Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ferris v. Board of County Commissioners

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FIs. ED

91-] 661 MAR.~11

femme = (1992

| OFFICE OF THE CLERK

CASE NO. ised

SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

PAUL FERRIS

PETITIONER

Vv.

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE

COUNTY OF MESA, STATE OF COLORADO; RICHARD

C. POND IN HIS CAPACITY AS MEMBER OF SAID

BOARD AND INDIVIDUALLY; MAXINE ALBERS AND

R. W. HOLMES IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES

AS MEMBERS OF SAID BOARD AND INDIVIDUALLY.

RES PONDENT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION III.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Paul Ferris

840 23 Road

Grand Junction, Colorado 81505

Telephone: (303) 243-3115

March 1992.

ai i

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the unlawful imposition of a gen-

eral property tax by legislative act of a

board of county commissioners violates a

citizen’s right to a Republican Form of

Government as guaranteed by Article IV,

Section 4 of The United States Constitution

for which a citizen’s right to petition for

redress may not be impaired.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

eg sos 2 eee eee ee 1

PRC HO ke KS 5 544% bas 6004S 6 Ow Ew 2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 3

SaActoremes OF THE CASE .. nc ccccscccnsvcas 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..... 30

I. The Republican Guarantee ......... 32

II. Equal Protection and Due Process 38

Po gis Vg eo: aoe a er oe eer arn 52

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Board of Assessment Appeals v. Benbrook,

4am wim SOR. (COLO. 5 BOOT) i dvi ee ewes 45

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 52 L.Ed.2d

Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 15

pce cae ee? ROS Fi ak wes oe GA eee 40

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.(1 Cranch) 137,

eas ee ee 8 846d hea kK xe RE Oe Oe 34

i a

McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185,

23 L.EG.2d 194 (1969) ..ccescscveseses 44

McKesson v. Division of Alc. Bev., 495 U.

S. , 110 L.Ed.2da 17 (1990). 49, 50, Si

Minor v. Haypersett, 88 U.S. 162,

22 L.BA.627 (i673) ..ccscee ea baeeces eo ke

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 73

L.Ed.20 349 (19802) ccsccoveceeset vives ao

Pacific Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S.

118, 56 L.Ba@. 377 (Sis) cen tws tan 33, 26

Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. 389, 19 L.Ed.2d

1267 (1968) wevcctsussecae sheen eee ee 46

U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)

U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. (Otto)196, 27 L.Ed.

171 (1862) 6 scusue ve eee ee eee eee 34

iii

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

United States Con:

First Amendment

Fifth Amendment

itution:

Fourteenth Amendment

Colorado Const itut

Section 6

Feder al Enabl ing Act

of Colorado, Sect

Declaration of Indepe

Colorado Revised S

24-6-401, et sed.

cain

ee ie re re re ee ea 15

ee ee EY ere ae ry rere eee aa 14, 22

ee ee dS ree were ee ee ee 15

Part 3, Article 1, Title 29 ... 2, 17, 18

ee eS rene eee ere eee eee gan 4

-, 2Y Ck > Seen ree sere e” ‘, 38. 37,38. @2

oe EO Dee ef) See es rare na 14

BOS SOStaE) COP 8 oc eects seer anae ee 14, 47

BO sees ee kas KAO 14, 22, 47, 30

Re ee Tt | ea PRE A A es a ete Pee es oo 14

Mae oe. T&S Rare rere a bert ai, 22; #7

eO* 2 *3CS 16): 4055-0 ¥05 43 $4, 23; 22.47, 30

29-9-101(Public Meetings Law) ..... 34.20

22, 42

ae ee oe. me a, er orca eran ier et 21

2s COP Ys ok no on ee eee 14, 22

ey Gat Fk See ere eee +, 3. th @

dag at oy ee aa a 3. &; Ta,

39 ~+20-234 (2) fe) TZ) 1B) 2.2 cca cc ee’s 48, 50

A&R (Abatement and Refund at 39-1-113

se°SU-EAG} 120s Dy 380, 24, 42; 28, 22.

46, 47, 48, 49,

MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITIES:

Hamilton, "Federalist" No. 84

Madison, "Federalist" No. 44

Madison, "Federalist" No. 39

and

SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

PAUL FERRIS

Petitioner

Vv.

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE

COUNTY OF MESA, STATE OF COLORADO; et al.

Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION III.

Petitioner Paul Ferris petitions for a Writ

of Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Ap-

peals affirmation of Colorado District

Court dismissal of his complaint for decla-

ratory and injunctive relief against the

Board of County Commissioners of the County

of Mesa, State of Colorado, and the commis-

Sioners individually.

OPINIONS BELOW

The unreported opinion of the Coloradc

Court of Appeals and order on rehearing are

reprinted in the appendix. No. 89CA2137.

Oral findings and conclusions of Colorado

District Court for dismissal and two subse-

quent unreported written orders affirming

oral dismissal are reprinted in the appen-

dix. No. 89CV204.

Unreported orders of the Colorado Supreme

Court denying certiorari and striking peti-

tion to reconsider are reprinted in the ap-

pendix. No. 91SC370.

JURISDICTION

The Colorado Court of Appeals, Division

III, on April 25, 1991 entered judgment

affirming district trial court dismissal.

Rehearing was denied May 23, 1991.

Petition for Certiorari by Colorado’s Su-

preme Court was denied Nov. 12, 1991.

Time for filing a petition in this Court

has been extended to and including March

11, 1992. Application No. A-544.

Jurisdiction of The United States Supreme

Court is invoked by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1257.

Also 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2403(b).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

This case involves these United States

Constitution provisions: The Republican

Guarantee of Article IV, Section 4; the

right to petition Government for a redress

of Grievances of Amendment I; the Due Pro-

cess Clause of Amendment V, the Due Process

and Equal Protection Clauses of Amendment

XIV, Section 1.

This case involves the Federal Enabling

Act to Colorado State Government, Sec.4.

