Supplemental Appendix — Hudson Insurance v. American Electric Corp.

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1992

S

HUDSON INSURANCE COMPANY,

a Delaware corporation,

Petitioner,

VS.

AMERICAN ELECTRIC CORP., a Fiorida

corporation, AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION CORP., a Florida corporation,

AMELCO INVESTMENT CORP., a Florida corporation,

EASTERN ELECTRIC CORP., INC., a Florida

corporation, DON L. TULLIS AND ASSOCIATES, INC.,

a Florida corporation, and GREEN RIVER STEEL CORP.,

a Delaware corporation,

Respondents.

.

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Eleventh Circuit

€

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

*

JONATHAN L. Apert, Esquire

Florida Bar No. 121970

Apert, Josey & Gritul, P.A.

Post Office Box 3270

Tampa, Florida 33601-3270

813/223-4131

Counsel of Record

for the Petitioner

-

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

|

“~ -*,

a ot

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Order on Petition for Rehearing, United States

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, No.

Pe EOE sa nnn cked ess Serb eekeeekebers

Hudson Insurance Company v. American Electric Cor-

poration, United States Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit, No. 90-4033, April 3, 1992.......

Hudson Insurance Company v. American Electric Cor-

poration, United States District Court Middle

District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, No.

89-869-CIV-J-12, October 12, 1990 ........ ide th te

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 90-4033

HUDSON INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

AMERICAN ELECTRIC CORPORATION,

a Florida corporation, AMERICAN

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CORP.,

a Florida corporation, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

ON PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING AND SUGGES-

TION(S) OF REHEARING EN BANC

(Filed May 28, 1992)

Before: BIRCH, Circuit Judge, TUTTLE, Senior Circuit

Judge, and FULLAM*, Senior District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

( X ) The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no

member of this panel nor other Judge in regular active

service on the Court having requested that the Court be

* Honorable John P. Fullam, Senior U.S. District Judge for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

Nm

polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-5), the

Suggestion(s) of Rehearing En Banc are DENIED.

) The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and the

Court having been polled at the request of one of the

members of the Court and a majority of the Circuit

Judges who are in regular active service not having voted

in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Pro-

cedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-5), the Suggestion(s) of

Rehearing En Banc are also DENIED.

( ) A member of the Court in active service having

requested a poll on the reconsideration of this cause en

banc, and a majority of the judges in active service not

having voted in favor of it, Rehearing En Banc is

DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

/S/

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

HUDSON INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

AMERICAN ELECTRIC CORPORATION, a Florida cor-

poration, American Environmental Protection Corp., a

Florida corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 90-4033.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

April 3, 1992.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida.

Before BIRCH, Circuit Judge, TUTTLE, Senior Circuit

Judge, and FULLAM*, Senior District Judge.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

This case involves an insurance coverage dispute.

Defendant Green River Steel Corporation (“Green River”)

is allegedly an additional named insured on the compre-

hensive general liability insurance policy issued by plain-

tiff Hudson Insurance Company (“Hudson”) to defendant

American Electric Corporation (“AEC”). In 1982, Green

River hired AEC to remove and properly dispose of

Green River’s transformers which had been contaminated

by polychlorinated biphenyl (commonly known as PCB).

AEC’s deficient handling and disposal practices

* Honorabie John P. Fullam, Senior U.S. District Judge for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

prompted a response by the federal Environmental Pro-

tection Agency (“EPA”).

In 1989, the EPA informed Green River that pursuant

to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-

sation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675

(1988) (“CLERCLA”), Green River was potentially

responsible for the costs incurred by the EPA in cleaning

up the hazardous substances found at AEC’s disposal

site. In turn, Green River informed Hudson that if it was

liable for cleanup costs to the EPA, it would seek pay-

ment for that liability under AEC’s insurance policy.

Hudson subsequently filed this federal lawsuit, seeking a

declaratory judgment that its insurance policy in favor of

AEC does not provide coverage for CERCLA-imposed

pollution liability.

In a comprehensive and studied opinion, the United

States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

See Hudson Ins. Co. v. American Elec. Corp., 748 F.Supp. 837

(M.D. Fla.1990). Because the parties in this action lack

complete diversity, the district court reasoned that it had

jurisdiction over the dispute only if the underlying cause

of action arose under federal law within the meaning of

the federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331

(1988). Finding that “the underlying action is a suit for

the proceeds of an insurance policy” and that “[this] kind

of action is usually a matter of state law, not a federal

question,” Hudson Ins. Co., 748 F. Supp. at 840, the court

concluded that Section 1331 did not empower it to hear

the case. Id. at 845. We AFFIRM.

Wen i a a capac

I. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1331 Does Not Grant Jurisdiction Because

The Underlying Action Arises Under State Law

In order to determine whether a claim arises under

federal law within the meaning of Section 1331, a court

must ascertain if a federal cause of action would appear

on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. See, e.g.,

Louis lle and Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152,

29 S.Ct. 42, 43, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908). Because this is an

action pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28

U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1988), the normal position of the

parties is reversed; therefore, we do not look to the face

of the declaratory judgment complaint in order to deter-

mine the presence of a federal question. Instead, this

court must determine whether or not the cause of action

anticipated by the declaratory judgment plaintiff arises

under federal law. See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petro-

leum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72, 70 S.Ct. 876, 879, 94 L.Ed.

1194 (1950). “Where the complaint in an action for declar-

atory judgment seeks in essence to assert a defense to an

impending or threatened state court action, it is the char-

acter of the threatened action, and not of the defense,

which will determine whether there is federal question

jurisdiction in the District Court. If the cause of action,

which the declaratory defendant threatens to assert, does

not itself involve a claim under federal law, it is doubtful

if a federal court may entertain an action for a declaratory

judgment establishing a defense to that claim.” Public

Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248, 73 S.Ct. 236,

242, 97 L.Ed. 291 (1952).

