Petition for Writ of Certiorari — New York State Department of Health v. Andrulonis

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Cu Su Court, U.

9 a “104 9 FIL i. .

No. 91- MAR 2 5 1992

IN THE QFFICE OF He, CEE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1991

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

Petitioner,

against

JOANNA ANDRULONIS, Individually and as Conservator of the Property of

JEROME ANDRULONIS; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; GLATT AIR

TECHNIQUES, INC.; GLATT GmbH; WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH

FOUNDATION, INC.; WARF INSTITUTE, INC.; RALTECH SCIENTIFIC

SERVICES, INC.; RALSTON PURINA COMPANY; ELI LILLY AND COM-

PANY; and JOHN L. THOMPSON AND SONS COMPANY,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ROBERT ABRAMS

Attorney General of the State of New York

Attorney for Petitioner

The Capitol

Albany, NY 12224

(518) 474-8101

JERRY BOONE

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

PETER H. SCHIFF

Deputy Solicitor General

MICHAEL S. BUSKUS

Assistant Attorney General

Of Counsel

Dated: March 26, 1992

THE REPORTER Company, INC —Walton, NY 13856—800-252-7181

Syracuse Office, University Building, Syracuse, NY 13202—315-426-1235

NYC Office—30 Vesey St., New York, NY 10007—212-732-6978—800-800-4264

(1897A—LCS5-929—1992)

Questions Presented

1. Whether the Second Circuit on remand (see, New York

State Dept. of Health v Andrulonis, 112 S Ct 39, 116 L Ed 2d

18 [1991]), misinterpreted United States v Gaubert, 111 S Ct

1267, 113 L Ed 2d 335 (1991), and misapplied the discretion-

ary function exception (“exception”) of the Federal Tort

Claims Act (“FTCA”) by (1) virtually equating conduct

immunized under the exception with non-negligent conduct;

(2) holding that the errors and omissions by a Federal scientist

did not implicate any ‘“‘policy considerations” because the

agency did not promulgate detailed regulations to circum-

scribe the conduct of its researchers; and (3) equating the

scientific risk-assessment errors with negligent driving by a

government chauffeur.

2. Whether the exception precludes liability for errors or

omissions of a Government scientist in assessing the magni-

tude of risk of a public health experiment

il

Parties

The parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment

is sought to be reviewed are:

1. Joanna Andrulonis, Individually and as Conservator of

the Property of Jerome Andrulonis, Plaintiff:

2. The United States, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff:

3. The New York State Department of Health

(“NYSDOH”), the Third-Party Defendant; and

4. Glatt Air Techniques, Inc.; Glatt GmbH: Wisconsin

Alumni Research Foundation, Inc.; Warf Institute, Inc.:

Raltech Scientific Services, Inc.; Ralston Purina Company; Eli

Lilly and Company; and John L. Thompson and Sons and

Company, Defendants.

All of the non-governmental defendants (# 4 above) settled

with plaintiffs during trial and were not involved on the appeal

to the Court of Appeals. Only parties ## 1-3 were, and still are,

involved in this appeal.

ll.

Index to Appendix’

. Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals,

Second Circuit, Dated January 12, 1991 .....

. Opinion of the United States District Court for the

Northern District of New York, Dated Decem-

a ee ck ea’

. Opinion of the United States District Court for the

Northern District of New York, Dated October

Oe eo ae ee ee

. Order of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit Denying Petition for

Rehearing, Dated March 4, 1991 ...........

. Order of the United States Court of Appeals, Sec-

ond Circuit, Dated January 28, 1991, Issued as

Mandate March 12, 1991 .................

. Amended Judgment of the United States District

Court for the Northern District of New York.

Dated December 15, 1989 ................

Judgment of the United States District Court for

the Northern District of New York, Dated

SO OO Oo ck wa cw cunceacncaas

. Memorandum Decision of the United States

Supreme Court, Dated October 7, 1991......

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit, Dated December 30, 1991

'The Appendix is a separately-bound document.

Page

A46

A390

A399

A406

IV.

Page

10. Order of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit, Dated December 30, 1991,

Issued as Mandate February 14, 1992....... A416

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.

CASES:

Allen v United States, 816 F2d 1417 (10th Cir 1987),

cert. den., 484 US 1004 (1988)......... 17, 20, 21

Allen v United States, 588 F Supp 247 (D Utah 1984),

revd, 816 F2d 1417 (10th Cir 1987), cert. den.,

484 US 1004 (1988) ..2 0. 20

Andrulonis v United States, 593 F Supp 1336 (NDNY

sicpink REET CEE ET RT I core ee, 2,9

Andrulonis v United States, 724 F Supp 1421 (NDNY

ining EEE OE TE TOE TBO Peace BE hic 2, 8-9

Andrulonis v United States (“‘Andrulonis I’’), 924 F2d

Rew Cae Ge B90) ec ck, os passim

Andrulonis v United States (““Andrulonis II’), 952 F2d

GS2Z (20 Cir 1991). o.oo cc cece... Passim

Barnson v United States, 816 F2d 549 (10th Cir), cert.

den., 484 US 896 (1987) ................... 20

Begay v United States, 768 F2d 1059 (9th Cir 1985)... 20

Berkovitz v United States, 486 US 53] i. | re 10

Boruski v United States, 803 F2d 142] (7th Cir 1986) 19

Brown v United States, 790 F2d 199 (Ist Cir 1986), cert.

den., 479 US 1058 (1987)................. 11n4

Page

Caraballo v United States, 830 F2d 19 (2d Cir 1987).. 11n4

Consolidated U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litigation, In re,

v United States, 820 F2d 982 (9th Cir 1987), cert.

