Opposition Brief — Klagiss v. Indiana

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91-1863 JUN 26 1999

SOF Tc 6

No. 91-1983 Ui royale

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1991

RAYMOND L KLAGISS,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF INDIANA,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the Supreme Court of Indiana

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

~ | LINLEY E. PEARSON

sano Attorney General of Indiana

RICHARD CAREY WEBSTER

Deputy Attorney General

Counsel of Record

— LOUIS E. RANSDELL

| Deputy Attorney General

— | Office of Attorney General

_— 219 State House

— IN 46204-2794

(317) 232-6230

Counsel for Respondent

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EN RNR Me Le ET ey eee Ae

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether IC 35-46-1-4(a)(1), defining the crime of

Neglect of a Dependant, is unconstitutionally vague.

Il. Whether IC 35-46-1-4(a)(1), is unconstitutional in

that it fails to sufficiently define the conduct constituting

Neglect of a Dependant.

Il. Whether the Defendant was convicted of an

offense with which he was not charged.

IV. Whether the State failed to produce sufficient

evidence of probative value to support the jury's verdict of

guilty of Neglect of a Dependant.

V. Whether the burden of proof was inadequate to

protect the Defendant's right to due process.

VI. Whether the trial court impermissibly limited the

testimony of the Defendant's expert witness.

ss

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.................... i

pp 8 ee pe 6). a

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. IC 35-46-1-4(a)(1), DEFINING THE

OFFENSE OF NEGLECT OF A DEPEN-

DANT, IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY

IT. IC 35-46-1-4(a)(1) DEFINES NEGLECT

OF A DEPENDANT IN SUFFICIENT

CLARITY TO ADVISE A CITIZEN OF

WHAT CONDUCT IS PROHIBITED......... 6

Il. THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT CONVICTED

FOR AN UNCHARGED OFFENSE.......... 7

IV. THE STATE PRODUCED SUFFICIENT

EVIDENCE OF PROBATIVE VALUE

TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT

OF GUILTY OF NEGLECT OF A

TABLE OF CONTENTS - CONT'D.

Page:

V. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH A

BURDEN OF PROOF THAT VARIED

FROM THE TRADITIONAL REQUIRE-

MENT FOR PROOF BEYOND A

fF Se tO Gs 6 ty ae 7

VI. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY

IN PREVENTING HYPOTHETICAL

QUESTIONS FOR WHICH THERE WAS

os 8, ee err 8

LE Sites asus a cen sch hae nee need 9

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Pages:

Cage v. Louisiana, 11 S.Ct. 328,

= a A Ok ch ee 7

Carella v. California, 109 S.Ct. 2419,

___ U.S. ____ (1989), rehearing denied,

OSA 2a ee ee a eee eee 7

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 92 S.Ct. 2294,

408 U.S. 104, 33 L.Ed2d 222 (1972) ......... 6

Klagiss v. State, 585 N.E.2d 674

pee ere re ee 1,2,6

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) .......... 7

Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) ......... 7

U.S. v. Altenburger, 549 F.2d 702

oe Ae ee >. 8

Statutes:

Indiana Code 35-42-1-5 . 1.1... cc eee eee 2

I CR FE oa 5 ck beh e ee aGees 2

Indiana Code 35-46-1-4(a)(1)..............005. i,1,5,6

Rules:

Sa A GA Wet Boe vo nee ooo eee l

No. 91-1983

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 199]

RAYMOND L. KLAGISS,

Petitioner,

Vv.

STATE OF INDIANA.

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the Supreme Court of Indiana

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respondent, State of Indiana, by its counsel, Linley E.

Pearson, pursuant to Rule 15 of the Rules of this Court,

respectfully opposes the Petition for Writ of Certiorari to

review the decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana, in the

case of Klagiss v. State, 585 N.E.2d 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Indiana Code 35-46-1-4(a)(1) reads as follows:

2

(a) A person having the care of a de- |

pendent, whether assumed voluntarily or

because of a legal obligation, who knowingly

or intentionally:

(1) places the dependent in a situation

that may endanger his life or health;

*x* * xX

commits neglect of a dependent, a Class D

felony. However, except for a violation of

clause (4), the offense is a Class B felony if it

results in serious bodily injury. It is a defense

that the accused person, in the legitimate

practice of his religious belief, provided

treatment by spiritual means through prayer,

in lieu of medical care, to his dependent.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Procedural History

The Defendant was indicted by a grand jury on April 3,

1989 when he was charged with Reckless Homocide, a Class

C felony under IC 35-42-1-5, and Neglect of a Dependant, a

Class B felony under IC 35-46-1-4 (R.14). Trial was held from

July 16, 1990 through July 19, 1990 (R.6, 840). On July 20,

1990, the jury found the Defendant to be guilty of Neglect of

a Dependant (R.92). The Defendant was then sentenced to six

(6) years of imprisonment (R.1023).

