Opposition Brief — El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Corp.
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No. 92-430
IN TEE
Stiles Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
,
EL Paso NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,
Petitioner,
v.
THE HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY CORPORATION,
a Connecticut corporation,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeais
for the Tenth Circuit
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
JAMES C. MARTIN PAUL C. Droz
(Of Counsel) (Counsel of Record)
CROSBY, HEAFEY, ROACH Joy L. CLEGG
& May SNow, CHRISTENSEN
Professional Corporation & MARTINEAU
700 South Flower Street 10 Exchange Place
Suite 2200 Eleventh Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017 Post Office Box 45000
(218) 896-8000 Salt Lake City, UT 84145
(801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Respondent,
The Hartford Accident and Indemnity Corporation
WILSON - Eres Printine Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
BEST AVAILABLE COPY |
Os
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. On the facts of this diversity case, did the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals correctly apply state contract
law in holding that the “pollution exclusion” in the insur-
ance policies at issue excludes coverage for property dam-
age arising out of E] Paso Natural Gas Company’s regu-
lar, deliberate and continuous discharges of toxic wastes
into and onto its land for 15 years?
(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
COUNTERSTATEMENT « QUESTIONS PRE-
ED ooo phon cccncannenctbnsecessonnnancancuncenncvessnsessinsvonennconnesnocces
OPINIONS BELOV .................---.- PETC ERIE DR ee
Pit) 4) 0) (ep gC )), Sea ccc oo
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................------------+-+-
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ............
THIS CASE INVOLVES ONLY A CONTROL-
LING QUESTION OF STATE CONTRACT LAW
AND THE TENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY AP-
PLIED UTAH LAW TO RESOLVE THIS CASE
IN FAVOR OF HARTFORD ...
‘boo F851) Sates
(iii)
Page
i)
~]
~]
1]
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
- gy £ il fe ap |} Peele 9
American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp.,
667 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1987), aff’d on other
grounds, 946 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1991) -........... 10
American Mut. Liability Ins. v. Neville Chemical,
650 F. Supp. S29 C.D. Fe. 1967T)......................... 10
American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 587
F. Supp. 1549 (B.D. Mich. 1984) ......................... 9
Anaconda Minerals v. Stoller Chemicals, 773 F.
Me |) a 10
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) ..........00......... 7
Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 682 F.2d
927 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 865 F.2d 1267 (6th
RN.” MMPS: grscet cx <ton-choin cxsan ausntiadontecenbasedewuaseotasaiimerniciee 10
Broderick Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indus.,
Indem. Co., 954 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1992) ........ 9
CPC Intern v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Inc.,
7169 ¥. Supp. 966 (D.R.1. 1961) ....................... a 10
Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co.,
677 F. Supp. $2 (B.D. Pa. 1987) ......................... 10
Covenant Ins. Co. v. Friday Eng., Inc., 742 F.
ae ee | 10
EAD Metallurgical, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
oe FF, Be A. | Reece acomnnneen 9
F.L. Aerospace v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 897 F.2d
214 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 284
(1990) ........... 1 EE MASI RE = 9
Fireman’s Fund Ins. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F.
Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1988) ....... Deanna lara 9
Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 656
B.Com BE Ce i NY anne cscs 9
Grant-Southern Iron & Metal Co. v. CNA Ins. Co.,
905 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1990) .................. eceietessasne 9
Great Lakes Container v. National Union Fire
Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 3 (ist Cir. 1984) ................... 9
Gridiey Assoc’s, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 828
eg Beil YF | ee 10
Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983) —.............. 7
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. USF&G, 962 F.2d
1404 (10th 1968) ee 1, 7,40
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 765 F. Supp. 677
(D. Utah 1991), aff'd, 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir.
St | rennin 1, 6, 10
Hayes v. Maryland Cas. Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513
(ID. Fin, UGGB) -.c-cnincccscscccececicenssessmieoee eee a 9
Hieks v. American Resources Ins. Co., Inc., 554
Seq, BG GER CAlm. LORD DP vvcsianccs- cee 10
Hudson Ins. Co. v. Double D. Mgmt. Co., 768 F.
