Opposition Brief — Mobley v. United States

Supreme Court brief1992

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No. 92-279 . WOVE 992

DFPIOE GE JHE CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

GERALD I. MOBLEY, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

IN OPPOSITION

KENNETH W. STARR

Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 514-2217

RICHARD L. PURDON

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the prosecutor’s references to petitioner’s

failure to testify at trial were harmless beyond a rea-

sonable doubt.

2. Whether petitioner was denied a fair trial when an

automobile belonging to the husband of the murder

victim was returned to its owner before petitioner was

afforded an opportunity to inspect it.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) ............. . 15, 16,17

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (19638) ....................00e. 15

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) ............ 15, 16, 17

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) 0.0.0.0... eee. 10

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) ...................... 10

Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (1961) ..........000.... 16

Lent v. Wells. 861 F.2d 972 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,

I an sa neuntbabunnanenntnnd 11

United Staies v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) ............. 10

Statutes:

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 801 ef seq.:

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(IIT)

Jn the Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

No. 92-279

GERALD I. MOBLEY, PETITIONER

Uv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the Court of Military Appeals affirm-

ing petitioner’s conviction, Pet. App. la, is not yet

officially reported. The opinion of the Air Force

Court of Military Review on remand, Pet. App. 2a-12a,

is reported at 34 M.J. 527. An earlier opinion of the

Court of Military Appeals, Pet. App. 13a-30a, is re-

ported at 31 M.J. 273. An earlier opinion of the Air

Force Court of Military Review, Pet. App. 3la-52a, is

reported at 28 M.J. 1024.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Military Appeals was

entered on May 15, 1992. The petition for a writ of

(1)

certiorari was filed on August 13, 1992. The Court’s

jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1259(3).

STATEMENT

Following a general court-martial at Bergstrom

Air Force Base in Texas, petitioner, a member of the

United States Air Force, was convicted on one count

of premeditated murder and one count of attempted

rape, in violation of Articles 118 and 80 of the Uniform

Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. 918 and

880. He was sentenced to confinement for life, a

dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and

allowances, and a reduction in rank to the lowest

enlisted grade. The convening authority approved the

findings and sentence except for the forfeitures,

which he reduced to $300 of pay per month for 16

months. The Air Force Court of Military Review

initially affirmed the findings, as modified, and the

sentence approved by the convening authority. The

Court of Military Appeals granted discretionary

review, set aside the decision of the Air Force Court

of Military Review, and remanded the case to that

court to address certain questions regarding the

prosecutor’s closing argument. On remand, the Air

Force Court of Military Review found that some

aspects of the prosecutor’s closing argument were

improper, but held that the improper remarks were

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On further

consideration, the Court of Military Appeals affirmed.

l.a. The victim was the 25-year-old wife of an

airman first class. She worked as a cashier at the

Noncommissioned Officers’ (NCO) Club at Bergstrom

Air Force Base. When she did not return home on the

night of February 7, 1987, her husband became

concerned and drove to the NCO Club to look for her.

He found her lying unconscious and bleeding on the

floorboard of the front seat of her car, the apparent

victim of a beating, sexual assault, and strangulation.

Her body was transported to a hospital, where it was

determined that she was “brain dead.” Pet. App. 15a,

a9,

Jad.

The victim had been severely beaten. There was

trauma to her head caused by at least four blows from

the assailant’s fist. The injuries to her neck were

caused by use of the car’s seat belt strap to strangle

her. There were bruises on the victim’s legs caused

by sustained pressure from the assailant’s hands to

separate the victim’s legs. Tr. 996-1001. The cause of

death was asphyxia due to strangulation. Pet. App.

l5a, 32a. There was no eyewitness to the crime, but

various items of circumstantial evidence proved that

petitioner had assaulted and murdered the victim.

| A receipt bearing petitioner’s name was found in the front

seat of the victim’s car. Pet. App. 16a, 32a. Petitioner’s

permanent duty station was in California, but he had been

temporarily assigned to attend the Bergstrom NCO Academy

at the time of the murder. Jbid. A bloody palm print and

fingerprint were found in the vehicle on a piece of paper, and

the palm print positively matched a known print of petition-

er’s. Pet. App. 17a, 33a. A forensic test on saliva taken from

petitioner matched semen found on the carpet of the car and

on the victim’s dress and panties. A pubic hair found in the car

matched the unusual pubic hair sample taken from petitioner.

