Opposition Brief — Adkins v. General Motors Corp.

Veep VV, Vee

No. 91-1151

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IN THE APR 15 1992

Supreme Court of the Gnited SpgsFeBse OF THE cierk

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

JOHN J. ADKINS, et al.,

Petitioners,

7,

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION

AND

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRONIC, ELECTRICAL,

SALARIED, MACHINE & FURNITURE WORKERS,

AFL-CIO, Loca. 801

AND

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRONIC, ELECTRICAL,

SALARIED, MACHINE & FURNITURE WoRKERS, AFL-CIO,

Respondents.

On Petition For Certiorari To The

United States Court of Appeals

For the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF OF IUE LOCAL 801 AND THE IUE

IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

RICHARD F. RICE

3641 Office Park Drive

Kettering, Ohio 45439

513-294-1491

JAMES G. MAuRO, JR.*

1126 16th Street N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

202-296-1200

Attorneys for Respondent Unions

“Counsel of Record

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

(1) Whether the United States Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit erred in finding that Petitioners’

fraud, misrepresentation, tortious interference and

emotional distress claims, which arise out of a

collectively bargained agreement, are preempted

by § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act?

(2) Whether the United States Court of Appeals’ find-

ing of federal preemption in this case is in conflict

with that of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in

Wells v. General Motors Corporation, 881 F.2d

166 (5th Cir. 1989)?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS

FETT AIRE? initcnesecipsinsdadedutabinnicesseaecssiabiaiauienmeasine

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF CASE ............cccceceeeeeeee

ATGUTEEINS svexsscgncnscceseecvencooesneseannsabbarsapiesetalakeiness

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY

FOUND THAT STATE LAW CLAIMS WERE

PREEMPTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH WELL-

ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT. ................s00000

Il. THE PETITIONERS ERR IN ASSERTING A

CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OPINION OF THE

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIR-

CUIT IN THE PRESENT CASE AND THE

COURT OF APPEALS IN WELLS V. GEN-

ERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 881 F.2d 166

(Bth Clie. WOODY ccicsicescccscucescetvie botieseraneen

CONCLANSIIRS + cssicsnssntcsitavastongeenrestelaaa ned iaeanass

12

14

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Adkins vs. International Union of Electrical, Radio

and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, et al.,

769 F.2d 330 (6th Cir 1985) .............::ceeeeeeeeees 3

Air Line Pilots Association v. O’Neill, _—_ U.S. —

111 S. Ct. 1127 (1991) ................cccssssssssccsccees 8

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202

(1985) .....cssccscscsssscssscsssceseccssssnscesersvscssenscensesens 6,11

Anderson v. United Paper Workers International

Union, 641 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1981) .............- 12

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386

(1987) ....ccccsscssssccscssssscesessscesscsseesessssrsserssenasenees 7,10

Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Teams-

ters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) «2.0... .eeeeesseeeeeeeeeeeeeees 3

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v.

Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987) .....cecccccereeeeeeeees 7,11

Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486

U.S. 399 (1988) ........cccccsseccessssssererreeesssssseeeens 7

Storey v. Local 827, International Brotherhood of

*eamsters, 759 F.2d 517 (6th Cir. 1985) ....... 12

United Steelworkers of America v. Rawson, 495 U.S.

BEZQ (1990) ........ssccceesssccesseeeeereccssseessessseeseeesenees 12

Vaca v. Sipes, 8386 US 171 (1967) ......seeeeeeeerees 8

Wells v. General Motors Corporation, 881 F.2d 166

(Bth Cir. 1989) .......ccscesseceseseeesseeeseeeesenseeeees i,12,13

eel

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

ee

No. 91-1151

JOHN J. ADKINS, et al., vo

Petitioners,

V.

GENERAL Motors CorPORATION

AND

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRONIC, ELECTRICAL,

SALARIED, MACHINE & FURNITURE WORKERS,

AFL-CIO, Loca 801 ,

AND

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRONIC, ELECTRICAL,

SALARIED, MACHINE & FURNITURE Workers, AFL-CIO, 4

Respondents.

