Opposition Brief — Burlington Northern Railroad v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United tutes

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY,

. Petitioner,

BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYES, an

unincorporated association, BEN OCHOA, GENERAL

CHAIRMAN, E.R. SPEARS, GENERAL CHAIRMAN, PAUL S.

SWANSON, GENERAL CHAIRMAN, and BRUCE G. GLOVER,

GENERAL CHAIRMAN, Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

SANFORD R. DENISON

Counsel of Record

L.N.D. WELLS, JR.

SUSAN H. DURHAM

Cigna Tower, Suite 1202

600 E. Las Colinas Blvd.

Irving, TX 75089-5606

(214) 556-2999

WILLIAM Bon

General Counsel

BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE

oF WAY EMPLOYES

26555 Evergreen Road, Suite 200

Southfield, Michigan 48076-4225

December 9, 1992 Counsel for Respondents

WILSON - Eres PrintING Co.. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

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COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION

PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

When a union strikes over a dispute which is later de-

termined by a court to be “minor” in violation of § 2

First of the Ralway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 USC § 152

First, is the appropriate remedy for judicial enforcement

of § 2 First limited to equitable injunctive relief restor-

ing the status quo and channeling the parties to resolu-

tion of the dispute under the RLA procedures.

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION

PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

JURISDICTION

STATUTES INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

B. Statement of Facts

1. Petitioner’s Misstatement of the Facts Es-

tablished in the record

2. Counter-statement of the Facts

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

THE QUESTION PRESENTED DOES NOT

MEET THE CRITERIA SPECIFIED IN SU-

PREME COURT RULE 10 MERITING THE

GRANT OF CERTIORARI

I. THERE EXISTS NO CONFLICT AMONG

THE CIRCUIT COURTS

Il. THE DECISION BELOW DOES NOT CON-

FLICT WITH ANY APPLICABLE DECI-

SIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT

tl. THE DECISION BELOW PRESENTS AN

ISSUE THAT HAS BEEN LONG SETTLED

AND IS, THUS, NOT AN IMPORTANT QUES-

TION OF FEDERAL LAW REQUIRING SU-

PREME COURT RESOLUTION

A. The Courts Have Consistently Held That

Creation of a Strike Damage Remedy Under

the RLA Is a Matter for Congress and Not

the Courts

(ili)

Page

19

20

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

B. The Courts Have Consistenly Held That

Creation of a Strike Damage Remedy Under

the RLA Is Inappropriate Because It Would

Be Destructive of the Proper Functioning

OE Ge cakes cette re ee et

ee

The Courts recognize that after sixty-six

years the implication of a damage remedy

which could undermine RLA policy ob-

jectives requires a showing that injunc-

tive remedies are no longer sufficient _.....

Petitioner has made no showing that

injunctive relief is no longer sufficient

and its argument is premised on the false

legal conclusion that there is “an illogical

asymmetry” in the remedies available un-

der the RLA and the false factual as-

sumption that there is a need for deter-

I PD cnc acd he cee s,.

The Courts and commentators recognize

that a damage remedy would be inappro-

priate, because it would be destructive of

the RLA dispute resolution procedures

and undermine its policy objectives ....

eNO cada ceiSndaens oe encacks asin cee Ricco Gasman

APPENDIX

Page

23

24

26

28

30

la

cnet

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

AFA v. Horizon Air, 976 F.2d 541 (9th Cir.

BI Gacy clei ak te er a eee 11, 14, 17, 20, 28

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago

River and Indiana Railroad, 553 U.S. 30

CE Fs canbe cSceea een eee 2, 5, 11, 27

Burlington Northern v. BMWE, 481 U.S. 429

Ki. 5 SAAR Ne UMtLane anc ane ADDS ah Hoe ie Se 19, 20, 23

Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Broth-

erhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, 961

F.2d 86 (5th Cir.), reh’g en bane denied, 968

omen Bi tee Sa, RI oe passim

Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Railroad Company v.

Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and En-

ginemen, 268 F.2d 54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

ae So Bee See a 2

Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212

5 5: | RRR Sermon Ms Nis Ss Cad? AOer ls Skr Ne amruhee RTL aw 21

Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. United

Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971)........ 14, 16,

17, 20

Consolidated Rail Corp. v. R.L.E.A., 491 U.S. 299

_, BINA Ree nn ma Pring cae op at Bea SSO 2 oN 4

CSX Transportation, Inc. v. N.J. Marquar, et al.,

No. 91-5689, slip op., F.2d (6th Cir.

i gk) Rj aes ene passim

Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad v.

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 58 LRRM

2568 (D.C. Co. 1965) (not officially reported),

rev'd on other grounds, 367 F.2d 157 (10th Cir.

1966), rev’d, 387 U.S. 556 (1967) 15

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979) ........000..... 13, 18, 24, 29

Franklin v. Gwinnette County Public Schools,

US. , 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) ...._.17, 18, 19,

21, =

Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v.

Brown, 252 F.2d 149 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

pee tae. O6n (i008) ak 10, 11, 12, 13, 21

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

National Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Associa-

tion, 431 F. Supp. 53, 93 LRRM 2509 (S.D. FI.

ND Sis calece ccpacees cs beecan lac ketire en llenes Oe acura ge ee

Shoreline Railroad v. Transportation Union, 396

Rae, WORE Me RIED oasis dstesicetcadrnay pa bbs benctieestihiaaacvttaicatesactoats

Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323

Sei ee I iil este sdiechta tia bal Soc Ne doe

Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990)...

Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood

of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548

(1930).. Lantentic iia caletesShievsde CAR Lee AS

United Industrial W orkers of the Seafarers Inter-

national Union v. Board of Trustees of Galves-

ton Wharves, 400 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.

denied, 395 U.S. 905 ype

Virginian Railway Co. . System Federation No.

40, 300 U.S. 515 (1987) =

BOOKS AND ARTICLES

Lustgarten, Principles of Railroad and Airline

Labor Law, RALL Publications

STATUTES

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,

20 U.S.C. § 1681-1688 0.

§ 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act,

BO UG. 6 YB o.oo nvcccscccccccnccccnisccccincnes

§ 301 of the cabee Management Relations Act, 29

U. Ss. C. § IU aianinasendessnavivasencenasseatssinsaicsbosenaateaeied

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158

ijt} sicouhbehalaeintnniesatnaisanensascaaieheusteaiebes ee

Norris Laguardia Act, 29 U. S.C. § 101 et. seq....16,

§2 First of the Railway haber Act, 45 U.S.C.

ME OP RUN aces osncnsisinnvrdceecteihcacanseueveinacsiutcoes

$2 Sixth of the Railway Labor Act, 45 USC.

§ 152 Sixth ......0000000000000000....

§ 2 Seventh of the Railway Labor Act, rr U.S.C.

BS RGR Terme nanan nsec enc cesnnnscatececencccansese.

28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1) .....0220. ee. Pos Ave

BE CRAs OF BM viv escnsnenswaasinivnaichilnniiricenistianmoneridonsincsb barch 2

Page

16

29, 30

18

21, 22

21

21, 23

17, 25

passim

passim

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

RULES Page

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b) (6)... 3, 4

Supreme Court Rule 10.1 ............0.. eee. 10, 15, 19

Supreme Court Rule 15.1... AE) tre Spe DERE 2

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondents Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way km-

ployes, Ben Ochoa, E. R. Spears, Paul S. Swanson. and

Bruce G. Glover (hereinafter referred to collectively as

“Respondents” or “BMWE”) respectfully request that

this Court deny the petition for writ of certiorari, seek-

ing review of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Burlington

Northern Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Main-

tenance of Way Employces, 961 F.2d 86 (5th Cir.), reh’g

en bane denied, 968 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1992). In support

of denial of the writ Respondents would respectfully

show as follows:

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction has been invoked by writ of certiorari

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254/1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

The question presented involves the provisions of Seec-

tions 2 First, Sixth, and Seventh of the Railway Labor

Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C., Section 152 et seq., Which are

set forth in the Appendix. Section 2 First is set forth

below:

First. Duty of carriers and employees to settle

disputes

It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers,

agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort

to make and maintain agreements concerning rates

of pay, rules, and working conditions. and to settle

all disputes, whether arising out of the application of

such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any

interruption to commerce or to the operation of any

other carrier growing out of any dispute between the

carrier and the employees thereof.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner’s statement of the case contains factual as-

sertions which are beyond the record or are misstate-

9

—

ments of the facts established in the record. Therefore,

heeding Supreme Court Rule 15.1., Respondents submit

the following counter-statement of the case.

A. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

On June 26, 1990 Petitioner Burlington Northern

(“BN”) filed a “Verified Complaint for Injunctive Re-

lief’ ' seeking to enjoin a planned 24 hour strike by the

BMWE against a selected portion of BN’s property. The

strike was called over what BMWE reasonably believed

to be a “major dispute’ between the parties which would

give it the right to resort to self-help.*

On that same date, the District Court entered a Tem-

porary Restraining Order (“TRO”) (R.121-23)" re-

straining the BMWE from engaging in any strike ac-

tivity. Upon notice of the TRO, BMWE complied and

refrained from any further strike or self-help action. It

is undisputed that BMWE has fully complied with all

of the orders of the District Court. The strike injunction

was continued by agreement through- hearing on BN’s

Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (R.124, 125-26).

1 As indicated by the heading, Petitioner’s complaint, which was

never amended, sought injunctive relief under the authority of

Br. R.R. Trainmen v. Chicego River end Indiana R.R., 553 U.S. 20

(1957) against a strike by BMWE, and nowhere contains any

allegations with respect to the damages it now seeks to recover.

The sole mention in the complaint of any monetary recovery is the

passing reference in the prayer for a permanent strike injunction

that BN also seeks certain unspecified “damages incurred.”

2 See, e.g., Shoreline Railroad v. UTU, 369 U.S. 142, 154-155

(1969); Butte, Anaconda & Pacifie Railroad Co. v. BLE, 268 F.2d

54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864 (1959). As this Court

stated in Shoreline, supra, 396 U.S. at 154-155 “it could hardly be

expected that the union would sit idly by as the railroad rushed to

accomplish the very result the union was seeking to prohibit... .

If the railroad is free to resort to self-help -[by making a unilateral

change], the union cannot be expected to hold back its own eco-

nomic weapons, including strike.”

* Citation to the Record on Appeal will be by the notation “R.”

followed by the relevant pages of the Record.

3

At the close of the Preliminary Injunction hearing on

August 20, 1990, the District Court found a substantial

likelihood that the dispute was “minor” (and _ not

“major” as contended by BMWE) and entered a prelim-

inary injunction against any further strike activity pend-

ing trial on the merits. (R.295-98).

On January 9, 1991, BN moved for Summary Judg-

ment seeking a permanent strike injunction and the re-

covery of monetary damages in the guise of a claim for

equitable restitution. (R.393-400; R.401-27). By re-

sponse filed February 6, 1991, BMWE opposed the entry

of a permanent strike injunction asserting that the dis-

~ pute was a “major” dispute arising from BN’s violation

of Section 2 SEVENTH of the Railway Labor Act

(“RLA”’), 45 U.S.C. $152 SEVENTH, over which

BMWE had a right to engage in self-help (R.469-88).

Simultaneously BMWE moved pursuant to Rule 12

(b) (6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”),

to dismiss BN’s claim for monetary relief, which was

then couched by BN only as a claim for equitable restitu-

tion, not the compensatory damages which it apparently

now seeks. (R.435-37; R.438-68).

On February 14, 1991, the District Court granted BN’s

Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to a perma-

nent strike injunction, but denied BN’s request for mone-

tary relief, finding that BN “has failed to show that it

is entitled to monetary relief as a matter of law.”

(R.874-75). On that same date, the District Court en-

tered a separate order finding the dispute to be “minor”

and not “major,” and permanently enjoined BMWE and

certain of the individual defendants from engaging in

any further strike activity, which order has been fully

complied with. (R.872 ff.). On February 27, 1991,

BMWE moved to amend the breadth of the Court’s per-

manent strike injunction to limit its scope to the specific

dispute at issue in this case. (R.876-85).

On March 7, 1991, the court entered an Order grant-

ing BMWE’s Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss BN’s

4d

claim for monetary relief (R.913-14), and entered a sep-

arate Final Judgment (R.916) on that same date, which

held that BN “have no monetary recovery from defend-

ants.” (R.916).

On March 20, 1991, the District Court entered an or-

der granting BMWE’s Motion to alter the breadth of the

strike injunction (R.939-40). In accordance therewith,

on March 21, 1991 the District Court amended its Feb-

ruary 14, 1991 permanent strike injunction limiting its

scope to the dispute at issue in this case. (R.941).

Notice of Appeal from the District Court’s March 7,

1991 Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal of BN’s request for mone-

tary relief was filed on April 4, 1991. BN’s suggestion

for hearing en banc before the Fifth Circuit was denied

on October 29, 1991. Thereafter, on May 22, 1992 the

Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court decision. BN

once more filed a suggestion for rehearing en banc, which

again was denied by the Fifth Circuit on July 9, 1992. |

BN filed its petition for Writ of Certiorari on October |

7, 1992. |

B. Statement of Facts

1. Petitioner’s Misstatement of the Facts Established

in the record

The facts found by the District Court in granting the

permanent strike injunction bore only on the question of

whether the dispute was “minor” or “major’, based on

whether BN had asserted an arguable contract justifica-

tion for its action in the face of BMWE’s position that

BN had made a unilateral contract change. See Con-

solidated Rail Corp. v. R. L. E. A., 491 U.S. 299 (1989).

The District Court made no findings regarding the facts

or circumstances relating to the strike itself or the effects

thereof. Indeed, the District Court excluded such evi-

dence during the preliminary injunction hearing, which

was the only evidentiary hearing conducted below. In

addition, the lower court decisions from which this writ

has been taken originate from the District Court’s Rule

12(b) (6) dismissal of BN’s claim for monetary relief

. |

5

and, thus, the only record facts relevant to the question

presented for review are those contained in Petitioner’s

unamended “Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief”.

Thus, the bulk of the facts recited by Petitioner (See

Petition at 7-8; 24 Fn. 6; 25 Fn. 7, 26) concerning

what occurred during the strike and even whether BN

actually suffered any of the damages which it now

seeks to recover, are simply beyond the pleadings and the

facts established in the record.

BN’s factual statement is not only an embellishment

upon its pleading, but also contains, in BMWE’s view,

misstatements of the facts and circumstances which ac-

tually led up to and occurred during and after the strike

with regard to BMWE’s motivation for engaging in self-

help over this dispute. As discussed in the factual state-

ment to follow, BMWE reasonably believed that the

strike action it was taking was lawful. Moreover, in the

broader sense, BN’s factual implication that the lack of

a damage remedy here will leave labor organizations un-

deterred from engaging in illegal self-help and the car-

riers with no remedy‘ is totally without foundation in

this record (See Petition, at 10, 25-26).

So that BMWE is not deemed to have waived its objec-

tion to such misstatements of the factual record, BMWE

submits this counter-statement of the case. The Court is

advised, however, that the following recitation of facts,

just as the recitation contained in the Petition, goes be-

yond the facts pled in Petitioner’s complaint or which

are the subject of specific findings of the Courts bélow.

The only purpose for providing this counter-statement of

facts is to protect BMWE from the Court’s assumption

that the factual statement presented by Petitioner is as

established in the record.

* Thirty-five years ago the Court in Brotherhood of R. R. Train-

men v. Chicago River, 353 U.S. 30 (1957) held that the appropriate

remedy was a strike injunction.

