Appendix — Front Royal & Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal

Supreme Court brief1992

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IN THE DFFICE OF THE CLERK

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Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY

INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION,

FRED W. MCLAUGHLIN AND

GLaDYs L. MCLAUGHLIN,

Petitioners,

¥>

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA, et al.

Respondents.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT C. FITZGERALD

Myron C. SMITH*

10560 Main Street

Suite 510

Fairfax, VA 22030

(703) 273-0001

JOHN F. CAHILL

JOHN HOLLAND FOOTE

GRAYSON P. HANES

HAZEL & THOMAS, P.C.

P.O. Box 12001

Falls Church, VA 22042

(703) 641-4200

“Counsel of Record

Attorneys for Petitioner

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park

Corporation et al. v. Town of Front Royal, Vir-

ginia et al., 945 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1991) .....

Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park

Corporation et al. v. Town of Front Royal, Vir-

ginia et al., 865 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1989) .......

Order of the Fourth Circuit Denying Rehearing of

PURINES TS TOI accra ccccokscorteekeancds es

Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park

Corporation et al. v. Town of Front Royal, Vir-

ginia et al., 749 F.Supp. 1489 (W.D. Va.

POTD akin cadanmnamisndns eaesnbiaueiataareicitsdas sniccaae

Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park

Corporation et al. v. Town of Front Royal, Vir-

ginia et al., 708 F.Supp. 1477 (W.D. Va.

IPE, Wiocssssbioicacarnbuicenieiclatiinsndins cabdciaradantalcewenidonnebdeens

Order and Opinion of the United States District

Court Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Af-

I IID a cncicdetaanercodimmcmicinecncchanetieas

October 28, 1991 Denial of Petition for Rehearing

before the United States Court of Appeals for

OU PRO CII cish tstrsdecirtcccenscinreccrcerscencinds

Decree of Annexation dated December 31, 1976 ..

Decree of Annexation dated December 31, 1978 ..

Annexation Court Order dated January 20, 1984 .

First Amended Complaint of Front Royal and War-

ren County industrial Park Corporation (87-

PNIIUIEE -Wiaissin\acrcacned nits vgseiaiasesinvuieectaonesnencisein

First Amended Complaint of Fred W. McLaughlin,

PE Se ee ID acs caicscnnccccntnedeuassuotanrzsseecatoonns

Page

18a

la

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 90- 1875

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY INDUSTRIAL PARK

CORPORATION, a Virginia Corporation; FRED W.

McLAUGHLIN; GLADYS L. MCLAUGHLIN,

Plaintiffs-A ppellees,

Vv.

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA, a municipal corporation;

JOHN MARLOow, individually and as Mayor of the Town of

Front Royal; MICHAEL Kitts, individually and as a member

of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia;

EDWIN L. POMEROY, individually and as’a former member

of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia;

ALBERT G. RuFF, JR., individually and as a former member

of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia;

GEORGE E. BANKS, individually and as a former member

of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia;

BRACKENRIDGE H. BENTLEY, individually and as Town

Manager of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia,

Defendants-A ppellants,

VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES; LOCAL GOVERNMENT

ATTORNEYS OF VIRGINIA, INCORPORATED,

Amicus Curiae.

2a

No. 90-1884

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY INDUSTRIAL PARK

CORPORATION, a Virginia Corporation; FRED W.

McLAUGHLIN; GLADYS L. MCLAUGHLIN,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

v.

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA, a municipal corporation;

JOHN MARLOvW, individually and as Mayor of the Town of

Front Royal; MICHAEL KITTS, individually and as a member

of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia;

EDWIN L. POMEROY, individually and as a former member

of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia;

ALBERT G. RUFF, JR., individually and as a former member

of the Town Council of Front Royal, Virginia; GEORGE E.

BANKS, individually and as a former member of the Town

Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia;

BRACKENRIDGE H. BENTLEY, individually and as Town

Manager of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia,

Defendants-A ppellees,

VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES; LOCAL GOVERNMENT

ATTORNEYS OF VIRGINIA, INCORPORATED,

Amicus Curiae.

Appeals from the United Stated District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg.

James H. Michael, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-87-19, CA-87-20)

3a

Argued: June 3, 1991

Decided: September 19, i991

Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and SPROUSE and

WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinions. Chief Judge

Ervin wrote the opinion, in which Judge Sprouse and

Judge Wilkins joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Glenn M. Hodge, WHARTON, ALDHIZER &

WEAVER, Harrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellants. Harold

Jonathan Krent, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL

OF LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Amici Curiae. Rob-

ert C. Fitzgerald, FITZGERALD & SMITH, P.C., Fairfax,

Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Douglas L. Guynn,

Mark D. Obenshain, WHARTON, ALDHIZER &

WEAVER, Harrisonburg, Virginia; David N. Crump, AD-

AMSON, CRUMP & SHARP, Front Royal, Virginia, for

Appellants. Harold P. Juren, G. Timothy Oksman, Joseph

P. Rapisarda, Jr., LOCAL GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS

OF VIRGINIA, INC., Charlottesville, Virginia; C. Flippo

Hicks, VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, Rich-

mond, Virginia, for Amici Curiae. Myron C. Smith, FITZ-

GERALD & SMITH, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellees.

OPINION

ERVIN, Chief Judge:

Plaintiffs in this consolidated § 1983 action are Warren

County Industrial Park Corporation (‘‘Front Royal Cor-

poration”) and two Front Royal, Virginia, landowners.

They sought damages from the Town of Front Royal

(‘Front Royal’’) and several Front Royal officials, alleging

that they violated plaintiffs’ fifth and fourteenth amend-

4a

ment rights. Although plaintiffs had remedies available to

them under state law, they did not pursue those remedies

but instead came into federal court seeking relief. The

district court granted summary judgment in favor of

plaintiffs. We find that the district court should have ab-

stained from ruling in this case and therefore vacate the

order granting summary judgment.

I

Plaintiffs own parcels of land which were annexed by

Front Royal in 1976 and 1978 pursuant to separate An-

nexation Court orders. The orders directed Front Royal

to extend sewer service to the parcels of land covered by

the annexation orders as expeditiously as practicable, but

in any event within 5 years of the entry of the orders.

Front Royal failed to extend sewer--service to plaintiffs’

parcels. As a result, plaintiffs sought to vindicate their

rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments and 42

U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the

Western District of Virginia.

Plaintiffs alleged that the refusal by the defendants to

extend sewer service to their parcels deprived them of all

economically viable uses of their property. Plaintiffs also

contended that they were denied equal protection of the

law because defendants provided sewer service to similarly

situated landowners within the annexed area, while de-

nying the same service to plaintiffs.

Defendants raised several affirmative defenses including

absolute legislative immunity and executive qualified im-

munity. The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion to

strike the absolute immunity defense, and defendants

appealed to this court in an interlocutory appeal. In a

previous holding, we upheld the district court’s holding

that absolute legislative immunity was not available to

defendants. Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park

5a

Corp. v. Front Royal, 865 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1989) (“Front

Royal I’).

Thereafter, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion

to strike defendants’ asserted qualified immunity defense.

Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Front

Royal, 708 F. Supp. 1477, 1480-82 (W.D. Va. 1989) (‘‘F’ront

Royal II’). On cross motions for summary judgment, the

district court granted plaintiffs’ motion on the § 1983 tak-

ings claim. Jd. at 1483-85. The court rejected defendants’

argument that (1) there was no compensable taking; and

(2) adequate state remedies existed which sho'd have

counselled the district court to abstain from hearing the

case at all. The district court also granted summary judg-

ment in favor of plaintiffs on the equal protection claim.

Id. at 1487. The court held that the actions taken by the

town counsel served no legitimate governmental purpose

and that the actions deprived plaintiffs of equal protection

of the laws. After granting summary judgment in favor

of plaintiffs, the district court held a bench trial on the

issue of damages and awarded the following amounts:

$176,526.56 to the individual landowners and $489,072.59

to the Front Royal Corporation. Front Royal & Warren

County v. Front Royal, 749 F. Supp. 1439, 1448-49 (W.D.

Va. 1990) (‘Front Royal III’).

Both parties appealed from the judgment of the district

court. Defendants alleged that there were numerous er-

roneous rulings by the district court, and plaintiffs as-

serted that the court should have awarded punitive

damages.

II

The defendants and amici curiae urge us to abstain

from ruling in this case. They assert that under Virginia

law, alternative remedies were available to plaintiffs. In

addition, they argue that land use policy is local in nature

6a

and that federal courts should not intrude into this area

unless absolutely necessary.

We note at the outset that we are not barred from

abstaining in this case because we previously issued an

opinion in F’ront Royal I, 865 F.2d 77. There, we addressed

the issue of absolute immunity on interlocutory appeal. We

held that the district court’s order dismissing the absolute

immunity defense was immediately appealable. Front Royal

I, 865 F.2d at 79. However, the fact that we had juris-

diction over the district court’s order regarding absolute

immunity did not permit us to review other claims raised

below. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662-63

(1977). We could have considered the abstention issue only

if it fell within the exception to the final-judgment rule

set out in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.

541, 547 (1949). Therefore, it is proper for us to now

consider whether abstention is appropriate even though we

have already issued an opinion in this case.

Plaintiffs argue that we should not consider the ab-

stention issue because it was not raised by defendants, but

was raised by amici curiae on this appeal. We note, how-

ever, that we may apply the abstention doctrine at our

own instance even if no party urges the doctrine upon us.

Caleb Stowe Associates, Ltd. v. County of Albemarle, 724

F.2d 1079, 1080 (4th Cir. 1984); AFA Distributing Co. v.

Pearl Brewing Co., 470 F.2d 1210, 1213 (4th Cir. 1978).

Therefore, we turn to the issue of whether we should

abstain from ruling on the case before us.

In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), the

Supreme Court set out a form of abstention which is ap-

propriate in order to prevent unnecessary interference by

the federal courts in the interpretation of a complex state

regulatory scheme. This court has explained the purpose

of the Burford abstention doctrine as follows:

The purpose of Burford abstention is to prevent

a federal court from interfering with a ‘“‘complex

Ta

state regulatory scheme concerning important

matters of state policy for which impartial and

fair administrative determinations subject to ex-

peditious and adequate judicial review are af-

forded.” Aluminum Co. v. Utilities Commission

of North Carolina, 713 F.2d 1024 (4th Cir. 1983),

Cert. denied, ___U.S. __, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984).

Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 774 F.2d 77,

79 (4th Cir. 1985).

In Browning-Ferris, complex state regulations govern-

ing landfill operations were at issue. We held that ab-

stention was proper based on the following reason:

(T]he state regulations governing landfill opera-

tions are lengthy and detailed and involve com-

plex scientific questions that must be reviewed

before a permit for a waste disposal facility is

approved. The Burford requirement that a com-

plex state regulatory scheme be involved in order

for a district court to abstain is sufficiently pres-

ent in this case.

Additionally, land use questions, . . . are the

peculiar concern of local and state governments,

and traditionally, federal courts have not inter-

fered with state courts in the area of land use

policy.

Id. at 79. Similarly, in Caleb Stowe Associates, 724 F.2d

1079 (4th Cir. 1984), we abstained from deciding the case

because it involved a matter of state and local land use

law. Id. at 1080. There,

_ all of the plaintiffs’ state and federal claims

necessarily depended[ed] upon the construction of

state land use law concerning the scope of au-

thority of local planning bodies and Boards of

Supervisors, the proper interpretation of state

8a

and local land use law and county zoning prac-

tices and procedure.

Id.

In Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. Martinsville, 493 F.2d 481

(4th Cir. 1974), we abstained from deciding a land use

case because ‘‘the courts of Virginia ha[d] extensive fa-

miliarity and experience with such matters, and. . . should

have the initial opportunity to pass upon them.” Jd. at

482.

We noted that a state adjudication might avoid: (1) the

necessity of a decision on the federal constitutional ques-

tions presented; and (2) ‘‘needless friction in federal-state

relations over the administration of purely state affairs.”

Id. at 483. We find the reasoning of the above cases per-

suasive. Here, we are asked to determine that Front Royal

violated the orders of the Annexation Courts and that, as

a result, plaintiffs’ land was taken without just compen-

sation, and plaintiffs were denied equal protection of the

law. All of plaintiffs’ claims stem from their assertion that

Front Royal violated the Annexation Courts’ orders.

In Virginia, Annexation Courts are established by stat-

ute to determine whether a city or town may annex ad-

jacent land. Va. Code Ann. § 15.1-1035 et seg. (1989 Repl.

Vol.). The Annexation Court is composed of three judges

designated by- the Supreme Court of Virginia. Va. Code

Ann. § 15.1-1038 (1989 Repl. Vol.). The Annexation Court

is to determine the ‘‘necessity for an expediency of an-

nexation” considering the best interests of the city or towr

and the people in the area to be annexed. Va. Code Ann.

§ 15.1- 1041(b) (Repl. Vol.). If the Annexation Court grants

the petition for annexation, the Court “shall set forth in

detail all such terms and conditions upon which the petition

is granted.”” Va. Code Ann. § 15.1-1041(d).

The Annexation Court ‘“‘shall enter an order setting forth

what it deemed fair and reasonable terms and conditions,

9a

and shall direct the annexation in conformity therewith.”

Va. Code Ann. § 15.1- 1042 (1989 Repl. Vol.). The An-

nexation Court remains in existence for 10 years from the

effective date of any annexation order entered. Va. Code

Ann. § 15.1-1047(a) (1989 Repl. Vol.). The Annexation

Court can be reconvened

_.. at any time during the ten-year period on its

own motion, or on motion of the governing body

of the county, or of the city or town, or on

petition of not less than fifty registered voters

or property owners in the area annexed; pro-

vided, however, if the area annexed contains less

than 100 registered voters or property owners,

then a majority of such registered voters or prop-

erty owners may petition for the reconvening of

the court.

Va. Code Ann. § 15.1-1647(b) (1989 Repl. Vol). The An-

nexation Court has the power during the ten year period

to enforce the performance of the terms and conditions

under which annexation was granted. Va. Code Ann.

§ 15.1-1047(c) (1989 Repl. Vol.). Any action by the An-

nexation Court under § 15.1047(c) is subject to review by

the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. Va. Code Ann.

§ 15.1-1047(d) (1989 Repl. Vol.). In addition, “(mjandamus

and prohibition shall lie from the Supreme Court of Appeals

or any circuit court to compel a city or town to carry out

the provisions of [the annexation statute] or to forbid any

violation of the same.”’ Va. Code Ann. § 15.1-1048 (1989

Repl. Vol.).

In this case, the orders of two separate Annexation

Courts are at issue. The 1978 Annexation Court, whose

order covered property owned by the Front Royal Cor-

poration, reconvened itself in 1983 after being petitioned

by the Front Royal Corporation for the purpose of deter-

mining whether its order had been obeyed. Based on rep-

resentations made by the town at that hearing regarding

10a

their plans for adding sewer lines, the Annexation Court

found that Front Royal was in substantial compliance with

the 1978 order. The 1976 Annexation Court, whose order

covered the individual landowners’ property, was never

reconvened. *

At the heart of the case before us is the question

whether Front Royal ever complied with the orders of the

Annexation Courts. The answer requires interpretation of

the Annexation Courts’ orders, which is a determination

that the Annexation Court was uniquely qualified to make.

The annexation system as set up in Virginia is a complex

scheme. It involves a court system set up specifically to

deal with the annexation process. It provides for appeal

to the Virginia courts if the town fails to comply with the

Annexation Court’s orders. See Va. Code § 15.1-1048. We

believe that this annexation scheme is sufficiently local in

nature to warrant our abstaining from deciding the issues

before us. Like the claims in F’ralin and Caleb Stowe, all

of plaintiffs’ federal claims necessarily depend upon the

construction of state law—here the orders of the Annex-

ation Courts. The courts of Virginia have much greater

familiarity with the operations of the Virginia annexation

scheme, and we believe that they should have the first

opportunity to pass upon them. See Fralin, 493 F.2d at

482.

In addition, there are other state remedies which might

be available to plaintiffs. The Virginia Constitution pro-

vides due process protection to those who have been un-

lawfully deprived of their property. Va. Const. art. I, § 11.