——___

On Petition For Certiorari To The

United States Court of Appeals

For the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF OF IUE LOCAL 801 AND THE IUE

IN OPPOSITION i PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit (Pet. App., pp. 1-26) is reported at 946 F.2d

1201. The district court’s opinion sustaining, in part,

ieee tren al

Respondents’ motions for summary judgment, is un-

reported. The district court’s opinion granting, in part,

Respondents’ motions for reconsideration of the

court’s decision on petitioners’ motion to remand is

reported at 713 F.Supp. 1043.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

in October 15, 1991. The petition for a writ of

certiorari was filed on January 13, 1992. The juris-

diction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §

1254(1).

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent Unions, the International Union of

Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Furni-

ture Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 801 and International

Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and

Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO, (hereafter referred to

as the “Unions’’), file this brief in opposition to the

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

This action was originally filed by the Adkins

plaintiffs (Petitioners in the case before this Court)

in the Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County,

Ohio, on September 19, 1983. Respondents in this

case sought jointly to remove this matter to-the

United States District Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Sec. 1441, on the ground that original jurisdiction

under federal labor laws was vested in the courts of

the United States.

The complaint filed by the Adkins plaintiffs in state

court was of similar length and style, and contained

the same allegations as the complaint Case No. C-3-

‘

Pee

82-011, filed on January 18, 1982, in federal district

court pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Manage-

ment Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, and Section

101(aX1) of the Labor Management Reporting and

Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 411(aX1). This latter

action was disposed of by decision of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Adkins v.

International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine

Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, et al., 769 F.2d 330 (6th Cir.

1985), which held that the claim that the Unions failed

to represent the Adkins plaintiffs in negotiations

which eliminated their seniority rights, and the claim

that the Unions had denied them informed and mean-

ingful participation in deliberating and voting for a

collective bargaining agreement, were barred by the

statute of limitations. See, Del Costello v. Interna-

tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).

After the Adkins plaintiffs learned that their fed-

eral court action was time-barred, a case was filed in

state court seeking a second bite at the proverbial

‘apple’. This complaint was identical to that in the

first case, and contains Four Counts. Count One al-

leged a claim against the Unions for a failure to prop-

erly negotiate and adopt the collective bargaining

agreement. The Second Count claimed that the Unions

made misrepresentations of fact during the ratifica- ,

tion process. The Third Count alleged a breach by

the Unions of fiduciary obligations owed to

Petitioners. The Fourth Count alleged that in the ne-

gotiation and ratification process the Unions caused

emotional distress to the Petitioners.

These legal attacks against Respondent Unions had

their genesis in the sale by General Motors of the

assets of its Frigidaire Division to White Consolidated

Industries. General Motors retained the plants in

which the Frigidaire Division conducted its operations

in Dayton in order to convert them to a Chevrolet

truck assembly plant and a Chevrolet diesel engine

plant. At the time of this sa]: Respondent Unions

represented the factory workers of the Frigidaire Di-

vision of General Motors, and of the Delco Air Con-

ditioning Division of General Motors, which had split

from Frigidaire in 1974. The Delco Air Conditioning

employees received higher wage rates than Frigidaire

employees because they were involved in the auto-

motive industry whereas the Frigidaire employees

were in the appliance industry.

At the time of the sale, a collective bargaining

agreement, known as the “Bridge Agreement,’’ was

in effect which permitted Frigidaire employees to

“flow” or transfer to Delco Air to receive higher

rates when Delco Air needed additional employees. It

also allowed Delco Air employees to bump Frigidaire

employees to avoid being laid off if business declined.

This Bridge Agreement provided that Frigidaire em-

ployees would retain their flow rights until all em-

ployees had been given an opportunity to transfer to

Delco Air and 900 new Delco Air employees hired.