6

2. Counter-statement of the Facts

BMWE is a labor organization which serves as the

collective bargaining representative of employees of BN

who work within the maintenance of way craft and class.

(R.519).° Subordinate to the Grand Lodge of BMWE are

System Federations, which are intermediate labor or-

ganizations generally organized along carrier lines.

(R.520-21). The principal officer of each System Federa-

tion is its General Chairman." Since the present day BN

is the product of the merger of several formerly inde-

pendent railroads, there are presently four System Fed-

erations of BMWE on BN, each of which is a party to

and administers several collective bargaining agreements

between those Federations and BN. (R.521-22)

One of the agreements to which each BMWE System

Federation on BN is a party is the “Schedule Agree-

ment” which generally governs the hours of service, rates.

of pay, and working conditions of the employees working

within the BMWE eraft and class. (R.522). In addi-

tion to the Schedule Agreements, however, BN and cer-

tain of the BMWE System Federations are also parties

to various side or special agreements which supersede the

terms of the Schedule Agreement in connection with the

specific matters they were negotiated to cover. One

such special agreement between BN and three of the four

BMWE System Federations is the September 16, 1987

P-811 special agreement. (R.523) The P-811 Agreement

specified the terms under which BMWE members would

be employed with reference to BN’s installation of con-

crete ties utilizing the P&11-S machine. BMWE’s posi-

tion is that the P-811 special agreement superseded the

Schedule Agreement and preserved certain jobs from

5 The maintenance of way craft and class consists of the em-

ployees who construct and maintain the track, buildings and bridges

on the right of way along BN’s rail lines. (R.520).

® Individual defendants Ben Ochoa, E.R. Spears, Paul Swanson

and Bruce Glover were respectively the General Chairmen of the

four System Federations of BMWE on BN at times relevant to

this case. (R.521-22).

7

further subcontracting on BN’s P-811 concrete tie in-

stallation program.’ In BMWE’s view, Paragraph “E”

of the P8il-S Agreement preserved these jobs by provid-

ing that BN personnel represented by BMWE would be

“bulletined” for all work ahead of and behind the P-811

track-laying machine, including the installation of the

“clips” and “insulators” holding the concrete tie to the

rail. (Ixhibits 3 at R.716; R.529, 533, ff.).°

For the first two and a half years after execution of

the P-811 Agreement, BMWE members bid on and were

assigned all the jobs involving the installation of clips

and insulators as required by the P811-S Agreement.

(R.534). In March of 1990, however, BMWE received

a letter advising that BN intended to make what BMWE

believed would be a unilateral change in the P-811 agree-

ment by subcontracting the clipping function to third

party contractors. ‘Exhibit 19 at R.795; R.535). In

BMWE’s view, this would not only deprive BMWE mem-

bers of jobs, but would also result in a unilateral! change

in the P811-S Agreement because it would deny BMWE

the very consideration it received for entry into the P-811

agreement, i.e, the preservation of clipping jobs from

future subcontracting. (R.538-40). The preservation of

these jobs was the quid pro quo for BMWE’s agreement

that certain other work involving the P-811 machine

could be subcontracted and for BMWE’s agreement to

grant BN certain work rule concessions in the P-811

Agreement.

In BMWR’s view, if BN stopped issuing bulletins for

these jobs to BMWE members and subcontracted the

* The consideration received by BMWE for entry into the P-811

agreement was the promise that certain jobs, particularly those

involving the clipping function, would be preserved to BMWE

members and would not be subject to subcontracting in the future.

(R.530-31, 532-34). In return for that promise, BMWE agreed

that certain other work could be subcontracted by BN and granted

BN other work rule concessions. (2.530, 532).

‘A bulletin is the procedure whereby members of BMWE bid

on jobs on BN. (R.524-25).

8

clipping function to a third party, this would be a uni-

lateral change in employee rates of pay, rules and work-

ing conditions as embodied in the P-811 agreement with-

out complying with the procedures prescribed by Section

6 of the RLA. (R.538-40). That being the case, this

would create a “major” dispute because BN would have

violated its obligation to maintain the status quo pur-

suant to Section 2 SEVENTH of the RLA. (/d.).

BMWE, thus, felt it had the right to exercise self-help,

including taking strike action, to protect its members’

interests.”

At the request of the BMWE General Chairmen, and

in an attempt to resolve the matter short of self-help, a

meeting was held with BN officials on April 5, 1990 to

discuss the matter. (R.536). At that meeting, and later

by corresondence that same date, the General Chairmen

specifically advised BN representatives that they viewed

the subcontract, if implemented, as a unilateral change

in the P-811 agreement, which would create a “major”

dispute between the parties, allowing resort to self-help if

not resolved. (/d.).

The affected General Chairman conferred with the

President of BMWE and sought his verification that

the dispute was major. (Exhibit 23 at R.809; R.538-

39). After obtaining his concurrence (R.538, 540), the

three affected BM WE Genera! Chairmen again wrote to

BN on May 2, 1990 advising that BMWE would view

the subcontracting of the clipping function on BN’s con-

crete tie installation program, as a major dispute over

a unilateral contract change. (R.538, 540-41; Exhibit

24 at R.811). BMWE subsequently received a letter

dated May 11, 1990 from BN disputing BMWE’s posi-

tion. (R.541). Since it appeared BN was intent upon

proceeding to implement this change, BMWE believed

the only recourse available to it to protect the inter-

ests of its members was to engage in self-help in the

event the carrier brought the clip car on to the property.

(R.541).

® See cases cited at Footnote 2, supra.

9

On May 18, 1990, the Grand Lodge President verified

in writing his earlier decision that this was a major

dispute over a unilateral change in an existing agreement.

(Exhibit 26 at R.816; R.542). He thus authorized the

affected BMWE General chairmen to initiate the steps

to obtain strike sanction under the Union’s Constitution.

(id.; see Exhibit 1 at R.586; Exhibit 28 at R.825).

Before taking strike action, special membership meet-

ings were held at each Local Lodge affected by the dispute

as required by Article XX $17(b) of the BMWE Con-

stitution, (R.542-43). At these meetings the members

Were orally advised about the nature of the dispute and

the basis upon which BMWE believed that this was a

“major” dispute over which the membership had the right

to strike if they voted to do so. (R.543; Exhibit 29 at

R.829) ; Exhibits 30 at R.853; Exhibit 31 at R.855). At

these meetings, the membership voted overwhelmingly to

strike over this dispute. (R.843-44; Exhibit 33 at R.859).

Based on the membership’s determination to strike over

this dispute, on June 25, 1990, in accordance with Article

XX $17(b) of the BMWE Constitution, the Grand Lodge

officers authorized the initiation of strike action against

BN in response to the unilateral change. (R.544:; Exhibit

32 at R.857; Exhibit 34 at R.861). The strike action

authorized, however, was specifically limited to last for

twenty-four hours, from 6:00 a.m. on June 26, 1990 to

conclude at 6:00 a.m. on June 27, 1990, and to cover

only the portion of BN’s property within the one BMWE

System Federation (the former CB&Q lines) upon which

BN had implemented the clip car. (R.544; Exhibit 35

at R.864). Contrary to BN’s assertion in its Petition,

the strike was not system wide and was focused only on

the one section of BN’s property where the unilateral

change had been implemented.

BMWE engaged in strike action based on its belief

that it could lawfully exercise self-help in response to

BN’s violation of its status quo obligation under Section 2

10

SEVENTH of the RLA by making a unilateral change

in the P-811 agreement. (R.545-46).

Immediately upon notice of entry of the TRO, BMWE

ceased al! self-help and other strike activity, and has

fully complied with that and all subsequent injunctive

orders issued by the District Court. (R.546; Exhibit 37

at R.&71).

