Appendix — Bright v. Rutgers
Supreme Court brief1992
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No. 92-254
donee Cot, ws,
FILED
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IN THE
GFFIGE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
JAY B. BRIGHT,
Petitioner,
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF
NEW JERSEY; RUTGERS COUNCIL OF AAUP
CHAPTERS; THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; and NEW JERSEY
DIVISION OF STATE POLICE,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUTI
APPENDIX OF RESPONDENT
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF
NEW JERSEY, TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
JOHN B,. WOLF
Rutgers, The State University
of New Jersey
New Brunswick, New Jersey
September 9, 1992
ARON M. SCHWARTZ *
VOGEL, CHAIT, SCHWARTZ
AND COLLINS
A Professional Corporation
=
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7 Headquarters Plaza,
North Tower
Morristown, New Jersey 07960
08903 (201) 538-3800
*Counsel of Record.
Wesington OC
+ THIEL PRESS
* (202) 328-3286
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Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX A — Complaint, filed September 21, 1988....... la
APPENDIX B — Plaintiff’s Motions Returnable January
20, 1989, dated December 15, 1988 ................ 10a
APPENDIX C — Opinion (per Hon. Stanley Brotman,
USDJ) dated January 19, 1989, filed January 19,
So Sve eee eG Se Ek TET ee OP eee eee eee 12a
APPENDIX D — Plaintiff's Motions Returnable March
ee ee ae 17a
APPENDIX E — Plaintiff’s Urgent Petitions as follows,
eS Oe Oo ka kk eh 660 8 He aa ew 20a
APPENDIX F — Plaintiff’s Elaboration of his 3-3-1989
Petition #3 dated March 13,1989 .............e02. 23a
APPENDIX G — Opinion (per Hon. Stanley Brotman,
USDJ) dated March 14, 1989, filed March 22,
APPENDIX H — Amended Answer on Behalf of Defendant,
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, filed
eel ne DEE POT ERE CEE TAT CER CUETO TEEE 34a
APPENDIX I — Plaintiff’s Various Motions Including
Motions to Compel Discovery, et al., dated Septem-
et ere be Le a ens wks coh ee ka dw 2 4la
APPENDIX J — Order (per Hon. Stanley Brotman) dated
Octobe: 30, 1989, filed October 30,1989 ............ 43a
APPENDIX K — Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment
(filed by Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey),
ee PE OD 6 Sc a eee e ee bAs eek bad ee 44a
APPENDIX L — Affidavit of Peter Weissenberg, filed
o£ ee ee ee 46a
w/attached Letter of March 6, 1984 from Dr. Peter
Weissenberg to plaintiff, attached as Exhibit B
odin oe 5la
w/attached Letter of March 23, 1984 from plaintiff
to Dr. Weissenberg, attached as Exhibit C to
Sls 6 606 6a 0 hw ewe O64 06 wee 68 53a
(i)
Page
APPENDIX M — Affidavit of Walter Gordon, filed February
20, 1990 .... ces bee ae hee see eS oes 68 54a
w/attached Letter of June 13, 1984 from plaintiff to
Dr. Walter Gordon, attached as Exhibit E........... 6la
APPENDIX N — Transcript portions of plaintiff's deposi-
tion of July 12, 19GB... sscaseeae eee eae ss ss 62a
APPENDIX O — Transcript portions of plaintiff’s deposi-
tion of July 264, 1908. os sahara se eso 82a
APPENDIX P — Plaintiff’s Affidavit Seeking a Rule 56(f)
Continuance of the University’s Summary Judgment
Motion, filed March: 2, 5900): sa 505s ee ee kat 97a
APPENDIX Q — Opinion (per Hon. Stanley Brotman,
USDJ) dated February 15, 1991, filed February 19,
1991... cence & oe ae ees 10la
APPENDIX R — Order (per Hon. Stanley Brotman, USDJ)
dated February 15, 1991, filed February 19,1991...... llla
APPENDIX S — Opinion (per Hon. Stanley Brotman,
USDJ) dated Anvil 2, 1991, filed April 2,1991........ 112a
APPENDIX T — Order (per Hon. Stanley Brotman, USDJ)
dated April 2, 1991, filed April 2,1991............. 116a
APPENDIX U — Order (per Hon. Stanley Brotman, USDJ)
dated May 20, 1991, filed May 20,1991 ............ 118a
APPENDIX V — Order of U.S. Court of Aopeals dated
December 5, 1991 . . «6053 ae eee aes 120a
APPENDIX W — Judgment Order of U.S. Court of
Appeais dated March 16, 1908. s:i. 6s suas ces e se vies 123a
APPENDIX X — Sur Petition for Rehearing (U.S. Court
of Appeals) dated Apeld 25, S0IE cass ste e ue an 64 66s 125a
APPENDIX Y —
— EEOC Charge Number 031860632 .............. 126a
— EEOC Charge Number 031862289 .............. 128a
— EEOC Charge Number 170871770 .............. 130a
— EEOC Determination — Charge Number
081860682 ... ci csb in eee eee eke eee Oe ee 133a
— EEOC Determination — Charge Number
0381862289 .. ccc uccsnthee ee eee ee eee ae ee 138a
(122)
Page
— EEOC Determination — Charge Number
og Se ee oe ee ee ee ee 142a
— EEOC Determination on Review and Dismissal of
Title VII Charge — Charge Number 031862289...... 147a
— EEOC Determination on Review and Dismissal of
Title VII Charge — Charge Number 170871770...... 149a
~ EEOC Determination on Review and Dismissal of
Title VII Charge — Charge Number 031860632. ..... 152a
APPENDIX Z — Statutory Provisions Involved:
aS os ek 6g 6 hk kh. 68.60.4088 680 ae 154a
ee a Ss a awh Oe 86 oe ek 154a
Se | re re 154a
a ee ee ee 155a
i ee ek kb bp eos bv ot ea wee eee 156a
SR 156a
So A) er 157a
SS Ee ee 157a
AS eee eee ee ee ee 158a
la
APPENDIX A
Sept. 21, 1988
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Docket No. 88-4115 S.S.B.
Date Filed Sept. 21, 1988
JAY B. BRIGHT
Plaintiff
V.
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY
Defendant
RUTGERS COUNCIL OF AAUP CHAPTERS
Co-Defendant
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Co-Defendant
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Co-Defendant
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF STATE POLICE,
Co-Defendant
2a
CIVIL ACTION JURY DEMAND
1. Plaintiff: The plaintiff in this action is Dr. Jav B.
Bright (Jyotindra Bhupatrai Bhatt at birth, Americanized
to Jay B. Bright), a naturalized United States Citizen,
resident of New Jersey and residing at 212 Hillcrest Ave-
nue, Collingswood, New Jersey. Plaintiff, filing pro se,
files this suit upon the following defendants.
2. Defendants: The defendant in this action is Rut-
gers, the State University of New Jersey (generally called
Rutgers University), a public institution; its principal
representative being the officer in charge of the univer-
sity’s Camden campus and others with whom he/she
worked directly or indirectly, resulting in injury to plain-
tiff. The co-defendants in this action are the faculty
union at Rutgers (the Rutgers Council of AAUP Chap-
ters) its principal representatives being those officers who
handled and were responsible for plaintiff’s interests; the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) its representatives
being those whose actions injured plaintiff; and the New
Jersey Division of State Police its representatives being
those whose actions injured plaintiff; and Immigration
and Naturalization Service, U.S. Dept. of Justice.
3. Other parties litigably involved: The following are
among the parties litigably involved in this action and to
be possibly included as defendants in subsequent amend-
ments to this complaint: The Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC); William Bradford Reynolds
the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights; Edwin
Meese, the former Attorney General; Samuel Alito, Jr.
the U.S. Attorney for New Jersey; Former Secretary of
Education William Bennett; New Jersey State Republi-
can Party.
3a
4. Jurisdiction: This court has jurisdiction over this
action pursuant to the Fourth, the Fifth and the Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and
the following sections of 42 United States Code: 1981,
1983, 1985(2), 1986, 1988, 2000e, 2000e-2(a)(1),
2000e-2(a)(2), 2000e-3(a), 2000e-5(f)(3), 2000e-(6)(a),
and 2000e-(6)(b); and further pursuant to 28 United
States Code 1343, 2201, 2202; and further pursuant to
the pendent jurisdiction of this court.
5. Summary of Complaint and Factual Background:
Plaintiff was an employee of Rutgers University from
July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1988 employed as an Assistant
Professor of Finance in the Faculty of Business Studies at
the Camden Campus. Plaintiff earned his Ph.D. degree
from the School of Business Administration of the Uni-
versity of Houston, Houston, Texas, in 1969, and worked
as a professor between 1969 and 1984 rising from an
Assistant Professor in 1969 to a Full Professor and Direc-
tor of a Graduate program in Business Management (Ex-
hibit 1),
6. In July, 1984 Rutgers University employed him at
the entry level position, an Assistant Professorship, and
offered him a salary of $30,140 per academic year (Ex-
hibit 2) which was about $10,000- below any other Ph.D.
in his department (the Faculty of Business Studies) and
$8,000- below even non-Ph.D.’s in his department (em-
ployer has refused to supply facts needed; exhibits 3 and
4); assigned plaintiff an office with a group of non-Ph.D.’s
in the department and away and on a separate floor from
the main floor of the department where all the Ph.D.’s in
the dept. were housed—and this despite the fact that sev-
eral non-minority non-Ph.D.’s were housed with the
Ph.D.’s (Exh. 5).
4a
7. When plaintiff tried to reason with the university
administration, he met with hostility which escalated
into harassment and later brutality and a systematic con-
spiracy and campaign to malign, defame and discredit
him and a conspiracy to abridge his civil rights (exhibits
6, 7, and 8). The university administraton ignored plain-
tiff’s pleas for a campus-wide committee of non-partisan
professors. The plaintiff took his grievance before the
faculty union who (knowingly) presented his matter to
the administration (late) and the latter rejected it as un-
timely filed (Exh. 9). Fearing State-wide implications, the
university intensified concerted efforts involving numer-
ous parties on and off campus to malign, defame and dis-
credit plaintiff and, he is led to believe, ‘‘Federalized”’
the matter with defendants’ and others’ influence to the
plaintiff’s detriment. The union had filed the grievance
late although it had been alerted by plaintiff at an early
stage initially verbally and later in writing (Exh. 7).
Surely, the union knew the rules and procedures well—
it has worked hand in hand with the same university
administration for nearly twelve years. Subsequently, the
union and the university knowingly put the matter before
an unqualified arbitrator—one in the New Jersey State,
Board of Mediation. Both the university and the union
knew that the said Board hears complaints against “pri-
vate” employers (Exh. 10), and that a New Jersey Board
should not hear complaints against a New Jersey institu-
tion (Rutgers). The New Jersey State Board of Mediation
is equally at fault as this and other information (pre-
sented later in this complaint) leads plaintiff to believe.
Furthermore, the plaintiff is led to believe that the uni-
versity and the union—with the New Jersey Mediation
Board’s complicity—have engaged in such practices in
the case of other Rutgers professors. These and a number
-
5a
of other concerned individuals on and off campus indi-
cated to the plaintiff that they will testify in his behalf.
Fraud, collusion and conspiracy between the university
and the union to interfere with plaintiff’s civil rights
went much further: at no time has plaintiff met or seen
or heard from the arbitrator, nor despite written request
did the union clear with the plaintiff its brief to arbitra-
tor, nor have there been any hearings held by the arbi-
trator where plaintiff could give testimony or could have
professors, staff, students and others testify at the hear-
ings, nor has plaintiff ever been supplied with any rulings
issued by the arbitrator, nor has the arbitrator himself
sent the plaintiff anything despite repeated written re-
quests, while the parties carried on their deceit, fraud
and criminality (Exhs. 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15).
8 On November 11, 1985 plaintiff filed a charge
against the employer with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) at its field office in Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania and four subsequent charges on May
8, 1986, January 30, 1987, March 18, 1987 and July 22,
1987; and kept the EEOC informed of employer’s bla-
tant, brutal and massive retaliation against plaintiff (Ex-
hibits 16a through 16f, and others). The EEOC gave
increasing indications of repeatedly ignoring documented
evidence of employer’s unlawful discrimination and
retaliation against the plaintiff, while the employer
stepped up their unlawfulness (Exh. 17a to 26, and
others). There were strong and repeated indications of
EEOC personnel being coerced and intimidated by other
agencies of the United States Government. Plaintiff is led
to believe that among others, U.S. Dept. of Justice’s
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service; and apart from them the U.S. Dept.
6a
Education are involved. Additionally, the U.S. Attor-
ney for New Jersey, Asst. Attorney General for Civil
Rights, and former Attorney General Edwin Meese, in
keeping with the Reagan-Meese declared hostility tow-
ard Civil Rights and Affirmative action, were litigably in-
volved (42 USC 1986 and 1985(2), among others). Sev-
eral of the latter involved New Jersey State agencies in-
cluding the New Jersey Division of State Police and the
New Jersey Attorney General in a conspiracy to interfere
with plaintiff’s civil rights (Exhibits 27 to 36, et al.).
9. Rutgers University, in collusion and conspiracy
with parties on and off campus, built fraudulant and
fraudulantly contrived dossiers on plaintiff, and latter
are denied to plaintiff. Todate, Rutgers has denied plain-
tiff copies of his ‘“‘complete—and so certified” files (Exh.
25a to 25d, and others).
10. Rutgers University and their Federal Government
and other collaborators have rendered plaintiff unable to
find a job anywhere in the country, despite initial very
strong interest shown by numerous prospective employ-
ers across the country. In such activity Rutgers colluded
with national educational organizations as well as with
Federal agencies who actively worked to plaintiff's detri-
ment.
11. Rutgers University used totalitarian and oppres-
sive tactics in dealing with faculty; and an environment
of intense fear and oppression prevails among Rutgers
faculty and staff (Exh. 37, and others).
12. William Bradford Reynolds, Asst Attorney Gen-
eral for Civil Rights; and Samuel Alito, Jr., U.S. Attor-
ney for New Jersey knew of and wilfully and knowingly
looked the other way (and thus aided) plaintiff's abridge-
ment of civil rights (Exh. 27 to 36D, et al.).
-
fa
13. Rutgers University, other defendants and others
potentially defendants carned their campaign of malice
to discredit plaintiff into the community of Southern
New Jersey as well. Among others the Collingswood
Lions Club to which plaintiff belonged and others asso-
ciated with the New Jersey State Republican Party were
involved.
14. The contrived, questionable and unlawful “arbi-
tration exercise” of the university and the union must be
set aside.
15. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
Right to Sue letters are enclosed as they are required
(only) for that part of the complaint which relates to title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and
other applicable statutes, (Exh. 42 to 44).
16. Injury Sustained by Plaintiff: The plaintiff has sus-
tained the following harm and injury: (a) Plaintiff’s
career path has suffered irreparable harm and injury on
account of his suddenly being placed when he was em-
ployed by Rutgers University at an entry level position,
after having reached a Full Professorship and Director-
ship of a Graduate Program in Business Management pnor
to coming to Rutgers; (b) Plaintiff has been defamed,
maligned and has been ostracized and humiliated; his
standing in the profesional community has suffered
irreparable harm; (c) Plaintiff has been blocked from
suitable employment consistent with his career path, and
in effect has been blacklisted by Rutgers and their associ-
ates. Plaintiff is currently unemployed. (d) Plaintiff has
suffered anguish, pain, suffering and humiliation; and has
further suffered social ostracization.
17. Reltef Sought: Wherefore, plaintiff prays the court
for the following relief:
————EeE
8a
(1) A judgment ordering defendant Rutgers, the
State University of New Jersey, to (a) take plaintiff back
as its employee with the rank of a Full Professor and
additionally as director of a Graduate Business Program
or a similar position at its Camden Campus, at a salary (to
be paid retroactively to plaintiff) equal to the average
salary of a Full Professor in plaintiff’s former depart-
ment; (b) to pay plaintiff a sum of $2,000,000- as com-
pensation for the irreparable harm done to his profes-
sional career and reputation, plus punitive damages;
(c) to pay plaintiff a further sum of $1,000,000- as
compensation for defaming and maligning the plaintiff,
plus punitive damages; (d) to pay plaintiff a further sum
of $1,000,000- to compensate for the pain, suffering and
humiliation to which plaintiff has been subjected by the
university’s actions, plus punitive damages.
(2) A judgment against the faculty union: Rutgers
Council of AAUP Chapters ordering it to pay plaintiff a
sum of $2,000,000- as compensation for injury to his
professional career and career path resulting from its
actions,
(3) A judgement against the New Jersey Division of
State Police ordeing them to pay plaintiff $1,000,000-
for the defamation, ostracization, pain, suffering, and
humiliation plaintiff suffered as a consequence of their
actions;
(4) A judgment against the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation ordering it to pay plaintiff a sum of $2,000,000-
in damages for injuries he sustained as a consequence of
their actions;
(5) An order to the Attorney General of the United
States to immediately take appropriate measures to fully
investigate and bring to justice the U.S. Attorney’s office
Ga
in New Jersey, the office of the Asst. Attomey General
for Civil Rights, The U.S. Dept of Education, The Immi-
gration and Naturalization, the Attorney General of New
jersey, and the Defendants listed in this complaint.