This case involves the Equal Justice pro-

vision of Colorado Constitution, Article

II, Section 6.

This case involves these Colorado Stat-

utes: 24-6-401 (State Open Meetings Law) ;

Part 3 of Article 1, Title 29; 29-9-101

(Public Meetings Law), 39-1-113, 39-10-114.

The pertinent text of these constitution-

al provisions and the statutes are set

forth in the separate appendix volume.

ese een

erent Rarer <r

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In Fall, 1988, Respondent Board of County

Commissioners of Mesa County (Com’rs) im-

plemented exception procedures to collect

revenues in excess of the property tax rev-

enue increase limitation at 29-1-301,

C.R.S. and adopted a 4-mill excess levy for

budget year 1989 for capital expenditures,

debt service for capital expenditures, and

general operating budget’ pursuant solely

to "truth in taxation" public disclosure

procedures at 29-1-303, C.R.S.? Petition-

er Paul Ferris (Ferris) and others apprised

Com’rs, on the record, of then known de-

fects of procedure at public disclosure

hearings held, prior to Com’rs’ approval of

the excess amount of revenue and adoption

of the excess levy. Additionally Ferris

gave Com’rs written notice and complaint on

Dec 1, 1988, detailing the then known is-

* Record: Exhibits C, D, 1, and 2.

* Record: Exhibit 1, Sections K, OO.

ijioo————~~€~_,_

sues of this action.* Receiving no re-

sponse, Ferris filed suit March 20, 1989,

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief

as to the legality and validity of proced-

ures implemented and the resultant excess

levy. Ferris brought this action as citi-

zen/registered elector/property owner/prop-

erty taxpayer, alleging injury individually

to his several personages, though not nec-

essarily same injury to each individual

status, from the excessive governmental

conduct subject of the Complaint.‘

The Complaint was filed pursuant to Unit-

ed States Constitution First Amendment

right "to petition the Government for a re-

dress of grievances" and corollary Article

II Section 6 Colorado Constitution guaran-

> Record, Vol.I, COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR

REDRESS (stricken), p.26-30.

* Record, Vol.I: COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR

REDRESS (stricken), p.4-5, 17-18; AMENDED COMPLAINT

AND PETITION FOR REDRESS, p.154, 156; BRIEF IN

SUPPORT OF AMENDED COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR RE-

DRESS, p.144-145.

tee of "a speedy remedy for every injury to

person, property, or character,"* alleg-

ing that Com’rs’ legislative acts com-

plained of were not within their lawful

discretion, and therefore a cause of action

and redress was available directly through

the courts. The nature of the grievance

was that the Com’rs’ legislative imposition

of a general property tax was by unlawful

implementation of procedures, lawfully in-

sufficient procedure and notice, and in

violation of requirements of various appli-

cable Colorado statutory public meetings/

hearings requirements. "Since the Board

does not enjoy discretion to abrogate citi-

zens’ rights, nor to violate laws of the

General Assembly, including specific laws

of procedure and process for taxation, a

cause of action does lie in this case. The

Record, Vol.I: COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR

REDRESS (stricken), p.5, 6; AMENDED COMPLAINT AND

PETITION FOR REDRESS, p.153.

Court here is not asked to substitute its

judgment for that of the Board. The

Court’s jurisdiction is invoked for a de-

termination of: (a) Did the Board violate

law, binding upon the Board, in the matter

of "truth in taxation" complained of? And |

if so, (b) by doing so, were rights, privi-

leges, and/or immunities of Mesa County

citizens, as a class, violated? If so, (c)

TL LINC i ceca ta

were Plaintiff’s rights, privileges, and/or

immunities, as an individual, violated?

(d) remedies."*

In addition to direct monetary injury,

the Complaint alleged injury by virtue of

deprivation of immunity of "no taxation Pe

without representation" and deprivation of

rights, privileges and immunities secured

by United States Constitution, Fourteenth

* Record, Vol.I: BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR REDRESS, p.147; Also,

COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR REDRESS (stricken),

p.20, 21.

Amendment and by 42 U.S.C. 1983.’

Relief was sought by means of Colorado

statutory provisions for obtaining a decla-

ratory judgment.*® Ferris argued declara-

tory order and relief were available and

the proper means of redress for these

claims of unlawful imposition of a general

property tax by legislative act, and for

obtaining the relief sought here.® Nov.

8, 1989, at oral evidentiary hearing held

solely on Ferris’ motion for injunctive

relief, the district court denied temporary

injunction and orally dismissed the com-

plaint pursuant to one or more of Com’rs’

several motions for summary dismissal, pri-

or to and without any hearing of said mo-

Record, Vol.I: BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR REDRESS, p.144, 145,

147; COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR REDRESS (stricken),

pvt?, 38, 21.

® Record, Vol.I: COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR

REDRESS (stricken), p.8-10, 22-24; AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR REDRESS, p.153, 160-161;

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED COMPLAINT’ AND PETITION

FOR REDRESS, p. 146-147.

* Record: Vol.III, p.107 @line 17 p.108 @line

a2.

tions, such dismissal including claims of

other than monetary injury, on ground of

failure to exhaust administrative remedies,

citing that monetary relief was available

to Ferris through statutory procedure for

administrative abatement and refund of pro-

perty taxes at 39-1-113 and 39-10-114,

C.R.S. (A&R), and that the existence of

that remedy made its exercise a condition

precedent to commencing a suit for declara-

tory order and relief.*® Nov. 14 and Dec.

8, 1989, the trial judge affirmed oral dis-

missal by written order, citing solely as

ground that Ferris, as a property taxpayer,

had not exhausted the administrative remedy

of A&R.

