Opposition Brief — O'Neill Group v. Continental Airlines Corp., 113 S. Ct. 87 (1992) (No. 91-2014)

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No. 91-2014 |

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Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

O’NEILL GroupP, et. al., Petitioners

5%

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES CorP., Respondent

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

IN OPPOSITION

BARRY P. SIMON CHARLES A. SHANOR*

SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT JOHN J. GALLAGHER

AND GENERAL COUNSEL JON A. GEIER

DANIEL P. CASEY PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY

ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL & WALKER

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, 1050 CONNECTICUT AVE., N.W.

INC. TWELFTH FLOOR

2929 ALLEN PARKWAY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

HOUSTON, TEXAS 77019 (202) 223-9000

(713) 834-2273

July 13, 1992 ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

* COUNSEL OF RECORD

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code

grants employees who strike their debtor-in-possession

employer rights superior to those of strikers in all other

circumstances, such that they become entitled to wages and

benefits for the time period during which they voluntarily

withheld their services and did not work?

2. Whether Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code

grants employees who had no guarantee of future employment

an entitlement to future wages and benefits as contract

rejection damages for the time period after which the debtor-

in-possession employer would have ceased operations?

il

LIST OF PARTIES

The O’Neill Group, Petitioners in this Court and

appellants in the court of appeals, were originally four

hundred fifty-two past or present pilots and flight attendants

of Continental Airlines, Inc. Annex A to the O’Neill Group’s

Application to Extend Time to File a Petition for Writ of

Certiorari, filed on January 8, 1991 (No. A-528) lists all of

the Petitioners. Four hundred of the four hundred fifty-two

original Petitioners have settled the claims at issue here.

Respondent and appellee in the court of appeals is

Continental Airlines Corp., a corporate predecessor of

Continental Airlines, Inc.

RULE 29.1 STATEMENT

Continental Airlines, Inc. is a wholly owned

subsidiary of Continental Airlines Holdings, Inc.

- ili -

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................

OE es oo ks wk woe eS owe bles

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........00500.

ae

ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI .

I. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH

NO DECISION OF THIS COURT OR OF

ANY OTHER COURT OF APPEALS .....

IT. BOTH SETTLEMENTS OF CLAIMS AND

PASSAGE OF A NEW STATUTE

DRAMATICALLY DIMINISH THE

IMPORTANCE OF THIS CASE ........

III. THE DENIAL OF PETITIONERS’

CLAIMS TURNED ON FACTUAL

ISSUES, NOT QUESTIONS OF LAW

APPROPRIATE FOR THIS COURT’S

| BS Sg a

IV. THE DECISION BELOW CORRECTLY

og gg Oi ey eS ee 12

A. Strikers Are Not Entitled To Claim Wages For

Periods When They Struck Their Employer .. 14

B. Employees Are Not Entitled To Damages For

Future Wages For Time Periods After The

Employer Would Have Ceased To Do Business

Hee Mt Pag Such WaGeSs . wc ee 17

ee eee ee ee eee ee ee ee 18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page(s)

Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O'Neill,

Bak S. CR, TER CRED oes ever detaeeeee 4

American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB,

Jee U8. FO «6 a OOO eee 15

Comfort, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965), enforced,

365 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1966) ............. 14

Empresa Ecuatoriana de Aviacion, S.A. vy.

District Lodge No. 100, 690 F.2d 838

(11th Cir. 1982), cert. dismissed,

463 7.5. Tape tees 6 0k 0c owe eee 14

IAM v. Central Airlines, Inc.,

Ste Um Te CUD cho 0c ones ck nee ee 15

IBEW y. A-1 Electrical Serv.,

535 F.2d 1 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,

SED U2. SE CHP xn kb a ee tee eae 17

In re Altair Airlines, Inc.,

Vat F.28 Oe GO Cw. 1906) x. 5 6 odds ec evans 14

In re Continental Airlines Corp.,

38 B.R. 67 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984) .......... 3

In re Continental Airlines Corp., 50 B.R. 342

(S.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd, 790 F.2d 35

Coe Ge, Ne 6-0-5 5 bs oa pe eee 14

In re Continental Airlines Corp..,

57 B.R. 845 (Bankr. §.D. Tex. 1985) ..... ii, i7

In re Continental Airlines,

ae ©.26 127 OO Cr. 1991) . ww ok ek bcans 2

In re Nuisance Corp., 17 B.R. 80

(EN. SRN SOP ko eco awc can wee 13

In re Roth American, Inc., 120 B.R. 356

eS ee rr en... 8

+ ais

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - CONTINUED

Page(s)

In re U.S. Truck Co., 89 B.R. 618

(E.D. Mich. 1988), aff’g 74 B.R. 515

te a OM eee re ere 8

International Bhd. of Teamsters v.

IML Freight, Inc., 789 F.2d 1460

(Ts Rs ke eee ee eee 7

J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,

399 F.2d 356 (Sth Cir. 1968),

rev'd on other grounds,

700 Us Be ee sk 6 ee a ee eee eee 14

J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB,

Jak Wid ee CEs 6 kako ee 11, 17

Mazirow v. Grigsby (In re White Motor Corp.),

44 B.R. 563 (N.D. Ohio 1966)... ww ice ee ws 13

National Airlines, Inc. v. IAM,

416 F.2d 998 (Sth Cir. 1969),

after remand, 430 F:2d 957

CO CA: TR ks hk eee ee 14

NLRB vy. Bildisco & Bildisco,

4G5 UB. Sid Cle 5 2 a x ck 8, 10, 13, 16

NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co.,

Se U.S Bae GE 6 ake a eee es tee 15

NLRB vy. Southern Greyhound Lines,

426 F.2d 1299 (Sth Cir. 1970) ............. 14

Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,

SES Us BET CRD 6a be oe a ee 14

Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills

of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) ........... 15

- Vii -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - CONTINUED

Page(s)

STATUTES:

a ees © See 6 fi ek «wena are. 2

Oe ee oe eee koe. 2

Bankruptcy Code

Eyck ey i ere 10, 16

Ae us RSME ook ka sv erevs Ohaus 10

Pe We ED oe od ks ae ek oe eee 13

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:

130 Cong. Rec. No. 92 (June 29, 1984) ......... 10

TREATISES:

3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¢ 502.02

(OOO BPO, eo be ke pees wees 12, 14

MISCELLANEOUS:

Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy

Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain,

91 Yale L.J. 857 (1982) ................. 13

Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits

of Bankruptcy Law, Harvard Univ. Press

ee ae a Ware a nea ei ks 2: 13

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

O’NEILL GROUP, et. al., Petitioners

Vi

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES CorP., Respondent

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

IN OPPOSITION

Respondent Continental Airlines Corp. respectfully

requests that this Court deny the petition for a writ of

certiorari, seeking review of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in this

case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion and judgment of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reported at 901 F.2d 1259

(Sth Cir. 1990) (Pet. App. A). The Fifth Circuit’s order

denying petitions for rehearing and suggestions for rehearing

en banc is unreported (Pet. App. G.). The district court’s

order, filed March 13, 1989, is unreported (Pet. App. E).

The bankruptcy court order dated September 10, 1985 is

unreported (Pet. App. B), its order dated May 8, 1986 is

unreported (Pet. App. C), and its order dated June 26, 1986

is reported at 64 Bankr. 865 (Bankr. $.D. Tex 1986) (Pet.

App. D).

2

JURISDICTION

This Court, on January 9, 1991, extended the time

for filing a writ of certiorari to March 28, 1991, No. A-528.

On March 21, 1991, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

confirmed that Respondent Continental Airlines Inc.’s

("Continental") bankruptcy petition stayed appellate

proceedings arising from an earlier bankruptcy, In re

Continental Airlines, 928 F.2d 127 (Sth Cir. 1991) (Pet. App.

H), automatically extending the time for petitioning this Court

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 108(c)(2).Y The automatic

stay was lifted on May 12, 1992 (Pet. App. J), and thereafter

the petition for certiorari was timely filed under 11 U.S.C.

Section 108(c)(2). This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under

28 U.S.C. Section 1254 (1).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

After suffering over $500 million in losses during

the first five years of airline deregulation, Continental

suspended its domestic operations and filed a bankruptcy

petition on September 24, 1983. On September 27, 1983,

Continental resumed a reduced level of operations and filed a

motion with the bankruptcy court to reject its collective

bargaining agreements with the Air Line Pilots Association

("ALPA") and the Union of Flight Attendants ("UFA"). The

same day, Continental issued “emergency work rules" that

l/ A corporate predecessor of Continental ("Old Continental") filed a

petition in bankruptcy on September 24, 1983. Jn re Continental Airlines

Corp., Consolidated Case No. 83-04019-H2-5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.) The

contract rejection damages claims at issue here were filed against Old

Continental, which emerged as a new entity from bankruptcy on

September 2, 1986, pursuant to a confirmed plan of reorganization. The

reorganized Continental filed its bankruptcy petition on December 3, 1990.

In re Continental Airlines, Inc. , Case Nos. 90-932 through 90-984 (Bankr.

D. Del.) Old Continental is hereinafter referenced as Continental.

3

called for lower wages and fewer restrictions on the

availability of pilots and flight attendants for duty. The new

wages and work rules mirrored those in union contracts

agreed to in the then-recent reorganization of another carrier,

Braniff Airways. ALPA and UFA, including all members of

Petitioners, the O’Neill Group, went on strike beginning

October 1, 1983.2

On June 17 and December 5, 1984 respectively, the

bankruptcy couri approved rejection of the ALPA and UFA

collective bargaining agreements. (The bankruptcy court’s

subsequent Memorandum of Authorities Authorizing Rejection

of Airline Pilots Association Collective Bargaining

Agreements is reproduced at Appendix A hereto.) The

court’s now-final orders rejecting the labor contracts found

that the emergency work rules, adopted only after

“considerable and reasonable efforts" by Continental to obtain

voluntary modification of the agreements, were necessary for

Continental to “compete effectively with the low cost carriers

in direct competition with it."2 Despite this judicial finding,

2/ In addition to striking, ALPA and UFA moved to dismiss Continental’s

bankruptcy petition on the grounds it was filed in bad faith and that the

rejection of the union contracts would violate the United States

Constitution. Jn re Continental Airlines Corp., 38 B.R. 67, 69 (Bankr.

S.D. Tex. 1984). The bankruptcy court denied the unions’ motion finding

that Continental “filed . . . for the purpose of attempting to keep the

companies alive and functioning and that they had no other viable

alternative to that end." Jd. at 71.

3/ In contrast, the bankruptcy court found that ALPA “does not intend to

reach an agreement with Continental on terms the airline can afford."

Res. App. A at 16A, that ALPA “appears to have strong motives for

seeing that the carrier is shut down as an example to the other carriers

whose pilots are represented by this large and extremely powerful union"

(id.), and that "ALPA’s action to shut down Continental and/or to deprive

it of profitability reflects on ALPA’s good faith in bargaining and on any

equities involved." Jd. at 16A.

4

the UFA strike continued until April 17, 1985 and the ALPA

strike continued until October 31, 1985.

On April 26, 1985, ALPA filed bankruptcy claims

for all Continental pilots, $408 million of which was for

alleged damages arising from rejection of its collective

bargaining agreement with Continental.’ Three days later,

UFA filed claims for the flight attendants, $409 million of

which was for damages claimed to arise from rejection of the

UFA’s collective bargaining agreements with Continental.

Both claims for future wages were premised on (1) full pay

and benefits until dates long subsequent to expiration of the

collective bargaining agreements, and (2) full pay and benefits

for all striking employees during the period when the

employees did no work because they were on strike.

In October 1985, the bankruptcy court approved an

agreement between Continental and ALPA intended to settle

all issues between the parties, including the pilots’ contract

rejection damage claims.* Continental subsequently reached

a similar settlement with UFA which likewise was approved

by the court. Certain pilots and flight attendants, including

Petitioners O’Neill Group, raised objections to these

settlements. These objectors were permitted to opt out of the

settlement and file proofs of claim for their pro rata portions

of the claims originally filed by ALPA and UFA.

Continental, seeking to dispose of the contract

rejection claims, filed a motion for partial summary judgment

4/ Prepetition wage claims, which have been paid in full to all claimants,

are not at issue here.

5/ The Continental-ALPA settlement agreement has previously been

reviewed by this Court in Air Line Pilots Association v. O'Neill, 111 S.

Ct. 1127 (1991).

5

which asked the bankruptcy court to disallow contract

rejection damages claims for the period when the claimants

were on strike. This motion was granted on September 10,

1985. An additional motion filed by Continental to disallow

all remaining claims for contract rejection damages was

granted as to the flight attendants on May 8, 1986 and as to

the pilots on June 26, 1986. These two orders held the

claimants were not entitled to future wages and benefits

because they were not guaranteed future employment under

the collective bargaining agreements. All three orders, when

appealed to the federal district court, were affirmed.

The O’Neill Group then appealed to the Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit, in an opinion written by

Judge Gee, upheld the order disallowing damages for the

period when the employees were on strike ("the strike order")

but reversed and remanded the orders disallowing all pre-

strike claims ("the business cessation orders"). Judge

Garwood, who filed a partial dissent as to the strike order,

would have allowed damages for the difference between the

collectively-bargained rates of pay and the emergency work

rules rates of pay, even though the strikers did not work

during this period. As to the business cessation order, the

Court unanimously held that, from the date of the bankruptcy

petition until some date prior to January 30, 1984 when

"Continental would have run...[out] of cash" and “would have

had to shut its doors,"® nonstriking employees should

receive contract damages claims for the difference between

the collectively-bargained rates of pay and the emergency

§/ A separate, final, bankruptcy court Order had previously found that

Continental’s Bankruptcy was caused by financial circumstances so dire

that "Continental would have run [out] of cash and would no longer be

operating at the present time. It would have had to shut its doors even

before this hearing commenced [January 30, 1984]." Res. App. A at 30A.

