Opposition Brief — El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Corp.

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No. 92-430

IN TEE

Stiles Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

,

EL Paso NATURAL GAS COMPANY,

a Delaware corporation,

Petitioner,

v.

THE HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY CORPORATION,

a Connecticut corporation,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeais

for the Tenth Circuit

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

JAMES C. MARTIN PAUL C. Droz

(Of Counsel) (Counsel of Record)

CROSBY, HEAFEY, ROACH Joy L. CLEGG

& May SNow, CHRISTENSEN

Professional Corporation & MARTINEAU

700 South Flower Street 10 Exchange Place

Suite 2200 Eleventh Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90017 Post Office Box 45000

(218) 896-8000 Salt Lake City, UT 84145

(801) 521-9000

Attorneys for Respondent,

The Hartford Accident and Indemnity Corporation

WILSON - Eres Printine Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

BEST AVAILABLE COPY |

Os

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. On the facts of this diversity case, did the Tenth

Circuit Court of Appeals correctly apply state contract

law in holding that the “pollution exclusion” in the insur-

ance policies at issue excludes coverage for property dam-

age arising out of E] Paso Natural Gas Company’s regu-

lar, deliberate and continuous discharges of toxic wastes

into and onto its land for 15 years?

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COUNTERSTATEMENT « QUESTIONS PRE-

ED ooo phon cccncannenctbnsecessonnnancancuncenncvessnsessinsvonennconnesnocces

OPINIONS BELOV .................---.- PETC ERIE DR ee

Pit) 4) 0) (ep gC )), Sea ccc oo

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................------------+-+-

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ............

THIS CASE INVOLVES ONLY A CONTROL-

LING QUESTION OF STATE CONTRACT LAW

AND THE TENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY AP-

PLIED UTAH LAW TO RESOLVE THIS CASE

IN FAVOR OF HARTFORD ...

‘boo F851) Sates

(iii)

Page

i)

~]

~]

1]

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,

- gy £ il fe ap |} Peele 9

American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp.,

667 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1987), aff’d on other

grounds, 946 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1991) -........... 10

American Mut. Liability Ins. v. Neville Chemical,

650 F. Supp. S29 C.D. Fe. 1967T)......................... 10

American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 587

F. Supp. 1549 (B.D. Mich. 1984) ......................... 9

Anaconda Minerals v. Stoller Chemicals, 773 F.

Me |) a 10

Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) ..........00......... 7

Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 682 F.2d

927 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 865 F.2d 1267 (6th

RN.” MMPS: grscet cx <ton-choin cxsan ausntiadontecenbasedewuaseotasaiimerniciee 10

Broderick Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indus.,

Indem. Co., 954 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1992) ........ 9

CPC Intern v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Inc.,

7169 ¥. Supp. 966 (D.R.1. 1961) ....................... a 10

Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co.,

677 F. Supp. $2 (B.D. Pa. 1987) ......................... 10

Covenant Ins. Co. v. Friday Eng., Inc., 742 F.

ae ee | 10

EAD Metallurgical, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,

oe FF, Be A. | Reece acomnnneen 9

F.L. Aerospace v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 897 F.2d

214 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 284

(1990) ........... 1 EE MASI RE = 9

Fireman’s Fund Ins. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F.

Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1988) ....... Deanna lara 9

Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 656

B.Com BE Ce i NY anne cscs 9

Grant-Southern Iron & Metal Co. v. CNA Ins. Co.,

905 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1990) .................. eceietessasne 9

Great Lakes Container v. National Union Fire

Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 3 (ist Cir. 1984) ................... 9

Gridiey Assoc’s, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 828

eg Beil YF | ee 10

Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983) —.............. 7

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. USF&G, 962 F.2d

1404 (10th 1968) ee 1, 7,40

Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 765 F. Supp. 677

(D. Utah 1991), aff'd, 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir.

St | rennin 1, 6, 10

Hayes v. Maryland Cas. Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513

(ID. Fin, UGGB) -.c-cnincccscscccececicenssessmieoee eee a 9

Hieks v. American Resources Ins. Co., Inc., 554

Seq, BG GER CAlm. LORD DP vvcsianccs- cee 10

Hudson Ins. Co. v. Double D. Mgmt. Co., 768 F.

