Opposition Brief — Klagiss v. Indiana
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91-1863 JUN 26 1999
SOF Tc 6
No. 91-1983 Ui royale
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1991
RAYMOND L KLAGISS,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Indiana
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
~ | LINLEY E. PEARSON
sano Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD CAREY WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Counsel of Record
— LOUIS E. RANSDELL
| Deputy Attorney General
— | Office of Attorney General
_— 219 State House
— IN 46204-2794
(317) 232-6230
Counsel for Respondent
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EN RNR Me Le ET ey eee Ae
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether IC 35-46-1-4(a)(1), defining the crime of
Neglect of a Dependant, is unconstitutionally vague.
Il. Whether IC 35-46-1-4(a)(1), is unconstitutional in
that it fails to sufficiently define the conduct constituting
Neglect of a Dependant.
Il. Whether the Defendant was convicted of an
offense with which he was not charged.
IV. Whether the State failed to produce sufficient
evidence of probative value to support the jury's verdict of
guilty of Neglect of a Dependant.
V. Whether the burden of proof was inadequate to
protect the Defendant's right to due process.
VI. Whether the trial court impermissibly limited the
testimony of the Defendant's expert witness.
ss
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED.................... i
pp 8 ee pe 6). a
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I. IC 35-46-1-4(a)(1), DEFINING THE
OFFENSE OF NEGLECT OF A DEPEN-
DANT, IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
IT. IC 35-46-1-4(a)(1) DEFINES NEGLECT
OF A DEPENDANT IN SUFFICIENT
CLARITY TO ADVISE A CITIZEN OF
WHAT CONDUCT IS PROHIBITED......... 6
Il. THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT CONVICTED
FOR AN UNCHARGED OFFENSE.......... 7
IV. THE STATE PRODUCED SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE OF PROBATIVE VALUE
TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT
OF GUILTY OF NEGLECT OF A
TABLE OF CONTENTS - CONT'D.
Page:
V. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH A
BURDEN OF PROOF THAT VARIED
FROM THE TRADITIONAL REQUIRE-
MENT FOR PROOF BEYOND A
fF Se tO Gs 6 ty ae 7
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY
IN PREVENTING HYPOTHETICAL
QUESTIONS FOR WHICH THERE WAS
os 8, ee err 8
LE Sites asus a cen sch hae nee need 9
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Pages:
Cage v. Louisiana, 11 S.Ct. 328,
= a A Ok ch ee 7
Carella v. California, 109 S.Ct. 2419,
___ U.S. ____ (1989), rehearing denied,
OSA 2a ee ee a eee eee 7
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 92 S.Ct. 2294,
408 U.S. 104, 33 L.Ed2d 222 (1972) ......... 6
Klagiss v. State, 585 N.E.2d 674
pee ere re ee 1,2,6
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) .......... 7
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) ......... 7
U.S. v. Altenburger, 549 F.2d 702
oe Ae ee >. 8
Statutes:
Indiana Code 35-42-1-5 . 1.1... cc eee eee 2
I CR FE oa 5 ck beh e ee aGees 2
Indiana Code 35-46-1-4(a)(1)..............005. i,1,5,6
Rules:
Sa A GA Wet Boe vo nee ooo eee l
No. 91-1983
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 199]
RAYMOND L. KLAGISS,
Petitioner,
Vv.
STATE OF INDIANA.
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Indiana
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Respondent, State of Indiana, by its counsel, Linley E.
Pearson, pursuant to Rule 15 of the Rules of this Court,
respectfully opposes the Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
review the decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana, in the
case of Klagiss v. State, 585 N.E.2d 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
Indiana Code 35-46-1-4(a)(1) reads as follows:
2
(a) A person having the care of a de- |
pendent, whether assumed voluntarily or
because of a legal obligation, who knowingly
or intentionally:
(1) places the dependent in a situation
that may endanger his life or health;
*x* * xX
commits neglect of a dependent, a Class D
felony. However, except for a violation of
clause (4), the offense is a Class B felony if it
results in serious bodily injury. It is a defense
that the accused person, in the legitimate
practice of his religious belief, provided
treatment by spiritual means through prayer,
in lieu of medical care, to his dependent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
The Defendant was indicted by a grand jury on April 3,
1989 when he was charged with Reckless Homocide, a Class
C felony under IC 35-42-1-5, and Neglect of a Dependant, a
Class B felony under IC 35-46-1-4 (R.14). Trial was held from
July 16, 1990 through July 19, 1990 (R.6, 840). On July 20,
1990, the jury found the Defendant to be guilty of Neglect of
a Dependant (R.92). The Defendant was then sentenced to six
(6) years of imprisonment (R.1023).