Here, it is obvious that the cause of action threatened

by the declaratory defendant (Green River) and antici-

pated by the declaratory plaintiff (Hudson) arises under

state law. “A suit arises under the law that creates the

cause of action.” American Well Works Co. v. Layne and

Rowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260, 36 S.Ct. 585, 586, 60 L.Ed.

987 (1916). A suit to recover insurance proceeds is created

by state law.! Essentially, Green River has a potential

state cause of action against Hudson based upon the

applicable state law governing the interpretation of insur-

ance contracts. The federal CERCLA issues pressed by

Hudson in its declaratory judgment complaint are mere

potential defenses to Green River’s state-created cause of

action. These possible federal defenses are insufficient to

confer jurisdiction under Section 1331. See, e.g., Public

Serv. Comm'n, 344 U.S. at 248, 73 S.Ct. at 242-43; Skelly Oil,

339 US. at 672, 70 S.Ct. at 879. Because the underlying

insurance dispute in this case arises under state law, the

district court correctly dismissed the case for want of

subject matter jurisdiction.’

1 Hudson correctly observes that federal law (CERCLA)

creates the liability for which Green River might seek reimbur-

sement. This fact does not matter. A suit does not arise under

the law that creates the /iability; rather, a suit arises under the

law that creates the cause of action. In this case, that law is state

law.

2 It is true that some provisions of CERCLA have been

construed as creating federal causes of action. E.g., 42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(a) (1988); Id. § 9613(f)(1). In addition, at least one

CERCLA-created federal cause of action could conceivably

involve an insurance company. See id. § 9608(c)(2). Even so,

Hudson’s suggestion that these potential federal causes of

action create federal subject matter jurisdiction in this particular

B. The Unusual Circumstances Under Which A State

Cause Of Action Would Nevertheless Arise Under

Federal Law Are Not Present

There are three situations in which a state cause of

action might nevertheless arise under federal law. First,

when a prospective plaintiff's right to state-created relief

necessarily requires an interpretation of a substantial fed-

eral issue, his claim for such relief might arise under

federal law within the meaning of Section 1331. Second, if

a prospective plaintiff's right to state-created relief is

paralleled by a substantially similar federal cause of

action with sufficient preemptive force, her claim for such

relief might also arise under federal law within the mean-

ing of Section 1331. Finally, regardless of Section 1331,

Congress may be able to provide (in a separate jurisdic-

tional statute) that certain state causes of action are nev-

ertheless cognizable in federal court. None of these three

theories grant subject matter jurisdiction in this case.

suit must be rejected. These potential federal causes of action

are neither anticipated by Hudson’s declaratory judgment com-

plaint nor threatened by Green River. The only cause of action

anticipated and threatened in this case is Green River’s cause of

action for the recovery of insurance proceeds. Quite simply, if

Green River wanted to sue Hudson to collect upon AEC’s insur-

ance policy, it would be required to sue pursuant to state con-

tract law, not pursuant to Section 9607(a). Section 9613(f)(1).

Section 9608(c)(2), or any other provision of CERCLA. There-

fore, the underlying cause of action in this case arises under

state law, not CERCLA.

1. State causes of action which turn upon fed-

eral law.

The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 1331 such

that a cause of action need not necessarily be created by

federal law in order to arise under federal law. Instead,

state-created causes of action can sometimes arise under

federal law when the potential state court plaintiff's

“right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a

substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. v.

Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 28, 103

S Ct. 2841, 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983); see also id. at 9, 103

S Ct. at 2846; Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson,

478 US. 804, 808-09, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 3232-33, 92 L.Ed.2d

650 (1986). Hudson argues that this principle grants Sec-

tion 1331 jurisdiction in this case. In essence, Hudson

asserts that the central issue in Green River's potential

lawsuit — whether the language of AEC’s insurance policy

provides coverage for CERCLA-created pollution liability

_ must necessarily be determined by reference to federal

law. Therefore, Hudson contends even if the underlying

insurance action in this case arises under state law, Sec-

tion 1331 would nevertheless grant jurisdiction because

Green River’s right to recover upon AEC’s insurance

policy would necessarily turn upon substantial questions

of federal law.

Hudson’s contention that federal law governs the

insurance issues in this case is foreclosed by two prior

panel decisions of this circuit. In Claussen v. Aetna Casu-

alty & Surety Co., 865 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir.1989) (per cur-

iam), the panel clearly indicated that these insurance

issues — in particular, whether or not a comprehensive

general liability policy covers CERCLA-created liability -

must be resolved by reference to state law. See id. at

1218-19; see also id. at 1217 (observing that the interpreta-

tion of an insurance contract provision is “peculiarly a

question of state law”). Because the relevant state law in

Claussen was unclear, we certified the question to the

Georgia Supreme Court. See id, at 1217, 1219-20. Subse-

quently, in Industrial Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Crown

Auto Dealerships, Inc., 935 F.2d 240 (11th Cir.1991), we

determined that a similar dispute involving insurance

coverage of CERCLA-created liability raised an unre-

solved “important issue of Florida law” and accordingly

certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court. /d. at

241, 243. These two decisions defeat Hudson’s argument

the Green River’s potential insurance action would neces-

sarily require tne resolution of substantial questions of

federal law. Fairly read, Claussen and Industrial Indemnity

instruct that the underlying action in this dispute would

* Hudson’s arguments to the effect that the insurance cov-

erage issues in this case should turn upon federal law are not

completely without merit. However, as a panel of this circuit we

are bound by Claussen and Industrial Indemnity until those deci-

sions are overruled by an en banc court. See United States v.

