Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Vulpis v. United States
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1-1619
No. 91-___ ({_) Supreme Court, U3,
me
| APR 9 1992
IN THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Supreme Court of the United’ States
OCTOBER TERM, 1991
=>
ANTHONY VULPIS, ROSEDALE CARTING, INC.,
and VULPIS BROTHERS, LTD.,
Petitioners,
—against —
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BARBARA L. HARTUNG
Counsel of Record
Attorney for Petitioner
Anthony Vulpis
641 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 980-9494
LAROSSA MITCHELL & ROSS
Attorneys for Petitioners Rosedale
Carting, Inc. and Vulpis
Brothers, Ltd.
41 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10010
(212) 696-9700
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the unilateral expectation of
future revenues by a governmental entity is
a property right protected by the mail fraud
statute absent a duty to pay.
2. Whether the courts misapplied the Rule
403 balancing test when admitting evidence
that neither the prosecutor, the court, nor
the parties involved had originally viewed
aS a crime or wrongful act under Rule
404(b).
3. Whether the courts below failed to make
the required findings when imposing a
guideline sentence for offenses which were
not charged, did not result in conviction,
and were not the subject of stipulation.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The parties to the proceedings in the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit were
the United States of America and Angelo
Paccione, Anthony Vulpis, John J. McDonald,
A&A Land Development, Stage Carting, Inc.,
August Recycling, Inc., New York
Environmental Contractors, Inc., National
Carting, Inc., Rosedale Carting, Inc., and
Vulpis Brothers, Ltd.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE (8)
Questions Presented i
Parties to the Proceedings ii
Table of Contents iii
Appendices Vv
Table of Authorities vi
Opinions Below 2
Jurisdiction 2
Statutory Provisions and
Rules Involved 3
Statement of the Case 5
A. The Alleged Fraud
On New York City
B. The Alleged Bribe
Offers
C. The Sentence
The Court of Appeals Decision 21
iv
PAGE (8)
Reasons for Granting The Writ 24
A. A Governmental Entity's
Unilateral Expectation
Of Future Revenue Is
Not A Property Right
Protected By The Mail
Fraud Statute Absent
A Duty To Pay 24
B. The Court Misapplied
The Rule 403 Balancing
Test When Admitting
Evidence That Neither
The Prosecutor, The
Court, Nor The
Parties Involved Had
Originally Viewed As
A Crime Or Wrongful
Act Under Rule 404(b) 38
C. The Courts Below Failed
To Make The Required
Findings When Imposing
A Guideline Sentence
For Offenses Which
Were Not Charged,
Did Not Result In
Conviction, And Were
Not The Subject Of
Stipulation 43
Conclusion 47
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
(949 F.2d 1183) Nov. 15, 1992
Appendix B: Opinion of the
United States District Court
of the Southern District of
New York
(738 F. Supp. 691),
April 30, 1990
Appendix C: Opinion of the
United States District Court
of the Southern District of
New York
(749 F. Supp. 748),
Aug. 13, 1990
Appendix D: Opinion of the
United States District court
of the Southern District of
New York
(751 F. Supp. 368),
Oct. 12, 1990
PAGE (8)
Al
Bl
C1
D1
Appendix E: Order of the United
States Court of Appeals on
Petition For Rehearing and
Suggestion For Rehearing
In Banc
El
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGE (8)
Braxton v. United States, 45
111 S. Ct. 1854 (1991)
Carpenter v. United States, 24
484 U.S. 19 (1987)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 42
475 U.S. 673 (1986)
Huddleston v. United States, 39
485 U.S. 681 (1988) ~
McNally v. United States, 26, 27
483 U.S. 350 (1987)
United States v. Dray, 32
901 F.2d 1132 (1st Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 8S. Ct.
245 (1990)
United States v. Evans, 36
844 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988)
United States v. Gelb, 35, 41
881 F.2d 1155 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 544
(1989)
United States v. Helmsley, 30
941 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 117 L. Ed.2d
489 (1992)
United States v. Martinez, 34
905 F.2d 709 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
591 (1990)
PAGE (8)
United States v. Murphy, 40
768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012
(1986)
United States v. Porcelli, 29
865 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
53 (1989)
United States v. Schwartz, 34
924 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1991)
United States v. Turoff, 34
701 F. Supp. 981 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
viii
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
PAGE (8)
18 U.S.C. § 1341 3, 24, 27
18 U.S.C. § 1346 28
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (da) passim
Fed. R. Evid. 403 3, 2S,
a2, 49
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) 4, 22, 38
N.Y. Envir. Conserv. Law
§§ 71-2707 (McKinney 1984) 45
U.S.S.G. § 1Bl1.2(a) 4, 20
U.S.S.G. 2F1.1 19, 45
U.S.S.G. 2Q1.2 19
U.S.S.G.
§
§
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 20
§ 5K2.0 21, 44
§
U.S.S.G. 5K2.5 21
IN THE
SUPREME COURT of the UNITED STATES
October Term, 1991
No. 91-
ANTHONY VULPI8, ROSEDALE CARTING, INC.,
and VULPIS BROTHERS, LTD.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
Petition for writ of Certiorari To
The United States Court of Appeals
For The Second Circuit
Anthony Vulpis, Rosedale Carting, Inc.,
and Vulpis Brothers, Ltd., petition for a
writ of certiorari to review the judgment of
the panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, which
affirmed petitioners' convictions for
violations of the racketeering statute,
conspiracy to violate the racketeering
Statute, and mail fraud.
2
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals,
reported as United States v. Paccione, 949
F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1991), is reprinted in
the Appendix to this petition at Al. The
District Court opinions reported at 738 F.
Supp. 691, 749 F. Supp. 748, and 751 F.
Supp. 368 are reprinted at Bl, Cl, and Dl.
The order of the Court of Appeals denying
the petitioners' petition for rehearing
appears in the Appendix at page El.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit was entered on November
is, 19912. A timely petition for rehearing
was denied on January 10, 1992, and this
petition for writ of certiorari was filed
within ninety days of that date. This
Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1).
L
3
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
Title 18, United States Code:
§ 1341. Frauds and swindles
Whoever, having devised or
intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses .. . places
in any post office or authorized
depository for mail matter, any
matter or thing whatever to be sent
or delivered by the Postal Service,
or takes or receives therefrom, any
such matter or thing, or knowingly
causes to be delivered by mail
according to the direction thereon,
or at the place at which it is
addressed, any such matter or thing,
shall be fined not more than $1,000
or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both. If the violation
affects a financial institution, such
person shall be fined not more than
$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more
than 30 years, or both.
Title 28, United States Code:
Fed. R. Evid. 403: Exclusion of
Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice,
Confusion, or Waste of Time.
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
t
or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b): Other crimes,
wrongs, or acts.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
United States Sentencing Guidelines:
§ 1B1.2(a): The court shall apply the
offense guideline section in Chapter Two
(Offense Conduct) most applicable to the
offense of conviction. Provided, however,
in the case of conviction by a plea of
guilty or noio contendere containing a
stipulation that specifically establishes a
more serious offense than the offense of
conviction, the court shall apply the
guideline in such chapter most applicable to
the stipulated offense. Similarly,
stipulations to additional offenses are
treated as if the defendant had _ been
convicted of separate counts charging those
offenses.
>
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 11, 1990, after a jury trial
before Judge Motley in the Southern District
of New York, petitioners along with
codefendants Angelo Paccione, A&A Land
Development, Stage Carting, Inc., August
Recycling, Inc., and National Carting, Inc.,
were convicted of one substantive violation
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. ¢
1962(c), one RICO conspiracy count, 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d), and five counts of mail
fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 2.! Both RICO
1 Paccione was cohvicted of an additional
mail fraud count and defendant McDonald was
convicted on only one count of mail fraud.
A separate petition for a writ of certiorari
will be filed with this court on behalf of
Paccione and the Paccione companies.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 19.4,
petitioners join in the arguments raised in
that petition to the extent they are
applicable to them and not inconsistent with
the positions urged in this petition.
6
counts were based primarily on predicate
acts of mail fraud.
Petitioners' convictions were based on
the operation of an illegal landfill on the
former Arlington Railroad Yard, a Staten
Island property owned by CSX, a Virginia
corporation. The government’ charged
petitioners and the codefendants with a
scheme to defraud CSX of the value of its
property by using Arlington Yard as a
landfill without CSX's authorization for
four months, from May through September,
1988. The government also maintained that
through the operation of the illegal
landfill, the defendants had defrauded New
York City and State of licenses, licensing
fees, and dumping fees that the City and
State would have received if the waste
materials deposited on the CSX property had
been taken to the City owned landfill, Fresh
Kills. In addition, the government had
emanates
7
charged a third scheme to defraud involving
the transfer, storage and transportation of
medical waste, and petitioners were
acquitted of those charges. Thus, based
upon correspondence and telephone calls with
various State and City agencies as well as
an out-of-state corporation, the government
converted a state case grounded in illegal
dumping into a federal RICO offense by
utilizing the mail and wire fraud charges as
predicate acts. However, the indictment did
not charge the defendants with violations of
any federal environmental regulations nor
did it specify what city, state or federal
environmental laws might be involved.
At trial petitioners' defense was (i)
that CSX had given its approval for the
landfill operation at Arlington Yard but
claimed otherwise in the face of an official
investigation, and (ii) that the materials
received at the landfill were in compliance
8
with the various formal regulations and
informal practices governing such
operations, including the receipt of up to
ten percent of "unacceptable" material.
The Alleged Fraud on New York City
New York City operated the only two
landfills within the city for the disposal
of waste, the largest being Fresh Kills
Sanitary Landfill ("Fresh Kills") on Staten
Island. Residential waste and garbage were
collected by the City Department. of
Sanitation ("CDOS") and taken to Fresh
Kills. Private carters, who must be
licensed by the City Department of Consumer
Affairs ("CDCA"), handled waste collections
from commercial and industrial
establishments. Private carters were
allowed to use the city landfill only if
they had been issued a permit and if they
purchased dump tickets in advance. City
9
Sanitation trucks paid no fees, of course,
for the use of Fresh Kills.
From March 1988 through September 1988,
Fresh Kills charged $18.50 per cubic yard
for the disposal of trash and construction
or demolition debris. A higher fee was
charged for the disposal of asbestos, which
was Classified as hazardous waste. As early
as May 9, 1988, it was public knowledge that
a $60 million increase in fees for the use
of Fresh Kills had been proposed, and, in
October 1988, the rate was increased to
$40.00 per cubic yard. Raising the rates
made Fresh Kills less attractive to private
carters who had once dumped eight to nine
thousand tons per day. After the price
increase, the City lost $100 million in fees
per fiscal year.
Petitioner Vulpis and his codefendant,
Angelo Paccione, operated private carting
businesses in the New York City boroughs of
10
Brooklyn and Queens. Petitioner was fifty
percent owner of the defendant companies
Rosedale Carting, Inc. and Vulpis Brothers,
Ltd. (collectively the "Vulpis companies").
Paccione was the president and majority
shareholder of the defendant companies
August Recycling, Inc., National Carting,
Inc., and Stage Carting, Inc. (collectively
the "Paccione companies").
The CDOS kept monthly records of the
number of dump tickets purchased and used
by each private carter. These records
demonstrated that the Vulpis and Paccione
companies sharply reduced their purchase of
dump tickets starting in May 1988. However,
New York City had no regulation or statute
requiring private carters who operated
within the city to use the New York City
landfills. In addition to the city
landfills, private carters used landfills
11
located elsewhere in New York State as well
as out-of-state facilities.
Some city waste materials were never
taken to landfills as they could be utilized
for construction purposes. New York City
regulations permitted the use of "clean
waste" or "clean fill"--clean earth, dirt,
concrete, rock, gravel, stone, sand--to
upgrade building sites provided the
necessary permits were obtained. In early
1988, Vulpis and Paccione, who were also the
owners of A&A Land Development, were
contacted by Kenneth I. Wilpon, a real
estate broker and owner of undeveloped
property on Staten Island. The Staten
Island property was known as Arlington Yard,
a former railroad yard, and consisted of
three parcels of land. Two parcels, 35
acres, were owned by Wilpon and the third
parcel, 72 acres, was owned by CSX, an out-
of-state corporation. In 1988, Wilpon,
12
along with his partner Fred Weiss, and CSX
entered into a joint marketing proposal to
sell the three parcels as a unit as a site
for residential housing. To develop the
land for this use, the grade of the property
had to be raised, and Wilpon proposed to CSX
that clean fill be placed on their
properties for this purpose. CSX considered
the landfill proposal and negotiations
continued throughout the summer of 1988, but
CSX never gave written consent to a landfill
operation on its property.
In May 1988, A&A Land Development began
the landfill operation on the Wilpon
property after obtaining the required street
opening permit from the City Department of
Transportation (CDOT) and a letter of
acknowledgment from the City Department of
Sanitation (CDOS). These permits related
only to the Wilpon properties and indicated
that clean fill material would be placed on
13
the site. Additional and renewal permits
were issued by the CDOT to A&A Land
Development in July and August 1988. The
permit fees were calculated on the cubic
yards of fill material to be used, and fees
based on over 340,000 cubic yards were paid.
Between May 1988 and mid-September 1988,
A&A Land Development operated an all purpose
landfill on both the Wilpon and cSsx
properties. Approximately 550,000 cubic
yards of material--including clean fill,
construction and demolition debris, garbage,
and five pounds of asbestos--were deposited
on several acres of Arlington Yard. The
government's evidence included videotaped
Surveillance of trucks dumping at the site.
The landfill was closed by the State
Department of Environmental Control on
September 14, 1988.
The government maintained that through
the operation of the landfill, the Vulpis
14
and Paccione companies saved $4,625,000 in
dumping fees that would have been paid to
the City for use of the Fresh Kills
facility. A&A charged other companies $10
per cubic yard to dump at the site, thus
diverting additional fees that would have
been paid to Fresh Kills. In its four
months of operation, A&A earned
approximately $2.6 million. By using the
CSX property as a landfill, the government
charged that CSX had been defrauded of the
value of its land. The cost to cleanup the
CSX property was placed at $15 million.
The Alleged Bribe Offers
During the defense case, the prior sworn
testimony of Wilpon's partner, Fred Weiss,
was read to the jury. Weiss had testified
at an earlier civil proceeding concerning
his conversation with Baker, an officer with
the DEC, on September 14, 1988, the day the
landfill was closed. A portion of the
a9
property was excavated in the presence of
Weiss, Vulpis, and Baker, and Weiss
testified that "(W]e were very surprised
they found some household garbage."
Erroneously viewing petitioners' defense at
trial as a denial that any garb-ye had been
placed on the property, the district court
ruled that testimony of purported bribe
offers by petitioner, not admitted on the
direct case, would be admitted on rebuttal.
The district court overruled
petitioner's objections that the testimony
lacked probative value and that any value
was outweighed by its prejudicial impact,
citing Fed. R. Evid. 403. The court
instructed the jury \ that additional
testimony was being presented by the
government on the issue of petitioner's
intent. James Milewski, an officer with the
DEC, then testified that on September 14,
1988, while the landfill was’ being
16
inspected, Vulpis told him that he was
"losing approximately $80,000, and how about
$50,000." Milewski did not consider the
statement to be a bribe attempt and took no
further action beyond an oral report to his
supervisor.
David Baker, an officer with the DEC,
also spoke to petitioner on the same day,
and testified that petitioner told him, "I'm
losing $75,000 a day every day the place is
closed. How about $100,000, you just go
away?" Baker reported the conversation to
his supervisor but made no further written
or oral report of the incident. Although
Baker had told the court out of the presence
of the jury that he had not viewed the
comment as a bribe offer, the district court
would not permit defense counsel to elicit
this testimony, ruling that the witness's
state of mind was not relevant. The
district court denied counsel a recess to
17
obtain materials prior to cross-examination
on the rebuttal testimony and also denied
Vulpis an opportunity to present surrebuttal
on this new evidence.
However, the government's rebuttal case
was a reversal of the government's and the
district court's prior view of the evidence.
