Opposition Brief — Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman

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No. 92-116 | AUS \ |

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC., et al.

eee Petitioners,

v.

GUY HERMAN, JUDGE OF THE TRAVIS COUNTY

PROBATE COURT #1, et al.

CeEEEh ese oss Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO A PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

mnoameasincinatiese

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO A PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ee

KEN ODEN

TRAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY

Lorri Michel and Eric M. Shepperd James W. Collins

Assistant County Attorneys Executive Assistant

P. O. Box 1748 P. O. Box 1748

Austin, Texas 78767 Austin, Texas 78767

(512) 473-9415 (512) 473-9415

Fax: (512) 473-9316 Fax: (512) 473-9316

Attorneys for Respondent: Attorney for Respondent

Honorable Guy Herman and Counsel of Record:

August 14, 1992 Honorable Guy Herman

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether an atheist individual, who refused to make

a non-religious affirmation to tell the truth when answering

questions during jury service qualification, has standing to

seek prospective declaratory relief against the then

presiding judge on Free Exercise and/or Equal Protection

grounds, either as an individual or as a class representative

and/or as a coplaintiff with an atheist association?

LIST OF ALL PARTIES

ROBIN MURRAY-O'HAIR, and

SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC.,

Petitioners and Plaintiffs/Appellants below;

The HONORABLE GUY HERMAN, Judge

Travis County Probate Court #1,

Respondent and Defendant/Appellee below; and

The HONORABLE DAN MORALES, Attorney General

for the state of Texas,

Intervenor in the Court of Appeals.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Statement of Proceedings and Disposition

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Summary of Argument .................

Argument Presenting Reasons for Opposing

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page -

Cases ,

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) .......... 17, 18

Carter v. Jury Commission o

Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) .... 20, 21

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) 19, 21

County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,

owen: Om ,

BFE Die POET Fb Sow es ese dunr 17, 20,26

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,

ce Sg BD es TT CPE) 6.cas ee

Georgia v. McCollum, No. 91-372,

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(URN FUE BG, TRE) 6 oi nc eects ai, 2

Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969) ......... 20

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) ........... 24

Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987) ........... 20

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising

Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) ....... 16, 22

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, .§ US.___,

SSE Bs SEE ke hob Geet wnes 20, 25

Murray V. istrict ‘

No. 89-1463 (5th Cir. Feb. 26, 1990),

cert. denied, _ US

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SUG OEE bk 66 60 eas 4 eR dKG ED 24

Powers v. Ohio, __—sU.S. ___, |

ee ee Fd.) rere ry Me es

Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988) ........... 20

Cases cont’d

Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman,

No. A-89-CA-1021,

tf'3.. 2 o.. Peer errer ,£m@

Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman,

939 F.2d 1207 (Sth Cir. 1991),

reh'g granted, 946 F.2d 1573

(Suh GR. SOs 6 5k do ee eee 7, 19

Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman,

959 F.2d 1283 (Sth Cir. 1991)

(en banc), petition for cert. filed

daly £3, TREE 5 ck ek i ee eae 7, 19

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans

United for Separation of Church and

State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) .......... 17

Warth v. Seldin 422 U.S. 490 (1975) ............ 20

United States Constitution

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States and Rules of Procedure

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TEs We Ges Oe aks eked ee eee 15, 19

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6

a

OPINIONS BELOW

On November 19, 1990, the United States District

Court for the Western District of Texas, granted summary

judgment in favor of Defendant/Respondent and against

Plaintiffs/Petitioners. Society of Separationists, Inc. v.

Herman, No. A-89-CA-1021, (W.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 1990).

A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit awarded declaratory relief in favor of

Plaintiffs/Petitioners against Defendant/Respondent on

August 28, 1991. Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman

939 F.2d 1224 (Sth Cir. 1991).

On April 17, 1992, the Fifth Circuit, on rehearing

en banc, overruled the panel decision previously issued,

holding that the individual Plaintiff/Petitioner as well as

the associational Plaintiff/Petitioner lacked standing to

bring the action. Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman,

959 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1992).