Through 1979, some 2000 Frigidaire employees had

transferred to Delco Air and some 3500 other Frig-

idaire employees had retained but not exercised their

flow rights under the Bridge Agreement. There were

also some 2500 Frigidaire employees hired after Jan-

uary 1, 1977, who had no rights under the Bridge

Agreement. By its terms, this Bridge Agreement was

to expire in September 1979. °

Because the conversion from Frigidaire to Chev-

rolet was scheduled to take at least two years and

5

would result in the interim layoff of the Frigidaire

employees, the Unions and General Motors held a

series of meetings in February 1979 to address the

effects of the layoff on the Frigidaire employees and

to secure these workers employment at the Chevrolet

plants. At this time, Delco Air employees were all

actively employed, and the automobile industry was

booming. As a result of these meetings, the Unions

and GM reached a tentative agreement which gave

Frigidaire employees the right to be employed at

Chevrolet by order of seniority, and the Unions were

recognized as representatives of factory employees at

these Chevrolet plants. The parties also agreed to

terminate the Bridge Agreement and, therefore, Delco

Air employees’ right to transfer to these Chevrolet

plants.

These Agreements were presented for ratification

in February 1979, by the members of Local 801,

whose members included the employees of both Fri-

gidaire and Delco Air. As employees of Delco Air,

Petitioners were eligible to participate in the ratifi-

cation of these agreements, which were ratified by

the members of Local 801 and became effective on

February 26, 1979.

In late 1979, the automobile industry began to suf-

fer reductions in sales and, as a result, layoffs at

Deleo Air commenced and the lawsuits described

above were initiated by Petitioners.

ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY FOUND THAT

PETITIONERS’ STATE LAW CLAIMS WERE

PREEMPTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH WELL-ESTAB-

LISHED PRECEDENT.

The Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals

erred in deciding that all counts of this complaint

were preempted. Petitioners further argue that re-

view is warranted for this Court to clarify established

precedent in regard to the issue of federal preemption

in labor law cases.

Petitioners fail to recognize that since the time their

action was filed, this Court has issued decisions co-

gently clarifying precisely when labor law claims as-

serted under state law are preempted by federal law.

The first in the series of cases describing the

preemptive effect of Section 301 of the LMRA was

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985)

in which the Court emphasized that the consequences

flowing from. breaches of a collective bargaining

agreement must be resolved by reference to federal

law, whether the question arises in the context of an

action for breach of contract or an action sounding

in tort. As the Court held, to determine whether an

alleged state claim is preempted by federal law, the

critical question is ‘‘whether evaluation of the tort

claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of

the terms of the labor contract.’’ Jd. at 213. Further,

“‘{[w]hen resolution of a state-law claim is substantially

dependent upon analysis of the terms of the agree-

ment made between parties in a labor contract, that

claim must either be treated as a Section 301 claim

... Or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor con-

tract law.’ Id. at 220

The Court addressed this issue again in Jnterna-

tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Hechler,

481 U.S. 851 (1987). In concluding that the plaintiff's

negligence claim was preempted by Section 301, the

Court indicated that where a union’s tort liability

could not be determined without considering ‘‘whether

the collective-bargaining agreement in fact placed an

implied duty of care on the Union’, the matter was

preempted because of the overwheiming need to cre-

ate uniformity in the interpretation of the terms of

collective bargaining agreements.

This Court again dealt with the preemptive force

of Section 301 in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482

U.S. 386 (1987), which will be addressed more fully

below.

Lingle v. Norge Division of Magre Chef, Inc., 486

U.S.399 (1988) shed further light on the issue of

preemption. In holding that the issue to be addressed

in determining whether a state law claim was

preempted is whether it is necessary to interpret the

collective bargaining agreement, the Court concluded

that a retaliatory discharge for filing a workers’ com-

pensation claim was not preempted because the mat-

ter turned on state law on retaliatory discharge which

did not require an interpretation of the collective bar-

gaining agreement.

From these cases, the Court has clearly enunciated

the factors which determine whether an alleged state

law claim is preempted or not. Initially, the fact that

the claim is couched in terms of state law violations

is not dispositive, as there are at least two separate

and distinct grounds for preemption. One, when state

law claims involve rights which flow directly from the

labor contract: and secondly, when claims are de-

pendent upon analysis of the collective bargaining

agreement, regardless of whether such claims are

based upon rights which arise from the agreement

itself.