(6) Issue an order to appropriate Federal authorities
to arrange for and assure the safety and security of the
plaintiff, his family, and his residence—this in view of
State and Federal apparatus’ hostile and criminal inclina-
tions toward plaintiff.
(7) A judgement for costs, interest, reasonable
attorney’s fees, and such other relief as the honorable
court may deem fit.
(8) A judgment against the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service of the United States Dept. of Justice to
pay plaintiff $2,000,000- for malicious defamation of
and economic injury to the plaintiff.
Jury Demand .
J UT /s/ Jay B. Bright, Ph.D.
Jay B. Bright, Ph.D. 9-21-1988
Plaintiff
Enclosures:
As listed in each paragraph
eer
10a
APPENDIX B
United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
Civil Action Docket #88 4115 SSB
Jay B. Bright, Ph.D.
plaintiff
Rutgers, The State University of
New Jersey, et al
defendants
MOTIONS
Returnable: January 20, 1989
THE PLAINTIFF, Jay B. Bright, moves this honorable
court as follows:
* * x
2. MOTION NO. 2: The Plaintiff further moves this
honorable court to take urgent steps to assure personal
safety of the plaintiff and members of his immediate fum-
ily, and further to guarantee plaintiff and members of his
immediate family use of United States mail service and
telephone service free of any interference of any kind,
these being among fundamental constitutional rights of
us all Americans, and further since interference with
these has made impossible plaintiff’s pursuit of his
(legitimate interests and particularly) interests related to
the pursuit of work related this law suit. SEE IN THIS
lla
regard, among other, plaintiff’s letter of October 4, 1988
to the Hon. U.S. Magistrate Mr. Simandle. FURTHER-
MORE, on Dedember 8, 1988, plaintiff has supplied
information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Dept of Justice, and to the Camden County Prosecutors’
Office of an ongoing conspiracy involving organizations
and individuals largely in Southern New Jersey associated
with defendant Rutgers University among others, to
among other things, bring about physical harm to the
plaintiff and his family.
x * x
ENCLOSURES /s/ Jay B. Bright, 12-15-1988
Jay B Bright, Ph.D. / Plaintiff
212-B Hillcrest Avenue
Collingswood New Jersey 08108
l2a
APPENDIX C
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action #88-4155(SSB)
JAY B. BRIGHT,
Plaintiff
,
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
MR. JAY B. BRIGHT
212 Hillcrest Avenue, #B
Collingswood, NJ 08108
Plaintiff, pro se
VOGEL, CHAIT, SCHWARTZ & COLLINS
BY: ARON M. SCHWARTZ, ESQ.
Maple Avenue at Miller Road
Morristown, NJ 07960
Attorneys for Rutgers, The State
University of New Jersey
l3a
REINHARDT & SCHACHTER, P.C.
BY: DENISE REINHARDT, ESO.
744 Broad Street, Suite 3100
Newark, NJ 07102
Attorneys for Rutgers Council of
AAUP Chapters
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF NEW JERSEY
BY: WALTER LUCAS, ESQ.
New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety
Division of Law, Claims Service Section
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex CN 116
Trenton, NJ 08635
Attorney for New Jersey Division
of State Police
OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY
BY: DOROTHY DONNELLY, ASSISTANT
U.S. ATTORNEY
402 East State Street, Room 265
Trenton, NJ 08608
Attorney for U.S. Department of Justice
BROTMAN, District Judge.
Plaintiff has filed suit against several defendants as a
result of the expiration of his term of employment as an
assistant professor and lecturer at Rutgers, The State Uni-
versity of New Jersey. Presently before the court are the
plaintiff’s motions (1) for entry of default judgment
against defendants State of New Jersey Division of State
Police (“Division of State Police”) and Rutgers Council
of AAUP Chapters (“‘Rutgers AAUP”), and (2) for relief
to assure the personal safety of plaintiff and his family.
Also before the court is defendant Division of State
'
l4a
Police’s cross-motion for enlargement of time to answer
or plead. For the reasons set out below, the court will
deny the plaintiff’s motions and will grant the cross-
motion of defendant Division of State Police for enlarge-
ment of time.
The court cannot enter a default judgment against the
Division of State Police because fairness mandates that
it enlarge that defendant’s time to answer. “‘A defendant
shall serve an answer within 20 days after the service of
the summons and complaint upon that defendant... .”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a). Defendant Division of State Police
has asked this court to extend its time to answer plain-
uff’s complaint because it failed to provide the Attorney
General’s office with a copy of the summons and com-
plaint within 20 days. The Division of State Police claims
that it has meritorious defenses to the instant action and
it would be severely prejudiced by entry of a default
judgment against it. The court may, for cause shown,
enlarge a defendant’s time to answer where that defend-
ant’s failure timely to do so resulted from excusable ne-
glect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). Because the court finds the
Division of State Police’s neglect in this matter excusable,
in the interest of fairness the court will enlarge the time
in which that defendant must answer plaintiff’s com-
plaint to permit it to answer or file responsive pleadings
within 20 days of receipt of this opinion and accompany-
ing order. Since the court is enlarging this defendant’s
time to respond, it cannot enter a default judgment at
this time.
The court cannot enter a default judgment against
defendant Rutgers AAUP. “The time within which to
answer or reply may, before its first expiration and with
or without notice, be extended once for a period not to
exceed 15 days on order granted by the Clerk.” D.N.J.
-
l5a
R. 13(B). The court clerk granted such an extension and
Rutgers AAUP filed its answer within the extra 15-day
period, Consequently, that defendant is not in default
and the court cannot enter a default judgment against it.
The court is without power to grant plaintiff’s motion
for relief to secure the personal safety of him and his
family. Plaintiff’s request for relief is as follows:
MOTION NO. 2: The plaintiff further moves this
honorable court to take urgent steps to assure per-
sonal safety of the plaintiff and members of his
immediate family use of United States mail service
and telephone service free of any interference of
any kind, these being among fundamental consti-
tutional rights of us all Americans, and further since
interference with these has made impossible plain-
tiff’s pursuit of his (legitimate interests and particu-
larly) interests related to the pursuit of work related
this law suit.
In support of his motion plaintiff refers to his allega-
tions of “an ongoing conspiracy involving organizations
and individuals largely in Southern New Jersey associated
with defendant Rutgers University among others, to
among other things, bring about physical harm to the
plaintiff and his family.” In essence, plaintiff has asked
this court for injunctive relief. To establish entitlement to
such relief, a plaintiff must establish (1) a reasonable
probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable in-
jury; (3) that balancing the equities requires relief; and
(4) that injunctive relief is in the public interest. United
States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982); Kersh-
ner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982).
Because plaintiff has not put forth anything more than
bare allegations of harm, he has not met his burden of
l6a
proof. Consequently, the court must deny such relief at
this time.
An appropriate order will be entered.
/s/ Stanley S. Brotman
Stanley S. Brotman
United States District Judge
DATED: January 19, 1989
l7a
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil #88 4115 SSB
Dr. Jay B. Bright
Plaintiff
Rutgers, The State University, et al
Defendants
PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS
Returnable: March 3, 1989
THE PLAINTIFF, Dr. Jay B. Bright, moves this honor-
able court as follows:
*x * *
2. Motion No. 2: The plaintiff further moves this
honorable court to (a) Remove the Honorable Judge
Stanley s. Brotman from this case for his demonstration
of bias against plaintiff, and (b) Have this case transferred
to another judge. Plaintiff offers the following observa-
tions in support of this motion:
(i) Judge Brotman in his opinion signed on January
19, 1989—which is part of the permanent record of the
case since it has been entered in the Docket Sheet—dem-
onstrated bias in that in his opeining paraagraph (see page
2 of the Opinion) he knowingly, willfully and premedi-
tatedly distorts facts of plaintiff's complaint. Judge
Brotman knows very well from paragraphs 5 and 17 of
’
18a
plaintiff’s complaint and from exhibits 16a et seq of the
complaint, q.v., among other, that an important thrust
of plaintiff’s complaint and of the remedy sought is that
the plaintiff was improperly and unlawfully discriminated
against at the point of hire. Yet Judge Brotman, knowing-
ly, wilfully and premeditatedly states in his Opinion (Ex-
hibit 5) which is for all concerned—including a Jury and
other Courts—to be guided by that: “Plaintiff has filed
suit against several defendants as a result of the expira-
tion of his term of employment as an assistant professor
and lecturer ...”. Judge Brotman is blatantly distorting
plaintiff’s comlaint to plaintiff’s detriment, and further
untruthfully advocates for defendant Rutgers university
and for other defendants. Judge Brotman knows the dis-
tinction between “subsequent to” and “‘as a result of’’—
POST HOC ERGO PROPTER HOC—and yet in his Opin-
ion he uses the latter to plaintiff’s detriment.
(ii) It is to be noted that Judge Brotman wrote said
Opinion subsequent to having read plaintiff’s Reply to
Rutgers University’s answer to plaintiff’s motions return-
able 1/20/1989 (Exhibit 2).
(iii) Again, in the same opinion, Judge Brotman,
knowingly, wilfully, premeditatedly and to plaintiff’s
detriment refers only to half of plaintiff’s material on
Motion no. 2 returnable 1-20-1989: See pages 3 and 4
of his said Opinion, deliberately leaving out comment on
plaintiff’s specific and detailed indictments of extreme
unlawfulness by various defendants.
(iv) Furthermore, Judge Brotman has captioned his
said Opinion “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” thus attempt-
ing to obstruct scrutiny.
3.00 Motion No. 3: The plaintiff further moves this
honorable court to have the court immmediately subse-
19a
quent to the return date for these motions, forward
copies of all the materials gathered by the Court, Hon.
Judge -Brotman, and Hon. Magistrate Simandle to the
Attorney General of the United States with an urgent
request that he forthwith appoint a Special Prosecutor to
work with this Court in the adjudication of this case; and
further that the Court similarly fully apprise the Chair-
men of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary and
the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of
Representatives.
February 3, 1989 /s/Jay B. Bright, Ph.D.
Date Plaintiff
20a
APPENDIX E
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil #88-4115 SSB
March 3, 1989
Plaintiff's URGENT PETITIONS as follows
Jay B. Bright, Ph.D.
Plaintiff
Rutgers, The State University, et al
Defendants
plaintiff's URGENT PETITIONS as follows:
* * *
5. Urgent Petition No. 5: The plaintiff further ur-
gently petitions this honorable court to consider and act
upon FURTHER CONCERNS-see here, among other,
plaintiff’s Motions retumable 3-3-1989; Plaintiff to Hon
Mag Simandle, 10-4-1988; Complaint paragraphs 3, 12
and 13, among others—OF THE PLAINTIFF IN RE-
GARD TO THE INTEGRRITY AND INDEPENDENCE
OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
The plaintiff, in his February 14, 1989 petition to the
court—q.v.—had requested Continuance of FBI+INS’
“motion hearing” to April 7, 1989, and yet the Honor-
able judge Brotman wrote in a letter showing the date
2-15-1989: Exhibit 5 attached herewith, conveying the
2la
misleading impression on all objective readers that plain-
tiff had somehow requested continuance to March 17,
1989. The envelope in which the letter came shows no
date stamp: Exh 6, as it normally should—NONE OF
THE LETTERS FROM THIS COURT AND THE U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE SHOW DATE STAMPS WHILE
THEY NORMALLY SOULD. This court, in all fairness
needs to investigate if the fact that Judge Brotman has
had over twelve years of contacts with defendant Rutgers
University situated one block from the Court House,
Judge Brotman’s extremely close ties with the leaders of
defendant Rutgers University an overwhelmingly Jewish
dominated institution and the Honorable Judge Brotman
being an active leader for years in the local Jewish com-
munity; Judge Brotman’s Clerk Bloustein’s ties with de-
fendant Rutgers University (Bloustein being also of the
Jewish faith) and Clerk Bloustein’s appointment at or
about the time of plaintiff’s filing of this complaint (as
of Deputy Clerk of the Court Paul Taylor a recent Rut-
gers University employee: see Plaintiff to Hon Simandle,
10-4-1988 among other). These are plaintiff's concerns
and the Court needs to fairly look into these.
FURTHERMORE, the plaintiff also requests a thor-
ough investigation of the following as plaintiff experi-
enced it: ON 2-14-1989 olaintiff was typing his 2-14-
1989 sbmission to this honorable court, he got a tele-
phone call from his daughter at Collingswood Junior High
School that she was sick and if plaintiff could pick her
up; plaintiff left the papers on his desk and rushed to the
school, Plaintiff believes the “‘Police Apparatus” (Federal,
State, Local Police and people they use/employ/get/ as
volunieer vigilantees), as historically, entered plaintiff's
apartment when he was away, photographed plaintiff's
2-14-1989 submission, conveyed it to defendants FBI/
22a
their cohorts (and other defendants); Counsel for FBI
(and INS) received Fax copies of plaintiff’s said submis-
sion, wrote up a letter to plaintiff (Exh 7) backdating it
to 2-10-1989, and had the mailman deliver it to plaintiff's
residence on 2-14-1989 (Exh 8). Plaintiff’s papers on his
desk had been shifted. SUCH SCENARIO TOOK PLACE
REPEATEDLY WHILE PLAINTIFF WAS EMPLOYED
AT RUTGERS UNIVERSITY. These are plaintiff’s con-
cerns and the court needs to look into these fairly as
plaintiff believes they represent a prostitution of the
Judicial system and of Justice and of this Honorable
Court by a Police State apparatus led and fostered by the
Executive Branch of the Government of this great coun-
try of ours, and exemplify for the nth time a Police State
environment to which plaintiff has been subjected for
four years at Rutgers University and in New Jersey.
March 3, 1989 /s/ Jay B. Bright/3-3-1989
Plaintiff
23a
APPENDIX F
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil #88 4115 SSB
March 13, 1989
Plaintiff’s Elaboration of his 3-3-1989 Petition =3
Dr. Jay B. Bright
plaintiff
Rutgers University, et al
defendants
PLAINTIFF”S ELABORATION of his 3-3-1989 Petition
#3:
* * *
5, Plaintiff deems it essential to avoid as much as pos-
sible travel on highways, as he fears for his life (as he does
for the lives of his wife and children)—plaintiff has ex-
perienced in the past four years repeated attempts on his
life, including but not limited to those involving attempts
to crush plaintiff in his automobile—please see in this
regard among other{i) Complaint para 17.6; (ii) The tran-
script of the 1-4-1989 Court Conference; (iii) Plaintiff to
U.S. Representative James Flono—D-New Jersey, dated
July 6, 1987—copy attached; such attempts and others
including but not limited to use of biochemical/gas/germ
weapons being used on plaintiff continually, ongoingly
and presently and increasing in intensity.
* * *
March 13, 1989 /s/ Jay B. Bright/3-13-1989
plaintiff
U.S. Rep. Florio, D-NJ Jay B. Bright, Ph.D.
Dear Congressman Florio, July 6, 1987
1.00 Re the EEOC: On July 2, 1987 I went to the
office of the EEOC’s Dist Dir, Mr. Butler, at 127 N. 4th
St, Philadelphia, PA. As always, he had disappeared by
the time I reached his office. His secretary, Ms Shakel-
ford, took my papers (copy enclosed).
Now comes the main part: as with postal clerks, the
Federal/State police train all involved to deceive and to
commit fraud. Upon my insistence, Ms Shakleford “time
stamped” both my papers and the receipt (see enclosure)
showing June 32, 1987 on both my papers and the re-
ceipt! (see enclosure). Upon my polite but firm insistence
she then changed the date on her own date-stamper to
July 2, 87 (see enclosure). The Federal/State apparatus
tail me/tap my home and office ‘phones, and precede me,
and then, if people knuckle under (most do) corrupt
them and train them to deceive and defraud. At Rutgers,
numerous professors, staff, secretaries, and students have
been so used,
1.01 Investigation by Congressional Committee(s) is
called for, I am apprising U.S. Rep. Bill Gray of Philadel-
phia of the matter also,
2.01 Stepped-up attempts by the New Jersey State
Police/Federal Apparatus to physically hurt me: Last
Monday, June 29, ’87, I obtained from your Woodbury
office U.S. Rep Bill Gray’s, and Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service’s, addresses. On the way home from
Woodbury, as usual, unmarked old vehicles tailed me—
this time, however, one repeatedly tried to side-swipe me
and another one crossed me in the front. On Tuesday
and Wednesday huge commercial trucks tried to hurt
25a
me—one came at me on my side of the road: by God’s
grace I swerved in a split'second and survived. You see,
State and Federal agencies are deeply involved in my
matter against Rutgers (a large, powerful organization).
* * *
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Jay B. Bright, Ph.D.
26a
APPENDIX G
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Actin 88-4115 (SSB)
JAY B. BRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
JAY B. BRIGHT, pro se
212 Hillcrest Avenue, #B
Collingswood, NJ 08108
VOGEL, CHAIT, SCHWARTZ & COLLINS
BY: ARON M. SCHWARTZ, ESQ.
Maple Avenue at Miller Road
Morristown, NJ 07960
Attorneys for Rutgers, The State
University of New Jersey
27a
REINHARDT & SCHACHTER, P.C.
BY: DENISE REINHARDT, ESQ.
744 Broad Street, Suite 3100
Newark, NJ 07102
Attorneys for Rutgers Council of
AAUP Chapters
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF NEW JERSEY
BY: WALTER LUCAS, ESQ.