Subsequently, an appeal ensued, and the Indiana Court

of Appeals, District Two, affirmed the trial court in all respects

on 1/30/92, Klagiss v. State, 585 N.E.2d 674 (Ind. Ct. App.).

3

The Indiana Supreme Court denied the Defendant's Petition

for Transfer on 3/11/92. The Defendant's Petition herein then

resulted.

Facts Adduced at Trial

In his Statement of the Case, The Defendant's initial

comments concern the background of his family as political

refugees from Soviet repression in their native Latvia. One

might wonder how the Defendant knew the details of his

family history in Latvia when he left that troubled nation at the

tender age of six (6) or seven (7). This doubt is particularly

significant when one considers that he accuses the Komitet

Gossudarrstvennoi Bezopastnosti, KGB, of murdering his

father, when the Soviet secret police was then called the

Narodnyi Kommissariat Unutrennikh Dell, NK VD, and did

not become the KGB until March 13, 1954.

The facts relevant to the offense herein were that at the

tume of her death, Jadviga Klagiss (hereinafter, the victim),

was an eighty year-old woman who was apparently becoming

senile, but who was quite active for her age, often being

described as "spry" (R.443, 445, 447, 450-456, 471-472, 477,

481, 515).

On February 18, 1991, Wayne Bruness, a former law

associate of the Defendant (the victim's son), notorized docu-

ments he had prepared which gave the Defendant the victim's

power of attomey, and more importantly, deeded her home to

him (R.617, 618, 620).

On March 9, 1988, at approximately 3:30 a.m., a

woman claiming medical expertise (presumably, the Defen-

dant's soon-to-be-wife, Susan Klagiss, who is a nurse), called

Kay Nimocks, a MetroHealth triage nurse (R.536, 537, 538).

4

The caller said she wanted to know what to do as the victim

(who was a MetroHealth patient) had no pulse, was not

breathing and her fingers had turned blue (R.538). Nimocks

told her to call the Marion County Sheriff's Department, so that

the Coroner could be summoned (R.538). The police were

called at 4:11 a.m. (R.227).

When Gary Gray, a Deputy Coroner, arrived at the

scene, he became suspicious because of several oddities. The

Defendant, his girlfriend and former law associate were the

only people present beside police officers. However, he could

get only limited information from them (R.156, 157). The

victim's body appeared to have been posed in her bed, but the

witnesses denied tampering with the body (R.188). The

autopsy revealed that there was a fresh laceration to the

victim's left eye that would have bled until the moment of

death, but there was no blood on the victim (R.599). Similarly,

the bandage on the victim's bedsore showed no drainage,

which would have occurred with even a few minutes of contact

with a living victim (R.595). The victim's night clothes were

clean, while the bed was urine-stained (R.158).

The Defendant and his girlfriend stated that the victim

was alive when they went downstairs to deal with laundry, but

that she was dead when they retumed less than five minutes

later (R.267-268). After being informed that this did not jibe

with the autopsy results, the girlfriend noted that the Defendant

did not immediately come downstairs with her (R.271-272).

Dr. Dean Hawley performed the autopsy on the victim

(R.547). The victim had suffered some 21 separate visible

injuries (R.554). The various bruises were of significantly

different age, which was demonstrated by their varying colors

(R.554, 564-567). The eyelid of her left eye was freshly

lacerated to the extent that it would still have been bleeding at

a |

5

the time of death (R.557-558). The victim's sixth cervical

vertebrae was severed, causing hemorrhaging in the nearby

tissues from the base of her skull to the mid-back (R.559, 561).

The two pieces of the bone were so greatly displaced that they

no longer sat upon one another (R.560). This crushed the

larynx, causing an immediate blockage of the victim's air

passage (R.560). The spinal cord was effectively severed at

this site (R.561, 562). This injury would have been "promptly

fatal" (R.563).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This case is an inappropriate vehicle for review of the

Indiana statute defining Neglect of a Dependant as:

I. Indiana Code 35-46-1-4(a)(1) is not unconstitu-

tionally vague.

Il. Indiana Code 35-46-1-4(a)(1) is not unconstitu-

tional as it clearly defines the behavior that was prohibited.

Ill. The Defendant was not convicted of an offense for

which he was not charged.

IV. The State-of Indiana did produce sufficient evi-

dence of probative value to support the verdict of the jury.