6

work rules rates of pay. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case

for precise specification of that date.

ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI

The writ should be denied. The decision below does

not conflict with any decision of this Court or any other court

of appeals; the significance of the questions presented is

minimal -- most Petitioners no longer have live claims and

legislation inapplicable to this proceeding makes such claims

less likely to occur in the future; the allowability of

petitioners’ claims turned on factual issues not appropriate for

review by this Court; and the court of appeals decision is, in

all particulars, a correct application of both law and policy.

I. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH NO

DECISION OF THIS COURT OR OF ANY

OTHER COURT OF APPEALS

As Petitioners argued in their Suggestion for

Rehearing En Banc to the Fifth Circuit (at p. 5), the decision

of the panel below is "the first reported appellate decision in

the country concerning the proper measure of contract rejec-

tion damages [under the Bankruptcy Code]." Because there is

no split in the circuits concerning application of Bankruptcy

Code Section 502 to either the strike issue or the business

cessation issue, this case does not warrant this Court’s

consideration.

The Petition’s complaint (Pet. at 8-14) that strikers

should be paid in full for time they are on strike against their

employer is simply not the law, either inside or outside

7

bankruptcy.” Petitioners’ leading case for the notion that

they should have received damages for their time on strike,

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. IML Freight, Inc.,

789 F.2d 1460 (10th Cir. 1986) ("IML Freight") did not

involve a claim for wages at collective bargaining agreement

rates for striking employees. The main issue in JML Freight

was the propriety of a debtor’s rejection of a collective

bargaining agreement, an issue not present here. Indeed,

unlike the present case, the court disapproved the debtor’s

attempt to reject its collective bargaining agreement.

_ Therefore, there were no Section 502 damage claims from

rejection of that agreement. The Tenth Circuit’s discussion

of damages was limited to the proposition that rejection of a

collective bargaining agreement could give rise to damage

claims, just as the Fifth Circuit decided here. The Tenth

Circuit did not decide, or even discuss, whether strikers

should receive damages covering time on strike.

The second half of the petition (Pet. at 14-22) argues

that the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that damages for

rejection of a collective bargaining agreement (which does not

guarantee future employment) should exclude the time period

after which the debtor/employer would have ceased to employ

anyone. Petitioners’ rhetoric that the decision below

“contravenes basic bankruptcy law" proves, upon inspection,

to be hollow; there is no conflict between the decision below

and any decision of this Court or any other court of appeals.

7/ _ Petitioners assert, without authority, that the decision below creates

a conflict between the so-called “right to strike" and the so-called "right

to contract rejection damages." No such conflict exists. The strike order

upholds well settled labor law principles that strikers have no claim for

wages for time not worked. The business cessation order affirmed the

right to contract rejection damages. See Sec. IV, infra.

8

Petitioners’ so-called "contradiction" of the decision

below with NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513

(1984) (hereafter Bildisco), is disingenuous. _ Bildisco

acknowledged the propriety of judicial estimation of

contingent and unliquidated claims; all the Fifth Circuit did

was apply Bildisco, saying that such estimation results in a

claim which is limited by the exclusion of damages for those

times when the claim would not have been otherwise

recoverable due to the employer’s financial collapse. Bildisco

did not involve such a factual twist, and no appellate decision

has held contrary to the Fifth Circuit on this issue.

Petitioners’ best effort to claim a conflict with any

aspect of the decision below rests upon Jn re U.S. Truck Co.,

89 B.R. 618 (E.D. Mich. 1988), affg 74 B.R. 515 (Bankr.

E.D. Mich. 1987). Even if it were appropriate for this Court

to deal with a "split of authority" between the Fifth Circuit

and one district court, there is no such split here. The cases

are factually distinct. The district court in U.S. Truck said

that "the court cannot say what would have happened had the

company decided to liquidate," Jd. at 626, while the

bankruptcy judge here specifically found that Continental

would have ceased to operate between the petition date and

January 30, 1984. Res. App. A. at 30A. All the Fifth

Circuit did was to remand to the fact-finder for a further

specification as to that precise date; no comparable fact

pattern existed in U.S. Truck.®

8/ The only decision since the Fifth Circuit’s decision in this case holds,

citing the Fifth Circuit, that "Damages, if any, would only be available for

the time that Roth American would have been able to continue in

business.” Jn re Roth American, Inc., 120 B.R. 356, 360 (Bankr. M.D.

Pa. 1990).

9

II. BOTH SETTLEMENTS OF CLAIMS AND

PASSAGE OF A NEW STATUTE DRAMATICALLY

DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS CASE

Petitioners neglect to discuss two factors which

dramatically reduce the practical importance of this case.

Petitioners allege that the decision below "deprives

more than 450 Continental employees of their sole remedy for

Continental’s breach of its labor contracts" and that "the

magnitude of the harm in this case alone is sufficient to

warrant certiorari review." Pet. at 12. This is not true.

Petitioners failed to inform the Court that, on November 26,

1991, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court approved a settlement

between Continental and the O’Neill Group which allowed

individual pilots and flight attendants to settle their contract

rejection damage claims. (The bankruptcy court’s Order

Approving O’Neill Group Settlement is reproduced at

Appendix B hereto). Asa result of that settlement 305 of the

approximately 435 pilot Petitioners here elected to settle such

claims. All 17 of the flight attendant members of the O’Neill

Group agreed to settle. Petitioners also failed to inform the

Court that an additional 78 pilot Petitioners agreed to settle

their contract rejection claims pursuant to Continental’s 1985

settlement with ALPA. Thus, there are now only 52 hold-

outs who would receive any benefit from even a total reversal

of the decision below.”

Moreover, the legal framework for resolving collec-

tive bargaining agreement rejection issues has changed

9/ Moreover, all of the Petitioners with live claims were on strike

subsequent to October 1, 1983, and thus would only be eligible for six

days of damages (September 24, 1983 through September 30, 1983) if the

Court were to reverse the business cessation orders but affirm the strike

order.

10

dramatically since this case was filed in September 1983. In

all Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases filed after July 10, 1984,

Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1113,

governs assumption and rejection of collective bargaining

agreements. Were Continental’s petition to be filed today, its

collective bargaining agreements would remain in effect until

the bankruptcy court ruled on the company’s petition to reject

the agreements or until such time as the court, after notice

and a hearing, authorized adoption of interim work rules. 11

U.S.C. § 1113(e). No longer is it the case that, as here, "the

filing of the petition in bankruptcy means that the collective-

bargaining agreement is no longer immediately enforceable,

and may never be enforceable again." Bildisco, 465 U.S. at

532.

Although the claims provisions in Bankruptcy Code

Section 502 were not directly affected by Section 1113, the

chances that such claims will occur has been diminished. The

legislative history of Subtitle J of H.R. 5174 (P.L. 98-353),

codified as 11 U.S.C. § 1113, reflects Congress’ view that the

new provision would help to avoid rejection of collective

bargaining agreements in Chapter 11 proceedings, thus

obviating Section 502 claims for breach of such an

agreement.” Section 1113 was intended to promote

bargaining for new agreements between debtors and their

unions and thus to diminish the instances in which a contract

is rejected or acrimony causes a lengthy strike against a

10/ See e.g., 130 Cong. Rec. No. 92 (June 29, 1984), at H 7489 (Mr.

Rodino: “The provision ensures that a process of negotiation will take

place between the employer and union in a reorganization case before the

hearing for rejection of the collective bargaining agreement is

commenced.”), at S 8891 (Sen. Hatch: “Only if these good faith

negotiations fail does the court get involved in granting an application to

reject a contract."), and at S 8898 (Sen. Kennedy: ‘“[Section 1113 is

intended] to substitute a rule of law that encourages the parties to solve

their mutual problems through the collective bargaining process. ").

11

financially distressed debtor. Congress, in short, enacted

Section 1113 in an effort to substitute negotiated resolutions

for such strikes as the lengthy ALPA/UFA strikes against

Continental.

III. THE DENIAL OF PETITIONERS’ CLAIMS TURNED

ON FACTUAL ISSUES, NOT QUESTIONS OF LAW

APPROPRIATE FOR THIS COURT’S RESOLUTION

The O’Neill Group’s strike-related claims (Pet. at 8-

14) founder because of two factual shortcomings. First,

Petitioners are unable to point to any provision of their

collective bargaining agreements which would support a claim

for pay during any period they were on strike. Thus, they

lack a factual prerequisite for a claim for wages allegedly lost

during that time period. Second, Petitioners are collaterally

estopped from claiming that they weren’t on strike, but had

been constructively discharged by the bankruptcy court’s

unappealed finding that the strikers were not constructively

discharged.” In short, the courts below found no terms of

Continental’s collective bargaining agreements with either

ALPA or UFA which displaced or modified the legal doctrine

that an employee who withholds his labor is entitled to no

compensation for the time he is on strike, and the courts

11/ The bankruptcy court expressly held that Continental made "strenuous

efforts to get the pilots to return to work" after filing its bankruptcy

petition and that this effort “refutes the constructive discharge claim." In

re Continental Airlines Corp. , 57 B.R. 845, 851 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985).

The court specifically rejected the “suggestion that rejection of the

contracts alone gives rise to a claim for wrongful discharge damages." Id.

at 852. Petitioners, belatedly recognizing the difficulty these factual

findings create for their case, disingenuously seek in fn. 6 to argue there

was no such factual finding or that somehow an ex parte letter written in

a non-adversarial context by an official at the Department of Labor can

overturn the findings of the bankruptcy court.

12

below specifically rejected petitioners’ argument that they

were constructively discharged.

The O’Neill Group’s argument (Pet. at 14-22) that

employee claims should have continued accruing even after

Continental would have ceased doing business and ceased to

employ anyone is similarly undercut by factual shortcomings.

As this Court has held, collective bargaining agreements

typically only prescribe wages and conditions of employment

and do not guarantee future employment. See, e.g., J.J. Case

Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). Here, because there was

no employment contract guaranteeing employment, the Court

of Appeals directed the bankruptcy court to calculate the

amount Of the employee claims under this contract, taking

into account the point in time at which the bankruptcy judge,

with his extensive knowledge of the debtor’s financial affairs,

estimated that the debtor would have ceased doing business

and therefore would have had no jobs for petitioners.

Such estimation or liquidation of claims is inherent

to the claims administration process. Estimation of the value

of future claims is inherently factual and often imprecise,

even speculative. See, e.g., 3 Collier on Bankruptcy

q 502.02 (15th ed. 1992) ("virtually all matters involving the

allowability of claims and their right therefore to share in the

assets of the debtor ordinarily will be determined by the

bankruptcy judge, generally exclusive of all other courts").

IV. THE DECISION BELOW CORRECTLY

APPLIED THE LAW

The rejection of Continental’s collective bargaining

agreements was governed by Bankruptcy Code Section 365.

Prior to enactment of Section 1113 to deal specifically with

rejection of collective bargaining agreements, Section 365

permitted employers in bankruptcy to reject collective

13

bargaining agreements and set new employment terms.

Claims of employees resulting from such rejection, as this

court held in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 530,

are treated as claims to be administered by the bankruptcy

| court under Bankruptcy Code Section 502. Section 502(b)(1),

ignored by petitioners, provides for disallowance of any claim

“unenforceable against the debtor...under any agreement or

applicable law...."” In other words, Section 502(b)(1)

permits a debtor to assert any defense to a bankruptcy claim

that it would have been able to assert outside of bankruptcy.

See Mazirow v. Grigsby (In re White Motor Corp.), 44 B.R.

563, 569 (N.D. Ohio 1984); In re Nuisance Corp., 17 B.R.

12/ Together and separately, petitioners’ legal positions -- that they should

be paid wage-based damages during the time when they voluntarily refused

to work and that they should be paid wage-based damages beyond the

point at which Continental would have ceased to do business -- would

seriously undermine basic bankruptcy and labor law policies. It is widely

accepted that non-bankruptcy entitlements and defenses should be mirrored

in bankruptcy processes. See generally Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy,

Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 Yale L.J.

857 (1982). Were this not the case, those whose entitlements would be

enhanced in bankruptcy would he encouraged to engage in strategic

behavior designed to force the debtor into bankruptcy.

Specifically, claimants who think they will receive Section 502 claims

for time periods when they are on strike or would have had no

employment, even though outside bankruptcy they would not be paid for

this time, would press wage demands to the point where their employer

would enter the bankruptcy process. In theory, therefore, “bankruptcy law

should mirror the rights established by labor law by enforcing them as they

exist or by respecting their relative value." Thomas H. Jackson, The

Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, Harvard Univ. Press (1986) at 112.

The Fifth Circuit’s decision accomplishes exactly the theoretically correct

result on both issues by denying the unions claims in bankruptcy which

were unavailable outside bankruptcy.

eens eel

14

80, 82 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy,

{ 502.02 at 502-24,-25,-27 (15th ed. 1992).

A. Strikers Are Not Entitled To Claim Wages For

Periods When They Struck Their Employer.

As the Fifth Circuit held, the applicable law under

which to evaluate Petitioners’ claims includes federal labor

law, here the Railway Labor Act. Judge Gee, applying an

unbroken line of cases denying backpay to strikers under the

federal labor laws,’ correctly concluded that these strikers

should be treated no differently than striking employees would

be treated had Continental not filed for bankruptcy. Strikers,

by definition performing no work for their employer, would

not be entitled outside bankruptcy to claim wages for the

strike period, even under the provisions of the labor laws

which guarantee the right to strike and which establish

remedies for employer violations of these laws.