Ferris appealed District Court dismissal

and denial of temporary injunction to the

Colorado Court of Appeals. Appeal alleged

error in findings of fact and conclusions

of law, including as to facts and evidence

admitted at the Nov. 8, 1989 evidentiary

court hearing and those reasonable infer-

ences, favorable to Ferris’ position, that

could be drawn from evidence, testimony,

and facts, admitted and controverted, such

that would defeat Com’rs’ motions for sum-

mary judgment. That dismissal of claims

made in the complaint was error was basis

of appeal. Appeal raised additional feder-

al questions of whether a state can limit

means of redress for unlawful imposition of

a prospective general property tax by leg-

islative act of a board of county commis-

Sloners to the administrative remedy of A&R

for individual property taxes, to the ex-

clusion of all other remedies and statuses

of citizens without violating the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment United States Constitution; whether

Ferris’ First Amendment United States Con-

stitution right to petition for redress of

grievances in these circumstances could be

impaired without violating the United

States Constitution guarantee of a repub-

lican form of government; whether admini-

strative A&R procedure provides meaningful

relief meeting minimum United States Con-

stitution due process requirements of clear

and certain remedy.

In 89CA2137 opinion not selected for pub-

lication, the Court of Appeals opined: The

trial court’s detailed oral findings and

order disposed of the entire claim for re-

lief, therefore, all of Ferris’ contentions

could be considered on appeal; county com-

missioners must adhere to a mandatory pro-

cedure in order to levy excess property

taxes; violation of procedure constitutes

an “irregularity in levying" as contempla-

ted by statutes at 39-1-113 and 39-10-114,

C.R.S., procedure for abatement and refund

of property taxes (A&R); assuming Com’rs

here acted in derogation of the pertinent

Statutory guidelines, the tax is an illegal

levy to which A&R statutes apply; circum-

stances here do not except Ferris from

first exhausting administrative remedy of

A&R, because Com’rs might cure the defect

by imposing a subsequent legal levy should

the tax levy be determined illegal on ad-

ministrative review; it was unnecessary to

address Ferris’ other contentions of error

(including alleged injuries and claims for

relief in statuses other than property tax-

payer) because of disposition of "taxpay-

er’s" claims on jurisdictional grounds.

The Colorado Supreme Court denied Ferris’

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Colorado Court of Appeals.

The Federal question sought to be review-

ed here is to the fundamental constitution-

al ground upon which the claims at issue

before the trial court were based. Aspects

of such question were therefore squarely

A ees

raised in the Complaint, at the outset of

this action, and those same aspects and

others have been subsequently raised, as

error, to the Court of Appeals on appeal

and to the Colorado Supreme Court in denied

petition for discretionary review.

"A PUBLIC HEARING SHALL BE HELD ON A PRO-

POSAL TO INCREASE YOUR PROPERTY TAXES" was

sole notice caption published to advertise

all public hearings held (Sept. 20, Nov. 22

and 25, 1988) for Com’rs legislative adop-

tion of "truth in taxation" procedure and

the excess levy.** Ferris argued, as er-

ror, to the Court of Appeals: That the no-

tice caption published for the Sept. 20,

1988 hearing, admitted into evidence just

prior to oral trial court dismissal, was

other than the express and exact notice

caption mandated by statute for advertise-

ment of a lawful first hearing for adoption

*t Record: Exhibit 1, Sections B, MM, NN.

a Te Te nae

of that procedure, "A PUBLIC HEARING SHALL

BE HELD TO CONSIDER ADOPTION OF A TAXING

PROCEDURE TO INCREASE YOUR PROPERTY TAXES",

as per C.R.S. 29-1-303(1)(b); that since

Same express notice caption for adoption of

the procedure was never published, the sub-

sequent resolution to implement C.R.S. 29-

1-303 procedure was not adopted at a law-

fully-noticed first hearing; that Com’rs

were therefore without jurisdiction to pro-

ceed with adoption of an increased levy by

that procedure, and any levy adopted was

invalid as per C.R.S. 29-1-303(1) (a) (b),

(3); 24-6-402(4); 29-9-101(2) .??

The complaint sought a declaratory judg-

ment in the tral court that other notice

published did not meet express statutory

requirements of procedure at 29-1-303(4),

(6) C.R.S. nor substantive "full and time-

‘? APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON APPEAL (stricken),

p.51-53, 107-108; CONDENSED APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON

APPEAL, p. 14-15, 24-25.

ly" notice requirements at 24-6-402(2),

C. RS. Declaratory order and injunctive

relief were sought by express statutory

means provided at 24-6-402(6).*® Same ar-

guments were raised, as trial court error,

to the Court of Appeals.** Notice of the

Nov. 25, 1988 hearing was published Nov. 24

(Thanksgiving Day) and Nov. 25, 1988, the

day of the hearing.*® Neither time nor

place of the November 25, 1988 hearing was

published in the notice for the Sept. 20 or

Nov. 22, 1988 hearings.** Ferris argued:

That the express statutory requirement is

that notice must be published on two sepa-

rate dates for any hearing, for a hearing

time and place fixed in the advertisement,

** Record, Vol.I: COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR

REDRESS (stricken), p.15-17, 22; AMENDED COMPLAINT

AND PETITION FOR REDRESS, p.160; BRIEF IN SUPPORT

OF AMENDED COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR REDRESS,

D.142-244.

* CONDENSED APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON APPEAL, p.16-

17, 24-25; APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON APPEAL (stricken),

p.68-77, 107-108.

** Record: Exhibit 1, Section NN.

* Record: Exhibit 1, Sections B, MM.

the second notice expressly not more than

eight days prior, and the first implicitly

not less than eight days prior and express-

ly not less by other applicable statutory

notice requirements; that since notice pub-

lished did not meet such requirements, the

resolution for an increased levy was not

approved at hearing held pursuant to lawful

notice and was therefore invalid.

The trial court orally found that the

Com’rs provided proper notice of the Novem-

ber 22, 1988 hearing, and they

", . . didn’t need to give anybody

notice that the hearing was being

continued at all. They gave as

much notice as they could that the

hearing was being continued to

November 25, 1988, and exceeded

the statutory requirements. "?’