Virginia courts have consistently recognized a common law

* We note that 10 years have now run from the date of the An-

nexation Courts’ original orders. Thus, there is a question whether the

Courts could be reconvened at this time. However, because of the

defendants’ behavior in this case contributing to the passing of these

deadlines, it might be that the Annexation Courts could reconvene

under the specia! circumstances of this case. That is not for us to

decide, however.

lla

cause of action to protect this right. See Groves v. Coz,

559 F. Supp. 772, 777 (E.D. Va. 1983); Morris v. Elizabeth

River Tunnel District, 203 Va. 196, 123 S.E.2d 398 (1962).

Because the annexation court system is a matter of

purely state and local law, and because there may be other

state remedies available to plaintiffs in this case, we vacate

the district court’s orders granting summary judgment and

damages in favor of plaintiffs. However, as think that it

is appropriate for the district court to retain jurisdiction

over the case pending the outcome of the state proceedings

because they may not fully dispose of all of the federal

claims. See Caleb Stowe, 724 F.2d at 1080-81 (directing the

district court to retain jurisdiction over the case pending

a state court determination); Forest Hills Utility Co. v.

City of Heath, Ohio, 539 F.2d 592, 596 (6th Cir. 1976)

(holding that the district court should have retained juris-

diction over the claims pending the outcome of state pro-

ceedings when it abstained under the Pullman and Burford

doctrines). Therefore, we vacate the district court’s orders

and remand with instructions to retain jurisdiction of the

case pending the outcome of the state court proceedings.

VACATED AND REMANDED

WITH INSTRUCTIONS

12a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 88- 2066

Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corpo-

ration, a Virginia Corporation; Fred W. McLaughlin;

Gladys L. McLaughlin,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

Town of Front Royal, Virginia; John Marlow, and as

Mayor; Michael Kitts, individually and as member of Town

Council; Edwin L. Pomeroy, individually and as member

of Town Council; Albert G. Ruff, Jr., individually and as

former member; George E. Banks, individually and as for-

mer member, Brackenridge H. Bentley, individually and

as Town Manager,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. James H.

Michael, Jr., District Judge. (CA-87-0019 and CA-87-0020).

Argued: October 5, 1988 Decided: January 9, 1989

Before WINTER, SPROUSE, and ERVIN, Circuit Judges.

Mark D. Obenshain (Glenn M. Hodge, WHARTON, AL-

DHIZER & WEAVER on brief) for Appellants. Robert C.

Fitzgerald (Myron C. Smith, FITZGERALD & SMITH,

P.C. on brief) for Appellees.

13a

ERVIN, Circuit Judge

Plaintiffs in this consolidated § 1983 action are two

Front Royal, Virginia, landowners and the Front Royal

and Warren County Industrial Park Corporation. Plaintiffs

seek damages from defendants, the Town of Front Royal

(‘Front Royal”) and various Front Royal officials, for al-

leged violations of plaintiffs’ fifth and fourteenth amend-

ment rights. The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion

to strike defendants’ absolute immunity defense. We hold

that the district court’s order striking the defense was

immediately appealable, and affirm.

I.

Plaintiffs own parcels of land annexed by Front Royal

in 1976 and 1978. At the times of annexation, the Virginia

Annexation Court ordered Front Royal to extend sewer

service to the annexed parcels as quickly as reasonably

possible, and in any event within five years. Plaintiffs al-

lege that Front Royal has denied their repeated requests

for sewer service. When plaintiffs filed suit on February

12, 1987, Front Royal had not yet extended sewer service

to the annexed parcels.

Plaintiffs’ complaints alleged that defendants’ failure to

provide sewer service had deprived plaintiffs of all eco-

nomically viable and reasonable uses of their land. Plaintiffs

also alleged that defendants had deprived them of equal

protection of the laws by withholding sewer service from

plaintiffs while providing service to other landowners whose

needs were no greater than plaintiffs’.

Defendants interposed a number of affirmative defenses,

among them that absolute legislative immunity insulated

them from suit. Plaintiffs moved to strike the absolute

immunity defense, contending that defendants had taken

no legislative action with respect to sewer service. The

district court granted plaintiffs’ motion to strike in an

l4a

order from which defendants noticed an interlocutory

appeal.! Plaintiffs in turn argue that the order is not im-

mediately appealable.

Il.

Plaintiffs advance the threshold contention that the dis-

trict court’s order is not immediately appealable under the

test articulated in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102

S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982).2 We disagree. The

Supreme Court has several times held that orders denying

claims of absolute immunity are immediately appealable.

Nixon, 457 U.S. at 742. ,

We also note initially that we have held that orders

denying absolute immunity are, as a general matter, im-

mediately appealable under the Nixon criteria. England v.

Rockefeller, 739 F.2d 140, 142 (4th Cir. 1984); Bever v.

Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083, 1086-87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,

469 U.S. 948 (1984). Plaintiffs nonetheless contend that

this appeal presents no serious and unsettled question of

law. Because what defendants have asserted is essentially

the right to avoid trial, we believe the district court’s

denial of immunity presents a serious legal issue. We know

' The order also denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the action based

on absolute immunity.

2 Nixon declared that:

[A] small class of interlocutory orders are immediately

appealable to courts of appeals. ... [T]his class embraces

orders that ‘‘conclusively determine the disputed question,

resolve an important issue completely separate from the

merits of the action, and [are] effectively unreviewable on

appeal from a final judgment.” (quoting Coopers & Lybrand

v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)) ... [A]n additional

requirement [is] that collateral appeal of an interlocutory

order must “‘presen[t] a serious and unsettled question.”’

(quoting Cohen v Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.

541, 547 (1949)).

457 U.S. at 742 (citations omitted).

15a

of no Supreme Court case that has resolved an absolute

immunity claim similar to that broached by defendants.

See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 743. We therefore conclude that

the district court’s order in this case was immediately

appealable.

Ill.

It is well established that local legislators enjoy absolute

immunity from suit for decisions made in their capacity

as legislators. Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409,

1422-23 (4th Cir. 1983); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272,

279 (4th Cir. 1980). The inquiry in this case is accordingly

whether the district court correctly concluded that the

defendants’ denials of requests for sewer service were not

legislative actions. We believe the district court was cor-

rect to conclude that the defendants’ decisions were not

legislative.*

In Scott, 716 F.2d at 1423, we held that when municipal!

officials ‘“‘do more than adopt prospective, legislative-type

rules and take the next step into the area of enforcement,

they can claim only the executive qualified immunity ap-

propriate to that activity.” We agree with the district

court that defendants’ decisions had to do with zoning

enforcement rather than with rulemaking. See First Vir-

yinia Bank-Colonial v. Baker, 301 S.E.2d 8, 11 (Va. 1983)

(municipal officer liable for misfeasance of a ministerial

duty); Howlett v. City of South Norfolk, 69 S.E.2d 346,

348 (Va. 1952) (construction of authorized public works as

a ministerial activity); Hoggard v. Richmond, 200 S.E. 619,

615 (1939). The order of the Virginia Annexation Court

removed what discretion defendants might otherwise have

had to approve or decline plaintiffs’ requests for sewer

* Plaintiffs did not appeal the district court’s denial of their motion

to strike defendants’ qualified executive immunity defense. Our decision

accordingly reflects no opinion on the applicability or effect of the

qualified immunity defense.

16a

service. Defendants have not argued that they could law-

fully have defied the annexation court’s order,‘ or that

their failure to comply with the order represented a policy

decision that to do so was in the best interests of Front

Royal’s citizens. Defendants have, in short, not claimed

that their failure to authorize sewer service is the sort of

discretionary, prospective determination that warrants ab-

solute immunity.

AFFIRMED.

‘ Counsel stated in oral argument that the Virginia Annexation Court

no longer exists, but did not contest the continuing validity of the

court’s orders with respect to plaintiffs’ parcels.

17a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 88-2066

Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corp., et

al,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

Town of Front Royal, et al,

Defendants-Appellants.

FILED

JAN 31 1989

U.S. Court of Appeals

Fourth Circuit

On Petitior for Rehearing

Upon consideration of appellants’ petition for rehearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is de-

nied.

Entered at the direction of Judge Ervin, with the con-

currence of Chief Judge Winter and Judge Sprouse.

For the Court

JOHN M. GREACEN

CLERK

18a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

HARRISONBURG DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-0019-H

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COI

INDUSTRIAL PARK CORP.,

V.

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-0020-H

Judge James H. Michael, Jr.

FRED W. McLAUGHLIN, et ux.,

V%

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA,

Clerk’s Office U.S. Dist. Court

at Harrisonburg, VA

Filed

Oct 22 1990

Joyce F. Witt, Clerk

By: /s/ P. Hensley

Deputy Clerk

NTY

Plaintiff

Defendants

Plaintiffs

et al.,

Defendants

19a

ORDER

For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memoran-

dum Opinion, the court hereby finds as follows:

(1) The Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park

Corporation, plaintiffs in Civil Action No. 87-0019-H, are

entitled to recover compensatory damages in the amount

of $489,072.59, costs and attorney’s fees incurred through

December 4, 1989 in the amount of $68,096.25, plus ad-

ditional costs and fees as may be shown to the court; and

(2) Fred W. McLaughlin, et ux., plaintiffs in Civil Action

No. 87-0020-H, are entitled to recover compensatory dani-

ages in the amount of $176,526.56, costs and attorney’s

fees incurred through December 4, 1989 in the amount of

$39,371.30, plus additional costs and fees as may be shown

to the court.

In light of these findings, it is hereby

ADJUDGED AND ORDERED

as follows:

(1) The indicated damages amounts shall be paid by the

defendants.

(2) The plaintiffs herein shall make an appropriate show-

ing of such additional attorney’s fees and costs to the court

by November 12, 1990.

The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to send a

certified copy of this Order to all counsel of record.

ENTERED: /s/ James H. Michael, Jr.

Judge

October 22, 1990

Date

A TRUE COPY, TESTE:

JOYCE F. WITT, CLERK

BY: /s/ P. Hensley

DEPUTY CLERK

20a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

HARRISONBURG DIVISION

Civil Action No. 87-0019-H

Clerk’s Office U.S. Dist. Court

at Harrisonburg, VA

Filed

Oct 22 1990

Joyce F. Witt, Clerk

By: P. Hensley

Deputy Clerk

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY

INDUSTRIAL PARK CORP.,

Plaintiff

v.

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA, et al..,

Defendants

Civil Action No. 87-0020-H

Judge James H. Michael, Jr.

FRED W. McLAUGHLIN, et ux.,

Plaintiffs,

2la

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA, et al.,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs in these consolidated actions own land in the

town of Front Royal, Virginia. As a result of the town’s

failure to supply the plaintiffs’ properties with sewer and

water service in a timely fashion, as required by a decree

of a state annexation court, this court previously held as

a4 matter of law that a Fifth Amendment taking of the

plaintiffs’ properties had been effected. Front Royal &

Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Front Royal, 708

F. Supp. 1477, 1484 (W.D. Va. 1989) (“Front Royal I’).

The court also granted plaintiffs’ motions for summary

judgment on their Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protec-

tion claims. Jd. at 1487. Subsequently these actions came

before the court, sitting without a jury, for a trial on

damages. The court heard testimony from January 30 to

February 1 and also on February 21, 1990. Plaintiffs seek

both actual and punitive damages. This court has jurisdic-

tion pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

1343(3), (4). Both parties have submitted post-trial mem-

oranda and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of

law: this matter is now ripe for disposition.

The court fully set forth the facts which supported the

finding that a Fifth Amendment taking had occurred in

Front Royal I and will not recite them again here. The

court will, however, briefly summarize the facts from its

previous explication in order to place the present issue —

the amount of damages which the plaintiffs claim — in

context.

Plaintiffs are several individuals and a corporation who

own land in an area annexed from Warren County by the

Town of Front Royal (the ‘‘Town”’) under separate An-

nexation Court orders of 1976 and 1978. The orders of

annexation required the Town to extend sewer service to ¢

22a

the annexed areas as expeditiously as possible, but not

later than five years after the entry of the orders. At the

time the plaintiffs filed the present suits, the Town had

not yet provided sewer service to any of the subject par-

cels. Because the failure to provide the sewer rendered

the land unusable,’ this court found that a Fifth Amend-

ment taking had occurred. Additionally, although the Town

had not made sewer available to the plaintiffs’ properties,

it had made the service available to other similarly situated

parcels in the area. Most notably, the Town provided sewer

to property belonging to the then Mayor of the Town, who

was subsequently able to develop the property into a sub-

division. Based on these facts, the court further found that

the defendants’ actions violated plaintiffs’ Equal Protection

rights.

I

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), the

court finds the following facts.

Plaintiffs Fred W. McLaughlin and his wife. Gladys L.

McLaughlin, own as tenants in common a tract of land of

approximately 55 acres known as Happy Creek Knolls. The

McLaughlins purchased this tract of land for $14,350.00

as an investment property in July of 1964 when it was a

part of Warren County. On December 31, 1976, the Town

annexed a large parcel of land including the Happy Creek

Knolls tract. Immediately before the annexation, the

plaintiffs subdivided their property and it was taken into

the Town as a subdivision. The property is zoned R-1,

which allows the construction of single family homes on

lots_of at least 10,000 square feet.

‘Indeed, as is detailed more fully below, at the time of the trial on

damages the industriai park property had still not been provided the

required sewer and the individuals plaintiffs’ property had had sewer

services for only a matter of months.

23a

The Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park

Corporation (the “‘Corporation’’) is a private stock com-

pany of which Fred W. McLaughlin is President. In 1973

and 1974 the Corporation purchased parcels of land to-

talling 86 acres in Warren County. The purchase price

was approximately $107,000.00. The Town annexed this

land, along with other property, in 1978. The Corporation’s

property was zoned industrial and had been subdivided into

16 lots before the annexation.

By Order of the annexation court in 1976, the Town

was given a maximum of five years within which to pro-

vide sewer service to the Happy Creek Knolls property.

In accordance with the annexation court’s order, sewer

was to have been available to the property no later than

December 31, 1981. Sewer service was not actually avail-

able to the property unti! October 11, 1989.

Because sewer vervice is now available to the Happy

Creek Knolls property, the court finds that the taking of

that property has ceased. The plaintiffs are entitled, how-

ever, to appropriate damages for the period of the taking.

By Order of the annexation court in 1978, the Town

had a maximum of five years within which to provide

sewer service to the Industrial Park property. In 1983 the

annexation court granted the Town a two year extension

of the sewer provision date. In accordance with the an-

nexation court’s order, the property was to be provided

with sewer no later than December 31, 1985. As of the

date of trial, sewer service was not yet fully available to

the Industrial Park property.”

The court finds that the failure of the Town to provide

sewer service in a timely fashion was the sole reason why

* Because the Industrial Park property was taken into the Town

already subdivided, the Town was required to provide service to each

of the lots, not merely to one point on the edge of the entire tract.

Service is currently available to some of the Industrial Park lots but

not the majority.

24a

the plaintiffs were unable to develop their property: the

defendants’ failure to provide appropriate sewer service

prevented the plaintiffs from putting their property to its

fullest and best use. Even though at various times during

the relevant period the property was not appropriately

configured to comply with local zoning ordinances, the

court finds that this was due entirely to the absence of

Sewer service. For the plaintiffs to have undertaken the

efforts necessary to comply with the ordinances when it

was readily apparent that sewer service would still be

unavailable, thus leaving the property still unsalable, would

have been futile.

II

As noted previously, the sole issue before the court is

the amount of damages to which the plaintiffs are entitled.

The court’s previous Orders have established that a con-

stitutional taking has occurred and that the defendants are

not immune from liability for damages. Some of the evi- .

dence offered at the hearing on damages represented ef-

forts of the parties, principally the defendants, to offer

new evidence which would bolster their arguments in op-

position to the court’s previous rulings on liability. The

court cautioned counsel on several occasions that it would

consider only the evidence adduced at the hearing solely

in regard to the issue of damages as the liability issues

had previously been resolved. Whether such non-damages

evidence was offered for the purpose of making a record

is immaterial; it was not considered on the damages issue

and obviously was not considered on the liability issue.

A. Compensatory Da mages

A takings action can fall under two constitutional pro-

visions, the fifth amendment of th; United States Con-

25a

stitution or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.5 In Front Royal I, this court

found that the defendants had effectuated a compensable

taking by violating the plaintiffs’ due process rights under

§ 1983. That the plaintiffs’ action arose under § 1983 and

not the fifth amendment does not affect the appropriate

measure of damages to which they are entitled. Wheeler

v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833 F.2d 267, 270 n.3 (11th Cir.