While petitioners allege the Railway Labor Act

guarantees the "right to strike," they find no cases which

13/ See also In re Continental Airlines Corp., 50 B.R. 342, 353 (S.D.

Tex. 1985), aff'd, 790 F.2d 35 (Sth Cir. 1986) (whether a “right to

payment” exists under 11 U.S.C. §101(4) is determined by law governing

transaction); Jn re Altair Airlines, Inc., 727 F.2d 88, 90 (3d Cir. 1984)

(same).

14/ See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 n.7

(1941); NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299, 1303 (Sth

Cir. 1970); J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 356, 361 (Sth

Cir. 1968), rev’d on other grounds, 396 U.S. 258 (1969); Comfort, Inc.,

152 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1090 (1965), enforced, 365 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1966).

The principle applies equally under the Railway Labor Act. See National

Airlines, Inc. v. IAM, 416 F.2d 998, 1007 (Sth Cir. 1969), after remand,

430 F.2d 957 (Sth Cir. 1970); Empresa Ecuatoriana de Aviacion, S.A. v.

District Lodge No. 100, 690 F.2d 838 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. dismissed,

463 U.S. 1250 (1983).

15

order pay to strikers as though they had been working. This

is because the "right to strike" is nothing more than the

employee’s right to withhold his or her labor in an effort to

apply economic pressure to the employer; it does not include

the right to be paid for the time when the employee did no

work.

The Fifth Circuit majority was correct in applying

federal labor law. A contract under the Railway Labor Act,

like a contract under the National Labor Relations Act, "is a

federal contract and is therefore governed and enforceable by

federal law, in federal courts." IAM v. Central Airlines, Inc.,

372 U.S. 682, 692 (1963). This Court long ago held that

collective bargaining agreements and claims arising from

breach of such agreements are a matter of special federal

common law, not of state law. Textile Workers Union y.

Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). There

is no authority to indicate that, in the interpretation of this

special federal common law, any court has thought workers

should be paid for not working. Indeed, this Court has held

that employers are entitled to permanently replace economic

strikers without paying back wages to the strikers if they

return, NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S.

333 (1938), and that an employer may lock out its employees

under some circumstances without incurring a wage obligation

to them. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300

(1965). It would be strange indeed for the law to deny such

economic weapons (or effectively preclude their use by

requiring that wages be paid to strikers as well as working

employees) only to employers so economically distressed that

they seek refuge under the Bankruptcy Code.

15/ The O’Neill Group suggests that the decisions below provide a

debtor-in-possession employer with an incentive to make drastic change in

wages and working conditions in hopes of encouraging a strike while

(continued...)

16

Petitioners’ argument that the Fifth Circuit’s

"reliance on unfair labor practice cases to support its opinion

is misplaced" (Pet. at 13) is a tacit concession that

disallowance of damages to strikers accords with labor law

principles. Petitioners therefore turn to arguing (1) that

contract rather than labor law should apply with respect to the

strikers’ claims, or (2) that this is a special case involving

“severe and pervasive" changes made by the emergency work

rules approved by the bankruptcy court. Pet. at 13-1

Neither argument has merit.

Petitioners fare no better under a correct application

of contract law than under the labor laws they find so unhelp-

ful. Judge Garwood’s dissent, even if correct in applying

contract rather than labor law, erred in its contract

analysis.“ Far from providing a “windfall" to Continental,

the majority simply placed the parties in the position they

would have been in absent the strike by the employees.

Under contract law, where, as here, there is no constructive

discharge, failure to work for reduced wages terminates the

15/{...continued)

avoiding liability for contract rejection damages. Even before the 1984

amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, an employer could not make any

change to a collective bargaining agreement without ultimately obtaining

bankruptcy court approval. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526-27. The 1984

amendments imposed additional obstacles to such changes. See 11 U.S.C.

§ 1113; see supra at 9-10. Moreover, it is specious to contend that an

employer who wishes to remain in business would adopt the strategy the

O'Neill Group posits. A strike would additionally jeopardize the ability

of an already financially vulnerable debtor to stay in business. A debtor-

in-possession employer has every reason to avoid and no reason to

encourage a strike.

16/ With all due respect, we fail to see how Continental obiained any

“windfall” from the ruling below; Continental paid nonstriking employees

for the work which striking employees refused to do, and was willing at

all times to accept the strikers back into the workforce.

iinet mana iain

17

employee’s claim to wages for the time when services were

withheld. Here the bankruptcy court expressly held, in an

order which was not appealed, that Continental’s rejection of

its collective bargaining agreements did nor constitute a

constructive discharge. In re Continental Airlines Corp., 57

B.R. 845 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985). Continental received no

“windfall;" it was forced to recruit, train, and pay substitute

labor to perform services.

B. Employees Are Not Entitled To Damages

For Future Wages For Time Periods After

The Employer Would Have Ceased To Do

Business Had It Paid Such Wages

The Fifth Circuit was likewise correct in its

unanimous decision to limit damages for future wages to the

period of time when the debtor would have remained in

business, for cessation of Continental’s business would have

resulted in every employee being terminated. Employees

working under a collective bargaining agreement which does

not guarantee future employment are not entitled to lost future

wages. J.J. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. at 335. When a

nonbreaching party cannot demonstrate that it would have

suffered losses from the breach, it is entitled to only nominal

damages. IBEW vy. A-I Electrical Serv., 535 F.2d 1, 3 (10th

Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 832 (1976). In short, the Fifth

Circuit’s logic was impeccable: (1) as of some date between

the petition and January 30, 1984, Continental would have

ceased operating had it not rejected its labor contracts, (2) if -

this happened, no members of the O’Neill Group would have

had jobs, and (3) therefore, without any jobs or contractual

guarantees of jobs, the O’Neill Group members suffered no

damages from the rejection of the collective bargaining

agreement.

18

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Barry P. Simon Charles A. Shanor*

Senior Vice President John J. Gallagher

and General Counsel Jon A. Geier

Daniel P. Casey Paul, Hastings,

Associate General Counsel Janofsky & Walker

Continental Airlines, 1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Inc. Twelfth Floor

2929 Allen Parkway Washington, D.C. 20036

Houston, Texas 77019 (202) 223-9000

(713) 834-2273

Attorneys for

Respondent

* Counsel of Record

APPENDIX

1A

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

CASE NO.

IN RE:

83-04019-H2-5

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES CORPORATION

DEBTOR

IN RE: 83-04020-H1-5

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.

DEBTOR

IN RE:

83-04021-H3-5 ,

TEXAS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES, INC. :

DEBTOR

IN RE:

83-04022-H3-5

TXIA HOLDINGS CORPORATION

DEBTOR

CONSOLIDATED CASE NO.

83-04019-H2-5

August 17, 1984

MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES

AUTHORIZING REJECTION OF AIRLINE PILOTS

ASSOCIATION COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

2A

Mr. John Gallagher

Mr. David Callet

Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld

1333 New Hampshire Ave., N.W

Washington, D.C. 20036

Attorneys for Continental

Honorable William M. Schultz

Mr. B. J. Walter

Dotson, Babcock & Scofield

4200 InterFirst Plaza

Houston, Texas 77002

Attorneys for Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

Mr. Michael Abram

Mr. James Linsey

Cohen, Weiss & Simon

330 West 42nd Street

New York, New York 10036

Attorneys for Air Line Pilots Association

Mr. Philip Pierce

Booth, Marcus & Pierce

79 Fifth Avenue

New York, New York 10003

Attorney for Labor & Pension Committee

Mr. Daniel Johnston, Jr.

Ross, Banks, May, Cron & Cavin

6th Floor, Two Greenway Plaza E.

Houston, Texas 77026

Local Counsel for Labor and Pension Committee

Mr. Lenard M. Parkins

Sheinfeld, Maley & Kay

3700 First City Tower

Houston, Texas 77002

Local Counsel for Continental

3A

On September 24, 1983, Continental Airlines

Corporation ("CAC"), Continental Air Lines, Inc. ("CAL"),

Texas International Airlines, Inc. ("TXI") and TXIA Holdings

Corporation (collectively "Continental") filed simultaneous

Chapter 11 proceedings under Title 11 of the United States

Code. On the 27th day of September, 1983, Continental filed

a motion to reject the collective bargaining agreements with

the Airlines Pilots Association ("ALPA"), the Union of Flight

Attendants ("UFA"), the International Association of

Machinist and Aerospace Workers ("IAM"), and the

Transport Workers Union ("TWU").

On the 11th day of October, 1983, the unions filed

a joint motion to dismiss the Continental Chapter 11

proceedings on the ground that the proceedings were not filed

in good faith; alleging that the sole or the primary purpose of

Continental in filing its proceedings was to reject the union

contracts. After an extensive hearing, this court denied the

joint motion to dismiss. -

By agreement of the parties, the evidence introduced

at the hearing on the motion to dismiss was included in the

record on the motion to reject the employee agreements. The

court adheres to the findings made in that decision.

The taking of evidence on the motion to reject

commenced on January 30, 1984. This was over four months

after these proceedings were filed but was the earliest this

court’s calendar would permit it to undertake this lengthy

hearing. With some interruptions, the presentation of

evidence continued until April 27, 1984. At the conclusion

of the debtor’s evidence, the court took under advisement the

motion of the TWU to enter judgment denying rejection of the

collective bargaining agreements with the Transport Workers

Union. In addition, to some extent, the question of rejection

of the various agreements with the IAM is being treated

4A

separately. The court has not yet issued a ruling with respect

to the UFA agreements.

Continental shut down its domestic operations at

filing but restarted them on a substantially reduced basis on

September 27, 1984.

Immediately upon the filing of this proceeding on

September 24, 1983, Continental Airlines implemented

"Emergency Work Rules" with respect to each of the four

involved unions. These constituted unilateral changes in pay,

benefits, work rules and conditions. On or about that date,

Continental transmitted copies of the emergency work rules to

each union by a letter indicating that these emergency work

rules were just that and that they also constituted an offer to

each of the unions to negotiate a new agreement. These cover

letters refer to the fact that certain issues were omitted from

the provisions in the rules. After receipt of these emergency

work rules, ALPA and UFA went on strike (beginning

October 1, 1983) without undertaking any negotiations with

Continental over the emergency work rules or any new

agreement based on Continental’s then-existing status. Both

of these unions have been on strike since that date; although

a number of negotiating sessions have since take place.

The IAM and Continental had already bargained to

an impasse, which was declared effective July 13, 1983. On

August 13, 1983, the IAM went on strike; whereupon

Continental Airlines implemented "“Jnterim Work Rules"

which were subsequently amended on September 12, 1983.

These interim work rules were replaced on September 24,

1983, by the emergency work rules applicable to the

remaining IAM employees of Continental.

For the reasons set forth below, this court has

determined that the equities favor the debtor and its estate,

SA

that the contracts with the Airline Pilot Association are

onerous and burdensome and that such agreements must be

rejected in order for Continental to have an effective

reorganization. This rejection is pursuant to the provisions of

11 U.S.C. §365 and under the principles enunciated in the

case of NLRB vy. Bildisco and Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188

(1984) decided February 22, 1984, during the evidentiary

presentation in this case. That case was decided under the

National Labor Relations Act. This court determines that the

same reasoning and rationale are applicable to this case,

which is decided under the Bankruptcy Code and the Railway

Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151, et seq.

FACTS

Effective in 1978, the United States Congress, in its

wisdom, determined that the airline industry should be

deregulated to promote greater competition with respect to

routes and fares, to allow more ready access of new entrants

into the industry and to add flexibility of all airlines to enter

new and existing markets and to charge what the traffic would

bear, so to speak. Congress took this action despite the

protests of the existing airlines, ALPA, the IAM, and other

interested parties, who predicted that deregulation would

result in financial difficulty for many of the carriers and

bankruptcy or mergers for some and that this would cause

displacement of many employees.

The aims and goals of the U.S. Congress in

deregulating the airline industry appear to have been realized.

Airfares have decreased dramatically in areas where the

particular airline involved has not had substantial control over

the market. Many new airline companies have entered into

the marketplace and now compete directly with Continental

Airlines and the other airlines in the industry. In order to

offset this increasing competition, Continental sought to

6A

increase its marketing efficiency by resorting to a "hub and

spoke" operation; utilizing Denver and Houston as _ its

operational hubs. While this has had some substantial

beneficial effect on Continental’s operations, this benefit was

not sufficient to offset the fare advantages resulting from

lower labor costs enjoyed by the new entrants in Continental’s

market. The lower labor cost of these new entrants resulted

from the lack of historically based labor agreements which

had escalated during the regulated period, before 1978, when

the airlines could pass these increased costs on to the

consumer. In this regulated atmosphere of the airline industry

pre-1978, the self preservation instincts of the carriers were

mitigated against and they thus did not have adequate

incentive to resist the persistent and determined negotiating

techniques of the powerful unions in the airline industry, such

as ALPA and the IAM.

These unions have historically (and effectively) used

the last highest contract as a stepping stone for each new

negotiation. The result has been higher and higher wage rates

and better and better provisions for the employees relating to

work terms. There is no question that these unions did an

outstanding job on behalf of their membership in this regard.

This trend of higher and higher labor costs (negotiated by

these unions) continued even after deregulation by virtue of

these same techniques. No doubt upward inflation during this

same time was a factor in these negotiations. The result,

however, was a complex system of work rules which operated

less and less efficiently for the airlines but which generated

more and more time off and higher pay for the members of

these unions. The additional and more unfortunate result was

that it made a high and inflexible labor cost system for the

major carriers coming out from the nurture of regulation.