Moreover, in considering the issue of preemption,

actions against labor unions often involve claims of

failure of fair representation which are governed by

federal law. Thus, claims by members that they were

not represented by their union either in contract ne-

gotiations or contract administration, are governed by

federal law. See Air Line Pilots Association v.

O’Neill, —_ U.S. __. 111 S. Ct. 1127(1991); and

Vaca v. Stipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).

Prior to bringing the instant case, Petitioners had

unsuccessfully sued under the Labor Management Re-

porting and Disclosure Act, Sec 101(aX1), in regard

to the alleged failure of the Unions to properly notify

them as to the ratification of the collectively bar-

gained agreement which abrogated the Bridge Agree-

ment. That action was lost because the statute of

limitations period had run before the suit was filed.

Contrary to the arguments contained in Petitioners’

Brief, the Court of Appeals below followed preemp-

tion doctrines formulated by this Court in finding that

Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed in their entirety.

Petitioners’ first count is that the Unions interfered

with their contract rights in the “negotiation, manner

of adoption, implementation and enforcement of cer-

tain bargaining agreements.” This claim is obviously

one grounded in federal law and Petitioners do not

appear to contend that the Court of ..ppeals’ preemp-

tion finding was improper.

Petitioners’ second count involves allegations of

misrepresentation of fact in the ratification process

and likewise requires judicial interpretation of the

terms of the bargaining agreement to determine if

such misrepresentation occurred. Such claim is so in-

tertwined with an understanding of the agreement,

that it must be preempted. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.

Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985). The District Court and

Court of Appeals so found, and these findings are

solidly within the preemption doctrine established by

this Court in the recent cases cited above.

Petitioners third claim is that the Unions tortiously

interfered with their contract rights or business re-

lationships. The Court of Appea disposed of this

allegation by deciding:

In this case, in order to adjudicate plaintiffs’

claim that a contract existed under state law,

the court would have to determine that

plaintiffs were offered ‘‘seniority rights”

based on the “bridge agreement”’ after the

1979 collective-bargaining agreement, that

they accepted the offer, that there was con-

sideration, and so on. Or the court may have

had to determine that plaintiffs were induced

to believe that their asserted ‘“‘seniority

rights” under the “‘bridge agreement” were

intact or would be respected, even if not in-

tact, and that they relied on these represen-

tation justifiably and to their detriment. An

exercise such as this necessarily involves the

court in determining what the “seniority

rights” under the “bridge agreement’’ are.

It follows that adjudicating the plaintiffs’ tor-

tious interference claim necessarily involves

an analysis of a collective-bargaining agree-

ment because the contractual relation nec-

|

10

essary to the claim is based on the

representations of the president of Local 801

that their ‘‘seniority rights’ would continue.

For this reason, plaintiffs’ tortious interfer-

ence claims are fully preempted. The court

below did not err in so holding. At page 20.

Petitioners argue that the rationale of Caterpillar,

Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) requires a dif-

ferent result than reached by the Court below. How-

ever, the facts of the instant case are not analogous

to those critical facts of the Caterpillar case. Unlike

Caterpillar, Petitioners were always members of the

Unions and covered by the contracts negotiated by

the Unions. Thus, their claims clearly require the

interpretation of bargained-for agreements and the

application of federal law. Clearly, the Court of

Appeals was correct in its application of the Cater-

pillar rationale if not its holding, with respect to the

allegations of the present case.

Petitioners further contend that after ratification

of the elimination of the Bridge Agreement, the Pres-

ident of the Local Union misrepresented to them as

to whether the Bridge was actually abrogated and

argue that the Caterpillar case requires a different

result than that found by the lower courts. However,

as the courts below found, to decide whether there

was a misrepresentation requires an interpretation of

the collective bargaining agreement and is, therefore,

an allegation, however framed, preempted by federal

law.

