Opposition Brief — Harris v. United States
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No. 91-1224
| EFILibD !
FES 21 1992
{
{acti OF THE HE CLERK |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term,
PATRICIA ANN OUZTS,
Vv.
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
1991
Petitioner,
Respondent.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK
Attorney General
Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211
(803) 734-3727
AMIE L. CLIFFORD*
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 70100
N. Charleston, SC 29415
(803) 740-5850
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT.
*Counsel of Record
QUESTION PRESENTED
Did the Supreme Court of South Carolina
err in upholding the trial court's denial of
Petitioner's motion to suppress marijuana
found during the search of her car because
the car was covered by the search warrant
and, even if it were not covered, probable
cause existed to justify the search of the
car under the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..- + + + © © « * iii
0 on be i a a a l
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .- + + + © © = * l
Facts underlying Crimes and
—
Procedural History of Case
Facts Relating to Motion to
Suppress (Argument )
Uy
ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court of South
Carolina properly upheld the trial
court's denial of Petitioner's
motion to suppress marijuana found
during the search of her car
because the car was covered by the
search warrant and, even if it
were not covered, probable cause
existed to justify the search of
the car under the automobile
exception to the warrant require-
ment. ae.) see 8 + 8) ee 9
PUTESUMEEEIEE 85 6 3 6 © © © © © © © ee 14
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Cady v. Dombrowski,
433 (1973)
California v. Carney,
386 (1985)
413 VU.
S.
471 U.S.
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583 (1974)
Carroll v. United States,
132 (1925)
Chambers v. Maroney,
(1970)
Katz v. United States,
267 U.S.
399. U.S... 42,
reh. denied, 400 U.S.
347 (1967)
Michigan v. Thomas,
(1982)
856
389 U.S.
458 U.S: 259
People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286
(Colo. 1989)
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364 (1976)
State v. Bailey, 276 S.C.
274 &.2,.290 9is3
State v. Cox, 2390 §.C.
351 S.E.2d 570
State v. Dean, 282 S.C.
317 S.E.2d 744
(1981)
(1986)
(1984)
State v. Peters, 271 S.C.
248 S.E.2d 475
(1978)
iii
32,
489,
136,
498,
1]
12
10
12
10
13
11
United States v. Gentry, 839 F.2d
reh. denied, 844 F.2d
Sth Cir. 13968)
T T Cc? + r + + y
] ted states V Pe j i C d
Ar wr QOac
OUU os I Ae
+ | + + 2 Ag ¢
TY eQd ST +} Oc + C , “4
IO OL A
Otne!
+ , r
1
+ i ae ‘ >
|
No. 91-1224
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1991
PATRICIA ANN OUZTS,
Petitioner,
Ws
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
Respondent.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Respondent, State of South Carolina,
respectfully requests that this Court deny
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, seeking
review of the unpublished opinion of the
Supreme Court of South Carclina in this
case. See State v. Ouzts, Op. No. 91-M0-237
‘S.€.8. CS. AsEPL}s The opinion has been
reproduced in Petitioner's Appendix.
JURISDICTION
Respondent does not question the
Court's jurisdiction in this proceeding.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Facts underlying Crimes and Procedural
History of Case
On Wednesday, November 22, 1989, the
Metro Narcotics Unit of the Greenwood County
Sheriff's Department began surveillance of a
residence located on the corner of East
Cambridge Street and Willowdale Court in
Greenwood, South Carolina. The residence
was surrounded by a chain link fence;
because there was no driveway, the only
place one could park was on the road in
front of the house. On that day, police
observed Petitioner drive up to the
residence in her Cadillac; she parked
directly in front of the gate to the fence
and, ~along with George Dillard who was a
passenger in the car, got out and entered
the residence. (Tr. p. 39, line 22 - p. 41,
line 19; p. 45, line 22 p. 46, line 11; p
50, iine 23 I 5i, line 10; p. 66, line 23
i 67, iine 9 On the following night,
~
Petitioner was followed as she left the
residence in her car and drove to a mill
She was also followed on the following
morning, when she left the mill and returned
to the residence. Police continued to waten
the house that day, but did not observe
anything. (Tr. p. 41, line 16 p. 4
5; p. 70, lines 7-17).