When the Baker testimony had been elicited
on direct without notice to the defendants,
both the district court and the government
had taken the position that the meaning of
the remark was entirely unclear and could
have been a reference by Vulpis to a consent
decree and to daily penalties. Just prior
to Vulpis's comment, Baker had discussed a
consent decree and informed Vulpis that
penalties could run $25,000 per day. During
its direct case, the government told the
court that it had never taken the position
that petitioner's statement constituted a
bribe offer. At that time, the district
18
court reserved decision on petitioner's
mistrial motion, and the government agreed
to strike the direct testimony.
The disputed "bribe" testimony was the
last testimony heard by the jury prior to
its deliberations. In closing arguments,
the government utilized this controversial
evidence to the fullest extent, maintaining
that petitioner's comments to Baker and
Milewski were very important evidence of his
guilt. Significantly, petitioner was
acquitted of all charges unrelated to the
bribe testimony. At sentencing, the
district court rejected the government's
request for an increased sentence based on
the bribe offers, finding that petitioner
had no knowledge of the landfill
investigation and that the officers had not
considered the statements to be bribe
offers.
19
The Sentence
As noted above, the jury ultimately
returned guilty verdicts on the RICO charges
and five counts of mail fraud against
petitioners. The district court sentenced
Vulpis to a term of 151 months after
upwardly departing from the guideline
recommendation of 63-78 months. In lieu of
forfeiture, fines, and restitution, Vulpis,
Paccione, and the corporate defendants had
entered into a court-approved agreement to
pay the government $22 million.
When calculating petitioner's RICO
sentence pursuant to the Sentencing
Guidelines, the district court used the
higher guidelines applicable to predicate
acts of environmental crimes, § 201.2
(mishandling of hazardous or toxic
substances or pesticides), rather than the
lower guidelines applicable to mail fraud,
§ 2F1.1. Petitioners had not been charged
20
with environmental offenses and the
indictment did not specify any city, state
or federal regulatory or environmental
statute violated by petitioners' actions.
The predicate acts found by jury against
petitioners all involved fraud. The use of
§ 2Q1.2 was erroneous because the sentencing
court must use the guideline most applicable
to the offense of conviction unless the
defendant stipulates to a more. serious
offense. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a). The district
court compounded this error by treating the
purported environmental offenses as counts
of conviction for purposes of the multiple
count rules in § 3D1.2. The district court
increased the offense level based on the
belief that the purported uncharged and
untried environmental crimes could _ be
treated as offenses of conviction for
purposes of the Guideline calculation. The
resulting sentence was double that
21
recommended in the presentence report. The
district court stated that it would, in any
event, have departed upward under § 5K2.0 or
§ 5K2.5 to reach the same result.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
A panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed
petitioners' convictions. A-4. In affirming
the mail fraud convictions, the Court
reaffirmed prior decisions holding that fees
payable to the government for services or
taxes are property for purposes of the mail
fraud statute. A-22. Licensing fees and
dumping fees for use of Fresh Kills and
payable to New York City were held to fall
within the mail fraud statute. The Court
found that a loss of City revenues had been
established given evidence of declining fees
paid to Fresh Kills while the A&A landfill
was operating and given past use of Fresh
Kills by the defendant companies and others.
22
A-25. The Court rejected petitioners'
argument that a scheme to defraud of the
City of future income must be predicated on
an obligation to use the City's facility.
The Court of Appeals held that the bribe
offers were properly admitted under Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b) to negate a defense of accident
or mistake and to show petitioner's intent
to commit the offense. A-32. Under this
analysis, the probative value of the
evidence outweighed the potential for
prejudice. Fed. R. Evid. 403. However, the
Court of Appeals opinion never addressed the
ambiguous nature of the testimony and the
fact that neither officer had viewed
petitioner's comments as a bribe offer. The
Court also ignored the district court's and
the government's original positions that the
statements were not bribe offers. Without
any discussion, the Court concluded that the
23
Rule 403 balancing had been _ properly
conducted. A-33, 34.
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the
sentences. While acknowledging that
petitioners' objections to the sentencing
procedure had merit, the Court declined to
remand for recalculation of the sentences
given the district court's ruling that it
would have departed upward if the Guidelines
did not permit the procedure it had
followed. A-43, A-47, A-48.
24
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
A. A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY'S UNILATERAL
EXPECTATION OF FUTURE REVENUE IS NOT A
PROPERTY RIGHT PROTECTED BY THE MAIL FRAUD
STATUTE ABSENT A DUTY TO PAY.
Under this Court's decisions in McNally
v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), and
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19
(1987), the mail fraud statute (18 U.S.C. §
1341) protects victims only from the loss of
money or property. Schemes to defraud
citizens of certain intangible rights are
beyond the reach of the mail fraud statute.
While some intangible interests, such as the
interest in the confidentiality of
information, have been held to be property
rights within the scope of the mail fraud
statute, the statute requires that the
victim first have a right to the property
involved, whether tangible or intangible.
No such right existed here, and the Court of
25
Appeals erred in affirming petitioners’
convictions of three counts of mail fraud.
The government sought to avoid the
holdings in McNally and Carpenter by
asserting that New York City had a property
right in revenues from dumping fees that
would have been paid to the City if the
waste material unlawfully dumped at
Arlington Yard had instead been dumped at
the City's Fresh Kills Landfill. Under the
government's theory, the defendants thus
defrauded the City of dumping fees in excess
of $7 million through the operation of an
illegal landfill.
This theory is fatally flawed, however,
as there was no requirement that the
defendants, and other private carters, use
the New York City landfill. Thus, while the
City operated the only legal landfills in
New York City, private carters were not
required to use those landfills. In fact,
26
other facilities in New York State and in
neighboring states were available and were
used by private carters. Nor did the City
have individual contracts with any of the
private carters requiring them to use the
City facilities. Thus, the City did not
have exclusive control of or "ownership"
rights in the garbage generated within the
City which would support a claim that the
City had a right to the revenue produced by
fees for the disposal of that garbage. The
City had no more than ae unilateral
expectation of future revenue and not a
property right.
The cases relied on by the Court of
Appeals fail to support its decision for,
as set forth below, each deals with a well-
recognized obligation to pay either
government taxes or to use services in the
exclusive control of the government. The
Second Circuit failed to provide any legal
—_
27
authority to support its decision where the
use of a government service is optional.
The Court facilely dismissed the issue with
these words:
Second, defendants argue that the City
failed to prove any cognizable loss of
dumping fees because defendants had no
obligation to dump at Fresh Kills. We
are unpersuaded. Fresh Kills was the
largest dump_~ site in the City.
Defendants and other companies that used
the A&A illegal dump site had previously
dumped at Fresh Kills, and the
government presented evidence showing
that City revenues from that facility
declined precipitously during the time
of operation of the A&A dump. It was
within the province of the jury to
consider these facts, as well as the
additional expense that would have been
incurred by carters traveling to dump
outside of the City, and to infer that
the defendants' conduct cost the City
fees it would otherwise have received.
(A-25).
This Court clearly and unequivocally
stated in McNally that "we read § 1341 as
limited in scope to the protection of
property rights. If Congress desires to go
further, it must speak more clearly than sc
a
28
has."? 483 U.S. at 360. A governmental
entity's right to future revenues--the
property right alleged to be involved here-
-has been recognized in only aé_e few
exceptional circumstances not applicable to
this case. As discussed below, courts have
recognized a government's right to collect
sales tax, income tax, and licensing fees of
various types. However, in each such case
brought under the mail fraud statute, the
property right was based on a statutory
obligation to pay the monies, and the mail
fraud statute was held to protect the
governmental entities' recognized right to
these revenues. No such statute or right
exists in this case.
2 The mailings involved in these three
counts occurred prior to November 18, 1988,
the effective date of Congress's most recent
amendment of the mail fraud statute. 18
U.S.C. § 1346 amended the definition of mail
fraud to include "a scheme or artifice to
deprive another of the intangible right of
honest services."
eee...
29
The special circumstances presented in
United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352 (2d
Cir.), Gert, eonied, 110 8. Ct. 53: (19869),
illustrate when a state's property interest
in future revenue can be legally recognized.
Porcelli was a mail fraud prosecution of a
gasoline merchant who had not collected
sales tax, and later filed false returns in
order to hide his liability. Under New York
law, there are separate obligations to
collect sales tax and to remit to the state
the sales tax due on the sales, whether or
not the taxes were collected from the buyer.
Porcelli claimed he could not have defrauded
the state of the money since he never
collected the taxes. But the Second Circuit
sustained a mail fraud prosecution on the
ground that Porcelli had deprived the state
of its statutory right to collect the taxes.
In Porcelli, the property rights clearly
existed apart from the scheme to defraud and
30
were derived directly from the defendant's
sales tax obligation. Under New York law,
the obligation to pay sales tax is a legal
duty and the state's right to recover the
sales tax is the exclusive right of the
state. Porcelli presented a unique and
vastly distinct set of facts and legal
circumstances than does this case. Here
there was no obligation on the part of the
defendants to pay the dumping fees unless
they used the facility and clearly no right
of the state to collect fees from those who
chose not to use the facility. Hence, the
state could not be deprived any property in
this situation.
A similar situation was presented in
United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71 (2d
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 117 L. Ed.2d 489
(1992), where the Court of Appeals affirmed
the defendant's conviction on ten counts of
mail fraud where a scheme to defraud New
ee
aa
York State of income tax owned was
established but no actual tax debt existed.
The Court reasoned that the statute punishes
the scheme to deprive of money or property
and the success of the scheme is not
required. Id. at 94. However, Helmsley
like Porcelli was premised on the existence
of the State's property interest or property
right in the taxes. And the property right
was based on a statutory obligation to pay
imposed by the State upon the taxpayer.
In petitioner's case, there was no
requirement that he use the City facility,
thus creating an obligation to pay. Nor did
he use the City facility without paying the
requisite fees by, for example,
counterfeiting dump tickets or dumping at
Fresh Kills without paying. Petitioner
provided a service to those who used the A&A
landfill and received payment for that
service. Those who used petitioner's
32
landfill were under no obligation to use the
city facilities and were not themselves
defrauded by petitioner.
Obligations to pay licensing’ fees
imposed by a governmental entity have also
provided the statutory basis for mail fraud
prosecutions where the scheme attempted to
evade payment of those fees. The First
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction for conspiracy to commit mail
fraud in United States v. Dray, 901 F.2d
1132, 1142 (list Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 245 (1990), premised on the
underpayment of construction permit fees.
According to law, the permit fee was
calculated based upon the cost of the
construction work, and by underestimating
the construction cost, the defendant paid
roughly half of the required permit fee. In
rejecting the defendant's challenge to the
conviction under McNally, the Court stated:
—— tt
33
In this case, the permit fee was no
mere unilateral expectation, as
appellant exhorts, but a legal
obligation. Where such fees are
required, conspiracies to avoid paying
them deprive the sovereign of a very
concrete and tangible kind of property-
-cash. We think it obvious that a
governmental agency is deprived of
"money or property" when persons attempt
to evade, or divert, the payment of
legally required fees and taxes.
The Court of Appeals in petitioner's case
cited Dray to support its decision, but Dray
would be analogous only if New York City
imposed a tax or fee on all garbage picked
up within the City by private carters or
required the use of the City facility by
private carters. Only then could the Fresh
Kills dumping fees be properly viewed as
revenue which the City was entitled to
collect even when the Fresh Kills facility
was not used. The permit fee in Dray was
nothing more than a tax on all construction
within the city of Boston. No such tax has
been imposed on New York City garbage.
|
34
In a similar vein, the district court in
United States v. Turoff, 701 F. Supp. 981
(E.D.N.Y. 1988), held that the government
had properly charged the defendants under
the mail fraud statute based upon a scheme
to defraud the New York City of taxi
medallions and annual license renewal fees.
The court concluded that the medallions were
personal property of the City, and the
defendants had been charged with
misappropriating that property and depriving
the City of the required annual renewal fees
for each medallion. However, the
medallions--whether viewed as licenses? or
property--were controlled by the City which
3 Since the Turoff decision, the Second
Circuit has joined a majority of the Courts
of Appeals in holding that licenses are not
property for purposes of the mail fraud
statute. See United States v. Schwartz, 924
F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1991) and cases cited
therein; cf. United States v. Martinez,905
F.2d 709 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct.
591 (1990).
35
maintained a monopoly on their creation.
Unlike the situation presented in Turoff,
the City has not yet claimed a monopoly on
garbage generated within the city. Hence,
defendants here did not take the City's
property without paying the required fees.
The defendants did not use the City landfill
at all and were under no obligation to do
so. Thus, the government cannot claim a
property right in the unpaid fees, and there
is no cognizable loss under McNally.
What Dray and Turoff have in common is
the existence of a commodity that is only
available through the regulating
governmental entity. The same peculiar
characteristic was present in United States
v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1162 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 544 (1989), also
cited by the Court of Appeals when affirming
petitioners' conviction. The defendants in
Gelb had been charged with a scheme to
36
defraud the Post Office of revenue through
the improper packaging of mass mailings.
The service involved, however, was available
only through the Post Office and, thus, was
like the taxi medallions in Turoff.
Moreover, the decision here is at odds
with the Court of Appeals' earlier decision
in United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36 (2d
Cir. 1988), which recognized that the right
to control the future alienation and use of
a thing "does not mean that all such rights
are property rights within the meaning of
the federal fraud statutes." Id. at 41. "A
law prohibiting a particular use of a
commodity that the government does not use
or possess ordinarily does not create a
property right." Id. at 42. While the city
and state maintain the right to regulate and
control the private carting industry as well
as the disposal of waste materials, those
regulations do not create property rights in
37
the material regulated. Furthermore, when
a property right exists, it should be
possible to determine when it arises. If
the City of New York had a property right in
future revenues from dumping fees, then the
right must arise when the trash is picked up
by private carters within the city.
However, this analysis fails since the
carters were permitted to dispose of the
refuse outside of the City and the City
facilities.
The Second Circuit's decision represents
a dangerous expansion of the mail fraud
statute for it effectively eliminates the
"money or property" element of the offense
which this Court reaffirmed in McNally.
Indeed almost every commercial transaction
will involve some economic consequences that
could be transformed into mail _ fraud
"property" under’ the Second Circuit's
expansive construction of the statute. The
;
38
mail fraud statute would thus be converted
into an all purpose criminal statute, a
result that is contrary to the original
intent of the statute and contrary to this
Court's opinions in McNally and Carpenter.
This case presents an opportunity for
this Court to further clarify its holdings
under McNally and Carpenter and to check the
expansion of the mail fraud statute. A writ
of certiorari should therefore issue to
review the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
B. THE COURTS MISAPPLIED THE RULE 403
BALANCING TEST WHEN ADMITTING EVIDENCE THAT
NEITHER THE PROSECUTOR, THE COURT, NOR THE
PARTIES INVOLVED HAD ORIGINALLY VIEWED AS A
CRIME OR WRONGFUL ACT UNDER RULE 404(b).
Prior to the admission of similar or
other crimes evidence under Fed. R. Evid.
404(b), the district court must determine
"if there is sufficient evidence to support
a finding by the jury that the defendant
”-
39
committed the similar [or other] act."
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681,
685 (1988). Once that requirement has been
satisfied, the court must balance the
probative value of the evidence against the
potential prejudicial effect of that
evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403. When
assessing probative value, the "strength of
the evidence establishing the similar act is
one of the factors the court may consider
when conducting the Rule 403 balancing."
Huddleston at 689, n. 6.
In this case, the courts below
misapplied the Rule 403 balancing test and
erroneously admitted highly prejudicial
testimony of alleged bribe offers.
Insufficient evidence had been presented to
support a finding that any bribe offers had
been made by petitioner. Neither officer
had made written reports concerning the
incidents despite the large sums of money
——————————————
40
allegedly offered. Furthermore, the
district court's initial reaction had been
that the conversation between Baker and
petitioner referred to payment of a fine as
it had been made in the context of Baker's
remarks about consent orders and potential
daily fines of $25,000. Even the
prosecution initially maintained that it had
not viewed petitioner's statement to Baker
to be a bribe offer.
Moreover, the officers who participated
in the conversations with petitioner stated
that they had not viewed the remarks as
bribe offers. The district court
disregarded this testimony in the mistaken
belief that the officers' reaction to the
alleged offers was not probative of whether
or not a bribe had in fact been offered.
The court was in error. In United States v.
Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1535 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 wW.8, 1012 (1986),
:
eee
41
involving prosecution of a judge under the
Hobbs Act for offenses involving bribery,
the court held that how the participants in
the conversations held in chambers
interpreted the defendant's remarks was
relevant and admissible. Accord United
States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1663 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 544 (1989)
(postal employees, who testified against
defendant charged with bribery, stated that
initially they considered the money to be
tips but became suspicious when the tips
became larger). The district court's
mistaken belief that the officers' reaction
to petitioner's remarks was not relevant
resulted not only in the admission of the
disputed testimony at trial, but, once
admitted, the court would not permit defense
counsel to elicit the fact that the officer
had not viewed petitioner's remarks as a
bribe offer.
42
Given the highly ambiguous nature of the
purported bribe testimony, the courts below
erred in concluding that it was properly
admissible under the Rule 403 balancing
test. As this Court observed in Huddleston,
the strength of the evidence establishing
the similar or other criminal act is a
factor when making an evaluation under Rule
403. Here the evidence was simply too
inconclusive to support its admission given
the clear danger of unzair prejudice to
petitioner.
The error was compounded by the improper
curtailment of cross-examination and the
denial of surrebuttal once this new evidence
was admitted. The cumulative effect of
these errors cannot be deemed harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).
This case presents an opportunity for
this Court to address the question of
43
whether the court properly applied the Rule
403 balancing test when admitting evidence
which the prosecutor, the court, and the
parties involved had not originally viewed
as a crime or wrongful act under Rule
404(b).
C. THE COURTS BELOW FAILED TO MAKE THE
REQUIRED FINDINGS WHEN IMPOSING A GUIDELINE
SENTENCE FOR OFFENSES WHICH WERE NOT
CHARGED, DID NOT RESULT IN CONVICTION, AND
WERE NOT THE SUBJECT OF STIPULATION.
Although the Court of Appeals
acknowledged that serious errors’ had
occurred when the district court used the
environmental offense section to calculate
petitioner's offense level and then relied
on that environmental offense level to apply
the Guidelines multiple-count provisions,
the Court declined to remand for
recalculation of the sentence given the
district court's pronouncement that if its
44
application of the Guidelines were
incorrect, the court would have relied on
§ 5K2.0 to justify departure.
While both the Court of Appeals and the
district court repeatedly referred to
"environmental offenses" as the basis and
justification for the sentence here, at no
time did the government or the courts
specify which of the city, state or federal
regulatory or environmental statutes were
deemed to be violated by petitioners. The
legality of a sentence based on unspecified
environmental offenses, not charged and not
the subject of stipulation, should be
reviewed. Petitioner received no notice of
the specific offenses deemed to trigger the
sentencing enhancements by the district
court. The district court did not state
what statutes it found had been violated or
what standard of proof had been used by the
court to reach that determination. As a
— ee
45
result, the Court of Appeals could not
review the appropriateness of the sentence
calculation or of any upward departure, the
alternative ground for imposing sentence,
where these findings were never made.
Guidance on this point is provided by
Application Note 15 to § 2F1.1, dealing with
fraud offenses, which states that where the
underlying offense violated state law, the
most analogous guideline was to be applied.
However, this inquiry was never undertaken.
For example, under state law, environmental
offenses are classified by the nature of the
prohibited substance involved and the
quantity of that substance improperly
disposed of. See N.Y. Envir. Conserv. Law
§§ 71-2707 to -2717 (McKinney 1984).
Without some specification of the statutes
and offenses involved, it is impossible to
determine whether the sentencing court
—————
46
acted properly when literally adding years
to petitioner's sentence.
In an analogous case, Braxton v. United
States, 111 S. Ct. 1854 (1991), this Court
reversed a sentence based upon a plea
stipulation that failed to specifically
establish a more serious offense. This
Court held that the defendant had been
improperly sentenced for the graver offense
and his guideline sentence could not stand.
Id. at 1858. The same reasoning applies
here.
The procedure employed when sentencing
petitioner violated his constitutional right
to due process. Petitioner's case is one of
the first challenges to RICO sentencing
under the Guidelines and will certainly be
an important precedent. The Court of
Appeals opinion improperly invites’ the
district courts to follow a_ sentencing
procedure in violation of the Guidelines.
47
A writ of certiorari should be issued to
review the Court's decision.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, petitioners
respectfully pray that the Court issue a
writ of certiorari to review the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
Respectfully submitted,
BARBARA L. HARTUNG
Counsel of Record
Attorney for Petitioner
Anthony Vulpis
641 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 980-9494
LAROSSA MITCHELL & ROSS
Attorneys for Petitioners
Rosedale Carting, Inc., and
Vulpis Brothers, Ltd.
41 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10010
(212) 696-9700
APPENDIX A
Al
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
+
Nos. 1569, 1570, 1571, 1572, 1573,
1574, 1575, 1576, 1603—August Term, 1990
(Argued: June 17, 1991 Decided: November 15, 1991)
Docket Nos. 90-1587, -1588, -1589, -1590, -1591,
-1592, -1593, -1597, -1629
+
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
—V.—
ANGELO PACCIONE, ANTHONY Y. VULPIS, JOHN J.
MCDONALD, A & A LAND DEVELOPMENT, STAGE
CARTING, INC., AUGUST RECYCLING, INC., NEW
YORK ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTORS, _INC.,
NATIONAL CARTING, INC., ROSEDALE CARTING,
INC., and VULPIS BROTHERS, LTD.,
Defendants -Appellants.
Before:
MESKILL, KEARSE and MCLAUGHLIN,
Circuit Judges.
A2
Appeals from judgments of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, Constance
Baker Motley, Judge, convicting defendants who engaged
in illegal waste disposal operations of mail fraud, 18
U.S.C. § 1341, and RICO violations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962
(c) and (d).
Affirmed.
ELLIOTT R. PETERS, Assistant United States
Attorney, New York, New York (Roger S.
Hayes, Acting United States Attorney for
the Southern District of New York, Jef-
frey B. Sklaroff, Deirdre M. Daly, David
E. Brodsky, Daniel C. Richman, Assistant
United States Attorneys, New York, New
York, on the brief), for Appellee.
NATHAN Z. DERSHOWITZ, New York, New
York (Victoria B. Eiger, Dershowitz &
Eiger, New York, New York, Alan M.
Dershowitz, Amy Adelson, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, on the brief), for Defen-
dants-Appellants Angelo Paccione,A & A
Land Development, August Recycling,
Inc., National Carting, Inc., and Stage
Carting, Inc.
BARBARA L. HARTUNG, New York, New
York (Alan P. Williamson, Morvillo,
Abramowitz & Grand, New York, New
York, on the brief), for Defendant-Appel-
lant Anthony Vulpis.
cca
A 3
ROBERT KASANOF, New York, New York
(Edward M. Chikofsky, New York, New
York, on the brief), for Defendant-Appel-
lant John McDonald.
KAREN SILVERMAN, New York, New York
(James M. LaRossa, Michael S. Ross,
LaRossa, Mitchell & Ross, New York,
New York, on the brief), for Defendants-
Appellants Rosedale Carting, Inc. and
Vulpis Brothers, Ltd.
>
KEARSE, Circuit Judge:
Defendants Angelo Paccione, Anthony Y. Vulpis, and
John J. McDonald (collectively the “individual defen-
dants’”’), and defendants A & A Land Development, Stage
, Carting, Inc., August Recycling, Inc., National Carting,
Inc., Rosedale Carting, Inc., and Vulpis Brothers, Ltd.
(collectively the “corporate defendants”), appeal from
judgments entered in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York convicting them, fol-
lowing a jury trial before Constance Baker Motley, Judge,
of racketeering and mail fraud offenses in connection with
waste dumping operations. Paccione, Vulpis, and the cor-
porate defendants were convicted of Participating and
conspiring to participate in the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and (d) (1988) (counts 1
and 2), and five counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2 (1988) (counts 5-9). Paccione was
also convicted on an additional mail fraud count (count
———————
A4
12). McDonald was convicted on one count of mail fraud
(count 12). Paccione and Vulpis were sentenced princi-
pally to 151 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by
three-year terms of supervised release; McDonald was
sentenced principally to 12 months’ imprisonment and
ordered to pay a $79,500 fine. In lieu of forfeiture, fines,
and restitution, the corporate defendants, Paccione, and
Vulpis entered into a court-approved agreement to pay the
government $22 million.
On appeal, defendants contend principally (1) that they
were deprived of due process by the use of an anonymous
jury, (2) that the conduct charged to them was not within
the purview of the mail fraud statute, and (3) that the trial
court made various evidentiary errors. Paccione and
Vulpis also contend that the district court erred in com-
puting their sentences under the federal Sentencing
Guidelines (“Guidelines”). For the reasons below, we
affirm the judgments of conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1988, much of the private carting business in the
New York City boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens was
: controlled by Paccione and Vulpis. Paccione was the pres-
ident and majority shareholder of defendants August
Recycling, Inc., National Carting, Inc. (“National’’), and
Stage Carting, Inc. (“Stage”) (collectively the “Paccione
companies”); Vulpis owned 50% of defendants Rosedale
: Carting, Inc. (“Rosedale”), and Vulpis Brothers, Ltd. (col-
lectively the “Vulpis companies”). Together, these entities
generated income of some $23,000,000 per year. The pre-
sent prosecution arose principally out of defendants’
fraudulent operation in 1988 of an environmentally haz-
ardous landfill on 110 acres of largely undeveloped land
I ceeeeneeieeeaneaindnaieemmaumaiiiaiaian
TSE A LEO LC AOC
A 5
on Staten Island, New York. Victims of this fraud
included the City of New York (“City”) and CSX Realty
Corporation (“CSX”), Defendants operated by, inter alia,
disregarding regulations promulgated by the City’s
Department of Consumer Affairs and the New York State
(“State”) Department of Environmental Conservation
(“SDEC”) and fraudulently obtaining dumping permits
from the City’s Department of Sanitation (“CDOS”) and
the City’s Department of Transportation (“CDOT”). In
addition, certain defendants engaged in a fraudulent
scheme with respect to the disposal of infectious medical
waste. The evidence presented at the 12-week trial, taken
in the light most favorable to the government, revealed
the following.
A. The Illegal Dumping Scheme
Waste disposal in New York City is subject to stringent
regulations adopted primarily in recognition of health and
environmental dangers. “Clean waste” or “clean fill,”
which generally includes clean earth and/or ashes, dirt,
concrete, rock, gravel, stone, slag, and sand, is often used
to upgrade building sites, and upon obtaining the proper
permits, a contractor may dump specified quantities of
clean fill on any identified location. For other types of
waste, however, the regulations are more restrictive. Pri-
vate carters seeking to dispose of waste other than clean
waste within the City must use a City-owned landfill. The
principal City landfill is the Fresh Kills Sanitary Landfill
(“Fresh Kills”) on Staten Island. Under regulations pro-
mulgated by the City and SDEC, carters must pay the City
a dumping fee for use of Fresh Kills. From March to
October 1988, this fee was $18.50 per cubic yard of
putrescible trash and construction or demolition debris:
the fee for asbestos, which was classified as hazardous
PRL ET A TR a a Eti ELLES.
i
A 6
waste and required greater disposal precautions, was sig-
nificantly higher.
Arlington Yard, a 110-acre former railroad yard located
several miles from Fresh Kills, contains the largest unde-
veloped parcel of real property on Staten Island. Though
it still contained some remnants of former rail operations
and some small piles of refuse, until mid-1988 Arlington
Yard was overgrown with vegetation and trees, attracted
wildlife, and was considered suitable for residential
development.
In 1988, some 72 acres of Arlington Yard were owned
by CSX, an entity headquartered in Virginia. CSX had
previously sold two peripheral segments of the Yard to
one Kenneth I. Wilpon; the Wilpon parcels were managed
by W & W Properties (“W&W”), a partnership formed by
Wilpon and Fred E. Weiss, a Staten Island real estate
developer. (As discussed in greater detail in Part II.A.
below, Weiss, originally named as a defendant in this
action, was murdered prior to trial.) In 1988, W&W pro-
posed to CSX that clean fill be placed on their adjoining
properties to prepare the land for development. CSX con-
sidered the proposal but never gave permission to Wilpon,
W &W, or defendants to place any waste, clean or other-
wise, on its property.
In the spring of 1988, Paccione and Vulpis formed
defendant A & A Land Development (“A&A”) and
obtained permits from CDOT, CDOS, and SDEC, for the
operation by A&A of a clean fill operation on the W&W
land. Defendants never had authorization from CSX to
use its part of Arlington Yard, and they never sought
authorization to dump anything other than clean fill on the
W&wW portion of the Yard. Nonetheless, from May until
mid-September 1988, A&A proceeded to operate a full-
A7
scale commercial dump at Arlington Yard, on both W&W
and CSX land. Trucks filled with putrescible garbage,
construction and demolition debris, medical waste, and
asbestos dumped their loads into recently excavated pits.
When the pits were filled, more waste material was
heaped on, creating a plateau some 20 to 30 feet high. The
heap was then covered with a thin layer of the “clean” dirt
that had been excavated to create the pits, so that the
dump appeared to consist entirely of clean fill.
During the A&A dump’s first two months of operations,
CSX continued to consider W&W’s proposal to put clean
fill on CSX property, mistakenly believing that dumping
was proceeding only on the W&W land. In June, Paccione
mailed CSX a letter falsely reassuring it of the quality of
the A&A operation. For example, the letter stated that
daily inspections and testing were being conducted; in
fact there were no such inspections. Paccione also stated
that “[aJll material delivered to the site comes from var-
ious excavation and construction sites”; instead much of
the material brought to the site was garbage, medical
waste, and asbestos.
CSX executives visited Arlington Yard in late July and
only then became aware that a dumping operation was
underway on CSX’s land. They immediately instructed
Paccione, Vulpis, and Weiss in person to cease all dump-
ing on CSX property; CSX gave the same instructions to
Wilpon and Weiss by telephone and in writing. In a visit
in early August, CSX executives again toured the prop-
erty; they saw garbage in a pit and smelled foul odors.
They repeatedly wrote to Paccione, Vulpis, Wilpon, and
Weiss, stating that the dumping on CSX’s property was
unauthorized. In mid-August, having failed to get defen-
dants to stop using its property, CSX obtained a tempo-
rary restraining order barring A&A from CSX’s land.
A8
Defendants ignored the restraining order and continued to
pile garbage onto its land.
On August 25, 1988, after CDOS investigators had
found garbage in one of the pits at the A&A dump, Pac-
cione made numerous misrepresentations to CDOS offi-
cials. He falsely stated that all of the dump’s employees
had strict orders to turn away trucks carrying anything
other than clean fill. In fact, his own company’s trucks
and trucks of the Vulpis companies were daily being
allowed to dump their putrescible loads, mixed with hos-
pital waste and asbestos. Paccione stated that a corrupt
employee had been responsible for permitting the dump-
ing of the unacceptable material seen by the CDOS
inspectors and represented that the employee had been
fired as a result of the incident. In fact, the employee he
named was never fired but continued to work at the dump
until the State eventually closed it down. Paccione also
assured the inspectors that the materials A&A accepted
were Clean and did not contain any demolition materials,
“building fill,” or rags, representing that 50-100 test sam-
ples a week were being taken from incoming loads and
analyzed by a laboratory. In fact, no such testing proce-
dure had ever been implemented.
On September 14, 1988, SDEC shut down the A&A
landfill operation. The ensuing investigation by City,
State, and federal officials revealed asbestos, rotting
materials, construction debris, household garbage, and
medical waste across the entire Arlington Yard. in all,
prior to the shut-down, at least 550,000 cubic yards of
refuse had been unlawfully dumped by defendants at the
Yard. Much of the garbage deposited at the illegal oper-
ation was dumped by the Paccione and Vulpis companies.
By dumping at Arlington Yard, these companies avoided
paying the approximately $800 per truckload dumping
is eneereenereraeeninen eel
A9
fees that would have been required at Fresh Kills, totaling
some $4,625,000. In addition, A&A charged other com-
panies $10 per cubic yard to dump their refuse at the site,
considerably less than the $18.50 generally charged by the
City at Fresh Kills. In its four months of operation,
A&A’s dump had revenues of approximately $2.6 million.
From these revenues, Paccione received $315,610 in
direct weekly payments; Vulpis received $286,728 in
direct weekly payments; and McDonald cashed checks
totalling $196,565.