New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety
Division of Law, Claims Service Section
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex — CN 116
Trenton, NJ 08635
Attorney for New Jersey Division of
State Police
OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY
BY: DOROTHY DONNELLY,
ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY
402 East State Street, Room 265
Trenton, NJ 08608
Attomey for U.S. Department of Justice
BROTMAN, District Judge.
Plaintiff has filed suit against Rutgers, The State Uni-
versity of New Jersey (“Rutgers”), the New Jersey Divi-
sion of State Police (“Division of State Police”), and
other defendants charging discrimination and other
unlawful conduct arising out of his employment as an
assistant professor and later lecturer at Rutgers. Presently
before the court are plaintiff’s motions (1) to amend the
docket sheet for this case; (2) for me to recuse myself
from this case; (3) for this court to request the Attorney
General of the United States to appoint a special prosecu-
————_——
28a
tor in this case; and (4) to order defendant Rutgers to
appoint plaintiff to the position of “Court Ordered Pro-
visional Professor.”’ Also before the court is defendant
Division of State Police’s cross-motion to dismiss. For
the reasons set forth below, the court will deny plaintiff’s
motions and will grant the motion of the Division of
State Police.
Plaintiff first contends that the court should order the
court clerk to amend the docket sheet to reflect the filing
of plaintiff’s various reply briefs and a letter to the
United States Attorney. It is the practice of the court
clerk not to docket and retain letters and briefs: instead,
the clerk stamps them “filed” and transmits them to the
appropmiate judge’s chambers. The court must therefore
deny plaintiff’s request to amend the docket sheet.
Plaintiff next asks me to recuse myself from this case
because (a) the court’s previous opinion in this matter
allegedly misstated the nature of the plaintiff’s lawsuit;
(b) the court’s opinion of January 19, 1989, in this mat-
ter was written after I allegedly read plaintiff’s reply
papers regarding another motion returnable January 20,
1989; (c) the court’s January 19th opinion referred to
only half of plaintiff’s material on his “Motion No. 2”;
and the January 19th opinion was not designated for
publication. A judge must recuse himself or herself ‘in
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reason-
ably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. §455(a). Specifically, a
judge cannot participate in a matter “[w]here he has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party... .” Jd.
§ 455(b); see id. § 144. The court must measure plain-
tiff’s motion to recuse by an objective standard by deter-
mining whether a reasonable person would perceive bias
or prejudice, United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556,
1558 (11th Cir. 1986). Moreover, “‘The alleged bias must
29a
stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion
on the merits on some basis other than what the judge
learned from his participation in the case.” United States
v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966); accord Johnson v.
Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 291i (3rd Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). The court finds that none
of plaintiff’s allegations present reasonable grounds upon
which judicial bias or prejudice could be perceived. Fur-
thermore, none of plaintiff’s allegations points to bias
or prejudice stemming from beyond the merits of his law-
suit. The court must therefore deny plaintiff’s motion to
recuse.
Plaintiff further asks this court to
forward copies of all the materials gathered by the
Court, Hon. Judge Brotman, and Hon Magistrate
Simandle to the Attorney General of the United
States with an urgent request that he forthwith
appoint a Special Prosecutor to work with this
Court in the adjudication of this case; and further
that the Court similarly fully apprise the Chairmen
of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary and
the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House
of Representatives.
Plaintiff has failed to supply the court with either a fac-
tual or a legal basis for doing so, and therefore the court
must deny plaintiff’s request.
Plaintiff also asks the court to order Rutgers to rein-
state him “with a salary reflecting his latest paycheck and
with a job title of ‘Court Ordered Provisional Professor’
with the understanding that in the interest of continuity
of plaintiff’s employment he be paid back wages as well
going back to the day he was terminated from his em-
ployment... .” In essence plaintiff asks for summary
30a
judgment as well as injunctive relief. First, the plaintiff
has not demonstrated to the court the absence of any
genuine issues of material fact, and consequently sum-
mary judgment is inappropriate at this time. Second,
plaintiff has failed to make a sufficient showing for the
court to grant injunctive relief. To obtain such relief a
plaintiff must establish (1) a reasonable probability of
success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury; (3) that
balancing the equities requires relief; and (4) that injunc-
tive relief is in the public interest. United States v. Price,
688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982); Kershner v. Mazurkie-
wicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982). Because plaintiff
has failed to meet his burden, especially with regard to
irreparable injury, the court must deny the requested
injunctive relief.
Finally, defendant Division of State Police has moved
to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that the
eleventh amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XI, bars this
lawsuit. The eleventh amendment prevents any suit by a
citizen of a state against any state in federal court. Hans
v. Loutstana, 134 U.S. 311 (1890); see Edelman v. Jor-
dan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). The eleventh amendment
bar does not apply where a plaintiff seeks prospective in-
junctive relief against a particular state official rather
than against the state itself. Ex Parte Young, 209 USS.
123 (1908); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663-68. Plaintiff’s law-
suit against the Division of State Police is in essence a
lawsuit against the State of New Jersey. See Urbano v.
Board of Managers of New Jersey State Prison, 415 F.2d
247, 250-52 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948
(1970). Because this action does not fit into any excep-
tion to the eleventh amendment bar, the court must dis-
miss the complaint against the Division of State Police.
3la
An appropriate order will be entered.
/s/ Stanley S. Brotman
Stanley S. Brotman
United States District Judge
DATED: March 14th 1989
32a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action #88-4115 (SSB)
JAY B. BRIGHT,
_ Plaintiff,
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter having come before the court on plaintiff’s
motions (1) to amend the docket sheet, (2) to recuse,
(3) for this court to request the Attorney General of the
United States to appoint a special prosecutor, and (4) to
order defendant Rutgers, The State University of New
Jersey (“Rutgers”) to appoint plaintiff to the position of
“Court Ordered Provisional Professor,” and on defendant
New Jersey Division of State Police’s (‘‘Division of State
Police”) cross-motion to dismiss; and
The court having considered the submissions of the
parties; and
For the reasons set forth in the court’s opinion of this
date;
IT IS on this 14th day of March, 1989, hereby
ORDERED that
33a
(1) plaintiff's motion to amend the docket sheet is
DENIED;
(2) plaintiff’s motion to recuse is DENIED;
(3) plaintiffs motion to order defendant Rutgers to
appoint him to the position of “Court Ordered
Provisional Professor’’ is DENIED; and
(4) defendant Division of State Police’s motion to dis-
miss plaintiff’s complaint is GRANTED and the
complaint against the Division of State police is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
No costs.
/s/ Stanley S. Brotman
Stanley S. Brotman
United States District Judge
34a
APPENDIX H
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action No. 88-4115 (SSB)
JAY B. BRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
VS.
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY, et ai.,
Defendant.
AMENDED ANSWER ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT,
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF
NEW JERSEY
Defendant Rutgers, The State University of New Jer-
sey (hereafter, the “University’’) by way of answer to the
complaint says:
1. The University admits that the plaintiff in this
action is Jay B. Bright and that he filed this action pro se.
Otherwise, the University has insufficient knowledge or
information either to affirm or deny the remainder of
allegation 1.
2. The University admits that it is a defendant in this
action and that it is a public institution. The University
does not understand that part of the allegation relating to
the “principal representative being the officer in charge
of the University’s Camden campus and others with
35a
whom he/she works directly or indirectly . . .” and there-
fore does not respond, The University denies causing any
injury to plaintiff. The University admits that the other
co-defendants in this action are those who have been so
named.
3. The University does not understand allegation 3 of
the complaint and therefore does not respond.
4, This allegation relates to the jurisdiction of the
Court and does not set forth any factual allegations
which require either affirmance or denial.
5. The University admits that plaintiff was employed
by the University from July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1987 as
an Assistant Professor and from July 1, 1987 to June 30,
1988 as a Lecturer. The University has insufficient inde-
pendent knowledge or information either to affirm or
deny the remainder of allegation 5.
6. The University admits that plaintiff began his em-
ployment at the University in July, 1984 at the salary of
$30,140.00 per academic year. The remainder of allega-
tion 6 is denied.
7. The University denies the first and second sentences
of allegation 7.
With respect to the third sentence of allegation 7, the
University states that two grievances were filed pursuant
to the grievance procedure contained in the contract be-
tween the University and the faculty union; that the
University found the first grievance to be untimely and
aspects of the second grievance to be untimely as well;
that the first grievance was not pursued beyond the first
step of the grievance procedure; that plaintiff refused to
attend a meeting concerning the second grievance; that
the timeliness issue concerning the second grievance was
36a
taken to arbitration; that the arbitrator found one addi-
tional allegation of the second grievance to be timely;
that the University made a step one determination
adverse to plaintiff on the merits of the timely allegations
of the second grievance; and that the second grievance
was thereafter not pursued beyond the first step of the
grievance procedure. Otherwise, the third sentence of
allegation 7 is denied. =
The University denies the fourth sentence of allegation
Lp
The University has insufficient knowledge or informa-
tion either to affirm or deny the fifth and sixth sentences
of allegation 7.
The University denies the seventh sentence of allega-
tion 7,
With respect to the eighth sentence of allegation 7, the
University states that the contract between the Univer-
sity and the faculty union requires that arbitrators be
selected by means of written request to the State Media-
tion Service. Otherwise, the University denies the eighth
sentence of allegation 7.
With respect to the ninth and tenth sentences of allega-
tion 7, the University has insufficient information either
to affirm or deny what piaintiff believes.
The University has insufficient information either to
affirm to deny the eleventh sentence of allegation 7.
With respect to the twelfth sentence of allegation 7,
the University has insufficient knowledge or information
either to affirm or deny the statements pertaining to
meetings and communications between and among plain-
tiff, the arbitrator, and the faculty union. The University
denies the remainder of the twelfth sentence of allega-
tion 7.
37a
8. As to the first sentence of allegation 8, the Univer-
sity admits being served with three charges dated Novem-
ber 14, 1985, May 8, 1986, and March 18, 1987, respec-
rively; admits receiving a document dated January 30,
1987 entitled “Brief” but denies that that document is
a charge; has insufficient knowledge or information
either to affirm or deny the contention regarding a
charge supposedly filed on July 22, 1987; and denies
the remainder of the first sentence of allegation 8.
The University denies the second sentence of allega-
tion 8.
The University has insufficient knowledge or informa-
tion either to affirm or deny the remainder of allega-
tion 8.
9. The University denies allegation 9.
10. The University denies that it has rendered plaintiff
unable to find a job anywhere in the country and that it
colluded with national educational organizations and fed-
eral agencies. Otherwise, the University has insufficient
knowledge or information either to affirm or deny the
remainder of allegation 10.
11. The University denies allegation 11.
12. The University has insufficient knowledge or infor-
mation either to affirm or deny allegation 12.
13. The University denies that it carried out any cam-
paign of malice to discredit plaintiff; the University has
insufficient knowledge or information either to affirm or
deny the remainder of allegation 13.
14. The University denies allegation 14.
15. Allegation 15 states no facts which require either
affirmance or denial.
i
38a
16. The University denies allegation 16.
17. Allegation 17 constitutes plaintiff’s prayer for
relief and accordingly does not require either affirmance
or denial.
FIRST SEPARATE DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the applicable statutes
of limitations.
SECOND SEPARATE DEFENSE
To the extent plaintiff asserts a claim under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et
seq., plaintiff’s claim is barred for failure to comply with
the administrative procedures and prerequisites contained
in Title VII.
THIRD SEPARATE DEFENSE
The complaint fails to set forth a cause of action.
FOURTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
The complaint fails to state facts upon which to base
a claim for relief.
FIFTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s claims are barred as a result of his failure to
exhaust internal remedies.
SIXTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
All actions of defendant Rutgers, The State Univer-
sity of New Jersey, or its officers, employees, or agents,
were based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.
SEVENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
Defendant Rutgers, The Staty; University of New Jer-
sey, and its officers, employees, or agents were at all
39a
times acting in good faith and therefore the University
is entitled to qualified immunity.
EIGHTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
To the extent that plaintiff asserts a claim under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
et seq., plaintiff’s claim is barred by virtue of the fact
that it is beyond the scope of the charges filed by the
plaintiff with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission.
WHEREFORE, defendant Rutgers, The State Univer-
sity of New Jersey demands judgment dismissing the
complaint, awarding attorneys’ fees and costs of suit, and
awarding such other relief as the court may deem appro-
priate.
VOGEL, CHAIT, SCHWARTZ AND COLLINS
A Professional Corporation
By: /s/ Aron M. Schwartz
Aron M. Schwartz
DATED: 3/31, 1989
40a
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that the foregoing Amended Answer
was filed within the time provided by Court order dated
March 17, 1989, and in the manner provided by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and that a copy of the fore-
going Amended Answer was served this date by certified
mail, return receipt requested and by regular mail on
Jay B. Bright
212 Hillcrest Avenue, #B
Collingswood, New Jersey 08108
I further certify that a copy of the foregoing Amended
Answer was served this date by regular mail on
Denise Reinhardt, Esq.
Reinhardt & Schachter, P.C.
744 Broad Street
Newark, New Jersey 07012
Walter Lucas, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex
CN 116
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
Dorothy Donnelly, Esq.
Assistant U.S. Attorney
401 Market Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
/s/ Aron M. Schwartz
Aron M. Schwartz
DATED: 3/31, 1989
4la
APPENDIX I
United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
Docket #88 4115 (SSB)
Plaintiff’s Various Motions Including Motions
to Compel Discovery, et al.
Jay B. Bright, Ph.D.
Plaintiff
v.
Rutgers, the State University of
New Jersey, ef al.
Defendants
PLAINTIFF’S VARIOUS MOTIONS INCLUDING
MOTIONS TO COMPEL DISCOVERY, EL AL.
* * *
9.00 Motion No. 9 (Returnable October 6, 1989):
The plaintiff further moves this honorable court to make
arrangements with the U.S. Attorney to hold hearings
“in Confidence” in regard to this case, as numerous indi-
viduals may then be able to testify without fear of retalia-
tion from the University-Corporate-Government complex
that bribed and/or coerced them to engage in blatantly
unlawful activity a la “The Nuremberg Defense” effect.
Plaintiff, as he has been at the receiving end of the bru-
talities and atrocities, can identify elected officials, cor-
porate officials, University personnel, students, physi-
42a
cians, shopkeepers, attorneys, personnel of this very
court, shopkeepers, and individuals from across the coun-
try and India (where plaintiff was born) who were thus
“used” by the University-Corporate-Government com-
plex. The activities against the plaintiff ranged (and still
continue) from fraudulently painting plaintiff ‘bad’, to
entrapment, to murder of the plaintiff and of members
of his family.
*x* * *
Date Jay B. Bright, Ph.D., Plaintiff
September 11, 1989 /s/ Jay B. Bright, Ph.D.
43a
APPENDIX J
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action #88-4155 (SSB)
JAY B. BRIGHT, Ph.D.,
Plaintiff,
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter having come before the court on plaintiff’s
motion captioned “alert and petition seeking denial to
hear against motions of defendant Rutgers Council of
AAUP”; and
The court having carefully considered the submissions
of the parties; and
The court having determined that the motion is frivo-
lous in that the court routinely grants parties additional
time to respond as the court has discretion to change the
retum date of a motion, see Local Rule 12(c);
IT IS on this 30th day of October, 1989, hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion is DISMISSED.
No costs. /s/ Stanley S. Brotman
Stanley S. Brotman
United States District Judge
ee ae Te E
44a
APPENDIX K
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action No, 88-4115(SSB)
JAY B. BRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
Defendants.
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO: Dr. Jay B. Bright, Pro Se
212 Hillcrest Avenue
Collingswood, New Jersey 08108
Denise Reinhardt, Esq.
Reinhardt & Schachter, P.C.
744 Broad Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Dear Sir and Madam:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on Friday, March 16,
1990 at 10:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may
be. heard, the undersigned, attorneys for defendant Rut-
gers, The State University of New Jersey, will move
po
45a
before the Honorable Stanley S. Brotman for an order of
summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, pur-
suant to Fed, R. Civ. P. 56.
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that, in support
of the aforesaid motion, defendant, Rutgers, The State
University of New Jersey, relies upon the following:
1. The Affidavit of Peter Weissenberg;
Affidavit of Walter K. Gordon;
3. Plaintiff’s answers to Rutgers’ Interrogatories;
ho
4. Portions of the transcript of plaintiff’s deposition;
and
5. Brief.
In accordance with the local rules governing the Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Jersey, pleadings
responsive to this motion for summary judgment are to
be filed no later than 14 days prior to the return date.
VOGEL, CHAIT, SCHWARTZ AND COLLINS
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendant
Rutgers, The State University
of New Jersey
Maple Avenue at Miller Road
Morristown, New Jersey 07960
(201) 538-3800
By: /s/ Aron M. Schwartz
Aron M. Schwartz
DATED: February 20, 1990
46a
APPENDIX L
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action No. 88-4115(SSB)
JAY B. BRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
VS.
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF PETER WEISSENBERG
STATE OF NEW JERSEY:
: SS.:
COUNTY OF CAMDEN
I, PETER WEISSENBERG, upon my oath, say:
1. I am employed by Rutgers, The State University of
New Jersey (the “University”) as a Professor at the Uni-
versity’s School of Business, Camden Campus. From July
1, 1982 to June 30, 1987, I served as the Associate Dean
of the Faculty of Business Studies (FBS), the predecessor
to the School of Business in Camden. This Affidavit is
made and submitted in connection with the University’s
Motion for Summary Judgment.