Although a check of the license plate
on Petitioner's car revealed that it was
registered to another address - 1.@.,
Greenwood Trailer Park - the car was never
seen there when Sgt. G. Douglas Gunter, Jr.
checked. (Tr. p. 49, line 10 - p. 50, line
NO
> p. 70, line 18 - p. 71, line 19).
On the afternoon of Friday, November
* References to the appellate record
filed with the Supreme Court of South
Carolina in this matter are indicated by
sii! ps gar >.” and gat a
24, 1989, Sgt. Gunter obtained a _ search
warrant for the residence located on the
corner of East Cambridge Street and
Willowdale Court in Greenwood. (Tr. OB. Gk,
lines 8-14).
From that time until Thursday, November
30, 1989, Petitioner's Cadillac was the only
car in which Petitioner or Dillard were
observed. (Tr. p. 42, lines 15-22; p. 45,
lines 4-21). The car was seen at the
residence several times; it was always
parked on the street directly in front of
the gate to the fence. Petitioner was
either seen going into or coming out of the
residence on a couple of occasions. (Tr. Pp.
50, lines 7-24).
At approximately ten o'clock p.m. on
November 30, 1989, Sgt. Gunter, Captain
Ronnie McAllister, and Officer Charles
McLeod went to the residence to execute the
search warrant. Capt. McAllister knocked on
the door and, when it was opened by an
unidentified female, identified themselves
and their purpose for being there. As the
officers entered the apartment, they saw
Dillard and Petitioner laying in a bed in
front of the door. Petitioner, who was
asleep, was awakened and the officers began
their search. The search of the apartment
revealed three (3) partially consumed
marijuana cigarettes; one (1) was located
beside the bed and two (2) were located in
the bathroom. The search also disclosed two
(2) hand held scales that would measure up
to an ounce; they were found in a coat
Petitioner identified as belonging to her.
Capt. McAllister then arrested Petitioner
and Dillard for possession of marijuana.
(Tr. p. 47, lines 2-15; Pp. Ga, a2ne 26> ®.
64, line 2; p. 65, lines 12-25; p. 75, line
2 - p. 83, line 1; p. 83, lines 15-23; p.
84, line 9 - p. 85, line 9; p. 85, line 13
p. 86, line 16; p. 91, line 5 ~- Pp. 92, line
10; p. 98, lines 5-10).
While Capt. McAllister and Officer
McLeod conducted the search of the
apartment, Sgt. Gunter asked Petitioner for
the keys to her car. He then went out and
searched it. While the search of the
passenger compartment revealed no
contraband, the search of the trunk revealed
a quantity of plant material believed to be
marijuana. Inside a blue sports bag located
in the trunk, Sgt. Gunter found eleven eey
plastic bags of plant material, a box of
zip-loc plastic bags, a roll of black tape
and a black pocketbook; the black pocketbook
contained six (6) bags of plant material and
two (2) black tape-wrapped objects which,
when opened, were found to contain plant
material. (Tr. p. 47, line 15 - p. 48, line
5; p. 50, lines 3-6; p. Si, Line 21-3 B. "a3
line 18; p. 57, lines 9-13; p. 58, lines 4-
1l; p. 64, line 3 - p. 65, line ee
Sgt. Gunter carried the sports bag to
Capt. McAllister who inventoried its
contents. (Tr. p. 59, line 20 - p. 60, line
&). At that time, Captain McAllister
advised Petitioner and Dillard that they
were being arrested for possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute. (Tr.
p. 83, line 23 - p. 84, line 3).
Petitioner was subsequently indicted
and tried for the offenses of possession of
marijuana and possession of marijuana witn
intent to distribute. At the conclusion of
her jury trial, she was found guilty of
possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute and accordingly sentenced. (ir.
