Opposition Brief — O'Neill Group v. Continental Airlines Corp., 113 S. Ct. 87 (1992) (No. 91-2014)
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No. 91-2014 |
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ie Teas QFFICE OF THE CLERK j
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1991
O’NEILL GroupP, et. al., Petitioners
5%
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES CorP., Respondent
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION
BARRY P. SIMON CHARLES A. SHANOR*
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT JOHN J. GALLAGHER
AND GENERAL COUNSEL JON A. GEIER
DANIEL P. CASEY PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY
ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL & WALKER
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, 1050 CONNECTICUT AVE., N.W.
INC. TWELFTH FLOOR
2929 ALLEN PARKWAY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77019 (202) 223-9000
(713) 834-2273
July 13, 1992 ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
* COUNSEL OF RECORD
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code
grants employees who strike their debtor-in-possession
employer rights superior to those of strikers in all other
circumstances, such that they become entitled to wages and
benefits for the time period during which they voluntarily
withheld their services and did not work?
2. Whether Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code
grants employees who had no guarantee of future employment
an entitlement to future wages and benefits as contract
rejection damages for the time period after which the debtor-
in-possession employer would have ceased operations?
il
LIST OF PARTIES
The O’Neill Group, Petitioners in this Court and
appellants in the court of appeals, were originally four
hundred fifty-two past or present pilots and flight attendants
of Continental Airlines, Inc. Annex A to the O’Neill Group’s
Application to Extend Time to File a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on January 8, 1991 (No. A-528) lists all of
the Petitioners. Four hundred of the four hundred fifty-two
original Petitioners have settled the claims at issue here.
Respondent and appellee in the court of appeals is
Continental Airlines Corp., a corporate predecessor of
Continental Airlines, Inc.
RULE 29.1 STATEMENT
Continental Airlines, Inc. is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Continental Airlines Holdings, Inc.
- ili -
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................
OE es oo ks wk woe eS owe bles
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........00500.
ae
ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI .
I. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH
NO DECISION OF THIS COURT OR OF
ANY OTHER COURT OF APPEALS .....
IT. BOTH SETTLEMENTS OF CLAIMS AND
PASSAGE OF A NEW STATUTE
DRAMATICALLY DIMINISH THE
IMPORTANCE OF THIS CASE ........
III. THE DENIAL OF PETITIONERS’
CLAIMS TURNED ON FACTUAL
ISSUES, NOT QUESTIONS OF LAW
APPROPRIATE FOR THIS COURT’S
| BS Sg a
IV. THE DECISION BELOW CORRECTLY
og gg Oi ey eS ee 12
A. Strikers Are Not Entitled To Claim Wages For
Periods When They Struck Their Employer .. 14
B. Employees Are Not Entitled To Damages For
Future Wages For Time Periods After The
Employer Would Have Ceased To Do Business
Hee Mt Pag Such WaGeSs . wc ee 17
ee eee ee ee eee ee ee ee 18
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page(s)
Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O'Neill,
Bak S. CR, TER CRED oes ever detaeeeee 4
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB,
Jee U8. FO «6 a OOO eee 15
Comfort, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965), enforced,
365 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1966) ............. 14
Empresa Ecuatoriana de Aviacion, S.A. vy.
District Lodge No. 100, 690 F.2d 838
(11th Cir. 1982), cert. dismissed,
463 7.5. Tape tees 6 0k 0c owe eee 14
IAM v. Central Airlines, Inc.,
Ste Um Te CUD cho 0c ones ck nee ee 15
IBEW y. A-1 Electrical Serv.,
535 F.2d 1 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
SED U2. SE CHP xn kb a ee tee eae 17
In re Altair Airlines, Inc.,
Vat F.28 Oe GO Cw. 1906) x. 5 6 odds ec evans 14
In re Continental Airlines Corp.,
38 B.R. 67 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984) .......... 3
In re Continental Airlines Corp., 50 B.R. 342
(S.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd, 790 F.2d 35
Coe Ge, Ne 6-0-5 5 bs oa pe eee 14
In re Continental Airlines Corp..,
57 B.R. 845 (Bankr. §.D. Tex. 1985) ..... ii, i7
In re Continental Airlines,
ae ©.26 127 OO Cr. 1991) . ww ok ek bcans 2
In re Nuisance Corp., 17 B.R. 80
(EN. SRN SOP ko eco awc can wee 13
In re Roth American, Inc., 120 B.R. 356
eS ee rr en... 8
+ ais
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - CONTINUED
Page(s)
In re U.S. Truck Co., 89 B.R. 618
(E.D. Mich. 1988), aff’g 74 B.R. 515
te a OM eee re ere 8
International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
IML Freight, Inc., 789 F.2d 1460
(Ts Rs ke eee ee eee 7
J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
399 F.2d 356 (Sth Cir. 1968),
rev'd on other grounds,
700 Us Be ee sk 6 ee a ee eee eee 14
J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB,
Jak Wid ee CEs 6 kako ee 11, 17
Mazirow v. Grigsby (In re White Motor Corp.),
44 B.R. 563 (N.D. Ohio 1966)... ww ice ee ws 13
National Airlines, Inc. v. IAM,
416 F.2d 998 (Sth Cir. 1969),
after remand, 430 F:2d 957
CO CA: TR ks hk eee ee 14
NLRB vy. Bildisco & Bildisco,
4G5 UB. Sid Cle 5 2 a x ck 8, 10, 13, 16
NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co.,
Se U.S Bae GE 6 ake a eee es tee 15
NLRB vy. Southern Greyhound Lines,
426 F.2d 1299 (Sth Cir. 1970) ............. 14
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
SES Us BET CRD 6a be oe a ee 14
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills
of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) ........... 15
- Vii -
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - CONTINUED
Page(s)
STATUTES:
a ees © See 6 fi ek «wena are. 2
Oe ee oe eee koe. 2
Bankruptcy Code
Eyck ey i ere 10, 16
Ae us RSME ook ka sv erevs Ohaus 10
Pe We ED oe od ks ae ek oe eee 13
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:
130 Cong. Rec. No. 92 (June 29, 1984) ......... 10
TREATISES:
3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¢ 502.02
(OOO BPO, eo be ke pees wees 12, 14
MISCELLANEOUS:
Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy
Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain,
91 Yale L.J. 857 (1982) ................. 13
Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits
of Bankruptcy Law, Harvard Univ. Press
ee ae a Ware a nea ei ks 2: 13
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1991
O’NEILL GROUP, et. al., Petitioners
Vi
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES CorP., Respondent
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION
Respondent Continental Airlines Corp. respectfully
requests that this Court deny the petition for a writ of
certiorari, seeking review of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in this
case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion and judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reported at 901 F.2d 1259
(Sth Cir. 1990) (Pet. App. A). The Fifth Circuit’s order
denying petitions for rehearing and suggestions for rehearing
en banc is unreported (Pet. App. G.). The district court’s
order, filed March 13, 1989, is unreported (Pet. App. E).
The bankruptcy court order dated September 10, 1985 is
unreported (Pet. App. B), its order dated May 8, 1986 is
unreported (Pet. App. C), and its order dated June 26, 1986
is reported at 64 Bankr. 865 (Bankr. $.D. Tex 1986) (Pet.
App. D).
2
JURISDICTION
This Court, on January 9, 1991, extended the time
for filing a writ of certiorari to March 28, 1991, No. A-528.
On March 21, 1991, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
confirmed that Respondent Continental Airlines Inc.’s
("Continental") bankruptcy petition stayed appellate
proceedings arising from an earlier bankruptcy, In re
Continental Airlines, 928 F.2d 127 (Sth Cir. 1991) (Pet. App.
H), automatically extending the time for petitioning this Court
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 108(c)(2).Y The automatic
stay was lifted on May 12, 1992 (Pet. App. J), and thereafter
the petition for certiorari was timely filed under 11 U.S.C.
Section 108(c)(2). This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under
28 U.S.C. Section 1254 (1).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After suffering over $500 million in losses during
the first five years of airline deregulation, Continental
suspended its domestic operations and filed a bankruptcy
petition on September 24, 1983. On September 27, 1983,
Continental resumed a reduced level of operations and filed a
motion with the bankruptcy court to reject its collective
bargaining agreements with the Air Line Pilots Association
("ALPA") and the Union of Flight Attendants ("UFA"). The
same day, Continental issued “emergency work rules" that
l/ A corporate predecessor of Continental ("Old Continental") filed a
petition in bankruptcy on September 24, 1983. Jn re Continental Airlines
Corp., Consolidated Case No. 83-04019-H2-5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.) The
contract rejection damages claims at issue here were filed against Old
Continental, which emerged as a new entity from bankruptcy on
September 2, 1986, pursuant to a confirmed plan of reorganization. The
reorganized Continental filed its bankruptcy petition on December 3, 1990.
In re Continental Airlines, Inc. , Case Nos. 90-932 through 90-984 (Bankr.
D. Del.) Old Continental is hereinafter referenced as Continental.
3
called for lower wages and fewer restrictions on the
availability of pilots and flight attendants for duty. The new
wages and work rules mirrored those in union contracts
agreed to in the then-recent reorganization of another carrier,
Braniff Airways. ALPA and UFA, including all members of
Petitioners, the O’Neill Group, went on strike beginning
October 1, 1983.2
On June 17 and December 5, 1984 respectively, the
bankruptcy couri approved rejection of the ALPA and UFA
collective bargaining agreements. (The bankruptcy court’s
subsequent Memorandum of Authorities Authorizing Rejection
of Airline Pilots Association Collective Bargaining
Agreements is reproduced at Appendix A hereto.) The
court’s now-final orders rejecting the labor contracts found
that the emergency work rules, adopted only after
“considerable and reasonable efforts" by Continental to obtain
voluntary modification of the agreements, were necessary for
Continental to “compete effectively with the low cost carriers
in direct competition with it."2 Despite this judicial finding,
2/ In addition to striking, ALPA and UFA moved to dismiss Continental’s
bankruptcy petition on the grounds it was filed in bad faith and that the
rejection of the union contracts would violate the United States
Constitution. Jn re Continental Airlines Corp., 38 B.R. 67, 69 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 1984). The bankruptcy court denied the unions’ motion finding
that Continental “filed . . . for the purpose of attempting to keep the
companies alive and functioning and that they had no other viable
alternative to that end." Jd. at 71.
3/ In contrast, the bankruptcy court found that ALPA “does not intend to
reach an agreement with Continental on terms the airline can afford."
Res. App. A at 16A, that ALPA “appears to have strong motives for
seeing that the carrier is shut down as an example to the other carriers
whose pilots are represented by this large and extremely powerful union"
(id.), and that "ALPA’s action to shut down Continental and/or to deprive
it of profitability reflects on ALPA’s good faith in bargaining and on any
equities involved." Jd. at 16A.
4
the UFA strike continued until April 17, 1985 and the ALPA
strike continued until October 31, 1985.
On April 26, 1985, ALPA filed bankruptcy claims
for all Continental pilots, $408 million of which was for
alleged damages arising from rejection of its collective
bargaining agreement with Continental.’ Three days later,
UFA filed claims for the flight attendants, $409 million of
which was for damages claimed to arise from rejection of the
UFA’s collective bargaining agreements with Continental.
Both claims for future wages were premised on (1) full pay
and benefits until dates long subsequent to expiration of the
collective bargaining agreements, and (2) full pay and benefits
for all striking employees during the period when the
employees did no work because they were on strike.
In October 1985, the bankruptcy court approved an
agreement between Continental and ALPA intended to settle
all issues between the parties, including the pilots’ contract
rejection damage claims.* Continental subsequently reached
a similar settlement with UFA which likewise was approved
by the court. Certain pilots and flight attendants, including
Petitioners O’Neill Group, raised objections to these
settlements. These objectors were permitted to opt out of the
settlement and file proofs of claim for their pro rata portions
of the claims originally filed by ALPA and UFA.
Continental, seeking to dispose of the contract
rejection claims, filed a motion for partial summary judgment
4/ Prepetition wage claims, which have been paid in full to all claimants,
are not at issue here.
5/ The Continental-ALPA settlement agreement has previously been
reviewed by this Court in Air Line Pilots Association v. O'Neill, 111 S.
Ct. 1127 (1991).
5
which asked the bankruptcy court to disallow contract
rejection damages claims for the period when the claimants
were on strike. This motion was granted on September 10,
1985. An additional motion filed by Continental to disallow
all remaining claims for contract rejection damages was
granted as to the flight attendants on May 8, 1986 and as to
the pilots on June 26, 1986. These two orders held the
claimants were not entitled to future wages and benefits
because they were not guaranteed future employment under
the collective bargaining agreements. All three orders, when
appealed to the federal district court, were affirmed.
The O’Neill Group then appealed to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit, in an opinion written by
Judge Gee, upheld the order disallowing damages for the
period when the employees were on strike ("the strike order")
but reversed and remanded the orders disallowing all pre-
strike claims ("the business cessation orders"). Judge
Garwood, who filed a partial dissent as to the strike order,
would have allowed damages for the difference between the
collectively-bargained rates of pay and the emergency work
rules rates of pay, even though the strikers did not work
during this period. As to the business cessation order, the
Court unanimously held that, from the date of the bankruptcy
petition until some date prior to January 30, 1984 when
"Continental would have run...[out] of cash" and “would have
had to shut its doors,"® nonstriking employees should
receive contract damages claims for the difference between
the collectively-bargained rates of pay and the emergency
§/ A separate, final, bankruptcy court Order had previously found that
Continental’s Bankruptcy was caused by financial circumstances so dire
that "Continental would have run [out] of cash and would no longer be
operating at the present time. It would have had to shut its doors even
before this hearing commenced [January 30, 1984]." Res. App. A at 30A.