Supp. 1542 (M.D. Fila. 1991) ................---..00-0...- 10

Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co.,

Ltd., No. 91-611 (OH Sept. 16, 1992) ............... : 9

International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 552 N.E.2d 758 (Ill. App. 1988) .... 9

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus., 1992

WL 87185 (4th Cir. 1908) ...........cci.0..0.cieeceess 8

Lower Paxton Township v. United States Fidelity

& Guaranty Company, 557 A.2d 393 (Pa. Super.

106) eee atsicwulaletteeacnemma 10

Lumbermens Mut. v. Belleville Indus., 938 F.2d

LADS Chet Chr, WOE) acces ccninccccenccesscorcsesssncesessin 9

Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville Indus., 555

N.B.2d GSES (Bleas. LODO) «2 :nccecc.-cneesinccctseie is 9

New Castle County v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,

O88 F-34 1768 (Bd Cit. TOBE) nore cn cece 9

Northern Ins. Co. of New York v. Aardvark Assoc.,

Inc., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991) ........... ea 9

Ogden Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 924 F.2d 39

(Dd Che. TOBE) nnccacen cs cineccecseces erent sstanersenenromeriees 9

Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,

E70 N.B.2d 1164 (ill. App. 1991) -......-...-............. 10

Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 548

ee Bt ie & | | ne 10

Sharon Steel v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., Nos.

C-87-2306 and C-87-2311 (3d Dist. Utah 1988) .. 10

State of New York v. Amro Realty Corp., 745 F.

Supp. 832 (N.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd on this issue,

ONG Wd TEGO CBG Cle. LOBE F aincancncccnccsecensenevececeees 9

vi

~ TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 487 A.2d 820

(Pa. Bape. WE) ccciicccccicsc eee 9

Technicon Electronics Corporation v. American

Home Assurance Company, 542 N.E.2d 1048

Ces Ec. RAED hchnccenhaacsusunccncecennpeuedbutteteael aaa 10

Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 711 P.2d 212

(OW. Bap. SIP cosas kaccdl ccna 10

Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476

N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1991) . Fis cue oRe ee 9

USF&G v. Morrison Grain Co., 7134 F. Supp. 487

CED, TOM, TGP vvsscocccsencsscidspcissee eee 9

USF&G v. T.K. Stanley, Inc.; 764 F. Supp. 81 (S.D. |

BOG. BOOED checincccc ces eee 10

U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee v. Korman Corp., 693

F. Supp. 263 (2.D. Pa. 1908)... 9

United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals,

Inc., 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988) ......................... 9

Waste Mat. of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co.,

S40 S.B2G STE CIA. TBC) nic cceccccccccssessseeeeesccans 9

Statutes

SS UA; S SBC iiceaick ot eee sane 2

28 US.C. § 1382(a) (1) Bava ENT Seared fe 5 ve 2

Rules

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ... ; 2

Supreme Court Rule 10.1.. &

IN THE

Sigireuw Court of the Wuited Slates

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

No. 92-430

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,

a Delaware corporation,

a Petitioner,

THE HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY CORPORATION,

a Connecticut corporation,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Tenth Circuit is reported at 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir.

1992), and is reprinted in the Appendix to the Petition

for a Writ of Certiorari at la-17a. The order of the

Tenth Circuit denying rehearing is reprinted in the Ap-

pendix to the Petition at 18a-19a.

The opinion and order of the United States District

Court for the District of Utah (Jenkins, C.J.), granting

summary judgment for the Hartford Accident and Indem-

nity Corporation (Hartford), are reported at 765 F. Supp.

677 (D. Utah 1991), and are reprinted in the Appendix

at 20a-28a.

2

JURISDICTION

This action was brought in the United States District

Court for the District of Utah under 28 U.S.C. § 1332

(a) (1). On February 28, 1991, the district court granted

summary judgment for Respondent Hartford under Fed-

eral Rule of Civil Procedure 56. On April 30, 1992, the

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its unanimous

opinion affirming that judgment. On June 9, 1992, the

Tenth Circuit entered an order denying Petitioner’s peti-

tion for rehearing and rejecting its suggestion for re-

hearing en bance.

Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Perhaps the central theme of El] Paso Natural Gas

Company’s Petition is that there should be coverage for

the toxic chemical discharges here because E] Paso, like

most polluters, did not really mean to damage the prop-

erty of third parties or the environment. But that type

of self-serving observation skirts the true issue of insur-

ance policy construction presented in this proceeding. The

issue of construction here turns on the language of the

pollution exclusion in E] Paso’s liability policy, which

provides that El Paso’s liability insurance does not

apply:

(f) to bodily injury or property damage arising out

of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of...

toxic chemicals, ... waste materials, or other... pol-

lutants into or upon the land, the atmosphere or any

water course or body of water; but this exclusion

does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release

or escape is sudden and accidental. . . . (Doc. 94,

Exh. 4)

When the language of the pollution exclusion is con-

sidered, El] Paso’s demand for coverage completely breaks

down. El Paso does not dispute that its discharges of

3

toxic ‘wastes into and onto its land were the ultimate

source of all the property damage for which it seeks

coverage here. Nor does it dispute that those discharges

were continuous, deliberate or anything other than the

routine and regular manner by which El] Paso conducted

its business. If the plain language of El] Paso’s policy is

followed, therefore, there can be no coverage for the

property damage arising from those discharges.

From 1959 through 1974, El Paso operated a natural

gas transmission system running through Washington,

Oregon, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado and New Mex-

ico. (Doe. 95, Exh. 1, p. 2)

While it operated the system, E] Paso used Pydraul

AC, a product which contained a polychlorinated biphenyl

(“PCB”), as an air compressor lubricating oil at 15

different compressor stations located in the various states.

(Doe. 95, Exh. 1) The lubricant was continuously poured

into an 8-quart reservoir, which fed it at a rate of 3 or 4

drops per minute into a cylinder. While in the cylinder,

some of the lubricant vaporized and went with the com-

pressed air to an air receiver bottle where, because of the

increased air pressure, the used lubricant condensed and

settled to the bottom of the bottle.

To keep the air system as dry as possible, El Paso’s

employees drained the air receiver bottles every day by

means of a drain valve. They then disposed of the con-

densed liquid waste (‘including the PCB’s) by dumping

it into and on the property surrounding the compressor

stations. As Lori Komatar, the engineer in charge of

cleaning up El Paso’s PCB-cortaminated property ex-

plained:

Q: How did the PCBs get there?

A: Poor management practices. There was what

we call a blow-down pot which we found outside

several of the buildings at not all locations, a number

of locations anyway .. . where initially material

was discharged directly out of the building into the

4

ground . |W]e have also had people at the plant

site say, W ‘ell, the storm water drain is there, they

just went in and dumped it down the drain because

they didn’t want to get the floor dirty.

*% * * *

Later where they found that this was just not a good

practice to discharge oil directly into the ground,

they started running it to the pits. (Komatar Depo.,

Vol. 1, pp. 121-22)

Thus, at some compressor stations El] Paso simply

drained the PCB contaminants from the air receiver

bottles directly into the ground. At other stations, the

contaminants were drained into a concrete waste oil sump

which was then periodically pumped out into unlined

earthen pits.

The unlined pits also had discharge pipes designed to

allow any overflow to drain directly onto and into the

surrounding ground. As Lori Komatar again explained:

A: The pit itself is berm. It’s about, stands

about three feet above the ground surface and the

pit is dug about eight feet into the bottom, in to the

ground.

Q: Go ahead.

A: SoI was trying to find out how it was possibly

s getting out of the pit, the oil, and the PCB oil or

what but how that material was getting out of the

pit. And we didn’t have any idea how it could be

getting out so we talked to some other people at the

station who had been there for quite some time and

they indicated that there had been an overflow pipe

in the pit that as the level got up to a certain height

on the berm it would discharge out to the north from

the pit.

Q: The overflow pipe went off to the north?

Y A: Right. The overflow pipe came out of the pit

to the north. (Komatar Depo., Vol. 1, pp. 55-54)

Most of the lubricant containing the PCBs stayed in

the air compressors instead of being vaporized and set-

5

tling in the air receiver bottles. This contaminated liquid

was removed from the compressors during frequent oil

changes and equipment overhauls and was disposed of in

the same way as the condensed PCBs. It was either

drained into the local waste oil sumps, which were then

pumped into the unlined earthen pits, or simply dumped

directly on the ground.