1987) [Wheeler III].

The question of which measure of damages the court

should employ in this case is hardly clear. The court has

looked to the vast array of takings jurisprudence and can-

not find definitive precedent on the issue before it. As

noted previously, this case does not involve condemnation

proceedings, nor does it concern a taking which resulted

from an unconstitutional regulation. The defendants effec-

tuated the taking by failing to act on the annexation court’s

order. However, when examined in light of the Eleventh

Circuit’s definition of a regulatory taking in Wheeler IJ/J—

*The fifth amendment, applicable to the states through the Four-

teenth Amendment, provides ‘‘nor shall private property be taken for

public use, without just compensation.”’ Though the government may

take property pursuant to formal condemnation proceedings, condem-

nation for ‘‘public use’’ is not a constitutional requisite. Government

regulation can so resirict the use of land that it constitutes a taking.

First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los An-

geles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 (1987). Even where no regulation is involved,

government actions which interfere with a landowner’s beneficial use

of property can constitute a taking. Stoddard v. Western Carolina Re-

gional Sewer Authority, 784 F.2d 1200, 1206 (4th Cir. 1986). Takings

which do not result from condemnation proceedings are technically not

entitled to fifth amendment just compensation; however, such takings

may be the basis of a 42 U.S.C. § 1988 claim if they violate fourteenth

amendment due process rights. Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833

F.2d 267, 270 n.3 (11th Cir. 1987). A governmental taking need not

be permanent; the government must compensate the landowner even

if a taking is temporary. First Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 318-319.

‘ Wheeler was appealed from the district court on four separate oc-

casions. The court will cite to both the third and fourth appellate court

decisions herein.

26a

“a taking that is ultimately invalidated by a court’’—id.,

the facts of this case can most appropriately be analogized

to a regulatory takings case.* Even so, the lack of defin-

itive precedent on compensating a temporary regulatory

taking compels the court to examine the relevant case law.

Just compensation for the government’s permanent ac-

quisition of private property is the property’s fair market

value at the time of the taking. Kirby Forest Industries.

Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). In a temporary

taking, however, ‘‘the Just Compensation Clause of the

Fifth Amendment requires that the government pay the

landowner for the value of the use of the land during this

period.” First Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 319; Yuba

Natural Resources, Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577,

1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (just compensation ‘“‘is the value

of the use of the property during the temporary taking,

i.e., the amount which the owner lost as a result of the

taking.”’); Nemmers v, City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502, 504-

05 (8th Cir. 1985) (‘for a temporary taking, the govern-

ment is responsible for compensating the owner for the

interim during which it effected the taking.”’).

The issues before the Supreme Court in First Lutheran

unfortunately did not include how to measure appropriately

‘the value of the [temporary] use of the land” in tem-

porary regulatory takings cases. The Court offered some

guidance, however, when it held that a temporary regu-

* Although the taking at issue in this case is technically not a “‘reg-

ulatory taking,”’ the cases concerning regulatory takings are analogous

for the purpose of determining the appropriate compensation. As in a

regulatory taking, the defendants in this case have prevented the

plaintiffs from developing their property as they chos2 without initiating

formal condemnation proceedings. The City Council in Wheeler passed

an ordinance forbidding the plaintiff to build, whereas the Town of

Front Royal made the conscious decision not to act according to the

mandate of the annexation court’s order. The governing bodies in both

cases took affirmative steps to deny unconstitutionally the plaintiffs use

of their property, and therefore the facts are comparable.

sik saa aaa ae

27a

latory taking is no different from the government’s tem-

porary use of private property and should be similarly

compensated.® First Lutheran, 482 U.S. at 318-19. Indeed,

the Court contemplated this measure of damages for tem-

porary regulatory takings — that just compensation for

such a taking should be determined as is just compensation

for the temporary use of private property — on two oc-

casions prior to First Lutheran. In United States v. Dow,

357 U.S. 17 (1958), the Court stated that if the govern-

ment were to abandon a condemnation proceeding, the

taking would be temporary and ‘“‘{iJn such cases compen-

sation would be measured by the principles normally gov-

erning the taking of a right to use property temporarily.”

Id. at 26. Justice Brennan similarly expressed this in his

dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450

U.S. 621 (1981). In his discussion of the proper measure

of relief in a temporary regulatory taking, Justice Brennan

stated, “Rules of valuation for temporary ‘takings’ may

be particularly useful ... although additional rules may

need to be developed.” Jd. at 659 (Brennan, J. dissenting)

(citations omitted).

Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule definitively

on the proper measure of just compensation in a temporary

regulatory taking, some of the United States Courts of

Appeals which have addressed the issue have adopted Jus-

tice Brennan’s approach in San Diego Gas. See Nemmers,

764 F.2d at 505 n.2. In so doing, the courts have for-

mulated a computation for damages which parallels that

used for temporary use of private property takings.’ See

Wheeler III, 833 F.2d at 271; Nemmers, 764 F.2d at 505.

*In Furst Lutheran, the Court found that temporary regulatory tak-

ings were compensable by comparing them to takings in which the

government temporarily exercises its right to use private property, in

which cases the owners are entitled to compensation for the temporary

use. First Lutheran, 482 U.S. at 318-19.

’The method for determining appropriate damages for cases in which

28a

The Eleventh Circuit recently addressed the issue of

measuring damages from a tempcrary regulatory taking

in a case similar to this one, Wheeler v. City of Pleasant

Grove. 896 F.2d 1347 (11th Cir. 1990) [Wheeler IV]. The

plaintiff in Wheeler had obtained a building permit to con-

Struct an apartment complex on his property. After com-

munity opposition to the project, the City Council passed

an ordinance which forbade the construction of the com-

plex. Wheeler brought his action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983

and 1985. A federal district court found that the ordinance,

as applied to the plaintiffs, was unconstitutional,* Wheeler

ITI, 833 F.2d at 268-69, even though it did not deny the

plaintiff all use of his property. Wheeler IV at 1351.

In Wheeler III, the Eleventh Circuit set forth the fol-

lowing guidelines by which the district court was to de-

termine the amount of damages suffered by the plaintiffs:

In the case of a temporary regulatory taking,

the landowner’s loss takes the form of an injury

to the property’s potential for producing income

or an expected profit. The landowner’s compen-

Sative interest, therefore, is the return of the

portion of fair market value that is lost as a

result of the regulatory restriction. Accordingly,

the government has exercised its right to temporarily use private prop-

erty is well established. In such cases, the government essentially takes

over an ongoing concern of the plaintiff, and just compensation is the

fair rental value of the property over the period of the taking. Kimball

Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 7 (1949) (‘[T}he proper

measure of compensation ... is the rental that probably could have

been obtained.”) For example in Yuba, where the government had

temporarily taken the mineral rights in the plaintiff's property, the

Federal Circuit noted that “the usual measure of just compensation for

a temporary taking ... is the fair rental value of the property for the

period of the taking.”” Yuba, 904 F.2d at 1581.

‘The court further held that the City Council had arbitrarily and

capriciously enacted and implemented an ordinance which was confis-

catory in nature and had no rational purpose. Wheeler III, 833 F.2d

at 268-69.

29a

the landowner should be awarded the market rate

return computed over the period of the tempo-

rary taking on the difference between the prop-

erty’s fair market value without the regulatory

restriction and its fair market value with the re-

striction.

Wheeler III, 833 F.2d at 271 (citations omitted) (footnote

omitted).

On remand, the district court chose not to follow the

appellate court’s instructions, finding instead that the

plaintiffs could recover nothing because ‘“‘the value of the

property had increased despite the ordinance and since the

ordinance had not destroyed the highest and best use of

the land, ‘the fair market value of the ... property was

not diminished by the enactment of [the ordinance].’”’

Wheeler IV, 896 F.2d at 1350 (citing the memorandum

opinion of the district court). Once again on appeal, how-

ever, the Eleventh Circuit reversed. While noting that the

land’s fair market value probably did not decline as a

result of the government action, id. at 1351, the appellate

court rejected the district court’s determination that the

property’s increase in value over the period of the taking

necessarily negated the plaintiff's right to recover dam-

ages.’ Repeating its previous instructions for adequately

compensating the plaintiff, the Eleventh Circuit held that

the district court should have determined the ‘difference

in the fair market value of appellants’ right to develop

their property when they received their building permit

* The Supreme Court has also rejected the proposition that ‘the dif-

ference between the market value of the fee on the date of the taking

and its market value on the date of its return’’ was the appropriate

measure of just compensation for a temporary taking because ‘“‘there

might frequently be situations in which the owner would receive no

compensation whatever because the market value of the property had

not decreased during the period of the taker’s occupancy.’’ Kimball

Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 7 (1949).

30a

and the fair market value of what remained after the

City’s actions against appellants.” Jd. Applying this

method, the appellate court took the amount of the

plaintiff's interest in the undisputed fair market value, at

the time of the taking, of the complex which appellants

had a right to build, and subtracted from that the plaintiff's

interest in the value of the land only to get the ‘difference

in fair market value lost as a result of the regulatory

restrictions.”’ Jd. The court then computed the market rate

of return on that amount to arrive at the correct amount

of damages. Id. at 1352.

To determine the appropriate computation of damages

in the Wheeler cases, the Eleventh Circuit relied upon the

Eighth Circuit’s analysis in another temporary regulatory

takings case, Nemmers v,. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502

(8th Cir. 1985). In Nemmers, the plaintiff had invested in

developing his land as an industrial park. The land was

subsequently annexed and zoned residential, and the dis-

trict court found that a temporary taking had occurred.

The Eighth Circuit held that the proper method for cal-

culating the damages which resulted from the taking was

to determine “‘the difference between the property’s fair

market value when zoned [for industrial use] and its fair

market value when zoned (for residential use].”’ Jd. at 505.

That amount, plus the return over the number of years

at the appropriate interest rate, was the plaintiffs just

compensation. Jd.

This court finds the opinions of the Eighth and Eleventh

Circuits persuasive on the appropriate measure of damages

for a temporary regulatory taking. Both Nemmers and

Wheeler indicate that, in computing damages, the court

should determine the market value as of the date of the

taking. Wheeler, 896 F.2d at 1351; Nemmers, 764 F.2d at

904. This is consistent with permanent takings jurisprud-

ence, which bases just compensation on the fair market

value at the date of the taking. Furthermore, the approach

mirrors that used in takings involving the temporary use

3la

of private property — in which cases the owners are com-

pensated for the period of use only — as the Supreme

Court in Dow and Justice Brennan in San Diego Gas in-

dicated would be proper. By determining the difference in

value between what the plaintiff would have had absent

the taking and what remained after the taking became

effective, and adding the appropriate interest, the court

can grant a remedy which is fair and adequate. The eval-

uation accounts for the fact that the owner still retains

the property after the taking is invalidated and thus the

plaintiff is justly compensated.

Before the court can apply the damages formula to the

case at hand, it must briefly address alternative damages

calculations proposed by the parties. During the hearing

on damages, and in the parties’ briefs on damages, the

parties offered evidence as to the appropriateness of fac-

tors besides fair market value which the court could con-

sider in determining the appropriate amount of

compensatory damages. In particular, the plaintiffs seek

economic redress for development expenses which accrued

during the period of the taking. In essence, the plaintiffs

suggest that they are entitled to compensation for con-

sequential damages.

Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence conclusively es-

tablishes that when the government effectuates a taking,

‘[t]he owner is to be put in the same position monetarily

as he would have occupied if his property had not been

taken.’”’ United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 15-16

(1970). Consequently, the Court has indicated in both per-

manent and temporary takings cases that just compensa-

tion does not include the consequential damages which an

owner might suffer as a result of the taking. United States

v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 380 (1945) (“[T]hat

which is taken or damaged is the group of rights which

the so-called owner exercises in his dominion of the phys-

ical thing, and that damage to those rights of ownership

does not include losses to his business or other conse-

32a

quential damage.” (footnote omitted)). Indeed, courts have

uniformly held that lost profits, lost opportunities, and

other consequential damages suffered because of a taking

are not compensable. See United States v. 565.54 Acres of

Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (“[F Jair market value does

not include the special value of the property to the owner

arising from its adaptability to his particular use.”’); United

States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Powelson, 319

U.S. 266, 282 (1943) (“[T]he sovereign must pay only for

what it takes, not for the opportunities which the owner

may lose.’’); Yuba, 904 F.2d at 1581-1582 (in a temporary

taking of mineral rights, the difference in the value of the

property’s gold during the taking period and after the

taking is “precisely the kind of claim for consequential

damages — here, lost profits — that is not an appropriate

element of just compensation for the temporary taking of

property.’’); Helenic Center, Inc. v. Washington Metro Area

Transportation Authority, 815 F.2d 982, 984 (4th Cir.

1987) (“ordinarily, indirect costs to the owner resulting

from the taking ... are not part of the just compensation

which the owner is entitled to recover.’’); United States v.

1735 N. Lynn St., Situated in Rosslyn, VA, 676 F.Supp.

693, 701 (E.D.Va. 1987) (Damages for frustration of ren-

ovation plans are impermissible because “{t]he Fifth

Amendment allows only fair market value, it does not

guarantee a return on investment.”). These cases clearly

indicate that consequential damages are not appropriate

in takings cases.

Despite the overwhelming authority against awarding

consequential damages, the plaintiffs have noted that many

courts have espoused the principle that courts are not

When courts have awarded damages akin to lost profits, the gov-

ernment had taken an existing business or going concern. See Kimball

Laundry, 338 U.S. at 15 (one element of just compensation was what-

ever “demonstrable loss of going-concern value’’ the taking caused.).

In this case, the taking did not involve an ongoing concern.

33a

bound by a specific formula in determining just compen-

sation. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365

U.S. 624, 633 (1961); United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325,

332 (1949); United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo

Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949). Rather, courts

should examine the equities of a specific case to ascertain,

in fairness, the appropriate amount of damages. United

States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973); A.G. Davis Ice

Co. v. United States, 362 F.2d 934 (1st Cir. 1966); United

States v. Lee, 360 F.2d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 1966); Foster

v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 426, 446 (1983). The plaintiffs

advance compelling arguments that equity and fairness

concerns should compel this court to allow them damages

beyond those ascertained by the formula governing tem-

porary regulatory takings. They allege that economic relief

should lie for certain acts, aside from the ‘‘taking’’ act of

not providing sewer, which the defendants undertook dur-

ing the course of the takings."!

During the period of the takings, the Town of Front

Royal passed two measures which increased the plaintiffs’

expense of developing their property. The first, effected

in 1984, was a raise in the Town’s front foot charge for

sewer line extension from $6.00 per linear foot to $15.00

per linear foot. Because the Town should have provided

sewer service to the Happy Creek Knolls property by 1983,

the higher front foot charge would not have applied to

' Although the plaintiffs make claims for lost profits and interest

income caused by a lack of sewer service, the court need not address

them separately. In Wheeler, the Eleventh Circuit held that the formula

is used for compensating a temporary regulatory taking -- the measure

this court has adopted — accounted for landowner’s loss of ‘‘the prop-

erty’s potential for producing income or an expected profit.’’ Wheeler

III, 833 F.2d at 271. Moreover, specific claims of opportunity costs

clearly fal! within the scope of consequential damages which are rou-

tinely denied in takings cases. See Coastland Corp. v. Third National

Mortgage Co., 611 F.2d 969, 977 (4th Cir. 1979), Carley Capital Group

v. City of Newport News, 709 F. Supp. 1387 (E.D. Va. 1989). Cf Scott

v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1983).

34a

that property had the town abided by the annexation or-

der. The Town had an extension until 1985 to provide

sewer to the Industrial Park, however, and so the plaintiffs

would not have had the benefit of the lower cost for sewer

line extension to that property evén if the Town had com-

plied with the order.

The second Town action causing economic damage to

the plaintiffs was the passage of a slope ordinance in

1989." Again, had the Town not willfully disobeyed the

annexation court’s order, the plaintiffs would not have had

to comply with the slope ordinance. Because of the ordi-

nance, however, the plaintiffs are unable to develop some

of their lots, and additional lots will require a special use

permit.