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

THE QUESTION PRESENTED DOES NOT MEET THE

CRITERIA SPECIFIED IN SUPREME COURT RULE

10 MERITING THE GRANT OF CERTIORARI

As relevant to the question presented here, Supreme

Court Rule 10 specifies that the writ should be granted

only if (1) there is a conflict among the Circuit Courts;

(2) the case below conflicts with a decision of this Court;

or (3) this case presents an important unsettled question

of federal Jaw which this Court should resolve. Supreme

Court Rule 10.1(a) and (c). Since none of the criteria

apply here, there is no basis for granting the writ.

I. THERE EXISTS NO CONFLICT AMONG THE CIR-

CUIT COURTS

Far from there being a conflict among the Circuit

Courts, the question presented seeks reversal of the Fifth

Circuit’s decision in BN v. BMWE,” which comports with

sixty-six vears of settled jurisprudence under the RLA.

This decision followed over 30 years of precedent in the

Fifth Circuit ' and is in accord with the result in a

1 BN v. BMWE, supra, 961 F.2d 86.

1 Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Brown, 252 F.2d

149, 155 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 949 (1958): Nationa!

Airlines v. ALPA, 431 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1976).

ee

11

recent decision by the Sixth Circuit."2 The decision is

also in accord with the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit,"

in a related context arising under $2 First. In sum,

there are no conflicting decisions and all the Circuit

Courts are in accord regarding the appropriate remedies

for violations of Section 2 First. There is, thus, no basis

for the grant of certiorari under Supreme Court Rule

10.1 (a).

One year following the Supreme Court’s decision in

Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River, 353 U.S.

30 (1957), the Fifth Circuit held in Louisville & N.R.R.

Co, v. Brown, 252 F.2d 149, 155 (5th Cir.) cert. denied,

356 U.S. 949 (1958) that monetary damages were not

recoverable by a carrier for a- strike which could also be

enjoined under Chicago River as being over a niinor dis-

pute and in violation of § 2 First of the RLA. In the 34

years since, there have been no cases holding contrary

to the decision in Brown. In fact, the current viability

of this holding has been twice reaffirmed in the last year

by the only two other Appellate Court decisions, which

have considered the issue. BN vr. BMWE, 961 F.2d 86

(5th Cir, 1982) (the decision below); ESX v. Marquar,

No. 91-5689, slip op., F.2d (6th Cir. Novem-

ber 18, 1992).

In considering the present viability of its previous

Brown decision, the Fifth Circuit in BN v. BMWE, the

case below, noted that in the years following Brown

“other courts have recognized Brown as holding that there

is no cause of action against a union for damages for a

breach of the § 152 First duty.” Jd. at 88 (See cases

cited at Fn. 7 in Court’s Opinion). The court below also

noted that not only has the Fifth Circuit’s decision in

Grown been followed by other courts, but that in the

years since, “there are no reported cases awarding dam-

ages for the breach of the $152 First duty.” BN v.

"2 C.S.X. Transportation, Inc. v. Marquar et al., No. 91-5689, slip

op., —— F.2d —— (6th Cir. November 13, 1992).

18 AFA v. Horizon Air, 976 F.2d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 1992),

12

BMWE, supra, 961 F.2d at 89 fn. 15. Similarly, with

respect to BN’s claim under § 153 First, the Fifth Cir-

cuit below stated that ‘We are also not aware of any case

in which damages have been awarded for violation of

$ 153 First (i).” Jd. at 89. In refusing BN’s alternative

argument to overrule Brown,'' the Fifth Circuit went on

to state that “BN has not directed the attention of this

Court to any Supreme Court decision holding that mon-

etary relief is available for the breach of the 152 First

duty.” Jd. at 89. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit’s deci-

sion represents an acknowledgement that this is a well-

settled area of federal labor law, where no court has

rendered a contrary decision over the sixty-six years of

jurisprudence under the RLA, nor has any court held

differently than the rule as established over thirty-four

years ago in the Brown decision,

In reaching the same conclusion the Sixth Circuit in

CSX v. Marquar, No. 91-5689, slip op. at 45 (6th Cir.

November 13, 1992)'* noted that since Brown, “No pub-

lished opinion has ever held that a carrier may recover

damages against a union for an illegal strike over a

minor dispute.” More generally, the Sixth Circuit also

noted that:

In the sixty-six year history of the RLA, no Federal

Court has published an opinion holding that a union

may recover damages from a railroad, or that a rail-

road may recover damages from a union. On rare

occasions, individual employees have been allowed to

recover damages from their unions or their carriers,

14 Petitioner has twice sought en banc hearing of this case in the

Fifth Circuit to consider over-ruling Brown, once for initial hear-

ing of the appeal and later for review of the panel decision. On

both occasions, not one of the active Judges on the Fifth Circuit

considered this case of such significance to even request that the

Court be polled on whether to hear the case en banc. See Appendix

C to Petition.

15 Citation to the decision in CSX v. Marquar, supra, will to be

to the opinion of Ralph B. Guy, Circuit Judge, with whom Judge

Jones concurred, who delivered the opinion of the Court holding that

it would be inappropriate for the Federal Courts to imply a strike

damage remedy against a union under the RLA.

13

but the Courts have not permitted the railroads and

unions to use the club of damages against each other.

[emphasis added]

CSX, supra, No. 91-5689, slip op. at 43. Although ac-

knowledging that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Brown

was not binding on it, the Sixth Circuit in CSX concluded

that “Since at least 1958, the RLA ‘common law’ has

been that a railroad may not recover damages for a

strike over a minor dispute.” CSX, supra, slip op. at

46.'" The CSX court found further that no demonstra-

tion had been made that the injunctive remedies which

have been deemed appropriate for sixty-six years are

no longer sufficient, and that there were strong policy

reasons grounded in the RLA, which would make the

imposition of a damage remedy in these circumstances

inappropriate.'? Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit in CSX

reached the same result as the Fifth Circuit in Brown

and BN v. BMWE and concluded that “the common law

that has emerged [under the RLA] does not contemplate

awards of damages between unions and railroads.” /d.

slip op. at 438.

Brown and BN v. BMWE in the Fifth Circuit, and

CSX in the Sixth Circuit, are the only federal appellate

cases to directly address the issue presented. While both

Circuits use a somewhat different approach to arrive at

the same conclusion, they both clearly hold that monetary

16 The 6th Circuit stated:

Congress envisioned that the courts would set up a body of

law to enforce the RLA. The resulting body of the law has

not permitted railroads and unions to recover damages against

each other generally and, particularly, in the situation pre-

sented in this case. After 66 years, a Court should be reluctant

to change the balance that has been struck between railroads

and unions.

CSX, supra, No. 91-5689, slip op. at 46.

7 Citing this Court’s previous decision in JBW v. Foust, 442 US.

42, 47 (1979) the CSX court stated that “damages awards between

railroads and unions are inappropriate because they threaten the

delicate balance intended by the RLA.” CSX, supra, No, 91-5689

slip op. at 44,

14

damages are not recoverable by a carrier against a union

which engages in a strike in violation of § 2 First.

While the only cases directly on point are in the Fifth

and Sixth Circuits, by analogy, denying a damages rem-

edy as being inappropriate is also supported by the

reasoning of a recent decision of the Ninth Circuit. AFA

v. Horizon Air, 976 F.2d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 1992). In

that case a union was denied monetary relief in the

form of attorneys’ fees (apparently damages were not

sought) against a carrier who had violated $2 First by

negotiating without the intent of ever reaching an agree-

ment. In that case, fees were sought against the carrier

on the same basis that damages are being sought against

the union in this case, 7.c. that this Court’s decision in

Chicago and Northwestern Railway v. UTU, 402 U.S.