In 1974, El Paso sold its natural gas transmission

system to Northwest Pipeline Corporation. El Paso

agreed, as part of the contract of sale, to indemnify

Northwest for any liability or expense arising from El

Paso’s activities prior to transferring the system to

Northwest. (Doe. 95, Exh. 1, pp. 2-8)

Northwest discovered the PCB contamination at the

compressor stations in 1987. Northwest reported the con-

tamination to governmental agencies, including the United

States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Pur-

suant to consent orders entered into with the EPA, North-

west cleaned up the PCB contamination in the air system

equipment, drains, sumps, pits, the ground surrounding

the pits that had been contaminated by the discharge

pipes, and those areas around the auxiliary buildings

where waste oil had been dumped directly on the ground.

On June 22, 1987, Northwest filed a lawsuit against

El] Paso to recover the cleanup costs necessitated by El

Paso’s contamination of the equipment and property.

(Doe. 95, Exh. 1, 1 6-9) As a result of its own investi-

gation in the Northwest lawsuit, E] Paso believed that

it probably was “one hundred percent responsible” for

the cleanup costs and also determined that those costs

could reach $15 million. Therefore, on July 18, 1988, E]

Paso agreed to pay Northwest the $6.6 million neces-

sary to settle the lawsuit involving the cleanup costs.

After paying Northwest, E] Paso demanded that Hart-

ford and its other liability carriers indemnify it for the

full amount of the settlement. Hartford insured E] Paso

6

for general liability from January 1, 1976 to January 1,

1986. (Doc. 1, p. 3) On the basis of the express lan-

guage of its policy, Hartford declined to indemnify El

Paso and instead filed this declaratory relief action to

establish that it did not cover the damage caused by El

Paso’s discharges of toxic chemicals.

Hartford thereafter moved for summary judgment on

the grounds that any damage arising from El Paso’s reg-

ular, deliberate and continuous discharge of toxic waste

over the 15 years it operated the pipeline was not cov-

ered by the express terms of E] Paso’s liability policy.

(See Does. 43, 94, 95, 101, 102, 110, 119 and 122) Hart-

ford’s motion was based on the application of the “pollu-

tion exclusion” in the policy, which excludes coverage for

bodily injury or property damage arising from the non-

sudden or non-accidental discharge of toxic chemicals or

wastes into or upon anyone’s land. (Doc. 94, Exh. 4)

After the matter was submitted, the district court

entered a comprehensive ruling in favor of Hartford.

(Doc. 125) The court explained that the focus of the

pollution exclusion was not on whether E] Paso expected

or thought it was causing property damage to third par-

ties or releasing pollutants into the environment, but

solely on whether the toxic discharges, from which the

property damage arose, were sudden and accidental. 765

F. Supp. at 679-81. The court also reasoned that the

phrase “sudden and accidental,” as used in the pollution

exclusion, should be given its “plain and simple mean-

ing;” ie, “happening without notice and occurring by

chance.” (Jd.) In that regard, since there was nothing

sudden or accidental about El Paso’s 15 years of toxic

waste discharges into and on its land, the court held that

there could be no coverage under the plain language of

El Paso’s policy. (/d.)

El Paso appealed and the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-

peals unanimously agreed with the district court’s analy-

sis of the controlling provisions of E] Paso’s insurance

7

policy. -Following precedent from Utah appellate courts

and the courts of other districts, the Tenth Circuit, like

the district court, held that the phrase “sudden and acci-

dental’? should be construed in context to mean “tem-

porarily, abrupt and unexpected or unintended.” 962

F.2d at 1487-92. Therefore, because E] Paso’s discharges

of toxic waste on its land could not be considered “‘sud-

den” or “accidental,” coverage for the property damage

arising from El] Paso’s toxic discharges was expressly

excluded by the plain language of the pollution exclusion

in El Paso’s poliey. (Jd.)

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

THIS CASE INVOLVES ONLY A CONTROLLING

QUESTION OF STATE CONTRACT LAW AND THE

TENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY APPLIED UTAH

LAW TO RESOLVE THIS CASE IN FAVOR OF

HARTFORD

This Court has long instructed that “state law deter-

minations by the Court of Appeals will rarely constitute

an appropriate subject” for its review. Haring v. Prosise,

462 U.S. 306, 314 n.8 (1983). Indeed, this Court pays

“great deference” to the views of the lower federal courts

on controlling issues of state law, and “is hesitant to

overrule decisions by the federal courts skilled in the law

of particular states unless their conclusions are shown

to be unreasonable.” Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 346

n.10 (1976).