6
work rules rates of pay. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case
for precise specification of that date.
ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI
The writ should be denied. The decision below does
not conflict with any decision of this Court or any other court
of appeals; the significance of the questions presented is
minimal -- most Petitioners no longer have live claims and
legislation inapplicable to this proceeding makes such claims
less likely to occur in the future; the allowability of
petitioners’ claims turned on factual issues not appropriate for
review by this Court; and the court of appeals decision is, in
all particulars, a correct application of both law and policy.
I. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH NO
DECISION OF THIS COURT OR OF ANY
OTHER COURT OF APPEALS
As Petitioners argued in their Suggestion for
Rehearing En Banc to the Fifth Circuit (at p. 5), the decision
of the panel below is "the first reported appellate decision in
the country concerning the proper measure of contract rejec-
tion damages [under the Bankruptcy Code]." Because there is
no split in the circuits concerning application of Bankruptcy
Code Section 502 to either the strike issue or the business
cessation issue, this case does not warrant this Court’s
consideration.
The Petition’s complaint (Pet. at 8-14) that strikers
should be paid in full for time they are on strike against their
employer is simply not the law, either inside or outside
7
bankruptcy.” Petitioners’ leading case for the notion that
they should have received damages for their time on strike,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. IML Freight, Inc.,
789 F.2d 1460 (10th Cir. 1986) ("IML Freight") did not
involve a claim for wages at collective bargaining agreement
rates for striking employees. The main issue in JML Freight
was the propriety of a debtor’s rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement, an issue not present here. Indeed,
unlike the present case, the court disapproved the debtor’s
attempt to reject its collective bargaining agreement.
_ Therefore, there were no Section 502 damage claims from
rejection of that agreement. The Tenth Circuit’s discussion
of damages was limited to the proposition that rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement could give rise to damage
claims, just as the Fifth Circuit decided here. The Tenth
Circuit did not decide, or even discuss, whether strikers
should receive damages covering time on strike.
The second half of the petition (Pet. at 14-22) argues
that the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that damages for
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement (which does not
guarantee future employment) should exclude the time period
after which the debtor/employer would have ceased to employ
anyone. Petitioners’ rhetoric that the decision below
“contravenes basic bankruptcy law" proves, upon inspection,
to be hollow; there is no conflict between the decision below
and any decision of this Court or any other court of appeals.
7/ _ Petitioners assert, without authority, that the decision below creates
a conflict between the so-called “right to strike" and the so-called "right
to contract rejection damages." No such conflict exists. The strike order
upholds well settled labor law principles that strikers have no claim for
wages for time not worked. The business cessation order affirmed the
right to contract rejection damages. See Sec. IV, infra.
8
Petitioners’ so-called "contradiction" of the decision
below with NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513
(1984) (hereafter Bildisco), is disingenuous. _ Bildisco
acknowledged the propriety of judicial estimation of
contingent and unliquidated claims; all the Fifth Circuit did
was apply Bildisco, saying that such estimation results in a
claim which is limited by the exclusion of damages for those
times when the claim would not have been otherwise
recoverable due to the employer’s financial collapse. Bildisco
did not involve such a factual twist, and no appellate decision
has held contrary to the Fifth Circuit on this issue.
Petitioners’ best effort to claim a conflict with any
aspect of the decision below rests upon Jn re U.S. Truck Co.,
89 B.R. 618 (E.D. Mich. 1988), affg 74 B.R. 515 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1987). Even if it were appropriate for this Court
to deal with a "split of authority" between the Fifth Circuit
and one district court, there is no such split here. The cases
are factually distinct. The district court in U.S. Truck said
that "the court cannot say what would have happened had the
company decided to liquidate," Jd. at 626, while the
bankruptcy judge here specifically found that Continental
would have ceased to operate between the petition date and
January 30, 1984. Res. App. A. at 30A. All the Fifth
Circuit did was to remand to the fact-finder for a further
specification as to that precise date; no comparable fact
pattern existed in U.S. Truck.®
8/ The only decision since the Fifth Circuit’s decision in this case holds,
citing the Fifth Circuit, that "Damages, if any, would only be available for
the time that Roth American would have been able to continue in
business.” Jn re Roth American, Inc., 120 B.R. 356, 360 (Bankr. M.D.
Pa. 1990).
9
II. BOTH SETTLEMENTS OF CLAIMS AND
PASSAGE OF A NEW STATUTE DRAMATICALLY
DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS CASE
Petitioners neglect to discuss two factors which
dramatically reduce the practical importance of this case.
Petitioners allege that the decision below "deprives
more than 450 Continental employees of their sole remedy for
Continental’s breach of its labor contracts" and that "the
magnitude of the harm in this case alone is sufficient to
warrant certiorari review." Pet. at 12. This is not true.
Petitioners failed to inform the Court that, on November 26,
1991, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court approved a settlement
between Continental and the O’Neill Group which allowed
individual pilots and flight attendants to settle their contract
rejection damage claims. (The bankruptcy court’s Order
Approving O’Neill Group Settlement is reproduced at
Appendix B hereto). Asa result of that settlement 305 of the
approximately 435 pilot Petitioners here elected to settle such
claims. All 17 of the flight attendant members of the O’Neill
Group agreed to settle. Petitioners also failed to inform the
Court that an additional 78 pilot Petitioners agreed to settle
their contract rejection claims pursuant to Continental’s 1985
settlement with ALPA. Thus, there are now only 52 hold-
outs who would receive any benefit from even a total reversal
of the decision below.”
Moreover, the legal framework for resolving collec-
tive bargaining agreement rejection issues has changed
9/ Moreover, all of the Petitioners with live claims were on strike
subsequent to October 1, 1983, and thus would only be eligible for six
days of damages (September 24, 1983 through September 30, 1983) if the
Court were to reverse the business cessation orders but affirm the strike
order.
10
dramatically since this case was filed in September 1983. In
all Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases filed after July 10, 1984,
Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1113,
governs assumption and rejection of collective bargaining
agreements. Were Continental’s petition to be filed today, its
collective bargaining agreements would remain in effect until
the bankruptcy court ruled on the company’s petition to reject
the agreements or until such time as the court, after notice
and a hearing, authorized adoption of interim work rules. 11
U.S.C. § 1113(e). No longer is it the case that, as here, "the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy means that the collective-
bargaining agreement is no longer immediately enforceable,
and may never be enforceable again." Bildisco, 465 U.S. at
532.
Although the claims provisions in Bankruptcy Code
Section 502 were not directly affected by Section 1113, the
chances that such claims will occur has been diminished. The
legislative history of Subtitle J of H.R. 5174 (P.L. 98-353),
codified as 11 U.S.C. § 1113, reflects Congress’ view that the
new provision would help to avoid rejection of collective
bargaining agreements in Chapter 11 proceedings, thus
obviating Section 502 claims for breach of such an
agreement.” Section 1113 was intended to promote
bargaining for new agreements between debtors and their
unions and thus to diminish the instances in which a contract
is rejected or acrimony causes a lengthy strike against a
10/ See e.g., 130 Cong. Rec. No. 92 (June 29, 1984), at H 7489 (Mr.
Rodino: “The provision ensures that a process of negotiation will take
place between the employer and union in a reorganization case before the
hearing for rejection of the collective bargaining agreement is
commenced.”), at S 8891 (Sen. Hatch: “Only if these good faith
negotiations fail does the court get involved in granting an application to
reject a contract."), and at S 8898 (Sen. Kennedy: ‘“[Section 1113 is
intended] to substitute a rule of law that encourages the parties to solve
their mutual problems through the collective bargaining process. ").
11
financially distressed debtor. Congress, in short, enacted
Section 1113 in an effort to substitute negotiated resolutions
for such strikes as the lengthy ALPA/UFA strikes against
Continental.
III. THE DENIAL OF PETITIONERS’ CLAIMS TURNED
ON FACTUAL ISSUES, NOT QUESTIONS OF LAW
APPROPRIATE FOR THIS COURT’S RESOLUTION
The O’Neill Group’s strike-related claims (Pet. at 8-
14) founder because of two factual shortcomings. First,
Petitioners are unable to point to any provision of their
collective bargaining agreements which would support a claim
for pay during any period they were on strike. Thus, they
lack a factual prerequisite for a claim for wages allegedly lost
during that time period. Second, Petitioners are collaterally
estopped from claiming that they weren’t on strike, but had
been constructively discharged by the bankruptcy court’s
unappealed finding that the strikers were not constructively
discharged.” In short, the courts below found no terms of
Continental’s collective bargaining agreements with either
ALPA or UFA which displaced or modified the legal doctrine
that an employee who withholds his labor is entitled to no
compensation for the time he is on strike, and the courts
11/ The bankruptcy court expressly held that Continental made "strenuous
efforts to get the pilots to return to work" after filing its bankruptcy
petition and that this effort “refutes the constructive discharge claim." In
re Continental Airlines Corp. , 57 B.R. 845, 851 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985).
The court specifically rejected the “suggestion that rejection of the
contracts alone gives rise to a claim for wrongful discharge damages." Id.
at 852. Petitioners, belatedly recognizing the difficulty these factual
findings create for their case, disingenuously seek in fn. 6 to argue there
was no such factual finding or that somehow an ex parte letter written in
a non-adversarial context by an official at the Department of Labor can
overturn the findings of the bankruptcy court.
12
below specifically rejected petitioners’ argument that they
were constructively discharged.
The O’Neill Group’s argument (Pet. at 14-22) that
employee claims should have continued accruing even after
Continental would have ceased doing business and ceased to
employ anyone is similarly undercut by factual shortcomings.
As this Court has held, collective bargaining agreements
typically only prescribe wages and conditions of employment
and do not guarantee future employment. See, e.g., J.J. Case
Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). Here, because there was
no employment contract guaranteeing employment, the Court
of Appeals directed the bankruptcy court to calculate the
amount Of the employee claims under this contract, taking
into account the point in time at which the bankruptcy judge,
with his extensive knowledge of the debtor’s financial affairs,
estimated that the debtor would have ceased doing business
and therefore would have had no jobs for petitioners.
Such estimation or liquidation of claims is inherent
to the claims administration process. Estimation of the value
of future claims is inherently factual and often imprecise,
even speculative. See, e.g., 3 Collier on Bankruptcy
q 502.02 (15th ed. 1992) ("virtually all matters involving the
allowability of claims and their right therefore to share in the
assets of the debtor ordinarily will be determined by the
bankruptcy judge, generally exclusive of all other courts").
IV. THE DECISION BELOW CORRECTLY
APPLIED THE LAW
The rejection of Continental’s collective bargaining
agreements was governed by Bankruptcy Code Section 365.
Prior to enactment of Section 1113 to deal specifically with
rejection of collective bargaining agreements, Section 365
permitted employers in bankruptcy to reject collective
13
bargaining agreements and set new employment terms.
Claims of employees resulting from such rejection, as this
court held in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 530,
are treated as claims to be administered by the bankruptcy
| court under Bankruptcy Code Section 502. Section 502(b)(1),
ignored by petitioners, provides for disallowance of any claim
“unenforceable against the debtor...under any agreement or
applicable law...."” In other words, Section 502(b)(1)
permits a debtor to assert any defense to a bankruptcy claim
that it would have been able to assert outside of bankruptcy.
See Mazirow v. Grigsby (In re White Motor Corp.), 44 B.R.
563, 569 (N.D. Ohio 1984); In re Nuisance Corp., 17 B.R.
12/ Together and separately, petitioners’ legal positions -- that they should
be paid wage-based damages during the time when they voluntarily refused
to work and that they should be paid wage-based damages beyond the
point at which Continental would have ceased to do business -- would
seriously undermine basic bankruptcy and labor law policies. It is widely
accepted that non-bankruptcy entitlements and defenses should be mirrored
in bankruptcy processes. See generally Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy,
Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 Yale L.J.
857 (1982). Were this not the case, those whose entitlements would be
enhanced in bankruptcy would he encouraged to engage in strategic
behavior designed to force the debtor into bankruptcy.
Specifically, claimants who think they will receive Section 502 claims
for time periods when they are on strike or would have had no
employment, even though outside bankruptcy they would not be paid for
this time, would press wage demands to the point where their employer
would enter the bankruptcy process. In theory, therefore, “bankruptcy law
should mirror the rights established by labor law by enforcing them as they
exist or by respecting their relative value." Thomas H. Jackson, The
Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, Harvard Univ. Press (1986) at 112.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision accomplishes exactly the theoretically correct
result on both issues by denying the unions claims in bankruptcy which
were unavailable outside bankruptcy.
eens eel
14
80, 82 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy,
{ 502.02 at 502-24,-25,-27 (15th ed. 1992).
A. Strikers Are Not Entitled To Claim Wages For
Periods When They Struck Their Employer.
As the Fifth Circuit held, the applicable law under
which to evaluate Petitioners’ claims includes federal labor
law, here the Railway Labor Act. Judge Gee, applying an
unbroken line of cases denying backpay to strikers under the
federal labor laws,’ correctly concluded that these strikers
should be treated no differently than striking employees would
be treated had Continental not filed for bankruptcy. Strikers,
by definition performing no work for their employer, would
not be entitled outside bankruptcy to claim wages for the
strike period, even under the provisions of the labor laws
which guarantee the right to strike and which establish
remedies for employer violations of these laws.