Supp. 1542 (M.D. Fila. 1991) ................---..00-0...- 10
Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co.,
Ltd., No. 91-611 (OH Sept. 16, 1992) ............... : 9
International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 552 N.E.2d 758 (Ill. App. 1988) .... 9
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus., 1992
WL 87185 (4th Cir. 1908) ...........cci.0..0.cieeceess 8
Lower Paxton Township v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Company, 557 A.2d 393 (Pa. Super.
106) eee atsicwulaletteeacnemma 10
Lumbermens Mut. v. Belleville Indus., 938 F.2d
LADS Chet Chr, WOE) acces ccninccccenccesscorcsesssncesessin 9
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville Indus., 555
N.B.2d GSES (Bleas. LODO) «2 :nccecc.-cneesinccctseie is 9
New Castle County v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,
O88 F-34 1768 (Bd Cit. TOBE) nore cn cece 9
Northern Ins. Co. of New York v. Aardvark Assoc.,
Inc., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991) ........... ea 9
Ogden Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 924 F.2d 39
(Dd Che. TOBE) nnccacen cs cineccecseces erent sstanersenenromeriees 9
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
E70 N.B.2d 1164 (ill. App. 1991) -......-...-............. 10
Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 548
ee Bt ie & | | ne 10
Sharon Steel v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., Nos.
C-87-2306 and C-87-2311 (3d Dist. Utah 1988) .. 10
State of New York v. Amro Realty Corp., 745 F.
Supp. 832 (N.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd on this issue,
ONG Wd TEGO CBG Cle. LOBE F aincancncccnccsecensenevececeees 9
vi
~ TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 487 A.2d 820
(Pa. Bape. WE) ccciicccccicsc eee 9
Technicon Electronics Corporation v. American
Home Assurance Company, 542 N.E.2d 1048
Ces Ec. RAED hchnccenhaacsusunccncecennpeuedbutteteael aaa 10
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 711 P.2d 212
(OW. Bap. SIP cosas kaccdl ccna 10
Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476
N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1991) . Fis cue oRe ee 9
USF&G v. Morrison Grain Co., 7134 F. Supp. 487
CED, TOM, TGP vvsscocccsencsscidspcissee eee 9
USF&G v. T.K. Stanley, Inc.; 764 F. Supp. 81 (S.D. |
BOG. BOOED checincccc ces eee 10
U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee v. Korman Corp., 693
F. Supp. 263 (2.D. Pa. 1908)... 9
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals,
Inc., 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988) ......................... 9
Waste Mat. of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co.,
S40 S.B2G STE CIA. TBC) nic cceccccccccssessseeeeesccans 9
Statutes
SS UA; S SBC iiceaick ot eee sane 2
28 US.C. § 1382(a) (1) Bava ENT Seared fe 5 ve 2
Rules
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ... ; 2
Supreme Court Rule 10.1.. &
IN THE
Sigireuw Court of the Wuited Slates
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
No. 92-430
EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,
a Petitioner,
THE HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY CORPORATION,
a Connecticut corporation,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit is reported at 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir.
1992), and is reprinted in the Appendix to the Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari at la-17a. The order of the
Tenth Circuit denying rehearing is reprinted in the Ap-
pendix to the Petition at 18a-19a.
The opinion and order of the United States District
Court for the District of Utah (Jenkins, C.J.), granting
summary judgment for the Hartford Accident and Indem-
nity Corporation (Hartford), are reported at 765 F. Supp.
677 (D. Utah 1991), and are reprinted in the Appendix
at 20a-28a.
2
JURISDICTION
This action was brought in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(a) (1). On February 28, 1991, the district court granted
summary judgment for Respondent Hartford under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 56. On April 30, 1992, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its unanimous
opinion affirming that judgment. On June 9, 1992, the
Tenth Circuit entered an order denying Petitioner’s peti-
tion for rehearing and rejecting its suggestion for re-
hearing en bance.