This caused many of them to be less competitive with the new

entrants who were making increasing incursions into their

markets.

TA

This was particularly true of Continental Airlines,

whose hub systems in Denver and (particularly) in Houston

competed directly with many of these new entrants. Not

being fettered with the expensive and inefficient collective

bargaining agreements of the older airlines, these new

entrants’ could hire pilots, mechanics, and flight attendants

in the open labor market at substantially lower prices than

those that had been negotiated by Continental’s labor unions.

Labor is a major factor in the cost of operating an airline and

is one in which there can be material variances from airline

to airline. These new entrants could charge substantially

lower fares that the older more established airlines, and their

cheaper labor costs gave them a substantial competitive

advantage over other airlines, including Continental.

Continental did not have substantial control over its markets

and does not now.

As a result, Continental lost substantial sums of

money after deregulation. Up to September 24, 1983, the

date of filing of the Chapter 11 petition, Continental had lost

$521,900,000 as follows:

1979 lost $ 27.4 million

1980 lost 76.8 million

1981 lost 138.6 million

1982 lost 119.9 million

1983 to September 24 lost, 159.2 million

$521.9 million

‘Southwest Airlines had not been subject to regulation because it was an

intrastate carrier before deregulation. Its labor costs have been

traditionally lower. Thus while Southwest is not a "new entrant” in some

respects, it is in others, since it has materially expanded its markets since

deregulation. Its labor costs have been low, and it has run Continental out

of at least one market with its lower fares. It is highly competitive with

Continental in other markets. For convenience it will be included within

the term “new entrants” in this opinion.

8A

Although there were other factors, the main cause of

Continental’s losses was, as noted, that its higher labor costs

prevented it from effectively competing with the low cost new

entrants which have been significantly increasing their activity

in Continental’s markets. Continental did not have the benefit

of some of the advantages enjoyed by some of its larger

competitors such as United Airlines and American Airlines.

An expert employed by the Trade Creditors

Committee testified that all of the major airlines are seeing

"the handwriting on the wall" and are negotiating, or have

negotiated, important concessions with their respective labor

forces. Some have obtained significant reductions in their

labor costs from those stipulated by their existing collective

bargaining agreements. It was forecast that unless that major

carriers eventually reduced their labor costs to the level of the

new entrants, they will not survive.

Continental negotiated from time to time during the

year of 1983 attempting to obtain concessions from its various

unions.

During its disastrous summer of 1983, and prior to

filing its Chapter 11 proceeding, Continental Airlines

attempted, to negotiate a $60,000,000 cost concession from the

Airline Pilots Association (on an annual basis) and sought a

$40,000,000 annual concession from the Flight Attendants,

$20,000,000 from the International Association of Machinist

and an additional $30,000,000 from its other (non-union and

managerial) employees.

While the Airline Pilots Association members

indicated that they were "players", nevertheless, they never

committed to the requested $60,000,000 in cost concessions

nor to any other number prior to the filing of the Chapter 11

proceeding. After the filing, ALPA offered concessions of

9A

approximately $30,000,000 on an annual basis, or about half

what Continental had indicated it needed from the pilots to

break even before the filing of the Chapter 11 proceeding.

After the filing, Continental immediately cut back on

a number of its routes and a substantial number of the flights

that it had been flying. It shut down the airline from

September 24 until September 27, 1983, except that it

continued to fly its international routes for fear these lucrative

concessions might be lost. Continental was also fearful of the

domestic flights being shut down for any longer period. Its

position is that it was concerned that it would lose public

acceptance and that it might never fly again; at least most

certainly not without substantial cost to creditors,

shareholders, and all concerned, including employees.

Continental scaled back its cost structure in order to

provide high quality service on a fare structure competitive

with the new entrants. It appears to have been somewhat

successful at this marketing technique to date; although it is

not yet known what effect there will be if a full scale fare war

should be engaged in by a substantial number of its competi-

tion. Nor is it known what the full effect of additional

competition will be from carriers now entering the field,

including the "New Braniff", which began flying during the

spring of 1984 during the evidentiary presentation in this case.

REASONABLE EFFORTS

The Supreme Court in NLRB vy. Bildisco and

Bildisco, supra, (hereinafter "Bildisco") required that before

acting on a petition to “modify or reject" a collective

bargaining agreement, the bankruptcy court should be

persuaded that reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary

modification have been made and are not likely to produce a

prompt and satisfactory solution. The purpose of this is to

10A ;

serve the policies (if not the letter) of the Labor Act.’

However, the bankruptcy court is not required to determine

that the parties have bargained to impasse nor to make any

other determination outside the field of its expertise.

The unions assert that the involved principle requires

the bankruptcy court to hear evidence and pass on the substan-

tive details of all relevant negotiating sessions. This is part

of an effort to show that Continental acted unreasonably in the

substance of its proposals to the respective unions. The thrust

of this theory is to place the bankruptcy court in the posture

of determining that the parties should agree to and in what

respect the company offers vary from this standard.

It is precisely this kind of inquiry which this court

understands that Bildisco (and prior cases) determined that this

court should avoid. Bildisco pointed out that the national

labor policies of avoiding labor strife and encouraging

collective bargaining generally require that employees and

unions reach their own agreements on terms and conditions of

employment free from governmental interference. In

addition, the Court observed that a determination that the

parties have bargained to impasse is one ordinarily made by

the National Labor Relations Board and that to involve the

bankruptcy court in that kind of determination would divert

the bankruptcy court to an area outside its area of expertise.

See also American National Insurance Co. v. NLRB, 187 F.2d

307, page 310 (Sth Cir. 1941), affirmed 343 U.S. 395, page

404 (1952).

The labor agreements with ALPA, UFA & IAM are

complex and the resulting cost of virtually each provision is

In that case it was the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 29

U.S.C. 158 et seq. This case involves the Railway Labor Act ("RLA")

45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. .

L1A

difficult of ascertainment, partly because it varies substantially

with each level of flying operation. Asking this court to pass

on the merits of the respective offers would impose on the

bankruptcy court a substantial burden in areas far removed

from any expertise this court might have.

It is the opinion of this court that it is not intended

by the Supreme Court that the bankruptcy court examine the

substantive merits of the negotiations to determine whether the

parties respective proposals are reasonable but rather only that

a genuine effort has been made to reach agreement with the

certified representatives of the employees. In the same

phrase, the Supreme Court required this court to determine as

well that “such efforts are not likely to produce a prompt and

satisfactory solution." In other words, if a genuine effort has

been made by the debtor to reach agreement and this effort is

not likely to produce a prompt solution under all the existing

circumstances, the court is authorized to act on the debtor’s

motion to reject. Of course this duty of the debtor to

recognize the bargaining representative and to continue

bargaining exists both before and after any rejection is

permitted.

The Bildisco court avoided using the terms "good

faith" and “bad faith" bargaining; traditional terms in labor

negotiations and labor law. Presumably this was intentional.

Perhaps this is an indication that the Supreme Court intends

for the Bankruptcy Court to stay out of even shat area of

determination. The "good faith - bad faith" determination is

simply a determination of whether or not a party has a desire

to reach an agreement at all. It requires some assessment of

the substantive terms of an offer, as well as the willingness to

bargain and the effort to do so. NLRB v. Herman Sausage

Co., 275 F.2d 229 (Sth Cir., 1960). However, even a "good

faith - bad faith" determination is far less of an intrusion into

12A

the bargaining rights of the parties than a determination of

whether the substantive terms of a proposal are "reasonable".

The Supreme Court has noted that great caution

should be used in finding bad faith in cases other than

wherein there is a "desire not to reach agreement", for doing

so risks infringement of the strong federal labor policy against

governmental interference with the substantive terms of

collective bargaining agreements. Chicago & Northwestern

Railway v. United Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570

(1971). The Fifth Circuit has ruled to similar effect in many

cases, including Gulf State Manufacturing, Inc. v. NLRB, 579

F.2d 1298 (Sth Cir. 1978), aff'd in pertinent part 598 F.2d

896 (Sth Cir. 1979)(en banc).

In addition to this strong policy against such

determinations by a court, the burden on the bankruptcy court

to make an inquiry into the reasonableness of the terms of |

offers (as suggested) would appear to be excessive. This court

has allowed this type of evidence in this proceeding because

of some of the uncertainties in the law that existed at the time

of this hearing. The result has been that the hearing lasted

almost three months. No doubt future case law will give the

Bankruptcy Courts guidance with respect.to this issue as to

future hearings on applications to reject collective bargaining

agreements.

Be that as it may, this court allowed detailed

evidence concerning the substance of numerous bargaining

sessions which occurred both before and after the filing of the

Chapter 11 petition on September 24, 1983. This was at a

great cost of court time and may have consumed as much as

half or more of the hearing time. From this evidence, the

- court concludes (1) that Continental has made considerable

and reasonable effort to reach agreement with the unions

involved herein for voluntary modification of their respective

13A

bargaining agreements, (2) that Continental has bargained in

good faith with respect to those efforts, (3) that no agreement

has been reached and (4) that those efforts are not likely to

produce a prompt and Satisfactory solution. It is the intention

of Continental to reach agreement with these employee groups

consistent with its current economic situation. It has made

numerous attempts to do so.

That Continental continued to urge in its bargaining

session that it must maintain its labor cost levels at or about

those provided for in the emergency work rules does not

constitute bad faith negotiation under all of the circumstances

of this case. It is not bad faith for a party to insist on the

terms of a proposal and to maintain that posture. "Open mind

need not mean a mind without conviction nor need it mean a

mind easily swayed by argument." It need not make a

proposal or require the making ofa concession. American

National Insurance Co. v. NLRB, Supra, page 309.

A party may try to achieve its objectives and need

not yield. NLRB v. Tomco Communication, Inc., 567 F.2d

871, 884 (9th Cir. 1978). It may even withdraw an earlier

offer, including a tentative agreement on certain provisions,

if circumstances change. NLRB y. Randle-Eastern Ambulance

Service, Inc., 584 F.2d 720 (Sth Cir. 1978). A position taken

in good faith need not be abandoned or compromised. The

debtor is entitled to insist on a proposal, however

unacceptable to the union, and if the insistence is genuinely

and sincerely held it may be maintained even if it procudes a

stalemate. NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co, 275 F.2d 299 (Sth

Cir.), rehearing denied 277 F.2d 793 (Sth Cir. 1960), see

American National Insurance Co. y. NLRB, supra, page 309

r.3.

The unions’ position that a party must ask for more

than it wants in order to meet somewhere in the middle is not

14A

accepted by this court. That was urged as being the tradi-

tional method of negotiating. However, the facts in this case

show that this is not the traditional situation facing

negotiators. This is especially true where, as here,

Continental has been in extreme financial difficulty and

needed prompt modification of its collective bargaining

agreement.

Having just filed a Chapter 11 proceeding and being

the first air carrier to attempt to fly through such a

proceeding, Continental was in a period of uncertainty and

needed the flexibility allowed it by the so called emergency

work rules promulgated September 24, 1983, immediately

upon filing the proceeding. As noted, Continental

substantially cut back on the number of cities it served and the

number of flights to the cities it cantinued to serve. It

substantially reduced its work force. At the present time it is

facing increasing competition from even additional new

entrants coming into the market since the filing of this

proceeding. It is just now approaching profitability but may

be faced with a fare war in the near future. Under the

existing circumstances, Continental’s bargaining position

appears reasonable to this court. Although it severely cut

back the wage levels and liberalized its working rules, it

somewhat patterned these after those of other airlines with

which it was then in competition. Over half of the union

membership in each category has crossed the picket lines and

come to work for Continental under the terms of the

emergency work rules (eighty percent in the case of Flight

Attendants) as have newly hired personnel.’

_

*Some of the jobs subject to the IAM agreements were eliminated

because Continental could (and did) contract these services out to third

parties at cheaper rates than the IAM contract specified (i.e. cabin

cleaners, fuelers, flight kitchen personnel, etc.).

ISA

In Neon Sign Corp. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1203 (5th

Cir. 1979), the Fifth Circuit found that an employer engaged

in good faith bargaining even though it insisted on wage

decreases. The company was experiencing serious financial

problems and lower wages were essential to its survival.

That the proposals submitted by the company were

for provisions similar to those agreed to by the same union at

other companies is evidence of the employer’s good faith.

See NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S.

395, 405 (1952); Gulf State Manufacturers v. NLRB., supra.

That the unions have not accepted Continental’s

proposals does not in and of itself mean that they are

unreasonable or that they are not attempting to reach

agreement with Continental. Indeed, the concessions that are

_ being asked of the pilots, the flight attendants, and others is

substantial and greatly affects a standard of living to which

many of them have become accustomed. This is a difficult

idea to adjust to. Nevertheless, herein, the purposes of the

National Labor policy have been well served. Bargaining by

the debtor with its unions has been going on for well over a

year. No agreements could be reached with the IAM and an

impasse was declared. No agreement has been reached with

ALP. or UFA.

Prior to September 24, 1983, the terms offered the

respective unions were better than those required by the

debtor post filing. Yet no agreement could be reached on

those terms. Just before filing, Continental made major

presentations directly to its employees in order to reach

agreement on concessions which this court finds were

necessary for it to survive, but the unions (except TWU) did

not agree. A great deal of negotiation has taken place since

filing. To require further bargaining at this level before

i

16A

acting on the motions to reject seems to this court to be

unrealistic and useless.

Indeed, the failure of the court to act at this stage of

the proceeding (two months after the substantial evidentiary

hearing concluded) may be impeding eventual agreement. As

noted above, the parties have a continuing duty to bargain

even after rejection. If agreement is to be reached, it will

occur after the issue of the rejection of the agreements has

been determined. Perhaps this and the improving income

posture of the debtor will allow agreement to be reached in

the future.