47a
2. Among my duties and responsibilities as Associate
Dean of FBS, as assigned by Dr. Walter Gordon, the Dean
of FBS, was the oversight of recruitment and hiring of
new faculty members. As a result, I became familiar with
general university hiring practices and procedures. Be-
cause I was personally involved in the appointment of
Dr. Jay Bright to the faculty of FBS, I have direct knowl-
edge of the circumstances of his hiring. Consequently,
the facts set forth herein are based upon personal knowl-
edge.
3. As a result of two vacancies due to the resignation
o: FBS faculty members, I began a recruitment and
search process in the fall semester 1983 to find replace-
ments, At the time the recruitment process began, $27,084
was allocated to the faculty line which Dr. Bright ulti-
mately filled. As of the time of the determination of the
amount of funds available for that line, we had not re-
ceived any inquiry or application from Dr. Bright indicat-
ing interest in that position or applications from any
other candidates, Furthermore, when Dr. Bright first
inquired about a position at FBS in February, 1984, we
were well into the recruitment process and had received
a number of applications for the position.
Attached as Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of
the job listing which was placed with the Financial Man-
agement Association Placement Clearing House in con-
nection with the recruitment for the position ultimately
filled by Dr. Bright. Prior to my receipt of Dr. Bright’s
initial inquiry regarding this position in February, 1984,
the position had already been offered to several other
candidates at the rank of assistant professor and a salary
of no more than $27,084. Each of these three candidates
declined the offer.
48a
4. In February, 1984, I received a note from Dr. Bright
indicating interest in a position at FBS. I responded to
that inquiry by letter dated March 6, 1984 (a true and
accurate copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B).
In that letter | advised Dr. Bright that I was recruiting
for faculty in his field and would consider him for a posi-
tion provided that he furnished me with a complete vita.
I further advised Dr. Bright that I was unsure whether
any opening would be available since I was in the process
of discussing possible contracts with two other junior
faculty candidates. Dr. Bright then responded by letter
dated March 23, 1984 (a true and accurate copy of which
is attached hereto as Exhibit C). In that letter, Dr. Bright
expressed interest in a position as a visiting faculty mem-
ber at FBS with Rutgers. With respect to salary, Dr.
Bright stated, “I have in mind a figure in the low thirties
for the academic year.”
5. By memorandum of May 17, 1984, Dr. Milton
Leontiades, then Chairman of the Appointments & Pro-
motions Committee (the “A & P Committee”) in the
FBS, reported to me that he and Dr. Izzetin Kenis, also a
member of the A & P Committee had interviewed Dr.
Bright. (A true and accurate copy of Dr. Leontiades’ May
17, 1984 memorandum to me is attached hereto as Ex-
hibit D.) Dr. Leontiades reported that both he and Dr.
Kenis were “satisfied that Dr. Bright would be a worth-
while addition” to the FBS faculty as an assistant pro-
fessor.
6. By memorandum of May 18, 1984, I wrote to Pro-
vost Walter Gordon requesting the appointment of Jay
Bright as an Assistant Professor for a three-year term
beginning July 1, 1984. (A true and accurate copy of my
May 18, 1984 memorandum is attached hereto as Ex-
hibit E.) In that memorandum, I also requested additional
49a
funding, in the amount of $3,093, to bring Dr. Bright’s
starting salary to $30,177.
-
7. At the time plaintiff began his employment at the
University on July 1, 1984, there were five other assistant
professors in the FBS. The salaries of those faculty mem-
bers ranged from $25,217 to $28,794. At that time, Dr.
Bright’s salary of $30,140 was the highest of all the assist-
ant professors in FBS- These other assistant professors
held either a Ph.D., an MBA, a J.D., or an LL.M.—each of
which may be considered an appropriate terminal degree
for FBS faculty, depending on one’s field.
8. When I was Associate Dean of FBS, I was also re-
sponsible for making office assignments to new faculty in
the FBS. The primary consideration in making office
assignments was the availability of office space. In addi-
tion, an effort was made to place individuals with the
same area of expertise in the same vicinity. This is done
to encourage faculty interaction and professional devel-
opment.
9. The primary location of the FBS faculty offices was
in Victor Hall. As of September 1, 1984 when Dr. Bright
began at the University, 13 FBS faculty members had
offices on the sixth floor of Victor Hall and seven faculty
members (including Dr. Bright) had offices on the fifth
floor. In addition, three members of the FBS faculty had
office assignments in Armitage Hall, another building on
campus. At the time plaintiff was assigned his office in
July, 1984, that office was the only one available. More-
over, it was particularly appropriate since it was on the
same floor and in the same vicinity as the only other per-
son specializing in finance, Dr. Bright’s field.
50a
/s/ Peter Weissenberg
PETER WEISSENBERG
Sworn and subscribed to
before me this 20th day
of February, 1990.
/s/ Margaret S. Ryan
My commission expires 8/19/90
ATTACHMENTS TO AFFIDAVIT
OF PETER WEISSENBERG
INTENTIONALLY OMITTED,
EXCEPT FOR EXHIBITS B & C
5la
RUTGERS
The State University of New Jersey
Faculty of Business Studies
Camden, New Jersey 08102
March 6, 1984
Dr. Jay B. Bhatt, Director
PostGraduate Program in Business Management
Sauraschtra University
Rajkot Gujarat
360 005
India
Dear Jay:
Thank you very much for your note of February 6
indicating that you will be retuming to the U.S. soon and
might be interested in a position.
At the moment! am recruiting for faculty in the field
of Finance again znd will be glad to consider you. I do
remember that after our last meeting and discussion we
unfortunately concduded that you might not be able to
make the rank of Associate Professor with Tenure here
on our Faculty. However, if you will send me a complete
vita again I will be glad to review it once more. In addi-
tion it is possible I may be seeking a visiting faculty mem-
ber for one year only. If this happens to be the case,
would you be interested? Probably in that case, I would
be able to make it a Visiting Associate Professor. If you
are interested, please do let me know as soon as possible
and then I will get back with you.
52a
Please realize that I am not sure these openings will be
available since I am at present in the process of discuss-
ing possible contracts with two junior faculty candidates.
* * *
Cordially,
/s/ Peter
Peter Weissenberg
Associate Dean
53a
SAURASHTRA UNIVERSITY
Postgraduate Programme in Business Management
Rajkot, Gujarat
March 23, ’84
Dr. Peter Weissenberg
Associate Dean
Faculty of Business Studies
Rutgers, the State University
Camden, New Jersey, 08102
Dear Peter,
Thank you so very much for your letter of March 6th.
I have read your letter carefully, and it is my feeling
that I could give serious consideration to a Visiting Asso-
ciate Professorship in Finance with Rutgers/Camden for
this coming academic year.
As for the salary amount, I have in mind a figure in
the low thirties for the academic year. I will, incidentally,
happily accept your decision in this regard since we
seemed to be “on the same wavelength” on most things
when we had detailed discussions in Washington.
* * *
_ Sincerely yours,
/s[ Jay B. Bnght
Jay B. Bright, Ph.D.
54a
APPENDIX M
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action No, 88-4115(SSB)
JAY B. BRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
VS.
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF WALTER GORDON
STATE OF NEW JERSEY :
: BS.:
COUNTY OF CAMDEN
WALTER K. GORDON, being duly swon, says:
1. I am employed by Rutgers, The State University of —
New Jersey (the “University’’) as Provost of the Univer-
sity’s Camden Campus and have been Provost since July
1, 1981. In addition to serving as Provost, I also served as
the Dean of the Faculty of Business Studies (FBS) at
Camden from July 1, 1982 to June 30, 1986. This Affi-
davit is made and submitted in connection with the Uni-
versity’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly,
the facts set forth in this Affidavit are based upon my
personal knowledge.
55a
2. My duties as Provost are set out in University Regu-
lation 2.31 which states:
2.31. The provost in Camden shall be the principal
administrative officer for the Camden campus in re-
spect of academic affairs, student life, business man-
agement, campus security, and physical plant opera-
tions. The provost shall provide overall policy direc-
tion for the deans of the several schools and colleges
and for the directors of the aforementioned admini-
strative departments on the Camden campus; shall
administer personnel policies and procedures con-
cerning both faculty and staff of those units and
shall have responsibility for the proper maintenance
of their personnel records; shall direct, with the ad-
vice of deans and directors, the planning and budget-
ing process for the campus as a whole; shall allocate
resources among the several academic units and
administrative departments; and shall provide gen-
eral supervision of all academic and administrative
affairs of and between the several units and depart-
ments, to ensure that their affairs are being carried
out effectively and in accordance with the policies
of the University. The provost shall be accountable
to the president of the University.
University Regulations 2.41, 2.414, and 2.41B defined
my duties as Dean of FBS:
9.41. A dean or director shall be the principal
officer of each academic unit of the University, e.g.,
college, graduate and professional school, institute,
or center. This officer shall be charged with the
supervision of the administration of that unit, to
ensure that it is being carried out in accordance with
the policies of the University.
241A. Each dean or academic director shall pro-
vide overall direction for the several department
56a
chairpersons and directors of degree programs in
that unit and shall lead the faculty and staff of the
unit in the creation and implementation of effective
programs of instruction, research, service, and stu-
dent life.
2.41B. In the execution of these responsibilities,
the dean or academic director shall review the aca-
demic programs of the several departments and
degree programs of the unit, as well as the student
life program of the unit as a whole, and shall develop
with the advice of the department chairpersons the
overall asking and working budgets for the unit. The
dean or academic director shall supervise the overall
personnel and budget administration of the unit,
and shall be responsible for the maintenance of such
personnel and fiscal records as are necessary for the
proper exercise of these responsibilities.
I am consequently personally knowledgeable and familiar
with general university hiring practices and procedures
and the collectively negotiated agreement between the
University and the Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters,
the faculty union (AAUP).
3. While I was the Dean of FBS, the Associate Dean
of FBS performed such duties and responsibilities as I
assigned to him from time to time. Although I generally
delegated responsibility for recruitment and selection of
faculty to the Associate Dean of FBS, I retained the
appointment authority. Following this procedure, in
1984 I delegated to then Associate Dean of FBS, Dr.
Peter Weissenberg, the responsibility for the recruitment
and search process that ultimately led to the hiring of
Dr. Jay Bright. ‘
4. The first step in the hiring process in the FBS is a
determination by the faculty and administrative officers
57a
of FBS is a determination by the faculty and administra-
tive officers of FBS that a vacancy needs to be filled (or
that a new position should be established). No hiring can
actually take place unless a “line” is available to the FBS
—1.e., a commitment of a certain amount of funds for the
position. The faculty and administrative officers of FBS
also determine the fields of expertise, the types and levels
of experience and other credentials to seek in candidates
for the position. These procedures were followed in con-
nection with filling the position ultimately offered to
Dr. Bright.
5. Candidates for a faculty position at FBS are ordi-
narily interviewed by the FBS Appointments and Promo-
tions Committee (the “A & P Committee”). Pursuant to
University regulations, each faculty or college (academic
unit) has its own A & P Committee. The duties of the
A & P Committee are to advise the dean of the academic
unit as to appointments, reappointments, promotions,
retirement and personnel procedures generally.
6. By memorandum of May 18, 1984, the Associate
Dean of FBS (then Dr. Peter Weissenberg) requested the
appointment of Jay Bright at the rank of assistant pro-
fessor. (A true and accurate copy of Dr. Weissenberg’s
May 18, 1984 memorandum is attached as Exhibit A.)
As stated in Dr. Weissenberg’s memorandum, the line
available to FBS for this appointment was _ initially
funded up to $27,084. Dr. Weissenberg sought additional
funding in the amount of $3,093 to bring the salary to
$30,177. This figure corresponded to a range and step on
the salary guide then in effect and negotiated between
the University and the “AAUP” (a true and accurate
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B). (The
AAUP is the majority representative of Rutgers Univer-
sity full-time faculty members for purposes of collective
negotiations. )
58a
7. On May 25, 1984, I wrote to Dr. Bright offering
him a faculty position in the FBS. (Attached as Exhibit
C is a true and accurate copy of my May 25, 1984 letter
to Dr. Bright.) With that letter, I sent Dr. Bright a stand-
ard faculty contract calling for a starting salary of $30,140
for the academic year and appointment at the rank of
assistant professor. The reason for the salary of $30,140
instead of the $30,177 proposed by Dr. Weissenberg was
that a new collectively negotiated salary guide was going
into effect on July 1, 1984. (A true and accurate copy of
the salary guide effective as of July 1, 1984 is attached
hereto as Exhibit D.) The closest dollar amount on the
new guide that corresponded to the proposed salary of
$30,177 was $30,140.
8. Under cover of a letter dated June 13, 1984, Dr.
Bright returned the signed contract to me. (True and
accurate copies of his June 13, 1984 cover letter and the
signed contract are attached hereto as Exhibit E and
Exhibit F, respectively.)
9. The contract assigns Dr. Bright the rank of Assist-
ant Professor. In assigning academic rank upon initial
appointment, the following factors are weighed and con-
sidered by the University:
—degree(s) received or to be received
—institutions attended
—nature and extent of scholarly publications and
research activity
—quality and quantity of scholarly publication and
other evidence of research activity
—nature and extent of involvement in professional
and academic organizations
—experience and professional promise
—teaching experience
—visibility and impact within the field
The appraisal of qualifications is a process of making pro-
fessional academic judgments about the quality of one’s
credentials, scholarship and research activity; about the
merit of one’s achievements and potential; and about the
promise for future professional growth and contributions
to the field. These judgments are made by experienced
and tenured faculty members and academic administra-
tors.
10. Of the six assistant professors in FBS in July,
1984 (the time of plaintiff’s hiring), Dr. Bright was the
highest paid. The salaries and highest academic degree of
the Assistant Professors in FBS as of July 1, 1984 were as
follows:
$25,217 —J.D.
$25,515 — LL.M.
$28,255 — Ph.D.
‘ $28,345 — M.B.A.
$28,794 — M.B.A.
$30,140 — Ph.D. (Plaintiff).
In this regard, it should also be recognized that in the
FBS, a Ph.D. is not the terminal degree for various spe-
cialties. Depending on one’s field, an M.B.A., a J.D.,
LL.M. or a Certified Public Accountant license may be
appropriate.
/s/ Walter K. Gordon
WALTER K. GORDON
60a
Sworn and subscribed to
before me this 16th day
of February, 1990.
/s/ Marc E, Alterman
Marc E. Alterman
An Attorney at Law
of the State of New Jersey
ATTACHMENTS TO AFFIDAVIT
OF WALTER GORDON
INTENTIONALLY OMITTED,
EXCEPT FOR EXHIBIT E
é
6la
Dr. Walter K. Gordon
Dean
Office of the Provost
Rutgers—the State Univ.
Camden, NJ 08102
6-13-1984
Dear Dean Gordon,
Thank you for your letter of May 25, 1984 and for
the accompanying employment contract.
I have signed the contract, accepting my appointment.
The signed contract and other forms for the personnel
files are enclosed herewith.
Thanking you.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Jay B. Bright
SES ern REE Te
62a
APPENDIX N
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action No. 88-4115 (SSB)
JAY B. BRIGHT, Ph.D.,
Plaintiff,
VS.
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY, et al,
Defendants
Wednesday — July 12, 1989
Oral sworn deposition of Dr. Jay B. Bright, Ph.D.,
taken in the law offices of ARCHER & GREINER,
ESQUIRES, One Centennial Square, Haddonfield, New
Jersey, before Teresa Ann Iannaco, Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public of the State of New Jersey,
on the above date, commencing at 10:17 am., there
being present:
APPEARANCES:
VOGEL, CHAIT, SCHWARTZ & COLLINS, ESQUIRES
BY: MARC E, ALTERMAN, ESQUIRE
Attorneys for Rutgers, The State University
REINHARDT & SCHACHTER, ESQUIRES
BY: DENISE REINHARDT, ESQUIRE
Attorneys for Rutgers’ Chapter of AAUP
63a
ALSO PRESENT:
BARBARA A. McMANUS, Paralegal
* * xX
[62] A. I was born in 1932, sir. December 29, 1932.
Q. And where were you bom, sir?
[63] A. Objection, again. Irrelevant.
Q Sir, you have based your complaint in some man-
ner on your allegation that you’re being discriminated
against because of foreign birth. I can’t think of any-
thing more relevant than an answer to the question of
where you were bom, so please answer the question.
A. So as university’s attorney, naturally, you wish to
make this clear then. Yes, sir, I was born in the country
of India.
Q. Where, specifically?
A. I was born in the province which is called Gujarat,
G-U-J-A-R-A-T, Gujarat.
* * *
[64] A. My schooling was begun in the city of Bom-
bay, sir.
Q. And what, what type of school did you attend ini-
tially in Bombay? Was it a public school?
A. All this is, of course, under objection, but I am
responding anyhow. You understand that.
Q. Your objection is noted, sir.
A. Yes, Well, I suppose there is no harm in talking his-
tory, I suppose. I began schooling in the city of Bombay.
Do you want to know the name of the school?