den. sub nom. Konizeski v Livermore Labs, 488

le We COD 65nd ou ca ceeste ev oruxeriaes 18, 20

Creek National Indian Housing Authority v United

States, 905 F2d 312 (10th Cir 1990) .......... 19

Dalehite v United States, 346 US 15 (1953).......... 17

Dube v Pittsburgh Corning, 870 F2d 790 (Ist Cir 1989) 21

Eklof Marine Corp. v United States, 762 F2d 200 (2d Cir

| ERE TERE TOR ES TTT TOT TO ree 1 1n4

Feyers v United States, 749 F2d 1222 (6th Cir 1984),

cert. Gee... 471 US Tz (F965) «oo 5 6 ek ean ss 18

First Nat. Bank in Albuquerque v United States, 552 F2d

370 (10th Cir), cert. den., 434 US 835 (1977) .. 20

Fried v United States, 674 F Supp 636 (ND III 1987).. 20

General Public Utilities Corp. v United States, 745 F2d

239 (3d Cir 1984), cert. den., 469 US 1228

CPEND: kink oe ON eae hake ee oe ere eee 17, 19

Hylin v United States, 755 F2d 551 (7th Cir 1985).... 16

Indian Towing Co. v United States, 350 US 61

(ORAS hs okie shea a eee ee ee 9, 11-12

Johns v Pettibone Corp., 843 F2d 464 (11th Cir

Vi.

Page

Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation (Rob-

inson), In re, 891 F2d 31 (2d Cir 1989)........ 21

Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v United States, 880 F2d

1018 (9th Cir 1989)... 0.0.0, 17, 21

Myslakowski v United States, 806 F2d 94 (6th Cir 1986),

cert. den., 480 US 948 (1987)................ 21

New York State Dept. of Health v Andrulonis, 112 S Ct

39, 116 L Ed 2d 18 (1991). ................ i, 12

Routh v United States, 941 F2d 853 (9th Cir 1991).... 20

Sea-Land Service, Inc. v United States, 919 F2d 888 (3d

Cir 1990), cert. den., 111 S Ct 2235, 114 L Ed 2d

ik, | nonin nr caf 9, 87! 9 21

a) er re Pett eee roe Deed 16, 18

Thompson v Dilger, 696 F Supp 1071 (ED Va 1988) .. 19

Totten v United States, 806 F2d 698 (6th Cir 1986).... 19

United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v United States, 837

F2d 116 (3d Cir 1988), cert. den., 487 US 1235

ROWE soe Shh ee ae eee ee 19

United States v Gaubert, 111 S Ct 1267, 113 L Ed 2d 335

(RNP 6 vr eateakatel oe passim

Weiss v United States, 889 F2d 937 (10th Cir 1989)... 16

Wells v United States, 851 F2d 147] (DC Cir 1988), cert.

den., 488 US 1029 (1989) .................. 19

Vil.

Page

STATUTE:

2) 3 el eee ree eer rere. eres ee es oe 2-3

MISCELLANEOUS:

Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception and

Mandatory Regulations, 54 U Chi L Rev 1300

CL) Sree rary reer earerere ern ar 16

Stern, Gressman & Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice (6th

th

ed 1986), § 4.18, pp 224-26.................

Vill.

Page

Table of Contents.

(Question Presented ... ow... occ cece ccc nc. i

WE ds eee yeaa ete oe cee ll

ce | ll

Table of Autiiorities ........0.................... iV

I IE So oe coche ee ee 2

“oe ee ng OEE ee Or eta ra ane tel Pee oe 2

Pe Eo ey ee ee ee 3

pe ee Or een eee ee. 3

Reasons for Granting the Writ..................... 14

Cie cace cceas AEP PC AAI OAS Me oe HO 24

No. 91-

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1991.

NEw YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

Petitioner,

against

JOANNA ANDRULONIS, Individually and as Conservator of the

Property of JEROME ANDRULONIS; UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA; GLATT AIR TECHNIQUES, INC.; GLATT GmbH;

WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INC.; WARF

INSTITUTE, INC.; RALTECH SCIENTIFIC SERVICES, INC.;

RALSTON PURINA COMPANY; EL! LILLY AND COMPANY; and

JOHN L. THOMPSON AND SONS COMPANY,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ee ee ee

2

Opinions Below

The opinion of the court of appeals on remand (‘*Andrulonis

IT”) (App, A406-A415)2 is reported at 952 F2d 652 (1991).

This Court’s memorandum decision (App, A405), which

granted NYSDOH’s earlier petition for certiorari and vacated

and remanded for reconsideration in light of United States v

Gaubert, 111 S Ct 1267, 113 L Ed 2d 335 (1991), is reported

at 112 S Ct 39, 116 L Ed 2d 18 (1991).

The originai opinion of the court of appeals (‘‘Andrulonis

I’) (App, Al-A45) is reported at 924 F2d 1210 (1991).

The opinion of the district court (App, A46-A389) is

reported at 724 F Supp 1421 (NDNY 1989). An earlier opin-

ion of the district court (App, A390-A398) is reported at 593 F

Supp 1336 (NDNY 1984).

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the court of appeals (App, A416-A417)

was entered on December 30, 1991. This petition was filed on

March 26, 1992. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28

USC 1254(1).

Although no final judgment has been entered, in that a

purely state-law question of the proper apportionment of set-

tlement proceeds from private tortfeasors remains unresolved

(see App, A41-A45; Andrulonis 1, 924 F2d at 1226-27), no

further action in the trial court will enhance the ripeness for

review in this Court. See, Stern, Gressman & Shapiro,

Supreme Court Practice (6th ed.. 1986), § 418, pp 224-26. The

court below definitively resolved the federal Statutory ques-

tion under the FTCA. Nothing that might occur on remand to

"References to “App” are to pages of the Appendix to the Petition.

the trial court will increase the ripeness of the federal

question.

Statute Involved

28 USC § 2680(a)

§ 2680. Exceptions

The provisions of this chapter [28 USC §§ 2671 ef

seq.) and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply

to—(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an

employee of the Government, exercising due care, in

the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not

such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the

exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or

perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of

a federal agency or an employee of the Government,

whether or not the discretion involved be abused.