On the other hand, this court is concerned that the

Airline Pilots Association does not intend to reach an

agreement with Continental on terms the airline can afford.

ALPA appears to have strong motives for seeing that the

carrier is shut down as an example to the other carriers whose

pilots are represented by this large and extremely powerful

union. It represents pilots throughout the airline industry in

the United States. Other carriers are having difficulty in the

post-deregulation period and are requesting concessions from

their pilots. The obligations of ALPA to its other

(non-Continental) members would make it difficult for this

union to recommend settlement with Continental to the extent

needed by Continental in order to lower its labor cost

sufficiently for it to be competitive in its fare levels and to

return to profitability. Outside of the courtroom, ALPA has

asserted "we must continue to apply whatever pressures are

required to preclude New CAL [from] operating profitably.

These pressures will include both economic sanctions and all

legal action open to us...." In the courtroom, ALPA has

verified that its purpose is to shut down Continental. The

Airline Pilots Association has made it clear, and has

convinced this court, that its primary aim is to shut down

Continental Airlines.

17A

While ALPA’s actions (to the extent they are legal)

may be allowed by prevailing labor laws, wherein they are a

means to achieve an agreement, it appears to this court that

other motives are involved, at least in part. Thus ALPA’s

actions to shut down Continental and/or to deprive it of

profitability reflects on ALPA’s good faith in bargaining and

on any equities involved. ALPA’s attitude further seems to

be at odds with the spirit and purpose of the Bankruptcy

Code.

ALPA has maintained that its three principal areas

of concern are (1) preservation of the union as the bargaining

representative of Continental’s pilots (union security),

(2) safety and (3) seniority. It also contends that Continental

has bargained unreasonably by failing to agree with ALPA’s

proposals.

Continental has at all relevant times recognized

ALPA as the bargaining representative of its pilots, although

it has not honored the “dues checkoff" provision of the

collective bargaining agreement since the strike began.

THE “SAFETY” QUESTION

The evidence in this case shows that ALPA has

publically indicated that it and its members are vitally

concerned with the safety of the public flying on Continental

Airlines since the October 1, 1983 strike. The pilots failed to

mention that most of the pilots employed by Continental are

those off of ALPA’s seniority list (i.e., are ALPA pilots).

The newly-hired pilots must go through required training and

must be qualified. That some may be less experienced does

not of itself indicate lack of ability. In addition, the court

would note that safety is the responsibility of the Federal

Aviation Agency, who must revoke or suspend the certificate

18A

of Continental Airlines should Continental not adhere to the

safety standards imposed by this federal agency.

In short, while crying "Safety! Safety!" in the

courtroom and to the public, ALPA has failed in its meager

attempt to offer evidence that Continental Airlines is unsafe

to fly. It has offered almost no evidence of this to this court,

and has apparently failed to convince the FAA, in whose

jurisdiction and responsibility lies the safety of all airlines,

including Continental.

ALPA was singularly unsuccessful in providing a scintilla

of evidence to this court that safety is a genuine concern on

the part of the pilots or that there is substantial evidence of

unsafe conditions on Continental’s airplanes.‘

This court has concluded that ALPA’s campaign is

simply a scheme designed to further ALPA’s efforts to close

down Continental Airlines for its own economic purposes.

Among other things, this would act as a warning to other

Carriers who must deal with ALPA at the bargaining table in

other areas.

Based on the evidence offered to this court, this

promotion by ALPA appears to be a misuse of the labor laws

of this country. In any event, the court declines to deny

rejection on the basis of ALPA’s claim that safety is at stake.

“Were ALPA genuinely concerned over the public’s interest, it has it,

within its power to release some of its striking pilots back to Continental

to help fill its pilots needs. Continental has requested this. It would have

prevented further erosion of Continental's seniority list - an issue in the

settlement negotiations. ALPA is under no obligation to do this but its

failure to do so upon request is indicative of the fact that self interest is its

true motive in this endeavor; not that of the public.

19A

THE SENIORITY ISSUE

Some of the major provisions of the collective

bargaining agreements by and between Continental Airlines

and the Airline Pilots Association (including the old Texas

International agreement with ALPA) relate to seniority.

These are very sensitive and important provisions for the pilot

employees (as well as the other union employees with respect

to their respective collective bargaining agreements). ALPA

and the other unions argue that Continental Airlines has not

been reasonable in its efforts to settle because of Continental’s

position with respect to the relative position of "new hires"

that have been employed since the pendency of this

proceeding and after the strikes of Continental’s major unions,

including ALPA.

The unions further argue that the seniority provision

of the contract is a non-executory right which has become

"vested" in the pilots and therefore cannot be rejected under

the provisions of §365 of the Bankruptcy Code. This court

disagrees.

There is no precise definition of "executory contract"

in the Bankruptcy Code. At least one of the accepted defini-

tions of the term “executory contract" is a contract that is so

far unperformed on both sides that the failure of either party

to complete performance would constitute a material breach

excusing further performance of the other. Matter of Tonry,

724 F.2d 467 at page 468 (Sth Cir. 1984). See Countrymen,

Executory Contracts and Bankruptcy, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 439

(1973); 58 Minn. L. R. 479 (1974) and House Report No. 95-

595, page 347 (1977); Senate No. 989, 2d Sess. 58 (1978), 2

Collier on Bankruptcy §365.02 (1983).

Even though a pilot may have achieved a certain

level of seniority within the meaning and under terms of the

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collective bargaining agreement between ALPA and

Continental, nevertheless, the right of employment at

Continental by any particular pilot is not absolute. In order

to enjoy the use and benefit of any seniority position, the pilot

must be employed by, and perform services for, Continental

Airlines. It is therefore clear that under the collective

bargaining agreement both Continental and each employed

pilot have reciprocal obligations during the life of the

contract. In other words, performance is due by both parties.

This is likewise true for every other employee that has

seniority under a collective bargaining agreement. Thus,

under the Bankruptcy Code, such a provision is executory, at

least insofar as the right of a striking pilot to return to work

after the strike is settled.

Under Continental - ALPA collective bargaining

agreements, pilots were entitled to be placed on the seniority

list and to maintain their relative status thereon (absent other

agreement) under the terms and conditions of the agreement.

As a pilot went higher on the seniority list, he had the

privilege of being recalled, or his employment maintained, in

priority to pilots lower on the seniority list. In aadition, as

changes were made in the system such as routes, equipment,

bid runs, vacations, etc., the higher the seniority the higher

the priority for the pilot to have his choice in these areas.

Furloughs were made from the bottom of the seniority list.

Further, after pilots are furloughed, under the agreement they

were recalled in order of seniority. Often this required

extensive retraining by Continental, wherein a pilot changed

type of equipment or was out of service beyord a specified

amount of time.

When Continental filed its proceeding and drastically

cut back on the number of cities it served and the routes it

was flying to the remaining cities, Continental had to furlough

a number of pilots on the payroll. Continental immediately

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went on a campaign to get the remaining pilots to agree to fly

under the emergency work rules. Once the strike began on

October 1, 1983, Continental maintained a telephone "bank"

in which pilots were called -and requested to fly for

Continental notwithstanding the strike. Those that did return

to work filled the positions then available and, once recalled,

maintained their relative priority they enjoyed on the seniority

list pre-petition. Therefore, the relative seniority of working

pilots is not the issue as this seniority is being honored by

Continental.

For a period of time after the strike, Continental

attempted without success to reach agreement with ALPA on

the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement. As the

early initial chaotic days of filing passed and Continental

began to rebuild its system, Continental needed additional

pilots and made a strenuous effort to get striking pilots to

return to service. There was some success in this area, but

as Continental expanded its routes it was unable to fill out its

list of needs from the ALPA pilots then on strike. By

instructions from its chief operating officer, Continental

delayed hiring pilots not on the seniority list ("new hires")

until it felt it had to do so to service its re-expanding route

system. Continental did not undertake employing new hires

(pilots off their existing seniority list) without adequate

warning to the Airline Pilots Association and its membership.

ALPA was told on October 5, 1983, that replacements would

be hired if the strike was not over quickly, and Continental

sent letters to this effect to all of its pilots. Continental told

all of its active pilots that it would not displace working pilots

in the future to accommodate returning strikers. Striking

pilots had the opportunity to return to work with Continental

as it expanded its operations, but many declined to do so,

although more than 50% of its pre-petition pilots did return to

work.

22A

After Continental reached the conclusion that it had

to employ new hires, and began doing so in early November,

1983, it advised these new pilots that they were permanent

and would not be replaced by striking pilots returning to work

at Continental after the strike ended or upon each striking

pilot’s individual decision to cross the picket line. That

permanent replacements would be hired if the striking pilots

would not return was well know to ALPA and its membership

long before Continental undertook this practice.

Subsequently, since early November, 1983, as pilot positions

were available in the system, Continental has hired all pilots

off the seniority list who were willing to return (which pilots

have continued to enjoy their relative seniority position) and

has hired new pilots from outside its seniority list. As noted,

once employed, the seniority system has functioned for each

pilot as it did before the filing of these proceedings. Had

Continental not employed pilots who were not on its seniority

list the airline would have had to significantly limit its

operations. This would have served ALPA’s purposes but it

would have made Continental’s ability to reorganize

substantially less likely. It was necessary to hire these

replacements in order for Continental to discharge its duty to

the public to make a reasonable effort to continue flying.

However, in efforts to negotiate a settkement, ALPA has

pointed its finger at Continental for refusing to agree on a

"back to work" agreement under which the striking pilots

would return to work and would resume their old relative

seniority positions ahead of any newly-hired pilots (who

would naturally have lower seniority status in most, if not all,

Situations). Such an agreement would result in Continental’s

furloughing most, if not all, of these new hires, despite

express promises to these individuals that they would not do

this. ALPA says that Continental, by not so agreeing is

bargaining in bad faith and/or is unreasonable.

23A

Continental has maintained that it will take returning

pilots only to the extent that positions are (or become)

available and will not agree to "create" positions for returning

strikers by furloughing new hires.

Continental defends its position by urging to the

court that it has a legal obligation (the oral representations and

agreement) to the individual new hires as well as a moral

obligation. Continental further argues that if it agreed as

ALPA has suggested, the resulting furloughs of the new hires

would put Continental in a bad bargaining position with

respect to any future negotiations that might take place

between ALPA and Continental within the next several years.

Continental argues that its position does not constitute bad

faith bargaining and is entirely reasonable under the

circumstances.

Should an agreement be reached with ALPA, it is

doubtful that it would extend beyond a one or two-year

period, as has been customary between these parties. Many

of these new hires left, or declined to accept, other

employment positions when they came to work for

Continental. It would appear that they have relied upon

Continental’s representations. If Continental replaces these

permanent new hires despite its representation to the contrary,

Continental might well be at the mercy of ALPA at the end

of any new contract term because of its potential inability to

employ replacement piiots should ALPA then undertake a new

strike. Continental would have effectively lost credibility with

the pilot community in this country, risking the probability

that it could not hire replacement pilots in the event of any

future strike threat. For Continental to agree as ALPA

Suggests would place a powerful negotiating weapon in

ALPA’s hands with respect to future negotiations. In this

court’s opinion, given all of the circumstances of this case,

Continental has valid reason to be concerned over the use of

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such weapons by ALPA. In all probability, Continental will

not have completed any reorganization process within the next

two, three nor even five years.° The resulting leverage to

ALPA could place in jeopardy any confirmed plan of

arrangement.

The strong public right of the worker to engage in

a legal strike must be observed. However, the working pilots

(including those not on the pre-petition seniority list) and the

other working employees have done what they can to preserve

the value of the debtor for the benefit of all. Once-successful

reorganization is achieved or is foreseeable, can the striking

employee be heard to claim that Continental is unreasonable

in not agreeing that the striking employee may return to work

whether a position is available or not and demand his or her

former seniority status as a legal right, when it results in the

new hire being furloughed?

This court cannot agree that a policy such as ALPA

Suggests would be in the best interest of the reorganization

process.

Although any "legal" and/or "moral" obligation of

Continental] to the new hires is an important factor, in this

court’s view there is a much stronger reason for sustaining

Continental’s position that these needed new hires are now

permanent employees and that they should not be replaced by

Continental to create positions for returning striking pilots as

part of any back-to-work agreement. These reasons are the

public policy of keeping the air carrier flying (as provided in

the Interstate Commerce Act and in the Railway Labor Act)

and in the equally important public consideration and policy

‘By this is meant the completion of any payout period provided for in a

confirmed plan of arrangement. It is not unusual for such pay periods to

extend beyond three or even five years.

25A

of the Bankruptcy Code that a financially troubled company

make the highest and best use of its assets and facilities in

order to maximize the recovery to creditors and to preserve

the business operation for the economy of the country. It is

not the least of such policy that it promotes the preservation

of this particular job market.

The striking pilots made a choice, although it was no

doubt was a hard choice. When one makes a choice, it is not

always possible to continue to retain both options, and in fact

usually this is not the case. When great principles conflict,

a court must attempt to determine what the best overall public

policy must be under the circumstances. These striking pilots

made their decision knowing the potential consequences.

They were aware that Continental was asking them to return,

that Continental needed pilots to expand its operations, a

necessary step if it was to have a successful reorganization,

and that Continental was going to hire replacement pilots on

a permanent basis if they did not return, and that Continental

would not voluntarily allow displacement of these persons

who accepted employment under extremely troubling

circumstances.

A reorganizing debtor must be efficient in its

employment practices, since its ability to survive is at stake.