As a result of the A&A operation, the City iost the
business of the Paccione and Vulpis companies, as well as
business from other companies that defendants allowed to
dump at the illegal Arlington Yard site. Accordingly, the
City experienced a sharp decline in the tonnage of con-
Struction waste deposited at Fresh Kills during this period
and a concomitant decline in revenue. In addition, CSX’s
property, which prior to defendants’ unlawful dumping
had had an estimated value of $20 million based on its
potential for residential development, became unusable
for that purpose without a clean-up operation costing
approximately $15 million. As of the time of trial, the
entire extent of the environmental harm done to that prop-
erty had not yet been ascertained.
B. The Infectious Medical Waste Scheme
In addition to the A&A illegal landfill, Paccione and
Vulpis, along with McDonald, engaged in an unlawful
scheme with respect to the disposal of infectious or “red-
bag” medical waste. Throughout the period covered by
the indictment, the State had Stringent regulations with
respect to the disposal of such waste. Haulers of red-bag
waste were required, inter alia, to be specially licensed by
SDEC, to transport the waste in properly licensed and
A 10
marked vehicles, and to store the waste only in specified
locations and only for a limited time. Transfer of permits
between companies was not allowed. Beginning in August
1988, SDEC required an applicant for permits to include
background information on its individual owners in order
to permit SDEC to determine whether those who owned
and operated the company had previously committed
environmental offenses. In November 1988, the penalties
for improper transportation, storage, and disposal of
infectious medical waste were increased significantly.
Unlike prior statutes, the new red-bag law subjected doc-
tors and medical facilities to potential strict liability if
their red-bag waste were mishandled in any way, includ-
ing civil penalties of up to $50,000 per day and criminal
sanctions that included prison terms.
In 1988, Paccione, Vulpis, and McDonald formed
defendant New York Environmental Contractors, Inc.
(“Environmental Contractors”), for the commercial col-
lection of red-bag and other medical waste. Environ-
mental Contractors began publicizing the new penalties
and advertising itself as a properly licensed infectious
waste transporter upon which doctors and hospitals could
rely to avoid mishandling and liability. It ran full-page
advertisements in The New York Doctor, a health-related
publication, and mailed copies to as many as 1,000 doc-
tors and hospitals. One such advertisement read, in per-
tinent part, as follows:
A ll
IS YOUR MEDICAL WASTE
BEING WASHED UP ON
A BEACH?
YOU COULD BE PROSECUTED !
Let Us Handle Your Waste Problems:
New York State Licesnsed. . . .
BE SAFE, BE SURE, USE
NEW YORK
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTORS, INC.
(Emphasis in original.) Vulpis and McDonald also mailed
leaflets to prospective clients explaining the new civil and
criminal penalties for improper disposal of infectious
waste and describing how Environmental! Contractors
would comply with all of the rules and regulations gov-
erning the disposal of such waste. The leaflets maintained,
inter alia, that
N.Y. Environmental Contractor’s Corporation is
fully insured and licensed to handle the collection,
transportation and disposal of . . . infectious mate-
| re
Our organization was established with the moral and
ethical convictions to [sic] proper handling of infec-
tious waste removal and that it is to be managed is
[sic] a safe and non-hazardous manner. These con-
victions lead us in our decisions to maintain rigid and
concise measures in the removal and disposal of
infectious waste material. Our company has trained
personnel who are health orientated [sic] and envi-
A 12
ronment conscious. We are deeply committed to
obtaining a non-hazardous-environment, where infec-
tious waste removal and disposal is involved.
Contrary to its representations, Environmental Con-
tractors was neither properly licensed, nor ethical, nor
competent. All of its permits were either bogus or
obtained by forgery and fraud. It fabricated its first SDEC
infectious waste transporter “permit” by pasting the name
“New York Environmental Contractors” onto a permit
previously issued io August Recycling, Inc. Environ-
mental Contractors then mailed copies of this document to
several doctors who had asked to see its permit before hir-
ing the company. When Environmental Contractors sub-
mitted an application to obtain its own first SDEC
transporter permit, McDonald forged the signature of a
Pennsylvania incinerator manager supposedly certifying
that the incinerator had agreed to accept Environmental
Contractors’s infectious waste for disposal. In October
1988, when Environmental Contractors was applying to
SDEC for an amended permit, though McDonald, Pac-
cione, and Vulpis had represented to banks and other reg-
ulatory bodies that they each owned one-third of
Environmental Contractors, McDonald represented in the
application that he was the sole owner of the company,
presumably to conceal the financial interests of Paccione
and Vulpis who were then under investigation for their
roles in the A&A dump.
Environmental Contractors’s operations were no better
than its acquisition of permits. For example, on Septem-
ber 16, 1988, SDEC officer James Milewski saw a Vulpis
company truck parked outside of National in a commer-
cial and residential area. Though the truck was not autho-
rized on any SDEC permit to transport infectious medical
has neeeemneneenerminind
A 13
waste, it contained improperly unmarked barrels of infec-
tious waste and 245 boxes of such waste. This waste,
which Environmental Contractors had collected from its
Customers and had transferred to the truck, included blood
vials and human organs. The truck did not have the
required warnings posted on its exterior to indicate that it
contained infectious waste; it had been parked in front of
National for some two weeks, though the regulations per-
mitted storage for no more than five days; and because of
its failure to properly contain the waste, it was leaking
blood onto the pavement.
Environmental Contractors’s last SDEC permit expired
on March 31, 1989, but the company continued to collect
and dispose of infectious waste without a permit. From
February until June 1989, Environmental Contractors
operated out of a transfer station belonging to All County
Sanitation, a company owned by Vulpis in Long Island
City, New York, where infectious waste was stored for as
long as two months. This facility was not authorized by
SDEC to serve as an infectious waste storage facility.
Each of Environmental Contractors’s violations of the
state regulatory scheme in September 1988 and during the
early months of 1989 exposed to legal sanctions the per-
sons who had generated the waste found in Environmen-
tal Contractors’s possession. Several of these persons or
entities were required to pay civil penalties.
C. The Verdicts and the S entences
Based on the A&A dumping operation and the Envi-
ronmental Contractors medical waste collection operation,
a 12-count superseding indictment Charged all defendants
with a substantive RICO violation, to wit, conducting and
participating in the affairs of an enterprise through a pat-
A 14
tern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) (count 1); and with RICO conspiracy, in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (count 2). It charged all
defendants except McDonald and Environtnental Con-
tractors with five counts of scheming to defraud the City
of dumping revenues and license fees in connection with
the A&A dump site, in violation of the mail fraud statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (counts 3-7), and with two counts of
scheming to defraud CSX of the value of its Arlington
Yard property through the A&A dumping operations, also
in violation of § 1341 (counts 8 and 9). Counts 10 and 11
charged Paccione and Vulpis, along with their “co-rack-
eteers” and certain of their respective companies, with
schemes to defraud certain hospitals in connection with
the disposal of infectious or medical waste, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2. Finally, the indictment charged
that Paccione, Vulpis, McDonald, and Environmental
Contractors had schemed to defraud their medical cus-
tomers of money and property by charging them high
rates attributable to lawful transport, storage, and disposal
of medical waste without providing those services law-
fully, and had implemented that scheme through, inter
alia, mailings of letters and invoices to a certain doctor,
in violation of § 1341 (count 12). The alleged schemes to
defraud also formed the basis for 17 RICO predicate acts
charged in counts 1 and 2.
The trial lasted 12 weeks. The jury, empaneled »nony-
mously over defendants’ objections, deliberated from
May 22 to June 8, 1990, and found each of the defendants
guilty on some counts and not guilty on others. All of the
defendants charged in counts 3, 4, 10, and 11 were acquit-
ted on those counts. In addition, the jury found McDonald
and Environmental Contractors guilty on count 12 but not
guilty on counts | and 2. It found Vulpis guilty on counts
A 15
1, 2, and 5-9, but not guilty on count 12. It found Pac-
cione guilty on counts 1, 2, 5-9, and 12. It found the cor-
porate defendants guilty on counts 1, 2, and 5-9. With
respect to the RICO counts, as discussed in greater detail
in Part II.C. below, the jury also completed a special ver-
dict form, making findings on each of the alleged predi-
Cate acts.
On June 8, 1990, the district court approved the parties’
June 6, 1990 letter agreement with respect to forfeitures
under RICO (“forfeiture agreement”). That agreement
principally removed from the jury any issue of RICO for-
feitures and provided that Paccione, Vulpis, and the cor-
porate defendants, if convicted of RICO offenses, would
be jointly and severally liable to the government for $22
million, in satisfaction of forfeiture, court-imposed fines,
and restitution. The forfeiture agreement established a
periodic payment schedule and required that those defen-
dants pay the government in full within 90 days. No pay-
ments were made.
On October 3, 1990, the district court sentenced Pac-
cione and Vulpis principally to 151-month terms of incar-
ceration, and sentenced McDonald principally to a
12-month term of incarceration and ordered him to pay a
fine that later was reduced by stipulation to $79,500. For
reasons discussed in greater detail in Part III.B. below, the
sentences imposed on Paccione and Vulpis were more
severe than those recommended in the Probation Depart-
ment’s Presentence Reports, in part because the district
court found that Paccione and Vulpis had entered into the
forfeiture agreement with intent not to perform.
A 16
D. The Present Appeals
On appeal, defendants challenge their convictions on
procedural and substantive grounds. In addition, Paccione
and Vulpis challenge their sentences. For the reasons
below, we affirm the judgments of conviction of Paccione,
Vulpis, McDonald, and the corporate defendants.
We also note that Environmental Contractors, though it
filed a notice of appeal, did not file a brief or otherwise
pursue its appeal. Accordingly, its appeal is dismissed.
Il. CHALLENGES TO THE CONVICTIONS
Defendants challenge their convictions on the principal
grounds that (1) the use of an anonymous jury deprived
them of a fair trial, (2) the conduct charged to them was
not within the reach of the mail fraud statute, (3) the evi-
dence to support the mail fraud counts was insufficient,
and (4) the inapplicability of the mail fraud statute inval-
idated the predicate acts on which the RICO convictions
were premised. In addition, McDonald contends that the
court erred in refusing to give a requested jury instruc-
tion; he and Vulpis challenge certain of the court’s evi-
dentiary rulings; and the Vulpis companies contend that
they may not properly be held accountable for crimes
committed by Vulpis. For the reasons below, we conclude
that these challenges to the convictions lack merit.
A. The Anonymous Jury
Upon motion of the government, the district court
entered an order (a) limiting the voir dire so as not to dis-
close the name, address, or place of employment of any
member of the venire, (b) keeping the jurors together dur-
ing lunch recesses, accompanied by a United States Mar-
A 17
shal, and (c) having the jurors transported at the end of
each trial day to an undisclosed central location from
which they could go home. Defendants consented to most
of these measures, on condition that the jurors be care-
fully instructed that the procedures adopted were intended
as protection against intrusion by the media; but they
objected that the nondisclosure of the jurors’ names and
employers would deprive them of a fair trial. They pursue
this contention on appeal. We are unpersuaded.
In general, the court should not order the empaneling of
an anonymous jury without (a) concluding that there is
strong reason to believe the jury needs protection, and (b)
taking reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial
effects on the defendant and to ensure that his funda-
mental rights are protected. See, e.g., United States v.
Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1132 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1139 (1990); United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d
705, 717-18 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022
(1988); United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1365 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 819 (1985). Within these
parameters, the decision whether or not to empanel an
anonymous jury is left to the district court’s discretion.
See, e.g., United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d
934, 971 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2858
(1991).
Sufficient reason for empaneling an anonymous jury
has been found to exist where, for example, the defen-
dants “were alleged to be very dangerous individuals
engaged in iarge-scale organized crime who had partici-
pated in several ‘mob-style’ killings,” and there was
“strong evidence of defendants’ past attempts to interfere
with the judicial process, and defendants were alleged to
be part of a group that possessed the means to harm
jurors,” United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1364-65; or
A 18
where the defendants have been charged with grand jury
tampering and the trial is expected to attract publicity,
United States v. Vario, 943 F.2d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 1991);
United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d at 717 (warranted by
history of violence and willingness to corrupt and obstruct
justice, together with expectation of extensive publicity);
or where the defendant has a history of attempted jury
tampering and a serious criminal record, United States v.
Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1132-33; or where there had been
extensive pretrial publicity and there were abundant alle-
gations of dangerous and unscrupulous conduct, United
States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 141 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
Where jury anonymity is warranted, we have found the
defendant’s fundamental right to an unbiased jury is ade-
quately protected by the court’s conduct of “ ‘a voir dire
designed to uncover bias as to issues in the cases and as to
the defendant himself.’ ” United States v. Vario, 943 F.2d
at 242 (quoting United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 140).
In addition, we have found the danger that the jury might
infer that the need for additional security was attributable
to the character of the defendant was minimized where the
court took care to give the jurors a plausible and non-
prejudicial reason for not disclosing their identities or for
taking other security measures. See United States v.
Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1364-65 & n.1 (explained as pro-
tection against pressures from media); United States v.
Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d at 971 (same).
In the present case, the government’s motion expressed
concern that, in light of the serious nature of the charges
and the potential for long prison terms and high monetary
penalties, defendants might seek to influence the outcome
of the prosecution by improper means. An affirmation
served with the motion stated, inter alia, that W&W’s
————
escapees aaa i sta ib 20nd Saks A sa a
A 19
Weiss, named as a defendant in the indictment, had been
murdered in circumstances that strongly suggested a con-
nection to the present case and to certain of these defen-
dants. It stated that based on public information and on
confidential information from a reliable source, the gov-
ernment believed that Paccione was a “made” member of
the Gambino Crime Family; that Vulpis was believed to
have strong ties to organized crime; that various persons
had been threatened by Vulpis and his associates with a
baseball bat or a pistol; and that a government witness had
recently received a middle-of-the-night anonymous tele-
phone call telling him that he would be safe so long as he
“ “remembered nothing.’ ” The government also pointed
out that the case had been front-page news and that the
trial could be expected to be the subject of extensive pub-
licity, exposing the jurors to inappropriate contacts that
could compromise the trial. An additional affirmation,
submitted to the court ex parte and in camera because of
an ongoing grand jury investigation and the potential dan-
ger to witnesses who had testified before that body, pro-
vided details as to the gangland style of the Weiss killing
and other details supporting the government’s assertions
as to the circumstances surrounding the killing, defen-
dants’ ties to organized crime, and the probability that
that murder had been arranged by one or more of the
defendants. The presentation by the government was suf-
ficient to warrant the district court’s conclusion that jury
anonymity should be preserved.
We see no inadequacy in the procedural precautions
taken by the court to prevent prejudice to the defendants
as a result of the anonymity of the jurors. Defendants do
not contend that the voir dire was in any way inadequate.
The court also adequately instructed the jury at the outset
of the trial that the special precautions were designed to
A 20
protect the jury from contacts by the media, thereby
implying that the security measures were not the result of
threats from the defendants. Though there was evidence
that some of the jurors were apprehensive about possible
threats from defendants, defendants have not shown any
basis for believing they were prejudiced by the court’s
security measures. To the contrary, the fact that the jury
acquitted each of the defendants on several counts
strongly indicates that those measures did not induce any
lack of objectivity.
In sum, we find no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s decision to keep confidential the jurors’ names and
places of employment.
B. The Mail Fraud Convictions
The federal mail fraud statute prohibits the use of the
mails in furtherance of “any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” 18
U.S.C. § 1341. In McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350
(1987), the Supreme Court held that § 1341 is “limited in
scope to the protection of property rights.” Jd. at 360.
Though the statute reaches a scheme to obtain either tan-
gible or intangible property rights, see Carpenter v.
United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25-28 (1987) (confidential
information protected), it does not reach a scheme
designed merely to deprive the citizenry of honest gov-
ernment, McNally, 483 U.S. at 356. In the wake of
McNally, this Court has considered the status of federal
and state licenses under § 1341 and under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343 (1988), its wire fraud analogue. In United States
v: Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Schwartz”), we
concluded that an arms export license in the hands of the
federal government is not property, and that the govern-
A 21
ment’s interest in such a license “is ancillary to its power
to regulate, and [therefore] is not a property interest
within the meaning of the wire fraud statute.” /d. at 418.