While petitioners allege the Railway Labor Act
guarantees the "right to strike," they find no cases which
13/ See also In re Continental Airlines Corp., 50 B.R. 342, 353 (S.D.
Tex. 1985), aff'd, 790 F.2d 35 (Sth Cir. 1986) (whether a “right to
payment” exists under 11 U.S.C. §101(4) is determined by law governing
transaction); Jn re Altair Airlines, Inc., 727 F.2d 88, 90 (3d Cir. 1984)
(same).
14/ See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 n.7
(1941); NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299, 1303 (Sth
Cir. 1970); J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 356, 361 (Sth
Cir. 1968), rev’d on other grounds, 396 U.S. 258 (1969); Comfort, Inc.,
152 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1090 (1965), enforced, 365 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1966).
The principle applies equally under the Railway Labor Act. See National
Airlines, Inc. v. IAM, 416 F.2d 998, 1007 (Sth Cir. 1969), after remand,
430 F.2d 957 (Sth Cir. 1970); Empresa Ecuatoriana de Aviacion, S.A. v.
District Lodge No. 100, 690 F.2d 838 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. dismissed,
463 U.S. 1250 (1983).
15
order pay to strikers as though they had been working. This
is because the "right to strike" is nothing more than the
employee’s right to withhold his or her labor in an effort to
apply economic pressure to the employer; it does not include
the right to be paid for the time when the employee did no
work.
The Fifth Circuit majority was correct in applying
federal labor law. A contract under the Railway Labor Act,
like a contract under the National Labor Relations Act, "is a
federal contract and is therefore governed and enforceable by
federal law, in federal courts." IAM v. Central Airlines, Inc.,
372 U.S. 682, 692 (1963). This Court long ago held that
collective bargaining agreements and claims arising from
breach of such agreements are a matter of special federal
common law, not of state law. Textile Workers Union y.
Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). There
is no authority to indicate that, in the interpretation of this
special federal common law, any court has thought workers
should be paid for not working. Indeed, this Court has held
that employers are entitled to permanently replace economic
strikers without paying back wages to the strikers if they
return, NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S.
333 (1938), and that an employer may lock out its employees
under some circumstances without incurring a wage obligation
to them. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300
(1965). It would be strange indeed for the law to deny such
economic weapons (or effectively preclude their use by
requiring that wages be paid to strikers as well as working
employees) only to employers so economically distressed that
they seek refuge under the Bankruptcy Code.
15/ The O’Neill Group suggests that the decisions below provide a
debtor-in-possession employer with an incentive to make drastic change in
wages and working conditions in hopes of encouraging a strike while
(continued...)
16
Petitioners’ argument that the Fifth Circuit’s
"reliance on unfair labor practice cases to support its opinion
is misplaced" (Pet. at 13) is a tacit concession that
disallowance of damages to strikers accords with labor law
principles. Petitioners therefore turn to arguing (1) that
contract rather than labor law should apply with respect to the
strikers’ claims, or (2) that this is a special case involving
“severe and pervasive" changes made by the emergency work
rules approved by the bankruptcy court. Pet. at 13-1
Neither argument has merit.
Petitioners fare no better under a correct application
of contract law than under the labor laws they find so unhelp-
ful. Judge Garwood’s dissent, even if correct in applying
contract rather than labor law, erred in its contract
analysis.“ Far from providing a “windfall" to Continental,
the majority simply placed the parties in the position they
would have been in absent the strike by the employees.
Under contract law, where, as here, there is no constructive
discharge, failure to work for reduced wages terminates the
15/{...continued)
avoiding liability for contract rejection damages. Even before the 1984
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, an employer could not make any
change to a collective bargaining agreement without ultimately obtaining
bankruptcy court approval. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526-27. The 1984
amendments imposed additional obstacles to such changes. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1113; see supra at 9-10. Moreover, it is specious to contend that an
employer who wishes to remain in business would adopt the strategy the
O'Neill Group posits. A strike would additionally jeopardize the ability
of an already financially vulnerable debtor to stay in business. A debtor-
in-possession employer has every reason to avoid and no reason to
encourage a strike.
16/ With all due respect, we fail to see how Continental obiained any
“windfall” from the ruling below; Continental paid nonstriking employees
for the work which striking employees refused to do, and was willing at
all times to accept the strikers back into the workforce.
iinet mana iain
17
employee’s claim to wages for the time when services were
withheld. Here the bankruptcy court expressly held, in an
order which was not appealed, that Continental’s rejection of
its collective bargaining agreements did nor constitute a
constructive discharge. In re Continental Airlines Corp., 57
B.R. 845 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985). Continental received no
“windfall;" it was forced to recruit, train, and pay substitute
labor to perform services.
B. Employees Are Not Entitled To Damages
For Future Wages For Time Periods After
The Employer Would Have Ceased To Do
Business Had It Paid Such Wages
The Fifth Circuit was likewise correct in its
unanimous decision to limit damages for future wages to the
period of time when the debtor would have remained in
business, for cessation of Continental’s business would have
resulted in every employee being terminated. Employees
working under a collective bargaining agreement which does
not guarantee future employment are not entitled to lost future
wages. J.J. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. at 335. When a
nonbreaching party cannot demonstrate that it would have
suffered losses from the breach, it is entitled to only nominal
damages. IBEW vy. A-I Electrical Serv., 535 F.2d 1, 3 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 832 (1976). In short, the Fifth
Circuit’s logic was impeccable: (1) as of some date between
the petition and January 30, 1984, Continental would have
ceased operating had it not rejected its labor contracts, (2) if -
this happened, no members of the O’Neill Group would have
had jobs, and (3) therefore, without any jobs or contractual
guarantees of jobs, the O’Neill Group members suffered no
damages from the rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement.
18
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Barry P. Simon Charles A. Shanor*
Senior Vice President John J. Gallagher
and General Counsel Jon A. Geier
Daniel P. Casey Paul, Hastings,
Associate General Counsel Janofsky & Walker
Continental Airlines, 1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Inc. Twelfth Floor
2929 Allen Parkway Washington, D.C. 20036
Houston, Texas 77019 (202) 223-9000
(713) 834-2273
Attorneys for
Respondent
* Counsel of Record
APPENDIX
1A
APPENDIX A
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CASE NO.
IN RE:
83-04019-H2-5
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES CORPORATION
DEBTOR
IN RE: 83-04020-H1-5
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.
DEBTOR
IN RE:
83-04021-H3-5 ,
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES, INC. :
DEBTOR
IN RE:
83-04022-H3-5
TXIA HOLDINGS CORPORATION
DEBTOR
CONSOLIDATED CASE NO.
83-04019-H2-5
August 17, 1984
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES
AUTHORIZING REJECTION OF AIRLINE PILOTS
ASSOCIATION COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
2A
Mr. John Gallagher
Mr. David Callet
Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld
1333 New Hampshire Ave., N.W
Washington, D.C. 20036
Attorneys for Continental
Honorable William M. Schultz
Mr. B. J. Walter
Dotson, Babcock & Scofield
4200 InterFirst Plaza
Houston, Texas 77002
Attorneys for Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
Mr. Michael Abram
Mr. James Linsey
Cohen, Weiss & Simon
330 West 42nd Street
New York, New York 10036
Attorneys for Air Line Pilots Association
Mr. Philip Pierce
Booth, Marcus & Pierce
79 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10003
Attorney for Labor & Pension Committee
Mr. Daniel Johnston, Jr.
Ross, Banks, May, Cron & Cavin
6th Floor, Two Greenway Plaza E.
Houston, Texas 77026
Local Counsel for Labor and Pension Committee
Mr. Lenard M. Parkins
Sheinfeld, Maley & Kay
3700 First City Tower
Houston, Texas 77002
Local Counsel for Continental
3A
On September 24, 1983, Continental Airlines
Corporation ("CAC"), Continental Air Lines, Inc. ("CAL"),
Texas International Airlines, Inc. ("TXI") and TXIA Holdings
Corporation (collectively "Continental") filed simultaneous
Chapter 11 proceedings under Title 11 of the United States
Code. On the 27th day of September, 1983, Continental filed
a motion to reject the collective bargaining agreements with
the Airlines Pilots Association ("ALPA"), the Union of Flight
Attendants ("UFA"), the International Association of
Machinist and Aerospace Workers ("IAM"), and the
Transport Workers Union ("TWU").
On the 11th day of October, 1983, the unions filed
a joint motion to dismiss the Continental Chapter 11
proceedings on the ground that the proceedings were not filed
in good faith; alleging that the sole or the primary purpose of
Continental in filing its proceedings was to reject the union
contracts. After an extensive hearing, this court denied the
joint motion to dismiss. -
By agreement of the parties, the evidence introduced
at the hearing on the motion to dismiss was included in the
record on the motion to reject the employee agreements. The
court adheres to the findings made in that decision.
The taking of evidence on the motion to reject
commenced on January 30, 1984. This was over four months
after these proceedings were filed but was the earliest this
court’s calendar would permit it to undertake this lengthy
hearing. With some interruptions, the presentation of
evidence continued until April 27, 1984. At the conclusion
of the debtor’s evidence, the court took under advisement the
motion of the TWU to enter judgment denying rejection of the
collective bargaining agreements with the Transport Workers
Union. In addition, to some extent, the question of rejection
of the various agreements with the IAM is being treated
4A
separately. The court has not yet issued a ruling with respect
to the UFA agreements.
Continental shut down its domestic operations at
filing but restarted them on a substantially reduced basis on
September 27, 1984.
Immediately upon the filing of this proceeding on
September 24, 1983, Continental Airlines implemented
"Emergency Work Rules" with respect to each of the four
involved unions. These constituted unilateral changes in pay,
benefits, work rules and conditions. On or about that date,
Continental transmitted copies of the emergency work rules to
each union by a letter indicating that these emergency work
rules were just that and that they also constituted an offer to
each of the unions to negotiate a new agreement. These cover
letters refer to the fact that certain issues were omitted from
the provisions in the rules. After receipt of these emergency
work rules, ALPA and UFA went on strike (beginning
October 1, 1983) without undertaking any negotiations with
Continental over the emergency work rules or any new
agreement based on Continental’s then-existing status. Both
of these unions have been on strike since that date; although
a number of negotiating sessions have since take place.
The IAM and Continental had already bargained to
an impasse, which was declared effective July 13, 1983. On
August 13, 1983, the IAM went on strike; whereupon
Continental Airlines implemented "“Jnterim Work Rules"
which were subsequently amended on September 12, 1983.
These interim work rules were replaced on September 24,
1983, by the emergency work rules applicable to the
remaining IAM employees of Continental.
For the reasons set forth below, this court has
determined that the equities favor the debtor and its estate,
SA
that the contracts with the Airline Pilot Association are
onerous and burdensome and that such agreements must be
rejected in order for Continental to have an effective
reorganization. This rejection is pursuant to the provisions of
11 U.S.C. §365 and under the principles enunciated in the
case of NLRB vy. Bildisco and Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188
(1984) decided February 22, 1984, during the evidentiary
presentation in this case. That case was decided under the
National Labor Relations Act. This court determines that the
same reasoning and rationale are applicable to this case,
which is decided under the Bankruptcy Code and the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151, et seq.
FACTS
Effective in 1978, the United States Congress, in its
wisdom, determined that the airline industry should be
deregulated to promote greater competition with respect to
routes and fares, to allow more ready access of new entrants
into the industry and to add flexibility of all airlines to enter
new and existing markets and to charge what the traffic would
bear, so to speak. Congress took this action despite the
protests of the existing airlines, ALPA, the IAM, and other
interested parties, who predicted that deregulation would
result in financial difficulty for many of the carriers and
bankruptcy or mergers for some and that this would cause
displacement of many employees.
The aims and goals of the U.S. Congress in
deregulating the airline industry appear to have been realized.
Airfares have decreased dramatically in areas where the
particular airline involved has not had substantial control over
the market. Many new airline companies have entered into
the marketplace and now compete directly with Continental
Airlines and the other airlines in the industry. In order to
offset this increasing competition, Continental sought to
6A
increase its marketing efficiency by resorting to a "hub and
spoke" operation; utilizing Denver and Houston as _ its
operational hubs. While this has had some substantial
beneficial effect on Continental’s operations, this benefit was
not sufficient to offset the fare advantages resulting from
lower labor costs enjoyed by the new entrants in Continental’s
market. The lower labor cost of these new entrants resulted
from the lack of historically based labor agreements which
had escalated during the regulated period, before 1978, when
the airlines could pass these increased costs on to the
consumer. In this regulated atmosphere of the airline industry
pre-1978, the self preservation instincts of the carriers were
mitigated against and they thus did not have adequate
incentive to resist the persistent and determined negotiating
techniques of the powerful unions in the airline industry, such
as ALPA and the IAM.
These unions have historically (and effectively) used
the last highest contract as a stepping stone for each new
negotiation. The result has been higher and higher wage rates
and better and better provisions for the employees relating to
work terms. There is no question that these unions did an
outstanding job on behalf of their membership in this regard.
This trend of higher and higher labor costs (negotiated by
these unions) continued even after deregulation by virtue of
these same techniques. No doubt upward inflation during this
same time was a factor in these negotiations. The result,
however, was a complex system of work rules which operated
less and less efficiently for the airlines but which generated
more and more time off and higher pay for the members of
these unions. The additional and more unfortunate result was
that it made a high and inflexible labor cost system for the
major carriers coming out from the nurture of regulation.
This caused many of them to be less competitive with the new
entrants who were making increasing incursions into their
markets.
