Appendix — Anderson v. Battle

Supreme Court brief1992

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No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1991

PARK ANDERSON, et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

BOBBY BATTLE, et al.,

Respondents,

and

Intervenor,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SUSAN B. LOVING

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA

SUE WYCOFF*

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEPUTY CHIEF

FEDERAL and TORT DIVISION

420 West Main - Suite 550

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102

(405) 521-4274

March, 1992 *Counsel of Record

APPENDIX

Statutes Involved ose 6 2 «© o 6 o Reh

1986 Opinion of Court of Appeals ... 3

1989 Opinion of District Court .... 43

1991 Opinion of Court of Appeals ... 58

1991 Denial of Rehearing ....... 63

APPENDIX

The Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution:

Excessive bail shall not be required,

nor excessive fines imposed, nor

cruel and unusual punishments

inflicted.

42 U.8.C. § 1983:

Every person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or

Territory or the District of

Columbia, subjects or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-

tion of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress.

For the purposes of this section, any

Act of Congress applicable exclusive-

ly to the District of Columbia shall

be considered to be a statute of the

District of Columbia.

2

Rule 52 (a) Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure:

In all actions tried upon the facts

without a jury or with an advisory

jury, the court shall find the facts

specially a nd state separately its

conclusions of law thereon, and

judgment shall be entered pursuant to

Rule 58; and in granting or refusing

interlocutory injunctions the court

shall similarly set forth the

findings of fact and conclusions of

law which constitute the grounds of

its action. Requests for findings are

not necessary for purposes ofreview.

Findings of fact, whether based on

cral or documentary evidence, shall

not be set aside unless clearly

erroneous, and due regard shall be

given to the opportunity of the trial

court to judge of the credibility of

the witnesses. The findings of a

master, to the extent that the court

adopts them, shall be considered as

the findings of the court. It will

be sufficient if the findings of fact

and conclusions of law are stated

orally and recorded in open court

following the close of the evidence

or appear in an opinion or memorandum

of decision filed be the court.

Findings of fact and conclusions of

law are unnecessary on decision of

motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any

other motion except as provided in

subdivision (c) of the rule.

3

Bobby Battle, et al.,

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Vv.

Park Anderson, et al.,

Defendants/Appellees,

and

United States of America,

Plaintiff/Appellee-Intervenor.

No. 84-1026

United States Court of Appeals,

Tenth Circuit.

April 16, 1986

The United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Oklahoma, Frank

Howell Seay, Chief Judge, entered judgment

in ongoing litigation by prison inmates

concerning conditions. Judgment found

that system was constitutional, although

there were four Subjects of previous

orders found to be inadequate and not in

compliance, and granted motion to dismiss,

4

and inmates appealed. The Court of

Appeals, Holloway, Chief Judge, held that:

(1) evidence supported finding that access

to courts was adequate; (2) court's

findings regarding claims of racial

discrimination were inadequate; and (3)

evidence supported finding that conditions

were not in violation of Eighth Amendment.

Affirmed in part; vacated and

remanded in part.

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, and

BARRETT and DOYLE, Circuit Judges.

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge.

I

This § 1983 class action was

initially commenced by inmate Bobby

Battle, pro se, Challenging various

conditions of confinement at the Oklahoma

State Penitentiary in 1972. The district

>

court held that conditions in the Oklahoma

prison system violated the Eighth Amend-

ment proscription against cruel and

unusual punishment. The subsequent

history of the controversy is detailed in

the opinions cited in the margin.’

In April, 1982, the district court

entered an order that defendants "should

"Since the district court held that

conditions in the Oklahoma prison system

violated the Eighth Amendment's

proscription of cruel and unusual

punishment in tle v nderson, 376

F.Supp.402 (E.D.Ok1a.1974}, the litigation

concerning constitutional compliance has

been ongoing. See Battle v. Anderson, 447

F.Supp. 516 (E.D.Okla.), aff'd, 564 F.2a

388 (10th Cir.1977); Ba e iv nderson,

457 F.Supp 719 (E.D.Okla. 1978), remanded

for further hearings. 594 F.2d 786 (10th

Cir.1979) ; vV._Anderson, 614 F.2d

251 (10th Cir. 1980); Battle v. Anderson,

708 F.2d = 1523 (10th Cir.1983) (per

curiam), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014,

104 S.Ct. 1019, 79 L.Ed.24a 248 (1984); see

also Vv nderson, 541 F.Supp. 1061

(E.D. Okla. 1982) (award of attorneys'

fees).

6

have and do hereby have the authority

indefinitely but not permanently’ to

double-cell where necessary," 708 F.2d

1523 at 1526, following increases in the

Oklahoma prison population. In October,

1982, the district court issued an opinion

following an evidentiary hearing on its

orders that had previously been entered.

The court stated that although it would

not conclude from the evidence that the

system had become unconstitutional in its

operation, it was clearly in a state of

decline. 708 F.2d at 1539. The court

continued jurisdiction over the case to

insure that the Oklahoma prison system did

not revert to an unconstitutional

condition. JId. The court ordered that a

statement of penal policy and detailed

plan of action be filed.

