Opposition Brief — Yeager v. Camp

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- In The

Supreme Court of the United States

: October Term, 1992

S

WILLIAM N. YEAGER, JR. and

TIMBES & YEAGER, INC.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

BILLY JOE CAMP,

Respondent.

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The Supreme Court Of Alabima

¢

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

~j

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

py FR Ga 2 sy, s.r eee ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.................-. 1

STAT Ge Cae ee es Bikd kus ov exe b 0k s Ree 2

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION......... 6

28 wht 8 PP ee eee rer Te re re 14

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CAsEs:

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242 (1986)...10, 12

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)....7, 8

New York Times v. Sullivan, 374 U.S. 254 (1964)...... 11

St. Amant v. Thompson 390 U.S. 727 (1968)........ 12, 13

United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220 (1925).......... 6

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Roget's College Thesaurus, 481 (1985) ..............005. 7

Webster’s New World Dictionary Compact School and

Office Edition, S68 CIDRD) . .06sccsnnantunsdavnenssesas 7

wy

No. 92-585

«

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1992

*

WILLIAM N. YEAGER, JR. and

TIMBES & YEAGER, INC.,

Petitioners,

V.

BILLY JOE CAMP,

Respondent.

*

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The Supreme Court Of Alabama

“

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

*

Respondent, Billy Joe Camp, respectfully requests

that the Court deny the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

review the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama

rendered on July 2, 1992.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Honorable Court should not exercise jurisdic-

tion in this case because the Petitioner has not pro-

pounded an important question of federal law which

1

should be settled by this Court, nor has Petitioner pre-

sented to the Court a federal question that conflicts with

the decision of another state court of last resort or which

has been decided in a way that conflicts with applicable

decisions of this Court. Sup.Ct. R.10.1.

2

vv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner’s statement of the case is incomplete.

Respondent adopts the assertions of the Petitioner while

setting forth additional facts previously omitted.

From 1980 through 1982, Billy Joe Camp (hereinafter

“Camp”), was President of the Alabama Public Service

Commission. During that period, there were three rate

increases granted to Alabama Power Company. Camp, as

Commission president, voted against each and every rate

increase (R.57). All three rate increases were granted pur-

suant to orders entered by the Alabama Supreme Court

(R.57). Over three years after leaving the Public Service

Commission, Camp’s consulting firm entered into agree-

ments with Georgia Power Company, a separate entity, to

perform certain consulting work regarding economic

development, labor relations, public relations and regula-

tory affairs pertaining to nuclear generation (R.41-42).

In the Fall of 1990, Camp was a Democratic nominee

for the office of Secretary of State in Alabama. Perry

Hand was his opponent. William N. Yeager, Jr., Petitioner

(hereinafter “Yeager”), was the media consultant to the

Hand campaign (R.31). Jack Edwards, a former Republi-

can Congressman, was the chairman of the Hand cam-

paign. Edwards was also a member of the board of

directors for the Southern Company, the utility holding

company which includes both Alabama Power Company

and Georgia Power Company (Edwards’ depo. 13).

Yeager was completely responsible for creating the

political ad referred to as the Cemetery Ad. This ad aired

from October 2, 1990 until October 9, 1990, on all major

television stations in the State of Alabama. The text of the

Cemetery Ad as it aired is reproduced below:

[Perry Hand]: Since becoming Secretary of

State, I’ve been working to keep these folks

from voting.

[Voice over]: While Perry Hand’s been fight-

ing to clean up the voters list and curb election

fraud, what’s his opponent done?

When Billy Joe Camp was president of the

Public Service Commission, we got hit with

three rate increases. As a reward, Georgia

Power paid him over 700 thousand dollars in

consulting fees. A clear choice, Perry Hand, a

tough secretary of state who’s cracking down

on corrupt politics.

(R.35). Emphasis added.

Yeager asserts that the ad was based upon informa-

tion that had first appeared in Bill Shipp’s Georgia, an

Atlanta political newsletter (R.37). Similar information

was republished in an Associated Press report of the Mont-

gomery Advertiser (R.36). Neither of these two publica-

tions mentioned any rate increases that occurred during

Camp’s tenure on the Public Service Commission.

The text of the ad as aired was not the first draft.

Yeager had previously revised the ad after receiving

information from the Hand campaign that Camp was not

responsible for the rate increases (R.38). The previous text

of the Cemetery ad included the following language:

[Perry Hand]: Since becoming Secretary of

State, I’ve been working to keep these folks

from voting.