TA
This was particularly true of Continental Airlines,
whose hub systems in Denver and (particularly) in Houston
competed directly with many of these new entrants. Not
being fettered with the expensive and inefficient collective
bargaining agreements of the older airlines, these new
entrants’ could hire pilots, mechanics, and flight attendants
in the open labor market at substantially lower prices than
those that had been negotiated by Continental’s labor unions.
Labor is a major factor in the cost of operating an airline and
is one in which there can be material variances from airline
to airline. These new entrants could charge substantially
lower fares that the older more established airlines, and their
cheaper labor costs gave them a substantial competitive
advantage over other airlines, including Continental.
Continental did not have substantial control over its markets
and does not now.
As a result, Continental lost substantial sums of
money after deregulation. Up to September 24, 1983, the
date of filing of the Chapter 11 petition, Continental had lost
$521,900,000 as follows:
1979 lost $ 27.4 million
1980 lost 76.8 million
1981 lost 138.6 million
1982 lost 119.9 million
1983 to September 24 lost, 159.2 million
$521.9 million
‘Southwest Airlines had not been subject to regulation because it was an
intrastate carrier before deregulation. Its labor costs have been
traditionally lower. Thus while Southwest is not a "new entrant” in some
respects, it is in others, since it has materially expanded its markets since
deregulation. Its labor costs have been low, and it has run Continental out
of at least one market with its lower fares. It is highly competitive with
Continental in other markets. For convenience it will be included within
the term “new entrants” in this opinion.
8A
Although there were other factors, the main cause of
Continental’s losses was, as noted, that its higher labor costs
prevented it from effectively competing with the low cost new
entrants which have been significantly increasing their activity
in Continental’s markets. Continental did not have the benefit
of some of the advantages enjoyed by some of its larger
competitors such as United Airlines and American Airlines.
An expert employed by the Trade Creditors
Committee testified that all of the major airlines are seeing
"the handwriting on the wall" and are negotiating, or have
negotiated, important concessions with their respective labor
forces. Some have obtained significant reductions in their
labor costs from those stipulated by their existing collective
bargaining agreements. It was forecast that unless that major
carriers eventually reduced their labor costs to the level of the
new entrants, they will not survive.
Continental negotiated from time to time during the
year of 1983 attempting to obtain concessions from its various
unions.
During its disastrous summer of 1983, and prior to
filing its Chapter 11 proceeding, Continental Airlines
attempted, to negotiate a $60,000,000 cost concession from the
Airline Pilots Association (on an annual basis) and sought a
$40,000,000 annual concession from the Flight Attendants,
$20,000,000 from the International Association of Machinist
and an additional $30,000,000 from its other (non-union and
managerial) employees.
While the Airline Pilots Association members
indicated that they were "players", nevertheless, they never
committed to the requested $60,000,000 in cost concessions
nor to any other number prior to the filing of the Chapter 11
proceeding. After the filing, ALPA offered concessions of
9A
approximately $30,000,000 on an annual basis, or about half
what Continental had indicated it needed from the pilots to
break even before the filing of the Chapter 11 proceeding.
After the filing, Continental immediately cut back on
a number of its routes and a substantial number of the flights
that it had been flying. It shut down the airline from
September 24 until September 27, 1983, except that it
continued to fly its international routes for fear these lucrative
concessions might be lost. Continental was also fearful of the
domestic flights being shut down for any longer period. Its
position is that it was concerned that it would lose public
acceptance and that it might never fly again; at least most
certainly not without substantial cost to creditors,
shareholders, and all concerned, including employees.
Continental scaled back its cost structure in order to
provide high quality service on a fare structure competitive
with the new entrants. It appears to have been somewhat
successful at this marketing technique to date; although it is
not yet known what effect there will be if a full scale fare war
should be engaged in by a substantial number of its competi-
tion. Nor is it known what the full effect of additional
competition will be from carriers now entering the field,
including the "New Braniff", which began flying during the
spring of 1984 during the evidentiary presentation in this case.
REASONABLE EFFORTS
The Supreme Court in NLRB vy. Bildisco and
Bildisco, supra, (hereinafter "Bildisco") required that before
acting on a petition to “modify or reject" a collective
bargaining agreement, the bankruptcy court should be
persuaded that reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary
modification have been made and are not likely to produce a
prompt and satisfactory solution. The purpose of this is to
10A ;
serve the policies (if not the letter) of the Labor Act.’
However, the bankruptcy court is not required to determine
that the parties have bargained to impasse nor to make any
other determination outside the field of its expertise.
The unions assert that the involved principle requires
the bankruptcy court to hear evidence and pass on the substan-
tive details of all relevant negotiating sessions. This is part
of an effort to show that Continental acted unreasonably in the
substance of its proposals to the respective unions. The thrust
of this theory is to place the bankruptcy court in the posture
of determining that the parties should agree to and in what
respect the company offers vary from this standard.
It is precisely this kind of inquiry which this court
understands that Bildisco (and prior cases) determined that this
court should avoid. Bildisco pointed out that the national
labor policies of avoiding labor strife and encouraging
collective bargaining generally require that employees and
unions reach their own agreements on terms and conditions of
employment free from governmental interference. In
addition, the Court observed that a determination that the
parties have bargained to impasse is one ordinarily made by
the National Labor Relations Board and that to involve the
bankruptcy court in that kind of determination would divert
the bankruptcy court to an area outside its area of expertise.
See also American National Insurance Co. v. NLRB, 187 F.2d
307, page 310 (Sth Cir. 1941), affirmed 343 U.S. 395, page
404 (1952).
The labor agreements with ALPA, UFA & IAM are
complex and the resulting cost of virtually each provision is
In that case it was the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 29
U.S.C. 158 et seq. This case involves the Railway Labor Act ("RLA")
45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. .
L1A
difficult of ascertainment, partly because it varies substantially
with each level of flying operation. Asking this court to pass
on the merits of the respective offers would impose on the
bankruptcy court a substantial burden in areas far removed
from any expertise this court might have.
It is the opinion of this court that it is not intended
by the Supreme Court that the bankruptcy court examine the
substantive merits of the negotiations to determine whether the
parties respective proposals are reasonable but rather only that
a genuine effort has been made to reach agreement with the
certified representatives of the employees. In the same
phrase, the Supreme Court required this court to determine as
well that “such efforts are not likely to produce a prompt and
satisfactory solution." In other words, if a genuine effort has
been made by the debtor to reach agreement and this effort is
not likely to produce a prompt solution under all the existing
circumstances, the court is authorized to act on the debtor’s
motion to reject. Of course this duty of the debtor to
recognize the bargaining representative and to continue
bargaining exists both before and after any rejection is
permitted.
The Bildisco court avoided using the terms "good
faith" and “bad faith" bargaining; traditional terms in labor
negotiations and labor law. Presumably this was intentional.
Perhaps this is an indication that the Supreme Court intends
for the Bankruptcy Court to stay out of even shat area of
determination. The "good faith - bad faith" determination is
simply a determination of whether or not a party has a desire
to reach an agreement at all. It requires some assessment of
the substantive terms of an offer, as well as the willingness to
bargain and the effort to do so. NLRB v. Herman Sausage
Co., 275 F.2d 229 (Sth Cir., 1960). However, even a "good
faith - bad faith" determination is far less of an intrusion into
12A
the bargaining rights of the parties than a determination of
whether the substantive terms of a proposal are "reasonable".
The Supreme Court has noted that great caution
should be used in finding bad faith in cases other than
wherein there is a "desire not to reach agreement", for doing
so risks infringement of the strong federal labor policy against
governmental interference with the substantive terms of
collective bargaining agreements. Chicago & Northwestern
Railway v. United Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570
(1971). The Fifth Circuit has ruled to similar effect in many
cases, including Gulf State Manufacturing, Inc. v. NLRB, 579
F.2d 1298 (Sth Cir. 1978), aff'd in pertinent part 598 F.2d
896 (Sth Cir. 1979)(en banc).
In addition to this strong policy against such
determinations by a court, the burden on the bankruptcy court
to make an inquiry into the reasonableness of the terms of |
offers (as suggested) would appear to be excessive. This court
has allowed this type of evidence in this proceeding because
of some of the uncertainties in the law that existed at the time
of this hearing. The result has been that the hearing lasted
almost three months. No doubt future case law will give the
Bankruptcy Courts guidance with respect.to this issue as to
future hearings on applications to reject collective bargaining
agreements.
Be that as it may, this court allowed detailed
evidence concerning the substance of numerous bargaining
sessions which occurred both before and after the filing of the
Chapter 11 petition on September 24, 1983. This was at a
great cost of court time and may have consumed as much as
half or more of the hearing time. From this evidence, the
- court concludes (1) that Continental has made considerable
and reasonable effort to reach agreement with the unions
involved herein for voluntary modification of their respective
13A
bargaining agreements, (2) that Continental has bargained in
good faith with respect to those efforts, (3) that no agreement
has been reached and (4) that those efforts are not likely to
produce a prompt and Satisfactory solution. It is the intention
of Continental to reach agreement with these employee groups
consistent with its current economic situation. It has made
numerous attempts to do so.
That Continental continued to urge in its bargaining
session that it must maintain its labor cost levels at or about
those provided for in the emergency work rules does not
constitute bad faith negotiation under all of the circumstances
of this case. It is not bad faith for a party to insist on the
terms of a proposal and to maintain that posture. "Open mind
need not mean a mind without conviction nor need it mean a
mind easily swayed by argument." It need not make a
proposal or require the making ofa concession. American
National Insurance Co. v. NLRB, Supra, page 309.
A party may try to achieve its objectives and need
not yield. NLRB v. Tomco Communication, Inc., 567 F.2d
871, 884 (9th Cir. 1978). It may even withdraw an earlier
offer, including a tentative agreement on certain provisions,
if circumstances change. NLRB y. Randle-Eastern Ambulance
Service, Inc., 584 F.2d 720 (Sth Cir. 1978). A position taken
in good faith need not be abandoned or compromised. The
debtor is entitled to insist on a proposal, however
unacceptable to the union, and if the insistence is genuinely
and sincerely held it may be maintained even if it procudes a
stalemate. NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co, 275 F.2d 299 (Sth
Cir.), rehearing denied 277 F.2d 793 (Sth Cir. 1960), see
American National Insurance Co. y. NLRB, supra, page 309
r.3.
The unions’ position that a party must ask for more
than it wants in order to meet somewhere in the middle is not
14A
accepted by this court. That was urged as being the tradi-
tional method of negotiating. However, the facts in this case
show that this is not the traditional situation facing
negotiators. This is especially true where, as here,
Continental has been in extreme financial difficulty and
needed prompt modification of its collective bargaining
agreement.
Having just filed a Chapter 11 proceeding and being
the first air carrier to attempt to fly through such a
proceeding, Continental was in a period of uncertainty and
needed the flexibility allowed it by the so called emergency
work rules promulgated September 24, 1983, immediately
upon filing the proceeding. As noted, Continental
substantially cut back on the number of cities it served and the
number of flights to the cities it cantinued to serve. It
substantially reduced its work force. At the present time it is
facing increasing competition from even additional new
entrants coming into the market since the filing of this
proceeding. It is just now approaching profitability but may
be faced with a fare war in the near future. Under the
existing circumstances, Continental’s bargaining position
appears reasonable to this court. Although it severely cut
back the wage levels and liberalized its working rules, it
somewhat patterned these after those of other airlines with
which it was then in competition. Over half of the union
membership in each category has crossed the picket lines and
come to work for Continental under the terms of the
emergency work rules (eighty percent in the case of Flight
Attendants) as have newly hired personnel.’
_
*Some of the jobs subject to the IAM agreements were eliminated
because Continental could (and did) contract these services out to third
parties at cheaper rates than the IAM contract specified (i.e. cabin
cleaners, fuelers, flight kitchen personnel, etc.).
ISA
In Neon Sign Corp. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1203 (5th
Cir. 1979), the Fifth Circuit found that an employer engaged
in good faith bargaining even though it insisted on wage
decreases. The company was experiencing serious financial
problems and lower wages were essential to its survival.
That the proposals submitted by the company were
for provisions similar to those agreed to by the same union at
other companies is evidence of the employer’s good faith.
See NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S.
395, 405 (1952); Gulf State Manufacturers v. NLRB., supra.
That the unions have not accepted Continental’s
proposals does not in and of itself mean that they are
unreasonable or that they are not attempting to reach
agreement with Continental. Indeed, the concessions that are
_ being asked of the pilots, the flight attendants, and others is
substantial and greatly affects a standard of living to which
many of them have become accustomed. This is a difficult
idea to adjust to. Nevertheless, herein, the purposes of the
National Labor policy have been well served. Bargaining by
the debtor with its unions has been going on for well over a
year. No agreements could be reached with the IAM and an
impasse was declared. No agreement has been reached with
ALP. or UFA.
Prior to September 24, 1983, the terms offered the
respective unions were better than those required by the
debtor post filing. Yet no agreement could be reached on
those terms. Just before filing, Continental made major
presentations directly to its employees in order to reach
agreement on concessions which this court finds were
necessary for it to survive, but the unions (except TWU) did
not agree. A great deal of negotiation has taken place since
filing. To require further bargaining at this level before
i
16A
acting on the motions to reject seems to this court to be
unrealistic and useless.
Indeed, the failure of the court to act at this stage of
the proceeding (two months after the substantial evidentiary
hearing concluded) may be impeding eventual agreement. As
noted above, the parties have a continuing duty to bargain
even after rejection. If agreement is to be reached, it will
occur after the issue of the rejection of the agreements has
been determined. Perhaps this and the improving income
posture of the debtor will allow agreement to be reached in
the future.