Ferris additionally sought a declaratory

‘7 Record: Vol.III, p.110 @1.15-20.

judgment in the trial court that the excep-

tion procedure at 29-1-303, C.R.S. was for

obtaining excess general operating budget

revenues for one budget year only, and

could not be implemented to obtain excess

revenues for capital expenditures or prosp-

ective revenues, as it was here, because of

the express wording of that statutory proc-

edure, the availability of other alterna-

tive exception procedures, also at Part 3

of Article I, Title 29, C.R.S., expressly

for obtaining excess revenues for such

other purposes, and express statutory re-

strictions placed upon raising excess rev-

enues for such other purposes.**® Same is-

sues were rgised as error to the Court of

Appeals.*® ~*

#® Record: COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR REDRESS

(stricken), p.10-17; BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR REDRESS, p.138-144.

19 APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON APPEAL (stricken),

p.48-51, 53-68, 77-88, 107-108; CONDENSED APPEL-

LANT’S BRIEF ON APPEAL, p.13-14, 15-16, 17-20, 24-

25.

—

The trial court orally found that proce-

dure at 29-1-303, C.R.S. was the applicable

one in these circumstances.?® As to the

above claims of unlawful taxing procedure

under Part 3, Article 1, Title ae; ¢€.8.8.,

raised on appeal as error, the Court of

Appeals did not contemplate the factual

issues of this case in light of the statu-

tory requirements, apparently because of

disposition of all claims on jurisdictional

ground of failure to exhaust administrative

remedy of A&R as a property taxpayer.”

The Court of Appeals generally found this

action was of the nature for which A&R pro-

cedure was intended. ??

Ferris raised the issue to the Court of

Appeals, as trial court error, that un-con-

troverted evidence and testimony were ad-

mitted at the Nov. 8, 1989 trial court

*° Record: Vol.III, p.109 @line 18.

** 89CA2137 Opinion, p.7.

*2 89CA2137 Opinion, p.5.

hearing from which a reasonable inference,

if not proof, could be drawn favorable to

the Ferris position that Com’rs’ adoption

of an excess mill levy at "truth in taxa-

tion" hearing was a mere “rubber stamp" of

decisions made outside of public hearing

and out of public "“hearing."** The same

claim had been made a part of the Com-

plaint**, and was argued in pleadings to

vacate summary trial court dismissal.*

At the November 25, 1988 "truth in taxa-

tion" hearing, Commissioner Pond had moved

and read into the record a resolution to

adopt a 4-mill increase levy and read the

final vote prior to any public vote by

** APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON AFPEAL (stricken),

p.91-110; CONDENSED APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL,

p.21-26.

%@ Record, Vol.I: COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR

REDRESS (stricken), p.15-17; AMENDED COMPLAINT AND

PETITION FOR REDRESS, p.158-159; BRIEF IN SUPPORT

OF AMENDED COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR REDRESS,

p.142-144.

7° Record, Vol.II: PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION AND

PETITION FOR REDRESS WITH AFFIDAVIT, p.412, p.415.

Com’rs.** Un-controverted testimony by

Commissioner Pond was admitted at trial

court hearing that during a recess outside

the November 25, 1988 "truth in taxation"

hearing, "There was a debate between the

commissioners as to what mill levy might be

established."*” Subsequent to such testi-

mony, the trial court orally ruled that 24-

6-401, C.R.S., the State Open Meetings Law,

was inapplicable to county commissioners;

that 29-9-101, C.R.S., the Public Meetings

Law, was the applicable statute and was

observed; that the resolution to approve an

excess mill levy was adopted at a properly

noticed open and public session.”

Ferris raised the argument to the trial

court, orally and in his pleas to recon-

*° Record: Vol.III, p.39 @1.21-p.40 @1.5; Plai-

ntiff’s Exhibit C, tapes 5, 6, C1; Defendants’

Exhibit 2, 11/25/88, p.37.

*” Record, Vol.III: p.24 @1.8; p.44 @1.16; p.45

@1.6; p.46 @1.6.

*® Record: Vol.III, p.109 @1.24 - p.110 @1.10.

Sider dismissal**, and at length to the

Court of Appeals as trial court error’,

that neither debate of proposed public pol-

icy by Com’rs outside public hearing, pro-

posals not presented in public hearing,

where a public vote follows same, nor pub-

lic "rubber stamping" of final policy deci-

sions reached outside of public hearing,

were within the purpose of "truth in taxa-

tion" public disclosure procedures and vio-

lated express wording at: 29-1-303(5), (6),

C.R.S., "truth in taxation" procedure; 24-

6-402(1), C.R.S., the State Open Meetings

Law; 29-9-101(1), C.R.S., the Public Meet-

ings Law. Ferris argued that all of these

statutory public hearings/meetings statutes

79 Record: Vol.III, p.108 @1.17-21. Vol.II:

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’

ALTERNATIVE MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

AND/OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, p.382; PLAINTIFF’S OBJEC-

TION AND PETITION FOR REDRESS WITH AFFIDAVIT,

p.412, 415; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR C.R.C.P. RULE 11

SANCTIONS, p.420-421.

3° APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL (stricken),

p.95-110; CONDENSED APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL,

p.22-25.

were applicable, and the resolution approv-

ing an excess property tax levy was adopted

contrary to requirements of each and was

expressly invalidated by same statutes at

29-1-303(3), (5), (6); 24-6-402(4), 29-9-

201 (2); ©.k.8. Upon reconsideration of

oral dismissal, dismissal of all claims,

the trial court twice subsequently affirmed

such dismissal by written order, but there

cited solely, as grounds, failure to ex-

haust administrative remedy of A&R before

bringing the action™ - same failure jur-

isdictionally precluding hearing of Ferris’

claims as to Com’rs’ violation of statutory

public meetings/hearings requirements*™.

Ferris argued, as trial court error, to the

Court of Appeals that reasonable inferenc-

es, if not proof, of violation of "truth in

taxation" hearings requirements, of the

State Open Meetings Law, and/ or the Public

> Record, Vol.II: ORDER p.424; ORDER, p.436.