JURISDICTION

Petitioners have attempted to invoke the certiorari

jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section

1254. However, it is Respondent’s contention that the en

banc decision of United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit decided a question of federal law which has

been well settled by this Court and which in no way

conflicts the applicable decisions of this Court.

10

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Proceedings and Disposition in the Courts Below:

Petitioners, an individual and atheist organization

filed suit on November 16, 1989, seeking preliminary and

permanent injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment and

damages against Guy Herman, Probate Judge of Travis

County, Texas and other Travis County Defendants

alleging specifically that the Defendants violated

Petitioners Free Exercise rights. Petitioners suit was not

brought nor ever certified as a class action. In fact, the

District Court dismissed the associational Plaintiff. The

District Court ruled for the Defendants on every issue and

further held that all named Defendants were immune or

not amenable to suit.

The United States District Court for the Fifth

Circuit held that all named Defendants except for Judge

Guy Herman were properly dismissed by the District

Court but reversed that Court’s dismissal of the

associational Plaintiff. The Fifth Circuit panel then issued

declaratory relief in favor of Petitioners and against Judge

Herman.

Subsequently, on November 1, 1991, the Fifth

Circuit ordered the case reconsidered en banc. As a

result, on April 17, 1992, the Fifth Circuit, en banc, after

receiving written briefs from both sides on the issue of the

standing, overruled the prior panel decision, holding that

the individual Petitioner lacked standing to seek

prospective declaratory relief and that the associational

Petitioner lacked associational standing.

11

Statement of Facts

Petitioner Murray-O’Hair was summoned to the

Travis County Courthouse for jury duty along with a

number of other citizens. When the group of prospective

jurors of which Petitioner Murray-O’Hair was a member

was asked to rise to take the statutorily required juror

oath, Petitioner Murray-O’Hair objected to the oath on

the grounds that she was an atheist. She was then called

to the bench by Judge Herman, who inquired as to her

refusal to take the oath. After stating her objections,

Petitioner Murray-O’Hair was immediately offered an

opportunity to make an affirmation. She refused to make

an affirmation as well.

After the other jurors were sworn in, Petitioner

Murray-O Hair again appeared before Judge Herman, who

made further inquiries about her refusal to take an

affirmation. The judge again offered an affirmation,

assuring her that the affirmation he was offering would be

".. without any recognition or any statement, any

reference to God or anything of that nature ... .". Record

Excerpt, Transcript of Contempt Hearing, p.3, 11.3-5. Her

response was: “I cannot affirm, sir. That is just as

religious as an oath," Id. at 11.7-8, and, later, "An

affirmation, my understanding, is a religious statement."

Record Excerpt, Transcript of Contempt Hearing, p.4,

11.1-2.

After repeatedly offering to allow Petitioner

Murray-O’Hair to make a non-religious affirmation, after

explaining that the law required her to make an oath or an

affirmation in order to qualify for jury duty, after warning

12

her that if she refused to make either " ... an oath or an

affirmation, ... " Id. at p.3, 1,12, she would be held in

contempt of court, and after receiving nothing in response

other than unqualified refusals to make either an oath or

an affirmation, Judge Herman finally held Petitioner

Murray-O'Hair in contempt of court and ordered her

detained in the Travis County Jail. Petitioner Murray-

O’Hair was released on bond approximately six (6) hours

later and Judge Herman reduced her contempt sentence

to time served. Subsequently, as a result of the forgoing

incident, Petitioners filed this action.

13

14

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Regardless of how broad and sweeping an effect

the Petitioners would like their lawsuit to have on the

Travis County jury system and the State of Texas, the fact

remains that the only parties involved in this lawsuit are

the Petitioner, Robin Murray-O’Hair, along with her co-

Petitioner, the non-certified class, Society of Separationists,

Inc., and the sole Respondent, Guy Herman, Presiding

Judge, Probate Court Number One, Travis County, Texas.