Statement of the Case*

1. Factual background and proof at trial.

Plaintiff, a research scientist employed by the New York

State Department of Health (“‘NYSDOH’’), tragically contrac-

ted rabies and sustained permanent brain damage from expo-

sure to an experimental rabies virus. App, A3. The experiment

was conducted by NYSDOH scientists on NYSDOH prem-

ises. App, A3, Al22, A217. The accident happened when

airborne particles (aerosols) of rabies virus leaked from a Uni-

Glatt machine. App, A6-A7. NYSDOH scientists had been

using that machine to encapsulate the virus in sugar-coated

’References to “Tr. — * refer to pages of the trial transcript.

References to “Exh. refer to trial exhibits. References to “J. App.

—__—” refer to pages of the Court of Appeals Joint Appendix.

Te

4

tablets. App, A6-A7. The objective was to produce a vaccine

which would be eaten by wildlife (e.g., foxes and raccoons) in

order to immunize the animals from, and thereby prevent the

spread of, rabies. App, A6-A7.

Although the experiment was devised, controlled and oper-

ated by NYSDOH scientists in a State laboratory, a Federal

scientist offered advice and supplied the virus. App, A9,

A122, Al29-A130, A217. Dr. George Baer, the Chief of Viral

Zoonosis Research at the Federal Center for Disease Control

(“CDC”’), was regarded as one of the world’s leading rabies

experts. App, A7, A9, A232. CDC’s mission, as well as its

policy of facilitating public health research, encouraged its

Scientists to share research results. etiologic agents (such as

viral materials) and ideas with professional colleagues in the

public and private sector. App, A7, A9: Tr. 2051-56, 2067-68,

2172-73. It was, therefore, entirely consistent with CDC pol-

icy that Dr. Baer would collaborate with NYSDOH

researchers in furtherance of a public health experiment. App,

A7, AY; Tr. 2051-56, 2067-68, 2172-73.

It is unnecessary to grasp the intricate details of NYSDOH’s

rabies research (App, A109-A 150), or to focus on the specifics

of this experiment (App, A150-A157), or to absorb the history

of rabies research generally (App, A60-A109), in order to

understand whether Dr. Baer’s errors or omissions were pro-

tected by the Exception of the FTCA. After a brief factual

background, we will demonstrate that Dr. Baer’s errors and

omissions—his failures properly to assess the risk of aerosol

exposure to the rabies virus and to warn other sophisticated

scientists that their research methods were unsafe—were

within the protection of the exception.

The objective of NYSDOH’s project was the creation of a

vaceine, which is a modified virus. App, A7. Vaccines, which

are attenuated or weakened viruses, work by creating anti-

5

bodies so that the body’s own immune system can resist a

“challenge” by later exposure to the disease. App, A7, A76.

NYSDOH had encountered technical difficulties in formu-

lating a rabies vaccine. App, A9. Conventional laboratory

techniques failed to yield a vaccine with enough potency, or

titer. App, A9. Accordingly, NYSDOH asked for he!p from

CDC’s Dr. Baer, who was regarded as the “expert’s expert”

on rabies research. App, A7, A9. Dr. Baer agreed to, and later

did, furnish a more potent strain of rabies virus which he had

used at CDC. App, A8-A10.

Like other professionals potentially exposed to the rabies

virus (e.g., veterinarians, postal delivery personnel), Dr. Baer

had been vaccinated with the commercial (Eli Lilly) rabies

vaccine. App, A8, All, A91. Also, his blood levels of rabies

antibody had been confirmed after testing. App, A&8.

NYSDOH and CDC researchers all assumed that, in the event

of accidental exposure, they were not at risk. App, A8-A10.

Despite accidental exposures to the most potent “street virus”

from rabid animals in laboratories, no scientist immunized

with the Lilly vaccine had ever contracted rabies. App, A8, Tr.

1027-28, 1421, 2113-14, 2224-25.

Dr. Baer, as a bystander and observer of the NYSDOH

project, stood next to plaintiff during the experiment. App,

A12. Although we will never know why plaintiff was the only

scientist there to contract rabies, he was probably exposed to

greater concentrations of the aerosol because he spent more

time with the machine and was closer to the aerosol leak. App,

A10, Al2-A13, A66, A137.

Dr. Baer’s error in gauging the risk of the NYSDOH experi-

ment was his underestimation of the risk of aerosol exposure.

App, Al10-Al1. NYSDOH and CDC scientists knew that there

were two “routes of transmission” of the rabies virus: blood-

6

strcam or aerosol (airborne). App, All, A232-A233. In the

more typical example, such as a dog bite, the rabies virus

enters the body directly through the bloodstream. App, A10-

All, A54, A62, A68. For that route of transmission, the Lilly

vaccine had always been effective. App, All.

Plaintiff contracted rabies by the aerosol route of transmis-

sion after the Uni-Glatt machine leaked. App, A10-A11. The

virus traveled from the nerve endings in his nasal mucosa

directly to his brain. App, All, Al105-A107. Thus, the virus

bypassed the rabies antibodies in the blood. App, All, A105-

A107.

At trial, plaintiff established that NYSDOH scientists had

operated an unsafe laboratory, which lacked adequate contain-

ment devices to prevent aerosol exposures. App, All. How-

ever, since State law barred tort suits against NYSDOH (plain-

tiff’s employer) in that the receipt of workers’ compensation

benefits was an exclusive remedy, plaintiff’s theory at trial

was that the Government was a joint tortfeasor. App, A6.

Plaintiff contended that CDC’s Dr. Baer either should have

halted the State project or should have warned that it was

unsafe to conduct it in the NYSDOH laboratory. App, A22.

With expert testimony from risk-appraisal scientists, plain-

tiff proved that Dr. Baer, although he did not believe this virus

posed dangers in the event of aerosol exposure, should have

known than an aerosol exposure was dangerous. App, All,

A233, Tr. 985-87, 999-1000, 1003, 1030, 1087-89, 1479-83.