Machado, 804 F.2d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir.1986). Accordingly, Hud-

son’s claim that a uniform federal rule of decision should gov-

ern cases of this type is more appropriately addressed in a

motion for rehearing en banc. We express no opinion on the

question of whether the development of a federal common law

in this area would be sufficient to establish Section 1331 juris-

diction.

10

turn upon state law.+ Therefore, there is no subject matter

jurisdiction under this theory of Section 1331.

2. Preemption by a parallel federal cause of

action.

A potential state court plaintiff could not defeat fed-

eral subject matter jurisdiction solely by pleading his

state cause of action without reference to a sufficiently

preemptive parallel federal cause of action. See Avco Corp.

Aero Lodge No. 735, 376 F.2d 337, 340 (6th Cir.1967), affd,

390 U.S. 557, 560, 88 S.Ct. 1235, 1237, 20 L.Ed.2d 126

(1968). For example, Avco Corp. has come to stand for the

proposition that a state court litigant cannot defeat Sec-

tion 1331 jurisdiction over actions arising under Section

301 of the Labor Management Relations Act because “the

preemptive-ferce of [Section] 301 is so powerful as to

lisplace entirely any state cause of action. ...” Franchise

Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23, 103 S.Ct. at 2853. Therefore, the

Avco Corp. Court ruled that the plaintiff’s cause of action

based solely upon state contract law nevertheless arose

under federal law (and was therefore removable by the

defendant). See Avco Corp., 376 F.2d at 340. Hudson

argues that this theory of Section 1331 confers jurisdiction

4 Hudson correctly observes that whether or not CERCLA

completely preempts state insurance causes of action in this

area would be determined by reference to federal law, not state

law. However, this federal issue can arise in the underlying

action only as a potential defense to Green River’s threatened

state claim for the recovery of insurance proceeds. Therefore,

the presence of this possible federa’ defense is insufficient to

create Section 1331 jurisdiction. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd., 463

U.S. at 13-14, 103 S.Ct. at 2848.

1]

in this case because CERCLA is so pervasive that if Green

River brought a state law insurance action, such a suit

would be completely preempted by CERCLA and there-

fore arisen under federal law.

Hudson’s reliance upon this theory of Section 1331 is

misplaced. This aspect of Section 1331 confers federal

jurisdiction over admittedly state-created causes of action

only when there is a sufficiently preemptive parallel fed-

eral Cause of action that the state court litigant could have

brought. In this case, Green River would be required to

bring a state cause of action in order to sue Hudson on

AEC’s contract; there is no parallel federal cause of action

for the recovery of insurance proceeds for CERCLA-created

liability. See supra note 2, Therefore, because Green

River’s potential state cause of action against Hudson has

no preemption parallel federal counterpart, Section 1331

does not confer federal jurisdiction over that state suit.

See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 26, 103 S.Ct. at 2855.5

3. Jurisdiction statutes other than Section 1331.

Because Article III of the Constitution provides the

judiciary with the constitutional power to receive juris-

diction broader than that conferred by Section 1331, see

> In fact, there is some evidence that CERCLA anticipated

that state court suits would be brought in order to collect insur-

ance proceeds for CERCLA-created liability. See, Se. 42 VS.C.

§ 9607(c)(1) (1988) (providing that CERCLA does not “bar any

agreement to insure, hold harmless or indemnify a party to such

agreement for any liability under this-section”); id § 9672(a)

(stating that the insurance subchapter of CERCLA should not be

construed so as to affect the “law governing the interpretation

of insurance contracts of any State”).

12

Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 495, 103

S.Ct. 1962, 1972, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983), Congress might be able

to grant the jurisdiction to hear state-created causes of action

even when those causes of action failed to arise under

federal law within the meaning of Section 1331. See Franchise

Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. at 2846 n. 8. Hudson

contends that the jurisdiction provision contained with

CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (1988), expresses a congres-

sional desire to go beyond Section 1331 in order to grant

federal courts-the jurisdiction to hear cases such as Green

River’s potential insurance suit against Hudson, even though

these potential suits are state-created.

Hudson’s argument is interesting. Congress may indeed

have the constitutional ability to empower federal courts to

hear these state-created insurance claims. However, Hud-

son’s argument is belied by the explicit language of

CERCLA’s jurisdictional provision: “district courts shall have

exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies arising

under this chapter, without regard to the citizenship of the

parties or the amount in controversy.” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b)

(1988) (emphasis added). As we have repeatedly mentioned,

the underlying insurance dispute in this case arises under

state law, not CERCLA. See supra notes 1-2 and accompany-

ing test. Therefore, the language of CERCLA’s jurisdictional

provision does not independently grant subject matter juris-

diction over state-created insurance causes- of action which

may implicate CERCLA.

Il. CONCLUSION

The district court correctly concluded that it lacked sub-

ject matter jurisdiction over this dispute. AFFIRMED.

13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

HUDSON INSURANCE

COMPANY, etc.,

Plaintiff,

VS. Case No. 89-869-Civ-J-12

AMERICAN ELECTRIC

CORPORATION,

etc. et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

This cause is before the Court on several motions.

Plaintiff submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment,

filed herein on April 11, 1990. Defendant Don L. Tullis

and Associates, Inc. subsequently moved, on April 23,

1990, to adopt that motion. Defendant Green River Steel

Corporation responded with a memorandum in opposi-

tion to the motion and a Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings, both filed herein on May 15, 1990. Plaintiff

responded with a memorandum in opposition to that

motion, filed herein on June 1, 1990. By leave of the

Court, reply memoranda also have been filed.