It would not be consistent with the overall purposes of the

Railway Labor Act and/or the Bankruptcy Code to thusly

penalize the new hire after he has been successful in assisting

the debtor to return to profitability.

Certainly Continental needed to give assurance to

these new hires that they would not be replaced when the

strike was over. No one knew how long the strike might last.

This emphasizes (and is consistent with) the strong public

policy of the Railway Labor Act to keep the carrier in

operation. When you couple this public policy with the

26A

circumstances that the carrier in this instance was in a weak

financial condition, one must conclude that while the union is

free to use self-help under labor law, the debtor likewise had

the right to use self-help as Continental did here. There is

legal precedent for the position taken by Continental.

Empresa Equatoriana De Aviacion vy. District Lodge, 690

F.2d 838, (8th Cir. 1982); National Airlines, Inc. v.

International Association of Machinists and Aerospace

Workers, et al, 416 F.2d 998 (CA 5, 1969) cert. denied, 400

U.S. 992 (1971); Flight Engineers International Association

v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 359 F.2d 303 (2nd Cir. 1966);

International Association of Machinists v. Central Airlines,

Inc., 355 S.W.2d 803 (Civ. App. Texas, 1962) cert. denied,

371 U.S. 934 (1962), reh’g denied, 371 U.S. 970 (1963).

In the case of Flight Engineers International Assoc.

v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., supra, ALPA itself successfully

espoused the position that its members should permanently

replace striking flight engineers.

In National Airlines, Inc., supra, page 100€, the

court stated: "Under both the N.L.R.A. and the Railway

Labor Act, a carrier need not discharge those hired to replace

strikers. The hiring of replacements for the strikers would

have been consistent with the attempt to restore service." In

Empresa Equatoriana, supra, the court stated on page 846

that “the carrier could replace strikers where necessary to its

operation." On page 847 it said: "The strikers who were

properly replaced are entitled to be placed on such [a

preferential hiring] list, to be rehired when their replacements

quit or when a similar vacancy arises. Without the hiring

preference, the concept of replacement becomes

indistinguishable from discharge."

The hiring of permanent replacement employees in

a Strike situation has been held to be an acceptable practice

27A

under the National Labor Relation Act. In NLRB v. Mackay

Radio and Television Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), the Supreme

Court held that permanent replacements hired in an economic

strike need not be terminated to make room for returning

strikers. On page 345, the court said it is not "...an unfair

labor practice to replace the striking employees with others in

an effort to carry on the business" and that an employer is

"not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of

strikers upon the election of the latter to resume their

employment in order to create places for them." See also

Gulf States Manufacturers, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, page 1327

and 1328.

To require the debtor to place in effect at this time

rules which would cause the termination or furlough of these

people who have made a vital contribution to the effort to

reorganize, would in this court’s opinion, serve as bad

precedent for future reorganization cases.

While Continental is free to make the choice of

agreeing or not agreeing with ALPA on this point, this court

declines to accept ALPA’s view that Continental has engaged

in unreasonable bargaining (or bad faith) in refusing to accept

ALPA’s position on this point.

THE STATUS QUO PROVISIONS OF THE

RAILWAY LABOR ACT, THE

EMERGENCY WORK RULES, AND REJECTION

OF THE CONTRACTS AND THEIR TERMS

As noted above, immediately upon filing of its

Chapter 11 proceeding on September 24, 1983 Continental

unilaterally implemented new wage rates and work rules for

each of its union groups, including the pilots. Continental

undertook this action notwithstanding that the agreements with

the pilots were not then open for negotiation and, further, the

*

28A

negotiating procedures of Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act

had not been exhausted, as specified by the Act ("RLA").

The unions argue that notwithstanding §365 of the

Bankruptcy Code, the status quo provisions of the Railway

Labor Act prohibit any unilateral change in the wage rates or

work rules "on the property" until all negotiations pursuant to

the scheme of the status have been exhausted. The Unions,

including ALPA, argue that there is a difference between

making unilateral changes in a contract which might be

rejected under the provisions of §365 of the Bankruptcy Code

and the statutory provisions of the RLA, which (they allege)

continue the terms of the contracts in effect until the

bargaining procedures have been completed. The Unions

argue that §365 does not authorize rejection of statutory

requirements, as opposed to contractual provisions, i.e. this

court cannot authorize changes in the wage rates and work

rules of a carrier governed by the RLA until the Section 6

bargaining procedures have been exhausted. ALPA no doubt

would concede that such procedure may take years (indeed

it has already taken about nine months since filing without

effect).

Unquestionably the Railway Labor Act contains

"status quo” provisions. As noted by the 5th Circuit in the

United Industrial Workers of the Seufarers International Union

of North America v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharfs,

400 F.2d 320, page 329 "the objective of the Railway Labor

Act is continuance of the status quo until the statutory

procedures of the Act have been exhausted." And "As the

Supreme Court stated in Order of Railway Telegraphers v.

Railway Express Agency, 1943, 321 U.S. 342, 347, 64S. Ct.

582, 586, 88 L. Ed. 788, 792, the failure of the carrier to

proceed as provided by the Railway Labor Act of 1926, then

applicable, leaves the collective agreement in _ force

throughout." The court also noted with approval the language

29A

of Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 1946, 326 U.S.

561, to the effect that the object of Section 6 is to maintain

the status quo pending the expiration of the period provided

by the section for allowing the process of negotiation,

mediation and conciliation to have a play. It is to prevent

changes being made until these processes have been exhausted

or the prescribed waiting period has expired without bringing

them into effect. The Sth Circuit also noted that the Railway

Labor Act is more concerned than the National Labor

Relations Act ("NLRA") with continuance of the employers

operations and the employer-employee relationship. This is

evidenced by the fact that while bargaining is the first and last

step under the NLRA it is only the first step under the

Railway Labor Act in a ladder that leads to the White House

if differences cannot be resolved.

Generally speaking, this principle is reccgnize by

virtually all labor law precedents. On the other hand, while

the Supreme Court in Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship

Clerks, Freighthandlers, Express and Station Employees, ALF-

CIO, et al v. Florida East Coast Railway Company, 384 U.S.

238 (1965), recognized the requirement by law for the railway

to abide by all the rates of pay, rules, and working conditions

specified in the existing collective bargaining agreements until

the termination of the statutory mediation procedure, the court

allowed exceptions “upon specific authorization of [the U.S.

District] court after finding a reasonable necessity therefore".

The Supreme Court therein recognized that one of the primary

purposes of the Railway Labor Act is to keep the carrier

operating. On page 246 the court notes “that the procedures

of the Act are purposely long and drawn out, based on the

hope that reason and practical considerations will provide in

time an agreement that resolves the dispute". In that

nonbankruptcy case, the Supreme Court held that under

emergency conditions the carrier could implement new terms

and conditions governing the labor force as long as those

30A

changes were necessary for the railroad to fulfill its duty to

continue operations, provided the power to make such changes

is closely confined and is supervised. Thus, the Supreme

Court has recognized that the status quo provisions of the

Railway Labor Act must, in some instances, bend to the

exigencies of the situation.

The evidence in the instant case shows that, had

Continental not been able to significantly reduce its labor

costs (by the unilateral implementation of less costly and more

efficient work rules and pay rates) at the time it filed this

proceeding, Continental would have run of cash and would no

longer be operating at the present time. It would have had to

shut its doors even before this hearing commenced.

Continental was simply in no position to continue its

operations under the wage rates and working conditions

contained in its agreements with the Airline Pilots

Association. It did not have the money to do so nor the

ability to acquire it. In addition, under the circumstances,

Continental could not even have reduced its operations (as it

did beginning September 27, 1983) and still have complied

with the terms of its agreement with ALPA. Continental

reduced them significantly, and it needed the low cost, the

efficiency, and the flexibility of its emergency work rules in

order to do so.

ALPA’s contention cannot be sustained under the

law. By virtue of § 1167 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.

§1167), the U.S. Congress provided that notwithstanding §365

a debtor-in-possession under Chapter 11 of the Code cannot

change the wages or working conditions of employees of a

debtor subject to the Railway Labor Act except in accordance

with Section 6 of such act. Changes in wages working

conditions would and are otherwise authorized by §365 of the

Bankruptcy Code. The Congress then expressly provided in

§103(g) of the Bankruptcy Code that Subchapter IV of

31A

Chapter 11 applies only to a case under such chapter

concerning a railroad. Section 1167 is part of Subchapter IV

of Chapter 11. Continental is not a railroad. Under the

statutory scheme thusly set forth Congress, in its wisdom, by

clear implication provided that a debtor governed by the

Railway Labor Act need not comply with Section 6 of that act

before making unilateral changes in wages and work rules if

it is in Chapter 11 and is not a railroad. The statutory

scheme of the Bankruptcy Code thereby provides for the

action taken by Continental in this instance. It might well be

noted that the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, the

same year that airline deregulation became effective.

Further, since the contracts are no_ longer

immediately enforceable after filing, the changes in wages and

work rules are accomplished not by the employer’s unilateral

action, but rather by operation of law. NLRB v. Bildisco &

Bildisco, supra, 104 S. Ct. 1188 at page 1200. In Bildisco,

the Supreme Court laid down a pragmatic rule in dealing with

the National Labor Relations Act. This court is persuaded

that the reasoning of the Court in that case is likewise

applicable here in relation to the RLA. As noted above, this

debtor would not have survived implementation of the

suggestion by the Airline Pilots Association that Continental

could make no post-filing change in its wage rates and

working conditions.

In Bildisco, the Court held that the authority of a

debtor-in-possession to seek rejection of the collective

bargaining agreement was not qualified by the restrictions of

Section 8(d) of the NLRA, which section established detailed

guidelines for midterm modification of collective bargaining

agreements. The Court noted the policies of flexibility and

equity built into Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. These

policies were desperately needed by Continental at filing in

order to continue its duties as a carrier. As _ noted,

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performance of this duty to continue public service is one of

the primary purposes of the RLA. At least to that extent, the

Bankruptcy Code and the RLA are entirely consistent and

compatible.

The Supreme Court did not fully accept the "new

entity" theory utilized by the Court of Appeals in its Bildisco

opinion, 682 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir. 1982), but the Court did

observe that the debtor-in-possession, while the same "entity"

which existed before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, is

nevertheless empowered by the Bankruptcy Code to deal with

its contracts and property in a manner that it could not have

done absent the bankruptcy filing. The court noted that the

fundamental purpose of reorganization is to prevent a debtor

from going into liquidation with an attendant loss of jobs and

possible misuse of economic resources. The court noted

further that recapitalization of a debtor could be jeopardized

if the debtor-in-possession was saddled automatically with the

debtor’s prior collective bargaining agreement. The

Bankruptcy Code specifies that the rejection of an executory

contract which has not been assumed constitutes a breach of

the contract which relates back to the date immediately

proceeding the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.

§365(g)(1). The court further noted that if the debtor-in-

possession elects to continue to receive benefits from the other

party to an executory contract pending a decision to reject or

assume, the debtor-in-possession is obligated to pay for the

"reasonable value" of those services, which, depending upon

the circumstances of the contract may be what is specified in

it. Should the debtor-in-possession elect to assume the

executory contract, however, it assumes the contract cum

onere.

The Supreme Court concluded that the filing of the

petition in bankruptcy means that the collective bargaining

agreement is no longer immediately enforceable and may

33A

never be enforceable again. Specifically the Court concluded

that after the filing, the collective bargaining agreement is not

an enforceable contract within the meaning of NLRA

Section 8(d), and that it follows that the debtor-in-possession

need not comply with the provisions of Section 8(d) prior to

seeking the bankruptcy court’s permission to reject the

agreement. The court further stated that in a Chapter 11 case

the "modification" in the agreement has been accomplished

not be the employers unilateral action, but rather by operation

of law. The court further noted that even the National Labor

Relations Board had conceded in that case that the cumber-

some and rigid procedures of Section 8(d) need not be

imported into the bankruptcy proceedings. The Supreme

Court also held that the debtor-in-possession need not bargain

to impasse before seeking rejection and that these provisions

of the National Labor Relations Act must be subordinated to

the exigencies of bankruptcy.

In this court’s opinion, the rationale of the Supreme

Court in Bildisco is equally applicable to the Railway Labor

Act and the status quo provisions of that act must give way to

the realities of bankruptcy. A company whose financial life

is threatened should not, under rational public policy be

forced to adhere to principles which, though of good service

in times of ordinary financial health, would, as in this case,

jeopardize the company’s existence.

The unions’ attempt to distinguish Bildisco because

it dealt with the National Labor Relations Act, whereas

Continental is subject to the Railway Labor Act. However,

this court is not persuaded that in the situation that

Continental now finds itself, there is any persuasive difference

from the parameters outlined by the Supreme Court.

If ALPA’s argument is followed, the statutory

"status quo” provisions of the Railway Labor Act would put

34A

a financially troubled debtor to the task of an arduous (and

perhaps impossible) process before it could obtain the

economic relief which might well be necessary to its

continued operation. The result in many instances, including

this one, might well be that liquidation would result

unnecessarily while lip service was being given to the alleged

purposes of the Railway Labor Act, and many jobs would be

unnecessarily lost. Clearly the overriding public policy is that

more jobs should be saved under these unfortunate circum-

Stances rather than that higher wages be paid for a short

period of time before the debtor’s financial heart stops

beating. The demise of a company is too much of a price to

pay for strict adherence to Section 6 bargaining requirements.

Any policy which would tend to precipitate this demise could

not truly be consistent with the spirit and purposes of the

RLA, much less the Bankruptcy Code.