Os £)}<
Petitioner appealed her convictions to
the Supreme Court of South Carolina. In
affirming her convictions and sentences in
an unpublished memorandum opinion, the state
court rejected Petitioner's challenge to the
trial court's denial of her motion to
suppress marijuana found during a search of
her car. That opinion reads, in pertinent
part, as follows.
Affirmed pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 23 and the following
authorities: Exceptions 1-4:
State v. Dean, 262 68.C. 135, 3h7
S.E.2d 744 (1984); California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct.
2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985)....
State v. Ouzts, Supra. Petitioner timely
filed a Petition for Rehearing which was
denied by the Supreme Court of South
Carolina.
Facts Relating to Motion to Suppress
(Argument)
At the beginning of Petitioner's trial,
Petitioner's counsel moved to suppress
evidence seized from Petitioner's car. (Tr.
p. 2, lines 13-15; p. 2, lines 22-23). The
trial court then held an in camera hearing
on the motion during which both the State
and the defense presented evidence.
The State called Sergeant George
Douglas Gunter, Jr., of the Greenwood County
Sheriff's OLTice, to the stand. He
testified that during the week of November
reliable onfidential informant that there
was a quantity of piant aterial believed to
be mar yana inside the garage apartment
ated n the rne! f East imbridge and
Willowdale in Greenwood County. sgt. Gunter
was als told that a man named Butcnh D1 llard
lived in the apartment with his gl! riend
Pat, and anotner fremaiec, Judy Basea updo!
> } < ~ * YN) , y ++ *y a , _ +
L \ . hiida iS iite See ' Ly IU « AwyUiliccCd \ bi + e
surveillance f the apartment; his
bl ~<a 7 me nes = , ] - > ‘ - . 7 ~
surveillance revealed that the apartment was
« 1 ; +} > ~“h + } . oo 5 7
it atvea WIitTNI1I a cnall?n As K Lence, tnere was
¥ + . ‘7 , q - bh + + } © ~
QI lveway ana Line gate VX Cne Llenc e
non + '.7 1 ber <F7 , + ] — _ ler +
opened onto a waikway which led directly to
‘tment door. During the time the
r+
—
—
-
V
n
ba
—"
e
ba
rm
apartment was watched, the only car seen
going to or from it was that belonging to
Petitioner she was by herself sometimes
and, at other times, Butch was in the car
with her. Petitioner was followed, on at .
apartment late at night and drove to
Greenwood Mills where she worked. (TEs DP
3, line 8 p. 4, ine l; p. 4, ine p.
6, line 19; p. 8, lines 11-18; | 9, lines
1-13; p. 14, line 13 i 5, line 4; p. 16,
ines 6 O; p 9, nes 6-12; Pp 9, line
13 p. 20, line 7; Pp 21, lines 4-9; p. 41;
lines 10-23; p. 23, ines 20-24 A check
|
on the license plate on Petitioner § i
revealed that it was registered to another
address, i.e., Greenwood Trailer Park. Sgt.
Gunter
times,
(sre. BD:
On
Gunter
the res
Willowdale
accordingly went by the Park several
but never saw Petitioner's car there.
15, line 8 - p. 16, line 3)
Friday, November 24, 1989, Sgt.
obtained a search warrant covering
idence located at the intersection of
Court and East Cambridge Street
occupied by "Butch" and any and all vehicles
owned
occupants of the residence.
search
or operated "Butch" or other
by
At the time the
warrant was issued, Sgt. Gunter
10
_believed that Petitioner and another woman
named Judy lived in the apartment with
Butch; however, because the confidential
informant did not know Petitioner except by
the name "Pat", Sgt. Gunter did not list
either Petitioner or Judy by name in the
search warrant as being an occupant of the
residence. (Tr. p. 8, lines 4-10; p. 9,
lines 3-13; p. 19, line 13 - p. 20, line 7;
pp. 106-108).