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Perhaps the central theme of El] Paso Natural Gas
Company’s Petition is that there should be coverage for
the toxic chemical discharges here because E] Paso, like
most polluters, did not really mean to damage the prop-
erty of third parties or the environment. But that type
of self-serving observation skirts the true issue of insur-
ance policy construction presented in this proceeding. The
issue of construction here turns on the language of the
pollution exclusion in E] Paso’s liability policy, which
provides that El Paso’s liability insurance does not
apply:
(f) to bodily injury or property damage arising out
of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of...
toxic chemicals, ... waste materials, or other... pol-
lutants into or upon the land, the atmosphere or any
water course or body of water; but this exclusion
does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release
or escape is sudden and accidental. . . . (Doc. 94,
Exh. 4)
When the language of the pollution exclusion is con-
sidered, El] Paso’s demand for coverage completely breaks
down. El Paso does not dispute that its discharges of
3
toxic ‘wastes into and onto its land were the ultimate
source of all the property damage for which it seeks
coverage here. Nor does it dispute that those discharges
were continuous, deliberate or anything other than the
routine and regular manner by which El] Paso conducted
its business. If the plain language of El] Paso’s policy is
followed, therefore, there can be no coverage for the
property damage arising from those discharges.
From 1959 through 1974, El Paso operated a natural
gas transmission system running through Washington,
Oregon, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado and New Mex-
ico. (Doe. 95, Exh. 1, p. 2)
While it operated the system, E] Paso used Pydraul
AC, a product which contained a polychlorinated biphenyl
(“PCB”), as an air compressor lubricating oil at 15
different compressor stations located in the various states.
(Doe. 95, Exh. 1) The lubricant was continuously poured
into an 8-quart reservoir, which fed it at a rate of 3 or 4
drops per minute into a cylinder. While in the cylinder,
some of the lubricant vaporized and went with the com-
pressed air to an air receiver bottle where, because of the
increased air pressure, the used lubricant condensed and
settled to the bottom of the bottle.
To keep the air system as dry as possible, El Paso’s
employees drained the air receiver bottles every day by
means of a drain valve. They then disposed of the con-
densed liquid waste (‘including the PCB’s) by dumping
it into and on the property surrounding the compressor
stations. As Lori Komatar, the engineer in charge of
cleaning up El Paso’s PCB-cortaminated property ex-
plained:
Q: How did the PCBs get there?
A: Poor management practices. There was what
we call a blow-down pot which we found outside
several of the buildings at not all locations, a number
of locations anyway .. . where initially material
was discharged directly out of the building into the
4
ground . |W]e have also had people at the plant
site say, W ‘ell, the storm water drain is there, they
just went in and dumped it down the drain because
they didn’t want to get the floor dirty.
*% * * *
Later where they found that this was just not a good
practice to discharge oil directly into the ground,
they started running it to the pits. (Komatar Depo.,
Vol. 1, pp. 121-22)
Thus, at some compressor stations El] Paso simply
drained the PCB contaminants from the air receiver
bottles directly into the ground. At other stations, the
contaminants were drained into a concrete waste oil sump
which was then periodically pumped out into unlined
earthen pits.
The unlined pits also had discharge pipes designed to
allow any overflow to drain directly onto and into the
surrounding ground. As Lori Komatar again explained:
A: The pit itself is berm. It’s about, stands
about three feet above the ground surface and the
pit is dug about eight feet into the bottom, in to the
ground.
Q: Go ahead.
A: SoI was trying to find out how it was possibly
s getting out of the pit, the oil, and the PCB oil or
what but how that material was getting out of the
pit. And we didn’t have any idea how it could be
getting out so we talked to some other people at the
station who had been there for quite some time and
they indicated that there had been an overflow pipe
in the pit that as the level got up to a certain height
on the berm it would discharge out to the north from
the pit.
Q: The overflow pipe went off to the north?
Y A: Right. The overflow pipe came out of the pit
to the north. (Komatar Depo., Vol. 1, pp. 55-54)
Most of the lubricant containing the PCBs stayed in
the air compressors instead of being vaporized and set-
5
tling in the air receiver bottles. This contaminated liquid
was removed from the compressors during frequent oil
changes and equipment overhauls and was disposed of in
the same way as the condensed PCBs. It was either
drained into the local waste oil sumps, which were then
pumped into the unlined earthen pits, or simply dumped
directly on the ground.