On the other hand, this court is concerned that the
Airline Pilots Association does not intend to reach an
agreement with Continental on terms the airline can afford.
ALPA appears to have strong motives for seeing that the
carrier is shut down as an example to the other carriers whose
pilots are represented by this large and extremely powerful
union. It represents pilots throughout the airline industry in
the United States. Other carriers are having difficulty in the
post-deregulation period and are requesting concessions from
their pilots. The obligations of ALPA to its other
(non-Continental) members would make it difficult for this
union to recommend settlement with Continental to the extent
needed by Continental in order to lower its labor cost
sufficiently for it to be competitive in its fare levels and to
return to profitability. Outside of the courtroom, ALPA has
asserted "we must continue to apply whatever pressures are
required to preclude New CAL [from] operating profitably.
These pressures will include both economic sanctions and all
legal action open to us...." In the courtroom, ALPA has
verified that its purpose is to shut down Continental. The
Airline Pilots Association has made it clear, and has
convinced this court, that its primary aim is to shut down
Continental Airlines.
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While ALPA’s actions (to the extent they are legal)
may be allowed by prevailing labor laws, wherein they are a
means to achieve an agreement, it appears to this court that
other motives are involved, at least in part. Thus ALPA’s
actions to shut down Continental and/or to deprive it of
profitability reflects on ALPA’s good faith in bargaining and
on any equities involved. ALPA’s attitude further seems to
be at odds with the spirit and purpose of the Bankruptcy
Code.
ALPA has maintained that its three principal areas
of concern are (1) preservation of the union as the bargaining
representative of Continental’s pilots (union security),
(2) safety and (3) seniority. It also contends that Continental
has bargained unreasonably by failing to agree with ALPA’s
proposals.
Continental has at all relevant times recognized
ALPA as the bargaining representative of its pilots, although
it has not honored the “dues checkoff" provision of the
collective bargaining agreement since the strike began.
THE “SAFETY” QUESTION
The evidence in this case shows that ALPA has
publically indicated that it and its members are vitally
concerned with the safety of the public flying on Continental
Airlines since the October 1, 1983 strike. The pilots failed to
mention that most of the pilots employed by Continental are
those off of ALPA’s seniority list (i.e., are ALPA pilots).
The newly-hired pilots must go through required training and
must be qualified. That some may be less experienced does
not of itself indicate lack of ability. In addition, the court
would note that safety is the responsibility of the Federal
Aviation Agency, who must revoke or suspend the certificate
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of Continental Airlines should Continental not adhere to the
safety standards imposed by this federal agency.
In short, while crying "Safety! Safety!" in the
courtroom and to the public, ALPA has failed in its meager
attempt to offer evidence that Continental Airlines is unsafe
to fly. It has offered almost no evidence of this to this court,
and has apparently failed to convince the FAA, in whose
jurisdiction and responsibility lies the safety of all airlines,
including Continental.
ALPA was singularly unsuccessful in providing a scintilla
of evidence to this court that safety is a genuine concern on
the part of the pilots or that there is substantial evidence of
unsafe conditions on Continental’s airplanes.‘
This court has concluded that ALPA’s campaign is
simply a scheme designed to further ALPA’s efforts to close
down Continental Airlines for its own economic purposes.
Among other things, this would act as a warning to other
Carriers who must deal with ALPA at the bargaining table in
other areas.
Based on the evidence offered to this court, this
promotion by ALPA appears to be a misuse of the labor laws
of this country. In any event, the court declines to deny
rejection on the basis of ALPA’s claim that safety is at stake.
“Were ALPA genuinely concerned over the public’s interest, it has it,
within its power to release some of its striking pilots back to Continental
to help fill its pilots needs. Continental has requested this. It would have
prevented further erosion of Continental's seniority list - an issue in the
settlement negotiations. ALPA is under no obligation to do this but its
failure to do so upon request is indicative of the fact that self interest is its
true motive in this endeavor; not that of the public.
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THE SENIORITY ISSUE
Some of the major provisions of the collective
bargaining agreements by and between Continental Airlines
and the Airline Pilots Association (including the old Texas
International agreement with ALPA) relate to seniority.
These are very sensitive and important provisions for the pilot
employees (as well as the other union employees with respect
to their respective collective bargaining agreements). ALPA
and the other unions argue that Continental Airlines has not
been reasonable in its efforts to settle because of Continental’s
position with respect to the relative position of "new hires"
that have been employed since the pendency of this
proceeding and after the strikes of Continental’s major unions,
including ALPA.
The unions further argue that the seniority provision
of the contract is a non-executory right which has become
"vested" in the pilots and therefore cannot be rejected under
the provisions of §365 of the Bankruptcy Code. This court
disagrees.
There is no precise definition of "executory contract"
in the Bankruptcy Code. At least one of the accepted defini-
tions of the term “executory contract" is a contract that is so
far unperformed on both sides that the failure of either party
to complete performance would constitute a material breach
excusing further performance of the other. Matter of Tonry,
724 F.2d 467 at page 468 (Sth Cir. 1984). See Countrymen,
Executory Contracts and Bankruptcy, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 439
(1973); 58 Minn. L. R. 479 (1974) and House Report No. 95-
595, page 347 (1977); Senate No. 989, 2d Sess. 58 (1978), 2
Collier on Bankruptcy §365.02 (1983).
Even though a pilot may have achieved a certain
level of seniority within the meaning and under terms of the
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collective bargaining agreement between ALPA and
Continental, nevertheless, the right of employment at
Continental by any particular pilot is not absolute. In order
to enjoy the use and benefit of any seniority position, the pilot
must be employed by, and perform services for, Continental
Airlines. It is therefore clear that under the collective
bargaining agreement both Continental and each employed
pilot have reciprocal obligations during the life of the
contract. In other words, performance is due by both parties.
This is likewise true for every other employee that has
seniority under a collective bargaining agreement. Thus,
under the Bankruptcy Code, such a provision is executory, at
least insofar as the right of a striking pilot to return to work
after the strike is settled.
Under Continental - ALPA collective bargaining
agreements, pilots were entitled to be placed on the seniority
list and to maintain their relative status thereon (absent other
agreement) under the terms and conditions of the agreement.
As a pilot went higher on the seniority list, he had the
privilege of being recalled, or his employment maintained, in
priority to pilots lower on the seniority list. In aadition, as
changes were made in the system such as routes, equipment,
bid runs, vacations, etc., the higher the seniority the higher
the priority for the pilot to have his choice in these areas.
Furloughs were made from the bottom of the seniority list.
Further, after pilots are furloughed, under the agreement they
were recalled in order of seniority. Often this required
extensive retraining by Continental, wherein a pilot changed
type of equipment or was out of service beyord a specified
amount of time.
When Continental filed its proceeding and drastically
cut back on the number of cities it served and the routes it
was flying to the remaining cities, Continental had to furlough
a number of pilots on the payroll. Continental immediately
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went on a campaign to get the remaining pilots to agree to fly
under the emergency work rules. Once the strike began on
October 1, 1983, Continental maintained a telephone "bank"
in which pilots were called -and requested to fly for
Continental notwithstanding the strike. Those that did return
to work filled the positions then available and, once recalled,
maintained their relative priority they enjoyed on the seniority
list pre-petition. Therefore, the relative seniority of working
pilots is not the issue as this seniority is being honored by
Continental.
For a period of time after the strike, Continental
attempted without success to reach agreement with ALPA on
the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement. As the
early initial chaotic days of filing passed and Continental
began to rebuild its system, Continental needed additional
pilots and made a strenuous effort to get striking pilots to
return to service. There was some success in this area, but
as Continental expanded its routes it was unable to fill out its
list of needs from the ALPA pilots then on strike. By
instructions from its chief operating officer, Continental
delayed hiring pilots not on the seniority list ("new hires")
until it felt it had to do so to service its re-expanding route
system. Continental did not undertake employing new hires
(pilots off their existing seniority list) without adequate
warning to the Airline Pilots Association and its membership.
ALPA was told on October 5, 1983, that replacements would
be hired if the strike was not over quickly, and Continental
sent letters to this effect to all of its pilots. Continental told
all of its active pilots that it would not displace working pilots
in the future to accommodate returning strikers. Striking
pilots had the opportunity to return to work with Continental
as it expanded its operations, but many declined to do so,
although more than 50% of its pre-petition pilots did return to
work.
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After Continental reached the conclusion that it had
to employ new hires, and began doing so in early November,
1983, it advised these new pilots that they were permanent
and would not be replaced by striking pilots returning to work
at Continental after the strike ended or upon each striking
pilot’s individual decision to cross the picket line. That
permanent replacements would be hired if the striking pilots
would not return was well know to ALPA and its membership
long before Continental undertook this practice.
Subsequently, since early November, 1983, as pilot positions
were available in the system, Continental has hired all pilots
off the seniority list who were willing to return (which pilots
have continued to enjoy their relative seniority position) and
has hired new pilots from outside its seniority list. As noted,
once employed, the seniority system has functioned for each
pilot as it did before the filing of these proceedings. Had
Continental not employed pilots who were not on its seniority
list the airline would have had to significantly limit its
operations. This would have served ALPA’s purposes but it
would have made Continental’s ability to reorganize
substantially less likely. It was necessary to hire these
replacements in order for Continental to discharge its duty to
the public to make a reasonable effort to continue flying.
However, in efforts to negotiate a settkement, ALPA has
pointed its finger at Continental for refusing to agree on a
"back to work" agreement under which the striking pilots
would return to work and would resume their old relative
seniority positions ahead of any newly-hired pilots (who
would naturally have lower seniority status in most, if not all,
Situations). Such an agreement would result in Continental’s
furloughing most, if not all, of these new hires, despite
express promises to these individuals that they would not do
this. ALPA says that Continental, by not so agreeing is
bargaining in bad faith and/or is unreasonable.
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Continental has maintained that it will take returning
pilots only to the extent that positions are (or become)
available and will not agree to "create" positions for returning
strikers by furloughing new hires.
Continental defends its position by urging to the
court that it has a legal obligation (the oral representations and
agreement) to the individual new hires as well as a moral
obligation. Continental further argues that if it agreed as
ALPA has suggested, the resulting furloughs of the new hires
would put Continental in a bad bargaining position with
respect to any future negotiations that might take place
between ALPA and Continental within the next several years.
Continental argues that its position does not constitute bad
faith bargaining and is entirely reasonable under the
circumstances.
Should an agreement be reached with ALPA, it is
doubtful that it would extend beyond a one or two-year
period, as has been customary between these parties. Many
of these new hires left, or declined to accept, other
employment positions when they came to work for
Continental. It would appear that they have relied upon
Continental’s representations. If Continental replaces these
permanent new hires despite its representation to the contrary,
Continental might well be at the mercy of ALPA at the end
of any new contract term because of its potential inability to
employ replacement piiots should ALPA then undertake a new
strike. Continental would have effectively lost credibility with
the pilot community in this country, risking the probability
that it could not hire replacement pilots in the event of any
future strike threat. For Continental to agree as ALPA
Suggests would place a powerful negotiating weapon in
ALPA’s hands with respect to future negotiations. In this
court’s opinion, given all of the circumstances of this case,
Continental has valid reason to be concerned over the use of
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such weapons by ALPA. In all probability, Continental will
not have completed any reorganization process within the next
two, three nor even five years.° The resulting leverage to
ALPA could place in jeopardy any confirmed plan of
arrangement.
The strong public right of the worker to engage in
a legal strike must be observed. However, the working pilots
(including those not on the pre-petition seniority list) and the
other working employees have done what they can to preserve
the value of the debtor for the benefit of all. Once-successful
reorganization is achieved or is foreseeable, can the striking
employee be heard to claim that Continental is unreasonable
in not agreeing that the striking employee may return to work
whether a position is available or not and demand his or her
former seniority status as a legal right, when it results in the
new hire being furloughed?
This court cannot agree that a policy such as ALPA
Suggests would be in the best interest of the reorganization
process.
Although any "legal" and/or "moral" obligation of
Continental] to the new hires is an important factor, in this
court’s view there is a much stronger reason for sustaining
Continental’s position that these needed new hires are now
permanent employees and that they should not be replaced by
Continental to create positions for returning striking pilots as
part of any back-to-work agreement. These reasons are the
public policy of keeping the air carrier flying (as provided in
the Interstate Commerce Act and in the Railway Labor Act)
and in the equally important public consideration and policy
‘By this is meant the completion of any payout period provided for in a
confirmed plan of arrangement. It is not unusual for such pay periods to
extend beyond three or even five years.
25A
of the Bankruptcy Code that a financially troubled company
make the highest and best use of its assets and facilities in
order to maximize the recovery to creditors and to preserve
the business operation for the economy of the country. It is
not the least of such policy that it promotes the preservation
of this particular job market.
The striking pilots made a choice, although it was no
doubt was a hard choice. When one makes a choice, it is not
always possible to continue to retain both options, and in fact
usually this is not the case. When great principles conflict,
a court must attempt to determine what the best overall public
policy must be under the circumstances. These striking pilots
made their decision knowing the potential consequences.
They were aware that Continental was asking them to return,
that Continental needed pilots to expand its operations, a
necessary step if it was to have a successful reorganization,
and that Continental was going to hire replacement pilots on
a permanent basis if they did not return, and that Continental
would not voluntarily allow displacement of these persons
who accepted employment under extremely troubling
circumstances.
A reorganizing debtor must be efficient in its
employment practices, since its ability to survive is at stake.