And despite how unconstitutional Petitioners assert that

Rules 226 and 236 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure

are along with the way in which they are implemented by

the Travis County jury system, the only substantive issue

asserted by Petitioners, in this action, is whether or not

Judge Herman violated Murray-O’Hair’s Free Exercise

and/or Equal Protection rights by holding her in contempt

for refusing to make a non-religious affirmation during jury

service qualification.

Focusing on these simple yet key facts surrounding

this litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit, en banc concluded that Petitioners did not

have standing to seek prospective declaratory relief against

Respondent, Judge Herman.

Respondent argues that the Fifth Circuit correctly

held that pursuant to Article III of the United States

Constitution and this Court’s decisions regarding and

interpreting the same, Petitioners lack standing to bring

this action. Specifically, Respondent asserts that there is

no conceivable declaratory remedy available for Petitioners

which would alter Respondent Judge Herman’s behavior

15

towards Petitioner Murray-O’Hair. This is so because

Petitioner suffers no continuing harm and has only

demonstrated a conjectural or hypothetical threat of future

injury stemming from Respondent Herman’s conduct in

1987.

Additionally, Respondent asserts that the Fifth

Circuit correctly held that Society of Separationists lacks

associational standing according to this Court’s decision in

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,

432 U.S. 333 (1977).

16

ARGUMENT

Introduction

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied

because the en banc decision of the Fifth Circuit, holding

that Petitioners lack standing to seek prospective

declaratory relief against Respondent Herman, in no way

conflicts with the well settled decisions of this Court on the

issue of standing.

Article III of the United States Constitution limits

the jurisdiction of the federal courts to determining actual

cases or controversies. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737

(1984). Part and parcel of the Article III, ‘actual case or

controversy’ requirement is the rule that a litigant must

have ‘standing to invoke the power of the federal courts.

Id. at 750.

The doctrine of standing has been repeatedly

defined by this Court as, "the requirement that a plaintiff

allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s

allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by

the requested relief." County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,

___—US. ____, 111 S.Ct. (1991); citing Allen v. Wright,

468 U.S. 737 (1982); citing Valley Forge Christian College

v. ricans United for Separation of Church and State

Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).

Due to the constraints imposed by Article III,

Petitioners, Murray-O’Hair and Society of Separationists,

do not have standing to seek declaratory relief. This is so

because in actuality what Petitioners seek is an advisory

opinion.

17

The lack of standing for Petitioner Murray-O’Hair

and Petitioner Society of Separationists will be addressed

separately in this brief.

Individual Standing

When making a_ standing inquiry, judicial

examination of the plaintiff's complaint is necessary. Such

an inquiry should include identifying the parties, the issues

involved and the type of relief sought. One factor to be

considered is whether or not the prospect of obtaining

relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling is too

speculative? Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 753.

An examination of Petitioner’s complaint shows that

she, as an individual, and the Society of Separationists (the

purported class which never obtained class certification

under Rule 23, Federal Rules Civil Procedure) are seeking

prospective declaratory relief against Respondent Judge

Herman on the basis that he violated her Free Exercise

and/or Equal Protection rights by holding her in contempt

when she refused to make a non-religious affirmation

during jury service qualification. Neither Travis County,

Texas nor the State of Texas is a party to this action.’

‘In Petitioner's original complaint, Travis County, Texas, was

named as a co-defendant but was dismissed by the District Court on

grounds that Petitioners never established that her injury occurred

pursuant to some policy or custom which represents the official policy

of Travis County. The Court found that, Petitioner never pointed to

any policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or other officially adopted

decision by Travis County which was the moving force behind the

deprivation she alleges. Nor did Petitioner identify another Travis

County trial judge who may have held other jurors in contempt for

18

The constitutionally of Rules 226, Oath to Jury Panel, and

236, Oath to Jury, of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure

was never challenged by Petitioner’s in their complaint.