Q. If you know. What I'd like to do, sir, so you under-
stand what my purpose is, is develop for my own infor-
mation, on behalf of the university, an understanding
of your educational background and the [65] the history
from, as I indicated, earliest days --
64a
A. I see.
Q. - and I’m going to move forward. And, you know,
I realize that you have advanced degrees. I will work up
to those. But, in order to fully appreciate your back-
ground --
A. Yes, yes.
Q. -which reflects on your qualifications to be a pro-
fessor at Rutgers or any other university, I think it’s im-
portant that I appreciate the entire educational back-
ground.
A. Sure.
Q. It’s, as I say, it’s nothing out of the ordinary. |
just need some framework.
A. Let’s go ahead and ask me a somewhat narrow
question now, please.
Q. Okay. I think I, I think I asked you -- you were
telling me you began your schooling in Bombay.
A. City of Bombay.
Q. The city of Bombay.
A. It’s, it’s like New York, New York, you see? Be-
cause, in those days, not now, --
Q. Um-hum.
A. -- Bombay also was a state. Now they’ve changed
the names.
[66] Q. I see. I, most candidly, -
A. That’s the reason I keep saying city of Bombay.
Q. I understand. I appreciate that clarification. I
must say that my knowledge of Indian geography would
not win me any prizes.
A. Mine » ouldn’t either. I’ve been here for 30 or 31
years, so I don’t know much about India now. I’ve for-
gotten most of it.
Q. I’m glad at least we would all enjoy a smile at least
for a change. In any event, in the city of Bombay you
oO
‘o>
yr
28)
began your schooling.
I don’t know what the ordinary course of educa-
tion in the city of Bombay is. Were there public schools
that you attended?
A. Well, I attended -- you see, what we call public
schools here are not called public schools there. Here, by
public schools we mean schools that are funded by
municipalities and so forth, you see? In the British Com-
monwealth, it’s the exact opposite meaning. Public
schools there mean privately funded, private schools,
so in that sense, I attended private schools.
Q. Which would the state-sponsored schools?
A. No, no, private schools.
Q. Oh, private school --
[67] A. Private schools.
Q. What we would consider private schools in the
states?
A. In this country, yes.
Q. Okay. I see. And how long was your education at
these private schools?
A. All the way up to high school and then into college.
Q. Okay. What year did you graduate from high
school, sir?
A. 19 and, let me think. 1950, 1-9-5-0. All this is
under objection, of course, but, you know, since you are
curious. Not many people ask me about my childhood,
so, go ahead.
* * *
[76] Q. And you came to America, when, sir?
[77] A. 1958.
Q. January --
A. Now, all this is under objection, is irrelevant.
Q. January or December or somewhere in between in
1958?
66a
A. June, sir.
Q. Okay. And what did you do when you came to the
states?
A. Irrelevant, sir.
Q. Please answer the question.
A. Sir, this is clearly beyond the scope of the issues.
Q. Sir, your experience bears directly on the issues in
this case. It’s critical for me to know what your back-
ground is. Among your allegations are that the university
paid you an inadequate salary and discriminated against
you based, I believe, on your foreign birth and your
color. In order to determine the reasonablness of the
university’s action, it’s essential that I be aware of your
entire background, That’s what I’m asking you for.
You came to the states in you June, 1958. I’d
like to know, first of all, where you moved to in the
states?
[78] A. Sir, may I correct you on one thing, sir?
Q. You can make a statement, sir.
A. What complaints I have against the university are
in the complaint itself. What you represented them --
your representations of the complaint vary from the
complaint, sir.
Q. The complaint will speak for itself, Dr. Bright, and
we'll get to that, I have no doubt, at some point. Never-
theless, I’d like you to answer my question. Where did
you come to when you came to the United States in
1958?
A. Under objection, I can answer it.
Q. Your objection’s noted,
A. I went to a college, a private college in San Fran-
cisco.
Q. What college was that?
A. It is called, was called the Heald, H-E-A-L-D, Col-
lege of Engineering.
Re
6/a
Q. And what did you study at that college?
A. Engineering.
Q. Any specialty in engineering or --
A. I think I had planned to major in electrical engi-
neering.
Q. And how long did you study at Heald College?
A. About a year, one year.
[79] Q. Would that be the academic year 1958-'59?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. Did you receive a degree upon completion of your
studies at Heald College?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. And you left there then in June of 1959; would
that be correct?
A. That is correct.
*x* * *
[103] A. Let me think now. I think I then wanted to
go back to school and apply to a number of universities
and one of the universities who not only accepted my
application but also promised some assistance was the
University of Houston, in Texas.
Q. What, what program did you apply to?
A. In the college of business. They had a master’s
degree program, economics and management.
Q. Previously, Dr. Bright, you told me that your stud-
ies had been in the field of science.
A. Sciences, that’s nght.
Q. Okay. Had you ever taken any business courses
prior to your application to the University of Houston
in approximately 1960?
A. Oh, no. As a matter of fact, before 1960, I [104]
had never taken any courses in business anywhere. But,
my working in the industry told me that, to be in a man-
agement position, it was essential to get schooling in busi-
68a
ness administration or business management. This is, this
is the reason I decided to go into management schooling.
Q. And you applied and were accepted to the Univer-
sity of Houston then?
A. That is correct. .
Q. And when did you matriculate with the University
of Houston?
A. I got my master’s degree in 1962.
Q. I didn’t ask you when you received your degree,
sir, I asked you when you matriculated there. When did
you begin attending classes there at the university of
Houston?
A. Oh, 1960 -- oh, wait a minute. ’61, I think. At least
61, 1 believe. Probably so. Yeah, 1961.
Q. So you were out of work then for some time be-
tween being laid off at Raytheon and matriculating at
the University of Houston?
A. That is —- that may be. I don’t recall, but that’s
possible.
Q. Well, did you have a family at that time, sir?
A. Oh, no.
[105] Q. No?
A. No, no, no, no.
Q. Were you collecting unemployment compensation
or anything of that nature during that period of time?
A. I don’t believe so, no.
Q. You began attending the University of Houston in
early 1961?
A. Yeah.
Q. And you were taking business courses?
A. Courses in economics, in agricultural economics, in
farm management, behavioral sciences, including soci-
ology I think and so forth. They have a well-rounded cur-
riculum. Most universities do, you see, but my master’s
thesis was in management.
eee
69a
Q. We'll get to that in a minute. Did you take a full
load of courses?
A. Oh, absolutely.
Q. Were you working at all during that period apart
from your studies? Did you have a, other part-time
employment?
A. Yeah, I had departmental -- you see this was prom-
ised by them -- departmental part-time employment.
Q. When you say departmental part-time employ-
ment, what do you mean? What do you mean?
A. Doing work in the department, clerical work,
[106] you know, statistical, helping the professors with
their statistics’ research. Clerical work, mostly.
Q. Did it entail any teaching?
A. Oh, no, it was more of a, what is known as research
assistant, not teaching assistant.
Q. And you were paid for this work?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. And that was more or less I take it in the form ofa
stipend?
A. Stipend is the right word.
Q. I see. Was that the extent of the financial aid which
you received from the University of Houston?
A. Yes, that’s right.
Q. Did you pay tuition to the -
A. Full tuition.
Q. Okay. Just so I understand, then, you were a full
paying student?
A. Yes.
Q. But you received --
A. Somewhat work.
(Interruption by court reporter.)
BY MR. ALTERMAN:
Q. Dr. Bright, the court reporter has I guess admon-
ished both of us to try to talk one at a time. Please let
70a
me try to complete my questions. Again, [107] I'm just
trying to understand what you’re telling me having not
experienced it myself. I have to ask you specifically what
went on in order to understand it. What I was saying, |
think, was that my understanding is that you paid tui-
tion, full, the tuition as an ordinary student but you did
receive some aid in a sense that you had a job and re-
ceived the stipend for performing some clerical work as
a research assistant?
A. I think what you described is, conveys the mean-
ing, yes.
Q. Okay. Good. Thank you. And you did that begin-
ning in early 1961. I take it that would be with, the
equivalent of the spring semester in 1961?
A. Possibly, quite possibly.
Q. Did you attend school that summer?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. So you were continuing full time?
A. Yes, all the way up to getting my master’s degree.
Q. Okay. And when did you receive your master’s
degree?
A. Let me --
MR. ALTERMAN: Dr. Bright, feel free to change
your audio tape again.
MR. ALTERMAN: We’re back recording, Dr.
[108] Bright?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
MR. ALTERMAN: Okay. Good.
BY MR. ALTERMAN:
Q. I do not remember whether there was a question
pending. If there was, I’ll withdraw it. And I think you
were telling me you received your master’s degree in
1962 from the University of Houston?
A. August of 1962.
7la
Q. Okay. You told me a little bit, sir, that you took
courses in economics, agricultural economics, foreign
management and behavioral sciences. Were there any
other particular areas that you studied in prior to receiv-
ing your master’s in 1962?
A, Well, let me think now. You know, it’s going back
so many years. There was a course in marketing, as I re-
call. There was a course in statistics. My thesis was in
management of agricultural cooperatives. I may have
taken a course in labor economics; that’s right, I did, a
course in economic development. It was a fairly well-
rounded curriculum.
x * *
[118] Q. Okay. You went down to Houston in 65 or
early ’66 to begin further studies?
A. That is correct.
Q. Did you have a scholarship there?
A. No, not at that time, no, sir.
Q. Okay. You were then a full tuition student again
at the University of Houston?
A. I had saved up money just for that purpose, you
[119] see.
x * *
[132] Q. Okay. And you had ther completed the
requirements for the Ph.D. at the University of Houston?
A. When you finish the thesis and when you defend
it.
Q. The dissertation?
A. The dissertation. And when the advisers, there
are four of them, when they sign it, then you have a de-
gree in hand. The actual confirmment takes place at
[133] the time of commencement.
Q. And the commencement was in August 1969?
A. That’s right, yes.
72a
A. I had a job offer from the university system of
Georgia in Columbus, Georgia, so in September of ’69,
I accepted, went, joined the college in Columbus,
Georgia.
Was that a minority college?
Oh, no, it was a white college.
It was a part of the University of Georgia?
Yes, university system of Georgia.
I see. And what was your rank?
A. Assistant professor in the college of business. The --
it was a division of business, not a college of business.
Q. And what was your salary when you began there?
A. You realize all this is under objection anyhow.
Q. That’s fine.
A. As I recall, it was 13 thousand dollars for nine
months. In those days, you could buy a house for 14
thousand, by the way, in those days, you know.
* *
OPO rev
[135] Q. Were you doing any independent research
during that period of time?
A. Well, I was working on a revision of my disserta-
tion to publish it as a book.
Q. I’m sorry.
A. A revision.
Q. A revision?
A. Yes. I did the -- by the way, it was published as a
book.
Q. We'll get to that in a minute. Your primary inde-
pendent work was to work on a revision of your disser-
tation during that period of time?
[136] A. Well, not during’ that period but it was one
of the things I did.
Q. Okay. What other independent work did you
undertake while you were teach --
a a all
73a
A. Well, --
Q. -- while you were teaching at the University of
Georgia?
A. I was, in those days, thinking back, I was interested
in economic theory, you know, especially microeconomic
theory, and I researched in that. Columbus College had a
very small library, so we were somewhat limited in that.
Q. Did you prepare any papers during that period of
time while you were an assistant professor -
Yes, sir.
-- at the University of Georgia?
Yes, I did.
How many papers?
I think I presented maybe four, maybe four papers.
Were those papers published then?
Well, if they were published, it would be in the
journals of the associations.
PO PO POY
x * *
[150] Q. And you’ve never bothered to find out?
A. No, I haven’t, really.
Q. Apart from that publication, did you publish any
other material while you were an assistant professor at
the university system of Georgia at Columbus?
A. I can’t think of any right now. There was, I started
work on a second book on Environmental Economics.
Q. I’m sorry, what economics?
A. Environmental.
Q. Environmental?
A. Economics.
Q. That was other independent research you did while
A. Yes.
Q. ~ at Columbus College?
A. Yes, that’s right. But it was not finished, the book
was never finished.
74a
Q. Did you conduct any other academic research dur-
ing that period of time?
A. Apart from what I said, I can’t think of any other.
[151] Q. Were you a member of any professional
associations during that period of time?
A. Well, yes, the American Economic Association, the
Southwestem Economic Association, the Academy Of
Management, the American Institute For Decision Sci-
ences, Atlantic Economic Association. These are some
that I can think of.
Q. Did you hold any offices in any of the professional
associations of which you were a member?
A. Well, if by office you mean chairing a session or
program coordination, I did that once for the Southwest-
ern Economic Association.
Q. Tell me what you did.
A. Essentially, it had to do with screening papers for
presentation and recommending them to the session, or,
rather, the program chairman.
Q. Are there any other activity of that sort for any of
the other professional organizations?
A. Oh, yes, indeed, indeed. I was a foundiig member
of the American Institute For Decision Science..
Q. And what is the American Institute For Decision
Sciences?
A. Okay. Now it is called the Decision Sciences Insti-
tute. You see, they changed it because the [152] letters
A-I-D-S now have a different connotation, so --
Q. Fair enough.
A. - so they, as soon as the New England Medical
Journal popularized A.I.D.S., these people got together
and changed the name to - D.S.I., Decision Sciences
Institute. What they do, they promote a quantity to man-
agement techniques in universities, you see.
oO
75a
Q. How many members does that association have
now?
A. I would say not less than two or three thousand.
Maybe more.
Q. How many did it have -- strike that?
A. When?
Q. How many, quote, “founding members’, end
quote, were there?
A. The founding members would be a hundred or so.
Q. Did you carry out any administrative function with
respect to that organization?
A. Well, during the initial stages, promotional ma-
terial, explaining the institute, you know, helping with
mailing out things, mailing out literature. This was, I
think, in 1970, ’71, something like that.
Q. At Columbus College, with respect to the [153]
college, did you perform any administrative functions in
your department?
A. No, I never did.
Q. I don’t think I asked you, Dr. Bright, who was the
dean at the school that you were at at Columbus College?
A. Columbus College?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, we did not have a dean. It was a division, so
we had a division chairman.
Q. Okay. Who was the division chainnan?
A. A gentleman by the name of Voinich, V-O-I-N-I-
C-H.
Q. Do you know Professor Voinich’s whereabouts
today?
A. I’m quite sure he’s either retired or otherwise inac-
tive because even in those days he was a very old man.
Q. I see. How many faculty members were there in
your division?
76a
Okay. I have to think back now.
Approximately.
Let’s see. I’d say about 14, 15.
. Were any of those, other than yourself, minority
members?
[154] A. I was the only one. I was the only minority.
Q. Were there any women in that group?
A. Yes, there was a lady. She used to teach shorthand
and typing, of all things, to evening students, you know.
She was a leftover from very old days when a doctorate
was not necessary. She was the only one who didn’t have
a doctorate, I think, and she was left over. She was, I
think, involved in teaching shorthand and typing to ladies
in the evening who were working in the industry. She
wasn’t on the faculty but they kept her on because she
was, she had tenure and so forth, so...
Q. Was - strike that. At Columbus College, was it pri-
marily an evening school?
A. Oh, no, no, no, no, no, They had very few evening
classes, as a matter of fact. It was a regular day college.
THE WITNESS: Please note that Mr. Alterman
is conferring with his associate.
BY MR. ALTERMAN:
Q. Did you have an office at Columbus College, Dr.
Bright?
A. Yes.
Q. And why don’t you describe to me the office facili-
ties that you enjoyed.
[155] A. It was comparable with offices provided to
others. Same size, same location. There was no discrimi-
nation involved.
Q. With respect to the others in the department, you
said there were approximately 14. How many of them
were at your rank and how many were above or below
you, roughly?
OPO>
oe Aner
ija
A. Well, I think there were two associate professors,
one full and the rest were assistant professors or below.
It was a young department, so to speak.
Q. Let’s talk about your salary history there, Dr.
Bright. I think you told me before that your initial salary
there was $13 thousand, i think, for a nine-month period,
although --
A. Nine month, yes.
Q. Okay. Did it increase over time?
A. It increased every year.
Q. Could you tell me, if you recall, the increments for
each year leading up to what your concluding salary was
there?
A. I do recall that they were what the State of Geor-
gia approved for state colleges. It was never less.
Q. That’s not what I asked you, Dr. Bright. I [156]
asked you --
A. Percentage?
Q. -- if you could give me either percentage, or, more
useful to me would be if you remember the salary. Now,
you said you started at 13,000 for a nine-month period.
How much did you make in the next nine-month period?
A. Oh, that, I don’t recall. But at the end, it was tow-
ard 15 thousand.
Q. So between 1969 and 1975, your salary increased
from 13,000 to $15 thousand per nine-month period?
A. It was ’69 to ’74, as I recall. You see, it makes four
years -- five years that way. ’69-’70, ’70-’71, ’71-’72, so it
will go up to ’74.
Q. Your last academic year at Columbus College then
was 1973-’74?
A. Wait a minute, It may have been °74-’75.
Q. So you may have been there for six years then?
A. No, five years. If -- I had -- I was counting. I think
78a
it was five years. What does it come to? I have to, I have
to put it down on paper.