It would not be consistent with the overall purposes of the
Railway Labor Act and/or the Bankruptcy Code to thusly
penalize the new hire after he has been successful in assisting
the debtor to return to profitability.
Certainly Continental needed to give assurance to
these new hires that they would not be replaced when the
strike was over. No one knew how long the strike might last.
This emphasizes (and is consistent with) the strong public
policy of the Railway Labor Act to keep the carrier in
operation. When you couple this public policy with the
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circumstances that the carrier in this instance was in a weak
financial condition, one must conclude that while the union is
free to use self-help under labor law, the debtor likewise had
the right to use self-help as Continental did here. There is
legal precedent for the position taken by Continental.
Empresa Equatoriana De Aviacion vy. District Lodge, 690
F.2d 838, (8th Cir. 1982); National Airlines, Inc. v.
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, et al, 416 F.2d 998 (CA 5, 1969) cert. denied, 400
U.S. 992 (1971); Flight Engineers International Association
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 359 F.2d 303 (2nd Cir. 1966);
International Association of Machinists v. Central Airlines,
Inc., 355 S.W.2d 803 (Civ. App. Texas, 1962) cert. denied,
371 U.S. 934 (1962), reh’g denied, 371 U.S. 970 (1963).
In the case of Flight Engineers International Assoc.
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., supra, ALPA itself successfully
espoused the position that its members should permanently
replace striking flight engineers.
In National Airlines, Inc., supra, page 100€, the
court stated: "Under both the N.L.R.A. and the Railway
Labor Act, a carrier need not discharge those hired to replace
strikers. The hiring of replacements for the strikers would
have been consistent with the attempt to restore service." In
Empresa Equatoriana, supra, the court stated on page 846
that “the carrier could replace strikers where necessary to its
operation." On page 847 it said: "The strikers who were
properly replaced are entitled to be placed on such [a
preferential hiring] list, to be rehired when their replacements
quit or when a similar vacancy arises. Without the hiring
preference, the concept of replacement becomes
indistinguishable from discharge."
The hiring of permanent replacement employees in
a Strike situation has been held to be an acceptable practice
27A
under the National Labor Relation Act. In NLRB v. Mackay
Radio and Television Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), the Supreme
Court held that permanent replacements hired in an economic
strike need not be terminated to make room for returning
strikers. On page 345, the court said it is not "...an unfair
labor practice to replace the striking employees with others in
an effort to carry on the business" and that an employer is
"not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of
strikers upon the election of the latter to resume their
employment in order to create places for them." See also
Gulf States Manufacturers, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, page 1327
and 1328.
To require the debtor to place in effect at this time
rules which would cause the termination or furlough of these
people who have made a vital contribution to the effort to
reorganize, would in this court’s opinion, serve as bad
precedent for future reorganization cases.
While Continental is free to make the choice of
agreeing or not agreeing with ALPA on this point, this court
declines to accept ALPA’s view that Continental has engaged
in unreasonable bargaining (or bad faith) in refusing to accept
ALPA’s position on this point.
THE STATUS QUO PROVISIONS OF THE
RAILWAY LABOR ACT, THE
EMERGENCY WORK RULES, AND REJECTION
OF THE CONTRACTS AND THEIR TERMS
As noted above, immediately upon filing of its
Chapter 11 proceeding on September 24, 1983 Continental
unilaterally implemented new wage rates and work rules for
each of its union groups, including the pilots. Continental
undertook this action notwithstanding that the agreements with
the pilots were not then open for negotiation and, further, the
*
28A
negotiating procedures of Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act
had not been exhausted, as specified by the Act ("RLA").
The unions argue that notwithstanding §365 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the status quo provisions of the Railway
Labor Act prohibit any unilateral change in the wage rates or
work rules "on the property" until all negotiations pursuant to
the scheme of the status have been exhausted. The Unions,
including ALPA, argue that there is a difference between
making unilateral changes in a contract which might be
rejected under the provisions of §365 of the Bankruptcy Code
and the statutory provisions of the RLA, which (they allege)
continue the terms of the contracts in effect until the
bargaining procedures have been completed. The Unions
argue that §365 does not authorize rejection of statutory
requirements, as opposed to contractual provisions, i.e. this
court cannot authorize changes in the wage rates and work
rules of a carrier governed by the RLA until the Section 6
bargaining procedures have been exhausted. ALPA no doubt
would concede that such procedure may take years (indeed
it has already taken about nine months since filing without
effect).
Unquestionably the Railway Labor Act contains
"status quo” provisions. As noted by the 5th Circuit in the
United Industrial Workers of the Seufarers International Union
of North America v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharfs,
400 F.2d 320, page 329 "the objective of the Railway Labor
Act is continuance of the status quo until the statutory
procedures of the Act have been exhausted." And "As the
Supreme Court stated in Order of Railway Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, 1943, 321 U.S. 342, 347, 64S. Ct.
582, 586, 88 L. Ed. 788, 792, the failure of the carrier to
proceed as provided by the Railway Labor Act of 1926, then
applicable, leaves the collective agreement in _ force
throughout." The court also noted with approval the language
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of Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 1946, 326 U.S.
561, to the effect that the object of Section 6 is to maintain
the status quo pending the expiration of the period provided
by the section for allowing the process of negotiation,
mediation and conciliation to have a play. It is to prevent
changes being made until these processes have been exhausted
or the prescribed waiting period has expired without bringing
them into effect. The Sth Circuit also noted that the Railway
Labor Act is more concerned than the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA") with continuance of the employers
operations and the employer-employee relationship. This is
evidenced by the fact that while bargaining is the first and last
step under the NLRA it is only the first step under the
Railway Labor Act in a ladder that leads to the White House
if differences cannot be resolved.
Generally speaking, this principle is reccgnize by
virtually all labor law precedents. On the other hand, while
the Supreme Court in Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship
Clerks, Freighthandlers, Express and Station Employees, ALF-
CIO, et al v. Florida East Coast Railway Company, 384 U.S.
238 (1965), recognized the requirement by law for the railway
to abide by all the rates of pay, rules, and working conditions
specified in the existing collective bargaining agreements until
the termination of the statutory mediation procedure, the court
allowed exceptions “upon specific authorization of [the U.S.
District] court after finding a reasonable necessity therefore".
The Supreme Court therein recognized that one of the primary
purposes of the Railway Labor Act is to keep the carrier
operating. On page 246 the court notes “that the procedures
of the Act are purposely long and drawn out, based on the
hope that reason and practical considerations will provide in
time an agreement that resolves the dispute". In that
nonbankruptcy case, the Supreme Court held that under
emergency conditions the carrier could implement new terms
and conditions governing the labor force as long as those
30A
changes were necessary for the railroad to fulfill its duty to
continue operations, provided the power to make such changes
is closely confined and is supervised. Thus, the Supreme
Court has recognized that the status quo provisions of the
Railway Labor Act must, in some instances, bend to the
exigencies of the situation.
The evidence in the instant case shows that, had
Continental not been able to significantly reduce its labor
costs (by the unilateral implementation of less costly and more
efficient work rules and pay rates) at the time it filed this
proceeding, Continental would have run of cash and would no
longer be operating at the present time. It would have had to
shut its doors even before this hearing commenced.
Continental was simply in no position to continue its
operations under the wage rates and working conditions
contained in its agreements with the Airline Pilots
Association. It did not have the money to do so nor the
ability to acquire it. In addition, under the circumstances,
Continental could not even have reduced its operations (as it
did beginning September 27, 1983) and still have complied
with the terms of its agreement with ALPA. Continental
reduced them significantly, and it needed the low cost, the
efficiency, and the flexibility of its emergency work rules in
order to do so.
ALPA’s contention cannot be sustained under the
law. By virtue of § 1167 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.
§1167), the U.S. Congress provided that notwithstanding §365
a debtor-in-possession under Chapter 11 of the Code cannot
change the wages or working conditions of employees of a
debtor subject to the Railway Labor Act except in accordance
with Section 6 of such act. Changes in wages working
conditions would and are otherwise authorized by §365 of the
Bankruptcy Code. The Congress then expressly provided in
§103(g) of the Bankruptcy Code that Subchapter IV of
31A
Chapter 11 applies only to a case under such chapter
concerning a railroad. Section 1167 is part of Subchapter IV
of Chapter 11. Continental is not a railroad. Under the
statutory scheme thusly set forth Congress, in its wisdom, by
clear implication provided that a debtor governed by the
Railway Labor Act need not comply with Section 6 of that act
before making unilateral changes in wages and work rules if
it is in Chapter 11 and is not a railroad. The statutory
scheme of the Bankruptcy Code thereby provides for the
action taken by Continental in this instance. It might well be
noted that the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, the
same year that airline deregulation became effective.
Further, since the contracts are no_ longer
immediately enforceable after filing, the changes in wages and
work rules are accomplished not by the employer’s unilateral
action, but rather by operation of law. NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, supra, 104 S. Ct. 1188 at page 1200. In Bildisco,
the Supreme Court laid down a pragmatic rule in dealing with
the National Labor Relations Act. This court is persuaded
that the reasoning of the Court in that case is likewise
applicable here in relation to the RLA. As noted above, this
debtor would not have survived implementation of the
suggestion by the Airline Pilots Association that Continental
could make no post-filing change in its wage rates and
working conditions.
In Bildisco, the Court held that the authority of a
debtor-in-possession to seek rejection of the collective
bargaining agreement was not qualified by the restrictions of
Section 8(d) of the NLRA, which section established detailed
guidelines for midterm modification of collective bargaining
agreements. The Court noted the policies of flexibility and
equity built into Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. These
policies were desperately needed by Continental at filing in
order to continue its duties as a carrier. As _ noted,
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performance of this duty to continue public service is one of
the primary purposes of the RLA. At least to that extent, the
Bankruptcy Code and the RLA are entirely consistent and
compatible.
The Supreme Court did not fully accept the "new
entity" theory utilized by the Court of Appeals in its Bildisco
opinion, 682 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir. 1982), but the Court did
observe that the debtor-in-possession, while the same "entity"
which existed before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, is
nevertheless empowered by the Bankruptcy Code to deal with
its contracts and property in a manner that it could not have
done absent the bankruptcy filing. The court noted that the
fundamental purpose of reorganization is to prevent a debtor
from going into liquidation with an attendant loss of jobs and
possible misuse of economic resources. The court noted
further that recapitalization of a debtor could be jeopardized
if the debtor-in-possession was saddled automatically with the
debtor’s prior collective bargaining agreement. The
Bankruptcy Code specifies that the rejection of an executory
contract which has not been assumed constitutes a breach of
the contract which relates back to the date immediately
proceeding the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.
§365(g)(1). The court further noted that if the debtor-in-
possession elects to continue to receive benefits from the other
party to an executory contract pending a decision to reject or
assume, the debtor-in-possession is obligated to pay for the
"reasonable value" of those services, which, depending upon
the circumstances of the contract may be what is specified in
it. Should the debtor-in-possession elect to assume the
executory contract, however, it assumes the contract cum
onere.
The Supreme Court concluded that the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy means that the collective bargaining
agreement is no longer immediately enforceable and may
33A
never be enforceable again. Specifically the Court concluded
that after the filing, the collective bargaining agreement is not
an enforceable contract within the meaning of NLRA
Section 8(d), and that it follows that the debtor-in-possession
need not comply with the provisions of Section 8(d) prior to
seeking the bankruptcy court’s permission to reject the
agreement. The court further stated that in a Chapter 11 case
the "modification" in the agreement has been accomplished
not be the employers unilateral action, but rather by operation
of law. The court further noted that even the National Labor
Relations Board had conceded in that case that the cumber-
some and rigid procedures of Section 8(d) need not be
imported into the bankruptcy proceedings. The Supreme
Court also held that the debtor-in-possession need not bargain
to impasse before seeking rejection and that these provisions
of the National Labor Relations Act must be subordinated to
the exigencies of bankruptcy.
In this court’s opinion, the rationale of the Supreme
Court in Bildisco is equally applicable to the Railway Labor
Act and the status quo provisions of that act must give way to
the realities of bankruptcy. A company whose financial life
is threatened should not, under rational public policy be
forced to adhere to principles which, though of good service
in times of ordinary financial health, would, as in this case,
jeopardize the company’s existence.
The unions’ attempt to distinguish Bildisco because
it dealt with the National Labor Relations Act, whereas
Continental is subject to the Railway Labor Act. However,
this court is not persuaded that in the situation that
Continental now finds itself, there is any persuasive difference
from the parameters outlined by the Supreme Court.
If ALPA’s argument is followed, the statutory
"status quo” provisions of the Railway Labor Act would put
34A
a financially troubled debtor to the task of an arduous (and
perhaps impossible) process before it could obtain the
economic relief which might well be necessary to its
continued operation. The result in many instances, including
this one, might well be that liquidation would result
unnecessarily while lip service was being given to the alleged
purposes of the Railway Labor Act, and many jobs would be
unnecessarily lost. Clearly the overriding public policy is that
more jobs should be saved under these unfortunate circum-
Stances rather than that higher wages be paid for a short
period of time before the debtor’s financial heart stops
beating. The demise of a company is too much of a price to
pay for strict adherence to Section 6 bargaining requirements.
Any policy which would tend to precipitate this demise could
not truly be consistent with the spirit and purposes of the
RLA, much less the Bankruptcy Code.