On the authority of Schwartz, we decided in United States
v. Novod, 923 F.2d 970, 973 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Novod”),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2018 (1991), a mail fraud case,
that a state’s interest in issuing permits to operate a dump
site did not constitute property.
Defendants in the present case contend principally that
the schemes of which they were accused are not within
the reach of § 1341 because those schemes depended on
the issuance of State and City licenses, and that defen-
dants’ procurement of such licenses, even if by means of
misrepresentation and use of the mails, did not, according
to Schwartz, deprive the City and State of property.
Although, as discussed in Part II.C. below, this argument
has merit with respect to one of the predicate acts charged
in the RICO counts, it has no merit with respect to defen-
dants’ convictions on the mail fraud counts.
The decisions in Schwartz and Novod must be read in
light of the postures in which those cases arrived in this
Court on appeal. In each, we reversed wire or mail fraud
convictions because the trial court had instructed the jury
that the government’s right to control the issuance of its
licenses was a property right. For example, though in
Schwartz the government argued on appeal that the fraud-
ulent procurement of the arms license had deprived the
United States of property because it lost the right to seize
the arms, the jury had been instructed only on the theory
that the license itself was property. In Novod, the gov-
ernment had alleged that the fraudulent scheme was
designed not only to obtain a state permit but also to
defraud the state and its residents of funds necessary to
clean a dump site and to defraud the federal and state gov-
iit ell
A 22
ernments of taxes; but the trial court had instructed the
jury that it could convict on the basis of the first objective
alone, i.e., that it could convict if it found that the purpose
of the scheme at issue was to obtain a dumping permit,
because “as a matter of law the permit constitutes prop-
erty.” Neither of our decisions held that fraudulent pro-
curement of a permit or license in order to deprive the
issuing authority of money or other pecuniary interests
was not within the wire or mail fraud statutes. Consistent
with the boundaries of Schwartz and Novod, we have held
that fees payable to the government for services or for tax
purposes do constitute property for purposes of the fraud
statute. See, e.g., United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71,
94 (2d Cir. 1991) (scheme to deprive state of income taxes
cognizable under § 1341): United States v. Porcelli, 865
F.2d 1352, 1359-62 (2d Cir.) (same re state sales tax),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 53 (1989); United States v. Gelb,
881 F.2d 1155, 1162 (2d Cir.) (same re postal revenue
from mass mailings), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 544 (1989);
accord United States v. Dray, 901 F.2d 1132, 1141-42 (lst
Cir.) (scheme to evade legally required fees for municipal
building permits actionable as mail fraud), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 245 (1990).
There is no indication in the present case that the mail
fraud counts were presented to the jury on an improper
basis. In instructing the jury on these counts, the court
told the jury generally that it must find
[t]hat at some point during the time period alleged in
the charge, there existed a scheme to obtain money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations or promises. . .
A 23
The first essential element that must be established
to warrant conviction of the defendants under the
mail or wire fraud counts or a finding of guilty for
the racketeering acts of mail. . . fraud is that there
existed, with respect to each count or act, a scheme
or artifice to obtain money or property. .. .
Let me emphasize that the mail fraud statute is
limited to the protection of money or property rights.
Thus, it would not be sufficient for conviction under
these statutes that defendants sought to deprive
someone of intangible rights, such as the right of a
city or State government agency to have citizens
obey its regulations.
(Trial Transcript, May 21, 1990, at 7056-57.) The instruc-
tions as to specific mail fraud counts similarly focused on
the victims’ monetary interests. For example, with respect
to counts 5-7, the court stated:
Here, the government charges several different
schemes to defraud:
1. A scheme, in Racketeering Acts 1 and 2 and
Counts Three to Seven, to defraud the City and State
of revenues from licensing fees and dumping fees to
be derived from the disposal of waste materials at the
City-owned landfill at Fresh Kills.
(Trial Transcript, May 21, 1990, at 7057 (emphasis
added).) There was no suggestion to the jury that it was
allowed to convict defendants of mail fraud on the basis
that the City and State permits were themselves property.
As discussed below, there was ample evidence to sup-
port all of defendants’ mail fraud convictions.
A 24
1. Counts 5-7: Defrauding the City of Revenues
Counts 5, 6, and 7 of the indictment charged Paccione,
Vulpis, and the corporate defendants with use of the mails
in furtherance of
a scheme and artifice to defraud the City of New
York of money and property, to wit, revenues from
licensing fees and dumping fees to be derived from
the lawful disposal of waste materials at the City-
owned landfill at Fresh Kills.
In support of these counts, the government presented evi-
dence that, by fraudulently procuring permits to deposit
clean fill on the W&W property and using those permiis
to mask their dumping of nonclean waste—including
putrescible garbage, building demolition debris, medical
waste, and asbestos—in Arlington Yard, both on their
property and on the CSX property, defendants deprived
the City of the dumping fees to which it was entitled. In
addition to lowering their own dumping costs, defendants
allowed other companies to dump their nonclean waste in
Arlington Yard and charged them $10 per cubic yard. The
total amount of waste illegally dumped in Arlington Yard
was some 550,000 cubic yards. Since the only other size-
able dump in the City was Fresh Kills and the prevailing
dumping fee there during the pertinent period was $18.50
per cubic yard (and significantly higher for asbestos), the
defendants’ frauds cost the City more than $10 million in
licensing fees. Even if one were to accept defendants’
argument that some licenses were acquired that permitted
the dumping of some 340,000 cubic yards of clean fill, the
net loss to the City, considering the total amount dumped
in Arlington Yard, was several million dollars.
Defendants make two additional arguments with respect
to counts 5-7 that need not detain us long. First, they con-
A 25
tend that the government’s proof of mailing under counts
5 and 6 was insufficient because the alleged mailings
(consisting of permits applied for by A&A) were from
CDOT to CDOS, and defendants had not been informed
that such mailings would occur. To come within § 1341,
however, a mailing need not be by the defendant himself,
SO long as it was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant
and furthered his fraudulent scheme. Pereira v. United
States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954); United States v. Bronston,
658 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
915 (1982). There can be no serious doubt that both of
these requirements were met here.
Second, defendants argue that the City failed to prove
any cognizable loss of dumping fees because defendants
had no obligation to dump at Fresh Kills. We are unper-
suaded. Fresh Kills was the largest dump site in the City.
Defendants and other companies that used the A&A ille-
gal dump site had previously dumped at Fresh Kills, and
the government presented evidence showing that City rev-
enues from that facility declined precipitously during the
time of operation of the A&A dump. It was within the
province of the jury to consider these facts, as well as the
additional expense that would have been incurred by
Carters traveling to dump outside of the City, and to infer
that defendants’ conduct cost the City fees it would oth-
erwise have received.
2. Counts 8 and 9: Defrauding CSX of the Value of Its
Land
Counts 8 and 9 charged Paccione, Vulpis, and the cor-
porate defendants with use of the mails to conceal from
CSX the fact that defendants were causing vast amounts
of garbage, asbestos, and medical waste to be dumped on
CSX's property, thereby depriving CSX of the value of
i
A 26
that property. See, e.g., United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d
23, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1981) (cognizable fraud where mailings
of payments to investors victimized by scheme lulled
them into false sense of security), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
945 (1982). Defendants’ argument that their convictions
on counts 8 and 9 should be overturned on the ground that
“[ujnder McNally, . . . a scheme to damage a person’s
property is not a scheme to defraud him within the mean-
ing of” the mail fraud statute (brief on appeal of Paccione,
et al., at 50), is frivolous. Defendants schemed to conceal
from CSX their dumping of noxious wastes on its land
and mailed letters to CSX containing fraudulent state-
ments to achieve that end. Prior to defendants’ dumpings,
the CSX property had an estimated value for residential
purposes of $20 million; after their acts, it had no value
for that purpose without a clean-up expenditure of some
$15 million. There can be no doubt that defendants
schemed to and did deprive CSX of the value of its prop-
erty, using the mails in furtherance of their scheme. This
conduct was within the purview of § 1341.
3. Court 12: The Medical Waste Disposal Scam
Paccione and McDonald contend that their count 12
mail fraud convictions should be set aside principally on
the grounds that (1) the medical waste scheme merely
deprived Environmental Contractors’s customers of an
intangible right, i.e., “the right to the honest services of
the defendants in dumping their medical waste in a per-
mitted site listed on defendant’s waste transporter permit”
(McDonald brief on appeal at 30), and hence was not
actionable under § 1341 in light of McNally and Schwartz;
(2) the mailings charged, “having occurred afterward” and
being “incidental,” were not in furtherance of a scheme to
Te
A 27
defraud; and (3) there was no evidence of any intent to
defraud. Their contentions are untenable.
Count 12 charged that these defendants used the mails
in order
to defraud doctors, which [sic] generated medical and
infectious waste materials of money and property by
charging them the high rates required for lawful
transfer, storage and disposal of such waste, while
actually transferring, storing and disposing of the
waste at far lower rates illegally, and by exposing the
generators to potential civil and criminal penalties
for illegal transfer, storage and disposal of such
waste.
That count alleged that defendants caused the mailings of
letters and invoices to one Dr. Vado, who had engaged the
waste disposal services of a company other than Envi-
ronmental Contractors, which had in turn hired Environ-
mental Contractors.
Use of the mails in furtherance of a scheme to offer ser-
vices in exchange for a fee, with the intent not to perform
those services, is within the reach of § 1341. See, e.g.,
McNally, 483 U.S. at 360 (fraud cognizable where alleged
victim would have paid less or received better quality ser-
vices absent the alleged deceit); United States v. Wallach,
935 F.2d 445, 461 (2d Cir. 1991) (“providing alternate
services does not defeat a fraud charge [when] the [vic-
tims] did not receive the services that they believed were
being provided”); cf. Schwartz, 924 F.2d at 420-21 (use of
wire facilities in connection with defendants’ false assur-
ances to its arms supplier that defendants were in com-
pliance with government regulations was within reach of
§ 1343).
eee eee won
A 28
There is no requirement that the victim of the fraud be
deceived by the very document that satisfies the statute’s
mailing requirement; rather, the requirement is merely
that the mailing be “in furtherance of” the fraud. Novod,
923 F.2d at 973; United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d at
927. Nor is there any requirement that the mailings pre-
cede the fraud. United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 79-
80 (1962). The mailing of communications that are
designed to lull the victims of the fraud into believing
they have received the services they bought is sufficient
to support a conviction under § 1341. See, e.g., United
States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d at 36-37 (fraud cognizable
where mailings of payments to victimized investors lulled
them into false sense of security).
The conduct of Paccione and McDonald fits comfort-
ably within this framework. The fraud in obtaining per-
mits to dispose of infectious waste was a part of the deceit
employed to allow defendants to pursue a scheme that
was Clearly cognizable under § 1341. Environmental Con-
tractors offered to provide doctors with infectious-waste
disposal services that would be safe and adequate to
relieve them of the risk of civil and criminal liability.
There was no indication that any of its customers sought
a lower level of service, and it was inferable that the pay-
ments of the doctors and medical facilities were to be
commensurate with the high level of services promised by
Environmental Contractors. Environmental Contractors
mailed invoices designed to lull the customer into believ-
ing the services promised had been provided.
Defendants’ reliance on cases such as United States v.
Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1182 (2d Cir.
1970), and United States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir.
1987), is misplaced. In the former, though the defendants
had made false representations in order to gain access to
A 29
potential customers, they had not misrepresented either
the quality of their merchandise or the conditions of sale.
In Starr, the defendants, who operated a bulk mailing ser-
vice and were indicted for defrauding their customers,
charged their customers the correct price for postage but
cheated the Postal Service by “burying” higher-rate mail
in sacks being used for lower-rate mail. Because the cus-
tomers received the same postal service they would have
received had defendants paid the full postage, the mail
fraud conviction was reversed on the ground that the cus-
tomers had not been defrauded. Though the Postal Service
itself had been victimized, the indictment charged only
that the defendants had defrauded their customers, not
that they had defrauded the Postal Service.
Here there is no question that Environmental Contrac-
tors’s customers did not get what they paid for. Its cus-
tomers were led to believe they were purchasing careful,
competent, and licensed services, together with a reduc-
tion of the risk of civil and criminal penalties for
improper disposal. Instead Environmental Contractors fre-
quently and flagrantly violated numerous SDEC regula-
tions; its Customers were exposed to substantial regulatory
risks, and even had those risks not come to fruition, the
fraud was complete. These customers had also requested
assurance at the outset that the company was in fact
licensed to handle infectious medical waste; Environ-
mental Contractors was not so licensed and responded by
sending a permit it had counterfeited; and when it did
acquire its own permits, it did so by means of forgery and
fraud. Defendants’ suggestion that there was no evidence
of an intent to defraud is frivolous.
A 30
C. The RICO Convictions
Paccione, Vulpis, and the corporate defendants contend
that their RICO convictions should be set aside on the
ground that some of the alleged mail frauds listed as pred-
icate acts were not within the reach of the mail fraud
statute. We have dealt with most of the mail frauds above,
and since we have found that they were within the scope
of § 1341, there is no basis for challenging their use as
RICO predicate acts. One alleged predicate act, however,
was flawed as defendants contend.
Racketeering predicate act 12 (not to be confused with
count 12) charged that the individual defendants and
Environmental Contractors violated § 1341 by using the
mails “to defraud the State of New York of money and
property by awarding a lucrative waste transporter permit
to [Environmental Contractors].” Notwithstanding its ref-
erence to money and property, this allegation treated the
license itself as the property of which the State was
defrauded. As the government concedes on appeal, this
was invalid under Schwartz and Novod. Since this alle-
gation was insufficient to charge an offense under § 1341,
it was also insufficient to serve as a mail-fraud RICO
predicate act.
This deficiency, however, does not require reversal. The
jury returned a painstaking special verdict in which it
made findings as to each of several defendants with
respect to 17 alleged predicate acts (many with subparts).
Of the defendants found guilty on the RICO counts, only
Paccione was found by the jury to have committed pred-
icate act 12, and thus only he has standing to challenge
his RICO conviction on the ground that predicate act 12
was insufficient. We reject Paccione’s challenge because,
for the reasons below, we conclude that the error in sub-
A 31
mitting act 12 to the jury was harmless beyond any rea-
sonable doubt, see Fed R. Crim. P. 52(a); Chapman vy.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
In addition to predicate act 12, the jury found that Pac-
cione had committed eight predicate acts, to wit, acts 1, 3,
4, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17. These eight remaining predicate
acts, which suffer no defects, are an ample basis for Pac-
cione’s convictions on the RICO counts. We recognize
that the mere fact that a jury finds that a given defendant
committed three or more predicate acts does not neces-
sarily mean that it will convict that defendant of RICO
charges—witness the fact that the jury in this case found
McDonald not guilty on the RICO counts though it found
that he had committed six of the alleged predicate acts
(acts 12-17). But this treatment of McDonald gives us no
basis for believing the jury might have found Paccione
not guilty on the RICO counts if predicate act 12 had not
been submitted to it. Rather, the jury’s findings show that
predicate act 12 simply was not an ingredient in its RICO
verdicts. Thus, the jury found McDonald had committed
that act, but it acquitted him on the RICO charges; it
found Vulpis had not committed predicate act 12, but it
convicted him on the RICO charges; and the corporate
defendants were not alleged to have committed predicate
act 12, and the jury convicted them on the RICO counts.
The RICO convictions of Vulpis and the corporate defen-
dants were based on the jury’s findings that they com-
mitted predicate acts 1, 3, and 4, and no other predicate
acts. Given all of these findings and verdicts, including
the jury’s finding that Paccione too committed predicate
acts 1, 3, and 4 (plus five other validly submitted acts),
we have no doubt that the jury would have convicted him
on the RICO counts if predicate act 12 had not been sub-
mitted.
I sit iiieeeaemiimeil
A 32
D. Individual Challenges to the Convictions
Defendants make a number of individual challenges to
their convictions, including (1) Vulpis’s challenge to the
introduction of evidence that he attempted to bribe SDEC
investigators, (2) the Vulpis companies’ contention that
they were not responsible for derelictions of Vulpis, and
(3) McDonald’s contentions that the trial court erred in
refusing to give a requested jury instruction and erred in
certain evidentiary rulings with respect to character evi-
dence. We have considered all of defendants’ challenges
to the merits and find in them no basis for reversal.