Pet. App. 16a, 17a, 32a. Blood on both sides, the sleeves, and

the cuffs of a leather jacket seized from petitioner’s residence

matched the rare blood type of the victim. Pet. App. 16a. An

expert testified that the odds of the blood found on the jacket

not being the victim’s were one in 330. Tr. 954.

b. In the early morning hours of February 7, 1987,

Detective Hesskew of the Austin Police Department

A witness testified that a man matching petitioner’s descrip-

tion, wearing a leather jacket, walked in and out of the

Bergstrom NCO Club several times on the night of the murder,

acting in a manner that frightened the witness. Pet. App. 16a,

32a; Tr. 592-595. A dusty shoe imprint taken from the window

of the victim’s car matched the sole of one of the shoes

petitioner was wearing when he was contacted by the police.

Pet. App. 16a, 32a-33a. Petitioner had cashed a number of

checks at the NCO Club. On the day of the murder, the victim

had cashed one of petitioner’s checks. An academy classmate

of petitioner’s quoted petitioner as saying of the victim that

“he wouldn’t kick her out of bed for eating crackers and

wouldn’t mind having a piece of her ass.” Tr. 669, 714, 760-763;

PX 9.

Petitioner had injured his right thumb playing basketball on

January 30, 1987. The thumb was x-rayed and had a splint

placed on it at the base hospital. When petitioner was

interviewed by investigators, he complained about the thumb,

saying he had only limited, painful movement of it. The

contusions on the victim’s calf, which indicated strong,

sustained pressure to keep her legs apart, were caused by

someone who used the four fingers of a right hand without also

using the thumb. Tr. 751-752, 778, 1000-1001; PX 15, at 45-46.

When he was contacted by investigators, petitioner had

several scratch marks on his face and neck. He claimed that he

got the scratches playing basketball at the NCO Academy.

None of the men with whom petitioner had played ball

corroborated his story. Petitioner was at a barbecue at another

classmate’s home for five hours during the afternoon of the

murder, a Saturday. The classmate did not notice any

scratches on petitioner at that time. The following Monday

morning, the classmate noticed that petitioner had scratches on

his face. An expert testified that the scratches on petitioner

were consistent with a frontal assault by an individual facing

(APD) and Special Agent Brown of the Air Force

Office of Special Investigations (OSI), together with

an identification specialist (Koschell) from the APD,

returned to review the crime scene after seeing the

victim at the hospital. The car door handle was

fingerprinted first, so that entry into the vehicle

would not destroy potential evidence. Due to the poor -

lighting in the NCO Club parking lot and heavy

condensation that would retard fingerprinting efforts,

the car was sealed and transported to a locked garage

at the APD station. Pet. App. 33a; Tr. 646-648.

Later that day, APD Detective Hesskew began an

examination of the vehicle. First, the car was pho-

tographed several times. Detective Hesskew, who

was the State of Texas’ expert in blood splatter

analysis, scrutinized the array of blood and blood

splatters throughout the front seat area of the car.

Koschell extensively analyzed the interior and ex-

terior of the car for prints. He found prints from the

victim, the victim’s husband, and others he classified

as “unidentified.” Hesskew inventoried the interior

of the vehicle using rubber gloves and tweezers to

remove objects. The car was divided into sections and

a special vacuum cleaner was used on each one; the

contents were removed and sealed after each section

was swept. A special fluorescent light was used to

detect any blood, semen, or other evidence of fluids.

Hesskew observed and detailed each of the items he

found and removed from the car—including semen,

hairs, the victim’s shoes, her keys and purse, a piece

him, and were not consistent with petitioner’s explanations.