When a plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief for a

past exposure to illegal conduct, the plaintiff must show

that she suffers continuing harm or a real and immediate

threat of repeated injury in the future unless declaratory

relief is granted. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.

95 (1983).

According to the Lyons decision, Petitioner lacks

Standing to obtain prospective declaratory relief.

Petitioner does not suffer a continuing harm as a result of

Judge Herman’s actions. Nor can Petitioner show that she

will in the future appear before Judge Herman as a

prospective juror and that Judge Herman will exclude her

from jury service and jail her for contempt. In fact, it

would be a very remote possibility that Petitioner and

Judge Herman would find themselves back in this situation

with one another in the future. There are over one half

million residents in Travis County and twenty six judges of

varying types. Furthermore, Judge Herman’s regular

duties no longer include overseeing the jury qualification

process. Therefore, although it is possible even probable,

refusing to take a juror’s oath. Moreover, Petitioner never asserted

that Judge Herman was a policy maker for Travis County. Society of

Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, No. A-89-CA-1021, slip op. at 9 (W.D.

Tex. Nov. 19, 1990). See Monell v. New York Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The dismissal of defendant Travis

County was affirmed by both the panel and en banc decisions of the

Fifth Circuit. Society of Separationists v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1224

(Fifth Cir. 1991); Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 959 F.2d

1283 (Fifth Cir. 1992).

19

a

that at some point in Respondent’s life she might be called

for jury duty again, it is highly unlikely that she would

appear before Judge Herman for jury impaneling,

assuming that Judge Herman remained a judge of some

sort in Travis County for the remainder of Petitioner’s life.

Clearly, based on the facts of this case, the only threat of

future injury Petitioner can demonstrate is one that is

purely conjectural, hypothetical and in no way immediate.

See Luian v. Defenders of Wildlife, .=»«S=U.S. __, 112

S.Ct. 2130 (1992); Golden v. Zwickler 394 U.S. 103 (1969).

It is apparent that based on this Court’s decision in

Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988), Petitioner is actually

seeking an advisory opinion and not a declaratory

judgment. As this Court stated, "The real value of a

judicial pronouncement--what makes it a proper judicial

resolution of a case or controversy rather than an advisory

opinion--is the settling of some dispute which affects the

behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff. Rhodes v.

Stewart, 488 U.S. at 202, citing Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S.

755 (1987) (emphasis in original). Even if Petitioner in

this case, received a favorable declaratory judgment it

would not affect the behavior of Judge Herman towards

her.

In her petition for Writ of Certiorari, Petitioner

incorrectly relies on Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene

County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) and County of Riverside v.

McLaughlin, US. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1161 (1991), in

support of her argument that she has standing to seek

declaratory relief. This case is entirely different from

Carter and County of Riverside. This is so because unlike

this case, the plaintiffs in Carter obtained class certification

20

and sued, alleged and proved that the County Jury

Commission deliberately and systematically excluded blacks

from Greene County juries. Whereas, in this case, class

certification was never obtained and the only

Defendant/Respondent is an individual. Likewise, in

County of Riverside, the class certified plaintiffs,

demonstrated the existence of a continuing harm as a

result of the County’s official policy of "ot providing

probable cause determinations within thirty-six (36) hours

of arrest. Petitioner has not shown that Judge Herman

continuously and systematically excludes atheists from

serving On juries nor has she demonstrated that she suffers

a continuing harm as a result of her non-participation in

jury duty in 1987.

Instead, Petitioner Murray-O’Hair, like the

petitioner in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, complains of

one single incident which has altogether ceased before the

filing of her complaint and therefore has no standing.