1. Vulpis
During its rebuttal case, the government was allowed to
introduce evidence that, in connection with the illegal
A&A landfill, Vulpis had offered SDEC officers bribes.
Vulpis challenges the admission of this evidence, arguing
principally that it was not probative of the issues at trial,
that the unfair prejudice to him outweighed its probative
value, and that he did not have proper notice that the evi-
dence would be offered. We disagree.
Under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
relevant evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” may
be admitted at trial to show, inter alia, that a defendant
who claims that his conduct was the result of accident or
mistake had the intent to commit the offense. See Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b); see, e.g., United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d
897, 907 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2216 (1990);
United States v. Caputo, 808 F.2d 963, 968 (2d Cir. 1987).
A defendant’s attempt to bribe a law enforcement official
is relevant to show his awareness that his actions were not
innocent. See, e.g., United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247,
1260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 955 (1979); see also
[Onan an te ee
A 33
United States v. Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 78-79 (6th
Cir. 1986) (attempt to bribe witness), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 922 (1987). Evidence of such “other acts” should be
excluded, however, if the trial court finds that its poten-
tial for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its pro-
bative value. See Fed. R. Evid. 403; Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)
Advisory Committee Note; Huddleston v. United States,
485 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1988). The trial court’s decision to
admit such evidence will be reversed only for a clear
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Sappe, 898
F.2d 878, 880 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Caputo, 808
F.2d at 968.
Vulpis’s principal defense at trial was that he did not
intend the Arlington Yard operations to violate the law
and that any impermissible dumping there was the result
of accident or mistake. To substantiate that defense he -
was allowed, over the government’s objection, to intro-
duce testimony that Weiss had given in a civil action. In
that testimony, Weiss said that when two SDEC officers
discovered buried garbage at the landfill Vulpis had been
“shocked” and “surprised.” In response to this evidence,
the government was permitted, in its rebuttal case, to offer
testimony by those two officers that upon their calling the
violations to Vulpis’s attention, Vulpis had promptly
offered them money. Accordingly, SDEC Lieutenant
David Baker testified about his visit to the A&A landfill
in mid-September 1988 and a conversation he had there
with Vulpis. When Baker told Vulpis he was operating
illegally and risking $25,000-a day in penalties, Vulpis
responded, “I’m losing $75,000 a day every day the place
is closed. How about $100,000, you just go away.” Sim-
ilarly, SDEC officer Milewski testified that on the same
day, Vulpis told him he was “losing approximately
$20,000, and how about $50,000.” These statements by
A 34
Vulpis, which the jury was plainly free to interpret as
offering bribes, were relevant to show a consciousness of
guilt on the part of Vulpis and thereby to cast doubt on his
lack-of-intent defense. The court properly gave the jury a
limiting instruction, and it was well within the court’s dis-
cretion to conclude that, with that instruction, the pro-
bative value of this evidence outweighed its potential for
unfair prejudice.
Finally, we reject Vulpis’s contention that the bribe evi-
dence should have been excluded because he did not have
advance notice that the government would seek to use it.
In support of this contention, Vulpis relies on United
States v. Davidoff, 845 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir. 1988). His
reliance is misplaced, for Davidoff did not involve a Rule
404(b) question; rather, we ruled that it was error for the
trial court not to require the government to provide a bill
of particulars identifying the alleged victims of discrete
extortionate schemes that the government intended to
prove as RICO predicate acts. See 845 F.2d at 1154. A
requirement that, upon request of the defendant in a crim-
inal case, the government give advance notice of the gen-
eral nature of any other-act evidence that is to be offered
at trial will soon be added to Rule 404(b). See Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b) (effective Dec. 1, 1991: evidence of other
acts is admissible to prove, inter alia, absence of mistake
or accident, “provided that upon request by the accused,
the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court
excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the gen-
eral nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at
trial’). No such requirement was in effect, however, at the
time of the trial in the present case. See generally 2 J.
Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence § 404[19},
at 404-158 (1991) (“Rule 404 does not require the gov-
A 35
ernment to give notice of an intention to use other crimes
evidence at trial.’”’).
In any event, even if Vulpis had been entitled to
advance notice that the government would offer the bribe
evidence against him, he received adequate notice. The
evidence was introduced-during the government’s rebut-
tal case. The government had initially offered this evi-
dence, on another theory, during its direct case; when it
was rejected, the government pointed out that if the tes-
timony were viewed as reflecting the offer of a bribe, it
would be admissible under Rule 404(b) as other-act evi-
dence to meet a defense of mistake or lack of intent; the
government expressly reserved its right to offer the tes-
timony on rebuttal. The district court was not required to
exclude the bribery evidence on the ground that Vulpis
had not received notice.
2. The Vulpis Companies
The Vulpis companies contend that the jury’s verdict
finding them guilty on counts 1, 2, and 5-9 was not sup-
ported by sufficient evidence because the only evidence
linking them to the A&A illegal operation was the fact
they were 50% owned by Vulpis. They contend that they
could not properly be held liable for his actions because
there was no evidence that they had conferred any author-
ity on him to involve them in the A&A landfill. This con
tention need not detain us long.
A corporation can act only through its agents, and the
“acts of individuals on [the corporation’s] behalf may be
properly chargeable to it.” United States v. Ingredient
Technology Corp., 698 F.2d 88, 99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1131 (1983). Thus, the corporation may be held
criminally liable “for the conduct of its supervisory
Dctiinenseniemenill
A 36
employees who had either intentionally disregarded the
law or had acted with plain indifference to its require-
ments.” United States v. Demauro, 581 F.2d 50, 54 (2d
Cir. 1978).
The evidence in the present case was sufficient to per-
mit a rational juror to infer beyond a reasonable doubt
that Vulpis’s actions with respect to the A&A dump were
for the benefit of and authorized by Rosedale and Vulpis
Brothers, Ltd. It included proof that Vulpis owned 50% of
each company; that he was an officer of each corporation;
and that he largely ran their operations. Vulpis entered
into the A&A partnership with Paccione for the purpose
of operating the illegal dump. Vulpis helped run the
dump. Truck drivers for both of Vulpis’s companies tes-
tified that they daily made numerous dumps in Arlington
Yard without being required to pay a fee. Use of that
dump saved the Vulpis companies millions of dollars.
In short, the evidence was ample to support the con-
victions of the Vulpis companies on the RICO and mail
fraud counts with which they were charged.
3. McDonald's Contentions
McDonald contends that the trial court erred in refusing
to give a requested instruction to the jury and in making
certain evidentiary rulings, to wit, barring McDonald’s
character witnesses from testifying with respect to his
relationship with his son and allowing other witnesses to
be questioned hypothetically with respect to McDonald’s
commission of crimes. For the reasons below, we find no
basis for reversal.
A 37
a. The Requested Instruction
McDonald asked the trial court to charge the jury that
defendants’ representations that Environmental Con-
tractors was licensed to deal with infectious medical
waste were not fraudulent because defendants relied in
good faith on the permits they possessed. Thus, he
requested the court to instruct that “whether or not” Envi-
ronmental Contractors’s licenses were “fraudulently or
irregularly obtained,” advertisements describing the com-
pany as being licensed “w/{ere] not false” and that defen-
dants were “entitled to describe” Environmental
Contractors “as licensed.” McDonald contends that the
trial court’s refusal to give this instruction was error. It
was not.
The trial judge is not required to give a requested
charge if it lacks a foundation in law, see, e.g., United
States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 828 (2d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Ouimette, 798 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 863 (1988), or lacks a foundation in the
evidence adduced at trial, see United States v. Leonard,
524 F.2d 1076, 1084 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U-S.
958 (1976). Where the defendant requests a charge as to
his defense of good faith, there is no basis for reversal
where the court’s instructions have properly explained the
thrust of that defense. See, e.g., United States v. McElroy,
910 F.2d 1016, 1026 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Cheek v.
United States, 111 S. Ct. 604, 611 (1991) (in criminal tax
case, trial court should not instruct jury that, in order to
negate willfulness, defendant’s belief that enforcement of
tax laws was unconstitutional must be objectively rea-
sonable).
Here, the court gave the essence of a proper good-faith
defense in its jury charge, stating as follows:
A 38
Under the antifraud statutes, even false represen-
tations or statements or omissions of material fact do
not amount to a fraud unless done with fraudulent
intent. However misleading or deceptive a plan may
be, it is not fraudulent if it was devised or carried out
in good faith. An honest belief in the truth of the rep-
resentations made by a defendant is a good defense,
no matter how inaccurate the statements may turn out
to be.
(Trial Transcript, May 21, 1990, at 7069-70.) This general
instruction was sufficient. The record did not warrant a
charge, as McDonald requested, that the individual defen-
dants were entitled to describe Environmental Contractors
as licensed. At the outset, Environmental Contractors rep-
resented that it was licensed when it was not. When doc-
tors asked to see its license, defendants simply took
another company’s license and pasted Environmental
Contractors’s name on it, and distributed copies of the
fabricated document. As a matter of law, defendants could
not have had a good faith belief that their bogus document
was an Environmental Contractors license. Given this
record, for the court to have told the jury that defendants
were “entitled to describe” Environmental Contractors “as
licensed” would have been error.
b. The Evidentiary Challenges
McDonald, who did not testify at trial, presented only
character evidence in his defense. In addition to produc-
ing witnesses to testify to his honesty and integrity, he
sought to introduce evidence that his then-teenage son had
been born with cerebral palsy and that McDonald had
devoted his life to caring for the son, in order to persuade
the jury that McDonald would never do anything to risk
imprisonment thereby disabling himself from caring for
A 39
the boy. He contends that the court erroneously excluded
this evidence. We find no basis for reversal.
The admissibility of character evidence rests in the
sound discretion of the trial judge, and we will not disturb
the trial court’s ruling absent an abuse of discretion. See,
e.g., United States v. Davis, 546 F.2d 583, 592 (Sth Cir.)
(“Rarely and only upon a clear showing of prejudicial
abuse of discretion will appellate courts disturb the rul-
ings of trial courts in the admissibility of character evi-
dence.”), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906 (1977). It is within
the court’s discretion to exclude evidence that is preju-
dicial, as well as “evidence of specific acts intended to
demonstrate character traits not at issue.” United States v.
Wilson, 750 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 839 (1986).
Here, the court properly allowed McDonald’s four char-
acter witnesses to testify to their opinions that McDonald
was a forthright man of honesty whose integrity was
beyond reproach. It was well within the court’s discretion
to draw the line to exclude testimony that had no bearing
on his honesty or integrity and that could well cause the
jury to be influenced by sympathies having no bearing on
the merits of the case.
McDonald’s other evidentiary contention is that the
court improperly allowed the government to pose ques-
tions that assumed his guilt. In United States v. Oshatz,
912 F.2d 534, 539 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1695 (1991), decided after the trial of the present case, we
held that lay character witnesses should not be asked
“guilt-assuming hypothetical questions.” Here, one of the
government’s challenged questions was:
Are you aware, Ms. Tanella, that on the permit appli-
cation in the area, in the part of the permit applica-
A 40
tion regarding the New Hanover Incinerator, John
McDonald forged the name of another individual and
wrote the name of another individual on that appli-
cation?
(Trial Transcript, April 24, 1990, at 3761.) The govern-
ment concedes that this question, though not in the form
of a hypothetical, was improper under the spirit of this
Court’s ruling in Oshatz. We agree that the question was
improper, but we regard this single improper question in
the course of the 12-week trial as harmless error.
Ill. CHALLENGES TO SENTENCING
Paccione and Vulpis also challenge their sentences. In
calculating the offense level of each of these defendants
under the applicable version of the Guidelines (referred to
as “1988 Guidelines” to the extent that they differ from
the 1990 version), the court arrived at a total offense level
of 32. The imprisonment range for this level, in light of
Paccione’s and Vulpis’s respective criminal history cat-
egories, was 121-151 months. Noting in its sentencing
opinion, 751 F. Supp. 368 (1990), that Paccione and
Vulpis had “been convicted of one of the largest and most
serious frauds involving environmental crimes ever pros-
ecuted in the United States,” id. at 371, the court sen-
tenced Paccione and Vulpis to 151 months’ imprisonment.
Paccione and Vulpis challenge various aspects of the
court’s calculations, including its use of the Guidelines
section dealing with environmental offenses rather than
that dealing with mail fraud to reach an initial offense
level of 26 rather than 23, its use of the Guidelines’ mul-
tiple-count rules to increase the offense level from 26 to
28, and its two-level departure increasing the offense
level from 30 to 32 on the basis of its finding that Pac-
A 41
cione and Vulpis had defrauded the government and the
court in entering into the forfeiture agreement.
A. Use of the Environmental Offense and Multiple-Count
Sections
Under 1988 Guidelines § 2F1.1, which covered the
RICO offenses and mail fraud offenses, the district court
calculated that Paccione and Vulpis would, considering
enhancements for offense characteristics and adjustments
for their leadership roles, have an initial offense level of
23. The court observed, however, that the Guidelines rec-
ognize that RICO and mail fraud statutes are often used as
jurisdictional bases for the prosecution of other offenses,
and that Application Note 15 to 1988 Guidelines § 2F1.1
provided that “[i]n such cases the most analogous guide-
line. . . is to be applied.” Finding that defendants’ ille-
gal dumping of waste had “caused serious environmental
harm,” 751 F. Supp. at 376, the court concluded that the
most analogous Guidelines provision was § 2Q1.2, which
deals with offenses involving the mishandling of haz-
ardous or toxic substances. Calculating offense levels
under this section, with enhancements for offense char-
acteristics and adjustments for leadership roles, the court
concluded that the proper initial offense level was 26.
These calculations followed the recommendations of the
Presentence Reports (“PSRs”) prepared by the Probation
Department. They were not objected to by Paccione or
Vulpis in the district court.
The court also noted that if Paccione and Vulpis were to
be sentenced under § 2F1.1, the mail fraud section,
instead of under § 2Q1.2, their initial offense level would
still have been 26, not 23, because the court would have
departed upwardly under Guidelines § 5K2.0 or
§ 5K2.5 to take into account the serious environmental
tera En
A 42
harm and its “very strong nexus” with the fraud. 751 F.
Supp. at 375 n.4. The court stated as follows:
This court could have chosen not to look at the
environmental offenses at all but rather to sentence
the defendants pursuant only to the fraud offense. If
that had been the case, this court would have had to
substantially depart upward to capture the harm
which defendants caused to both the CSX land and
the environment. In deciding how many levels to
depart upward, this court would have looked to the
environmental offense guidelines as a template. Thus
the defendants would have had the same offense level
whether this court. . . looks at the environmental
offenses or whether this court used its discretionary
powers under § 5K2.0 or § 5K2.5.
751 F. Supp. at 375 n.4.
Having calculated defendants’ initial offense level as
26, the court next looked to the Guidelines’ multiple-
count rules and determined that the environmental
offenses were separate from the mail fraud offenses, and
thus could not be grouped together as a single offense
under § 3D1.2 but rather required a further adjustment
under § 3D1.4. The court concluded that application of
the latter section resulted in a two-level adjustment, giv-
ing these defendants an interim offense level of 28. This
calculation too followed the recommendations of defen-
dants’ respective PSRs and was not objected to by Pac-
cione or Vulpis in the district court.
The court also noted, however, that if it had not con-
cluded that the Guidelines required this upward adjust-
ment under the multiple-count rules, it would have
departed upwardly by two levels, still resulting in an
interim offense level of 28:
A 43
Alternatively, if this court were only able to look at
the environmental offense, this court would have had
to depart upward under § 5K2.0 to take into account
the fact that the defendants had defrauded various
agencies and individuals. Under these circumstances,
this court would have departed at least two levels.
Thus the resulting level would have been the same
even if the court did not use the multiple count
adjustment.
751 F. Supp. at 378 n.7.
Paccione and Vulpis contend here that the sentencing
court erred (a) in calculating their offense levels using the
environmental offense section of the Guidelines, rather
than the section dealing with mail fraud, resulting in an
initial offense level of 26, rather than 23, and (b) in using
the multiple-count sections to increase their interim
offense levels to 28. Though the latter contention has
some merit and the former gives us pause, we conclude
that, given the court’s alternative rulings, these matters do
not require recalculation of the sentences.