Like other rabies experts, Dr. Baer was certainly aware of the

theoretical danger of aerosol exposure. Tr. 1038, 1176,

2138-39. Indeed, Dr. Baer was the expert’s expert, having

written countless articles and edited the definitive two-volume

scientific treatise on rabies. Exh 112, The Natural History of

Rabies, J.App. at 4735-5590; Tr. 111, 2330.

7

Although Dr. Baer negligently underestimated the risk of

aerosol exposure, App, All, his error was grounded in scien-

tific reasoning. He knew that the scientific literature, including

the rabies treatise he edited, had documented the aerosol route

of transmission of the disease, but, to borrow a legal metaphor,

he believed that those cases were distinguishable. Tr. 1172-76.

Dr. Baer was aware that a public health worker and a mining

engineer doing work in bat caves had apparently contracted

rabies from an aerosol route of exposure. App, A94-A99.

However, the cave workers’ levels of exposure were perceived

to be have been much higher and, more critically, they had not

been immunized with the commercial vaccine, which was first

distributed in 1957. App, A90, A94-A99; Tr. 1175, 2310.

Thus, Dr. Baer believed that exposure to aerosols in a labora-

tory posed no dangers for scientists immunized with the com-

mercial vaccine. App, A205-A206; Tr. 880-881, 2139, 2252,

2254, 2258-59, 2312-14, 2322, 2324.

There was one prior case of a laboratory worker who

contracted rabies. App, A99-A100. A scientist in Texas con-

tracted rabies after inhaling aerosols produced by mixing

rabies materials in a blender. App, A100. However, that case

was distinguishable from this case because the Texas labora-

tory worker had been vaccinated some 13 years before the

accident, but had not developed demonstrable blood anti-

bodies. App, A100. Thus, it was as if he had never been

immunized. App, Al100-A101.

Additionally, the Texas blender incident was distinguish-

able because that scientist was using the so-called “*Challenge

Virus Standard” (“‘CVS’’), the particularly lethal strain used

as the benchmark virus to “challenge” or kill animals as a

means of assaying the effectiveness of vaccines previously

administered. App, A85-A86, A99-A100; Tr. 1032-34. In con-

trast to the CVS virus which killed the Texas laboratory

worker, Dr. Baer furnished NYSDOH with an “ERA” strain

8

of rabies virus, which is an attenuated strain used to immunize

animals. App, Al26-A128; Tr. 1033-34, 2138-39.

Moreover, the viral strain which Dr. Baer brought from

CDC to NYSDOH’s laboratory had proven not dangerous to

foxes, a species peculiarly susceptible to rabies and therefore

regarded as an “indicator species” for the pathogenicity of a

virus. App, A145; Tr. 1209, 1211, 2143-48. The few adverse

effects upon some animal species which had been documented

in the scientific literature were discounted on factual or scien-

tific grounds as not suggesting any real risks for man. Tr.

1176, 2255, 2258, 2265-66.

Therefore, on the basis of his knowledge and expertise, Dr.

Baer discounted as insignificant, albeit mistakenly, the risk of

exposure to rabies aerosols. App, A233; Tr. 1032, 1173-74.

1884, 1979-80, 2255, 2313-14. With the benefit of hindsight,

everyone recognizes that Dr. Baer tragically miscalculated the

risk to which he exposed himself and plaintiff.

2. Decisions of the courts below.

The district court held the Government liable for Dr. Baer’s

mistakes. Andrulonis vy United States, 724 F Supp 1421

(NDNY 1989); App, A46 et seg. Because NYSDOH was only

a third-party defendant, the court recognized that NYSDOH’s

negligence with respect to unsafe laboratory conditions could

not give rise to liability of the Government. 724 F Supp at

1472; App, A181. The court found that the State scientists

were sophisticated members of the “community of rabies

experts” who were assumed to know the theories and concepts

of rabies work. 724 F Supp at 1474; App, A187. The court

also found that NYSDOH scientists should have known the

following: that pathogenicity of viruses could not be known

for certain; that safe laboratory practice required researchers to

assume that the experimental strain was dangerous to humans;

9

that the concentration of a virus directly affects its patho-

genicity; that aerosol exposure should be avoided; and that the

Lilly vaccine could not guarantee safety against aerosol expo-

sure. 724 F Supp at 1475-76; App, A188-A195. The court also

found that NYSDOH scientists knew that the Uni-Glatt

machine they were using was not airtight. 724 F Supp at 1476;

App, A193.

From all of those facts, the district court found that

NYSDOH should have been able to anticipate that this experi-

ment was unsafe, particularly given the absence of contain-

ment devices in the NYSDOH laboratory. 724 F Supp at

1476-79; App, A198-A202.

The district court then detailed why the Government was

liable for failure to warn. 724 F Supp at 1481-1496; App,

A210-A256. The court found that since Dr. Baer had superior

knowledge about rabies, he should have made sure that

NYSDOH’s scientists were fully aware of all of the dangers

associated with this experimental virus. 724 F Supp at

1488-89; App, A232-A236. The court held that because Dr.

Baer knew that NYSDOH’s laboratory did not have safety

equipment that would have minimized or averted aerosol

exposure, he should have warned NYSDOH scientists not to

continue the experiment. 724 F Supp at 1490-93; App, A238-

A24d.

The court, which had earlier denied the Government's

motion to dismiss on the basis of the exception, Andrulonis v

United States, 593 F Supp 1336 (NDNY 1984), App, A390-

A398, gave very brief mention to it. 724 F Supp at 1496-98;

App, A256-A264. The court relied heavily upon Indian Tow-

ing Co. v United States, 350 US 61 (1955). Andrulonis, 724 F

Supp at 1497; App, A259-A260. The court hinged its analysis

on the planning/operational distinctions which it understood to

be the measure of the exception. 724 F Supp at 1497-98; App,

A259-A260.

