Opposition Brief — Burlington Northern Railroad v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United tutes
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
. Petitioner,
BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYES, an
unincorporated association, BEN OCHOA, GENERAL
CHAIRMAN, E.R. SPEARS, GENERAL CHAIRMAN, PAUL S.
SWANSON, GENERAL CHAIRMAN, and BRUCE G. GLOVER,
GENERAL CHAIRMAN, Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
SANFORD R. DENISON
Counsel of Record
L.N.D. WELLS, JR.
SUSAN H. DURHAM
Cigna Tower, Suite 1202
600 E. Las Colinas Blvd.
Irving, TX 75089-5606
(214) 556-2999
WILLIAM Bon
General Counsel
BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE
oF WAY EMPLOYES
26555 Evergreen Road, Suite 200
Southfield, Michigan 48076-4225
December 9, 1992 Counsel for Respondents
WILSON - Eres PrintING Co.. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
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COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
When a union strikes over a dispute which is later de-
termined by a court to be “minor” in violation of § 2
First of the Ralway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 USC § 152
First, is the appropriate remedy for judicial enforcement
of § 2 First limited to equitable injunctive relief restor-
ing the status quo and channeling the parties to resolu-
tion of the dispute under the RLA procedures.
(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTION
STATUTES INVOLVED
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
B. Statement of Facts
1. Petitioner’s Misstatement of the Facts Es-
tablished in the record
2. Counter-statement of the Facts
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
THE QUESTION PRESENTED DOES NOT
MEET THE CRITERIA SPECIFIED IN SU-
PREME COURT RULE 10 MERITING THE
GRANT OF CERTIORARI
I. THERE EXISTS NO CONFLICT AMONG
THE CIRCUIT COURTS
Il. THE DECISION BELOW DOES NOT CON-
FLICT WITH ANY APPLICABLE DECI-
SIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
tl. THE DECISION BELOW PRESENTS AN
ISSUE THAT HAS BEEN LONG SETTLED
AND IS, THUS, NOT AN IMPORTANT QUES-
TION OF FEDERAL LAW REQUIRING SU-
PREME COURT RESOLUTION
A. The Courts Have Consistently Held That
Creation of a Strike Damage Remedy Under
the RLA Is a Matter for Congress and Not
the Courts
(ili)
Page
19
20
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
B. The Courts Have Consistenly Held That
Creation of a Strike Damage Remedy Under
the RLA Is Inappropriate Because It Would
Be Destructive of the Proper Functioning
OE Ge cakes cette re ee et
ee
The Courts recognize that after sixty-six
years the implication of a damage remedy
which could undermine RLA policy ob-
jectives requires a showing that injunc-
tive remedies are no longer sufficient _.....
Petitioner has made no showing that
injunctive relief is no longer sufficient
and its argument is premised on the false
legal conclusion that there is “an illogical
asymmetry” in the remedies available un-
der the RLA and the false factual as-
sumption that there is a need for deter-
I PD cnc acd he cee s,.
The Courts and commentators recognize
that a damage remedy would be inappro-
priate, because it would be destructive of
the RLA dispute resolution procedures
and undermine its policy objectives ....
eNO cada ceiSndaens oe encacks asin cee Ricco Gasman
APPENDIX
Page
23
24
26
28
30
la
cnet
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
AFA v. Horizon Air, 976 F.2d 541 (9th Cir.
BI Gacy clei ak te er a eee 11, 14, 17, 20, 28
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago
River and Indiana Railroad, 553 U.S. 30
CE Fs canbe cSceea een eee 2, 5, 11, 27
Burlington Northern v. BMWE, 481 U.S. 429
Ki. 5 SAAR Ne UMtLane anc ane ADDS ah Hoe ie Se 19, 20, 23
Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Broth-
erhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, 961
F.2d 86 (5th Cir.), reh’g en bane denied, 968
omen Bi tee Sa, RI oe passim
Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Railroad Company v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and En-
ginemen, 268 F.2d 54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
ae So Bee See a 2
Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212
5 5: | RRR Sermon Ms Nis Ss Cad? AOer ls Skr Ne amruhee RTL aw 21
Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. United
Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971)........ 14, 16,
17, 20
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. R.L.E.A., 491 U.S. 299
_, BINA Ree nn ma Pring cae op at Bea SSO 2 oN 4
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. N.J. Marquar, et al.,
No. 91-5689, slip op., F.2d (6th Cir.
i gk) Rj aes ene passim
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad v.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 58 LRRM
2568 (D.C. Co. 1965) (not officially reported),
rev'd on other grounds, 367 F.2d 157 (10th Cir.
1966), rev’d, 387 U.S. 556 (1967) 15
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979) ........000..... 13, 18, 24, 29
Franklin v. Gwinnette County Public Schools,
US. , 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) ...._.17, 18, 19,
21, =
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v.
Brown, 252 F.2d 149 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
pee tae. O6n (i008) ak 10, 11, 12, 13, 21
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
National Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Associa-
tion, 431 F. Supp. 53, 93 LRRM 2509 (S.D. FI.
ND Sis calece ccpacees cs beecan lac ketire en llenes Oe acura ge ee
Shoreline Railroad v. Transportation Union, 396
Rae, WORE Me RIED oasis dstesicetcadrnay pa bbs benctieestihiaaacvttaicatesactoats
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323
Sei ee I iil este sdiechta tia bal Soc Ne doe
Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990)...
Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood
of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548
(1930).. Lantentic iia caletesShievsde CAR Lee AS
United Industrial W orkers of the Seafarers Inter-
national Union v. Board of Trustees of Galves-
ton Wharves, 400 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 905 ype
Virginian Railway Co. . System Federation No.
40, 300 U.S. 515 (1987) =
BOOKS AND ARTICLES
Lustgarten, Principles of Railroad and Airline
Labor Law, RALL Publications
STATUTES
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
20 U.S.C. § 1681-1688 0.
§ 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
BO UG. 6 YB o.oo nvcccscccccccnccccnisccccincnes
§ 301 of the cabee Management Relations Act, 29
U. Ss. C. § IU aianinasendessnavivasencenasseatssinsaicsbosenaateaeied
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158
ijt} sicouhbehalaeintnniesatnaisanensascaaieheusteaiebes ee
Norris Laguardia Act, 29 U. S.C. § 101 et. seq....16,
§2 First of the Railway haber Act, 45 U.S.C.
ME OP RUN aces osncnsisinnvrdceecteihcacanseueveinacsiutcoes
$2 Sixth of the Railway Labor Act, 45 USC.
§ 152 Sixth ......0000000000000000....
§ 2 Seventh of the Railway Labor Act, rr U.S.C.
BS RGR Terme nanan nsec enc cesnnnscatececencccansese.
28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1) .....0220. ee. Pos Ave
BE CRAs OF BM viv escnsnenswaasinivnaichilnniiricenistianmoneridonsincsb barch 2
Page
16
29, 30
18
21, 22
21
21, 23
17, 25
passim
passim
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
RULES Page
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b) (6)... 3, 4
Supreme Court Rule 10.1 ............0.. eee. 10, 15, 19
Supreme Court Rule 15.1... AE) tre Spe DERE 2
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Respondents Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way km-
ployes, Ben Ochoa, E. R. Spears, Paul S. Swanson. and
Bruce G. Glover (hereinafter referred to collectively as
“Respondents” or “BMWE”) respectfully request that
this Court deny the petition for writ of certiorari, seek-
ing review of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Burlington
Northern Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Main-
tenance of Way Employces, 961 F.2d 86 (5th Cir.), reh’g
en bane denied, 968 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1992). In support
of denial of the writ Respondents would respectfully
show as follows:
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction has been invoked by writ of certiorari
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254/1).