The last claim of the Petitioners’ case is that the

conduct of the Unions caused severe emotional dis-

tress to these union members, or the allegation that |

by proposing modifications to the collective bargaining

mnicsiiiceeiaiiniia iii aia.

11

agreement and in the procedures utilized to ratify

these agreements, the Unions caused Petitioners emo-

tional distress.

Obviously, this claim requires an interpretation of

the bargaining agreement to determine what modi-

fications in the applicable agreement were made or

whether the Unions did or did not properly inform

Petitioners of changes made in the collective bar-

gaining agreements. To determine if the contractual

change caused Petitioners emotional distress, a court

has to interpret the terms of the agreements as they

existed before and after the change to decide whether

the Petitioners were adequately notified of the

changes and the consequences of negotiations.

Petitioners rights and the conduct which is at issue

in this allegation are ‘‘inextricably intertwined”’ with

the actual terms of the collective bargaining agree-

ment. This Court stated in Allis-Chalmers Corp v.

Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985), ‘if the ... state

tort law purports to define the meaning of the con-

tract relationship, that law is preempted.” The need

for uniformity in the interpretation of contract terms

precludes Petitioners from evading the preemptive ef-

fect of Section 301 by framing their claim as a state

law tort action. International Brotherhood of Electri-

cal Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987). The

arguments advanced by Petitioners to show that this

state-law claim is not preempted are spurious and not

supported by the decisions of this Court.

As bargaining representatives, the Unions have a

wide range of reasonableness in carrying out their

representation duties. The emotional distress claim by

Petitioners is nothing more than an allegation that

the Unions violated the duty of fair representation

12

owed to Petitioners cast in state law terms. It is well

established that federal law governs this type of claim,

and equally clear that an action brought against a

labor union for claimed misrepresentations made dur-

ing ratification meetings are a violation of the duty

of fair representation. Storey v. Local 327, Interna-

tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, 759 F.2d 517 (6th

Cir. 1985) and Anderson v. United Paper Workers

International Union, 641 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1981). It

is equally settled, as the Court of Appeals found be-

low, that such a cause of action is completely

preempted by federal law. United Steelworkers of

America v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990).

II. THE PETITIONERS ERR IN ASSERTING A CONFLICT

BETWEEN THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT IN THE PRES-

ENT CASE AND THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS IN WELLS V. GENERAL MOTORS CORPO-

RATION, 881 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989).

The Wells case, so heavily relied upon by

Petitioners, was filed by a group of employees who

had received separation pay pursuant to an agreement

negotiated by the employees’ union and General Mo-

tors. The suit in Wells, however, was filed only against

General Motors based upon an allegation that a rep-

resentative of General Motors informed these workers

that they would be eligible to be rehired, or, in the

reverse, that representations by General Motors were

false and injurious.

The Wells Court held that because the case did not

require an interpretation of any collectively-bargained

agreement, the action was not preempted by federal!

law. Rather than being in conflict with Wells, the

rationale of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

ee a |

13

in the instant case, is based upon precisely the same

reasoning, albeit radically different facts. That both

cases involved charges of alleged ‘‘misrepresentation’’

does not render their dispositions to be conflicting.

In this case, misrepresentations are charged against

representatives of the Unions, which is therefore a

question concerning a failure to properly represent

these workers, an issue governed by federal law and

the Court below properly found the matter to be

preempted.

Accordingly, it is submitted that the Petitioners

have not shown a conflict between the circuits in

order to warrant review by this Court of this case.

For this essential reason, the decision of the Court

below is not in conflict with the rationale of the Wells

court, or any of the other decisions referred to by

Petitioners.

14

CONCLUSION :

On the basis of the foregoing and arguments sub- :

mitted by Respondent General Motors, it is respect- :

fully submitted that the Petitioners’ Writ for i!

Certiorari should be denied ;

Dated: April 15, 1992. t

Respectfully submitted, 3

:

RICHARD F. RICE

3461 Office Park Drive

Kettering, OH 45439

(518) 294-1491

JAMES G. MAURO, JR.* .

1126 16th St. N.W. y

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 296-1200

*Counsel of Record