10

The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the exception

did not apply. Andrulonis I, 924 F2d 1210, 1217-20; App,

A15-A23. The court applied what it understood to be a two-

part test derived from Berkovitz v United States, 486 US 531

(1988). Andrulonis I, 924 F2d at 1218; App, A18-A19.

First, we must consider whether the conduct was a

matter of choice for the acting employee, and if so, we

must then determine whether the employee’s actions

involved public policy considerations. 924 F2d at

1218; App, A18.

The court acknowledged that there was no statute, regulation

or any other directive which mandated what Dr. Baer should

have done or which forbade him from what he did. 924 F2d at

1218; App, Al9.

No such directive was applicable to Dr. Baer in this

Case; at the critical points in these events he had the

power to choose his actions. 924 F2d at 1218; App,

Al9.

Thus, in the view of the Second Circuit, Dr. Baer’s conduct

was “discretionary” in the sense of not being circumscribed

by regulations as in Berkovitz. Andrulonis I, 924 F2d at 1218:

App, Al9.

But this does not end the inquiry. As we have noted, to

qualify for the exception, Dr. Baer’s critical choices

had to involve policy considerations, and here they did

not. 924 F2d at 1218; App, A19.

_The court also relied on the operational/planning dichotomy

1]

which the Second Circuit had embraced on authority of /ndian

Towing.* Andrulonis I, 924 F2d at 1218-19; App, A19-A20.

The court conceded that the execution of policy decisions

might occasionally be protected by the exception. 924 F2d at

1219; App, A21. However, actions to implement policy would

be protected only “when the steps in the execution process

also require policy judgments”. 924 F2d at 1219; App, A21.

Essentially, the court required proof of conscious, deliberate

and explicit balancing of risks, benefits and costs; in the

absence of such an evidentiary record, the Government would

not be protected by the exception. 924 F2d at 1219; App, A21.

Applying those principles to this case, the court held that

the Government’s decisions to encourage rabies research, to

provide funding to NYSDOH and to furnish the virus were all

protected “policy” decisions. 924 F2d at 1219; App, A22.

The same is not true, however, with Dr. Baer’s alleged

failure to warn of the extreme dangers presented by the

particular circumstances of the March 29th experiment

which Dr. Baer failed to interrupt. The situation simply

did not lend itself to policy balancing, not [sic] is there

any indication that Dr. Baer considered the policy

implications or the pros and cons of allowing the

experiment to proceed. Once he became aware of the

risks, Dr. Baer was obligated to give warning. His is

precisely the type of negligent omission for which

congress waived the government’s sovereign immunity

in order to provide redress to citizens for the torts of

government actors. 924 F2d at 1219; App, A22.

4See, e.g., Caraballo v United States, 830 F2d 19, 21-22 (2d Cir 1987)

(the manner of patrolling a national park was not discretionary); and Eklof

Marine Corp. v United States, 762 F2d 200, 203 (2d Cir 1985) (the manner

of marking navigation obstacles was not discretionary). Eklof Marine was

sharply criticized by the First Circuit in Brown v United States, 790 F2d

199, 202 (Ist Cir 1986), cert. den., 479 US 1058 (1987).

12

NYSDOH filed a petition for certiorari. New York State

Dept. of Health v Andrulonis, No. 90-1864. This Court granted

the petition, vacated the judgment and remanded for further

consideration in light of United States v Gaubert, 111 S$ Ct

1267, 113 L Ed 2d 335 (1991). New York State Dept. of Health

v Andrulonis, 112 S Ct 39, 116 L Ed 2d 18 (1991); App, A405.

After further briefing but without oral argument, the Second

Circuit reinstated its original decision. Andrulonis II, 952 F2d

652 (1991); App, A408-A415. The court stated that ““Gaubert

does not undermine our original opinion”. Andrulonis I], 952

F2d at 652; App, A408. The court denied that, in its first

opinion, it had relied heavily on /ndian Towing or had adopted

the planning/operational dichotomy on authority of Indian

Towing. Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at 654: App, A412-413; but

see, Andrulonis 1, 924 F2d at 1218-19: App, Al7-A18. The

court interpreted Gaubert as limiting the scope of the excep-

tion to actions and decisions demonstrably based on considera-

tions of public policy. Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at 654: App,

A412.

In defining what “policy” was protected by the exception,

the court claimed to find support in Gaubert for the conclusion

that the Government must demonstrate conscious balancing of

risks and benefits. Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at 655: App, A413-

A414.

The government also argues that Dr. Baer’s decision to

allow the experiment to proceed was necessary to

fulfill the policy objectives of the CDC and as such,

should be protected by the exception. It interprets

Gaubert as focusing on whether the government agent

was allowed discretion, not whether he actually con-

templated different policy implications. Andrulonis II,

952 F2d at 655; App, A413-A414 (emphasis added).

13

The court also understood Gaubert to stand for the proposi-

tion that comprehensive regulations implied wide discretion,

with the converse also true. Andrulonis I], 952 F2d at 655;

App, A414. The court believed that the outcome in Gaubert

hinged on the fact that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board

had ‘‘a clear regulatory scheme [which] entrusted government

agents with discretionary powers to effectuate a clearly-

defined policy.” Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at 655; App, A414.

Because CDC did not have a detailed set of regulations to

circumscribe the conduct of CDC scientists, the Second Cir-

cuit held that Gaubert was distinguishable. Andrulonis I], 952

F2d at 655; App, A414.

With respect to its conclusion that the errors in risk-assess-

ment by Dr. Baer did not involve any “policy”, the court

focused on the result of injury and, reasoning backwards and

with the benefit of hindsight, stated that “‘it is hardly conceiv-

able that the CDC would ever have a policy to keep silent

about obvious, easily-correctable dangers in experiments

using drugs supplied by the CDC.” Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at

655; App, A414. The court then likened Dr. Baer’s errors in

assessing the risk of this research project to mundane errors of

a government chauffeur in driving an automobile. 952 F2d at

655; App, A414-A415.