32 Record, Vol.II: ORDER, p.436.

Meetings Law could be drawn from testimony

and admitted and controverted material

facts, such inferences of violation negat-

ing trial court dismissal by summary judg-

ment for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies, and defeating Com’rs’ motions for

summary judgment on issues of public meet-

ings.

The Court of Appeals did not address

these contentions of error regarding public

meetings/hearings statutes because of dis-

position of "taxpayer’s" (Ferris) claim on

the same jurisdictional ground as that for

trial court’s dismissal, for failure to

exhaust administrative remedy of A&R as a

property taxpayer.”

Ferris raised the contention of trial

court error to the Court of Appeals that in

these circumstances of unlawful imposition

of a general property tax by legislative

> 89CA2137 Opinion p.7.

act of Com’rs, where state citizens are

conferred statutory right to county commis-

Ssioners’ compliance with the various public

meetings hearings requirem ats and express

statutory means of redress and remedy as

sought here*™* for Com’rs’ noncompliance

with same, that dismissa] of all Ferris’

claims, in all statuses, for failure to

exhaust an administrative remedy for direct

monetary relief only, as a property taxpay-

er, is effectual denial of First Amendment

United States Constitution right to peti-

tion for redress in other statuses because

he might have an administrative avenue of

monetary relief in one status, property

taxpayer. Ferris argued that such a denial

of a protected right is not consistent with

due process, and is repugnant to the Equal

Protection Clause of United States Consti-

** Record: Vol.III, p.108 @ 1.15-22; Vol.II,

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’

ALTERNATIVE MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

AND/OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, p.397, 402, 390-391.

tution, Fourteenth Amendment, Article II,

Section 6 of Colorado Constitution, and the

form of republican government in Colorado

and the United States.** The Court of Ap-

peals did not address this contention of

error.”

The argument was made to the trial court

prior to and after dismissal®’, and raised

as error to the Court of Appeals*™® that

the administrative remedy of A&R is not

only inappropriate for redress of the un-

lawful legislative acts at issue and espe-

cially so for obtaining the non-monetary

relief sought in the Complaint, but that

°° APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON APPEAL (stricken),

p.46-48; CONDENSED APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON APPEAL,

5 pee & Boge Pe Oe

37 Record: Vol.III, p.108 @1.5-22. Vol.I,

COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR REDRESS (stricken),

p.20-21; Vol.I, BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED COM-

PLAINT AND PETITION FOR REDRESS, p.147; Wehwais

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’

ALTERNATIVE MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

AND/OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, p.384-400.

3® APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON APPEAL (stricken),

p.28-36; CONDENSED APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON APPEAL,

b.6-9.

such, if it is sole remedy available for

redress of a grievance of any unlawful leg-

islative conduct of a board of county com-

missioners in imposing a general property

tax, where same commissioners are judge in

their own cause, is violative of the doc-

trine of separation of government powers.

The contention was raised in the trial

court*®® and argued at length to the Court

of Appeals*®, as error, that monetary re-

lief available through administrative A&R

procedure did not meet minimum Federal Due

Process requirements of clear and certain

remedy; that even for direct monetary inju-

ry to the status of property taxpayer the

relief was not necessarily meaningful, as

any taxes abated or refunded could Simply

*? Record, Vol.III, p.107 @line 17-25. Vol.II,

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’

ALTERNATIVE MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

AND/OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, p.389, 398-399.

*° APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON APPEAL (stricken),

p.36-43; CONDENSED APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON APPEAL,

p.9-11.

be re-levied and collected the subsequent

tax year; that if the revenue resultant of

the excess levy were made a prospective

part of the county’s revenue base, a tax-

payer seeking remedy would be required to

pursue the administrative A&R procedure

each future year derivative levies were ap-

plied; that the statutes provided no means

for overall cure of the unlawful legisla-

tive conduct subject of claims in the com-

plaint. Ferris argued to the trial

court**? and to the Colorado Court of ap-

peals** that to allow the Com’rs to legis-

latively impose a general property tax levy

in excess of their authority is "taxation

without representation" and that to re-

strict redress for such unlawful legisla-

“1 Record: Vol.II, PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ ALTERNATIVE MOTIONS FOR

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND/OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

p.400.

‘2 APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL (stricken),

p.81; CONDENSED APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON APPEAL, p.19;

APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR REHEARING, p.5-6.

tive acts to administrative procedure for

piecemeal individual monetary damages, ava-

ilable to property taxpayers only, is re-

pugnant to United States and Colorado Con-

stitutions. The trial court found that

Ferris has available a simple remedy of

money damages through A&R.*? The Court of

Appeals opined that such a construction

would render the statutory language of A&R

meaningless and circumstances here do not

except Ferris from first exhausting such

administrative remedy, because the Commis-

Sioners might cure the defect by imposing

a subsequent legal levy were the tax levy

determined illegal on administrative rev-

iew.‘*

Each and all the above stated claims and

arguments made in the trial court and rais-

ed, as error, to the Colorado Court of Ap-

peals were raised in Ferris’ denied Peti-

** Record, Vol.III: p.111 @1.5-20.

*“* 89CA2137 Opinion, p.4-5.

aaa

tion to The Colorado Supreme Court for a

Writ of Certiorari to the Colorado Court of

Appeals’ affirmation of trial court dismis-

sal. Ferris summarized to the Colorado Su-

preme Court that the Court of Appeals’ zeal

to protect statutory language of A&R rati-

fies the excessive and infirm legislative

conduct at issue, resulting in an unlawful

tax levy for which individual monetary re-

lief afforded through administrative A&R

procedure is sole remedy, regardless of

other non-monetary injury to statuses other

than and including property taxpayer; that

such holding has rendered nugatory, in

these circumstances, statutory guarantees

of property tax revenue increase limitation

and public meetings/hearings, and Constitu-

tions’ guarantees and principles of separa-

tion of powers, equal protection, no taxa-

tion without representation, and due pro-

cess right to clear, certain remedy and

meaningful relief; that therefore for ad-

OO ee

ministrative A&R procedure to be sole reme-

dy is impermissible under United States

Constitution. *

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The legislative acts of the state govern-

ment officials and the resultant tax, sub-

ject of this cause of action are "so con-

trary to the root philosophy of a Republi-

can Form of Government as might cause this

Court to resort to the guarantee clause of

Article IV Section 4 of the United States

Constitution." This case presents a funda-

mental coustitutional issue, is of general

importance, and concerns the important pri-

vate right to petition the government for

a redress of grievances against unconstitu-

tional legislative acts of state govern-

ment. The Colorado Court of Appeals has

decided this important question of federal

law in a way not in harmony with United

** APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI,

p.5.