A central issue raised in opposition to the summary

judgment motion, and the basis for the motion for judg-

ment on the pleadings, is this Court’s jurisdiction. The

Court is obligated to resolve this issue as a threshold

matter. See Insurance Company of Ireland v. Compagnie des

Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). “[I]f a party

14

raises an issue of subject matter jurisdiction on his motion

for a judgment on the pleadings, the court will treat the

motion as if it had been brought under Rule 12(b)(1).” 5A

C WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 1367, at 516 (2d ed. 1990). Because the

Court concludes that jurisdiction.is lacking, this case will

be dismissed.

Plaintiff Hudson Insurance Company (“Hudson”)

filed suit, alleging jurisdiction pursuant to the Declara-

tory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the Comprehen-

sive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability

Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq., to

obtain a declaration that it is not liable to defendants, in

particular defendant Green River Steel Corporation

(“Green River”), for response and recovery costs incurred

by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) for the

clean-up of polychlorinated biphenyl (“PCB”) contami-

nated transformers. Green River contracted with defen-

dant American Electric Corporation (“AEC”) for handling

and disposal of PCB transformers. AEC’s handling and

disposal practices at a facility situated at 523 Ellis Road,

Jacksonville, Florida, eventuated the EPA’s response

activities.

Hudson provided insurance to AEC. When EPA

informed Green River that it might be liable to pay for the

expenses incurred in the PCB disposal and site clean-up,

Green River in turn informed Hudson that if liable it

would seek payment from Hudson on AEC’s insurance

policy. Hudson subsequently filed this action. In the com-

plaint, Hudson prays for the Court's declaration on two

issues. First, Hudson seeks a declaration that it is not a

- 15

“potentially liable party” under CERCLA. Second, Hud-

son asks for a declaration that the insurance policy upon

which Green River made its demand does not provide

coverage for the CERCLA response and recovery costs.

Green River affirmatively asserted in its answer that

the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, at

the preliminary pretrial conference defendants’ attorneys

stated there is no dispute over the “potentially liable

party” issue because no defendant has ever contended

that Hudson fits the statutory definition of a potentially

liable party. In its Memorandum of Law in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment, at 4 n.7, Hudson con-

cedes, “[nJeither EPA nor any Defendant has made claim

for reimbursement or contribution from HUDSON as a

[potentially liable party].”

The Court will not consider the “potentially liable

party” issue on the matter of jurisdiction. Hudson’s con-

cession must be read as an admission that no justiciable

controversy existed concerning that issue. Cf. Wendy’s

Int’l Inc. v. City of Birmingham, 868 F.2d 433, 436 (11th Cir.

1989). Subject matter jurisdiction in this case is measured

exclusively by the presence or absence of a federal ques-

tion in the insurance coverage issue.

The first step in evaluating jurisdiction in this declar-

atory judgment action is to untangle the procedural pos-

ture of the case. See Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v.

Transamerica-Occidental Life Ins. Co., 850 F.2d 1489, 1491

(1ith Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1534 (1989). The

declaratory judgment device allows Hudson to anticipate

an action or actions against it and preemptively strike by

16

obtaining a ruling on dispositive legal issues. The Declar-

atory Judgment Act, however, does not confer jurisdic-

tion on this action. See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips

Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950). Rather, the Court

must reconstruct the underlying action and evaluate the

jurisdiction issue in that instance.

The reconstructed action must respect the well-

pleaded complaint rule. Under this rule, as applied in the

process of reconstruction, the Court determines whether

a claim “arises under” federal law from what necessarily

would appear in the statement of claim that would be set

forth in the anticipated action; a defense to the antici-

pated action that raises a federal question is insufficient

to confer federal jurisdiction. See Public Serv. Comm'n of

Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952) (“if the cause

of action, which the declaratory defendant threatens to

assert, does not itself involve a claim under federal law, it

is doubtful if a federal court may entertain an action for

declaratory judgment establishing a defense to that

claim.”); see also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers

Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 16, 19 n.19 (1983) (jurisdiction

lacking when federal question is element of defense

only). An independent corollary to the well-pleaded com-

plaint rule, the “complete preemption” doctrine, appears

to be at issue here. This doctrine holds that some statutes

have a preemptive force so extraordinary that it “converts

an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating

a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded com-

plaint rule.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor 481 U.S. 58,

65 (1987). “Once an area of state law has been completely

pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-

empted state law is considered, from its inception, a

17 .

federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.”

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987).

Hudson’s concern in filing this suit was the potential

liability for payment under AEC’s insurance policy that

Green River might assert. Indeed, Green River counter-

claimed in this action, contingent on a finding of subject

matter jurisdiction for Hudson’s action, for declaratory

relief in its favor on the matter of insurance coverage and

for attorney fees and costs pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 627.428.

Simply put, the underlying action is a suit for the pro-

ceeds of an insurance policy. That kind of action is usu-

ally a matter of state law, not a federal question.

Hudson is not without theories that suggest the exis-

tence of federal question jurisdiction. Two principle argu-

ments emerge in Hudson’s response to the motion for

judgment on the pleadings. One, federal law must be

consulted to determine whether an insurance policy falls

within the savings clause portion of 42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(e)(1). Therefore, a federal question is presented in

the form of the interpretation of CERCLA, construction of

its provisions and their application to insurance policies.

Within this argument Hudson proposes that CERCLA

completely preempts state law on the issue of liability

under an insurance policy. Two, Hudson relies upon the

grant of original exclusive jurisdiction to the district

court for all controversies “arising under” CERCLA.