Pet. App. 16a; Tr. 781-784, 995-996

of folded paper, and another piece of paper with a

bloody print on it. The front seat belt, which appeared

to have blood stains on it, was also cut out and

subjected to analysis. Pet. App. 33a-34a; Tr. 652-667;

PX 29.

Following the inventory of the car, and on the same

day, Detective Hesskew interviewed the victim’s

husband at the APD. Agent Brown and Detective

Hesskew’s supervisor were also present. The hus-

band was advised of his rights as a suspect, but based

on the resu'ts of the interview and other evidence in

the case, Detective Hesskew and Agent Brown

quickly and independently concluded that he was not a

suspect. Pet. App. 34a; Tr. 666-667, 713-714.

Kight to ten days after the murder, and after no

major breaks had occurred in the case, Detective

Hesskew began to review the evidence in the case. He

noted that the folded piece of paper that was retrieved

from the front seat of the car appeared not to have

been fingerprinted. He took it to Koschell to have it

examined. Koschell returned about an hour later

with the paper unfolded, showing it to be the receipt

with petitioner’s name on it. Following a personnel

check on petitioner and a review of the cashiers’

records at the NCO Club, Detective Hesskew and

Agent Brown flew to California to interview peti

tioner, which they did on February 17, 1987. The

investigators noted and photographed the scratches

on petitioner; petitioner was interviewed; the shoe

and leather jacket were seized; and the blood, saliva

and hair samples were taken from petitioner. There

after, petitioner’s friends and acquaintances from the

NCO Academy were interviewed. Pet. App. 16a, 32a;

Tr. 669, 715; PXs 6, 23, 24 ;

Petitioner was placed in pretria nfinement at

Bergstrom on February 24, 1987; he was formally

charged the following day. Between February 17 and

February 24, petitioner consulted with a Captain

Mahone, who had been detailed to represent him. On

February 25, lead defense counsel, Captain Nix, was

detailed to represent petitioner. Pet. App. 18a, 34a;

Tr. 88-88.

On February 25, Detective Hesskew and his super-

visors at the APD released the car to its owner, the

victim’s husband. That action was in accordance with

standard operating procedures of the APD. Detective

Hesskew called Agent Brown and told him that they

were releasing the vehicle. Under APD procedures,

the officers were not required to notify anyone other

than the owner of the property. The APD had used

the same procedure for at least 15 years. Pet. App.

17a, 18a, 34a; Tr. 102-105.

The defense did not learn until mid-March that the

ar had been released to the victim’s husband. No

defense counsel had called APD seeking permission

to look at the vehicle. The physical evidence taken

from the vehicle was available to the defense for

inspection. Pet. App. 18a, 34a; Tr. 85-86, 218.

ce. During his closing argument, the prosecuting

attorney posed various questions to the members of

the court-martial panel and then answered the

questions based on evidence admitted at trial.2. The

“ The appendix to the Court of Military Appeals’ initial

opinion contains excerpts of the prosecuting attorney's closing

argument. Pet. App. 28a-30a

defense did not object, and the trial judge did not

intervene sua sponte. After the prosecutor had com-

pleted his argument, the defense moved for a mistrial,

asserting that the prosecuting attorney had called

attention to the fact that the petitioner did not

testify. Pet. App. 2a. The trial judge viewed the

argument as acceptable commentary, but gave a

curative instruction to the court-martial panel. The

defense did not object to the instruction as given, nor

did the defense request any additional instruction.

Pet. App. 8a-9a, 24a-25a.

2. The court of military review affirmed. Pet. App.

Sla-52a. The court found no prejudicial error in the

release of the car to the victim’s husband on March

24, 1987. The court noted that the physical evidence

actually removed from the vehicle and the forensic

tests conducted on that evidence were available for

examination by the defense. The court viewed the car

as the crime scene itself, and concluded that the

authorities were not required to preserve the crime

scene until defense representatives could examine it.