7

This court affirmed, one judge

dissenting. Battle v. Anderson, 708 F.2d

1523 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed,

465 U.S. 1014, 104 S.ct. 1019, 79 L.Ed.2ad

248 (1984). The majority of the panel

held that the district court did not abuse

its discretion in continuing its

jurisdiction to assure compliance with

past decrees and to prevent a recurrence

of unconstitutional conditions despite its

finding that the System was then currently

constitutional. id. at 1537-40.

The instant controversy concerns

events following that decision. In

compliance with the district court's

order, the State filed a detailed "Plan of

Measures to be Taken to Assure Continued

Constitutionality of Oklahoma's Prisons"

in June, 1983, and in July the State filed

8

a supplement to the Plan. In September,

1983, the court held an evidentiary

hearing on the State's Plan and the

State's motion to dismiss the case. Judge

Bohanon recused in December, 1983, and the

case was assigned to Chief Judge Seay.

Following review of a portion of the

record, he entered the order on appeal

herein on December 30.

The court conciuded that "since

October 1982 to the present date the

conditions of confinement in the Oklahoma

prison system are constitutional and are

not cruel and unusual punishment." xX Jt.

App. 237. The court noted that there had

been "disturbances, problems, and

inadequacies in the Oklahoma prison system

since the court's last findings." Id. at

235. The court noted that there were four

9

Subjects of previous court orders still

found to be inadequate and not in

compliance - racial integration, access to

the courts, equal protection guarantees

for women, and vacating for human

habitation the East and West Cellhouses of

the Oklahoma State Penitentiary at

McAlester. Id.

The court concluded nevertheless that

the system was constitutional and "each

area of continued violation has been

Specifically addressed by the State and is

subject to a Specifically planned remedy."

Id. The court found that the State

legislature and prison officials were

aware of and sensitive to the

constitutional requirements and that the

court was satisfied "that there is no

reasonable expectation that

10

unconstitutional practices will recur in

the conditions of confinement in the

Oklahoma prison system." Id. at 238.

Concluding that it was mindful of its

obligation to enforce the constitutional

rights of all persons, the court granted

defendants' motion to dismiss the case in

its entirety. However, the court

concluded that "[ajll of this court's

orders and injunctions as modified

heretofore remain in full force and

effect." Jd. at 239.

In May, 1984, the district court

denied a motion by plaintiffs to stay the

dismissal order. Responding to a

complaint that the judge had not had the

full record to review, the judge noted

that he had had four of seven transcripts

from the September hearing for review

11

before entering the order; that he had all

the transcripts containing plaintiffs'

case-in-chief; and that he had earlier had

the transcript volume with the testimony

of the Governor and the Director of the

Corrections Department. In denying the

request for a stay, the court concluded

that "[a)fter a careful review and study

of the entire transcript, the court finds

no reason to change its order of December

30. 1983, and the court reaffirms that

order." Id. at 248. The court stated

that "(ajlthough the court noted problems

of compliance in certain areas, those

areas were not held to be constitutional

violations." -Id. (emphasis in original).

On April 25, 1984, a panel of this

court denied an application by the

——

plaintiffs for a stay of the dismissal

12

order, pending appeal. On May 25, 1985,

Plaintiffs filed a further motion for a

stay of the dismissal order, pending

appeal, contending that the State was

housing inmates in the East and West

Cellhouses in violation of the district

court's order of May, 1979. The state

responded that the inmates were

temporarily housed in those cellhouses on

May 13, 1985, as a result of a disturbance

at another State prison, and that the

inmates were removed from them On May 28.

Plaintiffs did not dispute these facts but

did request that this court stay the

dismissal order nevertheless. We denied

the renewed application for a stay,

stating that we would "consider the

propriety and scope of the district

court's December 30, 1983, order in our

re,

y

disposition of the pending appeal in this

cause." A motion to reconsider that

ruling was filed, but in view of our

disposition of the case the motion becomes

moot.

We turn now to the appellate

arguments challenging the correctness of

the district court's order of dismissal.

II

Plaintiffs challenge the district

court's holding that the prison system is

constitutional. They argue that the

system is unconstitutional with respect to

access to the courts, racial integration,

and equal protection guarantees for women

- areas that the district court found to

be "inadequate and not in compliance" with

previous court orders. Plaintiffs also

contend that the Oklahoma prison systen,

14

considering the totality of the

circumstances, is in violation cf the

Eighth Amendment.

A.

Access to the courts

(1) Plaintiffs attack the

defendants' reliance on inmate law clerks

to provide. meaningful access to the

courts.* Brief of Appellant 40-42; Reply

Brief of Appellants 18-20. We have

previously noted, however, that "[(u]nder

Bounds, the State is free to make a choice

between affording law library facilities

on a reasonable basis, or the alternative

means of having available counsel on a

. The constitutional right of

access to the court has been found to rest

on the guarantees of the Due Process

Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments. See Ward v. Kort, 762 F.2d

856, 858 (10th Cir.1985).

re

15

reasonable basis." Ward v. Kort, 762 F.2d

856, 860 (10th Cir.1985). The district

court's dismissal order stated:

The court finds that’ the

mandated minimums of adequate

library facilities has not yet

been met. Bounds v. Smith, 430

U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52

L.Ed.2d 72 (1976). However,

testimony from Mr. Larry

Meachun, Director of the

Department of Corrections of

Oklahoma, at the September 1983

hearing, indicates and assures

this court that libraries will

be fully stocked and that

plaintiffs have and will be

assured continued access’ to

courts.