In 1974, El Paso sold its natural gas transmission
system to Northwest Pipeline Corporation. El Paso
agreed, as part of the contract of sale, to indemnify
Northwest for any liability or expense arising from El
Paso’s activities prior to transferring the system to
Northwest. (Doe. 95, Exh. 1, pp. 2-8)
Northwest discovered the PCB contamination at the
compressor stations in 1987. Northwest reported the con-
tamination to governmental agencies, including the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Pur-
suant to consent orders entered into with the EPA, North-
west cleaned up the PCB contamination in the air system
equipment, drains, sumps, pits, the ground surrounding
the pits that had been contaminated by the discharge
pipes, and those areas around the auxiliary buildings
where waste oil had been dumped directly on the ground.
On June 22, 1987, Northwest filed a lawsuit against
El] Paso to recover the cleanup costs necessitated by El
Paso’s contamination of the equipment and property.
(Doe. 95, Exh. 1, 1 6-9) As a result of its own investi-
gation in the Northwest lawsuit, E] Paso believed that
it probably was “one hundred percent responsible” for
the cleanup costs and also determined that those costs
could reach $15 million. Therefore, on July 18, 1988, E]
Paso agreed to pay Northwest the $6.6 million neces-
sary to settle the lawsuit involving the cleanup costs.
After paying Northwest, E] Paso demanded that Hart-
ford and its other liability carriers indemnify it for the
full amount of the settlement. Hartford insured E] Paso
6
for general liability from January 1, 1976 to January 1,
1986. (Doc. 1, p. 3) On the basis of the express lan-
guage of its policy, Hartford declined to indemnify El
Paso and instead filed this declaratory relief action to
establish that it did not cover the damage caused by El
Paso’s discharges of toxic chemicals.
Hartford thereafter moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that any damage arising from El Paso’s reg-
ular, deliberate and continuous discharge of toxic waste
over the 15 years it operated the pipeline was not cov-
ered by the express terms of E] Paso’s liability policy.
(See Does. 43, 94, 95, 101, 102, 110, 119 and 122) Hart-
ford’s motion was based on the application of the “pollu-
tion exclusion” in the policy, which excludes coverage for
bodily injury or property damage arising from the non-
sudden or non-accidental discharge of toxic chemicals or
wastes into or upon anyone’s land. (Doc. 94, Exh. 4)
After the matter was submitted, the district court
entered a comprehensive ruling in favor of Hartford.
(Doc. 125) The court explained that the focus of the
pollution exclusion was not on whether E] Paso expected
or thought it was causing property damage to third par-
ties or releasing pollutants into the environment, but
solely on whether the toxic discharges, from which the
property damage arose, were sudden and accidental. 765
F. Supp. at 679-81. The court also reasoned that the
phrase “sudden and accidental,” as used in the pollution
exclusion, should be given its “plain and simple mean-
ing;” ie, “happening without notice and occurring by
chance.” (Jd.) In that regard, since there was nothing
sudden or accidental about El Paso’s 15 years of toxic
waste discharges into and on its land, the court held that
there could be no coverage under the plain language of
El Paso’s policy. (/d.)
El Paso appealed and the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals unanimously agreed with the district court’s analy-
sis of the controlling provisions of E] Paso’s insurance
7
policy. -Following precedent from Utah appellate courts
and the courts of other districts, the Tenth Circuit, like
the district court, held that the phrase “sudden and acci-
dental’? should be construed in context to mean “tem-
porarily, abrupt and unexpected or unintended.” 962
F.2d at 1487-92. Therefore, because E] Paso’s discharges
of toxic waste on its land could not be considered “‘sud-
den” or “accidental,” coverage for the property damage
arising from El] Paso’s toxic discharges was expressly
excluded by the plain language of the pollution exclusion
in El Paso’s poliey. (Jd.)
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
THIS CASE INVOLVES ONLY A CONTROLLING
QUESTION OF STATE CONTRACT LAW AND THE
TENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY APPLIED UTAH
LAW TO RESOLVE THIS CASE IN FAVOR OF
HARTFORD
This Court has long instructed that “state law deter-
minations by the Court of Appeals will rarely constitute
an appropriate subject” for its review. Haring v. Prosise,
462 U.S. 306, 314 n.8 (1983). Indeed, this Court pays
“great deference” to the views of the lower federal courts
on controlling issues of state law, and “is hesitant to
overrule decisions by the federal courts skilled in the law
of particular states unless their conclusions are shown
to be unreasonable.” Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 346
n.10 (1976).