While Hudson does not fully draw the contours of this

argument, the Court infers an allusion to the “complete

preemption” doctrine stemming from the preemption

arguments Hudson presses in the first theory.

18

Hudson concedes that its theories are novel. In its

review of the case law, Hudson notes,

In the nearly ten years since the adoption of

CERCLA, both state and federal courts have

been asked to apply state common law princi-

ples to construe insurance policies, such as

[commercial umbrella liability] policies, in

regard to CERLA coverage. However, the funda-

mental analysis has been overlooked: was the

policy an agreement to insure CERCLA liability

under federal law?

Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary

Judgment, at 8. The federal cases bear out Hudson's

observation, as they uniformly predicate jurisdiction on

the diversity of the parties’ citizenship and apply state

law.! Moreover, a legion of state court decisions stand in

1 See FL Aerospace v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 897 F.2d 214, 217

(6th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. Aug.

15, 1990) (No. 90-289); Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 865 F.2d

1217, 1219, further proceedings, 888 F.2d 747 (11th Cir. 1989);

Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 887 F.2d 1200,

1202 (2d Cir. 1989), reh’g denied, 894 F.2d 498 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 110 S.Ct. 2588 (1990); City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard

Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146, 1147 (2d Cir. 1989); Maryland Cas. Co. v.

Armco, 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987) (aff’g 643 F.Supp. 430, 431

(D.Md. 1986)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988); Mraz v. Canadian

Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1326-27 (4th Cir. 1986); A.

Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 741 F. Supp. 298, 299 (D.

Mass. 1990); Industrial Indemn. Ins. Co. v. Crown Auto Dealerships,

Inc., 731 F. Supp. 1517 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (pretrial stipulation filed

Feb. 28, 1990, relies on diversity as jurisdictional basis), appeal

filed, Dkt. No. 90-3359 (11th Cir. Apri! 17, 1990); Federal Ins. Co. v.

Susquehanna Broadcasting Co., 727 F. Supp. 169, 170 (M.D. Pa.

1989), reconsidered in part, 738 F. Supp. 896 (M.D. Pa. 1990); U.S.

Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139,

> 19

contradiction to Hudson’s theory of exclusive federal

jurisdiction.2 Finally, informed commentary on

1164 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O

Corp., 685 F. Supp. 621, 623 (E.D. Mich. 1987), further proceedings,

702 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1988), reconsideration denied, 720 F.

Supp. 597 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc. v.

Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438, 455 (N.D. Ohio 1987),

reconsideration denied, __ F. Supp. __, 1990 W.L. 132694 (N.D.

Ohio Apr. 12, 1990); Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity &

Guaranty Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541, 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1987); National

Grange Mutual Insurance Co. v. Continental Cas. Ins. Co., 650 F.

Supp. 1404, 1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); but see Cincinnati Ins. Co. v.

Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1988) (jurisdictional basis

not stated, but U.S. government named as defendant); Continen-

tal Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 977

(8th Cir.) (jurisdictional basis not apparent from en banc or

panel opinion, but state law applied), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821

(1988); EAD Metallurgical, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 701 F.

Supp. 399, 400 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (jurisdictional basis not stated,

but state law applied), aff'd, 905 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1990); State of

New York v. AMRO Realty Corp., 697 F. Supp. 99, 107 (N.D.N.Y.

1988) (third-party action against insurers rested on diversity

jurisdiction), reconsideration denied, __ F.Supp.__, 1990 WL

129291 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 1990).

2 See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 213 Cai. App. 3d

1219, 262 Cal. Rptr. 182, rev. granted, 264 Cal. Rptr. 354, 782 P. 2d

595 (1989); Aerojet-General Corp. v. San Mateo County Superior

Court, 209 Cal. App. 3d 973, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621, reh’g denied & rev.

denied, 211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 258 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1989); Monsanto

Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 559 A.2d 1301 (Del. Super. 1988);

Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686

(1989); U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180

Ill. App. 3d 378, 535 N.E.2d 1071, appeal denied, 127 Ill. 2d 643,

545 N.E.2d 133 (1989); International Minerals & Chem. Co. v.

Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 168 Ill. App. 3d 361, 522 N.E.2d 758,

appeal denied, 112 Ill. 2d 576, 530 N.E.2d 246 (1988); James Graham

Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 88-

CA-2405-MR, 1990 WL 22793 (Ky. App. Mar. 9, 1990), rev.

20

comprehensive general liability policies, and the pollu-

tion exclusion in particular, has worked entirely within

the framework of state law, as it applies to insurance

policies covering CERCLA liabilities.°

On the few occasions when the choice between fed-

eral and state law has been raised in related contexts, the

state law concerning insurance has prevailed.* See, e.g.

granted, No. 90-SC-242-DG (Ky. Sept. 19, 1990); Hazen Paper Co.

v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 407 Mass 689, 555 N.E.2d 576

(1990); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457

N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1990); Technicon Elec. Corp. v. American Home

Assurance Co., 74 N.Y.2d 68, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 542 N.E.2d 1048

(1989); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 784

P.2d 507 (1990); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus., Inc., 390

S.E.2d 562 (W. Va. 1990); Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis.

2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570 (1990); see also Note, Forum Non Conve-

niens and Comprehensive Hazardous Waste Coverage Suits, 90

Cotum. L. Rev. 1066, 1071 (1990) (typically comprehensive

declaratory judgment actions by CERCLA-liable parties against

insurers are brought in state court).

3 See e.g., Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of

Insurance, 88 Cotum. L. Rev. 942, 961-66 (1988); Ballard & Manus,

Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive General

Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 610 (1990); The

CGL Policy and the Poliution Exclusion Clause: Using the Drafting

History to Raise the Interpretation Out of the Quagmire, 23 Cot.