[he court found no evidence of bad faith on the part of

the government in releasing the car; the court also

noted that any benefit that might have resulted fron

defense examination of the vehicle while it was i

police custody was purely speculative. Pet. App. 3la

5ba.

. The Court of Military Appeals reject

tioners argument that the release of the vel

denied him a fair trial. Pet. App. 17a-22a. The rt

held that the Constitution does not requir

government to preserve a crime scene for e»

tion DY defense representatives LiL!

was critical of the timing of the release of the car, the

court noted that the car was not released by military

police, but by the Austin city police, and detected no

bad faith on the part of the APD officers involved.

Pet. App. 20a, 22a. After reviewing the record, the

court found no basis to conclude that exculpatory

evidence was destroyed because the car was returned

to its owner. Pet. App. 2la. The Court of Military

Appeals, however, was troubled by the possibility that

the prosecutor may have commented on petitioner’s

silence at trial. The court therefore remanded the

case to the court of military review for it to readdress

this issue. Pet. App. 27a.

1. On remand, the court of military review found

improper certain aspects of the prosecutor’s argu-

ment. Pet. App. 3a-5a. Nevertheless, the court con-

cluded that any error was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. Pet. App. lla.

5. On further review, the Court of Military Ap-

peals summarily affirmed. Pet. App. la.

ARGUMENT

1. Petitioner argues that the prosecutor’s closing

argument Was Improper since he referred to the fact

that petitioner remained silent at trial.* The court of

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military review agreed with petitioner, concluding

that the prosecutor’s argument indirectly called

attention to efendant’s failure to testify at trial.

Accordingly, this case does not present that question.

The only question that is properly at issue here is the

correctness of the ruling of the military appellate

courts that the prosecutor’s closing argument was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Although peti-

tioner challenges the rulings below in that regard,

Pet. 6, the fact-bound ruling of the military appellate

courts to the contrary does not warrant review by

this Court.

A prosecutor’s improper comment on a defendant’s

failure to testify at trial is subject to harmless error

analysis. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499

(1983). “The primary task of this Court upon review

of a harmless-error determination by the court of

appeals is to ensure that the court undertook a

thorough inquiry and made clear the basis of its

decision.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 326 n.10

(1985). Here, the court of military review correctly

explained that the inquiry, under Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), is whether the error

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Pet. App.

9a. In undertaking that inquiry, the court carefully

reviewed the record and considered four factors,

which are appropriate to a harmless error analysis:

(1) whether €¢he prosecutor’s argument was man-

ifestly intended as a comment on the defendant’s

addition, although the prosecutor in rebuttal commenced an

argument about the defense’s failure to call witnesses, the

defense objected before he completed those remarks, and the

trial judge sustained the objection. Pet. App. 12a-13a; Tr. 1049.

11

failure to testify, or would naturally and necessarily

have been so understood by the court-martial panel;

(2) whether the improper comments were isolated or

extensive; (3) whether the proof of the defendant’s

guilt was overwhelming; and (4) whether and when

curative instructions were given. Pet. App. 10a,

citing Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 975 (6th Cir. 1988),

cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100 (1989).

With regard to the first factor, the court of military

review noted, as did the Court of Military Appeals,

that appellate judges are at a disadvantage in judging

arguments of counsel, because they are not present to

observe the attorney’s demeanor, tone of voice, voice

inflections, pauses, or nuances of his language. Pet.

App. 4a, 25a. The reviewing courts found it signifi-

cant that there was no contemporaneous objection by

defense counsel, and the trial judge did not feel the

need to intervene sua sponte. Pet. App. 7a, 25a. In

denying the defense motion for a mistrial. the trial

judge said: “I find that it was evident [that] the

pattern of rheterical questions were just that,

rhetorical in nature only, and obviously, under the

circumstances, not asked in a manner which invited

attention to the fac. that the accused did not testify in

his own behalf in this trial.” Tr. 1035. While it

disagreed with the trial judge’s characterization of

portions of the argument, the court of military review

did not find the argument “so egregious as to have

required the military judge to interrupt on his own

motion.” Pet. App. 7a. The court of military review

specifically found that the prosecuting attorney “did

not deliberately” engage in impermissible argument,

and did not find that the prosecutor “manifestly

12

intended” to comment on petitioner’s silence. Pet.