On the basis of that additional explanation and interpreta-

tion of Gaubert, the court reinstated its original opinion.

Andrulonis I], 952 F2d at 655; App, A415.

14

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Second Circuit took much too narrow a view of

“policy” and “discretion”, contrary to the plain thrust of

Gaubert and previous cases. Additionally, the decision

below conflicts with many analogous cases from other

circuits.

There are several reasons to grant this Petition.

First, the court below took much too narrow a view of the

discretionary function exception. The Second Circuit inter-

preted Gaubert as pivoting on the existence of a comprehen-

sive scheme of regulations. Because CDC had not promul-

gated detailed regulations to dictate how scientists engaged in

cooperative research should act, the court below inexplicably

inferred that a CDC scientist, visiting a laboratory run by

other, competent scientists, had no discretion in how to deal

with those other scientists. Contrary to the view of the Second

Circuit, Gaubert did not hold that the absence of regulations

negated the existence of broad discretion. Additionally, the

court below defined “policy” so narrowly that it practically

equated it with non-negligent conduct. Finally, the court

below came to a preposterous conclusion by equating risk-

assessment errors in theoretical and experimental research

with mundane driving errors of a governmental chauffeur.

The decision below is also in conflict with opinions in other

circuits. Other courts have construed the exception much more

broadly to cover negligent risk-assessments or negligent fail-

ures to warn. Examples include misjudging the dangers of

open-air testing of nuclear weapons, failing to warn miners of

known hazards of mining uranium, failing to follow safe

procedures in the clean-up of toxic spills, failing to adopt

better safety precautions for the transportation of bombs, fail-

ing to enforce workplace safety rules on the premises of

15

Government contractors where the Government retained a

contract-based right to suspend production or work in the

event of safety hazards, and failing adequately to test or warn

about the Swine Flu vaccine prior to promoting and distribut-

ing it to the general public. The list could readily be expanded.

The point is that the overwhelming consensus of decisions

outside the Second Circuit have interpreted the exception to

cover negligent acts or omissions where there was no violation

of mandatory regulations.

Finally, the decision below is also in conflict with the

prevailing view in other circuits with respect to the burden of

showing that Governmental conduct is “discretionary” or

embraces permissible “policy” considerations. The majority

of circuits have adopted and applied the “susceptible to pol-

icy” test by which the Government enjoys the benefit of the

exception even if it is not able to demonstrate a conscious,

deliberate ‘‘balancing” or risk-evaluation prior to the act or

omission giving rise to liability. The Second Circuit rejected

this rule, holding that Dr. Baer’s conduct could not have

involved permissible “policy” because he had not given

enough advance thought to the risks.

We will now amplify these reasons for granting the Petition.

I.

The decision below is in direct conflict with Gaubert. The

Second Circuit held that Dr. Baer’s errors in judging the risk

of a public health research project were not within the excep-

tion because ignoring unsafe laboratory conditions did not

implicate any “policy” considerations. Andrulonis II, 952 F2d

at 655; App, A415. Yet, the court offered no guidance to

distinguish mere negligence from conduct outside the scope of

the exception and, astonishingly, equated the errors of Dr.

Baer—the Chief of Viral Zoonosis research for CDC—with

16

bad driving by a government chauffeur. 952 F2d at 655; App,

A414-A415. The court also distinguished the case at bar from

Gaubert on the basis that CDC did not channel, confine or

circumscribe policy for its Scientists, whereas the Federal

Home Loan Bank Board in Gaubert had “a clear regulatory

scheme [which] entrusted government agents with discretion-

ary powers to effectuate a clearly-defined policy.” Andrulonis

i, 952 F2d at 655; App, A414.

That analysis is directly contrary to Gaubert because, rather

than presuming discretion based on the absence of a manda-

tory regulation, the Second Circuit presumed the absence of

discretion unless a regulatory scheme explicitly conferred

broad discretion. In holding that Gaubert did not apply, the

Second Circuit stated that CDC had “neither a regulatory

framework nor a defined policy that could serve as the basis

for infusing all decisions of CDC employees with policy

implications.” Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at 655; App, A414.

This Court did not say in Gaubert that the absence of

regulations equated with the absence of discretion. The con-

siderable weight of pre-Gaubert precedent held that the failure

to promulgate regulations was, itself, a discretionary decision

protected by the exception. Comment, The Discretionary

Function Exception and Mandatory Regulations, 54 U Chi L

Rev 1300, 1332 (1987) (“The discretion of the government in

promulgating, or failing to promulgate, regulations is unques-

tioned”); Weiss v United States, 889 F2d 937, 939 (10th Cir

1989); Shuman v United States, 765 F2d 283, 29] (1st Cir

1985); Hylin v United States, 755 F2d S51, 554 (7th Cir 1985).

Thus, the decision of the Second Circuit can only be

described as a strained reading of Gaubert and one seriously

out of step with the mainstream of decisional law on the

exception,

17

II.

The decision below also conflicts with the decisions of other

courts of appeals which have refused to define the exception

sO narrowly that mere common law negligence is not covered

by the exception. The court below placed emphasis on the fact

that the negligence here involved safety precautions and, from

that premise, came to the conclusion that no “policy’’ could

have been implicated since no permissible “policy” would

tolerate any safety hazard. Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at 655; App,

A415. Aside from the fact that the same argument was rejected

long ago in Dalehite v United States, 346 US 15, 37-38 (1953)

(involving safety hazards in the storage, handling and labelling

of an explosive substance), it has been consistently rejected in

the other circuits. Despite compelling proof of common law

negligence with respect to lapses in safety or the failure to

warn, the other circuits have refused to equate common law

negligence with conduct outside the coverage of the exception.