These facts surrounding the plaintiffs’ situations present

a strong case for which equity and fairness demand com-

pensation for consequential damages. The losses plaintiffs

suffered at the hands of the Town government do indeed

seem greater than the amount which plaintiffs would re-

cover under the formula endorsed in Wheeler and Nem-

mers. Although the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits did not

specifically hold that just compensation for a temporary

regulatory taking does not include consequential dam-

ages,’* this court sees no reason to invoke an exception

to the well-established rule that consequential damages are

not recoverable. The facts in this case are indeed com-

pelling ones for this court to attempt to forge new ground

in fashioning an appropriate measure of damages by is-

suing a rule that would grant compensatory damages; how-

ever, absent guidance from this circuit to do so, the court

will follow the well-reasoned approaches of the Eighth and

* The ordinance prevents development of slopes of 25% or greater

and requires a special use permit for development of slopes between

15% and 25%.

‘* Neither court awarded compensatory damages, nor is it apparent

that the plaintiffs in those cases asked for such an award.

35a

Eleventh Circuits. Accordingly, the court will not_ award

relief for the plaintiffs’ consequential damages.

In addition to the lack of authority for granting con-

sequential damages, another reason exists for denying them

in this case. Concededly, because economic evaluations

often depend upon assumptions, some amount of specu-

lation is inherent in establishing market values. United

States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943); Foster v. United

States, 2 Cl. Ct. 426, 446-47 (1983). Nonetheless, a court,

in its consideration of just compensation, must be wary of

those elements of damages which are speculative and con-

jectural. Olsen v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934);

Foster, 2 Cl. Ct. at 446. The court finds that the evidence

in the record pertaining to consequential damages is not

sufficiently founded to be the basis for compensatory relief.

Even if this court concluded that the increase in the

front foot charge is a consequential damage for which the

owners of the Happy Creek Knolls property could be com-

pensated, the record contains no evidence indicating how

many linear feet of sewer line are at issue. Thus, the court

could not compute the proper amount of damages suffered

due to the higher front foot charge. Likewise, had the

court found that the losses attributable to the slope or-

dinance were compensable consequential damages, the

plaintiffs must have proved that they indeed sustained such

damages by showing that they would have sold or devel-

oped the properties subject to the ordinance before it was

passed in order to recover for those losses. If no demand

for the affected lots existed before the regulation became

applicable, then the plaintiffs suffered no damages because

of it. Based on the evidence before it, the court could not

find that the lots subject to the slope ordinance would

have been sold or developed prior to 1989 even if the lots

had sewer. Consequently, the court concludes that, even

if it could appropriately award consequential damages, the

evidence does not sufficiently establish the extent — if any

— to which the plaintiffs sustained such damages.

36a

Having determined the appropriate method for meas-

uring damages, the court must now apply the formula to

the case at hand. The plaintiffs offered several experts on

the issue of damages. Although the defendants cross-ex-

amined these witnesses, they did not present their own

experts to testify on damages. They have relied instead

on their assertion that the plaintiffs have not been able

to complete their subdivisions because of their own failure

to comply with various zoning requirements, not because

of the Town’s failure to provide sewer service. Thus, the

defendants argue, their temporary taking did not cause

any damages beyond those already resulting from the

plaintiffs’ noncompliance with applicable regulations. The

court believes that this contention is fatally flawed be-

cause, to put it in the vernacular, it puts the cart before

the horse: it assumes that the plaintiffs would have per-

formed objectively futile activities, hoping that such actions

would spur the defendants to meet obligations which, de-

spite a court order, they had refused to do. Consequently,

if the plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony on damages meets ac-

ceptable standards for determining the applicable market

values, the court will use them to determine just compen-

sation.

The plaintiffs’ expert on the market value of the land

used a comparable sales approach to determine the value

of both properties at the dates of the takings. The com-

parable sales approach — analyzing sales of similar com-

mercial property in order to arrive at a fair market value

— is generally accepted as providing the best evidence of

fair market value. United States v. 179.26 Acres of Land,

644 F.2d 367, 371 (10th Cir. 1981); Houser v. United States,

12 Cl. Ct. 454, 472-73 (1987). The Eighth Circuit has ap-

proved the use of the evidence of comparable sales as the

“best evidence’ of damages on the rationale that com-

parable sales ‘‘on the whole reflect the principle of a will-

ing seller and a willing buyer concluding arms-length

negotiations.’ ’’ Nemmers, 764 F.2d at 505 (citing United

37a

States v. 47.17 Acres of Land, More or Less, 674 F.2d 722,

725 (8th Cir. 1984)). =

The comparability of real estate sales involves such fac-

tors as time of transaction, location of the property, quan-

tity and quality of property sold, nature of the sale, the

primary interests of the parties as well as other factors

peculiar to a particular transaction. The plaintiffs’ experts

engaged in such an examination in order to estimate the

fair market values of the properties, both with and without

sewer. Because they supported their findings with a strong

| factual and analytical framework, and as their testimony

was essentially unrebutted, the court adopts their figures

in order to obtain the appropriate amount of damages.

In 1981, the time of the taking of the McLaughlin prop-

erty, the fair market value of that property was $148,000

with sewer and $66,000 without sewer, leaving a difference

of $82,000. The period of the taking, that time in which

the City ought to have provided sewer but did not, ex-

tended from January 1, 1981, to October 11, 1989. Ap-

plying the applicable interest rates, with interest

compounded annually, to $82,000 for the period of Decem-

ber 1981 to October 11, 1989,'* the court finds that the

| amount of just compensation is $176,526.56.

In 1985, the time of the taking of the Industrial Park

property, the fair market value of that property was

$405,000 without sewer and $810,000 with sewer, leaving

a difference of $405,000. Because the record shows that

sewer lines run through three of the sixteen lots in the

Industrial Park, and as the evidence does not show the

value of the remaining thirteen lots with and without sewer

« The plaintiff's experts provided the market rates of return through

December of 1988. Because the record contains no evidence of the

applicable interest rates from December 31, 1988 through the present,

_ the court has used the Administrative Office of the United States Courts

52-week Treasury Bill Rate Table of Changes to determine the appro-

priate amount of interest accrued after January 1, 1989.

38a

service at the time of the taking, the court will reduce

the $405,000 difference in value by three-sixteenths, leav-

ing an amount of $329,062.50. The period of the taking

has extended from January 1, 1985 to the present time.

Again using the interest rates indicated above, the just

compensation for the Industrial Park property to date is

$489,072.59. The owners of the Industrial Park property

shall continue to receive compensation, determined as this

court has outlined, until the defendants cease their taking

and provide the sewer service mandated by the annexation

court.

B. Punitive Damages

The Supreme Court has endorsed punitive damages

awards in § 1983 actions. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,

51 (1983). Such damages are appropriate when the

defendants violate federal law with evil motive or intent,

or when they act with “reckless or callous disregard for

the plaintiff's rights” Jd.

The Fourth Circuit summarized the Supreme Court’s

precedent for awarding punitive damages in Stephens v.

South Atiantic Canners, Inc., 848 F.2d 484, (4th Cir. 1988).

The appellate court stated that such damages are ‘‘an

extraordinary remedy . . . designed to punish and deter

particularly egregious conduct.” Jd. at 489 (citing City of

Newport v. Fact Conceris, Inc. 453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981)).

In Cooper v.Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 948 (4th Cir. 1987), the

court discussed the standard for awarding punitive dam-

ages, stating, “‘the callous indifference required for puni-

tive damages is essentially the same as the deliberate

indifference required for a finding of liability on the § 1983

claim.”” Although this court’s determination that the

defendants effected a deprivation of the plaintiffs’ rights

under § 1983 and the equal protection clause could support

a punitive damages award, see Smith, 461 U.S. at 51-55:

Cooper, 814 F.2d at 948, the evidence on record does not

39a

satisfy this court that such an award is meritorious. The

plaintiffs’ contention that the defendants need only act

with “reckless or callous indifference to the [plaintiffs’]

federally protected rights” is correct; they need not show

malicious or evil intent. Piver v. Pender County Bd. of

Education, 835 F.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Cir. 1987).

In its opinion granting summary judgment on the taking

issue, this court concluded that the ‘defendants ought to

have known, and that a reasonable person in their shoes

would have known, that the defendants were under a legal

obligation to provide sewer service to the parcels in ques-

tion.” Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park

Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, and McLaughlin, et ux., v.

Town of Front Royal, 708 F. Supp. 1477, 1482 (W.D. Va.

1989). However, this court did not make a finding re-

garding the defendants’ malicious intent or callous indif-

ference. The same is true regarding the equal protection

claim. The basis for this court’s summary judgment on the

equal protection claim was not that the defendants had

acted with “invidious discrimination’’, but because no per-

missible state interest existed to which defendants’ deci-

sion could bear a rational relationship. Jd. at 1487. After

reviewing the evidence on damages, the court reaches the

same conclusions as to the defendants’ subjective intent.

The record contains no evidence showing that the four

council members who actually voted on the plaintiffs’ ap-

plication for sewer service were reckiess or callously in-

different to the plaintiffs’ rights. The Mayor and the Town

Manager testified about the meetings at which the council

discussed the applications for sewer, but the court cannot

attribute their testimony to the voting members of council.

Nor can the court base an award of punitive damages on

inferences that the defendants acted egregiously or with

malice. Stephens, 848 F.2d at 492. Though the evidence

does show that the Town Attorney told the council, “You

are required to provide [sewer] to whoever wants it within

the entire annexed areas’, the record does not sufficiently

40a

demonstrate that the defendants acted contrary to their

understanding — however skewed or incorrect it may have

been — of this advice. As to the Town Manager and Mayor

Marlow, neither voted on the sewer service applications.

Moreover, the strong evidence of Mayor Marlow’s pur-

ported bad faith is contradicted by the factual differentia-

tions between his application for sewer and those of the

plaintiffs. Although the court is not completely convinced

that the plaintiffs’ allegations of corruption, impropriety

and graft on the part of the defendants are without some

merit, the record does not contain the substantially high

measure of evidence necessary for a punitive damages

award. Consequently, the court will not award punitive

damages.

Because the plaintiffs brought these actions under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, the court has discretion to award attorneys

fees to the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The

court believes that this is an appropriate case for such an

award. The Front Royal-Warren County Industrial Park,

Inc., expended $68,096.25 for legal fees and costs in this

litigation as of December 4, 1989. The plaintiffs in the

McLaughlin case incurred similar expenses of $39,371.30

through the same date. The court hereby orders such

amounts, plus any additional fees incurred from December

4, 1989 to the present date as may be shown to the court,

to be paid by the defendants as reasonable attorney’s fees.

An appropriate order shall this day issue.

ENTERED: /s/ James H. Michael, Jr.

Judge

October 22, 1990

Date

A TRUE COPY, TESTE:

JOYCE F. WITT, CLERK

BY: /s/ P. Hensley

DEPUTY CLERK

4la

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

HARRISONBURG DIVISION

Civil Action No. 87-0019-H

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY

INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION,

Plaintiff

Vv.

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VA, et al.,

Defendants

Civil Action No. 87-0020-H

Judge James H. Michael, Jr.

FRED W. McLAUGHLIN, et ux.,

Plaintiffs

V.

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VA, et al.,

Defendants

Clerk’s Office U.S. Dist. Court

at Harrisonburg, VA

Filed

MAR 16, 89

Joyce F. Witt, Clerk

By: /s/ P. Hensley

Deputy Clerk

42a

ORDER

For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memoran-

dum Opinion, it is this day

ADJUDGED AND ORDERED

that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment shall be,

and it hereby is, denied.

2. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment shall be, and

it hereby is, granted.

The clerk is hereby directed to send a certified copy of

this Order, and the accompanying Memorandum Opinion,

to all counsel of record.

ENTERED: /s/ James H. Michael, Jr.

Judge

March 16, 1989

Date

A TRUE COPY, TESTE

JOYCE F. WITT, CLERK

BY: /s/ P. Hensley

DEPUTY CLERK

43a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

HARRISONBURG DIVISION

Civil Action No. 87-0019-H

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY

INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION,

Plaintiff

v.

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VA, et al.,

Defendants

Civil Action No. 87-0020-H

Judge James H. Michael, Jr.

FRED W. McLAUGHLIN, et ux.,

Plaintiffs

V.

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VA, et al.,

Defendants

Clerk’s Office U.S. Dist. Court

at Harrisonburg, VA

Filed

MAR 16, 89

Joyce F. Witt, Clerk

By: /s/ P. Hensley

Deputy Clerk

44a

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is presently before the court on cross mo-

tions for summary judgment. For the reasons elaborated

below, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied

and plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

:.

The plaintiffs in this matter are the Front Royal and

Warren County Industrial Park Commission and two Front

Royal, Virginia land owners. Plaintiffs own parcels of land

in an area annexed by the Town of Front Royal under

separate Annexation Court orders of 1976 and 1978. The

orders of annexation directed the Town of Front Royal to

extend sewer service to the parcels of land covered by the

annexation orders as expeditiously as was practicable and,

in any event, within five years of the entry of the orders.

Since the Town of Front Royal has not yet extended sewer

service to the annexed parcels owned by plaintiffs,

plaintiffs seek to vindicate their rights under the fifth and

fourteenth amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 through this

consolidated action.

Plaintiffs allege that the refusal by defendants to extend

sewer service to their parcels has deprived plaintiffs of all

economically viable uses of their property. In addition,

plaintiffs also contend that their right to equal protection

of the law has been violated because, while defendants

provided sewer service to land owners whose parcels in

the annexed area were situated similarly to plaintiffs’ par-

cels, defendants have refused to extend the sewer lines to

instant plaintiffs’ parcels. Defendants have offered several

affirmative defenses, among them the defenses of absolute

legislative immunity and executive qualified immunity. By

an earlier order of this court dated February 22, 1988,

this court granted plaintiffs’ motion to strike the affirm-

ative defense of legislative immunity and, conversely, de-

45a

nied defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds of

legislative immunity.

Defendants entered an interlocutory appeal before the

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in regard to the dismissal

of their claim of absolute legislative immunity. After not-

ing that the denial of a claim of absolute immunity is

appropriate for interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Circuit

concluded that ‘‘We agree with the district court that

defendants’ decisions had to do with zoning enforcement

rather than with rule making.” Front Royal and Warren

County Industrial Park Corp., et al. v. Town of Front

Royal, Virginia, et al., No. 88-2066, slip op. at 5 (4th Cir.

Jan. 9, 1989). Therefore, the Fourth Circuit found that

“The district court was correct to conclude that the

defendants’ decisions were not legislative’ and, thus,

defendants were not entitled to a defense of absolute im-

munity. Jd. at 4.

Il.

Defendants also offer the affirmative defense of qualified

executive immunity. Earlier, this court had denied

plaintiffs’ motions to strike the qualified immunity defense

(and, concomitantly, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss

on the basis of the qualified immunity defense) because

“The court finds that the present record provides an in-

adequate basis for making such a determination.” Front

Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corp., et al.

v. Town of Front Royal, Virginia, et al., CA Nos. 87-0019-

H and 87-0020-H, slip. op. at 4 (W.D. Va. Feb. 22, 1988).

After recourse to materials not available within the con-

fines of a motion to dismiss and after consideration of the

briefing materials submitted, the court finds that

defendants’ claim of qualified immunity is an issue which

is ripe for disposition on summary judgment. Accordingly,

the court finds that defendants are not entitled to the

defense of qualified immunity and therefore now denies

that portion of their motion for summary judgment.

46a

Qualified immunity is, in essence, the right not to have

to stand trial if, among other conditions, the acts at issue

were performed by defendants within the context of their

official, executive capacity. As the Fourth Circuit Court

of Appeals has held,

Qualified immunity thus protects government of-

ficials not only from liability, but from trial, in

recognition of the fact that subjecting officials

unnecessarily to trial leads to ‘distraction of of-

ficials from their governmental duties, inhibition

of discretionary action, and deterrance of able

people from public service.’

Turner v. Dammon, 848 F.2d 440, 444 (4th Cir. 1988)

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982))

(emphasis in original). Qualified immunity is largely a mat-

ter of getting the incentives right in order to provide the

proper context within which government officials can con-

scientiously discharge their duties without fear of harass-

ment through litigation and, at the same time, they can

be held liable for the violation of a clearly established

constitutionally-protected right. If an official had no re-

course to qualified immunity, the Damoclean sword of po-

tential litigation would always push the official in favor of

inaction, for ‘‘the person aggrieved by official actions may

be quite willing to sue but the losses to society as a whole

that come from official inaction may be more diffuse and

thus less likely to result in a lawsuit.” Turner, 848 F.2d

at 444. The scope of this protection has been set out by

the Supreme Court in Harlow. In that decision, the Court

held that ‘“‘government officials performing discretionary

functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” 457 U.S. at 818.

