manner prescribed in its Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission license without interference from conflicting

regulatory directives issued by the state. Decisions of this Court

and the lower courts are uniform in confirming that an identity in

federal rights asserted is sufficient to support an award of

attorneys’ fees for proceedings in collateral fora, and conflict only

with regard to whether those proceedings must be mandated by

Statute or court order. See, e.g., New York Gaslight Club, Inc.

v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980) (attorneys’ fees awarded under Title

VII for relief obtained in state court on employment

discrimination claim under state law); Pennsylvania v. Delaware

Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 560

(1986)(fees properly awarded under Clean Air Act for efforts to

protect Clean Air Act consent decree during state court litigation

and in proceedings before the Environmental Protection Agency);

Lampher v. Zagel, 755 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1985)(attorneys’ fees

awarded under Section 1988 after fee claimant’s intervention and

assertion of constitutional rights in action brought in state court

under Illinois Motor Vehicle Code resulted in state court ruling

invalidating state statute and ordering return of confiscated

vehicies); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, 670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir.

1982)(attorneys’ fees awarded under Title VII following collateral

debarment proceeding brought pursuant to Executive Order 11246

raising employment discrimination claim), cert. denied, 461 U.S.

956 (1983). In each of these cases the court ruled that an award

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of fees would be proper even though the collateral proceedings

were not themselves proceedings under Section 1983 or other

similar federal statutes.

2. The Acting Solicitor General places his sole reliance on

Webb v. Dyer County Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234 (1985), as

supposedly supporting his point. Webb, however, merely holds

that, for purposes of "automatic" entitlement to attorneys’ fees

under Section 1988, "[a]dministrative proceedings established to

enforce tenure rights created by state law . . . are not any part of

the proceedings to enforce § 1983." 471 U.S. at 241 (emphasis

added). Webb does not purport to determine that federal

administrative proceedings brought, as here, to enforce the federal

right on which the Section 1983 claim rests are not "proceedings

to enforce § 1983" within the meaning of the fee-shifting statute.

3. The Acting Solicitor General also suggests that fees cannot

be awarded unless the collateral proceeding leads to the entry of

a specific affirmative judgment in the 1983 action. See SG

Br. at9 This Court, however, has expressly rejected such a

position. In Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), the Court

considered whether attorneys’ fees could be awarded under

Section 1988 following settlement of a Section 1983 claim raising

both a statutory claim on which a fee award was arguably barred

by the Eleventh Amendment, and two constitutional claims not

subject to Eleventh Amendment strictures. The Court concluded

that neither the lack of a judgment on the merits, nor the

claimant’s presentation of an arguably "non-fee" claim, supported

reversal of the lower courts’ award of attorneys’ fees. 448 U.S.

at 129-33. In so holding, the Court relied on legislative history

expressly stating that “attorney’s fees may be allowed even though

the court declines to enter judgment for the plaintiff on that claim,

so long as the plaintiff prevails on the non-fee claim arising out

of a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’")(quoting legislative

history). /d. at 132 n.15. The Acting Solicitor General neither

acknowledges the Maher holding nor explains why a different rule

should apply on the mere fortuity that the "non-fee" judgment is

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formally obtained in administrative proceedings rather than in the

district court.

4. The Acting Solicitor General also asserts that "the decisions

on which petitioner relies do not establish a conflict warranting

review by this Court." (SG Br. at 9). Notably, he does not, and

cannot, deny that the lower courts are in conflict regarding

whether collateral proceedings must be mandated by statute or

court order before fees are awardable. His contention instead that

review is not warranted because petitioner’s authorities "were

decided before this Court’s decision in Webb, which clarified the

relevant principles" is incorrect because, as shown above, his

reading of the law in this area fundamentally misstates the

relevant principles. Webb, as noted, turns on the fact that the

collateral proceeding in that case simply did not raise the federal

right later asserted in the Section 1983 action. The collateral

proceedings in this case raised just such a right, requiring the

Ninth Circuit to decide whether fees nonetheless were not

awardable in the absence of a statutory or court mandate referring

the parties to an alternative forum. That is an important issue on

which the circuits are divided, and on which resolution by this

Court is important.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons stated in the

Petition and in the Reply Brief for Petitioner, certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

TIMOTHY B. DYK

(Counsel of Record)

SARAH L. WANNER

JONES, DAY, REAVIS &

POGUE

1450 G Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 879-3939

LOUIS L. TOUTON

JONES, DAY, REAVIS &

POGUE

555 West Fifth Street

Suite 4600

Los Angeles, CA 90013

(213) 489-3939

Counsel for Petitioner

May 20, 1993

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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