X Jt.App.235. In this connection, the

defendants' Plan stated that the State

intended "to continue their current

approach to access to courts by providing

both law libraries and trained inmate law

clerks to assist inmates in framing legal

16

issues for presentation to the court." xX

R. 113; See jd. at 113-14.

There is record evidence that the

Department of Corrections has a large or

small library at each of the prison

facilities. Inventories were admitted in

evidence as Defendants' Exhibits 29, 30,

and 31 respecting the major law libraries

at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, the

Mabel Basset Correctional Center, and the

Joseph Harp Correctional Center. V

Jt.App. 1041. Each library has a

supervisor. The fact finder appointed by

the district court had found an "appalling

lack of essential legal books’ and

reference materials at both major and

minor law libraries." VIII Jt. App. 119.

However, we note that the inventories do

list a substantial volume of basic

OE

17

materials in the libraries. See, e.g.,

Defendants' Exhibit 29 (containing

extensive listing of law books at Oklahoma

State Penitentiary Library). Further,

defendants' Plan represented to the court

that "the Department is continually

updating and supplementing its law library

inventories." xX Jt.App. 114°

In light of the testimony, the

documentary evidence, and the

representations accepted by the district

*In addition to the inventories of

materials at the libraries, we note that

the handbook "Civil Procedure for Inmate

Legal Research Assistants" itself covered

basic principles on federal habeas corpus

with chapters on the exhaustion doctrine,

procedural default, issues cognizable,

pleadings, preliminary procedure, and

evidentiary hearings. Statutory materials

and summaries on various cases from the

Supreme Court and the courts of appeals on

habeas proceedings were also included.

18

court, we hold that the finding of the

court that there was no constitutional

violation in this respect is not in error.

B.

The claim of racial discrimination

[2] Earlier practices of racial

discrimination in the Oklahoma prison

system were chronicled in Battle _v.

Anderson, 376 F.Supp. at 410-11. In that

opinion, the district court made

conclusions of law on these practices, id.

at 420-21, and entered orders designed to

remedy the discrimination. Id. at 428-

30. The State has endeavored since those

orders to comply with the constitutional

requirements.

In the instant proceeding there are

numerous allegations of racial

discrimination and segregation in the

ee

19

Oklahoma prison systen, including

discrimination in job assignments, dining

hall seating, and cell assignments.

Numerous examples are contained in the

fact finder's March 1983 final compliance

report, VIII Jt.App. 25-43, and in the

arguments and record citations in the

briefs of the Plaintiffs-appellants in

this phase of the controversy. Brief of

Appellants 15-16, 43; Reply Brief of

Appellants 12-14. The State and the

United States as intervenor argue that the

evidence supports a finding of

nondiscrimination. Brief of State

Defendants-Appellees 101-02; Brief for the

United States as Appellee 26-28.

In addition, the plaintiffs-

appellants argue that the trial court did

not address these issues in the December

20

30, 1983 order of dismissal. In that

regard, we note that the district court

did make the following findings and

conclusions respecting this claim of

racial discrimination:

Racial integration of the

occupants of double cells is

found to be almost non-existent

in the Oklahoma prison system.

Racial integration of cells is

strictly by voluntary action

only. However, a commitment by

defendants to fully integrate is

contained in the Defendants'

Plan. The court finds that the

Defendants ' Plan to be of

sufficient remedial effect and

has previously, in this order,

approved and ordered its

adoption.

X Jt. App. 235.

In view of the findings quoted above,

we cannot agree with the plaintiffs-

appellants that the trial court did not

address the racial discrimination claim at

all. Nevertheless, because of the several

aim i

21

distinct questions clearly raised by the

fact finder's findings and the specific

issues joined by the parties, we must

agree that the findings of the district

court are not sufficient under rule 52a),

Fed.R.Civ.P. We cannot perform our

appellate function without adequate

findings and conclusions by the trial

court on this issue of fundamental

constitutional importance. Battle v.

Anderson, 614 F.2d 251, 256 (10th Cir.

1980); Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2a

1086, 1902 (8th Cir.1980). Without

expressing any view on the validity of the

constitutional - claim of racial

discrimination, we hold that the findings

and conclusions thereon are not sufficient

due to the sharp conflict on the several

claims of specific discriminatory

ee

22

treatment not addressed by the trial

judge.

Accordingly, with respect to this

Claim of racial discrimination, the

judgment of dismissal must be vacated and

the case remanded on that claim for such

further proceedings as the district court

deems proper. In view of the intervening

time lapse it may well be desirable that

further evidence on this claim be

received. After the further proceedings

which the trial court finds proper are

held, the district judge should then find

the facts specially and state separately

his conclusions thereon in detail, dealing

with the various claims of racial

discrimination in accordance with Rule

52(a).

23

Cc.

The claim of sex discrimination

(3) Under the Equal Protection Clause,

the Plaintiff-appellants argue vigorously

that women inmates in the Oklahoma prison

System are subjected to discrimination in

conditions of confinement, job

assignments, training programs, mental and

medical health services, and recreation.