V. The courts of Indiana have not adopted a burden of

proof that varies from the traditional definition of “beyond a

reasonable doubt".

VI. The trial court correctly refused to allow the

Defendant to ask hypothetical questions for which there was

no foundation.

seen eiatieeie

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REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. and I. In these two (2) issues, the Defendant attacks

the constitutionality of IC 35-46-1-4(a)(1), as it is alleged to be

unconstitutionally vague and that it does not advise a citizen of

what behavior is prohibited. This is simply incorrect.

In its decision, the Indiana Court of Appeals noted that

an attack on a statute for being unconstitutionally vague, that

the statute must define the prohibited conduct in such a way

",., that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what

it prohibits," Klagiss, id., at 682. The court then quoted the

Statute above and concluded that there was no unconstitutional

ambiguity. As the court wrote:

A person blessed with any measure of common

understanding would recognize that endan-

gering a dependant by abusing her in a manner

which caused her to die of a broken neck

would violate the statute.

Klagiss, at 682. The court below therefore concluded that the

statute was therefore constitutional.

The rule of law cited by the court below is precisely the

rule set by this Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 92 S.Ct.

2294, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L.Ed2d 222 (1972). Thus, the standard

invoked below was correct. The issue is therefore whether the

court's application of the rule was incorrect. This could not be

the case. The logic noted by the court below is unassailable.

Any treatment of a dependant that was so extreme that it would

actually.sever the dependant's spinal chord must certainly be

within the behavior prohibited by the statute. Thus, the State

would urge that these issues do not justify granting a Writ of

Certiorari.

7

Ill. and IV. In these two issues, the Defendant asserts

that he was not charged under the above -quoted statute and that

the evidence did not suppport the conviction. The Defendant's

argument is certainly unconvincing.

The Defendant argues that the Information charged

him with the specific act of neglecting the victim by breaking

her neck, while the instructions to the jury referenced only the

general statute. This issue is procedurally defaulted as the

Defendant has never previously raised the issue of the wording

of instructions, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489 (1986).

Thus, this issue is unavailable here.

The Defendant's assertion that the evidence did not

support the conviction is without merit. The Statement of the

Case above clearly demonstrates that the State produced over-

whelming evidence, including the Defendant's videotaped

Statement, that he in fact committed the charged offense.

Therefore, the Defendant has certainly failed to demonstrate

the level of inadequacy of evidence that would justify review,

Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978). Clearly then, the

Defendant has wholely failed to demonstrate a failing in the

evidence.

V. The Defendant here attacks the decision below as

the court allegedly applied a standard other than the traditional

one of “beyond a reasonable doubt." This simply did not

happen.

It is certainly well settled that the Constitution, via the

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prevents

conviction in a criminal case on any level of proof less than

"beyond a reasonable doubt," Cage v. Louisiana, 111 S.Ct.

328, ___ U.S. ___ (1990), Carella v. California, 109 S.Ct.

2419, ___ U.S. ___ (1989), rehearing denied, 110 S.Ct. 23,

__._:;U.S. __. However, as noted in Taylor above, upon

8

appellate review, the question is whether there was evidence of

probative value to support the verdict. Thus, the comment

about "substantial evidence” in the court's opinion was a

reference to the standard on review and had nothing to do with

the trial court jury's determination. Therefore, the Defendant

has again failed to demonstrate a reviewable issue.

VI. Finally, the Defendant urged that the trial court

erred when it refused to allow certain hypothetical questions.

However, it is clear that the factual basis for the questions did

not suppport them, and they were therefore improper.

In both of the examples at issue herein, the Defendant

asked hypothetical questions that included assumed facts that

had not been produced at trial. The court below affirmed the

trial court's refusal to allow the questions on this basis. The

assumed facts in question were that the victim had suffered a

previous injury and that she showed no other evidence of

trauma. The only evidence for the former was a vague

reference by the Defendant in his statement to the police, and

the other was directly contradicted by every witness who

viewed the body. It is well settled that hypothetical questions

based upon facts not in evidence are objectionable, and may be

excluded, U.S. v. Altenburger, 549 F.2d 702, cert. denied, 431

U.S. 923. Here, it is clear that the hypothetical questions at

issue were improper, and therefore, there was no error commit-

ted when the trial court refused to allow the questions.

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CONCLUSION

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

LINLEY E. PEARSON

Attorney General of Indiana

RICHARD CAREY WEBSTER

Deputy Attorney General

and Counsel of Record

LOUIS E. RANSDELL

Deputy Attorney General

Office of Attorney General

219 State House

Indianapolis, IN 46204-2794

Telephone: (317) 232-6230

Counsel for Respondent

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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