STATUTES INVOLVED
The question presented involves the provisions of Seec-
tions 2 First, Sixth, and Seventh of the Railway Labor
Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C., Section 152 et seq., Which are
set forth in the Appendix. Section 2 First is set forth
below:
First. Duty of carriers and employees to settle
disputes
It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers,
agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort
to make and maintain agreements concerning rates
of pay, rules, and working conditions. and to settle
all disputes, whether arising out of the application of
such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any
interruption to commerce or to the operation of any
other carrier growing out of any dispute between the
carrier and the employees thereof.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner’s statement of the case contains factual as-
sertions which are beyond the record or are misstate-
9
—
ments of the facts established in the record. Therefore,
heeding Supreme Court Rule 15.1., Respondents submit
the following counter-statement of the case.
A. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
On June 26, 1990 Petitioner Burlington Northern
(“BN”) filed a “Verified Complaint for Injunctive Re-
lief’ ' seeking to enjoin a planned 24 hour strike by the
BMWE against a selected portion of BN’s property. The
strike was called over what BMWE reasonably believed
to be a “major dispute’ between the parties which would
give it the right to resort to self-help.*
On that same date, the District Court entered a Tem-
porary Restraining Order (“TRO”) (R.121-23)" re-
straining the BMWE from engaging in any strike ac-
tivity. Upon notice of the TRO, BMWE complied and
refrained from any further strike or self-help action. It
is undisputed that BMWE has fully complied with all
of the orders of the District Court. The strike injunction
was continued by agreement through- hearing on BN’s
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (R.124, 125-26).
1 As indicated by the heading, Petitioner’s complaint, which was
never amended, sought injunctive relief under the authority of
Br. R.R. Trainmen v. Chicego River end Indiana R.R., 553 U.S. 20
(1957) against a strike by BMWE, and nowhere contains any
allegations with respect to the damages it now seeks to recover.
The sole mention in the complaint of any monetary recovery is the
passing reference in the prayer for a permanent strike injunction
that BN also seeks certain unspecified “damages incurred.”
2 See, e.g., Shoreline Railroad v. UTU, 369 U.S. 142, 154-155
(1969); Butte, Anaconda & Pacifie Railroad Co. v. BLE, 268 F.2d
54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864 (1959). As this Court
stated in Shoreline, supra, 396 U.S. at 154-155 “it could hardly be
expected that the union would sit idly by as the railroad rushed to
accomplish the very result the union was seeking to prohibit... .
If the railroad is free to resort to self-help -[by making a unilateral
change], the union cannot be expected to hold back its own eco-
nomic weapons, including strike.”
* Citation to the Record on Appeal will be by the notation “R.”
followed by the relevant pages of the Record.
3
At the close of the Preliminary Injunction hearing on
August 20, 1990, the District Court found a substantial
likelihood that the dispute was “minor” (and _ not
“major” as contended by BMWE) and entered a prelim-
inary injunction against any further strike activity pend-
ing trial on the merits. (R.295-98).
On January 9, 1991, BN moved for Summary Judg-
ment seeking a permanent strike injunction and the re-
covery of monetary damages in the guise of a claim for
equitable restitution. (R.393-400; R.401-27). By re-
sponse filed February 6, 1991, BMWE opposed the entry
of a permanent strike injunction asserting that the dis-
~ pute was a “major” dispute arising from BN’s violation
of Section 2 SEVENTH of the Railway Labor Act
(“RLA”’), 45 U.S.C. $152 SEVENTH, over which
BMWE had a right to engage in self-help (R.469-88).
Simultaneously BMWE moved pursuant to Rule 12
(b) (6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”),
to dismiss BN’s claim for monetary relief, which was
then couched by BN only as a claim for equitable restitu-
tion, not the compensatory damages which it apparently
now seeks. (R.435-37; R.438-68).
On February 14, 1991, the District Court granted BN’s
Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to a perma-
nent strike injunction, but denied BN’s request for mone-
tary relief, finding that BN “has failed to show that it
is entitled to monetary relief as a matter of law.”
(R.874-75). On that same date, the District Court en-
tered a separate order finding the dispute to be “minor”
and not “major,” and permanently enjoined BMWE and
certain of the individual defendants from engaging in
any further strike activity, which order has been fully
complied with. (R.872 ff.). On February 27, 1991,
BMWE moved to amend the breadth of the Court’s per-
manent strike injunction to limit its scope to the specific
dispute at issue in this case. (R.876-85).
On March 7, 1991, the court entered an Order grant-
ing BMWE’s Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss BN’s
4d
claim for monetary relief (R.913-14), and entered a sep-
arate Final Judgment (R.916) on that same date, which
held that BN “have no monetary recovery from defend-
ants.” (R.916).
On March 20, 1991, the District Court entered an or-
der granting BMWE’s Motion to alter the breadth of the
strike injunction (R.939-40). In accordance therewith,
on March 21, 1991 the District Court amended its Feb-
ruary 14, 1991 permanent strike injunction limiting its
scope to the dispute at issue in this case. (R.941).
Notice of Appeal from the District Court’s March 7,
1991 Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal of BN’s request for mone-
tary relief was filed on April 4, 1991. BN’s suggestion
for hearing en banc before the Fifth Circuit was denied
on October 29, 1991. Thereafter, on May 22, 1992 the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court decision. BN
once more filed a suggestion for rehearing en banc, which
again was denied by the Fifth Circuit on July 9, 1992. |
BN filed its petition for Writ of Certiorari on October |
7, 1992. |
B. Statement of Facts
1. Petitioner’s Misstatement of the Facts Established
in the record
The facts found by the District Court in granting the
permanent strike injunction bore only on the question of
whether the dispute was “minor” or “major’, based on
whether BN had asserted an arguable contract justifica-
tion for its action in the face of BMWE’s position that
BN had made a unilateral contract change. See Con-
solidated Rail Corp. v. R. L. E. A., 491 U.S. 299 (1989).
The District Court made no findings regarding the facts
or circumstances relating to the strike itself or the effects
thereof. Indeed, the District Court excluded such evi-
dence during the preliminary injunction hearing, which
was the only evidentiary hearing conducted below. In
addition, the lower court decisions from which this writ
has been taken originate from the District Court’s Rule
12(b) (6) dismissal of BN’s claim for monetary relief
. |
5
and, thus, the only record facts relevant to the question
presented for review are those contained in Petitioner’s
unamended “Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief”.
Thus, the bulk of the facts recited by Petitioner (See
Petition at 7-8; 24 Fn. 6; 25 Fn. 7, 26) concerning
what occurred during the strike and even whether BN
actually suffered any of the damages which it now
seeks to recover, are simply beyond the pleadings and the
facts established in the record.
BN’s factual statement is not only an embellishment
upon its pleading, but also contains, in BMWE’s view,
misstatements of the facts and circumstances which ac-
tually led up to and occurred during and after the strike
with regard to BMWE’s motivation for engaging in self-
help over this dispute. As discussed in the factual state-
ment to follow, BMWE reasonably believed that the
strike action it was taking was lawful. Moreover, in the
broader sense, BN’s factual implication that the lack of
a damage remedy here will leave labor organizations un-
deterred from engaging in illegal self-help and the car-
riers with no remedy‘ is totally without foundation in
this record (See Petition, at 10, 25-26).
So that BMWE is not deemed to have waived its objec-
tion to such misstatements of the factual record, BMWE
submits this counter-statement of the case. The Court is
advised, however, that the following recitation of facts,
just as the recitation contained in the Petition, goes be-
yond the facts pled in Petitioner’s complaint or which
are the subject of specific findings of the Courts bélow.
The only purpose for providing this counter-statement of
facts is to protect BMWE from the Court’s assumption
that the factual statement presented by Petitioner is as
established in the record.
* Thirty-five years ago the Court in Brotherhood of R. R. Train-
men v. Chicago River, 353 U.S. 30 (1957) held that the appropriate
remedy was a strike injunction.