States Constitution, Article IV, Section 4,

nor with other rights of Due Process and

Equal Protection guaranteed by the Four-

teenth Amendment. The question of whether

the unlawful imposition of a general tax by

legislative act of local state government

officials, in excess of statutory limita-

tions imposed on their taxing power, vio-

lates the constitutional guarantee of a

republican form of state government, and

whether redress for such may be impaired

and limited solely to an administrative

proceeding for individual direct monetary

injury to taxpayers, has not been, but

should be, settled by this Court. Because

the tax levy was adopted ina manner faci-

ally in excess of statutory authority, the

core issue of this petition is sovereignty

of law. While tangential arguments of due

process and equal protection can be made in

attempting to reach the sovereignty doct-

rine, it can only be reached directly, in

this case, through the Guarantee Clause.

This Court could here reconsider the doc-

trine that all questions involving the Gua-

rantee Clause are by definition political.

I. THE REPUBLICAN GUARANTEE

The issue presented here is that the leg-

islative conduct of state government offic-

lals in the adoption of a general property

tax, and the resultant tax, are violative

of the express laws of the state, and ther-

efore such circumstance is violative of the

republican guarantee at Article IV, Section

4, United States Constitution. Adjudicat-

ing sovereignty of state law does not pres-

ent a challenge that Colorado state govern-

ment 1S not republican in form - challeng-

ing the state as a state. The challenge is

to the legality of governmental conduct and

to the tax as a tax - That the tax and con-

duct is contrary to congressional guaran-

tees enabling statehood. As to various

Claims of lawfully insufficient notice and

procedure, the law and facts facially show

that the challenged legislative enactment

of a general tax exceeds the specific stat-

utory, and therefore constitutional, limi-

tations imposed upon the Com’rs’ taxing and

spending power. That the challenged enact-

ment exceeds Com’rs’ lawful discretion is

alleged on further grounds of statutory

taxing limitation and on other statutory

ground of excessive conduct that is not

necessarily a tax matter. A challenge on

such issues is non-political in nature.

The question, as presented, is justiciable,

for reasons explained in Pacific Telephone

Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 @150, but

should additionally be found justiciable on

the ground that subject conduct and tax

violate Article IV, Section 4, United

States Constitution, for which a citizen’s

right to petition for redress may not be

impaired. While cause of action here does

not solely arise out of injury to rights

CC Ee

under Article IV, Section 4, this case can-

not be resolved absent recognition, tacitly

or expressly, that sovereignty of law is an

indispensable element of same republican

guarantee. This Court could avail itself

of this non-political Opportunity to state

that a guarantee of sovereignty of the law

in legislative taxing acts of state govern-

ment officials is one basic principle of

the republican guarantee, for which, if

violated, a citizen’s right to petition for

redress may not be impaired.

Sovereignty of law - the requirement

that all government officials, highest to

lowest, regardless of branch, must obey the

law - has been recognized by this Court as

essential to the form of republican govern-

ment in this country. See Marbury v. Madi -

gon, 3 U.S. 137; U8. yw, Lee, 106 U.S. 196.

A Modern court has been powerfully criti-

cized for weakening the sovereignty doct-

rine in the case of the President. See

a ee

Justice White’s dissent in Nixon v. Fitzge-

rald, 457 U.S. 731. Surely such immunity

should not be extended to taxaticn by coun-

ty commissioners. In return for their al-

legiance, all citizens of the United States

may demand government in conformity with

republican principles. Minor v. Hayper-

sett, 88 U.S. 162; U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92

U.S. S42. Also see generally Hamilton,

"Federalist" No. 84; Madison, "Federalist"

No. 44.

We were all taught from grade school that

the right to be taxed in accordance with

law is a fundamental constitutional guaran-

tee. A republican government is one "which

derives all its powers directly or indi-

rectly from the great body of the people."

Madison, "Federalist" No.39. Congressio-

nally established boundaries for the form

of republican government in Colorado demand

a representative one where the will of the

people is codified in laws passed by repre-

sentatives elected for that purpose, espe -

cially as to taxation. Through the enabl-

ing act to Colorado state government, Con-

gress has removed any doubt whether the

question raised here might be of a politi-

cal nature, and therefore not justiciable

for reasons in Pacific, above, where at

Section 4 it is expressly stated that the

constitution of the Colorado state govern-

ment formed: “shall be republican in form,

and not be repugnant to the constitu-

tion of the United States and the princi-

ples of the Declaration of Independence,

-" A fundamental principle facially ex-

pressed in the Declaration of Independence

is that of representative government.

"Taxation without representation" is ex-

pressly deplored.

"That to secure these Rights, Gov-

ernments are instituted among Men,

deriving their just Powers from

the Consent of the Governed

For imposing taxes on us without

our consent."

By Congressional Declaration, the prin-

ciple of "no taxation without representa-

tion" - being taxed in accordance with the

laws passed by legislators elected for that

purpose, expressed in The Declaration of

Independence, is an indispensable part of

a republican form of government and there-

fore a fundamental private right protected

under the guarantee clause of Article IV,

Section 4, United States Constitution. The

guarantee that state government will be

limited and delegated can only logically be

to the people. To argue that the guarantee

is to government officials that their pow-

ers will be limited renders it meaningless.