Q. If you began, if you began in the fall of 1969 --
A. Right.
Q. -- and I think you testified that that was the [157]
case, --
A. Yes.
Q. -- five academic years would bring you through to
June of 1974,
A. °74?
Q. That’s correct.
A. Yeah, that’s what it is.
Q. That would be five academic years.
A. That’s right. That’s what I told you.
Q. Okay. So from 1969 ’til June of 1974, your salary
increased from 13,000 to --
A. About 15 thousand, which is what the state ap-
proved. You see, in those days, as I -- we talked earlier,
you could buy a house for 13, $14 thousand, and Lester
Maddox, M-A-D-D-O-X of the X Hall of Fame, you re-
call? If you don’t -- he thought that college teachers did
not deserve any raises.
Q. What were the circumstances of your leaving Co-
lumbus College?
A. Okay. They had failed to promote me while pro-
moting those who got their Ph.D. after joining Columbus
College. Therefore, I had filed a complaint against them
with the EEOC, Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission, and, therefore, they did not renew my contract.
[158] Q. Let’s go back. Were you up for promotion
at any time during your, during the period you were at
Columbus College?
A. Yes, I was up for promotion in my second year. I
went to the dean. I told the dean I have this letter from
————
}
é
5
x
|
79a
Louisiana Technical University offering me an associ-
ate professorship. I had that in hand. I had said either
let me go or give me a promotion and raise. He said,
Jay, we'll give you a promotion and raise, so I did not
go to Louisiana. These people never gave me a raise Or
a promotion, It was then that I went to the EEOC.
Q. What year did you go to the EEOC?
A. Well, I, I think it would be probably in °73, as I
recall. I’m not sure. ’73, more than likely.
Q. And did you file a formal charge with the EEOC?
A. Yes. I had to go to Atlanta, you see, to do that,
and I did that.
Q. And, again, what was the substance of your alle-
gations?
A. Failure to give me a promotion.
Q. What type of discrimination did you allege, if
any?
A. Based on foreign birth, race, color.
Q. Was there an investigation conducted by the [159]
EEOC, to your knowledge?
A. If there was, I do not know of it.
Q. What was the disposition of that charge?
A. The disposition was that I withdrew my complaint
in 19 and ’76.
Q. Why did you withdraw the complaint?
A. I withdrew it because, number one, I had left Geor-
gia and I was unable to find a job without a recommenda-
tion from Columbus College, so the same dean who did
not let me go to Louisiana, who did not promote me, he
told me on the phone that he will definitely put in a good
recommendation if I withdraw the complaint. So, again, I
took him at his word, and, again, he did not put in a good
recommendation, so I wound up withdrawing the com-
plaint and did not find -- did not get the job that I had
applied for.
80a
Q. Was that Professor Voinich that you’re referring
to?
A. No, I was, I was thinking of Anderson, John An-
derson. Voinich I think was not the dean at that time. So,
anyhow, | knew that John Anderson was not to be
trusted. I knew that, but with the remote hope that he
will keep his word this time, I took a chance, and I was
mistaken.
Q. Let’s go back to Columbus Coilege. 1974, You,
[160] your contract was not renewed for the ’74-’75 aca-
demic year?
A. I think for the ’75-’76 it was not renewed, you
know, for the following year. ’74-’75 would be the last
year, I think. So, for the following year it was not re-
newed.,
Q. Well, there’s a little bit of a discrepancy, Dr.
Bright, because you said you were there for five years,
which you --
A. As I recall. Either four or five. I’m not sure. It
might be five I’m inclined to think.
Q. If you said you were there until the end of the
academic year of 1975 --
A. ’74,
Q. Right.
A. End of the year, academic year ’74.
Q. Right. So your contract was not renewed then for
the ’74-’75 year? Let me ask you this? The nine-month
period covered by these contracts was ordinarily Sep-
tember to June?
A. September to June, yes. So in June of ’75, I was
out. That’s, that’s what it amounts to.
Q. Dr. Bright, I’m having difficulty because - I’m
not trying to be -- strike that. I’m having difficulty be-
cause you said you began at Columbus [161] College
an neces caeeacemaaaaaaaiiaaiiiial
8la
in the fall of ’69 with a contract for the academic year
‘69-’70. You said you were there for five years, that you
taught there for five years.
A. That’s my recollection.
Q. Right. Which would bring us through to the con-
clusion of the academic year 1973-1974.
A. No, it would not, sir. If you count again.
Q. All right. I will count it. I will count it and you
tell me whether I’m right or wrong. ’69-’70 is one; ’70-
’71 is two; ’71-’72 is three; ’72-’73 is four; and *73-’74
is five. So five years would conclude in June, 1974, I
ask you again, were you -- did you teach there -- try to
do it this way: Did you teach there in 1974-’75 academic
year?
A. Well, I was there for five years, as I recall, and if
the five years concluded in ’74, then maybe not.
* * *
[163] Q. Did you send out resumes?
Many of them.
Hundreds?
Possibly.
One hundred?
More like three or four hundred.
Did you receive any interviews from anyone?
A. Well, to my amazement, I did not get a single
[164] interview until August of ’74 from a college
which was about sixty or seventy miles from Columbus
College; Montgomery, Alabama.
OPO Poy
82a
APPENDIX O
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action No. 88-4115 (SSB)
JAY B. BRIGHT, Ph.D.,
Plaintiff,
VS.
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
Defendants.
Monday — July 24, 1989
Oral sworn deposition of Dr. Jay B. Bright, Ph.D.,
taken in the law offices of ARCHER & GREINER,
ESQUIRES, One Centennial Square, Haddonfield, New
Jersey, before Teresa Ann Iannaco, Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public of the State of New Jersey,
on the above date, commencing at 10:24 a.m., there
being present:
APPEARANCES:
VOGEL, CHAIT, SCHWARTZ & COLLINS, ESQUIRES
BY: MARC E. ALTERMAN, ESQUIRE
Attorneys for Rutgers, The State University
JOHN B. WOLF, ESQUIRE
83a
(23] Q. When did you leave employment there then?
A. Well, I was fired from there. My contract was not
renewed I think beginning the end of the summer of ’75,
as I recall, going back 15 years.
* * *
[25] Q. Incidentally, did you ever file any charges of
discrimination against the Alabama State University ?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Whom did you file those charges with?
A. With the EEOC, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission.
Q. Okay. And do you know approximately when
those charges were filed?
A. The charges were filed sometime in the spring oi
1975, as I recall.
Q. Was it before or after you were advised of your
nonrenewal?
A. I’m not sure.
Q. Was the — strike that. What was the substance of
your charges against Alabama State University?
[26] A. I’m not sure, but I imagine it would be —
come to think of it, it may have been office assignment
and salary discrepancy because while I was there, I think
they hired non-Ph.D.s, who were white, at a salary higher
than mine, and as regards office assignment, I do know
that I was the only associate professor with no individual
office, and I think there were six people in the room
where I had my desk. That was supposed to be my office
assignment. So these two certainly would be issues. |
don’t recall the details.
Q. Did you claim that Alabama State University dis-
criminated against you at the time they hired you?
A. I may have claimed it, I’m not sure.
84a
Q. Did you claim that they — strike that. Did you
claim that you were terminated as a result of discrimin-
ation by the Alabama State University or others connect-
ed with that institution?
A. I don’t know, sir. I’m not sure.
Q. Well, do you think now that you were discriminated
against when you were discharged by the Alabama State
University?
A. I, I believe so, yes.
Q. Okay. And what was the basis of that discrimin-
ation?
[27] A. Office assignment.
Q. Let me, let me — I understand your office assign-
ment and salary. What I’m trying to get at: You claim
you were discriminated against on account of race?
A. Race and country of birth, foreign birth, you know,
and being a minority person in the sense that I was not
U.S. born.
Please do not communicate with Mr. Wolf unless you
want to record the conversation.
Q. Dr. Bright, Mr. Wolf is here as my client today,
representing the university. I can communicate with him
on or off the record to my heart’s delight, and I intend
to exercise that privilege, and, again, sir, if you wish to
make a todo out of this, I’m happy to call the magistrate
right now, but I have every nght to communicate with
him in any way I so desire and I will continue to do that.
A. Well, may I request that you record all communica-
tion, in full, with the court reporter, please.
Q. You can request that, sir. I’m telling you right
now, I may or may not honor your request.
A. I would request that you do so, please.
Q. I understand your request. What was — [28]
strike that. Do you know whether the EEOC conducted
85a
an investigation of your charges against Alabama State
University?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Were you ever advised of the disposition by the
EEOC of —
A. Let me change the tape here one moment.
Could you please repeat the question, sir?
Q. Sure. Well, I don’t recall exactly what the question
is, I think, but I’ll ask you this one: Do you — are you
aware of whether or not there was a disposition by the
EEOC of your charges against the Alabama State Univers-
ity?
A. Yeah. That was the question you just asked
before, —
Q. Okay.
A. — you see. I wasn’t sure, but, thinking back, a few
days ago I was thinking about this matter, and it seems
to me that about a year, about a year after I left Mont-
gomery, or perhaps even after that, I received disposition
that the, the EEOC had found for the university.
Q. Did you ever receive a copy of a written decision
or any other notification from the EEOC to that effect?
[29] A. Yes, I — it was — I just — it just came to me a
few days ago, thinking about this matter, that it did.
Q. When you say it came to you, you don’t mean the
writing came to you —
A. No, no.
Q. You recalled it?
A. That’s mght. I remembered a few days ago that,
yes, I did receive a notification.
Q. And that notification would have come sometime
through 1976 you think?
A. In the latter part of ’76, as I recall it.
x* * *
86a
{33] Q. How long were you unemployed in the states
before you obtained employment in India?
A. I would say about a year and a half, that’s my
guess, maybe two years.
* * *
[35] Q. Approximately how many private corpora-
tions did you apply to in India?
A. Let me think. As I recall, only one, because I
didn’t know of — I have — I had no idea where to apply.
The reason I applied to this company,-it’s called Swad-
eshi, S-W-A-D-E-S-H-I, Cotton, C-O-T-T-O-N, Textiles
Mills, M-I-L-L-S, is that I knew the owners and the man-
agers of this very large corporation.
Q. Where in India were they located?
A. They are located in a city called Kanpur, K-A-N-
P-U-R.
Q. Apart from applying to all of the universities and
to Swadeshi Cotton —
A. Textiles Mills.
Q. — Texttiles Mills, did you apply for any other
employment in India at this time?
A. Not as I recall.
Q. When did you receive a job offer from Swadeshi?
A. I don’t recall, sir. Sometime in 1976 would be a
fair guess.
* * *
[42] Q. Do you know what month you left employ-
ment with Swadeshi?
A. I would think sometime in ’77. I don’t recall the
month.
—
;
87a
[43] Q. When you left Swadeshi in 1977 —
A. As I recall it.
Q. — what did you do then?
A. Well, I returned to the United States and went to
California and obtained a part-time teaching position
with the California State University at Los Angeles. It’s
called California State University at Los Angeles. This
job I obtained as a result of floating my resume for
full-time jobs all over that region, the west.
* * *
[48] Q. Did you leave there for some full-time em-
ployment?
A. No.
Q. You left there to be unemployed again?
A. Well, my wife and children were in India, still, —
O. I see.
A. — and upon their insistance, I returned to India.
[49] Q. And when was that?
A. I think in the latter part of ’77 or early ’88 — ’78,
i mean, early ’78.
* * *
[59] Q. Okay. Then you went back to India for a few
months and then you came back to the United States?
A. Yeah. We went to Boston.
Q. Okay. Why did you pick Boston?
A. Well, because we thought — I thought that Senator
Ted Kennedy would be a man who would be fair enough
to correct the injustices to which I was being subjected.
Q. Had you ever communicated with Senator Kennedy
before you moved to Boston?
A. I may have. I may have written to him.
[60] Q. Did you speak to anybody on his staff?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Who did you speak to?
88a
A. Well, this was the reason we went to Boston. I went
to his office in Boston and spoke to, I don’t recall the
name, but I gave him, through that person, a petition
regarding this matter. And that I told Senator Kennedy
that it must be Columbus College who had maligned me
sufficiently to the U.S. government so that I was unable
to find employment anywhere. I think he did write back
that he will do what he can.
Q. Did you hear anything further from Senator ken-
nedy or anyone on his staff regarding the matter?
A. No, never did.
* * *
[61] Q. Did you apply for employment at that time?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Okay. With whom did you apply to for employ-
ment?
A. All the colleges and universities in that area.
Q. By “that area”, could you be more specific?
A. Well, the Massachusetts and vicinity area.
Q. Would it be fair to say New England, generally? -
A. Generally, yes, sir.
Q. Okay. About how many places did you seek em-
ployment?
A. I sent out I think about two hundred, three hun-
dred resumes.
Q. Were these all to colleges and universities?
A. Yes, they were. Yeah, including — I also sent out
resumes to economic research operations.
x ok OK
[71] Q. What position did they offer you?
A. An associate professor of management.
Q. And what was your salary?
A. I recall it was — let me think now. I think it was
16, 16 thousand for nine months.
* * *
89a
[73] Q. Okay. And how long were you associated with
American International College?
A. Two years.
*x* *
[78] Q. You began teaching there I think you said in
the fall of ’78; correct?
A. Right.
Q. All mght. And you said you were there for two
[79] years?
A. Oh, wait a minute. I’m sorry.
Q. So you would have left —
A. It would be, it would be August of 1980, 1980.
I stand corrected. 1980.
Q. That’s what I thought and that’s why I pursued
that.
A. Yeah, 1980 is correct, yes.
Q. Okay. Was your contract not renewed?
A. That is true.
* * *
[80] Q. And you said you started applying for posi-
tions again in approximately the spring of 1980?
A. Yeah.
Q. Where did you apply?
A. I applied, I think, you know, in the vicinity of
Massachusetts.
Q. Same general area you had two years before?
A. Well, yeah, northeast I would say, generally.
Q. Okay. And did you also apply to private industry
at that point as well?
A. Oh, no, no. My first love is academia, you see.
Q. I understand. So you simply applied again to
colleges and universities?
A. That’s right.
Q. Okay. And did you receive any positive [81] res-
ponses from those applications?
90a
A. Yes, I got a call from a university in Erie, Penn-
sylvania. That’s E-R-I-E.
Q. What university was that?
A. It’s called Gannon, G-A-N-N-O-N, Gannon Uni-
versity.
Q. You received a telephone call from them?
A. Yeah, I got a call from the dean.
Q. When did you get a call from the dean?
A. I imagine for sometime in June, was it, or May
or June of 1980.
Q. Did that telephone call result in an interview?
A. Yes, it did. )
Q. And you traveled to Erie, Pennsylvania, for this
interview?
- A. Um-hun, yes.
Q. When did you go to Erie for this purpose?
A. Probably in June or July.
Q. Of 1980?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you teaching during the summer of 1980?
A. I don’t recall, but probably not.
Q. When you went out to Gannon for an interview,
whom did you meet with?
A. I met with the dean of the college of business.
[82] Q. What was his name?
A. Under objection, I can divulge names.
Q. Note your objection. What’s his name?
A. Dr. Volpe. V-O-L-P-E.
Q. To your knowledge, is Dr. Volpe still associated
with Gannon University?
A. I don’t know any different.
Q. Did you meet with anybody else at Gannon Uni-
versity at that time?
A. Yes, the whole faculty of business.
Q. How many people was that?
A. At that time I think — I should say, oh, about 12
ar hE LF .
9la
people. They all interviewed me. You know, they actu-
ally used a fairly large conference room and we all talked
and they had me teach a lecture in statistics. They told
me to assume they were students, which I did.
Q. Okay. Did your — strike that. Did your interview
at Gannon University then last an entire day?
A. Oh, yes. Well, two days, as a matter of fact.
Q. Two days. That was going to be my next ques-
tion. The interview which was a process took two
days?
A. Two.
[83] Q. You have to keep your responses audible,
Dr. Bnght, —
A. Two, two days.
Q. — so the court reporter —
And after the two days of interviews, did they
offer you a position?
A. Yes, they did.
Q. Did they do that at the end of the second day?
A. No, no. Well, verbally, yes.
Q. What do you mean when you say verbally?
A. Yeah, the dean told me that I would be hired as
an associate professor.
Q. At what salary?
A. He said the salary he will decide and let me know.
Q. And how did you leave it with him that day?
A. Well, I told him what I was making at American
International College and I told him it would have to
be more, and he said it would be, it would be more.
Q. At that point, how much were you making at
American International?
A. I should think in the neighborhood of 17 thousand.
Q. 17?
A. Yeah.
[84] Q. Okay. And did he then — “the” being, I guess
this was Dean Volpe?
92a
A. Yeah.
Q. He got back in touch with you at some point?
A. Yeah. He called me.
Q. How much later?
A. I think it was two days later.
Q. And what did he tell you?
A. He told me that he had taken care of all the formal-
ities and that the only question was of salary and what
was the least that I would take.
Q. And what did you tell him?
A. I told him that I would take the most that he
could give me.
Q. And —
A. And he said that he could offer no more than
19 thousand, well, for academic year, and I said, well,
okay, I'll take it.
Q. And then you were to begin teaching at Gannon
in the fall?
A. Fall of 1980, that’s right.
* * *
[92] Q. Did you seek a promotion from Gannon
University?
A. Well, you see, Dr. Volpe, himself, told me that
they will make me a professor, full professor and chair-
man of the department.
Q. And chairman of the department?
A. Yes. -
* * *
[93] Q. And you apparently did not receive the
rank of full professor or an appointment as chairman
of the department.