6
2. Counter-statement of the Facts
BMWE is a labor organization which serves as the
collective bargaining representative of employees of BN
who work within the maintenance of way craft and class.
(R.519).° Subordinate to the Grand Lodge of BMWE are
System Federations, which are intermediate labor or-
ganizations generally organized along carrier lines.
(R.520-21). The principal officer of each System Federa-
tion is its General Chairman." Since the present day BN
is the product of the merger of several formerly inde-
pendent railroads, there are presently four System Fed-
erations of BMWE on BN, each of which is a party to
and administers several collective bargaining agreements
between those Federations and BN. (R.521-22)
One of the agreements to which each BMWE System
Federation on BN is a party is the “Schedule Agree-
ment” which generally governs the hours of service, rates.
of pay, and working conditions of the employees working
within the BMWE eraft and class. (R.522). In addi-
tion to the Schedule Agreements, however, BN and cer-
tain of the BMWE System Federations are also parties
to various side or special agreements which supersede the
terms of the Schedule Agreement in connection with the
specific matters they were negotiated to cover. One
such special agreement between BN and three of the four
BMWE System Federations is the September 16, 1987
P-811 special agreement. (R.523) The P-811 Agreement
specified the terms under which BMWE members would
be employed with reference to BN’s installation of con-
crete ties utilizing the P&11-S machine. BMWE’s posi-
tion is that the P-811 special agreement superseded the
Schedule Agreement and preserved certain jobs from
5 The maintenance of way craft and class consists of the em-
ployees who construct and maintain the track, buildings and bridges
on the right of way along BN’s rail lines. (R.520).
® Individual defendants Ben Ochoa, E.R. Spears, Paul Swanson
and Bruce Glover were respectively the General Chairmen of the
four System Federations of BMWE on BN at times relevant to
this case. (R.521-22).
7
further subcontracting on BN’s P-811 concrete tie in-
stallation program.’ In BMWE’s view, Paragraph “E”
of the P8il-S Agreement preserved these jobs by provid-
ing that BN personnel represented by BMWE would be
“bulletined” for all work ahead of and behind the P-811
track-laying machine, including the installation of the
“clips” and “insulators” holding the concrete tie to the
rail. (Ixhibits 3 at R.716; R.529, 533, ff.).°
For the first two and a half years after execution of
the P-811 Agreement, BMWE members bid on and were
assigned all the jobs involving the installation of clips
and insulators as required by the P811-S Agreement.
(R.534). In March of 1990, however, BMWE received
a letter advising that BN intended to make what BMWE
believed would be a unilateral change in the P-811 agree-
ment by subcontracting the clipping function to third
party contractors. ‘Exhibit 19 at R.795; R.535). In
BMWE’s view, this would not only deprive BMWE mem-
bers of jobs, but would also result in a unilateral! change
in the P811-S Agreement because it would deny BMWE
the very consideration it received for entry into the P-811
agreement, i.e, the preservation of clipping jobs from
future subcontracting. (R.538-40). The preservation of
these jobs was the quid pro quo for BMWE’s agreement
that certain other work involving the P-811 machine
could be subcontracted and for BMWE’s agreement to
grant BN certain work rule concessions in the P-811
Agreement.
In BMWR’s view, if BN stopped issuing bulletins for
these jobs to BMWE members and subcontracted the
* The consideration received by BMWE for entry into the P-811
agreement was the promise that certain jobs, particularly those
involving the clipping function, would be preserved to BMWE
members and would not be subject to subcontracting in the future.
(R.530-31, 532-34). In return for that promise, BMWE agreed
that certain other work could be subcontracted by BN and granted
BN other work rule concessions. (2.530, 532).
‘A bulletin is the procedure whereby members of BMWE bid
on jobs on BN. (R.524-25).
8
clipping function to a third party, this would be a uni-
lateral change in employee rates of pay, rules and work-
ing conditions as embodied in the P-811 agreement with-
out complying with the procedures prescribed by Section
6 of the RLA. (R.538-40). That being the case, this
would create a “major” dispute because BN would have
violated its obligation to maintain the status quo pur-
suant to Section 2 SEVENTH of the RLA. (/d.).
BMWE, thus, felt it had the right to exercise self-help,
including taking strike action, to protect its members’
interests.”
At the request of the BMWE General Chairmen, and
in an attempt to resolve the matter short of self-help, a
meeting was held with BN officials on April 5, 1990 to
discuss the matter. (R.536). At that meeting, and later
by corresondence that same date, the General Chairmen
specifically advised BN representatives that they viewed
the subcontract, if implemented, as a unilateral change
in the P-811 agreement, which would create a “major”
dispute between the parties, allowing resort to self-help if
not resolved. (/d.).
The affected General Chairman conferred with the
President of BMWE and sought his verification that
the dispute was major. (Exhibit 23 at R.809; R.538-
39). After obtaining his concurrence (R.538, 540), the
three affected BM WE Genera! Chairmen again wrote to
BN on May 2, 1990 advising that BMWE would view
the subcontracting of the clipping function on BN’s con-
crete tie installation program, as a major dispute over
a unilateral contract change. (R.538, 540-41; Exhibit
24 at R.811). BMWE subsequently received a letter
dated May 11, 1990 from BN disputing BMWE’s posi-
tion. (R.541). Since it appeared BN was intent upon
proceeding to implement this change, BMWE believed
the only recourse available to it to protect the inter-
ests of its members was to engage in self-help in the
event the carrier brought the clip car on to the property.
(R.541).
® See cases cited at Footnote 2, supra.
9
On May 18, 1990, the Grand Lodge President verified
in writing his earlier decision that this was a major
dispute over a unilateral change in an existing agreement.
(Exhibit 26 at R.816; R.542). He thus authorized the
affected BMWE General chairmen to initiate the steps
to obtain strike sanction under the Union’s Constitution.
(id.; see Exhibit 1 at R.586; Exhibit 28 at R.825).
Before taking strike action, special membership meet-
ings were held at each Local Lodge affected by the dispute
as required by Article XX $17(b) of the BMWE Con-
stitution, (R.542-43). At these meetings the members
Were orally advised about the nature of the dispute and
the basis upon which BMWE believed that this was a
“major” dispute over which the membership had the right
to strike if they voted to do so. (R.543; Exhibit 29 at
R.829) ; Exhibits 30 at R.853; Exhibit 31 at R.855). At
these meetings, the membership voted overwhelmingly to
strike over this dispute. (R.843-44; Exhibit 33 at R.859).
Based on the membership’s determination to strike over
this dispute, on June 25, 1990, in accordance with Article
XX $17(b) of the BMWE Constitution, the Grand Lodge
officers authorized the initiation of strike action against
BN in response to the unilateral change. (R.544:; Exhibit
32 at R.857; Exhibit 34 at R.861). The strike action
authorized, however, was specifically limited to last for
twenty-four hours, from 6:00 a.m. on June 26, 1990 to
conclude at 6:00 a.m. on June 27, 1990, and to cover
only the portion of BN’s property within the one BMWE
System Federation (the former CB&Q lines) upon which
BN had implemented the clip car. (R.544; Exhibit 35
at R.864). Contrary to BN’s assertion in its Petition,
the strike was not system wide and was focused only on
the one section of BN’s property where the unilateral
change had been implemented.
BMWE engaged in strike action based on its belief
that it could lawfully exercise self-help in response to
BN’s violation of its status quo obligation under Section 2
10
SEVENTH of the RLA by making a unilateral change
in the P-811 agreement. (R.545-46).
Immediately upon notice of entry of the TRO, BMWE
ceased al! self-help and other strike activity, and has
fully complied with that and all subsequent injunctive
orders issued by the District Court. (R.546; Exhibit 37
at R.&71).