Preliminarily, we note that, as indicated above, these
two adjustment objections were not voiced in the district
court. Given the complexity and novelty of this type of
case, however, we find it appropriate to consider these
issues on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. McCall, 915
F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir. 1990); see also United States v.
Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 215, 216-17 (2d Cir. 1991). Accord-
ingly, we address the propriety of the court’s use of the
environmental sections found in Chapter Two of the
Guidelines and the multiple-count sections found in Chap-
ter Three.
The challenge to the district court’s use of the envi-
ronmental offense sections presents interesting questions.
A 44
The Guidelines provide that, for calculation of a defen-
dant’s offense level, the applicable guideline section is
generally to be determined with reference to the offense
of conviction. Thus, § 1B1.2(a) instructs the court, where
there has been no plea of guilty or nolo contendere estab-
lishing a more serious offense than the offense of con-
viction, to “[djetermine the offense guideline section in
Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) most applicable to the
offense of conviction (i.e., the offense conduct charged in
the count of the indictment or information of which the
defendant was convicted).”
In the present case, the indictment charged defendants
with mail fraud, wire fraud, and RICO offenses; they were
convicted of mail fraud and RICO offenses. Thus, under
§ 1B1.2(a), defendants’ offense level would have been
calculated under the Guidelines section dealing with mail
fraud, i.e., 1988 Guidelines § 2F1.1, yielding an offense
level of 23. See Guidelines § 2E1.1 (for RICO, base
offense level is 19 or offense level applicable to the
underlying racketeering activity, whichever :s higher). A
problem arises because an application note to the mail
fraud section stated that
[iJn certain other cases, the mail or wire fraud
Statutes, or other relatively broad statutes, are used
primarily as jurisdictional bases for the prosecution
of other offenses. For example, a state law arson
where a fraudulent insurance claim was mailed might
be prosecuted as mail fraud. /n such cases the most
analogous guideline (in the above case, $2K1.4) is to
be applied.
1988 Guidelines § 2F1.1 Application Note 15 (emphasis
added). On the face of it, this Note appears to direct the
district court to proceed precisely as it did in the present
A 45
case, j.e., not to use the fraud section but to use the sec-
tion dealing with environmental offenses. The difficulty,
since defendants were not charged with or convicted of
environmental offenses, is that 1988 Guidelines § 2F1.1
Application Note 15 appears to conflict with § 1B1.2(a)’s
requirement that calculation of offense level proceed
under sections dealing with the “offense of conviction
(i.e., the offense conduct charged in the count of the
indictment or information of which the defendant was
convicted).”
Our view that the two provisions were in conflict here
is supported by the current version of the corresponding
application note (now numbered 13) to § 2F1.1. This ver-
sion, which became effective on November 1, 1989,
authorizes the court, upon a mail fraud conviction, to
apply a section other than § 2F1.1 only if the other section
deals with an offense that was “establish{ed]” in the infor-
mation or indictment. Thus, the amended version deleted
the language of the 1988 version’s Note 15 emphasized
above and substituted the following:
Where the indictment or information setting forth the
count of conviction (or a stipulation as described in
§ 1B1.2(a)) establishes an offense more aptly covered
by another guideline, apply that guideline rather than
§ 2F1.1. Otherwise, in such cases, § 2F1.1 is to be
applied, but a departure from the guidelines may be
considered.
Guidelines § 2F1.1 Application Note 13. The explanation
of the Sentencing Commission reveals that the major
“purpose[ ] of this amendment [was] to ensure that this
guideline is interpreted in a manner consistent with
§ 1B1.2.” Guidelines App. C, Amendment 155.
A 46
This amended version of § zF1.1 was in effect at the
time defendants in the present case were sentenced, and
were we to apply the amended version, we would likely
conclude that the district court should not have calculated
their offense levels under the environmental offense sec-
tions. Normally, of course, the court is to apply the ver-
sion of the Guidelines that is in effect at the time of
sentencing, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553, unless there is an ex
post facto problem. United States v. Adeniyi, 912 F.2d
615, 618 (2d Cir. 1990); cf. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S.
423, 435-36 (1987) (application of state’s revised sen-
tencing guidelines, in effect at time of defendant’s sen-
tencing, violates ex post facto clause if it “ ‘makes more
Onerous the punishment for crimes committed before its
enactment’ ”’) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,
36 (1981)). The application of the amended § 2F1.1 here
would have created an ex post facto problem because the
amended § 2F1.1 also modified the offense level enhance-
ments for specific offense characteristics; thus, the initial
offense level for Paccione and Vulpis under the amended
version, after enhancements and leadership adjustments,
would be 28, as contrasted with a level of 23 under the
1988 version. As a result, though application of the ver-
sion of § 2F1.1 in effect at the time of sentencing would
appear to prevent calculation of defendants’ offense lev-
els under the sections governing environmental offenses,
it would also result in a higher offense level. Hence, the
version of the Guidelines in effect at the time of sen-
tencing could not be applied, and application of the 1988
version of the Guidelines was required.
Accordingly, we are left with the question of whether
the direction given in Application Note 15 to 1988 Guide-
lines § 2F1.1 overrode the instructions given in § 1B1.2.
From the 1989 amendment and the Commission’s expla-
eo
A 47
nation for the amendment, it is clear that the Commission
recognized the possibility of erosion of § 1B1.2, but that
none was intended. Fortunately, however, we need not
resolve the conflict between apparent effect and later-clar-
ified intent, for the district court stated an alternative
basis for its arrival at an offense level of 26.
The court stated that if it had sentenced Paccione and
Vulpis under § 2F1.1 it would have, under Guidelines
§ 5K2.0 or § 5K2.5, “substantially depart[ed] upward to
capture the harm which defendants caused to both the
CSX land and the environment.” 751 F. Supp. at 375 n.4.
Section 5K2.0 provides that the “sentencing court may
impose a sentence outside the range established by the
applicable guideline, if the court finds ‘that there exists an
aggravating. . . circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should
result in a sentence different from that described.’ ”
Guidelines § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)); see
generally United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 681-83 (2d
Cir. 1990). Since there is no indication that when it for-
mulated punishments for mail fraud, the Commission took
into account the possible causation of massive environ-
mental damage such as that proven here, a § 5K2.0 depar-
ture would not have been an abuse of discretion. We
therefore see no basis for disturbing the court’s arrival at
an initial offense level of 26.
There is also a difficulty, together with a similar cura-
tive alternative holding, in connection with the court’s use
of the Guidelines’ multiple-count provisions to increase
defendants’ offense level from 26 to 28. The court
referred to § 3D1.2 to determine whether “the fraud
offense and the environmental offense can[ ] be grouped
together,” 751 F. Supp. at 377; determining that they
A 48
could not be grouped, it concluded that § 3D1.4 therefore
required a two-level upward adjustment. The multiple-
count sections, however, provide rules for calculating,
either by grouping or by adjustment, a single offense level
that takes into account all of “the counts of which the
defendant is convicted.” Guidelines Chapter Three, Part
D—Multiple Counts, Introductory Commentary. The
underlying premise of either grouping or adjustment
under these rules is that there have been multiple counts
and multiple convictions. See generally United States v.
Blanco, 888 F.2d 907, 909-11 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Guidelines
provide[ } that, for the most part, the court will determine
the applicable guideline by looking to the charge of which
the offender was convicted” (emphasis in original); other
conduct not charged as an offense may be taken into
account under relevant conduct rules or in departure from
the Guidelines, not under multiple-count rules). Here, no
counts of the indictment charged Paccione and Vulpis
with violation of federal environmental laws, and they
were not convicted of environmental offenses. Accord-
ingly, the only offenses subject to the multiple-count rules
were the RICO and mail fraud offenses.
Again, however, there is no basis for resentencing, for
the court stated that if no upward muitiple-count adjust-
ment were proper, the court would, under § 5K2.0, depart
upwardly by two levels. For the reasons indicated above,
such a departure would not have been an abuse of dis-
cretion.
B. Departure for Failure To Perform Forfeiture
Agreement
The district court’s final upward departure, from level
30 to level 32, was based on the defaults of Paccione and
Vulpis on their obligations under the forfeiture agreement.
A 49
The agreement, dated June 6, 1990, and so-ordered by the
court on June 8, made Paccione and Vulpis and their
respective companies jointly and severally liable to pay
the government, if they were convicted under RICO, a
total of $22 million in lieu of forfeitures, restitution, and
fines. The agreement called for defendants to make a $4
million payment within 30 days after the agreement was
signed, another $8 million within 60 days after signing,
and the remaining $10 million within 90 days after sign-
ing. Thus, the entire $22 million should have been paid to
the government by early September 1990. Defendants
made no payments whatever.
The government entered default judgments against
these defendants following their initial failure to perform;
and, in part relying on the total default, it urged the dis-
trict court not to follow PSR recommendations that Pac-
cione and Vulpis be given sentencing credit for
acceptance of responsibility. At a September 11, 1990
hearing with respect to the PSR recommendations, the
court asked the government to advise it of the status of the
forfeiture agreement as far as Paccione and Vulpis were
concerned.
The government attorney stated that there had been no
payments, interim or final. He stated that a few contracts
for sales of assets of the Paccione and Vulpis companies
had been submitted to the government, but that they
would result in negligible front-end cash payments and in
extended payment schedules. The government was pur-
Suing its default judgments and had sought to take depo-
sitions to identify assets with which to satisfy the
judgments. It had scheduled depositions of Paccione and
Vulpis but canceled them when it was advised that both
men would invoke the Fifth Amendment. It had also
noticed the deposition of a proposed purchaser of certain
ee a
A 50
Paccione company routes; but it was not certain whether
that deposition would proceed either, since there had been
a suggestion that the purchaser, a relative of Paccione by
marriage, would decline to answer any question dealing
with the bona fides of his purchase contract. Following
the government's representations, which were not dis-
puted, the court ordered a hearing to permit it to deter-
mine whether, in entering the forfeiture agreement,
Paccione and Vulpis had intentionally defrauded the gov-
ernment.
At the September 12, 1990 hearing, the court heard tes-
timony from witnesses called by Paccione and Vulpis, dis-
cussed in greater detail below, and heard argument from
both sides. Additional information was presented at an
October 3, 1990 hearing. Thereafter, addressing Pac-
cione’s attorney, the court stated,
[ijt is my finding that this constitutes the biggest
fraud that I have any personal knowledge of on the
United States Government that I have seen since I
have been on the bench. And that’s what we got here.
A perfect fraud by you[r] client, Mr. Paccione and
whoever assisted him in this misrepresentation that
he would have the ability to produce $22 million by
September the 8th.
(Sentencing Transcript, October 3, 1990, at 57.) In its sen-
tencing opinion, the court found “that both defendants
intentionally entered into the $22 million agreement with-
out bona fide purchasers in sight knowing that the busi-
nesses could not be sold within the ninety day period
because of procedural requirements,” 751 F. Supp. at 381,
and stated as follows:
[P]rior to the jury’s verdict, defendants entered into
a Settlement Agreement with the Government that
A 51
provided that if defendants were found guilty, they
would pay the Government $22 million in lieu of for-
feiture and fines. . . . Under the terms of the agree-
ment, defendants were jointly and severally liable. In
exchange defendants received a complete resolution
to any financial penalties rather than allowing the
jury to determine any possible forfeiture and the
court any possible fines. Under the agreement, the
entire $22 million was due, in full, by September 8,
1990, after two prior installment payments. Sen-
tencing was scheduled for September 12, 1990. The
agreement contemplated that the money would be
raised by the selling off of the numerous waste cart-
ing businesses which Paccione and Vulpis owned and
which corporations were also defendants in this case.
This court approved the agreement as requested by
the parties.
As of this date, however, defendants have not paid
one penny to the Government. Defendants claim that
they were unable to make the required payments
because of difficulty in selling their businesses. This
court concludes that defendants had difficulty selling
their business, but it is also the view of this court that
defendants knew full well when they entered into the
agreement that they would be unable to sell their
businesses within the short amount of time for which
the agreement provided without prior offers to buy
from bona fide purchasers. The private waste carting
business is a closed market and potential buyers con-
Sist largely of friends and relatives of defendants.
. . The court finds and concludes that friends and
relatives cooperated with defendants in not pur-
chasing the lucrative businesses owned by defendants
and allowing defendants to remain in possession.
eh a cree ete
A 52
Defendants had to have been aware of the fact that
there would not be any buyers when they entered into
the agreement. Defendants’ actions caused the ques-
tion of forfeiture to be taken away from the jury and
has caused this court’s hands to be tied with respect
to the fines.
In addition, there was also testimony that, even if
defendants had entered into a contract with a buyer,
it could take as much as two years to obtain a license
from New York City’s Department of Consumer
Affairs. . . . Paccione and Vulpis, who were both
involved in the carting business for many years
before their trial, were aware of the procedures
involved in selling a business and had to know that a
sale of a business in such a short time, even with a
ready, able and willing, buyer, was close to impos-
sible.
This court finds that defendants’ actions constitute
a fraud upon both the Government and this court
because the agreement caused the issue of forfeiture
to be withdrawn from the jury and prevents the court
from imposing fines.
Id. at 379-80.
Finding that these were unusual circumstances not ade-
quately considered by the Sentencing Commission, the
court concluded that it had discretion to depart upwardly
under § 5K2.0. It chose to add two levels because defen-
dants’ conduct was closely analogous to obstruction of
justice, for which the Guidelines provide a two-level
upward adjustment. See Guidelines § 3C1.1 (“If the
defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted
A 53
to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during
the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant
offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels.”). The
court stated that as an alternative to departure, it would
have adjusted the offense level upward by two levels pur-
suant to § 3C1.1.
Paccione and Vulpis argue here that any increase in the
severity of their sentences on the basis of fraud in enter-
ing the forfeiture agreement was impermissible because
(a) the court erroneously placed on them the burden of
proving their intent to perform, (b) the evidence did not
Support the court’s finding that they entered into the
agreement without intent to perform, and (c) it was unfair
to penalize them for failing to perform while allowing the
government to enforce the agreement. We reject all of
their contentions.
First, we see no merit in defendants’ suggestion that the
district court misallocated the burden of proof. At the end
of the September 11 hearing, following the government’s
representations as to nonperformance, the court stated as
follows:
THE COURT:. . . . I consider at the moment that
there has been a major fraud committed here on the
part—with the government as the victim. . . . The
present fraud makes pale and insignificant the fraud
prosecuted in the trial, so you’ve got a chance to
prove otherwise, and you better start tomorrow morn-
ing.
THE COURT: . . . I have said we are going to have
a hearing on this because I believe the government
has been defrauded and that the court has been mis-
A 54
led. Now you are going to have your chance to prove
otherwise.
(Sentencing Transcript, September 11, 1990, at 97.) We
do not see in this statement or in any other an indication
that the court placed the burden of proof, as contrasted
with the burden of going forward, on Paccione and
Vulpis. Rather, the court merely indicated that the gov-
ernment—having represented without contradiction that,
inter alia, in the agreed 90-day period Paccione and
Vulpis had not paid the government a cent, that the few
contracts for sales of assets that defendants had negotiated
were for small fractions of the sum due, that these would
result in payouts measured not in days but in years, and
that defendants and one of their prospective purchasers
were invoking Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to
the bona fides of these sales—had established a prima
facie case. Thus, at the hearing, the court stated, “I also
suggested that, prima facie, that looks like a major fraud
. . . .” (Sentencing Transcript, September 12, 1990, at
126.) The government having shown facts from which
intent not to pay could be inferred, the court merely
informed Paccione and Vulpis that it was their burden to
come forward with evidence to rebut the government's’.
prima facie case. The court’s eventual findings also reflect
no misallocation of the ultimate burden of proof. The
court did not at all suggest that defendants had merely
failed to prove their intent to perform. Rather, it found
affirmatively “that defendants knew full well when they
entered into the agreement” that they would not perform.
Nor are we persuaded that the evidence was insufficient
to support the court’s finding that Paccione and Vulpis
had entered into the forfeiture agreement without the
intent to perform their obligations under it. Such a find-
ing need be supported only by a preponderance of the evi-
———————— eee
A 55
dence, see, e.g., United States v. Shoulberg, 895 F.2d 882,
886-87 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Guerra, 888 F.2d
247, 251 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1833
(1990), and it may not be overturned unless clearly erro-
neous, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1988); see United States v.