J.L. & Soc. Pros. 233 (1990); Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause

Through the Looking Glass, 74 Gro. L.J. 1237 (1986); Developments

in the Law — Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1458, 1573-85

(1986); Note, The Pollution Exclusion in the Comprehensive General

Liability Insurance Policy, 1986 U. Itv. L. Rev. 897.

4 The matter has arisen in the context of defining whether

CERCLA response costs constitute “damages” under an other-

wise applicable insurance policy. Two cases decided by the

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals apparently consult federal law

to determine the legal or equitable nature of CERCLA response

21

Intel Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indemn. Co., 692 F. Supp.

1171, 1186-87 (N.D. Cal. 1988). As one commentator

explains, :

CERCLA does define certain cognizable harms

for which the responsible party may become

liable. But CERCLA never purports to define the

relationship between an insurer and the insured

for the purposes of allocating the costs of this

liability. . . . [O]nce the scope of liability is

defined by CERCLA, the scope of the insured’s

coverage for this liability should be determined

under state law.

Comment, Insurance coverage of CERCLA Response Costs:

The Limits of “Damages” in Comprehensive General Liability

Policies, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 779 (1989).

The Court approaches Hudson’s novel theories with

some caution. It would be imprudent to ignore the Elev-

enth Circuit’s treatment of a CERCLA insurance issue in

costs. See Armco, 822 F.2d AT 1352-54; Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328-29.

Cases from other jurisdictions expressly choose to rest solely on

the interpretation of state law. See, e.g., Northeastern Pharmaceuti-

cal, 842 F.2d at 985-86 (en banc opinion); Intel Corp., 692 F. Supp.

at 1186-88; United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich.

App. 579, 336 N.W. 2d 838, 842-43 (1983). The interjection of

federal law into this matter by the first line of cases, however,

arises only as an element of a defense to a traditional state !aw

claim. Federal law is employed solely to describe the nature of

the insurance claim asserted; state law determines whether the

insurance claim, so described, is covered by the policy. This role

for federal law, if it ultimately prevails over the second line of

cases, still is consistent with the ruling herein, as the use of

federal law as an element of a defense is insufficient to confer

subject matter jurisdiction.

Claussen as a matter of state law best resolved by certi-

fication of a question to the Georgia Supreme Court.

While Hudson is correct in the strictest sense that the

Eleventh Circuit did not explicitly consider the option of

federal common law, this Court does not lightly infer that

this option was simply “overlooked” by the Court of

Appeals. Consequently, the Court demands a strong

showing on Hudson’s part to overcome the overwhelm-

ing weight of authority that stands in contradiction to the

arguments underlying the assertion of exclusive federal

jurisdiction.

The notion that § 9607(e)(1) creates federal jurisdic-

tion on its own can be dismissed without much ado. The

relevant portion of the statute states: “Nothing in the

subsection shall bar any agreement to insure . . . a party

to such agreement for any liability under this section.” If

Hudson is correct in asserting that a court must decide as

a matter of federal law whether an insurance policy is

one to insure CERCLA liability,5 this issue alone does not

5 Hudson is not correct in this assertion. The second sen-

tence of subsection 9607(e)(1), quoted above, is paired with a

sentence that bans agreements that purport to transfer liability

from a statutorily liable party to some other party. The tension

between the first and second sentence has been widely noted. It

is resolved by “giv[ing] effect to contracts binding parties other-

wise not liable, to indemnify or insure liable parties.” Am Int'l

Inc. v. International Forging Equip., No. C88-2037, F. Supp

1990 WL 103154, 5 (N.D. Ohio June 29, 1990).

That is, a liable party remains liable (e.g., to the

United States) regardless of whether it has an indem-

nity agreement, but the liable party still may proceed

against a third party (e.g., an insurance company)

which has agreed to indemnify the liable party. This

create jurisdiction. The determination of the nature of the

insurance policy fits within the framework of a state law

interpretation is consistent with the language of the

Statute, the cases applying it, and the legislative his-

tory.

Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Industrial Oil Tank & Line Cleaning

Serv., 730 F.Supp. 1498, 1507 (W.D. Mo. 1990); see also Southland

Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F.Supp. 994, 1000 (D.N.J. 1988)

(“CERCLA . . . does not abrogate [private] parties’ contractual

[indemnity] rights.”), reconsidered in part, 1988 WL 12855 (D.N.].

Nov. 23, 1988).

In this light, Hudson’s call for a uniform federal common

law for insurance covering CERCLA liabilities rests on a exag-

geration of the stakes involved. Arranging for payment from an

otherwise-not-responsible third party is “essentially tangential

to the enforcement of CERCLA’s liability provisions.” Mardan

Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1986). It

concerns primarily private parties, not the United States or a

unique federal interest such as military procurement. See Boyle

v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506-08 (1988). Nothing in

CERCLA gives the explicit suggestion necessary to infer that

Congress intended to rely on a body of federal common law to

interpret insurance policies. Cf. National Audubon Soc. v. Depart-

ment of Water, 869 F.2d 1196, 1201-03 (9th Cir. 1988) (reaching

like conclusion regarding Clean Air Act).

While Hudson makes much of the congressional intent to

make polluters pay, this emphasis is misplaced. One problem in

the reasoning lies its source, S. 1480, a Senate bill that precursed

CERCLA. The relevant section underwent change from the cor-

mittee version. See AM Int'l, __ F.Supp. at __, 1990 WL103154,

4. The material changes render useless the earlier legislative

history cited by Hudson. See In re Burns, 887 F.2d 1541, 1546

(11th Cir. 1989).