Recently, the Fourth Circuit has summarized the test for

qualified immunity in this way, ‘Public officials ... are

clothed with qualified immunity in the performance of dis-

|

47a

cretionary functions when the action does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which the official knows or reasonably should be aware.”’

Bright v. McClure, No. 88-3974, slip op. at 5-6 (4th Cir.

Jan. 17, 1989).

As Harlow has indicated and as a number of subsequent

decisions have reaffirmed, the standard for an official seek-

ing to shield himself under the qualified immunity defense

is an objective and not a subjective standard. 457 U.S. at

818; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107

S.Ct. 3034 (1987). The issue is not whether the official in

| question actually knew that he was violating a right of

the plaintiff, but whether a reasonable person in that of-

ficial’s place would have known that such a right was being

violated. Turner, 848 F.2d at 448; Young v. Lynch, 846

F.2d 960, 963 (4th Cir. 1988). The question is one of

“whether an official acting under the circumstances at

issue reasonably could have believed that his action did

not violate the constitutional rights asserted.’ Sevigny v.

Dicksey, 846 F.2d 958, 956 (4th Cir. 1988). As Justice

Powell, in writing for the Fourth Circuit, has noted, the

question of the applicability of qualified immunity has no

reference at all to the actual good faith of the official, but

rather simply to the objective test as outlined in Harlow

and its progeny. Lane v. Griffin, 834 F.2d 403, 408 (4th

Cir. 1987). Thus, the issue is not what the instant

defendants believed but merely what reasonable people in

the defendarits’ position would have believed about whether

the acts in question violated plaintiffs’ rights.

~ However, it is not necessary for this court to inquire

deeply into the objective standard and ask what a rea-

sonable person in instant defendants’ position would have

known, for another component of the qualified immunity

defense is lacking in the defendants’ position. The qualified

immunity defense applies to government officials who are

performing ‘‘discretionary functions.’’ Anderson, 403 U.S.

at___ , 107 S.Ct. at 3038. In order to make use of qualified

2

48a

immunity protection, defendants would have to show that

their provision of sewer lines to the annexed area — or

their refusal to provide such lines — was a discretionary

function appropriate to an executive, and-not a mere min-

isterial act. Using both the common language understand-

ing of discretionary acts as well as the standards normally

applied by courts, this court finds that the provision of

sewer lines, under the specific aegis of two very explicit

annexation orders, was not a discretionary function em-

blematic of the executive and suitable for qualified im-

munity, but was indisputably a ministerial function.'

Defendants argue that the provision of sewer lines for

the annexed area is a discretionary function and attempt

to rely on comments from the bench made in the context

of the reconvening of the Annexation Court in 1984 as

evidence that the Annexation Court intended to leave with

defendants a degree of discretion, not merely in the timing

but also in the actual provision of sewer lines to parcels

of land in the annexed area. Defendants’ Reply Memoran-

dum In Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgement and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sum-

mary Judgment, as 12-13. Defendants argue that because

Judge Moon of the Annexation Court opined that it would

not be reasonable for plaintiffs to force defendants to blast

through rock at the cost of several million dollars per lot

in order to provide sewer lines, defendants are free to

exercise their discretion and engage in sweeping cost-ben-

efit analysis for the provision of any sewer service to

plaintiffs’ lots. Jd. at 13.

‘One federal court has defined ‘“‘discretionary function” in this way:

“Discretionary functions have been defined as those in which a gov-

ernment official determines what action to take based on an individual,

case-by-case analysis and in which his decision includes elements of

judgment and discretion.”” Biscayne Fed’l Savings & Loan Assoc. v.

Pratt, 646 F. Supp. 371, 376 n. 8 (D.C.D.C. 1986). The clear mandates

of the Annexation Court left defendants without the leeway for judg-

ment and analysis necessary to convert the provision of sewer service

to the annexed area into a discretionary function.

49a

Two responses are appropriate to this contention by the

defendants. First, it is important to note that the situation

about which Judge Moon spoke was obviously an extreme

hypothetical, a situation far different from that presented

by the facts in the case before this court.’ Furthermore,

Judge Moon went on to say that “They [defendants] have

to exercise that discretion reasonably and in accordance

with the representations they have made here.” Jd. Here,

he was referring to representations by defendants that

sewers would indeed be provided to those parcels affected

by the annexation order. Jd. Judge Moon went on to note

that the original annexation order was quite clear and that

the deliberations of this reconvened Annexation Court did

not uncover any significant ambiguity in the terms of that

original annexation order. Jd.

Second, as this court will note in greater detail infra,

the terms of the annexation orders are specific and clear

and therefore suffice to undercut defendants’ claim that

the provision of sewer lines to the parcels owned by

plaintiffs could be considered an act of discretion. In re-

jecting defendants’ attempt to shield themselves with the

defense of absolute immunity, the Fourth Circuit concluded

that “The order of the Virginia Annexation Court removed

what discretion defendants might otherwise have had to

approve or decline plaintiffs’ requests for sewer service.”

Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corp.,

Judge Moon observed that, ‘‘Well, I think they will have to exercise

some discretion, because certainly you [plaintiffs] are not going to make

them go out there and blast through rock that is going to cost several

million dollars to develop a single lot.’’ Defendants’ Reply Memorandum

in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Op-

position to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, at 13. There is

absolutely no evidence in the record that provision of sewer service to

any of the lots in the annexed area would involve a cost-to-benefit ratio

which could even remotely resemble Judge Moon's hypothetical, despite

defendants’ plea that having to provide sewer service to the annexed

area, under the annexation orders, ‘‘would spell financial disaster for

the Town.” Jd. at 11. Such a claim is simple, overheated hyperbole.

50a

slip op. at 5.8 Even though the Fourth Circuit made this

observation within the context of ruling on the absolute

immunity claim and did not address the merits of the

qualified immunity claim in their opinion, this court finds

that their characterization of the lack of the element of

discretion in the provision of sewer lines to plaintiffs’ par-

cels is of considerable guidance in reaching the issue before

us.

Even if one were to construe, as this court does not.

the provision of sewer service for the parcels in question

as a discretionary function, still this court would find the

defendants are unable to utilize the shield of a qualified

immunity defense. Defendants claim that they acted in

good faith in refusing to provide sewer service to plaintiffs’

parcels because they did not believe that they were under

any obligation to provide such service. However, since the

relevant legal test for determining the applicability of qual-

ified immunity is an objective and not a subjective stand-

ard, claims by the defendants about what they knew or

believed to be the case are beside the point. The legal

standard is what someone, standing in shoes of the

defendants, ought to have realized about the rights of the

plaintiffs and the defendants’ legal obligations to the

plaintiffs. Examining the explicit and clear language of the

annexation orders and noting that the Town’s iegal officer

had repeatedly advised defendants that the orders of the

annexation court required the provision of sewer service

to the plaintiffs’ properties, this court concludes that

defendants ought to have known, and that a reasonable

person in their shoes would have known, that the

defendants were under a legal obligation to provide sewer

‘This court is fully aware that the Fourth Circuit ruled simply ‘on

the absolute immunity defense and that that defense is an issue quite

separable from the question of qualified immunity. The Fourth Circuit

did take care to note that “Our decision accordingly reflects no opinion

on the applicability or effect of the qualified immunity defense.”’ Front

Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corp., slip op. at 4, n. 3.

ik am

dla

service to the parcels in question. The advice given to

defendants by their own counsel, the Town’s legal officer,

over a period of several years was on occasion blunt and

specific, advising defendants that the order of the annex-

ation court brooked no interpretation, and that provision

of sewer service to the lands of plaintiffs and to the lands

of others in the annexed area who sought the service was,

in a word, required. This bears dispositively on the ques-

tion of whether the defendants should reasonably have

known of the legal obligation created by the annexation

order. Thus, this court finds that defendants are singularly

ill-placed to attempt to make use of a qualified immunity

defense.

Ill.

Plaintiffs seek summary judgment under a claim that

the refusal of defendants to extend the sewer lines de-

prived the plaintiffs of constitutionally protected property

rights. Plaintiffs argue that defendants’ culpable omission

was an action under color of state law and constitutes a

compensable taking.

Defendants respond to this charge by arguing that

plaintiffs have not been deprived of all possible usages of

their land. Further, defendants contend that plaintiffs

should not be able to maintain a federal cause of action

since adequate state remedies exist for plaintiffs to pursue.

For instance, presumably, plaintiffs could seek to have the

Annexation Court reconvened, for yet another time. In the

alternative, defendants argue that plaintiffs are free to

maintain an independent state cause of action to seek re-

dress.

However, it is proper for plaintiffs to be before this

court on a takings claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Clearly,

the defendants acted under color of state law and, further,

this court finds that said action (the action in this case

consisting of an omission or a denial of a request for a

52a

required action) did deprive plaintiffs of property rights

and does constitute a taking. A restriction on the use

which can be made of property can result in a taking

without compensation and, thus, would qualify a plaintiff

for redress.‘ Board of Supervisors of James City County

v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975). It is true,

as defendants implicitly argue, that the taking or restric-

tion on the use of plaintiffs’ property is temporary in that

the origin of plaintiffs’ claims would be undercut if sewer

service were to be provided in the future.* While that

observation is true, it is not determinative of the takings

issue, for redress is available even in the instance of what

can be arguably construed as a “‘temporary”’ taking. First

English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los

Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987).°

In addition, this court finds it is not established that

adequate state remedies exist for the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs

are not able to force, at least unilaterally, a reconvening

of the Annexation Court. Even if the plaintiffs were in a

position to obtain through their own efforts a reconvened

Annexation Court, that court would not be equipped to

‘As Justice Holmes concluded, for the Court, ‘The general ruie at

least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if

regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Pennsylvania

Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).

* This is not to suggest that plaintiffs’ claims would evaporate if sewer

lines were installed, for the issue of past damages suffered by plaintiffs

still would remain. As the Supreme Court has recently concluded,

“[W]here the government’s activities have already worked a taking of

all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve

it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the

taking was effective.” First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.

County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, ___; 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2389 (1987).

* This court notes that the opinion of the Supreme Court in First

Englist Evangelical Lutheran Church effectively prevents defendants

from relying on Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), to argue that

the temporary nature of the interference with the use of the property

in question removes it from the category of a taking.

Teer

53a

provide the necessary relief for these plaintiffs since an-

nexation courts have only limited remedies at their dis-

posal. An annexation court in Virginia is a creature of

statute and not a court of general jurisdiction. Town of

Christiansburg v. Montgomery County, 216 Va. 654, 222

S.E.2d 5138 (1976).

In this court’s view, there is no need for the Annexation

Court to reconvene vet again. Its original orders were

clear and when it was previously reconvened it not only

reaffirmed those orders but it indicated that the directives

regarding the provision of sewer lines in those orders were

also clear. Defendants attempt to argue that the annex-

ation order contains language which is either conditional

or sufficiently ambiguous in order to justify its position

that defendants were under no legal obligation to provide

sewer lines to parcels of the plaintiffs. However, the an-

nexation order of December 31, 1976, contains the follow-

ing language:

Sewer Facilities: The Town of Front Royal shall

proceed to construct interceptor and collector

sanitary sewer lines in the areas herein decreed

to be annexed as shown for such areas on Town

Exhibit 13, the lines as shown on said exhibit for

the annexation area hereby decreed shall be in-

stalled as soon as they become reasonably nec-

essary and it becomes economically feasible so to

do to serve the residents of the annexation area,

but said improvements shall in any event be com-

pleted within five years from the effective date of

annexation.

Order of the Special Court, € 5(c) (2), page 4, Dec. 31,

1976, (emphasis added). The 1978 Annexation Decree con-

tains parallel language regarding the provision of sewer

lines. Defendants argue that the constraints of reasonable

necessity and economic feasibility operate as conditions

which bracket and define their entire set of ultimate legal

54a

obligations to plaintiffs. Defendants maintain that ‘The

terms of the annexation decrees mandate no more than

that the town treat requests for sewer extensions in the

annexed area just like a request from anywhere else within

the Town.” Defendants Reply Memorandum in Support of

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Op-

position to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 10-

11.

Therefore, defendants conclude that considerations of

economic feasibility could justify never extending sewer

lines to the plaintiffs’ parcels. This is clearly contrary to

the plain language of the annexation orders. Those orders

set out a terminus ante quem for the provision of sewer

service and cost-benefit analysis can operate only within

the temporal boundary set by that terminus. The two an-

nexation orders establish that the Town is obligated to

provide sewer service to the parcels in question within a

certain period and, while the speed with which the sewer

lines are extended may be constrained by an equation of

cost and benefit during the five-year period specified by

each order, it is clear that any such calculus is meant only

to operate prior to the expiration of each five-year period.

When the annexation orders cite the constraints of ne-

cessity and feasibility, that phrase of the orders suggests

a mandate which has the aura of “all deliberate speed.”’

It is nevertheless clear that the discretion granted to

defendants expired within five years of the annexation

orders. In order for defendants to construe the annexation

orders as they wish, they must rely on an interpretation

which runs directly contrary to the clear and unambiguous

language of the orders.’ In short, the defendants can sus-

‘This case is to be distinguished from those cases where the annex-

ation orders are very general in terms and grant localities what is in

effect an open ended arena for discretion. For example, the annexation

orders which establish the legal rights of instant plaintiffs are very

different from the order at issue in City of Staunton v. Cash, where

(Footnote Continued)

tain this position only by eliminating from the annexation

orders the language quoted supra, namely, “‘but said im-

provements shall in any event be completed within five

years from the effective date of annexation.”’

Normally, the question of whether there has been a

taking would be an issue for the trier of fact, but the

affidavits offered reveal that there can be no dispute that

plaintiffs’ parcels are worth so much less that they have

been deprived of property rights. Therefore this court

finds, as a matter of law, there was a taking for which

plaintiffs are entitled to compensation. However, while this

court finds that there can be no genuine dispute about an

issue of material fact which would establish that there was

a taking, there is such a dispute about the amount of

damages which would be appropriate to award in this case.

Therefore, while the court finds that there was a taking

for which defendants are liable, the court also finds that

it is not appropriate within the context of summary judg-

ment to determine the extent or amount of liability. As

plaintiffs concede in their motion for summary judgment,

this issue must be reserved for the trier of fact.

the Supreme Court of Virginia found that

While the annexation decree clearly imposed upon the City

a duty to make improvements in the annexed area, we do

not agree that the duty was of the absolute nature asserted

by [the defendants]. The decree did not require the City to

make any particular improvement at any given time. Ex-

pressing in general terms the duty imposed, the decree left

to the City, in the exercise of discretion, the determination

of what improvements should be made and when they should

be accomplished. The decree contemplated that, in exercis-

ing this discretion, the City properly should consider the

public necessity of proposed projects and the economic fea-

sibility of suggested undertakings.

220 Va. 742, 747, 263 S.E. 2d 45, 49 (1980).

,

56a

IV.

Plaintiffs allege that their rights have been violated un-

der the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-

stitution in its equal protection clause. They argue that

sewer service was provided to other properties which were

similarly situated to the parcels owned by the plaintiffs.

Therefore, to deny sewer service to plaintiffs’ parcels would

constitute unlawful, unequal treatment. In evaluating

plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, it is necessary to distin-

guish between what may be a denial of equal treatment

and what is a legally cognizable denial of equal protection

of the law. For example, burdening citizen X and not

burdening citizen Y when both citizens are members of

the same general class may be unequal treatment, but it

is not necessarily a denial of equal protection. Often, equal

protection refers to violations in regard to certain suspect

classifications such as gender or sex. Instant plaintiffs’

equal protection claim involved a different kind of classi-

fication and must call for a different type of scrutiny or

analysis by the court.

Defendants argue that there has been no equal protec-

tion violation because the factors which led to a denial of

sewer service to plaintiffs’ parcels are those factors which

are appropriate to consider in making decisions about util-

ity extensions. They argue that other municipalities can

consider costs in deciding whether to extend sewer lines.

One initial problem with defendants’ argument is that the

other municipalities to which defendants are comparing

themselves may not be under an explicit, detailed order

of an annexation court to provide sewer lines. Therefore,

it would misconstrue the legal situation for these

defendants to be considered as operating with a blank slate

or in the same position as any other municipal corporation.