These’ were objections made by the

Plaintiffs to ueficiencies in the fact

finder's final compliance report. <x Jt.

App. 58-61. The specific claims arise

from the fact that the State in a

Stipulation had agreed not to discriminate

against inmates on various grounds,

including sex, and had agreed further to

provide equal access to various programs

and work assignments. Brief of Appellants

24

22; Brief for the United States as

Appellee 30 n. 22.

The district court's order of

dismissal contains the

discussion of this issue:

following

The court finds that equal

protection guarantees for women

inmates are inadequate in terms

of programs, medical care, and

exercise. However, Director

Meachum testified there is a

$62,000.00 current special

appropriation for women's

programs and detailed the

specific remedies outlined in

the Defendants' Plan. The court

finds the proposed measures will

continue constitutionality.

X Jt.App. 236.

With respect to the claim of

violation of the Equal Protection Clause

in the treatment of women inmates, we feel

that the findings are not inadequate. The

trial court specifically

found

inadequacies in terms of programs, medical

25

care, and exercise. We feel that the

remaining claims of inadequate housing

were thus implicitly rejected.

Furthermore, the trial judge specifically

identified the testimony which ~ he

credited, that of Director Meachum. His

testimony concerning a $62,000 current

special appropriation for women's programs

was identified. Moreover, the court

concluded that the program laid out by

Director Meachum would be constitutionally

sufficient. We note that Director

Meachum's testimony explained the reason

for not having an intermediate health unit

for the Mabel Bassett facility in the

Oklahoma City area. He pointed out that

they had a psychiatrist assigned to the

Mabel Bassett facility addressing the

26

mental health needs of women. VII Jt.

App. 95-97.

On consideration of the evidence

relied on by the plaintiffs, the evidence

cited by the trial judge, and the resolve

shown in the testimony of Director Meachum

to solve the problem, we cannot say that

the findings and conclusions of the trial

judge on this constitutional claim were in

error.

D.

The Eighth Amendment Claim

(4) Plaintiffs further vigorously

challenge the findings and conclusions of

the district court which rejected their

claim that the totality of the

circumstances in the Oklahoma prison

system amounts to cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the prohibition

27

of the Eighth Amendment. More

specifically, they seriously complain

about overcrowding, food and kitchen

facilities, ventilation, educational and

training programs, medical and mental

health services, and the occupation

temporarily of the East and West

Cellhouses at the Oklahoma State

Penitentiary in violation of the May 4,

1979 order of Judge Bohanon.

In connection with this

constitutional claim and the detailed

complaints made, the district court's

findings and conclusions against the

plaintiffs were as follows:

(T)he court finds that

management problems exist in the

Oklahoma system. Problem areas

can be determined in food

preparation and service,

maintenance of equipment and

facilities, distribution of

28

clothing and essential supplies,

and inmate idleness. These

management problems exist

despite the extremely

professional staff of the

Oklahoma prison system. These

problems are found to be

primarily a direct result of

increases in prison population.

Unfortunately, there will always

be problems and inadequacies.

We are considering a large,

confined population of convicted

felons, not a nursery school.

As noted by Judge Barrett, "The

Rhodes majority observed that

harsh or restrictive conditions

of confinement are part of the

punishment criminal offenders

justly receive because’ the

Constitution does not mandate

comfortable prisons. Justice

Powell wrote that "To the extent

that such conditions [of

confinement] are restrictive and

even harsh, they are part of the

penalty that criminal offenders

pay for their offenses against

society. ' 452 U.S. [337] at

p.347 [101 S.Ct. 2392 at p.

2399, 69 L.Ed.2dad 59)." Battle

vs Anderson, supra at page 1535.

The court finds, considering the

totality of circumstances, these

inadequacies, problems, and

29

shortcomings do not constitute

cruel and unusual punishment

under the test of Rhodes.

, Supra at page

347 [101 S.Ct. at page 2399).

The court finds no evidence at

this time to show that the

Plaintiffs' present conditions

of confinement in the Oklahoma

prison system have changed from

one of constitutionality to

unconstitutionality. Thus, the

court finds that since October,

1982 to the present date the

conditions of confinement in the

Oklahoma _ prison System are

constitutional and are not crue]

and unusual punishment.

X Jt.App. 236-37.

For reasons we will outline

generally, from our review of the record

testimony and exhibits, and from the

arguments about the record evidence by

Plaintiffs, we conclude that the district

court's findings were not Clearly

erroneous, that the conclusions drawn were

Supported by the findings and record, and

oe

30

that the determination of the court to

dismiss the cause in its’ entirety,

retaining in full force and effect the

prior orders and injunctions against

constitutional violations, was not in

error.

We have noted that there are specific

complaints concerning conditions of

confinement, including overcrowding, food

and kitchen facilities, ventilation,

educational and training programs, medical

and mental health services, and the

temporary occupancy of the East and West

Cellhouses. See Brief of Appellants 4-

22, 30-36. However, the ban on cruel and

unusual punishment prohibits conditions

that "involve the wanton and unnecessary

infliction of pain, [or are) grossly

disproportionate to the severity of the

31

crime warranting imprisonment." Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.s. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct.

2392, 69 L.Ed.2da 59 (1981); see Whitley v.

Albers, __ U.S. . , 106 S.Ct.