Once a company is legitimately in Chapter 11, as

Continental has been found to be, the provisions of Title 11

and the principles of Bildisco are applicable to its collective

bargaining agreements even though they are otherwise

governed by the RLA. Unilateral changes may be made by

the carrier at filing, at leastwwhere rejection of the agreement

is later approved by the court. However, the debtor is still

required to make reasonable payment for the services it

receives during the pendency of the proceeding and is

obligated to bargain with the certified representatives of the

employees both before and after rejection.

Continental was the first airline ever to attempt to fly

through a Chapter 11 proceeding. Had Continental requested

interim relief from the contract wage levels and work rules

and had it been possible to have had such a _ hearing

immediately, such relief would have been granted by this

court; given the unusual circumstances concerning its cash

position, the changes it made in its level of flying, its

35A

competitive situation, and the uncertainties that existed

immediately after the filing of this petition.

The fact that other urgent matters were pending on

this court’s docket prevented it from hearing the evidence on

the motion to reject for a few months. When the evidence did

begin on January 30, 1984, it extended until April 28, 1984.

It appears to this court that to have required

negotiations between the time of filing and the institution of

emergency work rules unilateraily imposed by Continental

Airlines on its pilots (when operations resumed three days

after filing) would not only have required a useless and

nonfruitful act (no agreement has been reached nine months

later) but would have prevented Continental from resuming

domestic operations at that time. Further since rejection is

being allowed, had Continental not reduced its wage

payments, it would have expended more monies in reliance on

the contractual provisions than those necessary to obtain these

same services. Continental would have paid more than the

reasonable value of these services based on market rates,

given all of the circumstances in this case.

Further delays in restricting Continental’s flying

operations would also have resulted in loss of those

advantages it had as a going business. At worst, this could

have resulted in the destruction of its business and at best it

would have severely diminished its ability to reorganize. In

either of these events, it would have stopped payment of

wages to all employees for either a longer period or for all

time.

RELATIVE EQUITIES

As has been noted, deregulation has caused some

difficulty to the industry majors, including Continental. Other

36A

carriers have furloughed employees and many unions have

granted concessions to various carriers in light of the

increasing competition. Continental has suffered substantial

losses since deregulation and now has a substantial debt

Structure and debt service. This deSt service makes it

difficult to compare Continental to other airlines in terms of

what costs are necessary for it to be profitable.

An effort has been made to show that Continental

was solvent when it filed its proceeding and that rejection

should not be permitted. The effort to prove solvency

stemmed from the appraisal of Continental’s air fleet at an

amount greater than that shown on its books. In other words,

its airplanes have a greater market value than book value. It

is axiomatic that for Continental to realize market value from

these airplanes they would have to be sold. If they were sold

Continental could not operate then. Without airplanes to

operate, Continental would have additional obligations from

rejections of its numerous leases on ground space and from

other executory contracts. Whether the net result, taking all

resulting liabilities into account, would show that Continental

is solvent is speculative at this time. No effort was made to

show this result. Resulting obligations from rejection of

executory contracts are not now on the books of Continental

as a liability.

At filing, as determined in connection with the

motion to dismiss, Continental had reached the point where it

no longer had free assets upon which to obtain any credit and

certainly could not obtain credit on the basis of its potential

profit margin. Further, assuming Continental was in fact

solvent, had Continental adhered to the labor costs specified

in the respective collective bargaining agreements, Continental

would have soon become insolvent unless it ran out of cash

and had to close its doors before this occurred.

37A

Moreover, if assets were liquidated (even at the best

market price) there would be no further need for employees

at Continental, including those who would seek to be

employed under the collective bargaining agreement. Thus a

sale of Continental’s air fleet would defeat the purposes of

such agreements entirely.

Therefore, it seems that for these purposes, a

liquidation test for solvency seems foolhardy and a self-

defeating way of evaluating Continental, under the circum-

stances. As a going concern, Continental was losing

substantial sums of money. An evaluation of the assets on

this basis (capitalized earnings) would not show Continental

to be solvent. In addition, at the filing Continental was not

paying its debts as they matured.

Unless a company can become profitable and

maintain that posture consistently, it is inevitable that it go out

of business. If a reorganization proceeding is to succeed,

prior accrued indebtedness must be paid out of future profits

(unless the company is liquidated). If there is no excess of

money over and above operating expenses, there is nothing to

pay prior indebtedness with; whether it be secured or

unsecured indebtedness, including any damages resulting from

rejection of collective bargaining agreements.

The unions have recognized that Continental needs

relief from the high labor cost which results from adherence

to the respective collective bargaining agreements. Each has -

indicated in testimony before this court that it would (and/or

did) agree to significant concessions in modification of these

agreements. (Even the IAM’s representative testified that it

would - or might back off of its requested “industry standard"

wages.)

38A

The non-union employees agreed to their share of

relief (by 80% vote). ALPA points out that Continental

realized the savings it requested (pre-filing) from the IAM

group as a result of the IAM strike and the interim work rules

imposed on August 13, 1983 and by contracting out of much

of the IAM employee work. The pilots intimate in testimony

that they would have agreed to the $60,000,000 requested of

them and that Continental should have interpreted their

“signals” to mean that they would agree to concessions at that

level. The UFA has said it would agree to the $40,000,000

in concessions requested by Continental prefiling (and even

more) but that the problem in reaching agreement has been

the dispute over the value (UFA’s costing) of the concessions

offered by UFA. Continental says they are worth far less that

the $40,000,000 requested, while UFA says they were worth

much more (i.e., $50,000,000). However, the UFA never

sent its costing experts to confer with Continental’s - so the

issue was never resolved. TWU did agree to the concessions

requested by Continental pre-filing.

This evidence is indicative of the recognition by

these unions that Continental cannot survive under the costs

of these agreements as written.

When Continental resumed flying operations

September 27, 1983 (after filing its Chapter 11 and being shut

down for three days), it severely reduced its fare level on all

flights in order to entice the flying public back onto the

airline. It also needed to restore the confidence of travel

agents who had been “booking away" from Continental as

rumors of its financial troubles had grown (pre-filing). This

had the desired effect. When it became apparent that the

public perceived that Continental could fly through a

Chapter 11, Continental increased its fare level but only to the

point they were competitive with the low cost airlines flying

in competition against them. However, unlike the low-cost

39A

competition, Continental still served hot meals on certain

flights, and maintained free baggage handling and interchange

with other airlines, areservation service, and others amenities

that are normally associated with a full-service airline. This

has been criticized severely by the unions, but it has

apparently been successful for Continental. Continental had

tried maintaining higher fare levels and full service as a

means of competing with the new entrants and had found it to

be very unsuccessful.

Continental has implemented this marketing program

and has set its fare levels in order to maximize its yield. It is

now projecting a profit and has been meeting its projections

for the first time in a long time. Taking into consideration all

of the existing circumstances, this court concludes that

Continental’s business plan is reasonable.

The unions point out that the emergency work rules

unilaterally imposed by Continental at filing would result in

annualized cost savings to Continental far in excess of the

$150,000,000 requested just before filing. The unions

contend that the annualized savings would be in the area of

$250,000,000. It should be noted that the $150,000,000 in

concessions was calculated merely for Continental to break

even. Further, at the time of the filing of its Chapter 11

proceeding, many uncertainties existed and many changes

were taking place within the airline. Continental was cutting

back its operations severely for a period of time. It did not

intend to return fully to its prefiling level of flying. It was

and is facing increasing competition. There is potential for a

fare war and skirmishes are even now being fought.

Continental needed the lower costs and flexibility

provided by the emergency work rules (or at least substan-

tially so) in order to survive, right itself financially, and

progress toward a stable and profit-making posture on a

40A

consistent basis. Substantial sacrifices have been, and are

going to be, necessary for this airline to revitalize itself. The

current working employees are making that sacrifice. They

have recognized that meat and potatoes come first; dessert on

the terrace comes later.

Because of the collective bargaining agreements the

pilots have enjoyed standards of living that make the required

sacrifices hard to adjust to. The court can understand why

a pilot making at, near, or over $100,0W0 per year has set a

standard (or cost) of life style that makes adjusting to a salary

of $43,000 or less extremely difficult. Small wonder the

pilots resist such a change. But economics can be harsh. It

has been to the airline industry in general and to Continental

in particular. The pilots have managed to negotiate (over the

years) pay benefits and work rules which are onerous and

non-productive, especially when compared to those of some

of the other competitive carriers. The result was a significant

cost imbalance and a substantial advantage to much of

Continental’s competition. In one sense, the pilots had simply

priced themselves (and/or Continental) out of the existing

market.

The average 1982 earnings for Continental captains

(excluding TXI pilots) were $89,673 the 94 DC-10 captains

salary averaged $101,793 in 1982. An analysis by the

Economic Analysis and Information Services Department of

ALPA concluded on July 28, 1983 that between 1980 and

1982 "pilots average earnings are greater than" the average

earnings of accountants, attorneys, college professors, dentists

and PH.D chemists and that only doctors earn more than

pilots but that pilots salaries were increasing at a faster rate

than those of any other profession.

Furthermore, the evidence showed that the actual

hard-hour utilization of pilots was less than 60 per month,

41A

pre-petition. Scheduled flying days for pilots in May, 1983

(presented as an example) averaged 14 days for regular

DC-10 and 727 pilots on domestic flights. In addition, pilots

got substantial vacation time (between 16 and 44 days per

year depending on seniority). This vacation time can, at least

in part, be used to further reduce scheduled flying time.

Federal Aviation Regulations permit utilization of

pilots up to 100 “block hours" in a calendar month, not to

exceed 1,000 block hours per year.

It should be noted that traditionally Continental’s

labor force has historically been over 50% non-union; 6,776

out of 12,008 employees pre-petition and 3,553 out of 5,763

employees post-petition (56.4%) as of January 31, 1984.

As observed above, more than 50% of the currently

active employees in each unionized job category® (and more

than 80% of the active flight attendants) have elected to cross

their own union’s picket lines. This appears to be indicative

of these employees’ acceptance of the need of Continental for

relief from the respective collective bargaining agreements

and their willingness to work at the wage levels and under the

working conditions (including increased productivity) being

currently offered by Continental.

Continental is offering a living wage to its currently

flying pilots. In addition, it is offering to its employees a

profit-sharing plan guaranteeing each a participation in 25%

®At the time the IAM struck, 12:01 a.m. EDST, August 13, 1983,

Continental sold all three of its flight kitchens (at Los Angeles, Denver and

Houston) and contracted out this service and that of cabin cleaning and

fueling because it could contract this service from third parties

substantially cheaper than it could perform them with IAM employees

under the terms of the IAM collective bargaining agreement.

42A

of the profits of the airline from the first dollar upward. It

has also proposed to this court for approval a stock ownership

plan which would make the employees 35% owners of the

company on a fully diluted basis. They as a group, would

then be the largest shareholder of the company. Overall,

morale appears to have increased post-filing to a very high

level. As of April, 1984, Continental had grown to

approximately 6,000 employees and was projecting 8,000

employees by the year end.

As of April i, 1984, Continental had 1,070 active

pilots, including those currently in training or on leave. Of

this number, 494 were new hires and 576 were from its pre-

petition seniority list. It employed 1,471 flight attendants, of

which 270 were new hires and 1,201 were from its pre-

petition seniority list. All of the ground instructors were still

on the payroll as were 21 out of the 35 dispatchers (14

dispatchers were still on furlough).

Beginning in October, 1981, Continental

management personnel endured a 10% pay cut and non-union

employees had to forego scheduled pay increases. In January

- February, 1982 personnel department positions were reduced

by 35% and general staff levels in other offices were reduced

15%. In 1983, 25% of the remaining management staff jobs

and 15% of the line management positions were eliminated.

Non-unionized personnel and management were required to

work extraordinarily long work hours and even split shifts in

some instances. Just prior to the filing of bankruptcy,

management employees had a 15% pay cut and reduction in

benefits, and, as noted, non-unionized employees voted to

accept similar reductions.

It is true that there were "snap back" provisions

relating to these management pay cuts, and their salaries have

been increased (snapped back) in part already. However,

43A

under the evidence, this court is convinced that Continental

management employees are being paid materially less than

competitive salaries for top management positions that other

companies are paying for similar management skills. In

addition, as noted, Continental management personnel have

been required to work extraordinarily arduous schedules.

Further reduction in their wages could result in loss of key

employees, and it appears that Continental has in fact already

suffered from this problem.

This court finds that non-union and management

personnel have made sufficient sacrifices to justify rejection

of the respective union contracts when balancing the rights

between them. This is particularly true when you consider

the high level of wages and salaries which had been bargained

for by the various unions and agreed to by Continental, as set

forth in these contracts.

Labor costs, were a major factor contributing to

Continental’s bankruptcy. If the contracts had not been

rejected, the administrative claims resulting from reinstating

the contracts (and their resulting high cost) from the date of

filing would in and of itself be highly damaging to the

prospects of reorganization. Further, if the company is

liquidated under Chapter 7, the contracts would be rejected as

a matter of law, 11 U.S.C. §365(d), and this rejection would

likewise relate back to the date of filing.

Low labor cost are necessary for Continental at the

present time and at least for the near term, foreseeable future,

in order for Continental to be competitive.

Virtually no effort was made by ALPA to show that

Continental could afford to pay materially more to its pilots

than it is now doing under the emergency work rules . The

only effort was a calculation to show that if Continental raised

44A

its fare levels without losing any of its passenger miles, it

could do so. However, no evidence was introduced that

convinces this court that if Continental materially raised its

fares it would not lose a substantial portion of its flying

customers.

There is little loyalty, if any, among passengers.

Passenger miles are essentially fungible. Ticket prices remain

the single most important element in attracting the flying

public.