Petitioner also incorrectly relies on the line of cases

coming from this Court which address the issue of juror

exclusion on account race. Petitioner attempts to classify

herself as an "excluded juror." To the contrary, Petitioner

was not excluded from the jury, but refused to participate

in the jury selection process by refusing to make a non-

religious affirmation to tell the truth when answering voir

dire questions. Petitioner wholly differs from the jurors in

Powers v. io, ss ~U.S. __, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (1991);

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., __- U.S. ___, 111

S.Ct. 2077 (1991); Georgia v. McCollum, No. 91-372, __

US. _____s (1992) (decided June 18, 1992), who were

excluded from jury duty solely on account of race.

21

Furthermore, assuming arguendo, that Petitioner is

considered to be an "excluded juror," her reliance on

Powers v. Ohio, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., and

Georgia_v. McCollum, is still misplaced. The Powers,

Edmonson, and Georgia decisions held that when a

prospective juror is struck by the use of a racially based

peremptory challenge, then that juror’s Equal Protection

rights have been violated. Petitioner misinterprets those

decisions to mean that an Equal Protection violation

equals standing. That is not correct. In fact, this Court

specifically noted in Powers v. Ohio, that a potential juror

has daunting standing problems when seeking declaratory

relief for an equal protection violation which was caused

by the exercise of a racially based peremptory challenge.

This is so because it is difficult for an individual juror to

show a likelihood that discrimination will reoccur at the

voir dire stage. Id. at 1373. Without evidence of a

systematic practice, an excluded juror lacks standing to

seek prospective relief.

Associational Standing

In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising

Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), this Court held that,

An association has standing to bring suit on

behalf of its members when: (a) its

members would otherwise have standing to

sue in their own right; (b) the interests it

seeks to protect are germane to the

organizations purpose; and (c) neither the

22

claim asserted nor the relief requested

requires participation of individual members

in the lawsuit.

The Society of Separationists does not meet the

first and third requirements of the Hunt test.

The Associational Petitioner has not demonstrated

that its members would otherwise have standing to sue in

their own right. Remembering that Judge Herman is the

only respondent in this case, the other Society members

have not suffered any injury from the dismissal of Murray-

O’Hair from the venire in 1987. Just because other

Society members may agree with Murray-O’Hair’s opinion

regarding the oath or affirmation requirement, that is not

sufficient to therefrom conclude that they have suffered

actual injury. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).

Therefore, since the other Society members have not

suffered any injury, the Society does not have standing.

The Society also lacks standing under the Hunt test

because their complaint requires the participation of

individual members. The Society’s complaint does not

challenge the constitutionality of Rules 226 and 236 of the

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Travis County, Texas, and

the State of Texas are not parties to this suit. The Society

complains of Judge Herman’s actions in this isolated

incident. The basis of the Society’s complaint is a single

episode between Murray-O’Hair and Judge Herman in

December of 1987. Without Murray-O’Hair’s

participation, there would be no lawsuit. If Murray-O’Hair

never appeared before Judge Herman, and if the

subsequent exchange between Murray-O’Hair and Judge

Herman never took place, no lawsuit would exist.

Petitioners, disregarding the requirements of the

Hunt test, assert, in support of their associational standing

argument that this suit and Murray v. Travis County

District Court, No. 89-1463 (Sth Cir. Feb. 26, 1990), cert.

denied, _ _-—-U.S. ____ 1111 S.Ct. 75 (1991), shows that

Travis County has pattern of coercing potential jurors to

make a religious statement and excluding them if they do

not. This assertion is irrelevant and not compelling. First

of all, Travis County is not a Respondent to this action.

Judge Herman is the only named Respondent in this suit.

Petitioners failed long ago to present any proof or

establish that the alleged injury was the result of a policy

or custom representing the official policy of Travis County.

Secondly, other than Petitioner Murray-O’Hair, the Society

is only able to point to one other unnamed individual who,

they assert, was held in contempt for refusing to

participate in the jury selection process. This is insufficient

to establish a systematic exclusion of atheists and falls far

short from establishing that the members of the Society

have suffered actual injury.’