Defendants are correct when they note that legislative

activity involving land management and similar decisions

has uniformly been held to merit considerable deference

—

57a

from courts. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1

(1973).*

But, the actions of the defendants are not legislative

activities, but are nondiscretionary ministerial functions

carried out under the aegis of a specific, detailed court

order. The defendants are arguing that the decision not

to extend sewer service must be considered as a garden

variety municipal services decision. Yet, the annexation

orders which form the legal backdrop to this entire matter

mean that the defendants are not free simply to engage

in a cost benefit analysis or to weigh the factors which

municipalities ordinarily weigh when they consider whether

to extend sewer service.

In the area of economic regulation, regulations which

are challenged as violating equal protection clause are not

subject to strict scrutiny by the courts. Rather, the

Supreme Court has stated that

Unless the classification trammels fundamental

personal rights or is drawn upon inherently sus-

pect distinctions such as race, religion, or alien-

age, our decisions presume the constitutionality

of the statutory discriminations and require only

that the classification challenged be rationally re-

lated to a legitimate state interest.... [I]n the

local economic sphere, it is only the invidious

sphere, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot

stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amend-

ment.

New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976) (cita-

tions omitted). In order to prevail on a motion for sum-

‘In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that ‘“‘We deal [here]

with economic and social legislation where legislatures have historically

drawn lines which we respect against the charge of violation of the

Equal Protection Clause if the law be ‘reasonable, not arbitrary’ and

bears ‘a rational relationship to a (permissible) state objective.” Village

of Beile Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (citations omitted).

58a

mary judgment under an equal protection claim. plaintiffs

would have to show that there was no rational relationship

between a legitimate state interest and the decision not

to provide sewer lines to plaintiffs’ parcels—that the

defendants’ refusal to provide sewers was invidious and

wholly arbitrary.

In ferreting out the existence of a rational relationship

between the defendants’ decision and state interests, it is

important to note that it is “a legitimate state interest,”

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432.

440 (1985) or ‘‘a (permissible) state objective,” Village of

Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U-S. 1,8 (1973), to which a

rational relationship must point. Obviously, avoiding the

mandate of the order of the annexation court or preferring

certain property owners for private, self-referential rea-

Sons cannot quality as a “legitimate” or “permissible” state

interest. To what legitimate or permissible state interest

could defendants point? Most equal protection challenges

which are adjudicated under the rational relationship

standard fail, in large measure because the vast majority

of defendants in those cases are Operating within the nor-

mal legal context where a panoply of possible state inter-

ests can be cited. However, as noted passim, instant

defendants are operating within a more constricted legal

universe. State interests which, in other settings, would

be considered legitimate or permissible and would serve

to vindicate a legislative (or administrative) decision are

not available to instant defendants because of the orders

of the annexation court. These orders rightfully circum-

scribe the range of decisions which defendants can lawfully

make. Absent the explicit orders of the annexation court,

defendants could point to the results of cost-benefit anal-

ysis to justify their decision not to extend sewer service.

However, by the very terms of the annexation orders,

defendants are no longer free to cite such considerations

59a

to justify their refusal to extend sewer service.’ Further,

the provisions of the annexation orders are not subject to

challenge as being arbitrary or capricious or overreaching,

for those provisions were reflections of assurances given

to the annexation court by the Town in the course of the

annexation proceedings.

Were this court faced only with a common law claim

that defendants were obligated to provide sewer service

to plaintiffs’ parcels, the outcome of the equal protection

challenge might be quite different. Defendants do allege,

through affidavit, that they based their decision not to

extend the sewer lines on the sort of garden-variety eco-

nomic factors which courts historically conclude merit ju-

dicial deference. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment, 8-10. Reading this testi-

mony in the light most favorable to defendants, as this

court must do in passing on plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment, we find that the purposes articulated by

defendants for their refusal to extend sewer service cannst

count as legitimate state interests, given the legal mandate

imposed upon the town by the annexation orders.

Defendants allege that “The terms of the annexation de-

crees mandate no more than that the Town treat requests

for sewer extensions in the annexed area just like a re-

quest from anywhere else within the Town.” Defendants’

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion

*This court takes note, once again, of Judge Moon’s hypothetical

where he opined that, if it would require blasting through rock and

cost several million dollars, defendants could exercise some discretion.

See infra. However, no evidence has been offered which would suggest

that the situation in any way begins to approach the extreme hypo-

thetical constructed by Judge Moon. For all practical purposes, and

certainly for the purpose of this case, defendants do not have the

discretion to decline to provide sewer service to plaintiffs’ parcels on

the basis of cost and, thus, the expense involved in the provision of

sewer service cannot count as a legitimate or permissible state interest.

60a

for Summary Judgment, 10-11. Such is a manifestly in-

correct interpretation of the annexation orders. Parcel

holders in the annexed area do not stand in the same

relationship to the town as those from the original portion

of the town seeking sewer service. Defendants do not point

to any other state interest which could qualify as a per-

missible anchor for the rational relationships which wouid

justify defendants’ decision to treat plaintiffs differently

from (i.e., unequally) other parcel holders in the annexed

area. By defendants’ own evidence, this court finds that

defendants have identified no permissible state interest

which would allow them to survive plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment.

Since the only explanation for the refusal to extend

sewer service which is offered by defendants cannot count

as a legitimate state interest, this court is obligated to

determine if there are other conceivable state interests

which defendants could advance. The traditional test for

assessing the viability of the rational relationship is not

only whether the state has articulated a rationale, but

whether there is a conceivable basis for a rational rela-

tionship. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983).

Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that “{[W]e think the Alabama

legislature could have reasonably determined that the royalty-owner

exemption would encourage investment in oil or gas production.” Exxon

Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 196 (1983) (emphasis added). See also

Allied Stores of Ohio Vv. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 529 (1959). By the Same

token, the Court has also struck down classifications, on the basis of

the rational relationship test, when it discerned impermissible purposes

behind the classification. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S.

612, 622-23 (1985) (New Mexico cannot grant a special tax exemption

to Vietnam veterans only if they were residents of the state before a

certain arbitrary date); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (Alaska

cannot use length of residency as a differential in distributing dividends

from state’s oil reserves). As the Court concluded in Zobel. the state’s

objective “to reward citizens for past contributions’ cannot count as

‘‘a legitimate state objective.”” 457 U.S. at 63. (The Alaska legislature

had pointed to two other objectives, but the Supreme Court found that

6la

This court can construct no possible rationales for

defendants’ refusal, in the face of a clear court order, to

extend the sewer line except for reasons which ‘‘constitute[

| the very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal

Protection Clause was intended to prevent.”’ Metropolitan

Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 878 (1985). The

issue is not the absence of a rational relationship between

defendants’ denial of sewer service and reasons for that

denial — what is missing is a legitimate or permissible

state interest vindicated by that denial.

Plaintiffs allege, in effect, that there was a conspiracy

among the defendants to provide sewerage to certain par-

cels for personal benefit and to deny it to plaintiffs. While

there is some evidence that this may have been so, the

record does not provide the basis for a finding, under Rule

56, that there was invidious discrimination by defendants

against plaintiffs because there are disputes regarding is-

sues of material fact which relate to defendants’ motiva-

tion in providing sewers and the effect of providing the

sewer lines to some parcels and not to others. However,

it is not necessary to find uncontroverted evidence of a

conspiracy by defendants to reduce the value of plaintiffs’

parcels or to impermissibly deny to plaintiffs sewer service,

for defendants themselves have not been able to identify

any permissible state interest to which defendants’ decision

could bear a rational relationship nor could there feasibly

be any such interest, given the strictures placed upon

defendants by the annexation orders. It is conceded by

this court that state actions are only very rarely struck

down on equal protection grounds under the rational re-

lationship standard. Yet, in this case, it is clear to the

court that defendants were under such a strictly con-

structed judicial mandate that the interests to which a

those objectives were net advanced by the legislative scheme and the

Court noted that, in upholding the law and applying it retroactively to

1959, the Alaska Supreme Court relied solely on the state interest

which was identified as impermissible. Jd. at 62-63.)

62a

rational relationship might ordinarily refer are simply in-

accessable to instant defendants. Therefore, this court

grants plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the

basis of a violation of their right to equal protection of

the laws and, likewise, denies defendants’ motion for sum-

mary judgment on this point.

iP

Defendants seek summary judgment because they argue

that these actions are time barred. They contend that the

statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is two years and

that, since the sewer lines were required to be installed

within five years of the annexation orders and those orders

are dated 1976 and 1978, the statute of limitations on the

actions would have run in 1983 and 1985 respectively. This

court has previously considered the statute of limitations

defense offered by defendants and has found that, since

there was a continuing wrong, plaintiffs’ actions are not

time barred. To this extent, the court reaffirms ~:id adopts

its decision and the reasoning supporting that decision in

its Order and Memorandum Opinion of February 22, 1988.

VI.

In conclusion, the court denies defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on the basis of the qualified immunity

defense and grants plaintiffs’ motion for summary judg-

ment in finding that defense to be inapplicable. The court

grants plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to the

existence of a compensable taking by defendants, reserving

the question of the amount of appropriate damages for

trial. As regards plaintiffs’ claim of denial of equal pro-

tection, this court grants plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment and denies defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, also reserving for trial the question of damages

on this claim. Finally, this court denies defendants’ motion

for summary judgment on the basis of a statute of limi-

tations defense.

63a

An Appropriate Order shall this day issue.

/s/ James H. Michael, Jr.

Judge

March 16, 1989

Date

A TRUE COPY, TESTE

JOYCE F. WITT, CLERK

BY: /s/ P. Hensley

DEPUTY CLERK

64a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

HARRISONBURG DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-0019-H

CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-00120-H

JUDGE JAMES H. MICHAEL, JR.

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY INDUSTRIAL

PART CORPORATION.

Plaintiff

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL. VA. et al.,

Defendants

FRED W. McLAUGHLIN, et ux..

Plaintiffs

y

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL VA, et al..

Defendants

FILED

FEB 22 88

JOYCE F. WITT, Clerk

By: Deputy Clerk

ORDER

For the reasons stated in the accompanying Men

adum Opinion, it is this day

ADJUDGED AND ORDERED

65a

1. Plaintiffs’ motions to strike the affirmative defenses

of statute of limitations, legislative immunity, lack of

standing, res judicata, and failure to exhaust state rem-

edies shall be, and they hereby are, granted.

2. Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the defense of laches in

Civil Action No. 87-0020-H shall be, and it hereby is,

granted.

3. Plaintiffs’ motions to strike the defenses of qualified

immunity, failure to state a claim against defendants Mar-

lowe and Bentley, and failure to show deprivation of prop-

erty shall be, and they hereby are denied.

4. Defendants’ motions to dismiss based on the grounds

of statute of limitations, legislative immunity, qualified im-

munity, collateral estoppel, failure to state a claim as to

defendants Marlowe and Bentley, failure to state a claim

as to equal protection violations, failure to state due proc-

ess claims, and failure to state claims for inverse condem-

nation shall be, and they hereby are, denied.

5. Defendants’ motions to dismiss the claims for punitive

damages against the Town of Front Royal shall be, and

they hereby are, granted.

The clerk is hereby directed to send a certified copy of

this Order, and the accompanying Memorandum Opinion,

to all counsel of record.

ENTERED: — |

JUDGE

February 22, 1988

Date

A TRUE COPY, TESTE

JOYCE F. Wirt, CLERK

By: D. Rhodes

DEPUTY CLERK

66a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

HARRISONBURG DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-0019-H

CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-0020-H

JUDGE JAMES H. MICHAEL, JR.

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY INDUSTRIAL

PARK CORPORATION.

Plaintiff

V.

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VA. et al..

Defendants

FRED W McLAUGHLIN. et uz.

Plaintiffs

V.

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VA. et al..

Defendants

FILED

FEB 22 88

JOYCE F. WITT, Clerk

By: Deputy Clerk

MEMORANDUM OPINION

These companion cases come before the court on mo

tions to strike filed by the plaintiff and motions to dismiss

filed by the defendant. Because the motions filed in the

two cases were virtually identical, the court held one hear

ing and is issuing one opinion. Because

several questions

- 67a

are common to motions made by both sides, the court will

proceed by addressing each issue in turn, noting its rel-

evance to the motions made by the parties. Where ma-

terials outside the pleadings have been received and

considered with respect to an issue, the court will treat

the relevant motion as a motion for partial summary judg-

ment.

Statute of Limitations and Laches

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is the lim-

itation of the forum state for personal injury actions. Wil-

son v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938. 85 L.Ed.2d

254 (1985). The Code of Virginia provides a limitation of

two years for personal injury actions. Va. Code § 8.01-243.

For reasons the court cannot discern, defendants assert

that the cause of action arose in Civil Action 87-0020 on

December 31, 1981, but that the cause of action in Civil

Action 87-0019 did not arise until December 27, 1985. This

latter date was less than two years before the complaints

were filed; thus, plaintiffs’ motion to strike the statute of

limitations defense in Civil Action 87-0019 should be

granted on the face of the pleadings.

In both cases, the court finds that plaintiffs have made

out a claim for a continuing violation and continuing injury.

Cf. Ocean Acres, Ltd. v Dare County Bd. of Health, 707

F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1983). In addition, the court finds that

the plaintiffs had good reason to believe that sewer service

would be provided until they were notifed othewise in a

letter from the City Manager on June 10, 1986. The com-

plaints were filed well within two years of that date. For

these reasons, the court will deny the defendants’ motions

to dismiss based on the statute of limitations grounds and

will grant plaintiffs’ motions to strike the defense. In ad-

dition, the court will grant plaintiffs’ motion to strike the

defense of laches, which was pled only in Civil Action 87-

0020,

68a

Immunities

Defendants have raised three immunity defenses. The

first is that members of the Town Council enjoy absolute

immunity from damage suits under § 1983 for legislative

acts. Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980). Such

immunity applies to local legislators only when they ‘‘func-

tion in a legislative capacity.” Jd. at 279. Applying this

functional task in Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d

1409, 1422-23 (4th Cir. 1983), the Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Circuit determined that a county council func-

tioned in an executive capacity when it denied an appli-

cation for a building permit. In the present case, the Town

Council’s denial of a request for sewer services to a spe-

cific site must likewise be considered an executive act,

particularly in light of the annexation court’s order that

such services be provided. Accordingly, this court will grant

plaintiffs’ motions to strike the defense of legislative im-

munity and will deny defendants’ motions to dismiss as to

this ground.

Defendants have also pled the defense of qualified im-

munity. Officials acting as executives are entitled to con-

sideration of this defense under the standards stated in

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73

L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Scott, 716 F.2d at 1423. Harlow sets

forth an objective test under which officials “are shielded

from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct

does not violate clearly established Statutory or constitu-

tional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 St. Ct. at ARE

L.Ed2d at __.

Defendants in the present case assert that the Town

Council acted in good faith in denying plaintiffs’ request.

The complaints allege bad faith on the part of the

defendants, however, and material submitted by the

plaintiff provide some support for these allegations. There-

fore, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to

i

69a

defendants’ good faith. Moreover, the test of Harlow is

an objective one; it focuses on the “reasonableness of an

official’s conduct, as measured by reference to clearly es-

tablished law.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at _.

73 L.Ed.2d at __ . The court finds that the present record

provides an inadequate basis for making such a determi-

nation. The court therefore will deny defendants’ motions

at this time. Plaintiffs’ motions to strike the affirmative

defense of qualified immunity will also be denied.

Finally, defendants argue that the Supreme Court has

held that municipalities cannot be sued for punitive dam-

ages under § 1983. City of Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc..

453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981). This

argument is well taken, and the court will grant the mo-

tions to dismiss the claims for punitive damages against

the Town of Front Royal.

Standing

Defendants’ objection to standing was based on omis-

sions from the original complaints of allegations that

plaintiffs’ property is located in the annexed area.

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 suit does not rest solely on the orders

of the annexation court, however, and in any case, the

omission has been cured in the amended complaints. The

court finds that the plaintiffs have standing to bring this

action, and the court will grant the motion to strike the

affirmative defense of lack of standing.