Subsequently, an appeal ensued, and the Indiana Court
of Appeals, District Two, affirmed the trial court in all respects
on 1/30/92, Klagiss v. State, 585 N.E.2d 674 (Ind. Ct. App.).
3
The Indiana Supreme Court denied the Defendant's Petition
for Transfer on 3/11/92. The Defendant's Petition herein then
resulted.
Facts Adduced at Trial
In his Statement of the Case, The Defendant's initial
comments concern the background of his family as political
refugees from Soviet repression in their native Latvia. One
might wonder how the Defendant knew the details of his
family history in Latvia when he left that troubled nation at the
tender age of six (6) or seven (7). This doubt is particularly
significant when one considers that he accuses the Komitet
Gossudarrstvennoi Bezopastnosti, KGB, of murdering his
father, when the Soviet secret police was then called the
Narodnyi Kommissariat Unutrennikh Dell, NK VD, and did
not become the KGB until March 13, 1954.
The facts relevant to the offense herein were that at the
tume of her death, Jadviga Klagiss (hereinafter, the victim),
was an eighty year-old woman who was apparently becoming
senile, but who was quite active for her age, often being
described as "spry" (R.443, 445, 447, 450-456, 471-472, 477,
481, 515).
On February 18, 1991, Wayne Bruness, a former law
associate of the Defendant (the victim's son), notorized docu-
ments he had prepared which gave the Defendant the victim's
power of attomey, and more importantly, deeded her home to
him (R.617, 618, 620).
On March 9, 1988, at approximately 3:30 a.m., a
woman claiming medical expertise (presumably, the Defen-
dant's soon-to-be-wife, Susan Klagiss, who is a nurse), called
Kay Nimocks, a MetroHealth triage nurse (R.536, 537, 538).
4
The caller said she wanted to know what to do as the victim
(who was a MetroHealth patient) had no pulse, was not
breathing and her fingers had turned blue (R.538). Nimocks
told her to call the Marion County Sheriff's Department, so that
the Coroner could be summoned (R.538). The police were
called at 4:11 a.m. (R.227).
When Gary Gray, a Deputy Coroner, arrived at the
scene, he became suspicious because of several oddities. The
Defendant, his girlfriend and former law associate were the
only people present beside police officers. However, he could
get only limited information from them (R.156, 157). The
victim's body appeared to have been posed in her bed, but the
witnesses denied tampering with the body (R.188). The
autopsy revealed that there was a fresh laceration to the
victim's left eye that would have bled until the moment of
death, but there was no blood on the victim (R.599). Similarly,
the bandage on the victim's bedsore showed no drainage,
which would have occurred with even a few minutes of contact
with a living victim (R.595). The victim's night clothes were
clean, while the bed was urine-stained (R.158).
The Defendant and his girlfriend stated that the victim
was alive when they went downstairs to deal with laundry, but
that she was dead when they retumed less than five minutes
later (R.267-268). After being informed that this did not jibe
with the autopsy results, the girlfriend noted that the Defendant
did not immediately come downstairs with her (R.271-272).
Dr. Dean Hawley performed the autopsy on the victim
(R.547). The victim had suffered some 21 separate visible
injuries (R.554). The various bruises were of significantly
different age, which was demonstrated by their varying colors
(R.554, 564-567). The eyelid of her left eye was freshly
lacerated to the extent that it would still have been bleeding at
a |
5
the time of death (R.557-558). The victim's sixth cervical
vertebrae was severed, causing hemorrhaging in the nearby
tissues from the base of her skull to the mid-back (R.559, 561).
The two pieces of the bone were so greatly displaced that they
no longer sat upon one another (R.560). This crushed the
larynx, causing an immediate blockage of the victim's air
passage (R.560). The spinal cord was effectively severed at
this site (R.561, 562). This injury would have been "promptly
fatal" (R.563).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case is an inappropriate vehicle for review of the
Indiana statute defining Neglect of a Dependant as:
I. Indiana Code 35-46-1-4(a)(1) is not unconstitu-
tionally vague.
Il. Indiana Code 35-46-1-4(a)(1) is not unconstitu-
tional as it clearly defines the behavior that was prohibited.
Ill. The Defendant was not convicted of an offense for
which he was not charged.
IV. The State-of Indiana did produce sufficient evi-
dence of probative value to support the verdict of the jury.