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
THE QUESTION PRESENTED DOES NOT MEET THE
CRITERIA SPECIFIED IN SUPREME COURT RULE
10 MERITING THE GRANT OF CERTIORARI
As relevant to the question presented here, Supreme
Court Rule 10 specifies that the writ should be granted
only if (1) there is a conflict among the Circuit Courts;
(2) the case below conflicts with a decision of this Court;
or (3) this case presents an important unsettled question
of federal Jaw which this Court should resolve. Supreme
Court Rule 10.1(a) and (c). Since none of the criteria
apply here, there is no basis for granting the writ.
I. THERE EXISTS NO CONFLICT AMONG THE CIR-
CUIT COURTS
Far from there being a conflict among the Circuit
Courts, the question presented seeks reversal of the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in BN v. BMWE,” which comports with
sixty-six vears of settled jurisprudence under the RLA.
This decision followed over 30 years of precedent in the
Fifth Circuit ' and is in accord with the result in a
1 BN v. BMWE, supra, 961 F.2d 86.
1 Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Brown, 252 F.2d
149, 155 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 949 (1958): Nationa!
Airlines v. ALPA, 431 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
ee
11
recent decision by the Sixth Circuit."2 The decision is
also in accord with the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit,"
in a related context arising under $2 First. In sum,
there are no conflicting decisions and all the Circuit
Courts are in accord regarding the appropriate remedies
for violations of Section 2 First. There is, thus, no basis
for the grant of certiorari under Supreme Court Rule
10.1 (a).
One year following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River, 353 U.S.
30 (1957), the Fifth Circuit held in Louisville & N.R.R.
Co, v. Brown, 252 F.2d 149, 155 (5th Cir.) cert. denied,
356 U.S. 949 (1958) that monetary damages were not
recoverable by a carrier for a- strike which could also be
enjoined under Chicago River as being over a niinor dis-
pute and in violation of § 2 First of the RLA. In the 34
years since, there have been no cases holding contrary
to the decision in Brown. In fact, the current viability
of this holding has been twice reaffirmed in the last year
by the only two other Appellate Court decisions, which
have considered the issue. BN vr. BMWE, 961 F.2d 86
(5th Cir, 1982) (the decision below); ESX v. Marquar,
No. 91-5689, slip op., F.2d (6th Cir. Novem-
ber 18, 1992).
In considering the present viability of its previous
Brown decision, the Fifth Circuit in BN v. BMWE, the
case below, noted that in the years following Brown
“other courts have recognized Brown as holding that there
is no cause of action against a union for damages for a
breach of the § 152 First duty.” Jd. at 88 (See cases
cited at Fn. 7 in Court’s Opinion). The court below also
noted that not only has the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Grown been followed by other courts, but that in the
years since, “there are no reported cases awarding dam-
ages for the breach of the $152 First duty.” BN v.
"2 C.S.X. Transportation, Inc. v. Marquar et al., No. 91-5689, slip
op., —— F.2d —— (6th Cir. November 13, 1992).
18 AFA v. Horizon Air, 976 F.2d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 1992),
12
BMWE, supra, 961 F.2d at 89 fn. 15. Similarly, with
respect to BN’s claim under § 153 First, the Fifth Cir-
cuit below stated that ‘We are also not aware of any case
in which damages have been awarded for violation of
$ 153 First (i).” Jd. at 89. In refusing BN’s alternative
argument to overrule Brown,'' the Fifth Circuit went on
to state that “BN has not directed the attention of this
Court to any Supreme Court decision holding that mon-
etary relief is available for the breach of the 152 First
duty.” Jd. at 89. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit’s deci-
sion represents an acknowledgement that this is a well-
settled area of federal labor law, where no court has
rendered a contrary decision over the sixty-six years of
jurisprudence under the RLA, nor has any court held
differently than the rule as established over thirty-four
years ago in the Brown decision,
In reaching the same conclusion the Sixth Circuit in
CSX v. Marquar, No. 91-5689, slip op. at 45 (6th Cir.
November 13, 1992)'* noted that since Brown, “No pub-
lished opinion has ever held that a carrier may recover
damages against a union for an illegal strike over a
minor dispute.” More generally, the Sixth Circuit also
noted that:
In the sixty-six year history of the RLA, no Federal
Court has published an opinion holding that a union
may recover damages from a railroad, or that a rail-
road may recover damages from a union. On rare
occasions, individual employees have been allowed to
recover damages from their unions or their carriers,
14 Petitioner has twice sought en banc hearing of this case in the
Fifth Circuit to consider over-ruling Brown, once for initial hear-
ing of the appeal and later for review of the panel decision. On
both occasions, not one of the active Judges on the Fifth Circuit
considered this case of such significance to even request that the
Court be polled on whether to hear the case en banc. See Appendix
C to Petition.
15 Citation to the decision in CSX v. Marquar, supra, will to be
to the opinion of Ralph B. Guy, Circuit Judge, with whom Judge
Jones concurred, who delivered the opinion of the Court holding that
it would be inappropriate for the Federal Courts to imply a strike
damage remedy against a union under the RLA.
13
but the Courts have not permitted the railroads and
unions to use the club of damages against each other.
[emphasis added]
CSX, supra, No. 91-5689, slip op. at 43. Although ac-
knowledging that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Brown
was not binding on it, the Sixth Circuit in CSX concluded
that “Since at least 1958, the RLA ‘common law’ has
been that a railroad may not recover damages for a
strike over a minor dispute.” CSX, supra, slip op. at
46.'" The CSX court found further that no demonstra-
tion had been made that the injunctive remedies which
have been deemed appropriate for sixty-six years are
no longer sufficient, and that there were strong policy
reasons grounded in the RLA, which would make the
imposition of a damage remedy in these circumstances
inappropriate.'? Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit in CSX
reached the same result as the Fifth Circuit in Brown
and BN v. BMWE and concluded that “the common law
that has emerged [under the RLA] does not contemplate
awards of damages between unions and railroads.” /d.
slip op. at 438.
Brown and BN v. BMWE in the Fifth Circuit, and
CSX in the Sixth Circuit, are the only federal appellate
cases to directly address the issue presented. While both
Circuits use a somewhat different approach to arrive at
the same conclusion, they both clearly hold that monetary
16 The 6th Circuit stated:
Congress envisioned that the courts would set up a body of
law to enforce the RLA. The resulting body of the law has
not permitted railroads and unions to recover damages against
each other generally and, particularly, in the situation pre-
sented in this case. After 66 years, a Court should be reluctant
to change the balance that has been struck between railroads
and unions.
CSX, supra, No. 91-5689, slip op. at 46.
7 Citing this Court’s previous decision in JBW v. Foust, 442 US.
42, 47 (1979) the CSX court stated that “damages awards between
railroads and unions are inappropriate because they threaten the
delicate balance intended by the RLA.” CSX, supra, No, 91-5689
slip op. at 44,
14
damages are not recoverable by a carrier against a union
which engages in a strike in violation of § 2 First.
While the only cases directly on point are in the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits, by analogy, denying a damages rem-
edy as being inappropriate is also supported by the
reasoning of a recent decision of the Ninth Circuit. AFA
v. Horizon Air, 976 F.2d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 1992). In
that case a union was denied monetary relief in the
form of attorneys’ fees (apparently damages were not
sought) against a carrier who had violated $2 First by
negotiating without the intent of ever reaching an agree-
ment. In that case, fees were sought against the carrier
on the same basis that damages are being sought against
the union in this case, 7.c. that this Court’s decision in
Chicago and Northwestern Railway v. UTU, 402 U.S.