The principle of sovereignty of law as to

taxation is so basic to the republican form

of government established in this country

that this Court could find that unlawful

legislative imposition of a general tax by

local state government is a grievance for

which the people may petition the govern-

ment for redress, unimpaired; that all

State citizens may demand state government

in conformity with republican principles,

especially as to taxation. That the issue

here is an act of a local subdivision of

state government unlawfully imposing a gen-

eral tax by infirm legislative act should,

by itself, be enough to overturn dismissal.

II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS

In these circumstances of unlawful impo-

Sition of a general property tax by legis-

lative act, either the requirement that

administrative remedy for abatement and

refund of property taxes at 39-1-113 and

39-10-114, C.R.S. (A&R) be first pursued,

unconstitutionally impairs a citizen’s

right to petition the government for a red-

ress of grievances, or same A&R statutes do

not meet minimum Unites States Constitution

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process

standards of clear and certain remedy that

is meaningful.

Dismissal of all claims for relief here,

in all statuses, for failure to first pur-

sue administrative remedy of A&R, remedy

for seeking individual monetary relief for

property taxpayer status, is contrary to

the doctrine of separation of government

powers and violates fundamental and private

guarantees of the equal protection and due

process clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment; Even for the status of property tax-

payer, administrative A&R provides no rem-

edy for non-monetary injuries, does not

meet minimum federal due process standards

of clear and certain remedy for direct mon-

etary injury, and the monetary remedy pro-

vided is not necessarily meaningful. If

the Court of Appeals did not err in failing

to reach issues of the case (for lack of

Jurisdiction) in upholding district court

application of state law of A&R, said state

| ,

law violates Ferris’ constitutional rights

to petition for redress, equal protection

of the laws, and due process. Therefore,

said law of A&R is unconstitutional on its

face; or if the Court of Appeals did err,

it was applied unconstitutionally in this

case because a certain status, other than

State citizenship, is required to seek re-

dress - For issues here, non-property tax-

payer citizens have no less a stake in law-

ful government than property taxpayers. A

Statute can be unconstitutional as written

Or as explained by the state courts. Giac-

cio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399.

The Court of Appeals found that this cha-

llenge was of the nature for which A&R pro-

cedure was intended, and that circumstances

here do not except Ferris from first exhau-

sting administrative remedy of A&R, because

the Com’rs might cure the defect by impos -

ing a subsequent legal levy if the tax levy

were determined illegal, by Com’rs, on ad-

ministrative review; that it was therefore

unnecessary to address Ferris’ other con-

tentions of error (including claims for

relief in statuses other than property tax-

payer) because of disposition of "taxpay-

er’s" claims on jurisdictional grounds.

By applying A&R statutes to these circum-

stances, the trial and appellate courts

have bypassed the constitutional questions

presented by this case. Using the A&R sta-

tutes in such a manner to dispose of Fer-

ris’ claims and constitutional questions

effectively ratifies the excessive and in-

firm governmental conduct at issue, render-

ing nugatory, in these circumstances, Colo-

rado statutory guarantees of property tax

revenue increase limitation and public mee-

tings/hearings. Dismissal on ground that

Ferris’ First Amendment right to petition

the government for redress flows solely

through A&R procedure, solely as "taxpay-

er," has the same effect, for purposes of

_ss»e— sees

appeal, as if the constitutional questions

were answered erroneously, but absent an

articulated answer. Such so unnecessarily

complicates the equal protection and due

process aspects of this case that they can-

not be reached without involving the First

Amendment, the Guarantee Clause, and the

doctrine of conflict of laws. A&R statutes

ought not to be interpreted in such a way

as to defeat the clear intent of declarato-

ry judgment and openness -and-honesty-in-

government statutes. The claims here are

that the governmental conduct at issue vio-

lates both general Statutory rights to pub-

lic meetings/hearings and those specific to

legislative exception procedures for prop-

erty taxation, rights that are conferred on

all the general public. e.g. C.R.S. 24-6-

401; 29-9-101; 29-1-303. These express

guarantees are not contingent on additional

Status of property taxpayer. Therefore re-

dress cannot be limited to property taxpay-

ers, as the Court of Appeals opinion ef-

fects, without violating the Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process Clause, nor can rem-

edy to citizens with additional status of

property taxpayer be impaired by existence

of specific remedy of A&R for such status

without violating the Fourteenth Amendment

Equal Protection Clause. Equal access to

the courts to question the constitutional

validity of legislative acts and executive

fiats is a fundamental constitutional

right. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817;

United States Constitution, First Amend-

ment; Colorado Constitution, Article II,

Section 6. This Court could find that un-

impaired access is essential to upholding

the doctrines of sovereignty of law and

separation of powers that are indispensable

to a republican form of government, espe-

Cially where, as here, the conduct at issue

violates express statutory rights conferred

to all the general public. If A&R is abso-

emai

lute prerequisite to judicial review, non-

property taxpayers are denied remedy. If

so, then A&R is unconstitutional because

its existence limits standing in court to

Challenge illegal government behavior at

issue solely to property taxpayers.

An administrative A&R proceeding, before

Respondent Com’rs, is not an appropriate

forum for redressing same Com’rs legisla-

tive acts, and therefore judicial review

cannot be impaired by its existence. See

generally McKart v. United States, 395 U.S.