The fact the Society lacks standing under the Hunt

test, is also consistent with the holding of Harris v. McRae,

448 U.S. 297 (1980), in which this Court held that a Free

Exercise claim is one that ordinarily requires individual

“In fact, Petitioners submitted only one affidavit of another

individual, Keith Hailey, who refused to use the word affirm during

jury service qualification. However, Mr. Hailey’s affidavit did not

indicate whether he was a member of the Society or not.

24

participation. Here, as in Harris, individual participation

of the Society’s members is essential for a proper

understanding and resolution of their Free Exercise claims.

Petitioners have only made a general assertion in their

complaint they speak for their members. Yet, the Society

never submitted any evidence indicating how many of its

member’s share Petitioner’s view regarding the nature of

an affirmation nor how any of its members were injured

and in what way, by the dismissal of Murray-O’Hair from

the venire.

Recently, this Court held that, the elements of

standing "are not mere pleading requirements but rather

an indispensable part of plaintiff's case, each element must

be supported in the same way as any other matter on

which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, ie., with the

manner and degree of evidence required at the successive

stages of the litigation." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

112 S.Ct. at 2130. Thus, under Lujan, it is clear that

Petitioners fall far short of establishing the elements of

standing.

The Society of Separationists was never certified as

a class because it failed to meet the prerequisites for

obtaining class certification under Rule 23, Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the Society presented no

evidence that the class of individuals is so numerous that

that joinder of all members would be impracticable.* The

Society is a national organization of atheists. Yet, in light

of its nationwide status, the Society failed to present any

*Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, No. A-89-CA-1021, slip

1S. |

25

a

evidence of how the issue in the lawsuit, which involves a

Travis County Judge following a rule of state procedure,

contains a question of law common to the nationwide class

or how the out of state members are in need of having

their rights protected through Murray-O’Hair’s complaint.

Instead of setting forth facts showing that the Society

meets the requirements for class certification under Rule

23, the Petitioners simply made a vague assertion

contained in their original complain‘, purporting to

represent "All individuals eligible for jury service who have

deep seated convictions against mouthing any religious

dogma as-a condition to jury service."

Furthermore, there is no evidence-in the record

that other Society members even share Murray-O’Hair’s

opinion regarding the religious nature of an affirmation.

In this case, the Society does not represent a certifiable

class of similarly situated individuals and there is no real

and immediate threat to such a class.

Yet, even if the Society does represent a certifiable

class of similarly situated individuals, the Society would

have to demonstrate that a case or controversy actually

existed at the time the complaint was filed. County of

Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S.Ct. at 1667. In this case,

the alleged unlawful conduct by Judge Herman wholly

subsided by the time Petitioners’ complaint was filed.

Conclusion

As demonstrated above, the en banc decision of the

Fifth Circuit, holding that Petitioners lack standing to seek

prospective declaratory relief against Respondent Herman

26

:

is consistent with the well settled decisions of this Court.

Therefore, no need exists for this Court to review the en

banc decision of the Fifth Circuit and the Petition for Writ

of Certiorari should be denied.

James W. Collins

SBID(TX) 04611500

Counsel of Record

Attorney for Respondent:

Honorable Guy Herman

Zl del

Lorri Michel

Attorney for Respondent:

Honorable Guy Herman

Lh Dpp-—

Eric M. Shepperd

Attorney for Respondent:

Honorable Guy Herman

27

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, James W. Collins, hereby certify that I have

mailed copies of the foregoing Brief in Opposition to a

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to:

1. John W. Vinson

7215 Cameron Rd.

Austin, Texas 78752-2973

2. Richard D. Grossman

135 S. LaSalle St., Ste. 1540

Chicago, IL 60603-4297

on the 14th day of August 1992, in duly addressed

envelopes, with postage prepaid, return receipt requested.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing

is true and correct. Executed on ul 14, 1992.

Judd i?

es W. Collins, SBID(TX) 04611500

Travis County Attorney’s Office

P. O. Box 1748, Austin, TX 78767

(512) 473-9415 - FAX (512) 473-9316

Counsel of Record