570, 577 (1971) allows the Courts to fashion remedies

for violations of the RLA “by whatever appropriate

means might be developed on a case by case basis.’’ In its

decision, the Ninth Circuit discusses the policy reasons

supporting denial of attorneys fees under the RLA, which

reasoning would equally apply to the recovery of any

other forms of monetary relief, including damages, be-

tween unions and carriers under the RLA. Thus, while

not directly on point, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

Horizon Air is certainly consistent with the long line of

authority under the RLA, holding that injunctive relief,

channeling the parties into the resolution of their dis-

putes under the procedures of the RLA, is the limit of

appropriate remedies. The reasoning of that case thus

supports the rule that the imposition of monetary rem-

edies, whether they be damages or attorney’s fees, as

between carriers and unions, are not appropriate under

the RLA.

Not only are the only two Circuit Courts to have

directly considered this question in accord, but there are

no District Court decisions in any other circuits which

15

have reached a contrary result.’* In National Airlines,

Inc. v. ALPA, 431 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1976), which

is the only other District Court case to have directly

addressed this issue, the District Court noted that in

the eighteen years since the Brown decision, all the cases

involving the judicial enforcement of $ 2 First “confined

2 First remedies to those partaking of the nature of

equitable injunctive relief.” /d., 431 F.Supp. at 54. Not-

ing the apparent congressional satisfaction with the Brown

decision, evidenced by the fact that in those 18 years

“Congress has [not] enacted legislation which even sug-

gests its intent to create a right of action for damages,”

and that “the policy considerations underlying the Brown

decision are as tenable today as when Brown was de-

cided,” the Court denied a similar damage claim. Jd. at 55.

Accordingly, not just every Circuit Court decision, but

literally every judicial decision to address this issue in

the 66 years of RLA jurisprudence has consistently held

that damages are not recoverable in these circumstances.

Thus, there is no conflict which this Court need resolve

under Supreme Court Rule 10.1(a).

Il. THE DECISION BELOW DOES NOT CONFLICT

WITH ANY APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE

SUPREME COURT

This case does not present the Court with the oppor-

tunity to reverse a decision which conflicts with decisions

of this Court. See Supreme Court Rule 10.1ic). No de-

cision of this Court has ever countenanced the resolution

of disputes between labor organizations and earriers

under the RLA by the imposition of damage awards.

'S The only reported case where strike damages were ever awarded

wes Denver & Rio Grende Western Railroad +. Brotherhood of

Reilroad Trainmen, 58 L.R.R.M. 2568 (D. Co. 1965) (not officially

reported), rend on other grounds, 367 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1966).

rend, 387 U.S. 556 (1967). That case, however, has no precedential

value for the reasons stated by the Fifth Circuit in BN v. BMWE,

supra, 961 F.2d at 89 fn 15, and by the Sixth Circuit, in CSN,

supra, No, 91-5689, slip op. at 46 fn 4, in their discussions of

that case.

16

Rather, this Court’s decisions under §2 of the RLA

reveal the careful circumscription of the available reme-

dies to an injunction channeling the parties back into

compliance with their RLA duties and resolution of their

disputes under the workings of the Act. The Supreme

Court cases cited by Petitioner are, thus, inapposite.

In its Petition, BN argues that certiorari’ should be

granted, because the Fifth Circuit’s decision below con-

flicts with certain Supreme Court decisions. However,

when one focuses on the cases cited by BN, it is evident

that all the cases cited are inapposite to the issue of the

recovery of legal damages under the RLA. Three of the

Supreme Court cases relied upon by BN arise under the

RLA, but each deals solely with the issue of whether the

Courts have authority to issue injunctive relief to en-

force the duties specified in Section 2 of the RLA. Not

one even remotely deals with the issue of whether dam-

ages are recoverable.’”

Of the three Supreme Court RLA injunction cases cited

by BN, it principally relies upon Chicago & N.W.R.W. v.

UTU, 402 U.S. 570 (1971). BN argues that UTU sup-

ports the implication of a damage remedy based on the

In each of the cases cited by BN there was no issue of mone-

tary relief and the quotes that BN relies on are solely within the

context of the Court’s authority to enter injunctive relief. See

Texas and New Orleans Railway Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway

and Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) (injunction action

to enforce $2 Third of the RLA, which protects the right of the

employees and the carrier to designate their representatives with-

out influence or coercion from the other party); Virginian Railway

Co. v. System Federation #40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937) (injunction

action to enforce $2 Ninth of the RLA to require the carrier to

meet and treat with the employees’ representative as certified by

the National Mediation Board): Chicago and Northwestern Rail-

way Co. v. United Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971)

(injunction action where issue was whether a strike injunction

could be entered to enforce $2 First, in the face of the prohibi-

tiens of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 USC $101, et seq., after

conclusion of the RLA procedures when the union would otherwise

be free to exercise self-help, but where it was alleged that the

union failed to negotiate properly during those procedures).

17

Court’s statement that Section 2 First was “designed to

be a legal obligation, enforceable by whatever appro-

priate means might be developed on a case by case basis.”

Id. at 577. In that case the Court was struggling with

whether, in the unique facts presented there, a strike

could be enjoined, despite the strike injunction prohibi-

tions of the Norris Laguardia Act, 29 USC § 101 et seg.

The context of the quote relied on by BN is not whether

damages or monetary relief may be assessed, but what

manner of appropriate injunctive relief a court could

fashion to enforce § 2 First to meet the particular needs

of the case at bar. It is simply a misuse of UTU to cite

it for the proposition that damage awards may be im-

posed to resolve disputes under the RLA when monetary

relief was never even at issue in that case. In fact. a

correct reading of UTU reveals that it addressed no

more than whether an injunction may issue in the face

of the Norris Laguardia Act prohibitions when a strike

injunction is the “only practical, effective means of en-

forcing” Section 2 First. Jd. at 583.2

Similarly, BN’s reliance on quotations from Steele v.

L. & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) is entirely off

point. Steele was a fair representation case which deals

with the relationship between a union and those it repre-

sents and not with the relationship between a union and

rail carriers established by the RLA.*'| Since a fair

representation case is more akin to a breach of fiduciary

duty action, see Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 567-

568 (1990), it is entirely inapposite to a case involving

the relationship between carriers and labor organizations

*° If BN’s reading of UTU was correct then the union in AFA vr.

Horizon Air, supre, 976 F.2d at 551 would not only be entitled to

attorney’s fees, but also to recover as damages its negotiation

expenses incurred while the carrier was violating $2 First by

negotiating without the intent to reach an agreement.

** As the Court stated in CSX, supra, slip op. at 43:

On rare cecasions individual employees have been allowed to

recover damages from their unions or their carriers. but the

Courts have not permitted the railroads and unions to use the

club of damages against each other.

18

under the RLA, which is not a fiduciary relationship, and

{ where policy concerns are at issue involving the mainte-

nance of a balance between the two in addressing the

resolution of disputes.

Finally, BN argues that the Brown holding is incon-

sistent with Supreme Court’s recent decision in Franklin

v. Gwinnette County Public Schools, U.S. me ty |

L.Ed.2d 208 (1992). Once again Franklin is not a case

dealing with the enforcement of the duties under the

RLA, but is an action arising under an entirely different

line of cases dealing with the availability of damages un-

der Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20

f —USE § 1681-1688. As the Fifth Circuit held below, “even

( if this Court were considering the issue on a clean slate,

Franklin would not control.” BN v. BMWE, supra, 961

F.2d at 89 fn. 9.

Moreover, Franklin requires the presumption of a

damages remedy only when such a remedy is “appro-

priate” and “unless Congress has expressly indicated

otherwise.” Franklin, supra, U.S. , 117 L.Ed.2d

at 217. As demonstrated by the Sixth Circuit in CSX,

such a remedy would not be appropriate here because it

would upset the careful balance of interests necessary to

achieve the purposes of the RLA. CSX, supra, No. 91-

5689, slip op. at 44, citing JBEW v. Foust, supra, 442

U.S. at 48-50-51; see also discussion at section III.B.

infra, in this brief. a

( Moreover, there is strong indication that Congress has

“indicated otherwise,’ which also supports the conclusion

that a damage remedy is also inappropriate. And there-

fore, Franklin does not mandate implication of a damage

remedy. As recognized by the Sixth Circuit in CSX, this

Circuit’s Brown holding has now become well entrenched

as part of the federal common Jaw under the RLA. CSX,

supra, No, 91-5689, slip op. at 46-47. The failure of Con-

gress to legislatively reverse Brown in the 34 years since

should be taken as indication that Congress did not intend

22 See discussion at III A infra and footnote 25 infra.

EEE aS

19

a damage remedy in these circumstances and as an ex-

pression of Congressional policy on this issue. As this

Court stated in another context, “at this advanced stage

of the RLA’s development. . . it is for Congress, and not

the courts, to strike the balance between the uncontrolled

power of management and labor to further their respec-

tive interests.” Burlington Northern v. BMWE, 481 U.S.