Santiago, 906 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1990); United States
v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 196 (1990); United States v. Shoulberg, 895 F.2d at
884. The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the
government, included the following.
Paccione and Vulpis did not testify but introduced the
testimony of their accountants, of attorneys who had
attempted to negotiate sales of some of their companies’
assets, and of court-appointed monitors who had been
supervising the operations of the corporate defendants for
more than a year prior to the signing of the forfeiture
agreement. Principally through their attorneys, Paccione
and Vulpis argued that they had expected in good faith to
be able to sell enough assets to pay the government $22
million in 90 days. But the evidence was that when they
entered into the forfeiture agreement, they had no pur-
chasers waiting in the wings. Further, they indicated that
they had expected to find purchasers easily and that they
were surprised to find that potential purchasers were slow
to agree to pay full value because once Paccione and
Vulpis were convicted potential buyers believed they
could get bargains because Paccione and Vulpis were
required to sell to perform the forfeiture agreement. In
light of defendants’ extensive business experience and the
facts that the agreement envisioned assets sales and that
it provided for forfeiture only if defendants were con-
victed, the court was hardly required to credit these pro-
fessions of surprise. In addition, the witnesses indicated
that, as these experienced defendants would know, once a
A 56
sale contract is executed, it normally takes longer than 90
days (three months to two years, according to Paccione’s
attorney) to obtain the necessary local regulatory
approvals.
Defendants’ witnesses also indicated that contracts for
sales of carting routes normally call for very small cash
down payments and very long payouts. Further, even the
small monthly payments called for by the contracts they
negotiated were subject to reduction if income from the
sold routes decreased. Thus, the contracts that were nego-
tiated, far from meeting defendants’ obligations to pay
$22 million in 90 days, provided them with no funds to
pay the government anything within 90 days, provided
them with little more than $1 million to pay the govern-
ment upon regulatory approval of the sales, and would
have dribbled the rest of the $22 million to the govern-
ment over a period of many years. Along the same lines,
Vulpis’s father in August 1990 offered a modification of
the forfeiture agreement insofar as Vulpis’s presumed
share was concerned: he offered to pay the government
$100,000 (increased to $500,000 two days before the
hearing), to be followed by payments of $100,000 per
month for 12 years.
It is also noteworthy that though Paccione and Vulpis
claimed to have believed in good faith that they would be
able to pay the government the entire agreed amount
within 90 days of signing the forfeiture agreement, they
made little effort to show that they had had any good faith
belief that they could pay the government the $4 million
they agreed to pay within the first 30 days or the addi-
tional $8 million they agreed to pay within the second 30
days. Vulpis sought to show that he had attempted to
obtain a $2 million mortgage during the first month after
the forfeiture agreement; he apparently was surprised that
A 57
the bank would not lend him $2 million when it learned
he was about to go to jail.
The court was also entitled to believe that the testimony
presented by Paccione and Vulpis as to the timing of their
efforts to sell assets tended to detract from, rather than
support, their protestations of good faith. Paccione, for
example, had entered into four contracts that were sup-
posed to generate money to pay half of the $22 million; of
these four (which cumulatively called for front-end cash
payments of only some $1.2 million), only one, for $1.5
million, was executed prior to the expiration of the 90-day
period. None of the contracts had been approved by the
local regulatory agency. Vulpis’s attorney had negotiated
toward two sales of assets; one sale apparently fell
through in July. A proposed contract for the other was not
sent to the purchaser until August 28; by the September
12 hearing, Vulpis’s attorney had heard nothing from the
purchaser and had not followed up.
In sum, viewed in the light most favorable to the gov-
ernment, the evidence showed that Paccione and Vulpis
had not paid the government a penny of the sums due; that
their efforts to sell assets were few and late; and that they
had promised to make payments totaling $22 million
within 90 days knowing that if convicted they would be
under pressure to sell assets, knowing they had no pur-
chasers lined up, knowing that most contracts are for
small amounts of cash and extended payouts, and know-
ing that most sales require considerably longer than 90
days just to receive local regulatory approval. On the pre-
sent record, we cannot say the district court’s finding that
Paccione and Vulpis entered into the forfeiture agreement
without the intent to perform it was clearly erroneous.
A 58
Finally, we see no merit in defendants’ argument that,
because the government retained the right to enforce the
forfeiture agreement, it was unfair for the court to con-
sider their fraud as a ground for increasing their prison
terms. In support of this argument, Paccione and Vulpis
urge us to treat this matter strictly as a contract dispute.
Though contract principles obviously are material, see
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), we reject
defendants’ argument both because the sentencing context
cannot be ignored and because in fact defendants received
the principal benefit of their bargain and the government
did not.
To begin with, we note that the forfeiture agreement did
not purport to affect the prison terms to which Paccione
and Vulpis could be sentenced. Rather, the agreed for-
feiture was to be “in full satisfaction of the forfeiture
penalties [for RICO conviction], as contained in para-
graphs 64 through 68 of [the indictment], as well as what-
ever fines and restitution might otherwise be imposed
pursuant to Title 18, United States Code.” The cited para-
graphs of the indictment sought to compel the individual
defendants, inter alia, to forfeit their interests in the cor-
porate defendants, as well as all proceeds of defendants’
racketeering activity. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2)(A)
(forfeitability of interest in RICO enterprise); id.
§ 1963(a)(3) (forfeitabikity of property constituting or
derived from proceeds of racketeering activity). Had the
forfeiture issue been submitted to the jury, the jury could
have stripped Paccione and Vulpis of their interests in
their respective companies (having a conceded value of at
least $27-$53 million); or it could have determined that
the proceeds of the defendants’ racketeering activity
included $20 million for the taking of CSX’s property,
plus all dumping fees charged by A&A, all dumping fees
A 59
saved by the corporate defendants, and all derivative pro-
ceeds from the activity, perhaps totaling more than $10
million. Hence, jury-determined forfeitures could easily
have totaled $30 million or more. Moreover, in the
absence of the forfeiture agreement, the court could have
ordered defendants to make restitution to CSX and the
City, the victims of their racketeering activity, in addition
to any RICO forfeitures. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(a)(1),
(a)(2), and (b)(1)(B) (court may order defendant to make
restitution to RICO victim of the value of the property
lost); United States v. Robilotto, 828 F.2d 940, 944, 949
(2d Cir. 1987) (no Eighth Amendment violation in sen-
tence requiring defendant both to forfeit moneys to United
States and to make restitution to victim), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1011 (1988); United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d
648, 660, 663 (9th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1030 (1989). Thus, the monetary risks to Paccione
and Vulpis upon conviction of RICO offenses totaled
some $30-$80 million. By entering into the forfeiture
agreement, however, they limited their risk of financial
penalties to $22 million.
Defendants have retained this bargained-for limitation
despite their defaults. The district court found itself
barred from imposing fines on them or ordering restitu-
tion. By the time defendants defaulted, forfeiture ques-
tions could no longer be submitted to the jury. And
defendants’ assets worth upwards of $53 million, though
subject to a sheriff’s auction to permit collection of the
$22 million, are not themselves forfeited by reason of the
defaults. See United States v. Paccione, Nos. 91-1325L,
etc. (2d Cir. Nov. 4, 1991).
The government, on the other hand, though it has the
right to enforce default judgments against Paccione and
Vulpis, has hardly received the principal benefit of its bar-
A 60
gain. It was to receive $22 million in cash within 90 days,
thereby receiving the monetary penalties for the RICO
convictions without further effort on its part. Instead the
government received nothing and is required to engage in
perhaps protracted court proceedings, pursue defendants’
assets, and attempt to sell those assets in order to collect
its judgments. See United States v. Paccione, Nos. 91-
1325L, etc. (2d Cir. Nov. 4, 1991) (government required
to follow state creditor procedures to collect its $22 mil-
lion).
Given the district court’s adequately supported finding
that defendants had entered into the forfeiture agreement
without intending to perform it, we see nothing in the
Guidelines or in logic to suggest that the conduct of Pac-
cione and Vulpis should not have been considered
attempts to “impede[ ] the administration of justice dur-
ing the. . . sentencing of the instant offense” within the
meaning of Guidelines § 3C1.1, warranting a two-level
upward adjustment in offense level. If the present type of
fraud was not envisioned by that section, an upward
departure under § 5K2.0 was hardly an abuse of discre-
tion.
CONCLUSION
We have considered all of defendants’ arguments on
these appeals and have found in them no basis for rever-
sal. The appeal of Environmental Contractors is dis-
missed. The judgments of conviction of the other
defendants are affirmed.
APPENDIX B
B 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Se ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ae ee ee ee ».4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : SSS
>: 89 CR.
-VvV- >: 446
: (CBM)
ANGELO PACCIONE, :
ANTHONY VULPIS, : OPINION
JOHN MCDONALD, : ON
A&A LAND DEVELOPMENT, : DEFENDANTS!
W&W PROPERTIES, : MOTIONS TO
AUGUST RECYCLING, ENG e > : DISMISS
NATIONAL CARTING, Bes, :
STAGE CARTING, INC., :
NEW YORK ENVIRONMENTAL :
CONTRACTORS, INC., :
ROSEDALE CARTING, INC., :
AND VULPIS :
BROTHERS, LTD., :
Defendants. :
ee ee ee ee eee wm em mew em eee ee eee xX
BACKGROUND
Indictment 89 CR. 446 was filed on
June 15, 1989. A superseding
indictment adding Defendant McDonald
was filed on August 24, 1989. The
Superseding indictment charges
defendants with the following:
Substantive and conspiracy violations
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations ("RICO") statute, 18
|
B2
U.S.C. Sections 1962(c) and (d),
through a "pattern of racketeering
activity" and mail and wire fraud
violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 1341.
The RICO counts of that superseding
indictment alleged twenty-two
racketeering acts, including mail fraud
on New York City and State government
agencies, mail and wire fraud on CSX
Transportation Inc. ("CSX") and mail
fraud on doctors and medical care
facilities. A superseding indictment
removing, inter alia, Racketeering Acts
19-22, alleging acts of mail fraud on
several doctors and a nursing home, was
filed on February 6, 1990. A further
superseding indictment, removing
Racketeering Act 1(d) and the
corresponding Count 6 -- an alleged act
of mail fraud against the City of New
York -- and adding two mailings to
Racketeering Act 4, Acts 4(a) and (b)
) RN ee eT
B 3
corresponding to new Counts 8 and 9 --
alleging acts of mail fraud against CSX
Realty, was filed on March 8, 1990.”
Defendants have moved pursuant to
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 and 41 for the
following:
1) dismissal of Counts One and Two of
the indictment (the RICO counts) on the
grounds that they are
unconstitutionally vague; 2) dismissal
of the RICO counts or striking of
Racketeering Acts 1-2 and 5-22 on the
grounds that environmental crimes are
not authorized RICO predicate acts; 3)
dismissal of Counts 3-8 of the
indictment, alleging mail fraud against
the City of New York on the grounds
Since the changes made in the
two superseding indictments following
the court's January 27, 1990 Order
denying the motions discussed in this
Opinion do not affect Defendants'
arguments, this Opinion will refer to
the Racketeering Acts and Counts of the
first superseding indictment ("the
indictment").
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that they are based on insufficient
evidence; 4) dismissal of Racketeering
Acts 1-2 and 5-22 and Counts 3-8 of the
indictment on the grounds that the
conduct alleged does not constitute
mail fraud; 5) dismissal of the RICO
counts on the grounds that there is no
separation alleged between the
enterprise and the persons conducting
the affairs of the enterprise; 6)
dismissal of the RICO counts on the
grounds that the indictment does not
allege a proper enterprise; 7)
severance of the trial of Angelo
Paccione and Anthony Vulpis from John
McDonald on the grounds that severance
is required under Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) and that
their defenses will be antagonistic and
mutually exclusive; 8) suppression of
the evidence seized pursuant to the
search warrants on the grounds that the
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warrants authorized a general search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment's
particularity clause; 9) suppression of
evidence seized pursuant to allegedly
warrantless searches.
Defendant John McDonald has also
moved pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
12(b) (3) for suppression of statements
allegedly made by Defendant McDonald on
or about July 19, 1989.
For the following reasons, these
motions are denied.
ANALYSIS
1. The RICO Statute Is Not
Unconstitutionally Vague
Defendants have moved to dismiss
Counts One and Two of the indictment
(the RICO substantive and conspiracy
counts) on the ground that the RICO
statute is unconstitutionally vague.
Defendants assert that the terms
“pattern of racketeering activity,"
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"enterprise" and "association" with the
enterprise are so vague as to provide
little or no notice to any person of
what conduct is prohibited and that the
statute has provided neither content
nor standard for determining what these
terms mean, nor have the courts
provided any meaningful limitation.
Relying extensively on dicta in
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in
H.J., Inc. Vv. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 109 S.Ct. 2893 (1989),
1989 U.S. LEXIS saat, defendants
maintain that the terms "pattern of
racketeering" activity, "enterprise,"
and "association" with the enterprise,
are concepts so vague as to violate the
notice to defendants requirement that
the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment imposes on all _é federal
criminal statutes. Defendants also
complain that the vagueness of the
B7
statute's language, especially as to
the meaning of "association" with the
enterprise, is such as to give to the
prosecutors impermissible discretion as
applied to this case.
In H.J., Inc., the Court defined
the term "pattern of racketeering"
which requires proof by the prosecution
of at least two predicate acts, as
enumerated in the RICO statute, as
consisting of two components: (1)
relatedness and (2) continuity.
RICO's legislative history
reveals Congress' intent that
to prove a pattern of
racketeering activity a
plaintiff or prosecutor must
Show that the racketeering
predicates are related, and
that they amount to or pose a
threat of continued criminal
activity. For analytic
purposes these two
constituents of RICO's
pattern requirement must be
stated separately, though in
practice their proof will
often overlap. The element
of relatedness is the easier
to define, for we may take
guidance from a provision
elsewhere in the Organized
ls
B 8
Crime Control Act of 1970
(OOCA), Pub. L. 91-452, 84
Stat. 922, of which RICO
formed Title Ix. OCCA
included as Title xX the
Dangerous Special Offender
Sentencing Act, 18 U.S.C.
Section 3575 et seq. (now
partially repealed). Title xX
provided for enhanced
sentences where, among other
things, the defendant had
committed a prior felony as
part of a pattern of criminal
conduct. As we noted in
Sedima, 473 U.S., at 496,
n.14, Congress defined Title
X's pattern requirement
solely in terms of the
relationship of the
defendant's criminal acis one
to another: "criminal conduct
forms a pattern if it
embraces criminal acts that
have the same or similar
purposes, resuitse,
participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or
otherwise are interrelated by
@isetinguishing
characteristics and are not
isolated events." 18 U.S.C.
Section 3575(e) ... RICO's
legislative history tells us,
however, that the relatedness
of racketeering activities is
not alone enough to satisfy
Section 1962's pattern
element. To establish a RICO
pattern is must also be shown
that the predicates
themselves amount to, or that
they otherwise constitute a
threat of, continuing
B9
racketeering activity ...
"Continuity" is both a
closed- and open-ended
concept, referring either to
a closed period of repeated
conduct, or to past conduct
that by its nature projects
into the future with a threat
of repetition. See
j Vv ideli Unio
Bank/First National State,
832 F.2d 36, 39 (CA3 1987).
IG COS, in either’ case,
centrally a temporal consent
-- and particularly so in the
RICO context, where what must
be continuous, RICO's
predicate acts or offenses,
and the relationship these
predicates must bear to one
another, are distinct
requirements. A party
alleging a RICO violation may
demonstrate continuity over a
Closed period by proving a
series of related predicates
extending over a substantial
period of time. Predicate
acts extending over a few
weeks or months and
threatening no future
criminal conduct do _ not
satisfy this requirement:
Congress was concerned in
RICO with long-term criminal
conduct. Often a RICO action
will be brought before
continuity can be established
in this way. In such cases,
liability depends on whether
the threat of continuity is
demonstrated. See S. Rep.
No. 91-617, at-158.
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Whether the predicates proved
establish a threat of
continued racketeering
activity depends on the
specific facts of each case.
Without making any claim to
cover the field of
possibilities -- preferring
to deal with this issue in
the context of concrete
factual situations presented
for decision -- we offer some
examples of how this element
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