A. No, I did not.
93a
Q. Okay. Did Dr. Volpe tell you why that didn’t
happen?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. What did he tell you?
A. About three months after that, sometime, you
know, around November, I suppose, of ’81, he told me
that a former employee, a lady, had just finished her
Ph.D. and wanted to come back, and that if she came
back, I would, I would have to be relieved.
[94] Q. By “relieved”, he meant what?
A. My contract would not be renewed.
Q. What was that professor’s name?
A. I don’t know, but it was a young lady who was a
Gannon graduate and who had finished her Ph.D. and
wanted to come back — wanted to, rather, join Gannon
faculty. She used to be a student, I think.
* * *
[99] A. I floated a resume all over the country this
time.
Q. When you say all over the country, that would be
to approximately five hundred or so colleges and uni-
versities?
A. I would say at least three or four hundred, [100]
yes.
* * *
[110] Q. Did you ultimately — were you ultimately
hired at Saurashtra University?
A. Yes.
Q. What position were you hired in?
A. I was hired as a full professor of economics and
director of the postgraduate program in business man-
agement.
94a
[113] Q. *** again, how long a period of time were
you employed at Saurashtra University?
A. One year.
Q. From what month of what year to what month
of what year?
A. April of 1983 to Apmil of 1984.
[125] Q. When did you arrive in the Philadelphia
area?
A. May of 1984.
Q. Did you contact Dr. Weissenberg at that time?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did you telephone him?
A. I may — I’m sure I did —
Q. Okay.
A. — because he’s just across the river.
Q. Did you write to him as well or did you try to
renew the contact or —
A. No, I called him up and I said that, Dr. Weissen-
berg, I am here and I’m looking for a position, [126]
and he called back and said that I should come by for
a check.
Q. And did you do that?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you do that?
A. I think that would be — I’m trying to narrow down
the time period now. That would have to be sometime
in the latter part of May, I think. |
Q. Late May of 1984?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. You met with Dr. Weissenberg. Was anyone
else with you when you met with him?
A. Oh, yes, Milton Leontiades. The second name is
L-E-O-N-T-I-A-D-E-S. That’s one word, Leontiades, and
Professor Kenis, K-E-N-I-S, and a lady by the name of
i ciaeiaaeeneansiataaanaeeiaeaanmeaaniamaiilil
j
x
95a
Miss Fisher, and who else was there? I’m trying to
think now.
* * *
[128] Q. Did you discuss salary with him at that
point?
A. Yes, we discussed salary and I said, Peter, what
do you think is reasonable, and he said he could offer
me 30. I said, Peter, you offered me 32 back in ’81
and after that I was a full professor, I was a director.
Now you are saying 30. He said take it or leave it. And
I said the going rate is in the upper 40s and he said, Jay,
take it or leave it. He — in all fairness to me, and al-
though I like Peter, I think Peter and Milton Leon-
tiades — Milton Leontiades is a full professor of man-
agement, although like me he’s an economics Ph.D.,
and like me, he has been teaching management — they
both had entered into a conspiracy. *
[129] Q. What do you base that accusation on?
A. I’m coming to that, Mr. Alterman. I'll tell you
more about it. The plot was that I would be hired —
Peter had told me a few things. I’ll tell you in a min-
ute. I would be hired and I would be let go and I would
then be a colored face or a minority for three or four
years. In the meantime, they would probably catch
another minority man as a window dressing. This is the
sort of a plot that I think he and Milton Leontiades
were hatching.
Q. What do you base that belief on?
A. Okay. I base that belief on this: I told Peter, on
the way when he took me back, that, Peter, I should like
to buy a house, and what area would he recommend.
Now, I didn’t know anything about the geography of
New Jersey, nor Philadelphia, really, and he said that
there was no need for me to buy a house, nor for me to
96a
call my family, you know. He said that there was no
big rush, and he was dissuading me from settling down,
which confirmed my belief. I knew that he was offering
me a salary which was ten, maybe $15 thousand below
any person coming from a full professor’s position
would expect.
* * *
[132] Q. Have you — did you at the time form a
belief as to why he couldn’t offer you more than $30
thousand per year?
A. My, my impression was that as Weissenberg saw
it, I was going to be in the revolving door, so to speak,
window dressing for two or three years, you know.
[133] Q. Did you form this belief at the time?
A. Yes, I did.
* * *
[145] A. You see, I was in a position where I had
no job before I took the Rutgers’ job. The hiring season
was way behind me. There was no cash flow. I was sur-
viving on my savings, and, knowing Peter, from what
little I knew of him at that time; number one, he was a
likable man; number two, he was being blatantly dis-
criminatory; number three, hoping that there would be
wiser men than him, and having an optomistic attitude
toward life, I decided to go with Rutgers.
* * *
97a
APPENDIX P
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action Docket # 88 4115 SSB
JAY B. BRIGHT, Ph.D.
plaintiff
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
defendants
PLAINTIFF’S AFFIDAVIT SEEKING A RULE 56(f)
CONTINUANCE OF THE UNIVERSITY’S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
Plaintiff's affidavit seeking a Rule 56(f) continuance
of the University’s summary judgment motion
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Rule 56(f) invoked, para 1
Motions to compel discovery still pending, para 2
The court also needs all the facts, para 3
Discovery relating to the two years immediately preced-
ing the Complaint also pending, _ para 4
To meaningfully controvert the brief and the affidavits
accompanying said motion, plaintiff must first have
full, good-faith and per-rules discovery, para 5
98a
Discovery pursuant to Rule 45(b) is also crucial to plalin-
tiff’s meaningfully opposing said motion; that too is
pending, para6
Lindsey v. Board of Education and/or this court’s interest
in justice require that full, good-faith and per-rules dis-
covery precede the court’s deliberation on said mo-
tion, para 7
1.0 Rule 56(f) Invoked: The plaintiff prays that con-
tinuance on the University’ said motion be granted pend-
ing reasonable, per-rules, and good-faith discovery pursu-
ant to plaintiff’s pending motions to compel discovery.
SEE HERE DSI #s 169, 167, 159, 156, 141, and 102 for
an outline of the problem. The plaintiff cannot, pending
his motions to compel discovery, present ‘‘facts essential
to justify ... opposition” to the University’s said motion;
and prays that the court “refuse the application for judg-
ment or... order a continuance to permit . . . discovery
to be had” — SEE F.R.Civ.P., Rule 56(f).
2.0 Plaintiff’s motions to compel discovery are still
pending see here Docket Sheet Item nos. (DSI #s) 169,
167, 159, 156, 141, and 102, et al.
3.0 The court’s need as well for all the facts to mean-
ingfully decide any motion for summary judgment ts
crucial. The University has resorted to deceit and fraud in
making any facts available to the court as well. SEE
HERE among others, DSI #s 169, 167, 159, 156, 148,
120, 117, and 107.
4.0 Events during two years immediately preceding
the Complaint are equally cructal, should this court hold
valid the Cito v. Bridgewater decision although the plain-
tiff contends that the Cito decision is irrelevant, imma-
terial, and imcompetent. HERE,
59a
(i) (a) Complaint Exhibits 16a through 24b, and (b)
Complaint paras 8, 9, and 10 are equally crucial to claims
under 42 USC 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986, among other;
and
(ii) Good-faith, per-rules and per case-law answers
by the University to plaintiff’s interrogatories are absent,
denying the plaintiff crucial facts, and preventing the
plaintiff from preparing a meaningful opposition to said
motion. SEE HERE DSI #s 169, 167, 159, 156, 148,
141, 120, 117, 107, 102, and 98.
5.0 To meaningfully controvert the brief and the afft-
davits accompanying said motion, plaintiff must first
have good-faith, per-rules and full discovery from all
listed defendants, and plaintiff’s motions to compel dis-
covery from (i) the University, (ii) the Union, and (iii)
United States and New Jersey are still pending before
this court. SEE HERE DSI #s 169, 167, 159, 156, 141,
140, 120, 117, 107, 102, and 98. IN T? & COMPLAINT,
paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 among others refer to events in-
volving, among others, (a) the University, (b) the Union,
and (c) United States and New Jersey. THE EXECU-
TIONS OF THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE TWO UNI-
VERSITY OFFICIALS are objected to. SEE Exhibits
1 and 2, attached. Exhibit 1 has neither a signatuare
nor a date nor any notarization; Exhibit 2 is not exe-
cuted before a notary public (but before an attorney
who does not disclose when and if he was admitted to
what bar.) The plaintiff objects to any execution not
before a notary public.
6.0 To meaningfully provide rebuttals to the Unt-
versity’s said motion, the plaintiff will also, and equally
importantly, require access to documentation on plaintiff
with the listed defendants F.B.I., IL.N.S. and the New
Jersey Division of State Police. SE HERE DSI #s 169,
100a
167, 141, 102, and 98, among others. And this discovery
is also incomplete and pending.
7.0 Lindsey v. Board of Education and/or this court’s
interest in justice require the court to put the horse be-
fore the cart: and order full, good-faith and per-rules dis-
covery per DSI #s 169, 167, 159, 156, 141 and 102,
among others. A succinct write-up on said case law is in
Exhibit 3, attached. With or without the invokation of
said case law, this court’s interest in justice requires that
full discovery precede any meaningful opposition to said
motion by the plaintiff and any deliberation by the court
on any motion for a summary judgment which is by defi-
nition an extremely abrupt motion.
ATTACHMENTS: Exhibits 1, 2, and 3.
NO SEPARATE BRIEF SUBMITTED as none deemed
necessary.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I have mailed today
copies of this document to all counsel by first class mail
postage prepaid,
March 2, 1990 /s/ Jay B. Bright, Ph.D.
plaintiff — Pro se
SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME
THIS 2nd DAY OF Mar. 1990
/s/ Nancie S. Schaefer
NANCIE S. SCHAEFER
NOTARY PUBLIC OF NEW JERSEY
My Commission Expires March 2, 1994
10la
APPENDIX Q
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CIVIL ACTION NO. 88-4115 (SSB)
JAY B. BRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
JAY B. BRIGHT
212-B Hillcrest Avenue
Collingswood, New Jersey 08108
Plaintiff pro se
MARC E, ALTERMAN, Esquire
Vogel, Chait, Schwartz & Collins
Maple Avenue at Miller Road
Morristown, New Jersey 07960
Attorney for Rutgers,
The State University
DENISE REINHARDT, Esquire
Reinhardt & Schachter
102a
744 Broad Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Attorney for Rutgers Council
of AAUP Chapters
BROTMAN, District Judge,
Presently before the court are the motions for sum-
mary judgment by defendants, Rutgers, The State Univer-
sity, and Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters. Plaintiff’s
complaint alleges discrimination and violations of his civil
rights while employed as an Assistant Professor of Fi-
nance at Rutgers University. Plaintiff seeks monetary
damages, as well as reinstatement by Rutgers as a full
professor and as director of the Graduate Business Pro-
gram. For the reasons stated below, the court hereby
grants the motions for summary judgment of defendants
Rutgers, The State University and Rutgers Council of
AAUP Chapters.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
On September 21, 1988, plaintiff filed a complaint
naming as defendants, Rutgers, The State University
(‘Rutgers’); Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters, the
faculty union at Rutgers (“AAUP”); the Federal Bureau
of Investigation; the New Jersey Division of State Police
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Al-
though not entirely clear on its face, the complaint ap-
pears to allege violations of plaintiff’s civil nights under
42 U.S.C. §1981 (equal mghts under the law); § 1983
(civil action for deprivation of nghts); § 1985(2) (con-
spiracy to interfere with civil rights); § 1986 (action for
neglect to prevent violation of civil rights); § 2000e-2(a)
(unlawful employment practices) and § 2000e-3(a) (other
unlawful employment practices).
103a
Jay Bnght is a naturalized citizen of the United States
and of Indian origin. After earning his Ph.D. degree from
the University of Houston in Texas in 1969, he spent
several years working as a professor, in both the United
States and India.
The specific allegations set forth by Bright concern the
period from July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1988, during which
plaintiff was employed by Rutgers as an Assistant Pro-
fessor of Finance at the Camden Campus. In the com-
plaint, it is not clear what type of discrimination plaintiff
alleges. Plaintiff’s discrimination claim is based on his
view that at his time of hire in 1984, (1) his academic
rank of Assistant Professor was an inappropriate “entry
level” position; (2) his starting salary of $30,140 per year
was $8,000-$10,000 below any others in his department
and (3) his office assignment was on a separate floor from
the offices of all the Ph.D.’s in his department. Plaintiff
further alleges that the University administration sub-
jected him to a “systematic conspiracy and campaign to
malign, defame and discredit him” and a conspiracy to
abridge his civil rights.
Plaintiff also alleges that the AAUP knowingly pre-
sented his discrimination claims to the administration
late, resulting in the claims being rejected as untimely
filed. He also claims that the matter was put betore an
unqualified arbitrator, the New Jersey Board of Media-
tion, as it allegedly hears complaints against “private”
employers and therefore should not have heard a com-
plaint against Rutgers, a state institution. Moreover,
plaintiff claims that Rutgers colluded with the AAUP,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), the U.S.
Department of Education, other state and federal agen-
cies and community organizations, to interfere with his
civil rights.
104a
As a result of these alleged activities, Bright claims
his career and community standing have suffered irrepa-
rable harm; that he has been defamed, maligned, ostra-
cized and humiliated, and that he has been blocked from
suitable employment. He also claims pain and suffering.
As relief, plaintiff seeks to be reinstated by Rutgers
University as a full professor and as director of the Grad-
uate Business Program, as well as compensation for dam-
ages.
On March 22, 1989, an order was filed dismissing
plaintiff’s complaint against the New Jersey Division of
State Police. On April 5, 1989, the complaint against the
FBI and the INS were dismissed for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, Thereafter, plaintiff filed various mo-
tions with the court seeking additional discovery, which
were temporarily stayed in an order dated December 13,
1989.
The AAUP and Rutgers have both filed separate mo-
tions for summary judgment. Plaintiff responded in oppo-
sition to the AAUP’s motion for summary judgment by
arguing that it was untimely filed.’ He has also requested
lin opposition to the AAUP motion, plaintiff refers to an
order dated October 20, 1989 which set the deadline for defend-
ant to file summary judgment, ‘‘fourteen (14) days after the date
on which plaintiff’s deposition transcripts are either corrected and
certified by plaintiff or deemed final by operation of the rules of
procedure and orders of this court.”
Plaintiff then notes that an order dated September 21, 1989
instructed plaintiff to review, sign or make any desired changes
in the deposition transcripts within a certain period of days, other-
wise they would be deemed usable as though fully signed. Plain-
tiff petitioned and was granted a stay of this order pending appeal
on October 13, 1989. This order stated that if affirmed on appeal,
plaintiff would have ten (10) days from the date of affirmance in
which to review the transcripts. In an order filed October 30,
1989, the order was affirmed.
[ footnote continued]
105a
a continuance pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P 56(f), to obtain
further discovery.» However, based on the facts pre-
sented in this case, the court finds plaintiff’s position to
be without merit.
Il. DISCUSSION
The standard for granting summary judgment is a
stringent one. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) provides that summary
judgment may be granted only when the materials of
record ‘“‘show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Hersh v. Allen Products
Co., Inc., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir 1986); Lang v. New
York Life insurance Co., 721 F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1983),
The threshold inquiry is whether there are “any genuine
factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a
finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved
in favor of either party.” Anderson uv, Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
On December 1, 1989, the defendant filed its motion for
summary judgment, which according to plaintiff’s timetable,
should have been filed by November 23, 1989. Plaintiff however,
has failed to show any prejudice due to this short delay, and in
light of the fact that plaintiff caused the delay by his own per-
sistent refusal to review the transcripts, this court hereby grants
the defendant, AAUP, leave to file its summary judgment motion
late.
* Plaintiff relies on vague assertions regarding the nature of
the facts to be discovered in his requests. Defendants have already
responded to and substantially complied with, plaintiff's request
for answers to interrogatories and production of documents.
Despite all of the information with which he has been presented,
plaintiff fails to state what any further discovery might disclose,
or what facts he is seeking, or how they would overcome defend-
ants motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff relies only on broad
conclusory allegations, and for this reason, the court must deny
plaintiff's outstanding discovery motions and application for
continuance.
106a
Once the moving party has carried its burden of estab-
lishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,
‘its opponent must do more than simply show that there
is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co, v. Zenith Radto Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Thus, if the movant’s evidence is
merely ‘“‘colorable” or is ‘‘not significantly probative,”
the court may grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249-50. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held
that:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the
entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be
“no genuine issue as to any material fact,” since
a complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986).
A. Statute of Limitations
Based on the facts presented in this case, both Rutgers
and the AAUP argue that summary judgment must be
granted due to the expiration of the applicable statute
of limitations under the § § 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986,
1988 and Title VII claims.
For claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the
federal courts must refer to state statutes of limitations
when federal law provides no rule of decision in cases
under §§ 1981, 1985 and 1986. Board of Regents v.
107a
Tomaino, 446 U.S. 478, 484 (1980); Robertson v. Weg-
mann, 436 U.S. 584, 590 (1978). In § 1983 actions, the
Supreme Court has held that the applicable limitations
period is the same as the limitations period for a personal
injury claim in the state where the alleged wrong oc-
curred. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989); Goodman
v. Lukens Steel, 482 U.S. 656 (1987); Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261 (1985). In New Jersey, the two year per-
sonal injury statute of limitations provided in N.J.S.A.