Once a company is legitimately in Chapter 11, as
Continental has been found to be, the provisions of Title 11
and the principles of Bildisco are applicable to its collective
bargaining agreements even though they are otherwise
governed by the RLA. Unilateral changes may be made by
the carrier at filing, at leastwwhere rejection of the agreement
is later approved by the court. However, the debtor is still
required to make reasonable payment for the services it
receives during the pendency of the proceeding and is
obligated to bargain with the certified representatives of the
employees both before and after rejection.
Continental was the first airline ever to attempt to fly
through a Chapter 11 proceeding. Had Continental requested
interim relief from the contract wage levels and work rules
and had it been possible to have had such a _ hearing
immediately, such relief would have been granted by this
court; given the unusual circumstances concerning its cash
position, the changes it made in its level of flying, its
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competitive situation, and the uncertainties that existed
immediately after the filing of this petition.
The fact that other urgent matters were pending on
this court’s docket prevented it from hearing the evidence on
the motion to reject for a few months. When the evidence did
begin on January 30, 1984, it extended until April 28, 1984.
It appears to this court that to have required
negotiations between the time of filing and the institution of
emergency work rules unilateraily imposed by Continental
Airlines on its pilots (when operations resumed three days
after filing) would not only have required a useless and
nonfruitful act (no agreement has been reached nine months
later) but would have prevented Continental from resuming
domestic operations at that time. Further since rejection is
being allowed, had Continental not reduced its wage
payments, it would have expended more monies in reliance on
the contractual provisions than those necessary to obtain these
same services. Continental would have paid more than the
reasonable value of these services based on market rates,
given all of the circumstances in this case.
Further delays in restricting Continental’s flying
operations would also have resulted in loss of those
advantages it had as a going business. At worst, this could
have resulted in the destruction of its business and at best it
would have severely diminished its ability to reorganize. In
either of these events, it would have stopped payment of
wages to all employees for either a longer period or for all
time.
RELATIVE EQUITIES
As has been noted, deregulation has caused some
difficulty to the industry majors, including Continental. Other
36A
carriers have furloughed employees and many unions have
granted concessions to various carriers in light of the
increasing competition. Continental has suffered substantial
losses since deregulation and now has a substantial debt
Structure and debt service. This deSt service makes it
difficult to compare Continental to other airlines in terms of
what costs are necessary for it to be profitable.
An effort has been made to show that Continental
was solvent when it filed its proceeding and that rejection
should not be permitted. The effort to prove solvency
stemmed from the appraisal of Continental’s air fleet at an
amount greater than that shown on its books. In other words,
its airplanes have a greater market value than book value. It
is axiomatic that for Continental to realize market value from
these airplanes they would have to be sold. If they were sold
Continental could not operate then. Without airplanes to
operate, Continental would have additional obligations from
rejections of its numerous leases on ground space and from
other executory contracts. Whether the net result, taking all
resulting liabilities into account, would show that Continental
is solvent is speculative at this time. No effort was made to
show this result. Resulting obligations from rejection of
executory contracts are not now on the books of Continental
as a liability.
At filing, as determined in connection with the
motion to dismiss, Continental had reached the point where it
no longer had free assets upon which to obtain any credit and
certainly could not obtain credit on the basis of its potential
profit margin. Further, assuming Continental was in fact
solvent, had Continental adhered to the labor costs specified
in the respective collective bargaining agreements, Continental
would have soon become insolvent unless it ran out of cash
and had to close its doors before this occurred.
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Moreover, if assets were liquidated (even at the best
market price) there would be no further need for employees
at Continental, including those who would seek to be
employed under the collective bargaining agreement. Thus a
sale of Continental’s air fleet would defeat the purposes of
such agreements entirely.
Therefore, it seems that for these purposes, a
liquidation test for solvency seems foolhardy and a self-
defeating way of evaluating Continental, under the circum-
stances. As a going concern, Continental was losing
substantial sums of money. An evaluation of the assets on
this basis (capitalized earnings) would not show Continental
to be solvent. In addition, at the filing Continental was not
paying its debts as they matured.
Unless a company can become profitable and
maintain that posture consistently, it is inevitable that it go out
of business. If a reorganization proceeding is to succeed,
prior accrued indebtedness must be paid out of future profits
(unless the company is liquidated). If there is no excess of
money over and above operating expenses, there is nothing to
pay prior indebtedness with; whether it be secured or
unsecured indebtedness, including any damages resulting from
rejection of collective bargaining agreements.
The unions have recognized that Continental needs
relief from the high labor cost which results from adherence
to the respective collective bargaining agreements. Each has -
indicated in testimony before this court that it would (and/or
did) agree to significant concessions in modification of these
agreements. (Even the IAM’s representative testified that it
would - or might back off of its requested “industry standard"
wages.)
38A
The non-union employees agreed to their share of
relief (by 80% vote). ALPA points out that Continental
realized the savings it requested (pre-filing) from the IAM
group as a result of the IAM strike and the interim work rules
imposed on August 13, 1983 and by contracting out of much
of the IAM employee work. The pilots intimate in testimony
that they would have agreed to the $60,000,000 requested of
them and that Continental should have interpreted their
“signals” to mean that they would agree to concessions at that
level. The UFA has said it would agree to the $40,000,000
in concessions requested by Continental prefiling (and even
more) but that the problem in reaching agreement has been
the dispute over the value (UFA’s costing) of the concessions
offered by UFA. Continental says they are worth far less that
the $40,000,000 requested, while UFA says they were worth
much more (i.e., $50,000,000). However, the UFA never
sent its costing experts to confer with Continental’s - so the
issue was never resolved. TWU did agree to the concessions
requested by Continental pre-filing.
This evidence is indicative of the recognition by
these unions that Continental cannot survive under the costs
of these agreements as written.
When Continental resumed flying operations
September 27, 1983 (after filing its Chapter 11 and being shut
down for three days), it severely reduced its fare level on all
flights in order to entice the flying public back onto the
airline. It also needed to restore the confidence of travel
agents who had been “booking away" from Continental as
rumors of its financial troubles had grown (pre-filing). This
had the desired effect. When it became apparent that the
public perceived that Continental could fly through a
Chapter 11, Continental increased its fare level but only to the
point they were competitive with the low cost airlines flying
in competition against them. However, unlike the low-cost
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competition, Continental still served hot meals on certain
flights, and maintained free baggage handling and interchange
with other airlines, areservation service, and others amenities
that are normally associated with a full-service airline. This
has been criticized severely by the unions, but it has
apparently been successful for Continental. Continental had
tried maintaining higher fare levels and full service as a
means of competing with the new entrants and had found it to
be very unsuccessful.
Continental has implemented this marketing program
and has set its fare levels in order to maximize its yield. It is
now projecting a profit and has been meeting its projections
for the first time in a long time. Taking into consideration all
of the existing circumstances, this court concludes that
Continental’s business plan is reasonable.
The unions point out that the emergency work rules
unilaterally imposed by Continental at filing would result in
annualized cost savings to Continental far in excess of the
$150,000,000 requested just before filing. The unions
contend that the annualized savings would be in the area of
$250,000,000. It should be noted that the $150,000,000 in
concessions was calculated merely for Continental to break
even. Further, at the time of the filing of its Chapter 11
proceeding, many uncertainties existed and many changes
were taking place within the airline. Continental was cutting
back its operations severely for a period of time. It did not
intend to return fully to its prefiling level of flying. It was
and is facing increasing competition. There is potential for a
fare war and skirmishes are even now being fought.
Continental needed the lower costs and flexibility
provided by the emergency work rules (or at least substan-
tially so) in order to survive, right itself financially, and
progress toward a stable and profit-making posture on a
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consistent basis. Substantial sacrifices have been, and are
going to be, necessary for this airline to revitalize itself. The
current working employees are making that sacrifice. They
have recognized that meat and potatoes come first; dessert on
the terrace comes later.
Because of the collective bargaining agreements the
pilots have enjoyed standards of living that make the required
sacrifices hard to adjust to. The court can understand why
a pilot making at, near, or over $100,0W0 per year has set a
standard (or cost) of life style that makes adjusting to a salary
of $43,000 or less extremely difficult. Small wonder the
pilots resist such a change. But economics can be harsh. It
has been to the airline industry in general and to Continental
in particular. The pilots have managed to negotiate (over the
years) pay benefits and work rules which are onerous and
non-productive, especially when compared to those of some
of the other competitive carriers. The result was a significant
cost imbalance and a substantial advantage to much of
Continental’s competition. In one sense, the pilots had simply
priced themselves (and/or Continental) out of the existing
market.
The average 1982 earnings for Continental captains
(excluding TXI pilots) were $89,673 the 94 DC-10 captains
salary averaged $101,793 in 1982. An analysis by the
Economic Analysis and Information Services Department of
ALPA concluded on July 28, 1983 that between 1980 and
1982 "pilots average earnings are greater than" the average
earnings of accountants, attorneys, college professors, dentists
and PH.D chemists and that only doctors earn more than
pilots but that pilots salaries were increasing at a faster rate
than those of any other profession.
Furthermore, the evidence showed that the actual
hard-hour utilization of pilots was less than 60 per month,
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pre-petition. Scheduled flying days for pilots in May, 1983
(presented as an example) averaged 14 days for regular
DC-10 and 727 pilots on domestic flights. In addition, pilots
got substantial vacation time (between 16 and 44 days per
year depending on seniority). This vacation time can, at least
in part, be used to further reduce scheduled flying time.
Federal Aviation Regulations permit utilization of
pilots up to 100 “block hours" in a calendar month, not to
exceed 1,000 block hours per year.
It should be noted that traditionally Continental’s
labor force has historically been over 50% non-union; 6,776
out of 12,008 employees pre-petition and 3,553 out of 5,763
employees post-petition (56.4%) as of January 31, 1984.
As observed above, more than 50% of the currently
active employees in each unionized job category® (and more
than 80% of the active flight attendants) have elected to cross
their own union’s picket lines. This appears to be indicative
of these employees’ acceptance of the need of Continental for
relief from the respective collective bargaining agreements
and their willingness to work at the wage levels and under the
working conditions (including increased productivity) being
currently offered by Continental.
Continental is offering a living wage to its currently
flying pilots. In addition, it is offering to its employees a
profit-sharing plan guaranteeing each a participation in 25%
®At the time the IAM struck, 12:01 a.m. EDST, August 13, 1983,
Continental sold all three of its flight kitchens (at Los Angeles, Denver and
Houston) and contracted out this service and that of cabin cleaning and
fueling because it could contract this service from third parties
substantially cheaper than it could perform them with IAM employees
under the terms of the IAM collective bargaining agreement.
42A
of the profits of the airline from the first dollar upward. It
has also proposed to this court for approval a stock ownership
plan which would make the employees 35% owners of the
company on a fully diluted basis. They as a group, would
then be the largest shareholder of the company. Overall,
morale appears to have increased post-filing to a very high
level. As of April, 1984, Continental had grown to
approximately 6,000 employees and was projecting 8,000
employees by the year end.
As of April i, 1984, Continental had 1,070 active
pilots, including those currently in training or on leave. Of
this number, 494 were new hires and 576 were from its pre-
petition seniority list. It employed 1,471 flight attendants, of
which 270 were new hires and 1,201 were from its pre-
petition seniority list. All of the ground instructors were still
on the payroll as were 21 out of the 35 dispatchers (14
dispatchers were still on furlough).
Beginning in October, 1981, Continental
management personnel endured a 10% pay cut and non-union
employees had to forego scheduled pay increases. In January
- February, 1982 personnel department positions were reduced
by 35% and general staff levels in other offices were reduced
15%. In 1983, 25% of the remaining management staff jobs
and 15% of the line management positions were eliminated.
Non-unionized personnel and management were required to
work extraordinarily long work hours and even split shifts in
some instances. Just prior to the filing of bankruptcy,
management employees had a 15% pay cut and reduction in
benefits, and, as noted, non-unionized employees voted to
accept similar reductions.
It is true that there were "snap back" provisions
relating to these management pay cuts, and their salaries have
been increased (snapped back) in part already. However,
43A
under the evidence, this court is convinced that Continental
management employees are being paid materially less than
competitive salaries for top management positions that other
companies are paying for similar management skills. In
addition, as noted, Continental management personnel have
been required to work extraordinarily arduous schedules.
Further reduction in their wages could result in loss of key
employees, and it appears that Continental has in fact already
suffered from this problem.
This court finds that non-union and management
personnel have made sufficient sacrifices to justify rejection
of the respective union contracts when balancing the rights
between them. This is particularly true when you consider
the high level of wages and salaries which had been bargained
for by the various unions and agreed to by Continental, as set
forth in these contracts.
Labor costs, were a major factor contributing to
Continental’s bankruptcy. If the contracts had not been
rejected, the administrative claims resulting from reinstating
the contracts (and their resulting high cost) from the date of
filing would in and of itself be highly damaging to the
prospects of reorganization. Further, if the company is
liquidated under Chapter 7, the contracts would be rejected as
a matter of law, 11 U.S.C. §365(d), and this rejection would
likewise relate back to the date of filing.
Low labor cost are necessary for Continental at the
present time and at least for the near term, foreseeable future,
in order for Continental to be competitive.
Virtually no effort was made by ALPA to show that
Continental could afford to pay materially more to its pilots
than it is now doing under the emergency work rules . The
only effort was a calculation to show that if Continental raised
44A
its fare levels without losing any of its passenger miles, it
could do so. However, no evidence was introduced that
convinces this court that if Continental materially raised its
fares it would not lose a substantial portion of its flying
customers.
There is little loyalty, if any, among passengers.
Passenger miles are essentially fungible. Ticket prices remain
the single most important element in attracting the flying
public.