[Voice over]: While Perry Hand’s been fight-

ing to clean up the voters list and curb election

fraud, what’s his opponent done?

As president of the Public Service Commis-

sion, Billy Joe Camp hit us with three rate

increases. As a reward, Georgia Power paid him

over 700 thousand dollars in consulting fees. A

clear choice, Perry Hand, a tough secretary of

state who’s cracking down on corrupt politics.

(Yeager depo. Ex. 8). Emphasis added.

Thus, at the time of the revision, Yeager was aware

that Camp was not responsible for the rate increases, but

rather the increases were the result of orders of the Ala-

bama Supreme Court (R.38). This demonstrates that the

ad, implying Camp was rewarded for the rate increases

with consulting contracts, was known to be false by

Yeager. Additionally, before the ad was aired, a facsimile

copy of the script for the ad was sent to Jack Edwards, the

Hand campaign chairman. Edwards, a member of the

board of directors of the Southern Company, told Yeager

that he felt “very uncomfortable with the commercial,

and I urged him not to use it.” (Edwards’ depo. 35).

Edwards told Yeager that he knew of nothing personally

which was illegal or improper in the relationship between

Georgia Power and Mr. Camp (Edwards’ depo. 35). What

made Edwards uncomfortable about the ad was that the

a Gaus Bae ee

language chosen “suggests some impropriety.” (Edwards’

depo. 63). Edwards requested that his name not be used

in connection with this ad (Edwards’ depo. 39).

Furthermore, candidate Hand also had a discussion

with Yeager, prior to the airing of this ad, with respect to

reservations Hand had concerning the language used in

the ad. Hand voiced his concern to Yeager that the words

“as a reward” could be misinterpreted to mean that Camp

had done something illegal or improper (Hand depo. 50).

Yeager likewise led Hand to believe that Jack Edwards,

the campaign chairman, had approved this ad (Hand

depo. 56).

At the time the ad aired Hand was trailing widely in

the polls. Yeager acknowledges that Edwards urged him

not to run the ad, but Yeager was of the view that this

was “the best ad that we could produce at that time to try

to help our candidate win the election, move the

numbers.” (Yeager depo. 67). Yeager agrees that there

was a negative connotation intended for the Camp ad,

and that this connotation would affect Camp’s reputation

(Yeager depo. 62).

On October 3, 1990, the day after the ad first

appeared on state wide television, The Huntsville Times

ran a newspaper article entitled, “Hand Accuses Camp of

Taking 770 Thousand For Utility Rate Hikes.” (Yeager

depo. Ex. 11).

A certified letter was sent to Yeager on October 16,

1990, demanding a retraction of the ad (Yeager depo. 81).

No such retraction has ever been issued by Yeager.

On November 6, 1990, Camp instituted this libel

action against Yeager and other Defendants. On October

4, 1991, the trial court granted Summary Judgment on

behalf of Petitioner Yeager. Camp appealed the granting

of Summary Judgment to the Alabama Supreme Court.

On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the

lower court’s Summary Judgment and remanded the case

for trial in its Order of July 2, 1992. The Petition for Writ

of Certiorari followed.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

There is no special or important reason for this Court

to entertain this petition for writ of certiorari. The Ala-

bama Supreme Court has reversed an entry of summary

judgment, on an issue which involves a federal question,

but not in a way that conflicts with the decision of

another state court of last resort or of a United States

Court of Appeals, nor does the decision conflict with

applicable decisions of this Court.

I. THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT’S HOLDING IS

CONSISTENT WITH THE PRIOR DECISIONS OF

THIS COURT.

The Alabama Supreme Court below correctly applied

the standards imposed by this Court in its decisions

interpreting the First Amendment. Petitioner merely dis-

agrees with result reached by the Alabama Court, not

with the standard of review utilized. This Court has

historically not granted certiorari to review evidence and

discuss specific facts. United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S.

220 (1925). The Petitioner in this case merely seeks an

additional review of the evidence on the issue of actual

malice. Such a request does not meet this Court’s stan-

dards concerning certiorari.

The Petitioner alleges that the Alabama Court’s rul-

ing below is in conflict with this Court’s holding in

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1(1990). The asser-

tion is made that the Cemetery Ad is not sufficiently

factual such that it is susceptible of being proven true or

false. This claim is meritless and ignores the lower court’s

ruling below. It likewise ignores the plain meaning of the

words carefully chosen by Yeager, the professional media

consultant.