App. 10a. That finding is entitled to respect, since the

courts of military review have independent fact-

finding authority under Article 66(c) of the UCMJ, 10

U.S.C. 866(c). Similarly, the court did not find that

the jury would “naturally and necessarily” construe

the argument as a reflection on petitioner’s failure to

testify. Pet. App. 10a.

Concerning the second factor, the court of military

review noted that the rhetorical questions did not

“account for a large portion of the total argument

presented.” Pet. App. lla. In addition, as the court

of military review remarked, the lack of any defense

objection “contributed to the extent of improper

argument.” Ibid.

As to the third factor, the Court of Military Ap-

peals and two separate panels of the court of military

review characterized the evidence of petitioner’s guilt

as “overwhelming.” Pet. App. 16a, lla, 43a. Without

undertaking an exhaustive review of the evidence, the

evidence included: the receipt containing petitioner’s

name in the front seat of the automobile; the bloody

palm/finger print in the vehicle that positively mat-

ched petitioner’s; the forensic analysis of the seminal

fluid and pubic hair found in the vehicle; the com-

parison of blood samples from the crime scene and

petitioner’s clothing; the imprint on the car window of

the sole of a shoe that matched one worn by peti-

tioner; petitioner’s expressed sexual interest in the

victim; and the scratches on petitioner’s face and

neck.

Respecting the final factor, although the trial judge

did not find the argument to be in error, he provided a

13

proper and effective curative instruction in response

to the defense motion for a mistrial. He told the jury,

Pet. App. 24a n.4 (emphasis omitted).

The accused has an absolute right to remain

silent. You will not draw any inference adverse to

the accused from the fact that he did not testify as

a witness in this case. The fact that the accused

has not testified on any other matter must be

disregarded by you. And, in this regard, you heard

the trial counsel during the course of. his

argument of the evidence, ask certain rhetorical

questions which appeared to be directed towards

the accused, Sergeant Mobley. I think it was

obvious to you that these were [a] rhetorical form

of questions and a rhetorical form of argument,

but I do caution you again, that the accused has an

absolute right to remain silent, and you will not

draw any inference adverse to the accused from

the fact that he did not testify as a witness.

That instruction, of course, was in addition to the

judge’s other instructions that the burden of proof

was solely upon the government and that the

argument of counsel was neither evidence nor a

statement of the law for them to follow. Tr. i055,

1061.

The decision below clearly reflected a carefully

considered analysis of the harmless error issue.

Moreover, the decision was correct. As the court of

military review explained, the proof of petitioner’s

guilt, although circumstantial, was overwhelming.

Pet. App. lla, 43a. The prosecutor’s comments, even

if erroneous, could not have prejudiced petitioner.

14

2. Petitioner argues that he was denied a fair trial

by the government’s use of evidence obtained from a

search of the victim’s car. The military courts,

however, correctly rejected that claim, and their

decisions do not warrant review by this Court.

While defense counsel’s motion in limine focused

on Detective Hesskew’s testimony regarding blood

splatters, petitioner’s written motion to suppress and

the petition filed in this Court attempt to include all

of the evidence seized or derived from the car. Pet.

App. 17a. At the outset, it must be noted that all of

the physical evidence and forensic tests were pre-

served and available to the defense. Pet. App. 21a, 36a.

Accordingly, there is no issue in this case whether

the government properly disclosed to the defense the

evidence it obtained from an examination of the

victim’s car. Rather, the question is whether the

government acted improperly in some way by

returning the car to its rightful owner without first

allowing petitioner to examine the car, or informing

him about its imminent release.

The court of military review correctly character-

ized the car as the “crime scene” in this case, Pet.