See, e.g., Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v United States, 880 F2d

1018, 1030 (9th Cir 1989) (“Such a rule would collapse the

discretionary function inquiry into the basic issue of negli-

gence”); Allen v United States, 816 F2d 1417, 1421 (10th Cir

1987), cert. den., 484 US 1004 (1988) (“It is irrelevant to the

discretion issue whether the [Government] or its employees

were negligent in failing to protect the public’); General

Public Utilities Corp. v United States, 745 F2d 239, 243-245

(3d Cir 1984), cert. den., 469 US 1228 (1985) (same).

The Second Circuit took the view that no “discretion” or

“policy” was involved because Dr. Baer should have known

better. Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at 655; App, A414-A415. That

view might have had some validity if this case had involved an

accident within a CDC laboratory, because CDC had a Labo-

ratory Safety Manual (Exh G-136; J.App. at 9243-9445) which

would have required its own scientists to use aerosol-contain-

ment devices in a CDC laboratory. App, A238. However, the

18

Second Circuit ignored the fact that there was absolutely no

CDC regulation, practice, or rule requiring a CDC scientist

visiting the laboratory of another competent scientist to

attempt to tell that scientist how to run his own laboratory.

Moreover, as we have already demonstrated in our Statement

of the Case (supra, pp 5-8), Dr. Baer did not actually know the

hazard posed by exposure to this virus and, in fact, obviously

believed that the Lilly vaccine would be adequate protection

since he put himself in the same laboratory conditions in

which plaintiff worked. Thus, the court below failed to recog-

nize that the decision of a visiting scientist (CDC’s Dr. Baer)

not to interfere with the project of another competent scientist

(NYSDOH'’s Dr. Debbie) was itself a discretionary decision by

Dr. Baer. App, A120, A151, 263-264; Tr. 2074-77, 2170,

2180.

The Second Circuit’s findings that Dr. Baer should have

intervened to stop NYSDOH'’s project (Andrulonis I, 924 F2d

at 1219; App, A22; Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at 655; App, A413-

A414), are in conflict with cases involving the Government's

failure to exercise a contractually-retained right to intervene in

the event of safety violations by an independent contractor.

Those cases hold that however blatant or obvious the safety

hazard on someone else’s premises, when the Government has

delegated safety decisions to such contractors, the act of dele-

gating safety responsibility is itself the discretionary decision

protected by the exception. Feyers v United States, 749 F2d

1222, 1226-27 (6th Cir 1984), cert. den., 471 US 1125 (1985)

(“the decision to delegate responsibility for safety to Chrysler

was based on a perception by government negotiators that

Chrysler was a prudent contractor capable of implementing its

own Safety program”); Shuman v United States, 765 F2d 283,

292-93 (1st Cir 1985) (decision to delegate safety decisions to

an independent contractor doing governmental work was dis-

cretionary, even though the practical effect was that there was

little or no safety program); Jn re Consolidated U.S. Atmo-

19

spheric Testing Litigation, 820 F2d 982, 995-96 (9th Cir

1987), cert. den. sub nom. Konizeski vy Livermore Labs, 485

US 905 (1988) (same); Johns v Pettibone Corp., 843 F2d 464,

467 (11th Cir 1988) (“safety decisions represent an exercise of

discretion giving rise to governmental immunity”’); see also,

Thompson v Dilger, 696 F Supp 1071, 1077-79 (ED Va 1988)

(actions of Government in aiding and encouraging an inventor

in the development of an armor-piercing rifle included a dis-

cretionary determination that the inventor was sufficiently

knowledgeable about safety so that the Government need not

supervise or control his conduct).

The decision below also conflicts with many decisions

which have construed the exception broadly to encompass

judgmental errors in risk-assessment. Boruski v United States,

803 F2d 1421, 1429 (7th Cir 1986) (approval of vaccines for

Swine Flu vaccination program); Wells v United States, 851

F2d 1471, 1476-78 (DC Cir 1988), cert. den., 488 US 1029

(1989) (assessment of the risks to a residential neighborhood

posed by a lead smelter); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v

United States, 837 F2d 116, 120-23 (3d Cir), cert. den., 487

US 1235 (1988) (assessment of the risks to a residential

neighborhood posed by cleanup of a leaking toxic tank car);

Creek National Indian Housing Authority v United States, 905

F2d 312, 313-i4 (10th Cir 1990) (selection of safety precau-

tions for purposes of transporting bombs on public highways);

Totten v United States, 806 F2d 698, 700-02 (6th Cir 1986)

(cleanup of hazardous solid rocket fuel); Genera! Public Util-

ities Corp. v United States, 745 F2d 239, 243-46 (3d Cir

1984), cert. den., 469 US 1228 (1985) (errors by nuclear

safety experts in underestimating the significance of prior

incidents at Three Mile Island).

The decision below also conflicts with many “failure to

warn”’ cases where complaints were dismissed on the basis of

the exception despite compelling expert proof that the Gov-

20

ernment knew of particular safety hazards but failed to warn

those demonstrably at risk from the hazard. See, e.g., In re

Consolidated U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litigation, 820 F2d

982, 985 (9th Cir 1987), cert. den. sub nom. Konizeski v

Livermore Labs, 485 US 905 (1988) (open air nuclear testing

without warning area residents of the risks of nuclear fallout);

Allen v United States, 816 F2d 1417, 1423-24 & n 8 (10th Cir

1987), cert. den., 484 US 1004 (1988) (same); Barnson v

United States, 816 F2d 549, 553-57 (10th Cir), cert. den., 484

US 896 (1987) (decisions of Public Health Service and Sur-

geon General not to warn about the health hazards of working

in uranium mines); Begay v United States, 768 F2d 1059,

1064-66 (9th Cir 1985) (same); First Nat. Bank in Albuquer-

que v United States, 552 F2d 370, 374-77 (10th Cir), cert.

den., 434 US 835 (1977) (approval of warning labels for

fungicide which caused mercury poisoning in children); see

also, Fried v United States, 674 F Supp 636, 638-40 (ND II!

1987) (furnishing radioactive isotopes to a private university

without taking precautions for handling and storage of those

substances); contra, Routh v United States, 941 F2d 853,

855-857 (9th Cir 1991) (the failure of a United States Forest

Service contracting officer to require a contractor to provide

adequate safety equipment was not a public policy decision).