2A:14-2 has been held applicable to § § 1981, 1983 and
1985 actions. Cito v. Bridgewater Township Police De-
partment, 892 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1989). With respect to
claims under § 1986, the statute itself provides that ‘‘no
action under provision of this section shall be sustained
which is not commenced within one year after the cause
of action has accrued,”
1. Claims Against Rutgers, The State University
In assessing the timeliness of plaintiff’s claims, it is
important to determine when the limitations period
began to run. The basis of plaintiff’s complaint against
Rutgers involving his assigned rank, salary and office
assignment occurred in July, 1984 when Bright was hired.
Moreover, at his deposition, plaintiff expressly stated that
he believed, even at the time he was hired that Rutgers
was discriminating against him. Bright testified that he
accepted the position believing that he could convince
others at the University to remedy the discrimination.
Based on plaintiff’s own admissions, this court finds that
the cause of action accrued, and the limitations period
began to run in July, 1984 when he was assigned his
position, rank, salary and had received his office assign-
ment. More importantly, by July, 1984, plaintiff had
formed the belief in his own mind that he was being dis-
criminated against. As the statute of limitations for
108a
actions brought pursuant to § § 1981, 1983 and 1985 is
two years, and the statute of limitations for actions under
§ 1986 is one year, and this action was not initiated until
September, 1988, plaintiff’s claims under these statutes
are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Plaintiff also alleges violations of Title VII in his com-
plaint. Specifically, he refers to 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e-2(a)
and 2000e-3(a). Under these section, the filing of a timely
charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (‘“‘EEOC’’) is required before
an action may be maintained. Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974); McDonnell Douglas
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
The time in which a party must file a charge of dis-
crimination with the EEOC is set forth in § 2000e-5(e),
which states that ‘“[a] charge under this section shall be
filed within one hundred eighty days after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred. . .” With respect
to plaintiff’s claims based on his academic rank, salary
and office assignment, plaintiff has failed to meet this
requirement. Plaintiff’s first charge of discrimination was
filed with the EEOC on November 17, 1985. As discussed
above, Bright’s own deposition testimony establishes that
he believed he was being discriminated against by the
University when he was hired in July, 1984, and all of the
alleged discriminatory conduct was complete at the time
he received has assigned rank, salary and office assign-
ment. Therefore, the actions complained of occurred well
before the 180-days preceding the filing of discrimination
on November 17, 1985. This court finds that plaintiff’s
claims based on Title VII are also time barred.
109a
2. Claims Against Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters
As examined, the applicable statute of limitations is
two years for plaintiff’s claims based on § § 1981, 1983
and 1985 and one year for his § 1986 claims. In his com-
plaint, Bright alleges that the AAUP was negligent in pre-
senting his employment grievances in an untimely manner
to the administration.
Plaintiff initially contacted the AAUP with his prob-
lems early in 1985, although he never characterized them
as “discrimination” until October, 1985. In May and
June of 1986, plaintiff advised the AAUP that its actions
in failing to represent him with respect to his salary and
rank claims had harmed him. In June, 1986, after his
grievance had been deemed untimely by the University,
he threatened to sue the AAUP for its actions and de-
manded damages. The Complaint in this action was not
filed until September 21, 1988, more than two years
after plaintiff had explicitly accused the AAUP of the
very misconduct charged in the Complaint.
Under Title VII, plaintiff is required to file a charge
with the EEOC before proceeding with an action. In this
case, Bright never filed an EEOC charge against the
AAUP. Normally, the failure to file and EEOC claim
against a party would bar plaintiff’s claim, however, in his
deposition, plaintiff stated that he did not file a charge
against the AAUP because he believed that the University
administration and the union worked “in tandem” and
the union had no separate existence without the Univer-
sity. Even assuming that the University and the AAUP
did work in tandem, and that the court could treat plain-
tiff’s claim against Rutgers as a claim against the AAUP,
as discussed above, plaintiff filed his EEOC charges
against Rutgers after the statute of limitations expired.
Hence, plaintiff’s Title VII claims against the AAUP are
time barred.
110a
As all of plaintiff’s claims are time barred, the court
does not need to address defendant’s other arguments
for summary judgment.
Ill. CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the court hereby grants
the motions for summary Judgment in favor of defend-
ants, Rutgers, The State University and Rutgers Council
of AAUP Chapters.
An appropriate order will be entered.
/s/ Stanley S. Brotman
STANLEY S. BROTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: February 15, 1991
llla
APPENDIX R
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CIVIL ACTION NO. 88-4115 (SSB)
JAY B. BRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter having come before the court on motion
of defendants, Rutgers, The Sxate University and Rutgers
Council of AAUP Chapters;
The Court having considered the submissions of the
parties, and;
For the reasons stated in the Court’s opinion filed this
date;
IT IS on this Ist day of February 1991, hereby
ORDERED that defendants’ motions for summary
judgment are GRANTED and all claims against defen-
dants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
No Costs.
/s/ Stanley S. Brotman
STANLEY S. BROTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
112a
APPENDIX S
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CIVIL ACTION NO. 88-4115 (SSB)
JAY B. BRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
JAY B. BRIGHT
212-B Hillcrest Avenue
Collingswood, New Jersey 08108
Plaintiff pro se
MARC E. ALTERMAN, Esquire
Vogel, Chait, Schwartz & Collins
Maple Avenue at Miller Road
Morristown, New Jersey 07960
Attorney for Rutgers,
The State University
DENISE REINHARDT, Esquire
Reinhardt & Schachter
|
ll3a
744 Broad Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Attorney for Rutgers Council
of AAUP Chapters
BROTMAN, District Judge.
Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the February 15,
1991 order granting summary judgment in favor of de-
fendants, Rutgers, The State University and Rutgers
Council of AAUP Chapters. Plaintiff urges the court to
vacate that order. Plaintiff also moves for the court to
waive the costs of transcription of the February 16,
1990 hearing on the summary judgment motions. For the
reasons stated below, plaintiff’s motions are denied.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Plaintiff initially brought his claim against defendants,
Rutgers, The State University and Rutgers Council of
AAUP Chapters pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, alleging
discrimination and violations of his civil rights while
employed as an Assistant Professor of Finance at Rut-
gers University. Due to the expiration of the applicable
statutes of limitations on plaintiff’s claims, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of defendants in an
order and opinion dated February 15, 1991. Plaintiff
now seeks vacatur of this decision based on a claim of
judicial misconduct. His claim seems to be that the court
entered summary judgment in favor of defendants when
it learned of his complaint to the Third Circuit Judicial
Council against the court. Plaintiff has also requested
that the court waive all fees and provide him with a tran-
script of his February 16, 1990 hearing.
lida
II. DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, the court must determine
whether it should grant plaintiff’s application to waive
the cost of transcription of the February 16, 1990 hear-
ing. There is no general entitlement to free transcripts in
civil cases and a decision to authorize a litigant to obtain
a transcript a public expense rests within the sound dis-
cretion of the court. A. Lite, New Jersey Federal Practice
Rules (1991 ed). at 180 (Comment 2 to General Rule
41). At this juncture, the court finds neither a factual
nor legal basis for granting plaintiff’s request and there-
fore the court must deny plaintiff’s application.
The court now must tum to plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration, General Rule 12I provides that a motion
for reconsideration shall be served with a “memorandum
setting forth concisely the matters or controlling deci-
sions which counsel believes the Court has overlooked.”
The only proper ground for granting a motion for recon-
sideration, therefore, is that the matters or decisions
overlooked, if considered by the court, “might reason-
ably have altered the result reached. . . .” New York
Guardian Mortgage Corp. v. Cleland, 473 F.Supp. 409,
420 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); U.S. v. International Business
Machines Corp., 79 F.R.D. 412, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Plaintiff seems to contend that the court granted sum-
mary judgment to defendants as plaintiff filed a com-
plaint of judicial misconduct against this court. While
the court was not aware of plaintiff’s claim of judicial
misconduct at the time the order granting summary Judg-
ment was issued, the court’s decision was based on the
finding that plaintiff failed to file his claims in a timely
manner pursuant to statutory requirements. Plaintiff’s
claims were, therefore, time barred. Plaintiff’s motion
l15a
fails to set forth matters which would have altered the
result reached as his complaint of judicial misconduct
had no affect on that decision. Asa result, the court will
not vacate its earlier decision.
Ill. CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the court hereby denies
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and his motion to
waive the transcript costs of his February 16, 1990 hear-
ing.
An appropriate order will be entered.
/s/ Stanley S. Brotman
STANLEY S. BROTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: April 2, 1991
1l6a
APPENDIX T
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CIVIL ACTION NO. 88-4115 (SSB)
JAY B. BRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
V.
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter having come before the court on the mo-
tions of plaintiff, Jay B. Bright, to waive the costs of
transcription of the February 16, 1990 hearing and to
reconsider the court’s February 15, 1991 order granting
summary judgment to defendants;
The Court having considered the submissions of the
parties, and;
For the reasons stated in the Court’s opinion filed this
date;
IT IS on this 2nd day of April, 1991, hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to waive the cost
of transcription is DENIED; and
FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration is DENIED.
ll7a
No Costs.
/s/ Stanley S. Brotman
STANLEY S. BROTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
118a
APPENDIX U
DSI# 195
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CIVIL ACTION NO. 88-4115 (SSB)
DR. JAY B. BRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
V.
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY et ail.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter having come before the court on the mo-
tion of plaintiff, Dr. Jay B. Bright, for the court to recon-
sider its April 2, 1991 opinion and order denying plain-
tiff’s previous motion to reconsider the entry of sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendants, and upon plain-
tiff’s second motion to waive the costs of transcription
of the February 16, 1990 hearing previously denied in
the court’s April 2, 1991 opinion and order;
Having considered the submissions of the plaintiff;
The second motion to reconsider the entry of sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendants being based on
the identical argument as the initial motion, namely
that the court entered summary judgment in favor of the
defendants when it learned of plaintiff’s complaint of
judicial misconduct against it;
119a
The court having already indicated in its April 2, 1991
opinion that summary judgment was granted in favor of
defendants due to the court’s finding that plaintiff’s
claim was untimely, not because of any complaint of
judicial misconduct against it;
No new matters having been raised by plaintiff’s sec-
ond motion to reconsider the entry of summary judg-
ment as required by General Rule 121:
Plaintiff also having brought a second motion to waive
the cost of transcription of the February 16, 1990 hear-
ing before this court;
Plaintiff having contended that the purchase of the
transcript “would be rough on [his] budget” and that he
‘could conceivably purchase the said transcript and [his]
family could do with less of other things; [he has] never
claimed to have reached destitution” (Plaintiff’s Most
Urgent Petition Regarding the Mandatory Transcript Pur-
chase Order... at 1, 2); and
The court finding that such reasons do not constitute
good cause to provide plaintiff with a free transcript at
public expense as plaintiff had not indicated that he can-
not pay for the February 16, 1990 transcript;
IT IS on this 20th day of May, 1991, hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff’s second motion to recon-
sider the entry of summary judgment in favor of defen-
dants is DENIED; and
FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s second motion
to waive the costs of transcription of the February 16,
1990 hearing is DENIED.
No Costs. /s/ Stanley S. Brotman
STANLEY S. BROTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
120a
APPENDIX V
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 91-5353
November 26, 1991
JAY B. BRIGHT, Appellant
v.
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY; et al.
(N.J. (Camden) D.C. Civil No. 88-04115)
Present: SLOVITER, Chief Circuit Judge.
1. Motion by Appellant pro se dated November 19, 1991
in which He requests, inter alta:
a) Review of the Clerk’s Orders by a Single Judge
b) Denial of the Filing of Appellees’ Briefs
c) _A Ruling that the Filing of Appellant’s Reply
Briefs is moot
d) That the Clerk’s Willful Distortion of the Matter
before the Court be referred to the Attomey Gen-
eral of the United States and the appropriate
committee of the U.S. Congress for their pursual
[sic]
e) That the Chief Judge appoint a special panel of
Circuit Judges, drawn from a different jurisdic-
tion, to hear the Merits of the appeal
f) That the Court appoint a special Circuit Judge to
oversee the procedures in this case,
l2la
Copy of Clerk’s 11/26/91 order referring Appellant’s
11/19/91 Motion to a single judge as a Motion to Re-
view the Clerk’s 3 orders dated 11/15/91 and for con-
sideration of additional relief requested by Appellant,
Copy of Clerk’s 3 orders dated i1/15/91,
- Motion by Appellees, FBI and INS for permission to
file supplemental appendix
- Motion by Appellant to deny appellee, U.S. filing its
answering brief and answer opposing U.S.’s motion to
file supplemental appendix and Letter-Response by
Appellees FBI and INS to appellant’s motion to deny
filing of appellees’ brief
- Motion by Appellee Rutgers University for permission
to file supplemental appendix and Appellant’s answer
to Appellee Rutgers’ Motion to file supplementary
appendix
. Motion by Appellant to deny appellee, Rutgers filing
its answering brief in violation of Rules
- Motion by Appellee, Rutgers Council for leave to file
overlength brief of 59 pages and to include appendix
- Motion by Appellant to strike brief and supplemental
appendix of Appellee Rutgers
- Motion by Appellant to 1) to deny filing of brief of
appellee New Jersey Div. of State Police, in violation
of the rules, and 2) to extend time to file reply brief
until 14 days after final ruling on appellant’s motions
. Copy of this Court’s Docket Entries
/s/ Rita Golden
Deputy Clerk 597-5019
122a
ORDER
Each of the orders filed by the Clerk on November 15,
1991 in the above matter granting the motions of the
appellees to file supplemental appendices is hereby re-
viewed and affirmed. Similarly, the order of the Clerk
designated Order No. 3 requiring the Rutgers Council of
AAUP Chapters to file and serve a corrected brief within
ten days is reviewed and affirmed.
The orders of the Clerk referring to the merits panel the
issue of the timeliness of the filing of appellees’ briefs
are reviewed and the reference to the merits panel is
hereby reaffirmed. Appellant remains subject to the
Clerk’s order with respect to the time for filing a reply
brief. All of the remaining motions by appellant are
hereby denied.
By the Court,
/s/ Sloviter
Chief Judge
Dated: Dec 05 1991
123a
APPENDIX W
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 91-5353
JAY B. BRIGHT
Appellant
V.
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY:
RUTGERS COUNCIL OF AAUP CHAPTERS;
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE;
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE;
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF STATE POLICE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 88-04115)
District Judge: Stanley S. Brotman
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6)
March 6, 1992
Before: STAPLETON and MANSMANN,
Circutt judges and POLLAK, District Judge.*
*Honorable Louis H. Pollak of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designa-
tion.
124a
JUDGMENT ORDER
After consideration of all contentions raised by the
appellant, it is
ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that the judgment of
the district court be and is hereby affirmed.
Costs taxed against the appellant.
BY THE COURT,
/s/ Carol Los Mansmann
Circuit Judge
Attest:
/s/ Sally Mrvos, Clerk
Sally Mrvos, Clerk
MAR 16 1992
125a
APPENDIX X
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 91-5353
JAY B. BRIGHT
Appellant
vs.
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW JERSEY;et al.
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
Present: SLOVITER, Chief Judge,
BECKER, STAPLETON, MANSMANN, GREENBERG,
HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA, COWEN, NYGAARD and
ROTH, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, District Judge.*
The petition for rehearing filed by appellant in the
above entitled case having been submitted to the judges
who participated in the decision of this court and to all
other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular
active service, and no judge who concurred in the deci-
sion having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the
circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service not
having voted for rehearing by the court in banc, the peti-
tion for rehearing is denied.
BY THE COURT,
/s/ Carol Los Mansmann
Circuit Judge
Dated: Apni 15, 1992
* District Judge Pollak voted only as to panel rehearing.
126a
CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION
EEOC 031860632
Name: Dr. Jay Bright, 212 Hillcrest Avenue, Apt. B,
Collingswood, New Jersey 08108
Named is the employer who discriminated against me:
Rutgers University, Camden, New Jersey 08102
Cause of discrimination based on: National Origin—
Indian (East), Retaliation
Date most recent or continuing discrimination took
place: 12/84 and cont.
The particulars are:
I. I was hired as an Assistant Professor in July 1984, in
the Business Studies Department. The Departmental
Chairman, Peter Weissenberg, told me that he will pay me
an Associate Professor’s salary ($30,000 per year). I
agreed to this and signed a contract. i1 December 1984, I
discovered that I am being paid less than the average
Associate Professor. My pay was never adjusted and I in-
formed Dr. Gordon (Provost) about my problem. No
action was taken. On June 26, 1985, I had a meeting with
Dr. Weissenberg and Dr. Gordon (my attorey at that
time was present) and informed them that I believe that I
am being discriminated against because of my national
origin. Since that time, I have been subjected to differen-
tial treatment in the form of harassment.
II. Respondent gave me no reason for the harassment.
Dr. Weissenberg’s reason for the pay discrepancy was that
Respondent negotiate salaries and rank on an individual
basis.
127a
III. I believe that I am being discriminated against be-
cause of my national origin Indian, and retaliated against
for opposing what I perceive to be discriminatory treat-
ment because of my national origin, in that:
a. I am the only Indian in my department and the
only minority with a doctorate.
b. In December 1984, I discovered I was bei
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