In Webster’s New World Dictionary Compact School and

Office Edition, 368 (1989), the word reward is defined as

“something given in return for something done.” In

Roget's College Thesaurus, 481 (1985), common synonyms

for the word “reward” include terms such as “recom-

pense”, “compensation”, “payment” and “payoff”. If one

substitutes the synonym “payoff” for the word “reward”

in the Cemetery Ad, the applicable text now reads:

When Billy Joe Camp was president of the

Public Service Commission, we got hit with

three rate increases. As a payoff, Georgia

Power paid him over 700 thousand dollars in

consulting fees.

Thus, the plain meaning of this ad is inescapable. It

implies that Camp received the consulting fees as com-

pensation or a payoff for the rate increases. This is pre-

cisely what the Alabama Court below held in its ruling

that the ad’s plain meaning would be understood as

imputing corrupt conduct to Camp (A-6). Certainly an

implication that Camp had engaged in criminal or cor-

rupt conduct is an event that is sufficiently factual as to

be objectively verifiable. Such conduct is verifiable as it is

done with regularity in criminal cases charging public

officials with bribery.

The Alabama Court's holding is consistent with this

Court’s holding in Milkovich and its analysis of this issue

as concerns the effect of a statement upon the recipient.

This Court stated:

The dispositive question in the present

case then becomes whether or not a reasonable

factfinder could conclude that the statements

in the Diadiun column imply an assertion that

Petitioner Milkovich perjured himself in a

judicial proceeding. We think this question

must be answered in the affirmative ... .

We also think the connotation that Peti-

tioner committed perjury is sufficiently factual

to be susceptible of being proved true or false.

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695,

2707 (1990).

The facts in this case are directly in accord with

Milkovich. Here the viewer of the Cemetery Ad could

reasonably conclude that the statements imply that Camp

was guilty of criminal conduct, namely bribery. This con-

notation that Camp is guilty of bribery is analogous to the

connotation that the Petitioner in Milkovich was guilty of

perjury.

Yeager simply attempts to retreat from his own care-

fully chosen words, “as a reward,” suggesting now that

he was implying only that Camp was rewarded for his

“service” on the Public Service Commission. If that had

been the true implication, it would not have been neces-

sary to mention the rate increases. Likewise, his revision

of the ad further suggests that Yeager intended to link the

later consulting contracts to the earlier rate increases.

Yeager also asserts in his Petition that “no reasonable

viewer could have concluded that ‘as a reward’ implied a

prior agreement to employ Camp in’ exchange for rate

increases and, hence, signal bribery or corruption (Peti-

tion 6-7)”. Yeager’s assertion is meritless. The Alabama

Court below disagreed and for good reason. Jack

Edwards specifically urged Yeager not to run this ad

because it “suggested some impropriety to him”

(Edwards depo. 63). Clearly if the script of the ad implied

this to the chairman of the Hand campaign, it would have

a similar impact on an ordinary viewer. Likewise, a simi-

lar concern was voiced by candidate Hand, who cau-

tioned Yeager about a possible misinterpretation of the

ad. (Hand depo. 50). Additionally, on the day after the ad

was aired, an Alabama newspaper, The Huntsville Times,

ran a story with the headline reading “Hand Accuses

Camp of Taking 770 Thousand Dollars For Utility Hikes.”

(Yeager depo. Ex. 11). Thus, there was clear and convinc-

ing evidence that the ad would be interpreted by a rea-

sonable viewer as implying corruption. This is in accord

with the Alabama Court’s ruling below (A-6).

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10

Il. THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY

APPLIED THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVI-

DENCE STANDARD ON THE ISSUE OF ACTUAL

MALICE.

The writ should not issue in this case because the

Alabama Supreme Court has correctly applied the stan-

dard of review as espoused by this Court in its decision

in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).