429, 452-53 (1987). Thus, even assuming, without con-

ceding, that Franklin would apply to an RLA ease, Frank-

lin does not require the implication of a damage remedy,

because Congress has “indicated otherwise” as evidenced

by (1) its refusal to extend to cases under the RLA the

damage action it created for cases arising under the Na-

tional Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), and (2) its ex-

pression of satisfaction with the Brown rule by allowing it

to become well embedded in the RLA common law by re-

fusing to legislatively overturn it in thirty-four years.

In sum, as stated by the Fifth Circuit in the decision

below, “BN has not directed the attention of this Court

to any Supreme Court decision holding that monetary re-

lief is available for a breach of the § 152 First duty.”

BN v. BMWE, supra, 961 F.2d at 89. Since the decision

below is not inconsistent with an previous decision of the

Supreme Court, there is no reason to grant certiorari on

that basis under Supreme Court Rule 10.1 (c¢).

Ill. THE DECISION BELOW PRESENTS AN ISSUE

THAT HAS BEEN LONG SETTLED AND IS, THUS,

NOT AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL

LAW REQUIRING SUPREME COURT RESOLU-

TION

This case does not present a question involving an im-

portant issue of federal law which has not been, but

should be, resolved by this Court, which would justify

granting the writ under Supreme Court Rule 10.1(c).

As aptly stated by the Sixth Circuit “the Courts have not

permitted the railroads and the unions to use the club of

damages against each other.” CSNX, supra, No. 91-5689,

slip op. at 43.

20

Thus, the reasons underlying the holding of both the

Fifth and Sixth Circuit ** are based upon the recognition

that it would be inappropriate for the Courts to imply a

damage remedy, or a damage cause of action, under the

RLA, because to do so would (1) be destructive of the

RLA’s procedures and frustrate the achievement of its

stated policy objectives; and (2) involve the courts “at

this advanced stage of the RLA’s development” ** in a

matter which should be properly left for Congress to con-

sider in carrying out its legislative function of establish-

ing laber policy. Viewed in this sense, the holdings in both

the Fifth and Sixth Circuits are based on identical propo-

sitions; i.e. it would be “inappropriate” for the Courts

to fashion a damage remedy in these circumstances.

Moreover, arming the courts with the power to impose

legal damages, would transform judicial enforcement of

the RLA from the limited exercise of equity jurisdiction,

requiring the parties by injunction to comply with their

RLA duties, into a court at law resolving disputes between

the parties through the imposition of damage awards.

Such a fundamental change in the workings of the RLA

should be left to Congress.

A. The Courts Have Consistently Held That Creation

of a Strike Damage Remedy Under the RLA Is a

Matter for Congress and Not the Courts

The fact that Congress has declined to legislatively re-

verse the Brown holding during the thirty-four years

which have elapsed since its decision is compelling evi-

dence that Congress is satisfied with the state of the com-

mon law under the RLA with respect to the extent of

available remedies for enforcement of § 2 First. Thus,

one may reasonably conclude that by allowing Brown to

*3 These policy reasons also underlie the decision of the Ninth

Circuit in AFA v. Horizon Air, supra, 976 F.2d at 551 (9th Circuit

1992) denying a union monetary relief in the form of attorneys

fees for a carrier’s violation of §2 First, even in the face of the

argument that the Court could imply such a remedy under Chicago

& North Western, supra, 402 U.S. at 577.

*4 Burlington Northern R.R. v. BMWE, 481 U.S. 429, 452 (1987).

a ee

21

stand as the law, Congress is indicating that damages

should not be available in these circumstances.

Thus, even assuming that this Court’s decision in Frank-

lin v. Gwinnette County, USS. , 117 L.Ed.2d

208 (1992), applies to RLA cases, Gwinnette’s presump-

tion of the availability of “all appropriate” remedies ‘“un-

less Congress has expressly indicated otherwise’, Gwin-

nette, supra, 117 L.Ed.2d at 217, would not require the

implication of a damage remedy here, since the holdings

of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits stand for the propo-

sition that a damage remedy is both not “appropriate” in

these circumstances, and the acquiscence of Congress by

allowing Brown to remain the law for over thirty-four

years indicates that Congress does not want remedies un-

der the RLA extended to damages, at least in this par-

ticular circumstance.

Indeed, the Brown Court, being sensitive to its role as

an interpreter and not a maker of law and seeking to

avoid usurping the function of Congress to establish la-

bor policy, noted that “where Congress sought to set up

a right of acton for damages for breach of duty in other

labor management situations, it enacted a statute ex-

pressly spelling out the nature of the right of action.”

[emphasis added]. Brown, supra, 252 F.2d at 155. The

Brown Court then cited to § 303 of the Labor Manage-

ment Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 187, which

specifically created a cause of action for damages for a

strike in violation of §$ 8(b)(4) of the National Labor

Relations Act (“NLRA’’), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4). Since

damages for strikes in violation of the NLRA are not

recoverable, in the absence of Congressional enactment of

§ 303, no cause of action for damages would exist. Sim-

ilarly, when Congress decided to authorize the recovery of

damages for a strike in violation of a collective bargain-

ing agreement, enabling legislation was enacted spe-

cifically creating a right of action for damages. See

$ 301 at the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185; Carbon Fuel Co. v.

Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212 (1979). Thus, although hav-

ing the opportunity during the passage of the LMRA to

extend the remedy for strike damages to cases under the

22

RLA, Congress specifically declined to do so. Consider-

ing that the labor statute which specifically authorizes a

damage remedy for illegal strikes also specifically exeludes

RLA carriers from its scope, See 29 U.S.C. § 182, there is

clear indication that Congress did not intend to extend

such damage claims to cases under the RLA.**

The continued refusal of Congress since the passage of

the LMRA to legislatively overrule Brown, establishes

Brown as both an element of the common law of the rem-

edies available for judicial enforcement of § 2 First, but

also as an indication that Brown comports with Con-

gressional policy regarding the remedies which should

be available, and not available, for the judicial enforce-

ment of the RLA. After more than thirty years of limit-

ing enforcement of the RLA, as between carriers and _

unions, to injunctive relief, it would be a usurpation of

the function of Congress to establish labor policy for the

Brown holding to be reversed at this late date. Indeed,

to imply a damage remedy in these circumstances would

be tantamount to judicial enactment of $ 303 of the

LMRA into the RLA.

Even without respect to whether the legal basis for the

Brown Court holding remains sound (which BMWE sub-

mits it is}, over the passage of years this holding has

embedded itself in the common law developed by the

courts in the interpretation of the RLA. As the District

Court noted in National Airlines, Congress must have

been satisfied with the state of this common law since

in the twenty years since the Brown decision “Congress

[has not] enacted legislation which even suggests its

intent to create a right of action for damages.” National

Airlines, supra, 431 F. Supp. at 54.