570, 577 (1971) allows the Courts to fashion remedies
for violations of the RLA “by whatever appropriate
means might be developed on a case by case basis.’’ In its
decision, the Ninth Circuit discusses the policy reasons
supporting denial of attorneys fees under the RLA, which
reasoning would equally apply to the recovery of any
other forms of monetary relief, including damages, be-
tween unions and carriers under the RLA. Thus, while
not directly on point, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Horizon Air is certainly consistent with the long line of
authority under the RLA, holding that injunctive relief,
channeling the parties into the resolution of their dis-
putes under the procedures of the RLA, is the limit of
appropriate remedies. The reasoning of that case thus
supports the rule that the imposition of monetary rem-
edies, whether they be damages or attorney’s fees, as
between carriers and unions, are not appropriate under
the RLA.
Not only are the only two Circuit Courts to have
directly considered this question in accord, but there are
no District Court decisions in any other circuits which
15
have reached a contrary result.’* In National Airlines,
Inc. v. ALPA, 431 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1976), which
is the only other District Court case to have directly
addressed this issue, the District Court noted that in
the eighteen years since the Brown decision, all the cases
involving the judicial enforcement of $ 2 First “confined
2 First remedies to those partaking of the nature of
equitable injunctive relief.” /d., 431 F.Supp. at 54. Not-
ing the apparent congressional satisfaction with the Brown
decision, evidenced by the fact that in those 18 years
“Congress has [not] enacted legislation which even sug-
gests its intent to create a right of action for damages,”
and that “the policy considerations underlying the Brown
decision are as tenable today as when Brown was de-
cided,” the Court denied a similar damage claim. Jd. at 55.
Accordingly, not just every Circuit Court decision, but
literally every judicial decision to address this issue in
the 66 years of RLA jurisprudence has consistently held
that damages are not recoverable in these circumstances.
Thus, there is no conflict which this Court need resolve
under Supreme Court Rule 10.1(a).
Il. THE DECISION BELOW DOES NOT CONFLICT
WITH ANY APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT
This case does not present the Court with the oppor-
tunity to reverse a decision which conflicts with decisions
of this Court. See Supreme Court Rule 10.1ic). No de-
cision of this Court has ever countenanced the resolution
of disputes between labor organizations and earriers
under the RLA by the imposition of damage awards.
'S The only reported case where strike damages were ever awarded
wes Denver & Rio Grende Western Railroad +. Brotherhood of
Reilroad Trainmen, 58 L.R.R.M. 2568 (D. Co. 1965) (not officially
reported), rend on other grounds, 367 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1966).
rend, 387 U.S. 556 (1967). That case, however, has no precedential
value for the reasons stated by the Fifth Circuit in BN v. BMWE,
supra, 961 F.2d at 89 fn 15, and by the Sixth Circuit, in CSN,
supra, No, 91-5689, slip op. at 46 fn 4, in their discussions of
that case.
16
Rather, this Court’s decisions under §2 of the RLA
reveal the careful circumscription of the available reme-
dies to an injunction channeling the parties back into
compliance with their RLA duties and resolution of their
disputes under the workings of the Act. The Supreme
Court cases cited by Petitioner are, thus, inapposite.
In its Petition, BN argues that certiorari’ should be
granted, because the Fifth Circuit’s decision below con-
flicts with certain Supreme Court decisions. However,
when one focuses on the cases cited by BN, it is evident
that all the cases cited are inapposite to the issue of the
recovery of legal damages under the RLA. Three of the
Supreme Court cases relied upon by BN arise under the
RLA, but each deals solely with the issue of whether the
Courts have authority to issue injunctive relief to en-
force the duties specified in Section 2 of the RLA. Not
one even remotely deals with the issue of whether dam-
ages are recoverable.’”
Of the three Supreme Court RLA injunction cases cited
by BN, it principally relies upon Chicago & N.W.R.W. v.
UTU, 402 U.S. 570 (1971). BN argues that UTU sup-
ports the implication of a damage remedy based on the
In each of the cases cited by BN there was no issue of mone-
tary relief and the quotes that BN relies on are solely within the
context of the Court’s authority to enter injunctive relief. See
Texas and New Orleans Railway Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway
and Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) (injunction action
to enforce $2 Third of the RLA, which protects the right of the
employees and the carrier to designate their representatives with-
out influence or coercion from the other party); Virginian Railway
Co. v. System Federation #40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937) (injunction
action to enforce $2 Ninth of the RLA to require the carrier to
meet and treat with the employees’ representative as certified by
the National Mediation Board): Chicago and Northwestern Rail-
way Co. v. United Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971)
(injunction action where issue was whether a strike injunction
could be entered to enforce $2 First, in the face of the prohibi-
tiens of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 USC $101, et seq., after
conclusion of the RLA procedures when the union would otherwise
be free to exercise self-help, but where it was alleged that the
union failed to negotiate properly during those procedures).
17
Court’s statement that Section 2 First was “designed to
be a legal obligation, enforceable by whatever appro-
priate means might be developed on a case by case basis.”
Id. at 577. In that case the Court was struggling with
whether, in the unique facts presented there, a strike
could be enjoined, despite the strike injunction prohibi-
tions of the Norris Laguardia Act, 29 USC § 101 et seg.
The context of the quote relied on by BN is not whether
damages or monetary relief may be assessed, but what
manner of appropriate injunctive relief a court could
fashion to enforce § 2 First to meet the particular needs
of the case at bar. It is simply a misuse of UTU to cite
it for the proposition that damage awards may be im-
posed to resolve disputes under the RLA when monetary
relief was never even at issue in that case. In fact. a
correct reading of UTU reveals that it addressed no
more than whether an injunction may issue in the face
of the Norris Laguardia Act prohibitions when a strike
injunction is the “only practical, effective means of en-
forcing” Section 2 First. Jd. at 583.2
Similarly, BN’s reliance on quotations from Steele v.
L. & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) is entirely off
point. Steele was a fair representation case which deals
with the relationship between a union and those it repre-
sents and not with the relationship between a union and
rail carriers established by the RLA.*'| Since a fair
representation case is more akin to a breach of fiduciary
duty action, see Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 567-
568 (1990), it is entirely inapposite to a case involving
the relationship between carriers and labor organizations
*° If BN’s reading of UTU was correct then the union in AFA vr.
Horizon Air, supre, 976 F.2d at 551 would not only be entitled to
attorney’s fees, but also to recover as damages its negotiation
expenses incurred while the carrier was violating $2 First by
negotiating without the intent to reach an agreement.
** As the Court stated in CSX, supra, slip op. at 43:
On rare cecasions individual employees have been allowed to
recover damages from their unions or their carriers. but the
Courts have not permitted the railroads and unions to use the
club of damages against each other.
18
under the RLA, which is not a fiduciary relationship, and
{ where policy concerns are at issue involving the mainte-
nance of a balance between the two in addressing the
resolution of disputes.
Finally, BN argues that the Brown holding is incon-
sistent with Supreme Court’s recent decision in Franklin
v. Gwinnette County Public Schools, U.S. me ty |
L.Ed.2d 208 (1992). Once again Franklin is not a case
dealing with the enforcement of the duties under the
RLA, but is an action arising under an entirely different
line of cases dealing with the availability of damages un-
der Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
f —USE § 1681-1688. As the Fifth Circuit held below, “even
( if this Court were considering the issue on a clean slate,
Franklin would not control.” BN v. BMWE, supra, 961
F.2d at 89 fn. 9.