On the afternoon on Friday, November
24, 1989 -- after the search warrant had
been issued -- Sgt. Gunter was again
contacted by his confidential informant. At
that time, he was told that the subjects
would be getting a larger quantity of
marijuana over the weekend and would have it
the first part of the following week. The
informant also stated that Pat was carrying
the marijuana to work. Because of this
information, the search warrant was not
executed at that time and Sgt. Gunter
ll
continued his surveillance of the residence.
(Te. 6. 6, line 20 - p. 7, line 17; p. 16,
lines 11-20; p. 17, line 5 - p. 19, line ~ F
p. 20, lines 18-20; p. 22, lines 4-17).
Sgt. Gunter also testified that when
the search warrant was executed on Thursday,
November 30, 1989, Petitioner's car was
parked on the street in front of the gate;
he observed no other cars in the area. ey
Bt, aine 18-25; p. 9, line 14 - p. 10,
line 7; p. 23, line 25 - p. 24, line 7).
Sgt. Gunter, accompanied by Captain
McAllister, knocked on the door of the
apartment and it was opened by Judy; they
identified themselves and explained that
they had a search warrant for the residence.
As they entered the apartment, they saw
Petitioner and George "Butch" Dillard asleep
in a bed directly in front of the door. A
young child was seen laying on the couch.
The officers found partially consumed
marijuana cigarettes in the apartment; one
12
(1) was beside the bed. (Tr. p. 10, line &
- p. 1l, line 3). After getting the keys Ps
her car from Petitioner, Sgt. Gunter then
went outside and searched it. In the trunk
he found a blue sports bag containing seven-
teen (17) bags of plant material and a
pocketbook in which two (2) wrapped-up
packages of plant material were loca-ed.
Also found in the pocketbook was a
prescription bottle with George Dillard's
name on it and papers referring to him.
(Tr. p. 11, line 6 - p. 12, line 10; p. 13,
lines 6-21). The sports bag was turned over
to Captain McAllister who then arrested
Petitioner and the others. (Tr. Be Ads
lines 11-23).
Sgt. Gunter testified that an analysis
of the plant material found in Petitioner's
car revealed it to be marijuana. An
analysis of the partially consumed
cigarettes found inside the apartment also
revealed them to be marijuana. (Tr. p. 12,
13
line 24 - p. 13, line 5; p. 135, iines 2é-
24).
At the conclusion of Sgt. Gunter's
testimony, the defense presented that of
Petitioner. She began her testimony by
stating that while she had visited George
Dillard and his mother on a number of
occasions at their apartment, she was living
at Lot LT Greenwood Trailer Park in
November. 1989. She also stated that the
garage apartment was at least five (5) feet
from the road and that the gate to the fence
was the only access to the apartment from
the road; she stated that a car could not be
driven directly to the garage apartment.
She testified that when she visited Dillard
on November 30, 1989, she parked her car on
the public road outside the fence to the
apartment, but it was very close to the
fence. (Tr. p. 27, line 3 - p. 30, line 25;
p. 31, line 23 - p. 32, line 8).
At the conclusion of the suppression
14
hearing, Petitioner's counsel argued that
inasmuch as the search warrant did not
indicate that Petitioner's car was included
within its scope, the police improperly
searched it because it was not within the
curtilage nor did they have probable cause
to conduct a warrantless search of it. (Tr.
p. 32, line 10 - p. 34, line 2; p. 34, line
14 - p. 35, line 2; p. 38, iines 16-25).
The State opposed the motion and argued that
the search of Petitioner's car was lawful
inasmuch as the police had a reasonable
basis for believing that she was an occupant
of the residence and was therefore covered
by the search warrant. The State also
argued that Sgt. Gunter's corroboration of
the information given by the confidential
informant provided probable cause to search
the car. (Tr. p. 35, line 4 - p. 38, line
14). The trial court denied the motion to
Suppress. (Tr. p. 39, lines 1-10).