App. 35a, and correctly noted as well that there is no

constitutional requirement that the government

maintain and secure a crime scene for lengthy periods

of time while a suspect is captured and his attorney

has a chance to examine it, ibid. Petitioner’s rights

were adequately protected by the preservation of the

evidence taken from the car, the numerous photo-

graphs taken, the availability of the examiners for

interview and cross-examination, and even the avail-

ability of the vehicle after it was released.

15

Insofar as the car itself had any evidentiary value,

the fact remains, as noted by the court of military

review, that “any benefit that might have resulted

from a defense examination of the vehicle while it was

in police custody is purely speculative.” Pet. App.

36a. The trial judge found “no indication whatsoever

that any evidence in the car, either inculpatory or

exculpatory, material or otherwise, was lost, over-

looked, or not removed.” Pet. App. 19a n.3. And the

Court of Military Appeals’ review of the record

“suggest[ed] no reasonable theory upon which we

could conclude that ‘evidence favorable to an accused’

was destroyed because the car was returned to the

victim’s husband.” Pet. App. 21a, citing Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

The constitutional duty to preserve evidence is

limited to evidence that might be expected to play a

significant role in the suspect’s defense. The ev-

idence must possess an exculpatory value that was

apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and the

defendant must be unable to obtain comparable

evidence by any other reasonably available means.

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988): Cal-

fornia v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984). The failure

to preserve potentially useful evidence does not

constitute a denial of due process unless the de-

fendant can establish bad faith on the part of the law

enforcement authorities. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488

U.S. at 58. Petitioner cannot make that showing.

In ruling on the motion to suppress at trial, the

judge found:

There is no indication whatsoever that the action

of the Austin Police Department in returning the

16

auto to its owner after an exhaustive crime scene

examination of the interior was motivated by an

intention to circumvent disclosure requirements.

It was, rather, done in good faith and in accor-

dance with the department’s standard practice.

Pet. App. 18a n.3.4 The court of military review said,

“we can find no evidence of bad faith on the part of the

Government, including agents of the Office of Special

Investigations,” who maintained the liaison with the

APD. Pet. App. 35a. And the Court of Military Ap-

peals concluded that “[petitioner] has made no show-

ing of ‘bad faith.’” Pet. App. 20a (quoting Arizona v.

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58). Even defense counsel,

who testified on petitioner’s motion to suppress, dia

not believe that either the federal government or the

APD tried to conceal evidence. Tr. 88. Defense

counsel also acknowledged that the defense had not

sought permission to examine the car and that the

defense had access to the vehicle after it was released.

Tr. 85-86. See T'rombetta, 467 U.S. at 488; Aillian v.

United States, 368 U.S. 231, 242 (1961).

Petitioner attempts to distinguish Youngblood

from his case, noting that in Youngblood the State

did not use test results based on evidence that was

lost or destroyed before it could be examined by the

defense. Pet. 21. That purported distinction lacks

4 The Court of Military Appeals emphasized, “the vehicle

was returned to the victim’s husband by the Austin city police

officials, not by the military police. It is doubtful that those

officials would be cognizant of the high standards created by

Article 46 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and we

detect no bad faith on their part in releasing the car as they

did. Arizona v. Youngblood, supra.” Pet. App. 22a.

17

merit, however, for several reasons. First, the bulk of

the evidence in this case proving petitioner’s guilt

was preserved. Second, this Court held that the

evidence not preserved in Trombetta was properly

used against the defendant in that case. 467 U.S. at

491. Third, since this case did not involve a failure to

disclose material, exculpatory evidence in violation of

Brady, Youngblood required petitioner to prove that

the APD and OSI acted in “bad faith” in failing to

preserve “potentially” useful evidence. 488 U.S. at 58.

Petitioner has not made such a showing.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.

Respectfully submitted.

KENNETH W. STARR

Solicitor General

RICHARD L. PURDON

Col., AFLSA, USAF

JEFFERY T. INFELISE

iF Col... AF LSA. USAF

THOMAS EF. WAND

Capt., AFLSA, USAF

Aj pe llate Government Counsel

Government Trial and Appe llate

’ }

Counsel Division

NOVEMBER 1992

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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