Moreover, Franklin requires the presumption of a
damages remedy only when such a remedy is “appro-
priate” and “unless Congress has expressly indicated
otherwise.” Franklin, supra, U.S. , 117 L.Ed.2d
at 217. As demonstrated by the Sixth Circuit in CSX,
such a remedy would not be appropriate here because it
would upset the careful balance of interests necessary to
achieve the purposes of the RLA. CSX, supra, No. 91-
5689, slip op. at 44, citing JBEW v. Foust, supra, 442
U.S. at 48-50-51; see also discussion at section III.B.
infra, in this brief. a
( Moreover, there is strong indication that Congress has
“indicated otherwise,’ which also supports the conclusion
that a damage remedy is also inappropriate. And there-
fore, Franklin does not mandate implication of a damage
remedy. As recognized by the Sixth Circuit in CSX, this
Circuit’s Brown holding has now become well entrenched
as part of the federal common Jaw under the RLA. CSX,
supra, No, 91-5689, slip op. at 46-47. The failure of Con-
gress to legislatively reverse Brown in the 34 years since
should be taken as indication that Congress did not intend
22 See discussion at III A infra and footnote 25 infra.
EEE aS
19
a damage remedy in these circumstances and as an ex-
pression of Congressional policy on this issue. As this
Court stated in another context, “at this advanced stage
of the RLA’s development. . . it is for Congress, and not
the courts, to strike the balance between the uncontrolled
power of management and labor to further their respec-
tive interests.” Burlington Northern v. BMWE, 481 U.S.
429, 452-53 (1987). Thus, even assuming, without con-
ceding, that Franklin would apply to an RLA ease, Frank-
lin does not require the implication of a damage remedy,
because Congress has “indicated otherwise” as evidenced
by (1) its refusal to extend to cases under the RLA the
damage action it created for cases arising under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), and (2) its ex-
pression of satisfaction with the Brown rule by allowing it
to become well embedded in the RLA common law by re-
fusing to legislatively overturn it in thirty-four years.
In sum, as stated by the Fifth Circuit in the decision
below, “BN has not directed the attention of this Court
to any Supreme Court decision holding that monetary re-
lief is available for a breach of the § 152 First duty.”
BN v. BMWE, supra, 961 F.2d at 89. Since the decision
below is not inconsistent with an previous decision of the
Supreme Court, there is no reason to grant certiorari on
that basis under Supreme Court Rule 10.1 (c¢).
Ill. THE DECISION BELOW PRESENTS AN ISSUE
THAT HAS BEEN LONG SETTLED AND IS, THUS,
NOT AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL
LAW REQUIRING SUPREME COURT RESOLU-
TION
This case does not present a question involving an im-
portant issue of federal law which has not been, but
should be, resolved by this Court, which would justify
granting the writ under Supreme Court Rule 10.1(c).
As aptly stated by the Sixth Circuit “the Courts have not
permitted the railroads and the unions to use the club of
damages against each other.” CSNX, supra, No. 91-5689,
slip op. at 43.
20
Thus, the reasons underlying the holding of both the
Fifth and Sixth Circuit ** are based upon the recognition
that it would be inappropriate for the Courts to imply a
damage remedy, or a damage cause of action, under the
RLA, because to do so would (1) be destructive of the
RLA’s procedures and frustrate the achievement of its
stated policy objectives; and (2) involve the courts “at
this advanced stage of the RLA’s development” ** in a
matter which should be properly left for Congress to con-
sider in carrying out its legislative function of establish-
ing laber policy. Viewed in this sense, the holdings in both
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits are based on identical propo-
sitions; i.e. it would be “inappropriate” for the Courts
to fashion a damage remedy in these circumstances.
Moreover, arming the courts with the power to impose
legal damages, would transform judicial enforcement of
the RLA from the limited exercise of equity jurisdiction,
requiring the parties by injunction to comply with their
RLA duties, into a court at law resolving disputes between
the parties through the imposition of damage awards.
Such a fundamental change in the workings of the RLA
should be left to Congress.
A. The Courts Have Consistently Held That Creation
of a Strike Damage Remedy Under the RLA Is a
Matter for Congress and Not the Courts
The fact that Congress has declined to legislatively re-
verse the Brown holding during the thirty-four years
which have elapsed since its decision is compelling evi-
dence that Congress is satisfied with the state of the com-
mon law under the RLA with respect to the extent of
available remedies for enforcement of § 2 First. Thus,
one may reasonably conclude that by allowing Brown to
*3 These policy reasons also underlie the decision of the Ninth
Circuit in AFA v. Horizon Air, supra, 976 F.2d at 551 (9th Circuit
1992) denying a union monetary relief in the form of attorneys
fees for a carrier’s violation of §2 First, even in the face of the
argument that the Court could imply such a remedy under Chicago
& North Western, supra, 402 U.S. at 577.
*4 Burlington Northern R.R. v. BMWE, 481 U.S. 429, 452 (1987).
a ee
21
stand as the law, Congress is indicating that damages
should not be available in these circumstances.
Thus, even assuming that this Court’s decision in Frank-
lin v. Gwinnette County, USS. , 117 L.Ed.2d
208 (1992), applies to RLA cases, Gwinnette’s presump-
tion of the availability of “all appropriate” remedies ‘“un-
less Congress has expressly indicated otherwise’, Gwin-
nette, supra, 117 L.Ed.2d at 217, would not require the
implication of a damage remedy here, since the holdings
of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits stand for the propo-
sition that a damage remedy is both not “appropriate” in
these circumstances, and the acquiscence of Congress by
allowing Brown to remain the law for over thirty-four
years indicates that Congress does not want remedies un-
der the RLA extended to damages, at least in this par-
ticular circumstance.
Indeed, the Brown Court, being sensitive to its role as
an interpreter and not a maker of law and seeking to
avoid usurping the function of Congress to establish la-
bor policy, noted that “where Congress sought to set up
a right of acton for damages for breach of duty in other
labor management situations, it enacted a statute ex-
pressly spelling out the nature of the right of action.”
[emphasis added]. Brown, supra, 252 F.2d at 155. The
Brown Court then cited to § 303 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 187, which
specifically created a cause of action for damages for a
strike in violation of §$ 8(b)(4) of the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA’’), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4). Since
damages for strikes in violation of the NLRA are not
recoverable, in the absence of Congressional enactment of
§ 303, no cause of action for damages would exist. Sim-
ilarly, when Congress decided to authorize the recovery of
damages for a strike in violation of a collective bargain-
ing agreement, enabling legislation was enacted spe-
cifically creating a right of action for damages. See
$ 301 at the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185; Carbon Fuel Co. v.
Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212 (1979). Thus, although hav-
ing the opportunity during the passage of the LMRA to
extend the remedy for strike damages to cases under the
22
RLA, Congress specifically declined to do so. Consider-
ing that the labor statute which specifically authorizes a
damage remedy for illegal strikes also specifically exeludes
RLA carriers from its scope, See 29 U.S.C. § 182, there is
clear indication that Congress did not intend to extend
such damage claims to cases under the RLA.**
The continued refusal of Congress since the passage of
the LMRA to legislatively overrule Brown, establishes
Brown as both an element of the common law of the rem-
edies available for judicial enforcement of § 2 First, but
also as an indication that Brown comports with Con-
gressional policy regarding the remedies which should
be available, and not available, for the judicial enforce-
ment of the RLA. After more than thirty years of limit-
ing enforcement of the RLA, as between carriers and _
unions, to injunctive relief, it would be a usurpation of
the function of Congress to establish labor policy for the
Brown holding to be reversed at this late date. Indeed,
to imply a damage remedy in these circumstances would
be tantamount to judicial enactment of $ 303 of the
LMRA into the RLA.
Even without respect to whether the legal basis for the
Brown Court holding remains sound (which BMWE sub-
mits it is}, over the passage of years this holding has
embedded itself in the common law developed by the
courts in the interpretation of the RLA. As the District
Court noted in National Airlines, Congress must have
been satisfied with the state of this common law since
in the twenty years since the Brown decision “Congress
[has not] enacted legislation which even suggests its
intent to create a right of action for damages.” National
Airlines, supra, 431 F. Supp. at 54.