Thereafter, in the presence of the
5
,reus + Cc + + ry . r+ + rsran yo + +heo
}ULY , the ~~ EA EH presented evidence ‘ LCNne
J
TY) , 73) Yr) + TEheale. ry Io + rT)
marl uana tUUTLU i * 1e] iI I
c
a se | , y 7 . 7
) it t t
i ’ ‘ t . t /
im .
3 r 59 é 1s
a I 7
+ + . + } +
adil Le te % A ©] e .
ret t ners
r f ¢
4 h “ay *
The Supreme Court of South Carolina
properly upheld the trial court's denial of
Petitioner's motion to suppress marijuana
found during the search of her car because
the car was covered by the search warrant
and, even if it were not covered, probable
cause existed to justify the search of the
car under the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement.
nasmuch as the evidence presented
j y the suppression hearing demonstrated
that Petitioner's car was covered by the
earch warrant and, even if not covered,
that probable cause existed to justify a
*
warrantiess search of the car, the Supreme
urt 9X South Carolina properly uphe i the
1ienial : tne moti t SuUppre
ne earci! warrant pt Dy the
r é in th ase describ the pre
t pe searcneda as |] LilOows:
The residence occupied by "Butc!
r hial: Lo . . va. On th > COrna ry ? *
BJ Lng Ocacted Uiil \ l€ OF OP ae -F j i
‘. ae ‘ r ft ‘.7 ] ‘+
CamDpDI 1ldqe 2G and illowdale UT
eal " n ta — gan) 4 } }
rne sala residence will be nm GH
] ; r an - , a " . TT’ } .
left behind the corner house. rhe
- ~t{ Aan ot I - —T
residence will be >| Garage Lye,
= ~ r mx 7 th + + . mya +
two story white frame structure
Surrounded in chain link fence and
having wooden steps leading up ti
: pepe : URGES al
the Apt. being upstairs. Any and
all vehicles owned or operated by
Butcn or occupants of residents.
. ry e 3
tae ¢ k 108). me supporting .:
\I I P| lav t A vv I lێ ] aim St Lt I t ] ead Ly
y- a T + . + by "+
cos os 28 , [t -1s lear that the warrant
vers all vehicles owned r operated by the
. ‘ + + =r)
U4 } antsS A cne at al Mele. And, aest 1te
-+nHoO | y + + Do Norte ~ - c
the Known fact that Petitioner's car was
. . " r+ . IAr 7 : =< .
registered to another acdress, there was
es ‘ “0 -—Anah . 1c¢ , hel 3 , + t
more than reasonable cause to believe that
> .
L
Clear that Petitioner's car fell within the
scope of the search warrant even though it
was parked on a public road. See United
States v. Gentry, 839 F.2d 1065, reh.
denied, 844 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Percival, 756 F.2d 600 (7th Cir.
1985); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286
(Colo. 1989). There wasS no error in the
state court's ruling upholding the denial of
the motion to suppress.
However, assuming arguendo this Court
should find that Petitioner's car was not
covered by the search warrant, the search
was still proper inasmuch as it fell within
the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement.
The Constitutions of both the United
States and the State of South Carolina
generally proscribe warrantless searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; S.C.
Const. art. I, Section 190. In Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), this
18
Court held that "searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment --
subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.”
Id., at 357. One of the exceptions noted by
the Court was the automobile exception which
is predicated on the "long-standing
distinction
between a search of a store,
dwelling house or other structure
in respect of which a proper
official warrant readily may be
obtained, and a search of a ship,
motor boat, wagon or automobile,
for contraband goods, where it is
not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.
Carroll v. Unitec States, 267 U.S. 132, 153
(1925). See also United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 806-807 (1982); State v. Cox, 290
S.C. 489, 351 S.E.2d 570 (1986); State v.
Bailey, 276 S.C. 32, 274 S.E.2d 913 (1981);
State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 248 S.E.2d
19
S75 (i978).