In virtually every one of the cases just cited (supra, pp

18-20), the courts either found that plaintiff had proved, or

assumed that plaintiff could prove, that the Government's

errors and omissions were negligent when judged either by a

common law tort standard of reasonable care under the cir-

cumstances or by a professional malpractice standard. In some

of the cases, impressive expert testimony bolstered plaintiffs’

theories that the Government woefully underestimated the

risks of a particular activity. See, e.g., Allen v United States,

588 F Supp 247, 260-329 (D Utah 1984) (detailing expert

proof of what Government scientists either knew or should

have known when they conducted open-air atomic tests), revd,

21

816 F2d 1417, supra. Yet, the courts dismissed the complaints

on the basis that the errors or omissions were discretionary,

judgmental decisions protected by the exception, notwith-

standing that human safety was compromised by erroneously

made decisions.

Ill.

The decision below is also in conflict with Myslakowski v

United States, 806 F2d 94, 96-97 (6th Cir 1986), cert. den.,

480 US 948 (1987), and similar cases which apply the “‘sus-

ceptible to policy analysis” test to determine whether particu-

lar-conduct is protected by the exception. This test gives the

Government the benefit of the exception even when the Gov-

ernment is not able to prove that advance, conscious risk-

assessment decisions were made. The Sixth Circuit in

Myslakowski held that the decision by the Government to

dispose of surplus jeeps on an “as is” basis was protected by

the exception. Despite the fact that the Government was actu-

ally aware of the propensity of the jeeps to roll over (since a

Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory test and report had warned

the Government of the hazard), the court held that negligent

failure to warn purchasers of those surplus jeeps was

embraced within the scope of the exception. Myslakowski, 806

F2d at 97-98. Most other circuits are in accord. See, ¢.g., Sea-

Land Service, Inc. v United States, 919 F2d 888, 892 (3d Cir

1990), cert. den., 111 S Ct 2235, 114 L Ed 2d 477 (1991);

Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v United States, 880 F2d 1018,

1028 (9th Cir 1989); Allen v United States, 816 F2d 1417,

1422 n 5, 1423-24 & n 8 (10th Cir 1987), cert. den., 484 US

1004 (1988); contra, Dube v Pittsburgh Corning, 870 F2d 790,

798-99 (Ist Cir 1989).

The Second Circuit initially stated its acceptance of the

“susceptible to policy analysis” test. See, In re Joint Eastern

& Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation (Robinson), 891 F2d 31,

7

a ee

37 (2d Cir 1989). However, for reasons not clearly stated in

Andrulonis I or in Andrulonis 11, the court below did not apply

the “susceptible to policy analysis” test in the same manner in

this case. While purporting to apply that test, the Second

Circuit found that Dr. Baer was not engaged in policy-making

because he failed to consider the relevant risks. Andrulonis [,

924 F2d at 1219; App, A21-A22; Andrulonis II, 952 F2d at

655; App, A415. The court never explained why Dr. Baer’s

errors and omissions — in failing to consider, or discounting

as insignificant, the risk of aerosol exposure — could be

described as nor involving “policy” when a panoply of com-

parable risk-assessment errors have been treated by other

courts of appeals as discretionary matters implicating policy.

Likewise, Dr. Baer’s decision to defer to the competency of

NYSDOH scientists after delivering the virus was a judgmen-

tal, policy decision. Tr. 1155, 1162-63, 2070-74. While plain-

tiff established Dr. Baer’s negligence in the classic common-

law sense, the record established that Dr. Baer, in fact, had the

authority and discretion to make judgments as to the compe-

tence of NYSDOH to receive and handle etiologic substances

such as this rabies virus. Tr. 2186, 2263-64. Dr. Walter

Dowdle, the Deputy Director of CDC, explained it as follows

in his testimony (J.App. 2185):

Q. Dr. Dowdle, in 1976 and up to March of 1977,

were there any standards which governed the CDC

practice in providing etiologic agents to another

laboratory?

A. At the Class 2 level and even at the Class 3 level,

the responsibility there rests with the experts in that

particular area. In other words, the branch chief had the

authority to provide those strains to people that he felt

competent to receive them.

23

Q. With respect to rabies viruses in 1976 and 1977,

with whom did that discretion lie?

A. Dr. Baer.

Even after remand in light of Gaubert, the Second Circuit

failed to explain why it interpreted the ‘“‘susceptible to policy

analysis” test differently from the other courts of appeals.

Instead, the court seemed determined to justify and adhere to

its original decision in Andrulonis I. In reasoning that pro-

ceeded backwards from the fact of injury, the court charac-

terized the limits of permissible “policy” as not including any

errors Or Omissions which lead to injury. Andrulonis 11, 952

F2d at 655; App, A415.

Looking at the ‘nature of the conduct’ in this situation,

we do not see how Dr. Baer’s negligent omission could

possibly have been grounded in CDC’s policy scheme.

Nothing indicates that CDC policy required, or even

encouraged, Dr. Baer to ignore unsafe laboratory con-

ditions and thereby unnecessarily place the lives of

laboratory workers at risk in order to further a scien-

tific cause or any other objective of the government.

The general policy of wanting to eradicate rabies and

granting officials some discretion to achieve those

ends is far too broad and indefinite to insulate Dr.

Baer’s negligent conduct in the circumstances of this

case. 952 F2d at 655; App, A415.

This conflict in the circuits on so basic a point as the

“burden of proof” or the required evidentiary showing that a

decision embraces “discretion” is further reason to grant the

petition.

24

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the writ

Dated: Albany, New York

March 26, 1992

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT ABRAMS

Attorney General of the State of New York

Attorney for Petitioner

JERRY BOONE

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

PETER H. SCHIFF

Deputy Solicitor General

MICHAEL S. BUSKUS

Assistant Attorney General

Of Counsel

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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