“>In Guwinnette, this Court presumed that Congress lezislated
with full knowledge of the Court’s prior decisions. Thus in leaving
judicially crafted remedies undisturbed, the Court concluded that
Congress did not intend to modify the available remedies. Likewise
Congress’ satisfaction with Brown, and its progeny, manifest ap-
proval of the now “traditional rule” regarding the lack of a damage
remedy between carriers and unions under the RLA.
a
23
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in CSX, supra, No. 91-
5689, slip op., 46-47 is in accord. In CSX the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that since the limitation against the recovery
of strike damages has become part of the common law
under the RLA, it should be up to Congress and not the
courts to create a damage remedy. Jd. at 47. In CSX
the court notes that in Burlington Northern v. BMWE,
481 U.S. 429 (1987), the Court was faced with the ques-
tion of whether the RLA implicitly bars secondary picket-
ing. Although there is no prohibition in the RLA against
secondary activity similar to that found in the National
Labor Relations Act (““NLRA’”), 29 USC § 158(b) (4),
the Court refused to imply a similar bar under the RLA.
In language applicable here, which is quoted by the Sixth
Circuit in CSX, the Supreme Court stated:
We decline, at this advanced stage of the RLA’s de-
velopment, to find in it an implied limit on a union’s
resort to secondary activity. Instead, “if Congress
should now find that the abuses in the nature of
secondary activities have arisen in the railroad in-
dustry ... it ts for Congress, and not the Courts, to
strike the balance ‘between the uncontrolled power of
management and labor to further their respective
interests.’ ”
Burlington Northern, supra, 481 U.S. at 252-53 (citation
omitted) [emphasis added}. Thus, the Sixth Circuit in
CSX came to the same conclusion as the Fifth Circuit in
Brown that if present circumstances in the railroad and
airline industry merit the imposition of a damage award,
the “argument properly should be made to Congress.”
CSX Transportation, supra, No. 91-5689, slip op. at 47.
B. The Courts Have Consistently Held That Creation
of a Strike Damage Remedy Under the RLA Is
Inappropriate Because It Would Be Destructive of
the Proper Functioning of the RLA
The Fifth and Sixth Circuit holding that the recovery
of strike damages is not an appropriate remedy is ulti-
mately based upon the recognition that a damage remedy
24
would be destructive of fundamental policy considerations
underlying the RLA and would undermine the balance it
created between the interests of employees and the car-
riers. It is these policy considerations which have prompted
Congress to decline to legislatively reverse Brown over
the last three decades. Moreover, BN has shown no
reason for judicially deviating from the rule by demon-
strating that the remedies appropriate for sixty-six years
are no longer sufficient.
1. The Courts recognize that after sixty-six years
the implication of a damage remedy which could
undermine RLA policy objectives requires a
showing that injunctive remedies are no longer
sufficient
Noting that “the Courts have not permitted the rail-
roads and unions to use the club of damages against each
other”, CSX, supra, No. 91-5689, slip op. at 48, the Sixth
Circuit concluded in CSX that “damages awards between
railroads and unions are inappropriate because they
threaten the delicate balance intended by the RLA.” Jd.
at 44. In reaching that conclusion the CSX Court cited to
this Court’s decision in JBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47
(1979), which counseleld that “a court’s task in en-
forcing the RLA ‘is to implement a remedial scheme that
will best effectuate the purposes of the Railway Labor
Act, recognizing that the overarching legislative goal is
to facilitate collective bargaining and to achieve indus-
trial peace.’’’ CSX, supra, slip op. at 44, quoting, Foust,
supra, 442 U.S. at 47. Accordingly, just as this Court
concluded in Foust that punitive damages were not re-
coverable against a union in a duty of fair representation
case, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a strike damage
award against a union in an RLA ease is likewise in-
appropriate, because it could also “impair a union’s
financial stability and thereby upset the careful balance
of interests necessary to achieve the purposes of the
RLA.” CSX, supra, slip op. at 44.
25
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Brown, and
thus its decision in BN v. BMWE below, is grounded on
the identical policy concerns expressed by this Court in
Foust, i.e. a damages remedy could impair the labor
management relationship intended by the RLA. Recog-
nizing that this was the same policy basis underlying the
Brown holding, the District Court in National Airlines
stated:
... [T]he Court is of the opinion that policy con-
siderations underlying the Brown decision are as
tenable today as when Brown was decided. The life
cycle of labor-management bargaining is heated and
oftentimes results in bitter accusations. Representa-
tives attempt to secure the best possible terms for
their respective sides. To create a right of action
in favor of an employer against a union and its
collective bargaining representatives for losses the
former incurs in the course of the collective bargain-
ing process would, in effect, give the employer a
weapon with which to keep the unions and their
agents “in line.” Surely, neither Congress nor the
Appellate Courts would fashion a remedy which
would give the employer a lever upon which to gain
such an unfair advantage. [Emphasis added].
National Airlines, supra, 481 F.Supp. at 54.
In the years since Chicago River held that a strike
over a minor dispute could be enjoined, the Courts have
exercised judicial restraint, showing sensitivity to these
policy concerns (which are also expressed by Congress
in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. $101 et seg.) —
and, therefore, have limited the exercise of their equitable
powers in granting strike injunctions to the extent neces-
sary to fulfill the RLA’s purposes. Nevertheless, like the
Plaintiff in National Airlines, BN remains “|u]nsatisfied
with the injunctive relief and favorable results there-
from” and argues that complete relief and fulfillment of
the RLA’s purposes requires the imposition of damages.
However, complete relief aimed at serving the RLA’s
goals requires only the restoration of labor peace through
a strike injunction and does not require the shifting of
26
the incidental costs of the employees’ protected activity
to the employees themselves. As noted in National Air-
lines, imposing this burden on the employees would simply
cater to the “unmitigated desire for vengeance” of the
carrier and would not serve the purposes of the RLA.
National Airlines, supra, 431 F.Supp. at 54.
As the Sixth Circuit remarked in CSX, the body of
common law that has developed with respect to the en-
forcement of the RLA “has not permitted railroads and
unions to recover damages against each other generally,
and, particularly, in the situation presented in this case.”
CSX, supra, No. 91-5689 at 46.
The Sixth Circuit goes on to state that “after 66 years,
a court should be reluctant to change the balance that
has been struck [by the RLA] between railroads and
unions,” and that “at a minimum” before making such a
change, there should be a “demonstrat{ion] why the
remedies that have been appropriate for 66 years are no
longer good enough.” CSX, supra, No. 91-5689, slip op.
at 46.
2. Petitioner has made no showing that injunctive
relief is no longer sufficient and its argument is
premised on the false legal conclusion that there
is “an illogical asymmetry” in the remedies avail-
able under the RLA and the false factual as-
sumption that there is a need for deterrent
measures :
BN argues that injunctive remedies are no longer
sufficient and that a change should now be made after
66 years to imply a damage remedy based on two false
legal and factual assumptions. First BN falsely asserts
that an “illogical asymmetry” exists under present law
whereby “unions may be awarded the full range of re-
lief, including damages, for a carrier’s violation of its
duties under the RLA, but carriers are not allowed this
full range of remedies when a union violates its duties
under the RLA.” (See Petition pp. 4, 10-11, 23-25).
Second, BN makes the false factual assertion that there
27
is a basis in this record for finding that, despite the
availability of a strike injunction,” labor organizations
are undeterred from engaging in illegal self-help with-
out the threat of a damage remedy. (See Petition pp.
10, 25-26).
As to the first point, it is simply a misstatement of the
law to say that unions may recover damages against
carriers under the RLA, but that carriers may not do the
same. BN’s false assertion that an “illogical asymmetry”
exists can be summarily dismissed by the Sixth Circuit’s
statement in CSX where, after examining all of the
relevant cases under the RLA, the court stated:
In the 66-year history of the RLA, no federal court
has published an opinion holding that a union may
recover damages from a railroad or that a railroad
may recover damages from a union. [Emphasis
added ]
CSX, supra, No. 91-5689, slip op. at 43.27
As to BN’s second basis for granting certiorari, i.e., the
alleged need for a deterrent to illegal strikes, the Sixth
Circuit in CSX disposes of this point by stating that
“we have no reason to believe that the need for damages
: to deter illegal strikes over minor disputes is any greater
today than it was when Brown was decided in 1958, or
when the RLA was enacted in 1926.” CSX, supra, No.