The court rejects the motion that Continental could
materially raise its ticket prices and materially increase its
pilots labor costs, unless, and until, its competition also raises
ticket prices. That adventure has already been embarked upon
by Continental in the past; all to its financial dismay.
It appears to this court that substantial jobs will be
preserved as a result of rejection of these contracts. Certainly
the creditors are likely to get more under any plan of arrange-
ment than in liquidation; in fact, it is usually necessary for the
- court to find that they will receive nct less than they would
under Chapter 7 liquidation before any plan of arrangement
can be confirmed. 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(7). Any such plan
must be based on future earnings. From the evidence, it
appears that there will be no earnings unless these contracts
are rejected. Labor costs are such an important element in
Continental’s ability to operate profitably and to remain
competitive that it cannot offer a plan of arrangement until it
knows if the contracts are to be rejected, and, thereby, what
its future labor costs are likely to be. The respective
contracts must be rejected to get any new capital. No viable
business pian can include a return to all of Continental’s pre-
petition labor costs.
45A
Rejection will no doubt result in reduction in
standards of living of many of the employees, and possibly
even hardship in certain cases. Nevertheless, under the
circumstances and the economics currently prevailing, there
appears to be no reasonable alternative.
The unions argue that this court cannot make
necessary determinations in order to allow rejection of the
contract in light of the fact that Continental has not offered a
plan of arrangement, because this court cannot assess the
viability of such a plan or the need to reject the contracts as
an integral part thereof. This court disagrees. The Supreme
Court in Bildisco understood the difficulties in assessing the
outcome of a potential reorganization in the beginning stages
of such a proceeding. At this time the court cannot say that
Continental will have a confirmed plan of reorganization, nor
even that the confirmed plan will be successful, but it has
determined that without rejection no viable plan providing for
future operation by Continental of its own air fleet is possible.
The Supreme Court noted that "the Bankruptcy Court inquiry
is of necessity speculative, and it must have great latitude to
consider any type of evidence relevant to this issue." I believe
that the findings of this court have satisfied this issue as
required by Bildisco and other cases. In this instance, the
inability of the parties to reach an agreement is in itself a
deterrent to any plan of arrangement.
There was testimony that Continental could not
afford any substantial increase in its current labor costs. A
return to pre-petition labor costs under the ALPA contracts
would preclude Continental from effective competition with
the low cost, new entrants; some of which have negotiated
contracts with the very unions which oppose Continental’s
motion to reject.
46A
The unions argue that if the court allows rejection of
the agreements, it should only allow rejection of those parts
of the agreements that are burdensome and (presumably)
should require affirmation of all other parts. This court has
no true way to know the financial impact of each particular
provision in the agreements. The Supreme Court in Bildisco
noted that the bankruptcy court "need not determine that the
parties have bargained to impasse or make any other
determination outside the field of its expertise." (Emphasis
added).
The ALPA and UFA contracts are extremely
complex. This court could not possibly rewrite them for the
parties. if it tried to do so, in all likelihood serious mistakes
would be made. As noted in the Bildisco opinion, the
National Labor Policies generally require that employers and
unions reach their own agreements on terms and conditions of
employment free from governmental interference. The court
cited Howard Johnson Company v. Hotel Employees, 417
U.S. 249 (1974); NLRB v. Burns Security Services, 406 U.S.
272, 282-294 (1974). See also Chicago and Northwestern
Railway Company v. United Transportation Union, 402 U.S.
570, page 579, footnote 11, referring to the strong federal
labor policy against governmental interference with the
substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements.
There is no provision in the Bankruptcy Code which
would provide for rejection in part. Historical case authority
indicates that executory contracts must be accepted cwm onere
or not at all. The Supreme Court in Bildisco did not provide
for any such authority by this court; especially since the court
noted that acceptance must be cum onere and cited Jn re
Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190 F.2d 994, 996 (CA 3 1951) for
that proposition.
47A
Continental has a continuing duty to bargain with the
certified representatives of its employees in good faith. These
parties are themselves in a better position to know the effect
of the various provisions of their future agreements, which,
by their nature, are extremely complex. Should this court
impose restrictions or conditions on the rejection of these
agreements, the court would not only be involved in an area
outside of its expertise but it would violate strong principles
of labor law that government not interfere in this bargaining
process. This court should not impose on either party its own
notions of what is fair or reasonable or economical under the
circumstances. Neither the Bankruptcy Code provision (§365)
nor applicable case law mandates that this court set any terms
or conditions on the rejection and this court declines to do so
in this instance.
The unions next argue that if the court is going to
allow rejection of the agreements it should impose conditions
on the rejection, such as requiring Continental to (1) reoffer
its pre-petition concession package, (2) reimpose the
"non-economic" provision of the agreements, and/or
(3) implement those provisions which have been "signed-off™
on in the various labor negotiations. The unions cite Jn re
Parrot Packing Co., Inc., 99 C.C.H. Labor case P10, 550
(U.S.D.C. No. Dist. Indiana, Ft. Wayne division, case
number 83-10127) August 2, 1983, as precedent for this
proposition.
The concessions that were requested pre-petition do
not necessarily relate to the current labor cost requirements of
Continental. The question of which provisions are in fact
non-economic is in issue. Those "signed-off" provisions were
not intended by the parties to be binding unless and until a
complete and integrated collective bargaining agreement was
reached; they were simply tentative and conditional. On the
other hand, it is certainly fair for the unions to bring up these.
48A
tentative agreements as well as the non-economic provisions
in the future bargaining sessions that must take place.
If this court has the authority to impose such
conditions it declines to do so in this instance.
The unions, including ALPA, have not seriously
challenged with evidence that Continental is in serious
financial condition or that it was losing money, nor that it
needed serious economic concessions if it were to continue.
Nevertheless, ALPA urges that the emergency work rules
have inflamed the pilots.
The insult to the unions stems from the effrontery of
the employer escaping from the "bonds" of their labor
agreements before their very eyes; and in a highly visible
way. However, this employer, while it appears to be the
same, now has different characteristics and powers.
Section 1107 of Title 11 proscribes that a debtor-in-possession
has all of the rights, duties, and responsibilities of a trustee.
Were there to be an "actual" trustee (i.e. a disinterested third
person who could be perceived as acting on behalf of all
interested. parties) this pill (having this modicum of sweetener)
might not be so difficult to consume without even the benefit
of liquid refreshment. Small wonder that frustration so
conceived is the bearer of ill will and dismay.
Nevertheless, economics have changed substantially
in the airline industry. Recognition must be given to this.
The ALPA contracts give no such recognition nor any flexi-
bility to deal with the existing circumstances. Under these
circumstances, rejection of these burdensome agreements
should be, and are, permitted under the law.
To comply with the RLA, ALPA (as well as
Continental) must continue to bargain. ALPA must lay aside
«
49A
other considerations and recognize that this is an economic
problem. Economic problems are rarely, if ever, resolved in
the courtroom. The striking ALPA pilots need the bargaining
expertise of its union now more than ever. If properly and
steadfastly exercised, the bargaining ability of ALPA can
determine what level of pay and benefits Continental can
afford to pay under existing economic circumstances.
Whether, ALPA has alienated the working ALPA pilots to the
extent that it has lost the leverage of support from this group
remains to be seen. However, ALPA and Continental must
bargain from the relative positions in which they now find
themselves.
Signed this 17th day of August, 1984.
/s/_ RF, Wheless, Jr,
R.F. Wheless, Jr.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
1h
1B
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
Debtors.
In re )
)
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., ) Case No. 90-932
et al., ) through 984
)
)
ORDER APPROVING O’NEILL GROUP
—___LITIGATION SETTLEMENT _
Upon the Motion ("Motion") of Continental Airlines,
Inc. ("Continental") to Approve O’Neill Group Litigation
Settlement ("Settlement Agreement") filed by Continental on
October 22, 1991, the Court having considered said Motion,
the Memorandum In Support thereof and the attachments
thereto, and the Court having considered the Adair Pilots’
objection to said Motion filed November 12, 1991, and the
Court having conducted a hearing on said Motion on
November 26, 1991, and there appearing good cause
therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:
1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and Bankruptcy Rule
9019. This matter constitutes a core proceeding pursuant to
24 U.S.C. § 157.
2B
2. Continental filed its petition for relief under
Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code on
December 3, 1990 ("Petition Date").
a Since the Petition Date Continental has
continued in the operation and management of its business and
properties under §§ 1107 and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.
4. The Settkement Agreement (attached as
Attachment | to the Memorandum in Support of Motion of
Continental Airlines, Inc. to Approve O’Neill Group
Litigation Settlement) resolves claims with potential value in
excess of $100 million against the estate including (a) virtually
all of the remaining employee-related claims filed against a
corporate predecessor of Continental ("Old CAL") in a prior
bankruptcy proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Texas ("Continental I"), (b) litigation
arising Out of a 1985 strike settlement agreement between Old
CAL and the Air Line Pilots Association ("ALPA"), and
(c) litigation in the Texas state courts arising out of a side
Letter between Texas Air Corporation and ALPA. Included
among the claims resolved by the Settlement Agreement are
claims by over 200 pilots whom Continental has treated as
having resigned or retired during the 1983-85 pilot strike at
Continental. Those pilots claim a right to reinstatement and
backpay which, if successfully prosecuted, would be both
costly and extremely disruptive to the interests, seniority and
morale of Continental’s current pilot workforce.
a By resolving this litigation, the Settlement
Agreement will in large part put an end to a labor dispute that
has endured for almost nine years and should enhance morale
among the current Continental pilot workforce. The
Settlement Agreement further benefits the estate by avoiding
litigation of the O’Neill Group’s motion to transfer venue of
3B
these proceedings to the Texas bankruptcy court pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 1014, thereby allowing these proceedings to
continue without interruption or deiay.
6. Of the $20.9 million of potential
consideration available under the Settlement Agreement,
approximately $17.9 million or $5.6% has been accepted. Of
that total, 30% or approximately $5.4 Million will be paid in
cash in 15 equal monthly installments of approximately
$360,000 per month, commencing after a plan of reorganiza-
tion is confirmed herein. Seventy percent of the consideration
accepted, or approximately $12.5 million, will be provided in
the form of general unsecured pre-petition claims to be
scheduled in the name of each settling pilot. In addition,
Continental will provide approximately $1.8 million in
attorneys’ fees to the O’Neill Group’s counsel, to be paid in
eight monthly installments after confirmation of a plan. The
amount of consideration (showing both the cash and claim
portion) to be provided for each type of claim settled under
the Agreement is set forth below.
Claim Type Cash Claim
1. Resigned or retired pilots $2.16 mil. $5.04 mil.
2. Furlough Pay $2.46 mil. $5.75 mil.
3. Contract Rejection $350,000 $817,000
Damages
4. Other Bankruptcy Claims $199,500 $465,500
5. Side Letter Claims $ 36,375 $ 84,875
6. Class Action Claims $164,250 $383,250
4B
a A Bankruptcy Court must consider four
factors for approving settlement agreements pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rule 9019: (a) the probability of success in the
litigation; (b) the difficulties, if any, to be encountered in the
matter of collection; (c) the complexity of litigation involved,
and the expense, inconvenience and delays necessarily
attendant to it; and (d) the paramount interests of creditors
and a proper deference to their reasonable views in the
premises. See Drexel v. Loomis, 35 F.2d 800 (8th Cir.
1929), as adopted in Protective Committee for Independent
Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390
U.S. 414 (1968).
8. First, Continenta: is fully apprised of all
facts necessary to evaluate the risks associated with the claims
and litigation being settled, and it is prudent for Continental
to eliminate these risks in order to achieve certainty through
the Settlement Agreement. Although Continental believes that
it has strong defenses to the O’Neill Group’s claims and
litigation, it also recognizes that, in varying degrees, there are
risks associated with that litigation and that continuation of
these claims and litigation will impose a significant burden on-
the estate. ;
9. Second, the claims are all adverse to
Continental and thus present no "difficulties in the matter of
collection."
10. Third, the litigation with the O’Neill Group
has endured for over nine years and has consumed large
quantities of management resources and legal fees.
Disapproval of the Settlement Agreement would result in
continued litigation with the O’Neill Group on many fronts
and the continued expenditure of significant time, attention,
and money, all to the detriment of Continental and its
SB
creditors. Resolution of the O’Neill Group’s litigation will
enable Continental to focus on achieving a_ successful
reorganization, not on past disputes, and will thus enhance the
labor relations climate at Continental.
11. Fourth, the Settlement Agreement serves the
interests of Continental’s creditors by, in addition to the
benefits described above, avoiding any disruption of these
proceedings that might occur if Continental were required to
litigate the O’Neill Group’s motion to transfer venue of this
bankruptcy case. Thus, the Settlement Agreement will hasten
a successful reorganization.
12. The Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors has not objected to approval of the Settlement
Agreement.
13. The Court has considered the objections of
the Adair Pilots, finds them to be without merit, and they are
denied.
14. The Court therefore concludes that the
Settlement Agreement is in the best interests of Continental’s
estate.
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, this 26th day of November, 1991 that
a The Motion of Continental Airlines, Inc. to
Approve O’Neill Group Litigation Settlement is granted.
y The Settlement Agreement, attached as
Attachment 1 to the Memorandum in Support of Motion of
Continental Airlines, Inc. to Approve O’Neill Group
6B
Litigation Settlement, is approved in its entirety pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rule 9019.
= Continental is authorized to execute of
Settlement Agreement.
/s/ Helen S. Balick
United States Bankruptcy Judge
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.