Anderson, like the case at bar, involved the standard of

review in a defamation case at the summary judgment

level. This Court held:

In sum, we conclude that the determination of

whether a given factual dispute requires sub-

mission to a jury must be guided by the sub-

stantive evidentiary standards that apply to

case. This is true at both a directed verdict and

summary judgment stages. Consequently,

where the New York Times “clear and convinc-

ing” evidence requirement applies, the trial

judge’s summary judgment inquiry as to

whether a genuine issue exists will be whether

the evidence presented is such that a jury

applying that evidentiary standard could rea-

sonably find for either the plaintiff or the

defendant. Thus, where the factual dispute

concerns actual malice, clearly a material issue

in a New York Times case, the appropriate sum-

mary judgment question will be whether the

evidence in the record could support a reason-

able jury finding either that the Plaintiff has

shown actual malice by clear and convincing

evidence or that the plaintiff has not.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 255, 256 (1986).

11

This is precisely the test as enumerated by the Ala-

bama Supreme Court below. The Alabama Court noted

that the First Amendment requires that an alleged defam-

atory statement concerning a public official must be made

with actual malice. Actual malice, as defined by this

Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),

means the statement was made with “knowledge that it

was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was

false or not.”

The court below appealed the evidentiary standard

on the issue of actual malice as follows:

We have looked at the evidence in the record,

viewing the evidence in the light most favor-

able to the non-movant, Camp, and allowing

all reasonable inferences from that evidence,

to determine whether the trial court correctly

found that Yeager and Timbes & Yeager, Inc.

were entitled to a summary judgment based on

the issue of actual malice. ...

We have assessed the trial judge’s view at

the above matter within the framework of the

“clear and convincing” standard. We are now

compelled to conclude that the trial judge

erred when he granted Yeager and Timbes &

Yeager’s Motion for Summary judgment.

We are satisfied that Camp has presented

evidence, that, if believed by a jury, would be

sufficient to support a ing, by clear and

convincing evidence, that Yeager knew that the

statement, as understood, was false. (A-6).

The Petitioner does not argue that the Alabama

Supreme Court failed to use the New York Times v. Sullivan

standard on the issue of actual malice. Likewise, the

12

Petitioner does not argue that the court employed an

inappropriate test for the sufficiency of the evidence as

espoused in Anderson. Rather, the Petitioner merely sug-

gests that the court reached the wrong result while

employing the proper constitutional standards of review.

Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari for the purpose of

having this Court re-examine the record and reach a

different result. Certiorarf is an inappropriate vehicle for

such a factual review. There has been no verdict entered

in this case, only a reinstatement of a state law defama-

tion action. No constitutional error has occurred to date.

Yeager seeks to insulate himself from an action for

defamation based solely upon his “honest belief” that the

ad which he created was true. This Court has rejected the

notion that the inquiry ends based on the self-serving

statement of the Defendant. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390

U.S. 727 (1968), this Court noted:

The defendant in a defamation action

brought by a public official cannot, however,

automatically insure a favorable verdict by tes-

tifying that he published with a belief that the

statements were true. The finder of fact must

determine whether the publication was indeed

made in good faith. Professions of good faith

will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for exam-

ple, where a story is fabricated by the defen-

dant, is the product of his imagination, or is

based wholly on an unverified anonymous

telephone call. Nor will they be likely to pre-

vail when the publisher’s allegations are so

inherently improbable that only a reckless

man would have put them in circulation. Like-

wise, recklessness may be found where there

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13

are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of

the informant or the accuracy of his reports.

St. Amant, Supra 732. ;

Here the Court below has held that there were

obvious reasons for Yeager to doubt the truth of this ad.

Yeager had received documents from the Hand campaign

which indicated that the Alabama Supreme Court, and

not Camp, was responsible for the rate increases. Addi-

tionally, Yeager was warned by Edwards that there was

no impropriety concerning the consulting contracts and

Edwards urged Yeager not to run the Cemetery Ad.

Yeager likewise ignored warnings from Hand.

The Alabama Supreme Court has not ruled as a mat-

ter of law that Yeager was guilty of actual malice in

creating and publishing the Cemetery Ad. Rather, the

court has only held that the Plaintiff has put forth clear

and convincing evidence which, if believed by a jury,

would warrant a verdict against Yeager for defamation

(A-6). The court has simply held that a jury issue has

been presented. There is no constitutional error in the

lower court’s decision construing the record in this case.

+

14

CONCLUSION

The Petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

The Petitioner simply does not raise a federal question

appropriate for review by this Court.

Respectfully submitted,

TED TAYLOR

TayYLor & ROBERSON

2112 First Avenue North ;

Birmingham, Alabama 35203 |

(205) 323-3300

Attorney for Respondent

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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