1078, 1082-86, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986).

Although prison inmates may not be

deprived of the "minimal Civilized measure

of life's necessities, ... conditions

that cannot be said to be cruel and

unusual under contemporary standards are

not unconstitutional. To the extent that

such conditions are restrictive and even

harsh, they are part of the penalty that

criminal offenders pay for their offenses

against society." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399,

A little over two years ago a panel

of this court agreed that the overall

conditions of the Oklahoma prison system

32

at that time were constitutional. Battle

v. Anderson, 708 F.2d at 1533, 1537. We

have considered the plaintiffs' complaints

and the arguments in their briefs

concerning the evidence in this subsequent

case and are not convinced that the

findings of the district court are clearly

erroneous. The State defendants and the

intervenor United States have persuasively

argued that the evidence of record does

not demonstrate conditions of confinement

constituting cruel and unusual punishment

under the strict standard of Rhodes v,.

Chapman. See Brief of Defendants- —

Appellees 2-88; Brief for the United

States as Appellee 15-23.°

z The plaintiffs argue that they

were denied due process when Chief Judge

Seay entered his order of dismissal after

having received only four of seven

33

We note one item in particular, the

complaint that facilities at the Oklahoma

State Penitentiary were not air-

conditioned. The complaint concerning the

heat was covered by the testimony of Mr.

Hutto. The testimony was that the new

housing units at the Oklahoma State

Penitentiary were air-conditioned. IV

Jt.App. 597. The East and West Cellhouses

were not air-conditioned, but as discussed

transcripts of the hearing held earlier

before Judge Bohanon. Judge Seay had

before him at the time of his dismissal

the transcripts of the Plaintiffs' entire

case in chief, among other things, and the

testimony of Governor Nigh and Director

Meachum, and the exhibits were apparently

available, including those we have cited

earlier concerning access to the courts.

=

34

below, they were vacated, except for

limited emergency use, in compliance with

the orders of Judge Bohanon.

With respect to the East and West

Cellhouses, the May 4, 1979 order of Judge

Bohanon was that the State no longer house

inmates at those East and West Cellhouses

due to the inadequate facilities there.

In the dismissal order of December 30,

1983, the district court noted that the

State was not in compliance with that

order but was satisfied from’ the

assurances of Director Meachum_= and

Governor Nigh that the cellhouses would be

vacated as soon as feasible. X Jt.App.

236.

On May 25, 1985, plaintiffs filed a

motion for a stay pending appeal in this

court stating that inmates were being

3$

housed in the East and West Cellhouses in

violation of the May 4, 1979 order. The

State responded to that motion,

representing that the inmates were placed

in the cellhouses on May 13, 1985, as the

result of a disturbance at another state

prison and that the inmates were removed

from these East and West Cellhouses on May

28. Plaintiffs did not challenge these

representations.

There was a further motion for a stay

filed December 27, 1985, in which the

Plaintiffs again represented that some

inmates had been placed into the East and

West Cellhouses. However, this was again

related to a riot problem and the

defendants informed the plaintiffs'

counsel that the forty-three inmates

housed in the East Cellhouse following the

36

riot were all removed by January 6, 1986.

See Response of the United States to

Appellants' Motion to Reconsider Order

Denying Stay Pending Appeal 3. There was

no dispute of those facts concerning the

removal of the inmates from the East

Cellhouse after the problem of temporary

occupancy. We therefore conclude that the

complaint concerning the East and West

Cellhouses is not supported in our record,

and we are not persuaded that these

temporary emergency uses of the cellhouses

should be held a constitutional violation.

In sum, we are not persuaded by the

arguments of the plaintiffs and the

evidence that the findings of the district

sourt that there was no violation of the

Eighth Amendment were clearly erroneous.

In addition, we are not convinced that

Ne ee RY ee eRe

37

there was an abuse of discretion by the

district court in determining to dismiss

the cause as he did, retaining in force

and effect the prior orders and

injunctions against constitutional

violations.° the majority in Battle v.

. As noted, the district court

here expressly stated that "[(ajll of this

court's orders and injunctions as modified

heretofore remain in full force and

effect." X Jt.App. 239. This is in

accord with the principle that "(ijt has

long been settled that the court's power

to grant injunctive relief survives

discontinuance of the illegal conduct.

E.g., “—

U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897, 97 L.Fad.

11303 (1952). » 708

F.2d at 1538 n.4. If the district court

had intended any dissolution of the prior

orders, its order "should have contained

a definite provision for the dissolution"

of those provisions. , 185

F.2d 863, 865 (Sth Cir. 1950). We are

convinced that it is unmistakably clear

that the orders and injunctions protecting

the inmates against constitutional]

violations, as previously modified, were

in no way intended to be relaxed and that

they remain in full force and effect.

38

Anderson, 708 F.2d at 1537, concluded that

“a court should exercise supervisory power

over the suit until it can say with

assurance not only that eighth amendment

violations do not presently exist but

there is no reasonable expectation that

unconstitutional conditions will recur."

In dealing with the various issues before

him, the district judge concluded that he

was satisfied that the defendants intended

permanent compliance with constitutional

conditions in the Oklahoma prison systen.