Try as it might, Petitioner cannot change this diversity

case from what it is—a fact-bound determination involv-

ing state law issues of contract interpretation. The Tenth

Circuit did not keep the narrow scope of its decision a

secret. On the contrary, its opinion makes it plain that

it gave the insurance policy at issue here the interpreta-

tion it believed the Utah Supreme Court would when

applying Utah substantive law. 962 F.2d at 1486-88.

Petitioner relies on Erie v. Tompkins and conjures up

a variety of other rationales, including the supposed need

8

for nationwide uniformity of the law of the various states

on the pollution exclusion, to justify the grant of its

Petition. But this case does not present an issue of fed-

eral law, a conflict among the circuits construing an issue

of federal law, or any other reason conceivably justifying

this Court’s review. The Tenth Circuit merely carried

out its mission to interpret Utah law and it reached the

result that Utah law compelled. Even if it had erred,

Petitioner’s disagreement with that result could not make

this case worthy of this Court’s review. This case would

rernain what it always has been—a dispute about the

application of state law principles of contract construc-

tion. Such a dispute does not meet the criteria of Su-

preme Court Rule 10.1.

In any event, the Tenth Circuit was correct in holding

that the pollution exclusion precludes coverage for prop-

erty damage arising from El Paso’s discharges of toxic

wastes at its compressor stations. Although the Court

gets no hint of it from the Petition, the undisputed evi-

dence is that for 15 years E] Paso engaged in the regu-

lar, deliberate and continuous discharge of toxic waste

into and onto the land at each of the compressor stations

along its pipeline.

Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, the overwhelming

weight of authority from state to state and circuit to

circuit, in trial and appellate courts alike, has interpreted

the pollution exclusion precisely at the Tenth Circuit did

here—to preclude coverage of property damage arising

out of the regular and routine discharge of toxic wastes

by the insured onto its land. There is nothing “sudden

and accidental’ about property damage arising from

toxic discharges. that occur continuously and deliber-

ately over a period of many years as a matter of reg-

ular business practice. Property damage arising from

such non-sudden or non-accidental discharges is, more-

over, precisely what the plain language of the exclusion

excludes from coverage. E.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Triangle Indus., 1992 WL 37135 (4th Cir. 1992) ;

9

Broderick Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indus., Indem. Co.,

954 F.2d 601, 605-08 (10th Cir. 1992); Northern Ins.

Co. of New York v. Aardvark Assoc., Inc., 942 F.2d 189,

192-93 (8d Cir. 1991); Lumbermens Mut. v. Belleville

Indus., 938 F.2d 1423, 1425, 1430-31 (1st Cir. 1991);

A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 933 F.2d

66, 73 (1st Cir. 1991); New Castle County v. Hartford

Acc. & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1202 (3d Cir. 1991);

Ogden Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 924 F.2d 39, 42

(2d Cir. 1991) ; Grant-Southern Iron & Metal Co. v. CNA

Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 954, 956-57 (6th Cir. 1990); EAD

Metallurgical, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 905 F.2d

8, 9-11 (2d Cir. 1990); F.L. Aerospace v. Aetna Cas.

& Sur. Co., 897 F.2d 214, 217-20 (6th Cir.), cert. de-

nied, 111 S.Ct. 284 (1990); United States Fid. & Guar.

Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31, 34-35 (6th Cir.

1988); Great Lakes Container v. National Union Fire

Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1984).!

1To dispel any doubt about where the overwhelming weight of

authority lies on this issue, Hartford refers the Court to the fol-

lowing cases in which the pollution exclusion was held to bar cover-

age where toxic wastes were regularly and continuously discharged

by the insured onto its land as a routine business practice, resulting

in contamination to soil and ground or surface waters: Hayes v.

Maryland Cas. Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513, 1515-16 (N.D. Fla. 1988);

U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee v. Korman Corp., 693 F. Supp. 253, 259-

61 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,

656 F. Supp. 132, 140 (E.D. Pa. 1986); American States Ins. Co.

v. Maryland Cas. Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549, 1553 (E.D. Mich. 1984) ;

see International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,

552 N.E.2d 758 (Ill. App. 1988); Waste Mgt. of Carolinas, Inc. v.

Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986); Techalloy Co. v.

Reliance Ins. Co., 487 A.2d 820 (Pa. Super. 1984).