More importantly, the “polluters pay” goal is not jeopar-

dized by an autonomous body of state law on insurance.

“[C]ompelling insurance companies to pay will eventually

impose the full cost on the insured, by means of carefully calcu-

lated and frequently revised premiums, which will in turn

cause of action. “Given the significance of the assumed

congressional determination to preclude federal private

remedies, the presence of the federal issue as an element

of the state tort is not the kind of adjudication for which

jurisdiction would serve congressional purposes and the

federal system.” Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.

Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 (1986). Further, § 9607(e)(1)

cannot be seen as a source of a federal cause of action

because “[a] law that does not ‘affect’ the ability of a

encourage the insured to operate at an efficient level of accident

prevention.” Developments in the Law — Toxic Waste Litigation

supra, at 1578 (footnote omitted).

In the effort to impose on waste-handling firms

the full costs of the risks they generate, a regime of

full insurance with premiums tailored tightly to risks

is preferable to a regime of no insurance with firms

bearing all liabilities. The insurance industry is expert

in collecting and evaluating risk data, identifying

methods of risk reduction, and charging premiums

that reflect broad risk experience. Individual firms

lack such expertise, and society would pay large

transaction costs if each firm had to determine the

proper price of every risk it incurred. In addition,

large insurance pools provide for the compensation of

tort victims and the funding of cleanup agencies,

whereas individual firms are often overwhelmed by

their waste-related liabilities. ...

ld. at n.40 (citations omitted). The primacy of the remedial

ispect of CERCLA see United States v. Fleet Factors, Inc., 901 F.2d

1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-504

(Sept. 21, 1990), confirms the importance of giving effect to

otherwise valid insurance policies. The creation of a federal rule

to govern insurance policies would introduce confusion and

uncertainty into commercial relations long committed to state

law. Cf. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1460 (rejecting suggestion to create

federal rule to govern CERCLA releases).

25

[party] to sue hardly creates a cause of action.” Dillon v.

Combs, 895 F.2d 1175, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990), petition for cert.

filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3054 (U.S. July 2, 1990) (No. 90-25). In

the absence of a federal remedy directed to the matter of

insurance coverage, “the presence of a claimed violation

of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is

insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question

jurisdicticn.” Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814.

Given that jurisdiction is not directly conferred by a

cause of action concerning insurance, Hudson’s “com-

plete preemption” argument must be evaluated. This

argument underlies both theories upon which jurisdiction

is asserted, so its success or failure determines the

Court’s ability to hear this case. Because the Court finds

that the reconstructed suit for which declaratory judg-

ment is sought does not fall within an area of complete

preemption, the Court concludes that jurisdiction is lack-

ing. Aecord Boone v. DuBose, 718 F.Supp. 479, 485-86 (M.D.

La. 1988) (examining structure of CERCLA to conclude

that Congress did not intend complete preemption that

would give rise to “arising under” jurisdiction)

The McCarran-Ferguson Act serves as a Starting

point. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b), state regulation of

the business of insurance, which includes the determina-

tion of the substantive meaning of insurance policies, is

protected from the effect of federal legislation enacted

under the commerce clause unless the federal statute is

expressly applied to the insurance business. See Cochran v

Paco, Inc., 606 F.2d 460, 463 (5th Cir. 1979). It “precludes

the application of federal laws if, as a result, laws

of a state regulating insurance would be invalidated,

impaired, or superseded.” Miller v. National Fidelity Life

26

Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 185, 186-87 (5th Cir. 1979). In a nutshell,

the McCarran-Ferguson Act creates a strong presumption

against a finding of federal preemption of insurance reg-

ulation. See Comment, supra, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. at 778.

This recognition of the McCarran-Ferguson Act

should be coupled with a recognition that CERCLA is a

broad, wide-ranging regulatory and remedial regime.

Questions of liability under CERCLA are federal ques-

tions, resolved by reference to federal common law. For

instance, the doctrine of corporate successor or parent

liability for CERCLA response costs is one of federal

common law. See, e.g., Loutsiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco,

Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1990) (successor

liability); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.,

851 F.2d 86, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 488

U.S. 1029 (1989); United States v. Kaiser-Roth Corp., 624

F.Supp. 15, 19-24 (D.R.1. 1989) (parent corporation lia-

bility). Likewise, the validity of a release of the right to a

CERCLA contribution action is a matter of federal law for

which state law provides the rules of decision. See Mardan

Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1457-60 (9th Cir.

1986). In each of these instances, however, federal law

applies not because CERCLA is unique in any fashion;

rather, because federal liabilities and federal rights are

involved, federal law must be consulted. See, e.g., Ander-

son v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 365 (1944) (federal law deter-

mines matter of corporate liability for federal statutory

obligations); Parker v. DeKalb Chrysler Plymouth, 673 F.2d

1178, 1180 (11th Cir. 1982) (federal law determines val-

idity of purported releases of federal statutory causes of

action).

27

If the description of the statutory scheme halted at

this point, it may appear that a potential for conflict

exists. Further examination of CERCLA suggests other-

wise. Section 9614(a), for instance, provides, “[nJothing in

this chapter shall be construed or interpreted as preempt-

ing any State from imposing any additional liability or

requirements with respect to the release of hazardous

substances within such State.” Broadly construed, this

Savings clause effectively rebuts any inference that

CERCLA is intended to override the presumption against

preemption of insurance regulation guaranteed by the

McCarran-Ferguson Act., Cf. Comment, supra, 16 ECOL-

OGY L.Q. at 779 (“CERCLA is not an insurance Statute”).