X Jt.App. 232, 234-37. The Memorandum

Opinion and Order stated that "this court

finds that it is now satisfied that there

is no reasonable expectation that

unconstitutional practices will recur in

the conditions of confinement in the

Oklahoma prison system." Id. at 238.

39

We are convinced that the district

court's conclusion was based on findings

Supported by the record and that the

determination to dismiss in these

circumstances was not in error or an abuse

of discretion.

Irmr

As noted, there was a motion for a

Stay of the district court's dismissal

order filed on May 25, 1985, by the

Plaintiffs. This court denied that

motion, as noted, stating that we would

consider the propriety and scope of the

district court's December 30, 1983 order

of dismissal in our disposition of the

pending appeal. on December 27, 1985, the

Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider

that order denying the May 25, 1985 motion

for a stay. Because of the disposition we

te 1 eel ars

40

are making in this opinion, we find that

motion now to be moot.

In addition, on February 4, 1986, the

plaintiffs filed a motion for partial

remand for the district court to make an

appropriate award of attorney's fees

pendente lite. In view of the fact that

this court was proceeding to disposition

of the case, we have deferred a ruling on

that motion. Since we are making a

partial remand of the case, the plaintiffs

will have the opportunity to have the

district court consider a further

application of attorney's fees when those

proceedings on remand occur. The trial

judge should entertain any such motion

with those proceedings.

41

Iv.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated

we make the following determinations and

order as follows:

1. The order of dismissal of

December 30, 1983, by the district court,

which retained in full force and effect

the previous orders and injunctions

protecting the rights of the plaintiffs

against constitutional violations, is

AFFIRMED except with respect to the claim

of racial discrimination discussed in Part

II-B of this opinion. The plaintiffs may

by further proceedings in the district

court seek relief from any violations of

those previous orders and Injunction

protecting their constitutional rights.

2. The order of dismissal of

December 30, 1983, is VACATED with respect

42

to the claim of racial discrimination in

violation of the Equal Protection Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment; as discussed

in Part II-B of this opinion, the cause is

REMANDED to the district court for further

proceedings and the entry of findings and

conclusions by the district court on that

constitutional claim as directed by this

opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

eT

43

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE EASTERN DISTRICT oF OKLAHOMA

Bobby Battle, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Park J. Anderson, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION

On December 30, 1983, this court

)

)

)

)

)

)

dismissed Plaintiffs' case in its

entirety, finding that the defendants were

in constitutional compliance. Defendants

appealed that order. On May 22, 1989, the

mandate of the United States court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was filed in

this court affirming this court's order of

dismissal, except with respect to the

Claim of racial discrimination in

violation of the Equal Protection Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Circuit

Court remanded that portion of this

a4

court's dismissal for additional findings

of fact and conclusions of law. Battle v.

Anderson, 788 F.2d 1421, 1429 (10th Cir.

1986).

In accordance with that opinion, and

pursuant to Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, this court enters the

following findings of fact and conclusions

of law with respect to the plaintiffs'

Claim of racial discrimination:

Findings of Fact:

i. The court determines and finds that

there is sufficient evidence in record

from which to make findings of fact and

determine the racial discrimination issue,

such that additional hearings and evidence

are not needed.

2- Contrary to this court's order of

September 26, 1989, the court notes that

45

Plaintiffs' attorney has neither attached

nor made reference to testimony to support

his proposed Findings of Fact, and

Plaintiffs! attorney does not cite any

authority in his Proposed Conclusions of

Law.

3. The Fact Finder indicated, and others

testified, that there was a relatively low

number of racially mixed double cells.

(J.A. Vol. VII, pp. 152-153, 161-162, and

213 - Alback testimony; J.A. vol. Vv, p.

1029 - Douglas testimony; J.A. vol. VII,

P- 173 - Meachum testimony). The court

finds this was a result of the defendants!

initial policy of allowing all inmates to

voluntarily choose cellmates. (J.A. vol.

Ts WD 1029). Although the Equal

Protection clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment does not dictate the forcible

46

racial balancing of double cells, there

was evidence that the defendants were

attempting to racial balance double cells

by mandatory cell assignments, beginning

at the time the inmates first enter the

system. J.A. Vol. V, p. 1031 - Douglas

testimony; J.A. Vol. VI, p. 1275). The

Fact Finder testified that defendants made

improvements in racial balance, particular

in housing units. (J.A. Vol. III, p.

428). The President-elect of the American

Correctional Association, Terrell Hutto,

testified that he had seen no segregated

dorms in the systen. (J.A. Vol. IV, P

655). Director Meachum testified that

there was no intent or policy or practice

of defendants to racially segregate

inmates. (J.A. Vol. VII, p. 196).

iii i

47

4. This court finds no evidence of any

policy or practice by defendants which

deny plaintiffs equal protection of law

due to racial discrimination as concerns

housing or cell assignments. To the

contrary, this court finds that the intent

and purpose of defendants’! policies and

practices is to discourage and eliminate

racial discrimination in regard to

housing.

5. There was evidence of segregation in

the dining halls at the McAlester

facility. Again, this condition existed

due to voluntary, self-imposed segregation

by the inmates (plaintiffs), in that the

inmates were allowed to sit and eat where

they wished in the dining halls. (J.A.

Vol. II, pp. 237-238; Vol. VI, p. 1191).