“>In Guwinnette, this Court presumed that Congress lezislated

with full knowledge of the Court’s prior decisions. Thus in leaving

judicially crafted remedies undisturbed, the Court concluded that

Congress did not intend to modify the available remedies. Likewise

Congress’ satisfaction with Brown, and its progeny, manifest ap-

proval of the now “traditional rule” regarding the lack of a damage

remedy between carriers and unions under the RLA.

a

23

Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in CSX, supra, No. 91-

5689, slip op., 46-47 is in accord. In CSX the Sixth Cir-

cuit held that since the limitation against the recovery

of strike damages has become part of the common law

under the RLA, it should be up to Congress and not the

courts to create a damage remedy. Jd. at 47. In CSX

the court notes that in Burlington Northern v. BMWE,

481 U.S. 429 (1987), the Court was faced with the ques-

tion of whether the RLA implicitly bars secondary picket-

ing. Although there is no prohibition in the RLA against

secondary activity similar to that found in the National

Labor Relations Act (““NLRA’”), 29 USC § 158(b) (4),

the Court refused to imply a similar bar under the RLA.

In language applicable here, which is quoted by the Sixth

Circuit in CSX, the Supreme Court stated:

We decline, at this advanced stage of the RLA’s de-

velopment, to find in it an implied limit on a union’s

resort to secondary activity. Instead, “if Congress

should now find that the abuses in the nature of

secondary activities have arisen in the railroad in-

dustry ... it ts for Congress, and not the Courts, to

strike the balance ‘between the uncontrolled power of

management and labor to further their respective

interests.’ ”

Burlington Northern, supra, 481 U.S. at 252-53 (citation

omitted) [emphasis added}. Thus, the Sixth Circuit in

CSX came to the same conclusion as the Fifth Circuit in

Brown that if present circumstances in the railroad and

airline industry merit the imposition of a damage award,

the “argument properly should be made to Congress.”

CSX Transportation, supra, No. 91-5689, slip op. at 47.

B. The Courts Have Consistently Held That Creation

of a Strike Damage Remedy Under the RLA Is

Inappropriate Because It Would Be Destructive of

the Proper Functioning of the RLA

The Fifth and Sixth Circuit holding that the recovery

of strike damages is not an appropriate remedy is ulti-

mately based upon the recognition that a damage remedy

24

would be destructive of fundamental policy considerations

underlying the RLA and would undermine the balance it

created between the interests of employees and the car-

riers. It is these policy considerations which have prompted

Congress to decline to legislatively reverse Brown over

the last three decades. Moreover, BN has shown no

reason for judicially deviating from the rule by demon-

strating that the remedies appropriate for sixty-six years

are no longer sufficient.

1. The Courts recognize that after sixty-six years

the implication of a damage remedy which could

undermine RLA policy objectives requires a

showing that injunctive remedies are no longer

sufficient

Noting that “the Courts have not permitted the rail-

roads and unions to use the club of damages against each

other”, CSX, supra, No. 91-5689, slip op. at 48, the Sixth

Circuit concluded in CSX that “damages awards between

railroads and unions are inappropriate because they

threaten the delicate balance intended by the RLA.” Jd.

at 44. In reaching that conclusion the CSX Court cited to

this Court’s decision in JBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47

(1979), which counseleld that “a court’s task in en-

forcing the RLA ‘is to implement a remedial scheme that

will best effectuate the purposes of the Railway Labor

Act, recognizing that the overarching legislative goal is

to facilitate collective bargaining and to achieve indus-

trial peace.’’’ CSX, supra, slip op. at 44, quoting, Foust,

supra, 442 U.S. at 47. Accordingly, just as this Court

concluded in Foust that punitive damages were not re-

coverable against a union in a duty of fair representation

case, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a strike damage

award against a union in an RLA ease is likewise in-

appropriate, because it could also “impair a union’s

financial stability and thereby upset the careful balance

of interests necessary to achieve the purposes of the

RLA.” CSX, supra, slip op. at 44.

25

Similarly, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Brown, and

thus its decision in BN v. BMWE below, is grounded on

the identical policy concerns expressed by this Court in

Foust, i.e. a damages remedy could impair the labor

management relationship intended by the RLA. Recog-

nizing that this was the same policy basis underlying the

Brown holding, the District Court in National Airlines

stated:

... [T]he Court is of the opinion that policy con-

siderations underlying the Brown decision are as

tenable today as when Brown was decided. The life

cycle of labor-management bargaining is heated and

oftentimes results in bitter accusations. Representa-

tives attempt to secure the best possible terms for

their respective sides. To create a right of action

in favor of an employer against a union and its

collective bargaining representatives for losses the

former incurs in the course of the collective bargain-

ing process would, in effect, give the employer a

weapon with which to keep the unions and their

agents “in line.” Surely, neither Congress nor the

Appellate Courts would fashion a remedy which

would give the employer a lever upon which to gain

such an unfair advantage. [Emphasis added].

National Airlines, supra, 481 F.Supp. at 54.

In the years since Chicago River held that a strike

over a minor dispute could be enjoined, the Courts have

exercised judicial restraint, showing sensitivity to these

policy concerns (which are also expressed by Congress

in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. $101 et seg.) —

and, therefore, have limited the exercise of their equitable

powers in granting strike injunctions to the extent neces-

sary to fulfill the RLA’s purposes. Nevertheless, like the

Plaintiff in National Airlines, BN remains “|u]nsatisfied

with the injunctive relief and favorable results there-

from” and argues that complete relief and fulfillment of

the RLA’s purposes requires the imposition of damages.

However, complete relief aimed at serving the RLA’s

goals requires only the restoration of labor peace through

a strike injunction and does not require the shifting of

26

the incidental costs of the employees’ protected activity

to the employees themselves. As noted in National Air-

lines, imposing this burden on the employees would simply

cater to the “unmitigated desire for vengeance” of the

carrier and would not serve the purposes of the RLA.

National Airlines, supra, 431 F.Supp. at 54.

As the Sixth Circuit remarked in CSX, the body of

common law that has developed with respect to the en-

forcement of the RLA “has not permitted railroads and

unions to recover damages against each other generally,

and, particularly, in the situation presented in this case.”

CSX, supra, No. 91-5689 at 46.

The Sixth Circuit goes on to state that “after 66 years,

a court should be reluctant to change the balance that

has been struck [by the RLA] between railroads and

unions,” and that “at a minimum” before making such a

change, there should be a “demonstrat{ion] why the

remedies that have been appropriate for 66 years are no

longer good enough.” CSX, supra, No. 91-5689, slip op.

at 46.

2. Petitioner has made no showing that injunctive

relief is no longer sufficient and its argument is

premised on the false legal conclusion that there

is “an illogical asymmetry” in the remedies avail-

able under the RLA and the false factual as-

sumption that there is a need for deterrent

measures :

BN argues that injunctive remedies are no longer

sufficient and that a change should now be made after

66 years to imply a damage remedy based on two false

legal and factual assumptions. First BN falsely asserts

that an “illogical asymmetry” exists under present law

whereby “unions may be awarded the full range of re-

lief, including damages, for a carrier’s violation of its

duties under the RLA, but carriers are not allowed this

full range of remedies when a union violates its duties

under the RLA.” (See Petition pp. 4, 10-11, 23-25).

Second, BN makes the false factual assertion that there

27

is a basis in this record for finding that, despite the

availability of a strike injunction,” labor organizations

are undeterred from engaging in illegal self-help with-

out the threat of a damage remedy. (See Petition pp.

10, 25-26).

As to the first point, it is simply a misstatement of the

law to say that unions may recover damages against

carriers under the RLA, but that carriers may not do the

same. BN’s false assertion that an “illogical asymmetry”

exists can be summarily dismissed by the Sixth Circuit’s

statement in CSX where, after examining all of the

relevant cases under the RLA, the court stated:

In the 66-year history of the RLA, no federal court

has published an opinion holding that a union may

recover damages from a railroad or that a railroad

may recover damages from a union. [Emphasis

added ]

CSX, supra, No. 91-5689, slip op. at 43.27

As to BN’s second basis for granting certiorari, i.e., the

alleged need for a deterrent to illegal strikes, the Sixth

Circuit in CSX disposes of this point by stating that

“we have no reason to believe that the need for damages

: to deter illegal strikes over minor disputes is any greater

today than it was when Brown was decided in 1958, or

when the RLA was enacted in 1926.” CSX, supra, No.