The court rejects the motion that Continental could

materially raise its ticket prices and materially increase its

pilots labor costs, unless, and until, its competition also raises

ticket prices. That adventure has already been embarked upon

by Continental in the past; all to its financial dismay.

It appears to this court that substantial jobs will be

preserved as a result of rejection of these contracts. Certainly

the creditors are likely to get more under any plan of arrange-

ment than in liquidation; in fact, it is usually necessary for the

- court to find that they will receive nct less than they would

under Chapter 7 liquidation before any plan of arrangement

can be confirmed. 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(7). Any such plan

must be based on future earnings. From the evidence, it

appears that there will be no earnings unless these contracts

are rejected. Labor costs are such an important element in

Continental’s ability to operate profitably and to remain

competitive that it cannot offer a plan of arrangement until it

knows if the contracts are to be rejected, and, thereby, what

its future labor costs are likely to be. The respective

contracts must be rejected to get any new capital. No viable

business pian can include a return to all of Continental’s pre-

petition labor costs.

45A

Rejection will no doubt result in reduction in

standards of living of many of the employees, and possibly

even hardship in certain cases. Nevertheless, under the

circumstances and the economics currently prevailing, there

appears to be no reasonable alternative.

The unions argue that this court cannot make

necessary determinations in order to allow rejection of the

contract in light of the fact that Continental has not offered a

plan of arrangement, because this court cannot assess the

viability of such a plan or the need to reject the contracts as

an integral part thereof. This court disagrees. The Supreme

Court in Bildisco understood the difficulties in assessing the

outcome of a potential reorganization in the beginning stages

of such a proceeding. At this time the court cannot say that

Continental will have a confirmed plan of reorganization, nor

even that the confirmed plan will be successful, but it has

determined that without rejection no viable plan providing for

future operation by Continental of its own air fleet is possible.

The Supreme Court noted that "the Bankruptcy Court inquiry

is of necessity speculative, and it must have great latitude to

consider any type of evidence relevant to this issue." I believe

that the findings of this court have satisfied this issue as

required by Bildisco and other cases. In this instance, the

inability of the parties to reach an agreement is in itself a

deterrent to any plan of arrangement.

There was testimony that Continental could not

afford any substantial increase in its current labor costs. A

return to pre-petition labor costs under the ALPA contracts

would preclude Continental from effective competition with

the low cost, new entrants; some of which have negotiated

contracts with the very unions which oppose Continental’s

motion to reject.

46A

The unions argue that if the court allows rejection of

the agreements, it should only allow rejection of those parts

of the agreements that are burdensome and (presumably)

should require affirmation of all other parts. This court has

no true way to know the financial impact of each particular

provision in the agreements. The Supreme Court in Bildisco

noted that the bankruptcy court "need not determine that the

parties have bargained to impasse or make any other

determination outside the field of its expertise." (Emphasis

added).

The ALPA and UFA contracts are extremely

complex. This court could not possibly rewrite them for the

parties. if it tried to do so, in all likelihood serious mistakes

would be made. As noted in the Bildisco opinion, the

National Labor Policies generally require that employers and

unions reach their own agreements on terms and conditions of

employment free from governmental interference. The court

cited Howard Johnson Company v. Hotel Employees, 417

U.S. 249 (1974); NLRB v. Burns Security Services, 406 U.S.

272, 282-294 (1974). See also Chicago and Northwestern

Railway Company v. United Transportation Union, 402 U.S.

570, page 579, footnote 11, referring to the strong federal

labor policy against governmental interference with the

substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements.

There is no provision in the Bankruptcy Code which

would provide for rejection in part. Historical case authority

indicates that executory contracts must be accepted cwm onere

or not at all. The Supreme Court in Bildisco did not provide

for any such authority by this court; especially since the court

noted that acceptance must be cum onere and cited Jn re

Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190 F.2d 994, 996 (CA 3 1951) for

that proposition.

47A

Continental has a continuing duty to bargain with the

certified representatives of its employees in good faith. These

parties are themselves in a better position to know the effect

of the various provisions of their future agreements, which,

by their nature, are extremely complex. Should this court

impose restrictions or conditions on the rejection of these

agreements, the court would not only be involved in an area

outside of its expertise but it would violate strong principles

of labor law that government not interfere in this bargaining

process. This court should not impose on either party its own

notions of what is fair or reasonable or economical under the

circumstances. Neither the Bankruptcy Code provision (§365)

nor applicable case law mandates that this court set any terms

or conditions on the rejection and this court declines to do so

in this instance.

The unions next argue that if the court is going to

allow rejection of the agreements it should impose conditions

on the rejection, such as requiring Continental to (1) reoffer

its pre-petition concession package, (2) reimpose the

"non-economic" provision of the agreements, and/or

(3) implement those provisions which have been "signed-off™

on in the various labor negotiations. The unions cite Jn re

Parrot Packing Co., Inc., 99 C.C.H. Labor case P10, 550

(U.S.D.C. No. Dist. Indiana, Ft. Wayne division, case

number 83-10127) August 2, 1983, as precedent for this

proposition.

The concessions that were requested pre-petition do

not necessarily relate to the current labor cost requirements of

Continental. The question of which provisions are in fact

non-economic is in issue. Those "signed-off" provisions were

not intended by the parties to be binding unless and until a

complete and integrated collective bargaining agreement was

reached; they were simply tentative and conditional. On the

other hand, it is certainly fair for the unions to bring up these.

48A

tentative agreements as well as the non-economic provisions

in the future bargaining sessions that must take place.

If this court has the authority to impose such

conditions it declines to do so in this instance.

The unions, including ALPA, have not seriously

challenged with evidence that Continental is in serious

financial condition or that it was losing money, nor that it

needed serious economic concessions if it were to continue.

Nevertheless, ALPA urges that the emergency work rules

have inflamed the pilots.

The insult to the unions stems from the effrontery of

the employer escaping from the "bonds" of their labor

agreements before their very eyes; and in a highly visible

way. However, this employer, while it appears to be the

same, now has different characteristics and powers.

Section 1107 of Title 11 proscribes that a debtor-in-possession

has all of the rights, duties, and responsibilities of a trustee.

Were there to be an "actual" trustee (i.e. a disinterested third

person who could be perceived as acting on behalf of all

interested. parties) this pill (having this modicum of sweetener)

might not be so difficult to consume without even the benefit

of liquid refreshment. Small wonder that frustration so

conceived is the bearer of ill will and dismay.

Nevertheless, economics have changed substantially

in the airline industry. Recognition must be given to this.

The ALPA contracts give no such recognition nor any flexi-

bility to deal with the existing circumstances. Under these

circumstances, rejection of these burdensome agreements

should be, and are, permitted under the law.

To comply with the RLA, ALPA (as well as

Continental) must continue to bargain. ALPA must lay aside

«

49A

other considerations and recognize that this is an economic

problem. Economic problems are rarely, if ever, resolved in

the courtroom. The striking ALPA pilots need the bargaining

expertise of its union now more than ever. If properly and

steadfastly exercised, the bargaining ability of ALPA can

determine what level of pay and benefits Continental can

afford to pay under existing economic circumstances.

Whether, ALPA has alienated the working ALPA pilots to the

extent that it has lost the leverage of support from this group

remains to be seen. However, ALPA and Continental must

bargain from the relative positions in which they now find

themselves.

Signed this 17th day of August, 1984.

/s/_ RF, Wheless, Jr,

R.F. Wheless, Jr.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

1h

1B

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

Debtors.

In re )

)

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., ) Case No. 90-932

et al., ) through 984

)

)

ORDER APPROVING O’NEILL GROUP

—___LITIGATION SETTLEMENT _

Upon the Motion ("Motion") of Continental Airlines,

Inc. ("Continental") to Approve O’Neill Group Litigation

Settlement ("Settlement Agreement") filed by Continental on

October 22, 1991, the Court having considered said Motion,

the Memorandum In Support thereof and the attachments

thereto, and the Court having considered the Adair Pilots’

objection to said Motion filed November 12, 1991, and the

Court having conducted a hearing on said Motion on

November 26, 1991, and there appearing good cause

therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and

conclusions of law:

1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and Bankruptcy Rule

9019. This matter constitutes a core proceeding pursuant to

24 U.S.C. § 157.

2B

2. Continental filed its petition for relief under

Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code on

December 3, 1990 ("Petition Date").

a Since the Petition Date Continental has

continued in the operation and management of its business and

properties under §§ 1107 and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.

4. The Settkement Agreement (attached as

Attachment | to the Memorandum in Support of Motion of

Continental Airlines, Inc. to Approve O’Neill Group

Litigation Settlement) resolves claims with potential value in

excess of $100 million against the estate including (a) virtually

all of the remaining employee-related claims filed against a

corporate predecessor of Continental ("Old CAL") in a prior

bankruptcy proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court for the

Southern District of Texas ("Continental I"), (b) litigation

arising Out of a 1985 strike settlement agreement between Old

CAL and the Air Line Pilots Association ("ALPA"), and

(c) litigation in the Texas state courts arising out of a side

Letter between Texas Air Corporation and ALPA. Included

among the claims resolved by the Settlement Agreement are

claims by over 200 pilots whom Continental has treated as

having resigned or retired during the 1983-85 pilot strike at

Continental. Those pilots claim a right to reinstatement and

backpay which, if successfully prosecuted, would be both

costly and extremely disruptive to the interests, seniority and

morale of Continental’s current pilot workforce.

a By resolving this litigation, the Settlement

Agreement will in large part put an end to a labor dispute that

has endured for almost nine years and should enhance morale

among the current Continental pilot workforce. The

Settlement Agreement further benefits the estate by avoiding

litigation of the O’Neill Group’s motion to transfer venue of

3B

these proceedings to the Texas bankruptcy court pursuant to

11 U.S.C. § 1014, thereby allowing these proceedings to

continue without interruption or deiay.

6. Of the $20.9 million of potential

consideration available under the Settlement Agreement,

approximately $17.9 million or $5.6% has been accepted. Of

that total, 30% or approximately $5.4 Million will be paid in

cash in 15 equal monthly installments of approximately

$360,000 per month, commencing after a plan of reorganiza-

tion is confirmed herein. Seventy percent of the consideration

accepted, or approximately $12.5 million, will be provided in

the form of general unsecured pre-petition claims to be

scheduled in the name of each settling pilot. In addition,

Continental will provide approximately $1.8 million in

attorneys’ fees to the O’Neill Group’s counsel, to be paid in

eight monthly installments after confirmation of a plan. The

amount of consideration (showing both the cash and claim

portion) to be provided for each type of claim settled under

the Agreement is set forth below.

Claim Type Cash Claim

1. Resigned or retired pilots $2.16 mil. $5.04 mil.

2. Furlough Pay $2.46 mil. $5.75 mil.

3. Contract Rejection $350,000 $817,000

Damages

4. Other Bankruptcy Claims $199,500 $465,500

5. Side Letter Claims $ 36,375 $ 84,875

6. Class Action Claims $164,250 $383,250

4B

a A Bankruptcy Court must consider four

factors for approving settlement agreements pursuant to

Bankruptcy Rule 9019: (a) the probability of success in the

litigation; (b) the difficulties, if any, to be encountered in the

matter of collection; (c) the complexity of litigation involved,

and the expense, inconvenience and delays necessarily

attendant to it; and (d) the paramount interests of creditors

and a proper deference to their reasonable views in the

premises. See Drexel v. Loomis, 35 F.2d 800 (8th Cir.

1929), as adopted in Protective Committee for Independent

Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390

U.S. 414 (1968).

8. First, Continenta: is fully apprised of all

facts necessary to evaluate the risks associated with the claims

and litigation being settled, and it is prudent for Continental

to eliminate these risks in order to achieve certainty through

the Settlement Agreement. Although Continental believes that

it has strong defenses to the O’Neill Group’s claims and

litigation, it also recognizes that, in varying degrees, there are

risks associated with that litigation and that continuation of

these claims and litigation will impose a significant burden on-

the estate. ;

9. Second, the claims are all adverse to

Continental and thus present no "difficulties in the matter of

collection."

10. Third, the litigation with the O’Neill Group

has endured for over nine years and has consumed large

quantities of management resources and legal fees.

Disapproval of the Settlement Agreement would result in

continued litigation with the O’Neill Group on many fronts

and the continued expenditure of significant time, attention,

and money, all to the detriment of Continental and its

SB

creditors. Resolution of the O’Neill Group’s litigation will

enable Continental to focus on achieving a_ successful

reorganization, not on past disputes, and will thus enhance the

labor relations climate at Continental.

11. Fourth, the Settlement Agreement serves the

interests of Continental’s creditors by, in addition to the

benefits described above, avoiding any disruption of these

proceedings that might occur if Continental were required to

litigate the O’Neill Group’s motion to transfer venue of this

bankruptcy case. Thus, the Settlement Agreement will hasten

a successful reorganization.

12. The Official Committee of Unsecured

Creditors has not objected to approval of the Settlement

Agreement.

13. The Court has considered the objections of

the Adair Pilots, finds them to be without merit, and they are

denied.

14. The Court therefore concludes that the

Settlement Agreement is in the best interests of Continental’s

estate.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED, this 26th day of November, 1991 that

a The Motion of Continental Airlines, Inc. to

Approve O’Neill Group Litigation Settlement is granted.

y The Settlement Agreement, attached as

Attachment 1 to the Memorandum in Support of Motion of

Continental Airlines, Inc. to Approve O’Neill Group

6B

Litigation Settlement, is approved in its entirety pursuant to

Bankruptcy Rule 9019.

= Continental is authorized to execute of

Settlement Agreement.

/s/ Helen S. Balick

United States Bankruptcy Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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