In one instance, a guard directed a black

48

inmate from the dining hall containing

white inmates to the dining hall

containing black inmates. That inmate

filed a grievance. The Warden testified

that he wrote an executive memorandum to

the effect that there would be no racial

discrimination within the facility and

anyone purporting to advocate such a thing

would face disciplinary action. (J.A.

Vol. VI, pp. 1159-1160 - Brown testimony).

After this incident the defendants began

to assign inmates to the dining halls by

"runs", which are racially mixed, in order

to better integrate the dining halls.

(J.A. Vol. V, pp. 1159-1161 - Brown

testimony; Vol. VII, p. 120 - Meachum

testimony).

6. The court finds that the above dining

hall grievance was an isolated incident,

49

and that there is no evidence of any

policy or practice by the defendants which

denies plaintiffs equal protection of law

due to racial discrimination as concerns

seating or eating assignments in the

dining halls of the defendants’

facilities. To the contrary, this court

finds that the expressed intent and

purpose of defendants’ Policies and

practices to discourage and eliminate

racial discrimination in regard to dining

facilities.

Ve There were allegations and some

testimony of racial discrimination,

Principally between black and white

inmates, in "desirable" job assignments.

(J.A. Vol. II, P- 236 and Vol. III, Pp. 428

- Albach testimony). This was noted in

Situations where there were a small number

50

of positions available in an assignment,

primarily at the unit level. However the

Fact Finder testified that he believed the

defendants were making progress in that

area to eliminate discrimination, by

Director Meachum's efforts in stressing

the need to eliminate any vestiges of

discrimination at the unit level through

memos and staff meetings. (J.A. Vol. III,

pp. 428-429 - Albach testimony).

8. The court finds that there is no

policy, practice, or intent by defendants

to discriminate racially in job

assignments. The court finds’ that

defendants are eliminating any vestiges of

racial discrimination in job assignments

by their expressed policy and intent to

eliminate any racial imbalance in that

area.

"~~~ »p

51

9. There have been some disturbances in

which racial groups ban together to

express their animosity toward another

group or the institution. However, there

is no evidence that such behavior is due

to racial discrimination. Inmates of

whatever race associate with others and

groups of their own race to provide

themselves with a Support system and

because it is human nature to do so,

whether in a prison environment or in the

free world. (J.A. Vol. II, Pp. 41 - Kamka

testimony; Vol. VII, p. 129 = Meachum

testimony). This court finds that such

individual voluntary, self-imposed

segregation by inmate Plaintiffs is not

racial discrimination by defendants which

violates the equal protection clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment.

52

10. The plaintiffs’ expert witness,

Gordon Kamka, testified that he did not

find the defendants sanctioning or

condoning racial discrimination or

segregation. (J.A. Vol. II, pp. 82-83).

This court agrees and so finds, and

further, this court finds that it is the

expressed policy, practice, and intent of

defendants to discourage and eliminate any

racial discrimination.

Conclusions of Law:

1. This court has jurisdiction and

venue. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 28 U.S.C. §

1391(b).

2. Inmates of penal institutions, such

as plaintiffs herein, are protected

against invidious racial discrimination by

the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Turner v. Safley,

53

482 U.S. 78, 84 (1986), citing Lee v.

Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).

3. A law, policy, or other official act

is not unconstitutional solely because it

has a racially disproportionate impact or

effect. Evidence or proof of a racially

discriminatory purpose or intent is

necessary to sustain a denial of equal

protection clain. Washington v. Davis,

426 U.S. 229, 239-245 (1975); see, Andrews

Vv. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256, 1271 (10th Cir.

1986), note 11, wherein this Circuit,

citing the Washington case, recognized

that evidence of a discriminatory intent

is required to prove a denial of equal

protection; also, Personnel _ Admin. of

Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1978).

4. It is well recognized that the

federal courts should accord deference to

ee

54

the appropriate state prison authorities

in the administration of prison affairs.

Turner _v. Safley, supra, at 84-85, citing

Procunier _v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405

(1974); Cruz _v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321

(1971).

S. This court certainly agrees with this

Circuit that the pronouncement in Lee v.

Washington, supra, "that prison

authorities have the right, acting in good

faith and in particularized circumstances,

to take into account racial tensions in

maintaining security, discipline, and good

order in prisons and jails", recognizes

the principle that in the administration

of prison affairs there may arise unusual

situations in which security and

discipline demand segregation for limited

periods. United States _v. Wyandotte

55

County, Kansas, 480 F.2d 969, 970-971

(10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.

1068. Like the United States Supreme

Court in the concurring opinion of Lee v._

Washington, supra, at 334, this court is

“unwilling to assume that state or local

prison authorities {defendants} might

mistakenly regard such ... pronounce-

ment as evincing any dilution of this

Court's firm commitment to the Fourteenth

Amendment 's prohibition of racial

discrimination." (Emphasis added).

Pursuant to the above Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law, this court

having found no evidence of a racially

discriminatory purpose or intent on the

part of defendants, and having found, to

the contrary, that the defendants’

expressed intent, practices, and policies

56

are to prohibit and prevent invidious

racial discrimination, the court finds

that the defendants have not _ denied

plaintiffs of equal protection of law

under the Fourteenth Amendment by racial

discrimination. Accordingly, plaintiffs'

equal protection of law claims pursuant to

the Fourteenth Amendment due to racial

discrimination are denied and dismissed.