*6 See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River, 353

U.S. 30 (1957).

*7 Apparently BN seeks to support its misstatement of the law

in this regard by reference to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United

Industrial Workers of the Seafarers Int’l Union v. Galveston

Wharves, 400 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1968) cert. den. 395 U.S. 905

(1969). (See Petition pp. 23-25). However, as noted by the Sixth

Circuit in CSX, supra, No, 91-5689 slip op. at 43, fn 3, and by the

Fifth Circuit in the case below, Burlington Northern v. BMWE,

supra, 961 F.2d at 88-89, Galveston Wharves is not relevant to this

issue, since it did not deal with the issue of the recovery of com-

pensatory damages between carriers and unions, but rather with

the entitlement to recover the equitable remedy of back pay by

individual employees.

28

91-5689, slip op. at 46. Similarly, the factual record

below, which concerned only whether BMWE had the

right to strike based on the District Court’s determina-

tion of whether the dispute was minor or major, is like-

wise devoid of any basis for BN’s assertion that the

lack of a damage remedy has left labor organizations, in

general, undeterred from illegal strikes which after sixty-

six years is suddenly a problem requiring remediation.

Indeed these factual assertions are both unestablished

and untrue.”

Finally, even assuming BN’s_ unestablished factual

allegations regarding the need for deterrent measures

were true, for the reasons stated by the Sixth Circuit in

CSX, supra, No. 91-5689, slip op. at 47, BN’s argument

should properly be addressed to Congress, and not the

courts.

3. The Courts and commentators recognize that a

damage remedy here would be inappropriate,

because it would be destructive of the RLA dis-

pute resolution procedures and undermine its

policy objectives

Quite apart from whether there exists any basis for

Congress to consider creating a damage remedy, all the

courts and commentators on the RLA that have consid-

ered this issue, have concluded that to imply a damage

remedy in this context in fact would be destructive of the

Act’s procedures, and frustrate its ultimate policy ob-

jectives.” In language equally applicable to this case, the

Sixth Circuit in CSX stated:

By contrast, the concerns that weigh against such

a remedy are as present today as they ever were. In

the volatile atmosphere of labor-management rela-

*8 See discussion at “B. Statement of Facts, 1. Petitioner’s Mis-

statement of the Facts as Established in the Record,” supra, pp. 4-5.

29 See also, the discussion of the Ninth Circuit in Horizon Air,

supra, 979 F.2d at 551 regarding the similar policy reasons which

make inappropriate a monetary award of fees to a union for a

carrier’s violation of Section 2 First.

EEE

29

tions, the threat of a damages action could upset the

balance intended by the RLA.

The problem is particularly acute in a case such

as this where the union cannot know with certainty

at the time it calls a strike whether a court will later

decide that the dispute is minor or major. If dam-

ages were available, and the union guesved wrong, it

would be liable for damages that could deplete the

union treasury and impair its effectiveness as the

collective bargaining agent. Cf. Foust, 442 U.S. at

50-51. This threat of crushing financial loss allows

the carrier to keep the union “in line” and the em-

ployees off the picket line even in cases where the

dispute is later adjudged to be major. See National

Airlines, 431 F. Supp. at 54.

CSX, supra, No. 91-5689, slip op. at 46-47.

Contrary to BN’s factual assertions, which are unsup-

perted by the record or any findings of the courts below,

BMWE reasonably believed that this was a major dis-

pute over which it had a right to strike. At that time,

BMWE did not have the benefit of a court at its elbow

to evaluate and rule upon the propriety of its conclusion

that the dispute was major. As the court held in CSA,

if damages were available, a union would risk, in the

exercise of lawful self help, exposure to damages which

could bankrupt it, making it incapable of carrying out

its statutory duty of representing the employees under

the RLA. This would have a chilling effect on the exer-

cise of self-help in those circumstances when it has been

deemed lawful and necessary for the proper functioning

of the RLA over the past sixty-six years. See Shoreline,

supra, 396 U.S. at 154-55.

These policy concerns have also been recognized by

commentators on the RLA. In his Principles of Railroad

and Airline Labor Law, which was cited with approval

by the Fifth Circuit in the case below, BN v. BMWE,

supra, 961 F.2d at 89 fn. 15, Harry Lustgarten, after

noting that no case had ever allowed the recovery of such

damages, stated:

30

It appears unlikely, moreover, that the courts in the

future would be inclined to allow such damages in

4

view of the potential impact it might have on the

union’s ability to represent the employees.”

Accordingly, the Fifth and Sixth Cireuit decisions

holding a damage remedy inappropriate in these circum-

stances are based on sound policy reasons underlying the

RLA and which have become well-settled elements of the

RLA common law for over three decades. Thus, this

case «does not present a circumstance where writ of

certiorari should be granted under Supreme Court Rule

10.1(c) to resolve an important unsettled issue of federal

law.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the petition for writ of certioran

should be denied

*” Harry Lustgarten, Principles of Railroad and Airline Labor Law,

RALL Publications, p 157 L984 Blab yrating on the compelling

policy reasons against the creation of a damage remedy under the

RLA in these circumstances, Lustgarten states:

The very size of the potential damages arising from an un-

lawful strike tends to mitigate against allowing a carrier to

recover them from a union. Even for the relatively short period

required to obtain an injunction, the damages suffered by a rail

carrier would in most cases exceed the financial ability of the

union to pay. To allow a carrier to recover such damages,

therefore, could threaten the solvency and perhaps the very

continued existence of the union Since it is clearly the pol C\

of the Act to encourage and protect the right of a union to

represent the employees, from a public policy standpoint there

is little to justify an interpretation of the Act which would

permit a carrier, not only to promptly stop an unlawful strike

through injunctive action, but to alsa recover damages in an

amount which could threaten the ability of the union to con-

tinue to represent the employees.

Id. at 157

December 9, 1992

SANFORD R. DENISON

Counsel of Record

L.N.D. WELLS, JR.

SUSAN H. DURHAM

Cigna Tower, Suite 1202

600 E. Las Colinas Blvd.

Irving, TX 75039-5606

(214) 556-2999

WILLIAM BON

General Counsel

BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE

OF WAY EMPLOYES

26555 Evergreen Road, Suite 200

Southfield, Michigan 48076-4225

Counse l far Re sponde nts

Sections

la

APPENDIX

2 First, Sixth, and Seventh of the Railway

Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 provide as follows:

First. Duty of carriers and employees to settle

disputes

It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers.

agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort

to make and maintain agreements concerning rates

of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle

all disputes, whether arising out of the application of

such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any

interruption to commerce or to the operation of any

other carrier growing out of any dispute between the

carrier and the employees thereof.

Sixth. Conference of representatives: time: place;

private agreements

In case of a dispute between a carrier or

carriers and its or their employees, arising out of

grievances or out of the interpretation or application

of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or

working conditions, it shall be the duty of the desig-

nated representative or representatives of such car-

rier or carriers and of such employees, within ten

days after the receipt of notice of a desire on the

part of either party to confer in respect to such

dispute, to specify a time and place at which such

conference shall be held: Provided, (1) That the

place so specified shall be situated upon the line of

the carrier involved or as otherwise mutually agreed

upon; and (2) that the time so specified shall allow

the designated conferees reasonable opportunity to

reach such place of conference, but shall not exceed

twenty days from the receipt of such notice: And

provided further, That nothing in this chapter shall

be construed to supersede the provisions of any agree-

ment (as to conferences) then in effect between the

parties,

ana ant,

%-«

mC

Seventh. Change in pay, rules, or working condi-

tions contrary to agreement or to section

156 forbidden

No carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the

rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its

employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements

except in the manner prescribed in such agreements

or in section 156 of this title.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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