185. Even if A&R were available to non-

property taxpayers and provided all the

relief sought here, which it does not, it

is contrary to the doctrine of separation

of powers for a board of county commission-

ers to be given the courts’ review powers

in an administrative proceeding where same

board would judge the legality and validity

of its own binding legislative acts. A&R

was intended to remedy grievances to dis-

proportionate share of property tax burden

because of excessive assessment. Board of

Assessment Appeals v. Benbrook, 735 P.2d

860 (Colo.) @868. A&R affords no remedy to

non-property taxpayers, as it is unavail-

able to that status. Regardless of its

availability, no remedy is provided for

violations of public meetings/hearings sta-

tutes - only direct and individual monetary

relief to property taxpayers. On the other

hand, if non-property taxpayers are accord-

ed relief from illegal government behavior,

as to statutory public meetings/hearings

requisites at issue, by means of declarato-

ry judgment, as was sought here, then to

deprive Ferris of the same remedy and re-

lief accorded to non-property taxpayers,

for the sole reason that he has additional

status as property taxpayer, deprives him

of equal protection of the law. In view of

affirmed dismissal, for failure to exhaust

an administrative remedy available to only

one of several alleged statuses, a citizen

could be precluded from any redress or rem-

edy simply by labeling him in such a way a7

to preclude statutory remedies he might

have available in another Status, forcing

him to choose one avenue of remedy to the

exclusion of all others available and other

relief they might afford. This court has

already decided that forcing a citizen to

Surrender one right in order to assert ano-

ther right is intolerable. Simmons _v.

U.S., 390 U.S. 389. Where relief is first

sought has no bearing on whether the gener -

al tax is invalid. The question is, what

are the meaningful legal remedies for an

invalid general tax and the illegal govern-

mental conduct that produced it? Since

there is no express or implicit provision

in A&R statutes to administratively "cure"

the levy, the administrative framework pro-

vides no clear and certain remedy or "cure"

as to the legislative acts and the general

tax. Com’rs’ only lawful means to "cure"

the levy overall is only theoretically pos-

sible only for future tax collection years

beyond 1989 and only in the legislative

arena, not the administrative, contingent

on Com’rs’ majority resolution to do so.

Once legislative exception procedure to the

property tax revenue increase limitation

was elected, a resultant levy to collect

approved revenues was mandatory for budget

year 1989. 29-1-303(3), (6), C.R.S. A&R

applies to one property taxpayer’s direct

economic injury only. Right to mandatory

notice and opportunity to attend, hear, and

participate in hearings is conferred to the

general public at 29-1-303(1) (b),(5),

C.R.S., not only to property taxpayers.

A&R provides no relief to individual prop-

erty taxpayers for injury of being excluded

from attendance and participation by flawed

mandatory notice - absent, they could not

necessarily know the procedure was infirm,

nor how so - and certainly provides none to

citizen/electors, not property taxpayers,

who suffer other than direct economic in-

jury and to whom A&R is unavailable. Indi-

rect economic injury by effect of levy on

local consumer costs and property resale

value is real. Individual refund to Fer-

ris/taxpayer would not remedy the latter or

other injury. Constitutions’ “penumbrally"

guaranteed principle of "no taxation with-

out representation" is impermissible of no

remedy for Ferris’ personages that pay the

tax indirectly. The Court of Appeals rec-

ognized a private right to individual mone-

tary relief, but overlooked the public

rights to lawful taxation and open hear-

ing/meetings, thereby allowing Com’rs the

opportunity to collect the entire amount of

the excess revenue, abate and refund no net

amount [39-10-114(1) (a) (I) (B)], and levy

derivative taxes, as Com’rs already have,

with no requirement of any public cure.

The Fourteenth Amendment Due _ Process

Clause not only obligates the states to

provide "clear and certain remedy" and

"meaningful backward- looking relief to rec-

tify any unconstitutional deprivation," but

to insure that the remedy and relief are

meaningful. McKesson v. Division of Alc.

Bev. 495 U.S. ___. For the conduct at is-

sue, remedy of A&R provides Ferris relief

that is not clear and certain nor meaning-

ful. A&R is a remedy for individual prop-

erty taxes that have already been assessed.

What remedy does A&R provide for future

derivative levies if, as here, the excess

revenue is made a prospective part of the

county’s revenue base? The future amount

to be abated cannot be known, as such is

contingent on future legislative setting of

levies. For that circumstance, A&R is a

remedy that must be pursued, annually and

piecemeal, by individual property taxpayers

seeking relief. Since there is no provi-

Sion in A&R remedy to administratively cure

the illegal tax overall, potential of a

multiplicity of annual A&R proceedings does

not meet "clear and certain" due process

standards established in McKesson, above,

nor is relief provided "meaningful."

"Truth in taxation" legislative exception

procedure, whether or not successfully im-

plemented, allows only two possible resul-

tant levies: To collect a lawfully approved

excess revenue amount; or to collect zero

revenue increase. 29-1-303(3), (6), C.R.S.

A&R statutes allow the total amount of rev-

enue at issue to be collected, regardless

of whether individual property taxpayers

successfully petition. 39-10-114(1) (a) (I) -

(B), C.R.S. The proportionate part of aba-

ted or refunded taxes, including their own,

may be reassessed against successful peti-

tioners. Thus it is constitutionally im-

permissible that same be sole remedy under

minimum due process and meaningful relief

standards set in McKesson, above. Sole

clear, certain and meaningful remedy and

relief for "cure" of the injuries here is

judicial review as sought.

Petitioner Paul Ferris requests this

United States Supreme Court grant this pe-

tition, reverse dismissal, and enter find-

ings for declaratory and injunctive relief

sought on appeal, as to the validity of the

excess tax levy at issue.

\D gS Vo ix

Paul Ferris Date

840 23 Road

Grand Junction, CO

81505

(303) 243-3115

VERIFICATION

I, Paul Ferris, being of lawful age, and

being first duly sworn upon oath, depose

and state as follows:

I have drafted and read the foregoing

"PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI," know

the contents thereof, and pledge that the

Statements therein are true and correct to

the best of my knowledge, information and

belief. :

DATED this lo¢t gay of Apes 1992.

prs: Se

Paul Ferris

STATE OF COLORADO ) ss.

COUNTY OF MESA )

The foregoing instrument was knowledged

before me this onc day of ;

1992 by Paul Ferris.

/Witness my hand and official seal.

‘My commission expires: 4y ffy7o-

f_0-f2__

Date

NOTARY PUBLIC

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