IT I8 ALL 8O ORDERED this _22. day of

December, 1989.

(8) FRANK H. SEAY

United States District Judge

57

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

Bobby Battle, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv. No. 72-095-C

Park J. Anderson, et al.,

Defendants.

JUDGMENT

Pursuant to this Court's Order of

)

)

)

)

)

)

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

filed herein on December 22, 1989, the

court orders judgment entered for the

defendants on plaintiffs' claim of denial

of equal protection of law under the Four-

teenth Amendment due to racial

discrimination and judgment dismissing

this case.

IT I8 80 ORDERED this _8 £day of

January, 1990.

United States District Judge

58

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BOBBY BATTLE, et al.,

Plaintiff-Appellants,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

Vv. No. 90-7012

(E.D. Okla)

No. 72-95-CIV)

(D.C.)

PARK ANDERSON, his succes-

sOr;RICHARD CRISP, Warden,

Oklahoma State Penitentiary,

and his successor;J.M.

SUNDERLAND, Warden, Oklahoma

State Reformatory, and his

successor ;DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS ;F.WARREN BENTON,

Director, his successor, and

the current;BOARD OF

CORRECTIONS, STATE OF OKLA-

HOMA; FRANK E. CAREY, JR.,

President; LEROY KIRK;

PATRICIA MONTGOMERY; GARY M.

COOK; CHESTER T. CURTAIN;

SETH MILLINGTON; WILLIAM R.

THOMPSON,as members and

their successors,

Defendants-Appellees.

Filed October 3, 1991

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

59

Bobby Battle, the class representa-

tive of inmates incarcerated in the

Oklahoma State Penitentiary, appeals from

the dismissal of his claim of a denial of

equal protection under the Fourteenth

Amendment because of racial

discrimination.

Upon consideration of the record, the

briefs, and the arguments of counsel, the

order and judgment of the district court

is VACATED. This case is remanded for a

full evidentiary hearing concerning

compliance at the present date by the

Oklahoma Department of Corrections (DOC)

with the existing orders and injunctions

in this action concerning racial

\

discrimination in violation of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, see Battle v. Anderson, 376

60

F.Supp. 402, 428-30 (E.D. Okla. 1974);

Battle, 457 F. Supp. 719, 739-40 (E.D.

Okla. 1978), along with such further

actions and orders in connection therewith

or resulting therefrom as may be

appropriate. The evidentiary hearing

should focus on job assignments, but

should also cover segregation in celling

and dining, as well as other Claims of

discrimination.

This court is mindful of appellees'

concern that forcible mixed race double

celling, and other actions, could pose a

security and management problem to the

DOC. See Corrected Appellees' Answer

Brief at 22. As three Justices noted in

their concurrence to Lee v. Washington,

“prison authorities have the right, acting

in good faith and in particularized

61

circumstances, to take into account racial

tensions in maintaining security,

discipline, and good order in prisons and

jails." 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black,

J., concurring) .* See also Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (prisoners

retain those constitutional rights "not

inconsistent ... with the legitimate

penological objectives of the corrections

* This court expresses no view as to

whether the DOC has made or can make the

Showing necessary to satisfy

° We also note that Lee held

that invidious racial] discrimination is as

intolerable within a prison as outside

except where essential to prison security

and discipline. . See , 468

U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (dictum).

62

system") (quoting » 437

U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). However, "a vague

fear on the part of the authorities that

desegregation may result in violence . .

- + is not enough." United States v.

-, 480 F.2d 969, 971

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068

(1973).

JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE REMANDED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Stephen H. Anderson

Circuit Judge

63

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BOBBY BATTLE, et al.,

Plaintiff-Appellants,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

PARK ANDERSON, his succes-

sor ;RICHARD CRISP, Warden,

Oklahoma State Penitentiary,

and his successor;J.M.

SUNDERLAND, Warden, Oklahoma

State Reformatory, and his

successor;DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS ; F. WARREN BENTON,

Director, his successor, and

the current;BOARD oF

CORRECTIONS, STATE OF OKLA-

HOMA; FRANK E. CAREY, JR.,

President; LEROY KIRK;

PATRICIA MONTGOMERY; GARY M.

COOK; CHESTER T. CURTAIN;

SETH MILLINGTON; WILLIAM R.

THOMPSON,as members and

their successors,

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER

Entered December 13, 1991

BEFORE LOGAN, MOORE, ANDERSON,

Circuit Judges

64

This matter comes on for

consideration of appellants' suggestion

for rehearing en banc, which the court

treats as a petition for rehearing and

suggestion for rehearing en banc.

Upon consideration whereof, the

petition for rehearing is denied by the

panel that rendered the decision.

In accordance with Rule 35(b),

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the

suggestion for rehearing en banc was

transmitted to all of the judges of the

court who are in regular active service.

No member of the panel and no judge in

regular active service on the court having

requested that the court be polled on

rehearing en banc, Rule 35, Federal Rules

65

of Appellate Procedure, the suggestion for

rehearing en banc is denied.

Entered for the Court

(8) ROBERT L. HOECKER, CLERK

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