Since its decision in Carroll v. United
States, Supra, this Court has addressed the
parameters of the automobile exception in
numerous cases. For example, in Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), a majority of
the Court upheld the warrantless search of
an automobile lawfully parked in a public
place. The plurality upheld the warrantless
seizure on the grounds that the police had
probable cause to believe the automobile was
evidence of a crime and prompt action was
necessary because members of the defendant's
family might remove the automobile. Id., at
a) ee The mobility of automobiles
"creates circumstances of such exigency
that, aS a practical necessity, rigorous
enforcement of the warrant requirement is
impossible." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 367 ° (i976). The automobile
exception has been held to be applicable
even "in cases in which the possibilities of
20
the vehicle's being removed or evidence in
it destroyed were remote, if not = non-
existent." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433
(1973) (exception applied to a locked
automobile trunk).
As recent as 1985, this Court reit-
erated that under the automobile exception,
probable cause alone is sufficient to
justify a warrantless search of a vehicle
lawfully parked in a public place provided
that the scope of the search is reasonable.
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
See also State v. Cox, supra.
(T]he justification to conduct
such a warrantless search does not
vanish once the car has been
immobilized; nor does ~it depend
upon a reviewing court's assess~-
ment of the likelihood in each
particular case that the car would
have been driven away, or that its
contents would have been tampered
with, during the pericd required
for the police to obtain a war-
rant.
Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261
(1982). See also United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. at 807, n. 9; State v. Cox, Supra. In
21
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, reh.
denied, 400 U.S. 856 (1970), the Court
stated that there is "no difference [for
constitutional purposes] between on the one
hand seizing and holding a car _ before
presenting the probable cause issue to a
magistrate and on the other hand carrying
out an immediate search without a warrant.
Given probable cause to search, either
course is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment." Id., at 51-52...
The Record in this case shows that the
police had reason to believe that Petitioner
was involved in dealing drugs and that
evidence of such could be found in her car.
As previously stated, they had learned from
a reliable informant that there was marijua-
na in Dillard's apartment -- which the
informant and the police believed was shared
by Petitioner -- on Wednesday, November 22,
1989. After watching the apartment for two
(2) days -- during which the only car
22
observed going to or leaving the residence
was that of Petitioner -- the police
obtained a search warrant, covering the
residence and the vehicles belonging to any
of its occupants, on November 24, 1989.
Later that afternoon, the reliable informant
told police that Dillard would be getting a
larger quantity of marijuana over. the
weekend and that it would be in the resi-
dence by the beginning of the coming week;
the informant aiso stated that Petitioner
was carrying the marijuana to her work
place. For the next five (5) days, the
police continued with their surveillance,
but did not execute the warrant; during that
time, Petitioner was followed as she drove
her car from Petitioner's residence to
Greenwood Mills where she worked and, when
she finished her shift, back. This
information and knowledge -- along with the
discovery of (1) partially consumed
marijuana cigarettes in the apartment near a
23
bed occupied by Petitioner at the time the
police entered the residence to execute the
ho
search warrant and /( scaies found inside
}
a coat belonging to Petitioner which was in
the apartment during the execution of the
search warrant - clearly provided probable
cause to beiieve that contraband would be
found in Petitioner's car. See State v.
Dean, 282 S.C. 136, 317 S.E.2d 744 (1984).
.<
J of
Consequently, the warrantless’ search
Petitioner's car was permissible under the
automobile exception to the warrant require
ment.
The trial court properly denied
Petitioner's motion to suppress and its
ruling was, consequently, properly upheld by
the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth hereinabove,
it can only be concluded that the Supreme
Court of South Carolina properly interpreted
and applied its decisions as well as those
24
of this Court. There is, therefore, no
issue for this Court to decide and the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted,
T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK
Attorney General
Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, SC 2921
(803) 734-3727
AMIE L. CLIFFORD*
Assistant Attorney General
.O. Box 70100
February 19, 1992
ALC
25
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.