Try as it might, Petitioner cannot change this diversity
case from what it is—a fact-bound determination involv-
ing state law issues of contract interpretation. The Tenth
Circuit did not keep the narrow scope of its decision a
secret. On the contrary, its opinion makes it plain that
it gave the insurance policy at issue here the interpreta-
tion it believed the Utah Supreme Court would when
applying Utah substantive law. 962 F.2d at 1486-88.
Petitioner relies on Erie v. Tompkins and conjures up
a variety of other rationales, including the supposed need
8
for nationwide uniformity of the law of the various states
on the pollution exclusion, to justify the grant of its
Petition. But this case does not present an issue of fed-
eral law, a conflict among the circuits construing an issue
of federal law, or any other reason conceivably justifying
this Court’s review. The Tenth Circuit merely carried
out its mission to interpret Utah law and it reached the
result that Utah law compelled. Even if it had erred,
Petitioner’s disagreement with that result could not make
this case worthy of this Court’s review. This case would
rernain what it always has been—a dispute about the
application of state law principles of contract construc-
tion. Such a dispute does not meet the criteria of Su-
preme Court Rule 10.1.
In any event, the Tenth Circuit was correct in holding
that the pollution exclusion precludes coverage for prop-
erty damage arising from El Paso’s discharges of toxic
wastes at its compressor stations. Although the Court
gets no hint of it from the Petition, the undisputed evi-
dence is that for 15 years E] Paso engaged in the regu-
lar, deliberate and continuous discharge of toxic waste
into and onto the land at each of the compressor stations
along its pipeline.
Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, the overwhelming
weight of authority from state to state and circuit to
circuit, in trial and appellate courts alike, has interpreted
the pollution exclusion precisely at the Tenth Circuit did
here—to preclude coverage of property damage arising
out of the regular and routine discharge of toxic wastes
by the insured onto its land. There is nothing “sudden
and accidental’ about property damage arising from
toxic discharges. that occur continuously and deliber-
ately over a period of many years as a matter of reg-
ular business practice. Property damage arising from
such non-sudden or non-accidental discharges is, more-
over, precisely what the plain language of the exclusion
excludes from coverage. E.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Triangle Indus., 1992 WL 37135 (4th Cir. 1992) ;
9
Broderick Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indus., Indem. Co.,
954 F.2d 601, 605-08 (10th Cir. 1992); Northern Ins.
Co. of New York v. Aardvark Assoc., Inc., 942 F.2d 189,
192-93 (8d Cir. 1991); Lumbermens Mut. v. Belleville
Indus., 938 F.2d 1423, 1425, 1430-31 (1st Cir. 1991);
A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 933 F.2d
66, 73 (1st Cir. 1991); New Castle County v. Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1202 (3d Cir. 1991);
Ogden Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 924 F.2d 39, 42
(2d Cir. 1991) ; Grant-Southern Iron & Metal Co. v. CNA
Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 954, 956-57 (6th Cir. 1990); EAD
Metallurgical, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 905 F.2d
8, 9-11 (2d Cir. 1990); F.L. Aerospace v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 897 F.2d 214, 217-20 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 111 S.Ct. 284 (1990); United States Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31, 34-35 (6th Cir.
1988); Great Lakes Container v. National Union Fire
Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1984).!
1To dispel any doubt about where the overwhelming weight of
authority lies on this issue, Hartford refers the Court to the fol-
lowing cases in which the pollution exclusion was held to bar cover-
age where toxic wastes were regularly and continuously discharged
by the insured onto its land as a routine business practice, resulting
in contamination to soil and ground or surface waters: Hayes v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513, 1515-16 (N.D. Fla. 1988);
U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee v. Korman Corp., 693 F. Supp. 253, 259-
61 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
656 F. Supp. 132, 140 (E.D. Pa. 1986); American States Ins. Co.
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549, 1553 (E.D. Mich. 1984) ;
see International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
552 N.E.2d 758 (Ill. App. 1988); Waste Mgt. of Carolinas, Inc. v.
Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986); Techalloy Co. v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 487 A.2d 820 (Pa. Super. 1984).