V. The courts of Indiana have not adopted a burden of
proof that varies from the traditional definition of “beyond a
reasonable doubt".
VI. The trial court correctly refused to allow the
Defendant to ask hypothetical questions for which there was
no foundation.
seen eiatieeie
6
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I. and I. In these two (2) issues, the Defendant attacks
the constitutionality of IC 35-46-1-4(a)(1), as it is alleged to be
unconstitutionally vague and that it does not advise a citizen of
what behavior is prohibited. This is simply incorrect.
In its decision, the Indiana Court of Appeals noted that
an attack on a statute for being unconstitutionally vague, that
the statute must define the prohibited conduct in such a way
",., that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
it prohibits," Klagiss, id., at 682. The court then quoted the
Statute above and concluded that there was no unconstitutional
ambiguity. As the court wrote:
A person blessed with any measure of common
understanding would recognize that endan-
gering a dependant by abusing her in a manner
which caused her to die of a broken neck
would violate the statute.
Klagiss, at 682. The court below therefore concluded that the
statute was therefore constitutional.
The rule of law cited by the court below is precisely the
rule set by this Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 92 S.Ct.
2294, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L.Ed2d 222 (1972). Thus, the standard
invoked below was correct. The issue is therefore whether the
court's application of the rule was incorrect. This could not be
the case. The logic noted by the court below is unassailable.
Any treatment of a dependant that was so extreme that it would
actually.sever the dependant's spinal chord must certainly be
within the behavior prohibited by the statute. Thus, the State
would urge that these issues do not justify granting a Writ of
Certiorari.
7
Ill. and IV. In these two issues, the Defendant asserts
that he was not charged under the above -quoted statute and that
the evidence did not suppport the conviction. The Defendant's
argument is certainly unconvincing.
The Defendant argues that the Information charged
him with the specific act of neglecting the victim by breaking
her neck, while the instructions to the jury referenced only the
general statute. This issue is procedurally defaulted as the
Defendant has never previously raised the issue of the wording
of instructions, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489 (1986).
Thus, this issue is unavailable here.
The Defendant's assertion that the evidence did not
support the conviction is without merit. The Statement of the
Case above clearly demonstrates that the State produced over-
whelming evidence, including the Defendant's videotaped
Statement, that he in fact committed the charged offense.
Therefore, the Defendant has certainly failed to demonstrate
the level of inadequacy of evidence that would justify review,
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978). Clearly then, the
Defendant has wholely failed to demonstrate a failing in the
evidence.
V. The Defendant here attacks the decision below as
the court allegedly applied a standard other than the traditional
one of “beyond a reasonable doubt." This simply did not
happen.
It is certainly well settled that the Constitution, via the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prevents
conviction in a criminal case on any level of proof less than
"beyond a reasonable doubt," Cage v. Louisiana, 111 S.Ct.
328, ___ U.S. ___ (1990), Carella v. California, 109 S.Ct.
2419, ___ U.S. ___ (1989), rehearing denied, 110 S.Ct. 23,
__._:;U.S. __. However, as noted in Taylor above, upon
8
appellate review, the question is whether there was evidence of
probative value to support the verdict. Thus, the comment
about "substantial evidence” in the court's opinion was a
reference to the standard on review and had nothing to do with
the trial court jury's determination. Therefore, the Defendant
has again failed to demonstrate a reviewable issue.
VI. Finally, the Defendant urged that the trial court
erred when it refused to allow certain hypothetical questions.
However, it is clear that the factual basis for the questions did
not suppport them, and they were therefore improper.
In both of the examples at issue herein, the Defendant
asked hypothetical questions that included assumed facts that
had not been produced at trial. The court below affirmed the
trial court's refusal to allow the questions on this basis. The
assumed facts in question were that the victim had suffered a
previous injury and that she showed no other evidence of
trauma. The only evidence for the former was a vague
reference by the Defendant in his statement to the police, and
the other was directly contradicted by every witness who
viewed the body. It is well settled that hypothetical questions
based upon facts not in evidence are objectionable, and may be
excluded, U.S. v. Altenburger, 549 F.2d 702, cert. denied, 431
U.S. 923. Here, it is clear that the hypothetical questions at
issue were improper, and therefore, there was no error commit-
ted when the trial court refused to allow the questions.
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CONCLUSION
The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
LINLEY E. PEARSON
Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD CAREY WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
and Counsel of Record
LOUIS E. RANSDELL
Deputy Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
219 State House
Indianapolis, IN 46204-2794
Telephone: (317) 232-6230
Counsel for Respondent
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.