*6 See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River, 353
U.S. 30 (1957).
*7 Apparently BN seeks to support its misstatement of the law
in this regard by reference to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United
Industrial Workers of the Seafarers Int’l Union v. Galveston
Wharves, 400 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1968) cert. den. 395 U.S. 905
(1969). (See Petition pp. 23-25). However, as noted by the Sixth
Circuit in CSX, supra, No, 91-5689 slip op. at 43, fn 3, and by the
Fifth Circuit in the case below, Burlington Northern v. BMWE,
supra, 961 F.2d at 88-89, Galveston Wharves is not relevant to this
issue, since it did not deal with the issue of the recovery of com-
pensatory damages between carriers and unions, but rather with
the entitlement to recover the equitable remedy of back pay by
individual employees.
28
91-5689, slip op. at 46. Similarly, the factual record
below, which concerned only whether BMWE had the
right to strike based on the District Court’s determina-
tion of whether the dispute was minor or major, is like-
wise devoid of any basis for BN’s assertion that the
lack of a damage remedy has left labor organizations, in
general, undeterred from illegal strikes which after sixty-
six years is suddenly a problem requiring remediation.
Indeed these factual assertions are both unestablished
and untrue.”
Finally, even assuming BN’s_ unestablished factual
allegations regarding the need for deterrent measures
were true, for the reasons stated by the Sixth Circuit in
CSX, supra, No. 91-5689, slip op. at 47, BN’s argument
should properly be addressed to Congress, and not the
courts.
3. The Courts and commentators recognize that a
damage remedy here would be inappropriate,
because it would be destructive of the RLA dis-
pute resolution procedures and undermine its
policy objectives
Quite apart from whether there exists any basis for
Congress to consider creating a damage remedy, all the
courts and commentators on the RLA that have consid-
ered this issue, have concluded that to imply a damage
remedy in this context in fact would be destructive of the
Act’s procedures, and frustrate its ultimate policy ob-
jectives.” In language equally applicable to this case, the
Sixth Circuit in CSX stated:
By contrast, the concerns that weigh against such
a remedy are as present today as they ever were. In
the volatile atmosphere of labor-management rela-
*8 See discussion at “B. Statement of Facts, 1. Petitioner’s Mis-
statement of the Facts as Established in the Record,” supra, pp. 4-5.
29 See also, the discussion of the Ninth Circuit in Horizon Air,
supra, 979 F.2d at 551 regarding the similar policy reasons which
make inappropriate a monetary award of fees to a union for a
carrier’s violation of Section 2 First.
EEE
29
tions, the threat of a damages action could upset the
balance intended by the RLA.
The problem is particularly acute in a case such
as this where the union cannot know with certainty
at the time it calls a strike whether a court will later
decide that the dispute is minor or major. If dam-
ages were available, and the union guesved wrong, it
would be liable for damages that could deplete the
union treasury and impair its effectiveness as the
collective bargaining agent. Cf. Foust, 442 U.S. at
50-51. This threat of crushing financial loss allows
the carrier to keep the union “in line” and the em-
ployees off the picket line even in cases where the
dispute is later adjudged to be major. See National
Airlines, 431 F. Supp. at 54.
CSX, supra, No. 91-5689, slip op. at 46-47.
Contrary to BN’s factual assertions, which are unsup-
perted by the record or any findings of the courts below,
BMWE reasonably believed that this was a major dis-
pute over which it had a right to strike. At that time,
BMWE did not have the benefit of a court at its elbow
to evaluate and rule upon the propriety of its conclusion
that the dispute was major. As the court held in CSA,
if damages were available, a union would risk, in the
exercise of lawful self help, exposure to damages which
could bankrupt it, making it incapable of carrying out
its statutory duty of representing the employees under
the RLA. This would have a chilling effect on the exer-
cise of self-help in those circumstances when it has been
deemed lawful and necessary for the proper functioning
of the RLA over the past sixty-six years. See Shoreline,
supra, 396 U.S. at 154-55.
These policy concerns have also been recognized by
commentators on the RLA. In his Principles of Railroad
and Airline Labor Law, which was cited with approval
by the Fifth Circuit in the case below, BN v. BMWE,
supra, 961 F.2d at 89 fn. 15, Harry Lustgarten, after
noting that no case had ever allowed the recovery of such
damages, stated:
30
It appears unlikely, moreover, that the courts in the
future would be inclined to allow such damages in
4
view of the potential impact it might have on the
union’s ability to represent the employees.”
Accordingly, the Fifth and Sixth Cireuit decisions
holding a damage remedy inappropriate in these circum-
stances are based on sound policy reasons underlying the
RLA and which have become well-settled elements of the
RLA common law for over three decades. Thus, this
case «does not present a circumstance where writ of
certiorari should be granted under Supreme Court Rule
10.1(c) to resolve an important unsettled issue of federal
law.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the petition for writ of certioran
should be denied
*” Harry Lustgarten, Principles of Railroad and Airline Labor Law,
RALL Publications, p 157 L984 Blab yrating on the compelling
policy reasons against the creation of a damage remedy under the
RLA in these circumstances, Lustgarten states:
The very size of the potential damages arising from an un-
lawful strike tends to mitigate against allowing a carrier to
recover them from a union. Even for the relatively short period
required to obtain an injunction, the damages suffered by a rail
carrier would in most cases exceed the financial ability of the
union to pay. To allow a carrier to recover such damages,
therefore, could threaten the solvency and perhaps the very
continued existence of the union Since it is clearly the pol C\
of the Act to encourage and protect the right of a union to
represent the employees, from a public policy standpoint there
is little to justify an interpretation of the Act which would
permit a carrier, not only to promptly stop an unlawful strike
through injunctive action, but to alsa recover damages in an
amount which could threaten the ability of the union to con-
tinue to represent the employees.
Id. at 157
December 9, 1992
SANFORD R. DENISON
Counsel of Record
L.N.D. WELLS, JR.
SUSAN H. DURHAM
Cigna Tower, Suite 1202
600 E. Las Colinas Blvd.
Irving, TX 75039-5606
(214) 556-2999
WILLIAM BON
General Counsel
BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE
OF WAY EMPLOYES
26555 Evergreen Road, Suite 200
Southfield, Michigan 48076-4225
Counse l far Re sponde nts
Sections
la
APPENDIX
2 First, Sixth, and Seventh of the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 provide as follows:
First. Duty of carriers and employees to settle
disputes
It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers.
agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort
to make and maintain agreements concerning rates
of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle
all disputes, whether arising out of the application of
such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any
interruption to commerce or to the operation of any
other carrier growing out of any dispute between the
carrier and the employees thereof.
Sixth. Conference of representatives: time: place;
private agreements
In case of a dispute between a carrier or
carriers and its or their employees, arising out of
grievances or out of the interpretation or application
of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions, it shall be the duty of the desig-
nated representative or representatives of such car-
rier or carriers and of such employees, within ten
days after the receipt of notice of a desire on the
part of either party to confer in respect to such
dispute, to specify a time and place at which such
conference shall be held: Provided, (1) That the
place so specified shall be situated upon the line of
the carrier involved or as otherwise mutually agreed
upon; and (2) that the time so specified shall allow
the designated conferees reasonable opportunity to
reach such place of conference, but shall not exceed
twenty days from the receipt of such notice: And
provided further, That nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to supersede the provisions of any agree-
ment (as to conferences) then in effect between the
parties,
ana ant,
%-«
mC
Seventh. Change in pay, rules, or working condi-
tions contrary to agreement or to section
156 forbidden
No carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its
employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements
except in the manner prescribed in such agreements
or in section 156 of this title.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.