Estoppel

Defendants have raised the defense of res judicata, ar-

guing that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the order issued

on December 13, 1984, by the annexation court denying

the plaintiffs’ prayer for an injunction. That order, how-

ever, merely sets forth the court’s decision that the Town’s

revised plan of May, 1984, for the sewage extension to

Happy Creek substantially complied with the annexation

order of October 20, 1978. Moreover, the court explicitly

a

70a

based its decision in part upon “representations by the

Town’s attorney that the Town will comply with the or-

dinances.’’ The record of the hearing indicates that the

court interpreted the attorney’s representations to mean

that service would be provided. Thus, although the an-

nexation court ruled that the Town’s plan substantially

complied with its original order, there remains a question

as to whether the Town remained in compliance by im-

plementing the plan.

Moreover, the present action involves more than the

defendants’ compliance with the orders of the annexation

court. Plaintiffs allege that in refusing them sewer service,

the defendants have denied them equal protection of the

law and deprived them of property without due process

of law or just compensation. These issues were not decided

by the annexation court, which is a court of limited ju-

risdiction. Accordingly, this court will grant plaintiffs’ mo-

tion to strike the defense of res judicata and will deny

defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds of collateral

estoppel.

Liability of the Mayor and Town Manager

Defendants have moved the court to dismiss the com-

plaints against Mayor John Marlowe and Town Manager

Brackenridge Bentley for failure to state a claim against

them. Defendants argue that because Marlowe and Bentley

could not vote on plaintiffs’ request, they are not liable

for the Town Council’s refusal to provide service. The lack

of a vote is not determinative of liability, however; even

private persons may be liable under § 1983 if they willfully

participate in joint action with state officials acting under

the color of state law. Scott, 716 F.2d at 1422. Plaintiffs

here have alleged that even though Marlowe and Bentley

had no vote on the matter, they played a role in the denial

of sewer services to the plaintiffs. Based on the supporting

materials submitted by the parties, the court finds that a

genuine issue of material fact remains as to Marlowe and

Tla

Bentley’s involvement. Accordingly, the court will deny the

motions to dismiss them. The court will deny plaintiffs’

motions to strike the affirmative defense raised on behalf

of Marlowe and Bentley.

Equal Protection

Defendants have moved the court to dismiss plaintiffs’

equal protection claim for failure to state a claim on which

relief can be granted. The United States Supreme Court

has long held that in applying the equal protection clause,

courts should give broad deference to local decisions con-

cerning land use. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416

U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974). Berman v.

Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed.2d 27 (1954).

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47

S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). This rule reflects the gen-

eral equal protection doctrine concerning economic regu-

lations. In New Orleans v Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04,

96 S.Ct. 2518, —__ 49 L.Ed.2d 511 __, (1976), the

Supreme Court stated:

Unless a classification trammels fundamental per-

sonal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect

distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage,

our decisions presume the constitutionality of the

statutory discriminations and require only that

the classification challenged be rationally related

to a legitimate state interest. . .

[I]n the local economic sphere, it is only the in-

vidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act,

which cannot stand consistently with the Four-

teerth Amendment.

Although the equal protection clause places a very light

burden on those who defend an economic regulation, the

burden does exist. In the present case, the plaintiffs have

alleged invidious discrimination, claiming that the Town

denied them sewer services at the same time that it pro-

ee

72a

vided such services to a competing industrial park devel-

opment in which the Town itself has an interest. In the

face of this allegation, the defendants’ simple denial does

not meet the burden imposed upon them under equal pro-

tection analysis. On the present state of the record, there-

fore, the court will deny defendants’ motions to dismiss.

Due Process and State Remedies

Defendants argue that plaintiffs have no due process

claim because adequate state remedies exist which provide

due process. In support of this argument, defendants cite

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.

2d 420 (1981), rev’d on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams.

474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662, (1986).

Defendants’ reliance on these cases is seriously misplaced,

however. The holding of these cases is that a due process

claim does not arise when a government official’s negligent

act causes unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or

property. Deliberate decisions to deprive a person of life,

liberty or property are subject to the due process clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment; indeed, the due process

clause was “intended to secure the individual from the

arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.” Daniels,

474 U.S. at 331, citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.

916, 527 (1884) (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4

Wheat. 235, 244 (1819)).

The deprivation alleged by plaintiffs here was caused

not by negligence, but by deliberate decisions of the Town

Council. Plaintiffs have stated a claim under the due proc-

ess clause, and § 1983 remains available to vindicate their

due process rights. Accordingly, the court will deny

defendants’ motions to dismiss as to this ground. The court

will also grant plaintiffs’ motions to strike the affirmative

defense of failure to exhaust state remedies. No such re-

quiremert applies to this action.

73a

Inverse Condemnation

Defendants have moved the court to dismiss plaintiffs’

inverse condemnation claim on the grounds that no taking

has occurred within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.

Paragraph sixteen of the complaint in Civil Action 87-0019

states that “‘the refusal of the Defendants to provide sewer

service denies the Plaintiff of the economically viable and

all reasonable use of its land.’ Similarly, paragraph sev-

enteen of the complaint in Civil Action 87-0020 alleges

that “‘the policies and actions of the Defendants, individ-

ually and in combination, have prevented the Plaintiffs

from making any economically viable or reasonable use of

their land.” The present record contains no evidence chal-

lenging these allegations, nor have the defendants pre-

sented the court with any authority that holds that as a

matter of law, denial of sewer service may not constitute

a taking. For the purposes of defendants’ motions to dis-

miss, therefore, the court must treat the cited allegations

as true, and doing so, the court finds that plaintiffs have

made out a claim of inverse condemnation. Accordingly,

the court will deny defendants’ motions to dismiss as to

this ground. The court will deny plaintiffs’ motion to strike

the related defense, however.

An appropriate Order shall this day issue.

ENTERED:

Judge

February 22, 1988

Date

74a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 90-1875

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY INDUSTRIAL

PARK CORPORATION, a Virginia Corporation; FRED W.

MCLAUGHLIN; GLADYS L. MCLAUGHLIN

Plaintiffs-Appellees

V.

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA, VIRGINIA.

municipal corporation; JOHN MARLOW. ame: ae

as Mayor of the Town of Front Royal: MICHAEL

KITTS, individually and as a member of the Town

Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia; EDWIN

L. POMEROY, individually and as a former member of

the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia;

ALBERT G. RUFF, JR., individually and as a former

member of the Town Council of the Town of Front

Royal, Virginia; GEORGE E. BANKS. individually and as

a former member of the Town Council of the Town of

Front Royal, Virginia, BRACKENRIDGE H. BENTLEY.

individually and as Town Manager of the Town of Front

Royal, Virginia

Defendants-Anpellants

COO

75a

No. 90-1884

VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES: LOCAL

GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS OF VIRGINIA.

INCORPORATED

Amici Curiae

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY INDUSTRIAL

PARK CORPORATION, a Virginia Corporation; FRED W.

MCLAUGHLIN; GLADYS L. MCLAUGHLIN

Plaintiffs-Appellants

V.

TOWN FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA, a municipal

corporation; JOHN MARLOW, individually and as Mayor

of the Town of Front Royal; MICHAEL KITTS,

individually and as a member of the Town Council of

the Town of Front Royal, Virginia; EDWIN L.

POMEROY, individually and as a former member of the

Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia:

ALBERT G. RUFF, JR., individually and as a former

member of Town Council of the Town of Front Royal,

Virginia; GEORGE E. BANKS, individually and as a

former member of the Town Council of the Town of

Front Royal, Virginia; BRACKENRIDGE H. BENTLEY,

individually and as Town Manager of the Town of Front

Royal, Virginia

Defendants-Appellees

VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES: LOCAL

GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS OF VIRGINIA.

INCORPORATED

Amici Curiae

On Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing

In Bane

76a

Appellee/cross-appellant has filed a petition for rehear-

ing with suggestion for rehearing in banc. No member of

the Court requested a poll on suggestion for rehearing in

bane, and the original judicial panel voted to deny the

petition for rehearing.

The Court denies the petition for rehearing with sug

gestion for rehearing in banc.

Entered at the direction of Judge Ervin, with the con-

currence of Judge Sprouse and Judge Wilkins.

For the Court.

JOHN M. GREACEN

CLERK

77a

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WARREN COUNTY

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL

V.

COUNTY OF WARREN

DECREE OF ANNEXATION

This proceeding, instituted on motion of the Town of

Front Royal for the annexation of certain territory situate

in Warren County by virtue of an annexation ordinance

adopted on December 22, 1973, seeking to annex the ter-

ritory described therein, this day came on again to be

heard upon said ordinance and notice thereof. upon the

pretrial orders entered herein, upon the stipulations en-

tered into by and between the Town of Front Royai and

the County of Warren, upon the motion of Curtis E.

Thompson et als to intervene herein filed on April 19,

1976, upon the like motion of Cleveland Chair Company

et als, filed on June 15, 1976, upon the evidence and

exhibits heretofore taken and filed, and upon the argu-

ments of counsel.

And the Court, being now fully advised in the premises

and having matured its judgment and having reached a

unanimous decision in accordance with the stipulations en-

tered into by and between the parties hereto, as reflected

by the opinion of this Court set forth in writing and filed

in the Clerk’s office herereof doth ADJUDGE, ORDER

and DECREE as follows:

1. Jurisdiction

(a) The Annexation Court, consisting of Judge M. M.

Long, Jr. of the Thirtieth Judicial Circuit, Judge W. Coer-

rington Thompson of the Twenty-second Judicial Circuit.

and the Resident Judge Joshua L. Robinson of the Twenty-

Sixth Judicial Circuit, was duly constituted and convened

as provided by law;

—

he Town of Front Royal has di

: anner required by law, an annexation ordinance,

’ v? ry Yr)?

4\4hi

ily adopted and

ind said ordinance and the map attached thereto compl)

n form and content with the requirements of the statutes

{ this State in such cases made and provided, and a cop:

t the notice and ordinance have been duly served on each

member of the governing body of Warren County, upor

the Commonwealth Attorney for said County as required

\ iw, and sucn notice and ordinance nave been DUuodiSNned

i required DV iaw

. 4 hy 4 he + 'y _ _+ ) . n I lhe , +« an l. " y ‘

(c) The Town of Front Royal has substantially complied

+} +>) ’ " rrint \r) .+ + ) ‘ + . > , ‘yY ‘ ’ +

A le conaltions of tne last preceding annexa ! I

I

vnc! tne Iinal raer was entered more tnan I! ¢ Cal

prior t tne institution of this proceeding

(a) All proper jurisdictional steps have been

ryyyY O tT} r? O¢ +), oO nr per ' ‘ ’ a ’ { rt

l ‘ | te > ir Pe

(a) intervening etitions

It appearing tne rt tnat tne sald petit Ss

ntervene therein were not timely filed and should not be

‘

ral ted ic y- tne re 1S ne C6 ; + on \ tne oo rt , ths

Trancerinft 4 + tr? re) , qQriy ¥ \y ] \ 1076 ) ‘ y Ti? ’

L ALLO | i Cal az 4iy iwi SaiU bt

TO y Té rve rieé sé r¢ rT? ere! \ 1¢ ’ ed t wer r 1( > y | mal’

Court Insel for intervenors duly except

2. Necessity and Expediency

ine ( lY S Satished and eredy aetermines tnat tne

> + . " _ _ ) , | | > ‘< - ‘ ] ,

annexation nerein aecreed 1S Dotn necessary and expedient

va' Varet abate +} ) } sof + “Oct ee ‘ } i 3 "arro

considering the best interests of the County of Warren

ina tne T wn f Front R val. the best interests service

ana tne OWN Ol ont VOVal, tne DeSt Interests, Services

T e ) rp ‘ ) ye) ‘ af © ‘or ) Orponwyp

to be rendered and needs of the area herein decreed to

in r por

be annexed, and the best interests of the remai

. , .

tinne + W: -y ) Shale.

LIUITIS Ul arren ( OUNLY.

_

(Ya

3. Territory Annexed

The territory which should be and is hereby decreed to

be annexed to the Town of Front Royal contains 4.23

Square miles, all of which is situate in the County of War

ren, and which territory contains a population of 960 per

sons. The area decreed to be annexed is described by

metes and bounds as follows:

‘ ) ) —— “wr +) . ¢ | P . } ene

Metes ana Bounds descriptions OF tne annexed area

tha — + 4 ye + J grey Vire ~~ r\)e

the Town of Front Royal, Virginia

Northwest Parcel

“BEGINNING at a point having Virginia coordinates

North 462,992.05 and East 2,081,524.89, in the old cor-

porate limit line in the centerline of the Shenandoah River.

South Fork at the intersection of Punches Run: thence

with the centerline of Punches Run and the new annex-

ation line the following twelve courses: N 46-11-20 W

469.85 feet; N 30-10-33 E 133.46 feet; N 81-36-27 W 232.00

feet; N 61-44-53 W 95.41 feet; N 19-19-42 W 672.65 feet;

N 71-01-30 W 120.04 feet; N 42-14-19 W 203.00 feet: N

79-47-20 W 114.88 feet; N 29-43-53 W-268.12 feet: N 71-

30-40 W 174.93 feet; N 52-43-24 W 557.69 feet: N 46-56-

32 W 334.80 feet to a point in the west line of the Potomic

Edison Power Line easement; thence with the west line

of said easement the following five courses: N 40-59-43 E

1130.11 feet; S 49-00-17 E 25.00 feet: N 40-59-43 E 1243.68

feet; N 32-14-08 E 881.31 feet; N 28-59-19 E 6.10 feet to

a point in the southerly line of Forest Hills Subdivision:

thence with the lines of Forest Hills Subdivision the fol-

lowing three courses: N 71-06-40 W 102.84 feet to a point;

N 28-18-20 E 895.48 feet; S 70-02-47 E 121.71 feet to a

point in the west line of the Potomic Edison Power Line

easement and on the southerly side of the Southern Rail-

road right-of-way; thence with the west line of said Power

easement and crossing the Railroad: N 32-22-03 E 210.44

80a

feet to a point in the centerline of the Shenandoah River

North fork; thence with the centerline of the said river,

the following six courses: S 72-31-51 E 1541.22 feet; S

65-12-06 E 3640.71 feet; S 60-46-51 E 338.01 feet; S 47-

30-23 E 1051.06 feet; S 54-53-17 E 391.18 feet; S 74-06-

25 E 748.62 feet to the centerline intersection of the Shen-

andoah River South Fork and the centerline of Happy

Creek; thence with the old corporate limit line and the

centerline of the Shenandoah River South Fork, upstream

to the beginning.’’ Containing 606. acres more or less.

Easterly and Southerly Parcel

“BEGINNING at a point having Virginia coordinates

North 451,620.40 and East 2,088,064.96, in the old cor-

porate limit line on the south side of Criser Road corner

to the Shenandoah National park and N 11-00-39 E 20.11

feet from a concrete monument; thence with the old cor-

porate limit line to a point in Happy Creek where said

line intersects the new line opposite the Donaldson Estate

fence; thence with a new line and the Donaldson Estate

fence (through the major angle points) the following six

courses, S 76-46-36 E 964.76 feet; S 6-25-01 E 340.07 feet;

E 3-46-09 W 247 feet; S 82-24-48 E 3239.34 feet to an

iron rod, said rod being S 15-44-36.5 W 4173.90 feet from

a U.S.C.& G. station designated ‘‘Happy”’ bearing Virginia

Grid coordinates North 465,498.15 and East 2,094,444.50;

continuing with the Donaldson Estate fence S 6-06-45 W

755.74 feet; S 9-45-11 E 1147.55 feet to an iron rod on

the Northerly side of the Southern Railroad Right-of-way;

thence with the Northern side of said Right-of-way the

following four courses: N 75-25-42 E 2148.03 feet; thence

along an arc bearing to the right, having a radius of

1484.65 feet a distance of 1279.65 feet; S 57-31-33 E 401.70

feet; thence along an arc, bearing to the left having a

radius of 1887.00 feet, a distance of 1877.97 feet to a pin

set in concrete on the Easterly side of Route 606; thence

with the easterly side of Route 606 the following two

courses N 3-59-05 W 72.95 feet to a pin set; N 11-52-28

Sla

W 237.05 feet to a pin set; thence Route 606 in an easterly

direction, N 62-24-58 E 200.00 feet to a pin set; thence

in a southerly direction S 11-52-28 E 236.45 feet to a pin

set; thence S 1-59-05 W 756 feet to a pin set on the

Northerly side of the Southern Railroad Right-of-way:

thence S 2-46-20 W 7129.02 feet to a pin set in the cen-

terline of pavement of Route 55; thence leaving Route 55

and with the Easterly line of a Right-of-way from Route

55 to the line of the United States Government the fol-

lowing four courses: S 26-19-32 W 246.09 feet thence along

an arc bearing to the left, having a radius of 303.39 feet.

a distance of 168.91 feet to a point of reverse curve:

thence along an arc bearing to the right having a radius

of 595.90 feet a distance of 153.75 feet: S 9-12-32 W

115.35 feet to a point in the line of the United States

Government; thence with said Government line the follow-

ing twenty-two courses: N 58-53-08 W 69.82 feet to a

Monument # 107; S 20-16-02 W 233.47 feet to a mon. #

108; N 80-21-51 W 1461.25 feet to Mon. # 109: S 39-04-

17 W 850.76 feet to Mon. # 110; S 19-18-35 W 3012.75

Feet to Mon. # 111; S 38-01-23 W 322.50 feet to Mon.