There are many more. State of New York v. Amro Realty Corp.,

745 F. Supp. 832, 839 (N.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d on this issue, 936 F.2d

1420, 1428-29 (2d Cir. 1991); USF&G v. Morrison Grain Co., 734

F. Supp. 437, 447-49 (D. Kan. 1990); Fireman’s Fund Ins. v.

Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317, 1323-24 (E.D. Mich. 1988);

Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., Ltd., No. 91-611

(OH Sept. 16, 1992); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co.,

476 N.W. 2d 392 (Mich. 1991); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v.

10

Nor is there any dispute in this case involving the

meaning to be given to the phrase “sudden and acci-

dental,” as used in the pollution exclusion in El Paso’s

policy. That question was resolved in favor of Hartford

by the Utah Court of Appeals in Gridley Assoc’s., Ltd. v.

Transamerica Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah App.

1992). The Tenth Circuit correctly followed Gridley, as

it was compelled to do. 962 F.2d at 1490. Further, every

court that has applied Utah contract construction princi-

ples law to define the meaning of “sudden and accidental”

in the pollution exclusion has reached the same result as

Gridley. See Anaconda Minerals, 773 F.Supp. at 1505;

Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 765 F.Supp. at 680-81;

Sharon Steel v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., Nos. C-87-

2306 and C-87-2311 and 28 (3d Cir. Utah July 20, 1988).

The Utah law is uniform. There surely is no need for

this Court to disrupt it.

Belleville Indus., 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass. 1990); Hicks v. American

Resources Ins. Co., Inc., 554 So. 2d 952 (Ala. 1989); Outboard

Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.E.2d 1154 (Ill. App.

1991).

And more still. Anaconda Minerals v. Stoller Cemicals, 773

F. Supp. 1498, 1504-05 (D. Utah 1991) ; Hudson Ins. Co. v. Double

D. Mgmt. Co., 768 F. Supp. 1542, 1547-48 (M.D. Fla. 1991);

USF&G v. T.K. Stanley, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 81, 84-85 (S.D. Miss.

1991); CPC Intern v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Inc., 759

F. Supp. 966, 973-76 (D.R.I. 1991); Covenant Ins. Co. v. Friday

Eng., Inc., 742 F. Supp. 708, 711-12 (D. Mass. 1990); Borden, Inc.

v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 927, 930 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd,

865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir. 1989); American Motorists Ins. Co. v.

General Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423, 1429 (D. Kan. 1987),

aff'd on other grounds, 946 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1991) ; Centennial

Ins. Co. v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co., 677 F. Supp. 342, 347-49

(E.D. Pa. 1987); American Mut. Liability Ins. v. Neville Chemical,

650 F. Supp. 929, 931-33 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Technicon Electronics

Corporation v. American Home Assurance Company, 542 N.E.2d

1048, 1049-51 (N.Y. 1989); Lower Paxton Township v. United

States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 557 A.2d 393, 402 (Pa. Super.

1989); Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 548 N.E.2d 1301,

1302 (N.Y. 1989); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 711 P.2d 212,

244 (Or. App. 1985).

—— xo

11

Thus, notwithstanding Petitioner’s creative efforts to

make it so, there is simply no issue here for this Court to

review. It is not within this Court’s purview to bring

“nationwide uniformity” to state law principles of con-

tract construction as applied in diversity cases and that

is true whether the issue involves the construction of an

insurance policy or any other contract.

Even if this Court could somehow undertake that task,

there is no compelling need for it to do so in this case.

There already is a solid—indeed overwhelming—nation-

wide consensus that property damege arising from regu-

lar, deliberate and continuous discnarges of toxic waste,

like those involved here, is expressly excluded from cover-

age by the plain terms of a CGL policy, like El Paso’s.

If any cases are in need of this Court’s attention, it is

those decisions that have reached a contrary conclusion,

and not one, like the Tenth Circuit’s, that has landed

firmly in the mainstream.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES C. MARTIN PAUL C. DROZ

(Of Counsel) (Counsel of Record)

CROSBY, HEAFEY, ROACH JOY L. CLEGG

& MAY SNOW, CHRISTENSEN

Professional Corporation & MARTINEAU

700 South Flower Street 10 hxchange Place

Suite 2200 Eleventh Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90017 Post Office Box 45000

(213) 896-8000 Salt Lake City, UT 84145

(801) 521-9000

Attorneys for Respondent,

The Hartford Accident and Indemnity Corporation

Dated: October —, 1992

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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