Additionally, section 9651(g)(3) directed a study by

the General Accounting Office to determine the insur-

ability of hazardous waste facilities, which in part cov-

ered “[cJurrent trends, if any, in the judicial interpretation

and construction of applicable insurance contracts. ... ”

This statutory directive appears to presuppose the state

law regime governing insurance contracts, see, e2., Ti.

CONF. REP. NO. 962, 99th Cong. 2d Sess, 276 (1986),

reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS

3276, 3369, and the study, completed in 1987, does not

belie this reading. Once more, the statute on its face

rebuts Hudson’s suggestion that Congress intended to

vitiate the presumption of state insurance regulation

embodied in the McCarran-Ferguson Act.

More direct evidence lies in subchapter IV of

CERCLA, the only portion of the statute directly

addressed to insurance, specifically, pollution insurance.

While subchapter IV makes inroads into the state power

to regulate insurance in order to authorize risk retention

—

groups and purchasing groups that offer pollution insur-

ance,® it provides, “[nJothing in this subchapter shall be

construed to affect either the tort law or the law govern-

ing the interpretation of insurance contracts of any State.”

42 U.S.C. § 9672(a). Thus, entities that are formed

expressly for the purpose of providing insurance to cover

CERCLA liabilities can expect that the content of their

insurance policies will be subject to state insurance law. It

logically follows from this savings clause that CERCLA

f

> Subchapter IV must be read in conjunction with the Lia-

bility Risk Retention Act of 1986 (“RRA”) which passed contem-

poraneously with the relevant CERCLA amendments. See

Superfund Amendments & Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. |

99-499, § 210(b), as added by neg Risk Retention Act of

1986, Pub. L. a S 11(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3177 (“For purposes of

[42 U.S.C. §§ 9671-7 75], the pe and authorities of States

addressed by the mien Retention Act of 1986 are in addition to

those of this act.”). The limited purpose of the RRA was to

pierce the state laws that prevented or impaired the operation of

risk retention groups without preempting the myriad of other

state regulations of insurance. See Scales v. Memorial Medical

Center, 690 F.Supp. 1002, 1005-06 (M.D. Fla. 1988). Because the

scope of the laws subject to preemption to accomplish the goals

of the RRA could give rise to a wider preemption inference, the

RRA carefully states its preserv ation of State authority in sev-

eral places. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3902(f)(1), 3903(g), 3905. Similarly,

subchapter IV of CERC LA employs, of necessity, a federal law

definition of pollution insurance in the course of defining the

statute’s reach, see 42 U.S.C. § 9671(2), while clarifying the lim-

ited purpose of the definition, 1d. § 9672(a). As with the RRA, it

is the apparent potential for preemption that prompted congres-

sional inclusion of a savings clause. The absence of an identical

provision in subchater 1 of CERCLA then, is not an inference in

favor of preemption; rather, it is indicative of Congress’ belief

that no preemption inference is raised by the structure of that

portion of CERCLA.

29

does not preempt state insurance generally. Otherwise

the Court must engage in the assumption that Congress

intended for federal insurance law to apply to pollution

insurance except when federally-protected risk retention

groups are the carriers. The absurdity of this arrangement

illustrates the weakness in Hudson’s complete preemp-

tion argument.

The fallacy committed by Hudson is its assumption

that the expansive scope of CERCLA in some respects

extends to all matters somehow related to those known to

be preempted. The case law regarding the complete pre-

emption doctrine dispels this fallacy. Suits arising under

§ 301 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), for

example, form the fundamental body of law concerning

complete preemption. Yet “not every dispute concerning

employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a

collective bargaining agreement, is preempted by § 301 or

other provisions of the federal labor law.” Allis-Chambers

Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985). “[E]ven under

§ 301 we have never intimated that any action merely

relating to a contract within the coverage of § 301 arises

exclusively under that section. For instance, a state bat-

tery suit growing out of a violent strike would not arise

under § 301 simply because the strike may have been

violation of an employer-union contract.” Franchise Tax.

Bd., 463 U.S. at 25 n.28.

In fact, one case involving the NLRA, Malone v. White

Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978), is analogous to the

present case. In Malone, the Court was presented with the

argument that the NLRA preempted a right established in

a state pension statute because the NLRA empowered the

parties to collective bargaining agreement to come to a

30

private agreement about the subject of the state law. This

argument parallels Hudson’s assertion that CERCLA pre-

empts state insurance law by preserving the right to enter

into a contract of insurance that covers liabilities that may

arise under CERCLA. The Malone Court, however,

rejected the argument. See id. at 504-05; accord Lueck, 471

U.S. at 212 n.7. This Court perceives no distinction that

spares Hudson’s argument from the power of this anal-

ogy.

It is plain, then, that regardless of the degree of

preemption created by a federal statute, the Court must

isolate the issues in controversy to determine if those

particular issues arise under federal law or not. The issue

in this case, the enforceability of an insurance contract,

does not fall within the preemptive scope of CERCLA. To

the extent that questions of federal law will be implicated

in determining Hudson’s liability on the policy, those

questions are solely an ingredient of a defense, not the

underlying cause of action. This type of suit does not

arise under CERCLA or any other federal law.

Absent federal question jurisdiction, this Court pos-

sesses no basis to entertain this suit. In accordance with

the foregoing, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. That defendant Green River Steel Corpora-

tion’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is

hereby granted;

2. That this case is hereby dismissed without

prejudice for want of subject matter jurisdiction;

and

3]

3. That the Clerk of the Court is hereby

directed to enter final judgment dismissing this

case without prejudice for want of subject mat-

ter jurisdiction.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Jacksonville,

Florida, this 12 th date of October 1990.

S Howell W. Melton

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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