#112; N 37-30-29 W 662.26 feet to Mon. # 113: N 58-40-

40 W 927.56 feet to Mon. # 114: S 87-51-47 W 303.59

feet to Mon. # 115; N 49-34-44 W 1250.30 feet to Mon.

# 116; N 85-55-43 W 1145.58 feet to Mon. # 117: S 27-

08-15 W 680.80 feet to Mon. # 118; S 24-43-12 W and

crossing Route 522, 1627.54 feet to Mon. #1; S 55-36-08

E 78.25 feet to Mon. #2; S 16-12-16 E 252.62 feet to Mon.

# 3; S 21-08-57 E 126.45 feet to Mon. #4; S 37-14-16 E

357.08 feet to a point; S 6-05-30 E 379.73 feet to Mon.

#6; S 56-36-56 W 237.56 feet to Mon. #7: S 38-15-33 W

476.80 feet to Mon. #8; S 42-53-51 W 295.93 feet to a

point; S 44-54-40 W 66.00 feet to Mon. #10, Park desig-

nation ‘“‘W-36”’, corner to the Shenandoah National Park:

thence with Park line the following sixteen courses: N 76-

35-20 W 2185.87 feet to a rock pile; N 33-32-01 E 132.00

feet; N 15-32-01 E 198.00 feet; N 26-32-01 E 198.00 feet:

82a

N 19-32-01 E 396.06 feet; N 10-82-01 E 118.80 feet; N

17-32-01 E 198.00 feet; N 7-47-01 E 462.00 Feet; N 8-57-

58 W 198.00 feet; N 36-40-27 W 220.84 feet to a rock

pile; N 49-39-31 W 365.95 feet; N 29-23-37 W 257.40 feet;

N 42-38-37 W 429.00 feet; N 35-38-37 W 198.00 feet; N

15-21-23 E 118.80 feet to a rock pile; N 11-00-39 E 1902.11

feet and passing through a concrete monument to the be-

ginning.’’ Containing 1818. acres more or less.

4. Reasonably Compact Body of Land

The area described in paragraph 3 above when taken

together with the present Town of Front Royal forms a

reasonably compact body of land and such area is adapted

to town improvements and will be needed in the reasonably

near future for development.

5. Terms and Conditions of Annexation

(a) Public Debt, Schools: The Town of Front Royal shall

assume no public debt of the County of Warren in this

proceeding, none of the assessed values of the County

being removed thereby, nor is any feature of the operation

of the schools of the County of Warren affected by virtue

of this decree.

(b) Loss of Revenue: The Town of Front Royal shall

annually, for a period of five years, beginning with year

1977, pay to the County of Warren, as loss of sales tax

funds, the sum of Twenty-four Thousand Twenty Dollars

($24,020.00), and also-for a period of five years, beginning

with the year 1977, the Town shall reimburse the County

annually the sum of Forty-two Hundred Seventy Dollars

($4270.00), for the loss of ABC funds. Said payments shall

be paid on July 1 of each of the five years.

(c) Capital Outlay and Provision of Services:

(1) Water Facilities: The Town of Front Royal shall

proceed with the construction of water supply mains and

distribution lines in the areas herein ordered to be annexed

BE Nitta si li serait it isc

83a

as shown for such areas on Town Exhibit 11: the mains

as shown on said Exhibit for the annexation area hereby

decreed shall be installed as soon as they become reason-

ably necessary and it becomes economically feasible so to

do to serve the residents of the annexation area, but said

improvements shall in any event be completed within five

years from the effective date of annexation.

(2) Sewer Facilities: The Town of Front Royal shall

proceed to construct interceptor and collector sanitary

sewer lines in the areas herein decreed to be annexed as

shown for such areas on Town Exhibit 13: the lines as

shown on said Exhibit for the annexation area hereby

decreed shall be installed as soon as they become reason-

ably necessary and it becomes economically feasible so to

do to serve the residents of the annexation area, but said

improvements shall in any event be completed within five

years from the effective date of annexation.

(3) Extension of Other Municipal Services: The Town

of Front Royal shall, upon the effective date of annexation,

extend to the area decreed to be annexed the same police

protection, fire protection, planning and zoning, garbage

collection and other general governmental services, in the

same manner and to the same extent as they are now or

may in the future be furnished to the residents of the

existing Town.

(4) If the Town of Front Royal Becomes a City Within

Five Years: In the even that the Town of Front Royal,

through the action of its council, becomes a city within

five years from the effective date of this decree, this Court

shall be reconvened to require such city to make such

payments as are provided for in Paragraph C of Section

15.1-1042 of the 1950 Code of Virginia, as amended, for

a period not to exceed five years from the date that said

Town becomes a city.

84a

6. Map to be Recorded

The map of the area decreed to be annexed as filed

herewith and hereby made a part of this decree shall be

recorded in the Clerk’s office of the Circuit Court of War-

ren County.

7. Payment of Costs

The Town of Front Royal shall pay the costs of this

proceeding, including the per diem and expenses of the

court reporter.

8. Opinion

The opinion of this Court shall constitute the written

opinion of the Court required by law, and such opinion is

hereby made a part of the record in this proceeding. The

opinion is set forth in the transcript of the hearing of July

9, 1976.

9. Effective Date of Annexation

The annexation hereby decreed shall become effective

at midnight on December 31, 1976. After such effective

date the territory hereby decreed to be annexed shall be

governed, managed and controlled under and pursuant to

the terms and provisions of the charter of the Town of

Front Royal as amended, and shall in every respect be a

part of the Town and so governed.

—. 10. Adjournment

It is decreed that this Court be adjourned, but not dis-

solved, subject to being reconvened in the manner provided

by law at any time during a period of five years from the

effective date of this decree.

85a

Judge, Thirtieth Judicial Circuit

Judge, Twenty-Second Judicial

Circuit

. . “°

Judge, Twenty-Sixth Judicial Circuit

86a

VIRGINIA, IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WARREN

COUNTY:

FRONT ROYAL AND WARRREN COUNTY INDUSTRIAL

PART CORPORATION, et als

Vv.

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL

and

COUNTY OF WARREN

DECREE OF ANNEXATION

This proceeding, instituted on the petition of more than

ol per centum of the qualified voters of the territory,

sought to be annexed and others, this day came on again

to be heard upon said petition for annexation and notice

thereof; upon the pretrial orders entered herein; upon mo-

tion of R. Alton Morrison in open court that he be per-

mitted to intervene herein, said motion was granted, and

he was made a party to this suit: upon the evidence and

exhibits heretofore taken and filed. upon the full and com-

plete view by the Court of the areas proposed to be an-

nexed and territories adjacent thereto and upon the

arguments of counsel.

And the Court, being now fully advised in the premises

and having matured its judgment and having reached a

unanimous decision in accordance with the evidence and

the argument of counsel, as reflected by the opinion of

this Court set forth in writing and filed in the Clerk’s

Office hereof which is hereby made a part of the record

herein, doth ADJUDGE, ORDER, and DECREE as fol-

lows:

1. Jurisdiction

(a) The Annexation Court, consisting of Judge John A.

Jamison of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit. Judge Rober C.

Goad of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial Circuit. and Judge

Duncan C. Gibb of the Twenty-Sixth Judicial Circuit, the

ence citi sar i

87a

Resident and Presiding Judge, was duly constituted and

convened as provided by law.

(b) That the petition for annexation together with the

map attached thereto comply in form and content with

the requirements of the statutes of this State in such cases

made and provided, and a copy of said petition has been

duly served on the governing body of the Town of Front

Royal and its Town Attorney and a like copy having been

served upon each member of the governing body of the

County of Warren and its Commonwealth Attorney as re-

quired by law, and such petition and map have been pub-

lished as required by law.

(c) All proper jurisdictional steps have been taken to

bring this proceeding properly before this court.

2. Necessity and Expediency

The Court is satisfied and hereby determines that the

annexation herein decreed is both necessary and expedient,

considering the best interests of the County of Warren

and the Town of Front Royal, the best interests, services

to be rendered and needs of the area herein decreed to

be annexed, and the best interests of the remaining por-

tions of Warren County.

3. Territory Annexed

The territory which should be and is hereby decreed to

be annexed to the Town of Front Royal contains 595.8

acres, all of which is situated in the County of Warren,

which territory contains a population of 31 persons. The

area decreed to be annexed is described by metes and

bounds as follows, according to a survey made by William

Hall, Certified Land Surveyor, on September 11. 1978, to-

wit:

“BEGINNING at an iron pin found at a corner of the

Donaldson estate, said point being a corner of the recently

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acres OI land, more or less.

1. Reasonably Compact Body of Land

The area described in paragraph 3 above, when taken

gether with the present Town of Front Royal forms a

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». Terms and Conditions of Annexation

(a) Public Debt, School, Loss of Revenue: The Town of

Front Royal shall assume no public debt of the County of

Warren in this proceeding, none of the assessed values of

the County being removed thereby, nor is any feature of

the operation of the schools of the County of Warren

affected by virtue of this decree nor is there any com-

pensable loss of revenue due the County of Warren by

virtue of the annexation herein decreed.

(b) Capital Outlay and Prowision for Se rvices:

(1) Water Facilities: It appearing to the Court that

town water has already been extended to the boundaries

of the annexation area, it is accordingly ordered that the

town shall extend water service into said area as svon as

it becomes reasonably necessary and economically feasible

so to do in accordance with the then existing town policy.

(2) Sewer Facilities: The Town of Front Royal shall

proceed to construct interceptor and collector sanitary

sewer lines in the areas herein decreed to be annexed and

shall construct two pumping stations therein in accordance

with the testimony of engineer expert witness, Massie, one

90a

to be located in the area annexed belonging to the original

petitioners, and the other to be located on the area an-

nexed belonging to R. Alton Morrison, as soon as they

become reasonably necessary and it becomes economically

feasible so to do to serve the residents of the annexed

area or any industrial concerns which locate therein but

said improvements including the two pumping stations re-

ferred to above shall be completed within five years from

the effective date of annexation.

(3) Extension of other Municipal Services: The Town

of Front Royal shall, upon the effective date of annexation,

extend to the area decreed to be annexed the same police

protection, fire protection, planning and zoning, garbage

collection and other general governmental services, in the

same manner and to the same extent as they are now or

“may in the future be furnished to the residents of the

existing Town.

6. Map to be Recorded

The map of the area decreed to be annexed as filed

herewith and hereby made a part of the decree shall be

recorded in the Clerk’s Office of the Circuit Court of War-

ren County in accordance with Section 15.1-1051 of the

Code of Virginia.

7. Payment of Costs

After due corsideration as to who should pay the costs

of this proceeding and in what proportions, the Town of

Front Royal shall pay 50% of the costs of the final survey,

R. Alton Morrison shall pay 35% of the costs of the final

survey and the other petitioners shall pay 15% of the costs

of the final survey; the Town of Front Royal, County of

Warren, R. Alton Morrison and the other petitioners shall

each pay 25% of the expenses of the Court Reporter,

including the per diem; and all other costs are to be paid

by those who incurred them.

9la

8. Opinion

The opinion of this Court shall constitute the written

opinion of the Court required by law, and such opinion is

hereby made a part of the record in this proceeding.

9. Effective Date of Annexation

The annexation hereby decreed shall become effective

at midnight on December 31, 1978. After such effective

date the territory hereby decreed to be annexed shall be

governed, managed and controlled under and pursuant to

the terms and provisions of the charter of the Town of

Front Royal as amended, and shall in every respect be a

part of the Town and so governed.

10. Adjournment

It is decreed that this Court be adjourned, but not dis-

solved, subject to being reconvened in the manner provided

by law at any time during a period of five years from the

effective date of this decree.

Judge, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit

Judge, Twenty-Fourth Judicial

Circuit

Judge, Twenty-Sixth Judicial Circuit

ENTER October 20 1978

We request the entry of this Decree:

Q9.

a

seen:

Counsel for Town of Front Royal

SEEN AND EXCEPTED TO:

Counsel for Warren-County

93a

11 September 1978

Description of

Land Subject to Annexation Petition

Town of Front Royal

Warren County, Virginia

Beginning at an iron pin found at a corner of the

Donaldson estate, said point being a corner of the

recently annexed area of the Town of Front Royal as

described by Joseph G. Brogan, Land Surveyer; thence

leaving the existing town boundary

North 41°51'04” East, 3625.09 feet running through the

property of Morrison to an iron pin set by a fence

post, a corner of the Duncan property; thence

South 75°33’21” East, 3587.39 feet running with the av-

erage line of the fence between the Morrison and the

Duncan properties and crossing State Road Route 606

to an iron pin set in the easterly line of Route 606

and in the line of the Atwood property; thence

South 18°27’26” West, 371.70 feet running with the east-

erly line of Route 606 to an iron pin set by a fence

post, a corner of Atwood; thence leaving Route 606

South 79°10’49” East, 2204.13 feet running with the line

of Atwood to an iron pin set at a fence corner: thence

South 11°26’49” East, 1025.66 feet to an iron pin set in

the northerly line of the Southern Railroad: thence

leaving the Atwood property

South 49°00’47” East, 114.52 feet crossing the Southern

Railroad and crossing State Road Route 647 to an

iron pin set in the southerly line of Route 647, a

corner of the Baltimore and Robinson properties;

thence running with the southerly line of Route 647

the average courses and distances of which are

South 61°05’55” West, 87.15 feet to a point of curvature;

thence along a curve to the left having a radius of

2192.77 feet, an are length of 297.51 feet, and a chord

bearing and distance of

94a

South 57°12’43” West, 297.28 feet to a point of tangency;

thence

South 53°19’30” West, 2424.04 feet to a point of curva-

ture; thence along a curve to the right having a radius

of 1898.65 feet, an are length of 201.41 feet, and a

chord bearing and distance of

South 56°21’50” West, 201.31 feet to a point of tangency;

thence

South 59°24’10” West, 143.14 feet to an iron pin set where

the southerly line of Route 647 intersects the existing

town boundary, said point bearing South 02°46’2”

West, 102.19 feet from an iron pin found at a corner

of the recently annexed area of the Town of Front

Royal, said reference pin being in the northerly line

of the Southern Railroad; thence leaving the southerly

line of Route 647 and running with the existing town

boundary to the point of beginning, containing 595.8

acres of land, more or less.

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96a

ANNEXATION COURT ORDER DATED

JANUARY 20, 1984

COMMON LAW ORDER BOOK 6 PAGE 489

In the Circuit Court of the County of Warren, State of

Virginia, on Friday, the twentieth day of January, in the

year of Our Lord, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fighty-

Four.

Present: The Honorable Wiley R. Wright, Judge Des-

ignate

The Honorable B. A. Davis, III, Judge Des-

ignate

The Honorable Norman K. Moon, Judge Des-

ignate

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY

INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION, et al.

if

TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL and COUNTY OF WARREN

AT LAW NO. 4596

ORDER

This matter came on to be heard on the 27th day of

December, 1983, before a three-judge court composed of

the Honorable Wiley R. Wright, Judge of the Fighteenth

Judicial Circuit, designated resident judge; Honorable B.A.

Davis, II, Judge of the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit:

and the Honorable Norman K. Moon, Judge of the Twenty-

Fourth Judicial Circuit, pursuant to their designation by

order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Vir-

ginia, dated the 14th day of October, 1983, to hear this

matter on the petition of the Front Royal and Warren

County Industrial Park Corporation, et als, to require the

Town of Front Roya! to comply with the Annexation Order

entered in this matter on the 20th day of October, 1978.

97a

and upon the response to said petition by the Town of

Front Royal, and was argued by counsel.

And the Court, being fully advised of the premises,

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