There are many more. State of New York v. Amro Realty Corp.,
745 F. Supp. 832, 839 (N.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d on this issue, 936 F.2d
1420, 1428-29 (2d Cir. 1991); USF&G v. Morrison Grain Co., 734
F. Supp. 437, 447-49 (D. Kan. 1990); Fireman’s Fund Ins. v.
Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317, 1323-24 (E.D. Mich. 1988);
Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., Ltd., No. 91-611
(OH Sept. 16, 1992); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co.,
476 N.W. 2d 392 (Mich. 1991); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v.
10
Nor is there any dispute in this case involving the
meaning to be given to the phrase “sudden and acci-
dental,” as used in the pollution exclusion in El Paso’s
policy. That question was resolved in favor of Hartford
by the Utah Court of Appeals in Gridley Assoc’s., Ltd. v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah App.
1992). The Tenth Circuit correctly followed Gridley, as
it was compelled to do. 962 F.2d at 1490. Further, every
court that has applied Utah contract construction princi-
ples law to define the meaning of “sudden and accidental”
in the pollution exclusion has reached the same result as
Gridley. See Anaconda Minerals, 773 F.Supp. at 1505;
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 765 F.Supp. at 680-81;
Sharon Steel v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., Nos. C-87-
2306 and C-87-2311 and 28 (3d Cir. Utah July 20, 1988).
The Utah law is uniform. There surely is no need for
this Court to disrupt it.
Belleville Indus., 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass. 1990); Hicks v. American
Resources Ins. Co., Inc., 554 So. 2d 952 (Ala. 1989); Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.E.2d 1154 (Ill. App.
1991).
And more still. Anaconda Minerals v. Stoller Cemicals, 773
F. Supp. 1498, 1504-05 (D. Utah 1991) ; Hudson Ins. Co. v. Double
D. Mgmt. Co., 768 F. Supp. 1542, 1547-48 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
USF&G v. T.K. Stanley, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 81, 84-85 (S.D. Miss.
1991); CPC Intern v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Inc., 759
F. Supp. 966, 973-76 (D.R.I. 1991); Covenant Ins. Co. v. Friday
Eng., Inc., 742 F. Supp. 708, 711-12 (D. Mass. 1990); Borden, Inc.
v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 927, 930 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd,
865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir. 1989); American Motorists Ins. Co. v.
General Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423, 1429 (D. Kan. 1987),
aff'd on other grounds, 946 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1991) ; Centennial
Ins. Co. v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co., 677 F. Supp. 342, 347-49
(E.D. Pa. 1987); American Mut. Liability Ins. v. Neville Chemical,
650 F. Supp. 929, 931-33 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Technicon Electronics
Corporation v. American Home Assurance Company, 542 N.E.2d
1048, 1049-51 (N.Y. 1989); Lower Paxton Township v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 557 A.2d 393, 402 (Pa. Super.
1989); Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 548 N.E.2d 1301,
1302 (N.Y. 1989); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 711 P.2d 212,
244 (Or. App. 1985).
—— xo
11
Thus, notwithstanding Petitioner’s creative efforts to
make it so, there is simply no issue here for this Court to
review. It is not within this Court’s purview to bring
“nationwide uniformity” to state law principles of con-
tract construction as applied in diversity cases and that
is true whether the issue involves the construction of an
insurance policy or any other contract.
Even if this Court could somehow undertake that task,
there is no compelling need for it to do so in this case.
There already is a solid—indeed overwhelming—nation-
wide consensus that property damege arising from regu-
lar, deliberate and continuous discnarges of toxic waste,
like those involved here, is expressly excluded from cover-
age by the plain terms of a CGL policy, like El Paso’s.
If any cases are in need of this Court’s attention, it is
those decisions that have reached a contrary conclusion,
and not one, like the Tenth Circuit’s, that has landed
firmly in the mainstream.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES C. MARTIN PAUL C. DROZ
(Of Counsel) (Counsel of Record)
CROSBY, HEAFEY, ROACH JOY L. CLEGG
& MAY SNOW, CHRISTENSEN
Professional Corporation & MARTINEAU
700 South Flower Street 10 hxchange Place
Suite 2200 Eleventh Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017 Post Office Box 45000
(213) 896-8000 Salt Lake City, UT 84145
(801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Respondent,
The Hartford Accident and Indemnity Corporation
Dated: October —, 1992
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.