Appendix — Rives v. Interstate Commerce Commission

Supreme Court brief1992

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No. 1 OFFiCy

hen

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

| October Term, 1991

CHARLES F. RIVES, II,

Marv A. Seurer; Ronald D. Pester,

Tom Hampleman; R.D. Griffin;

John A. Cameron; Marv Slusser;

and Gene Dudley,

Petitioners,

¥.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,

United States of America,

Respondents.

UNION PACIFIC MOTOR FREIGHT COMPANY,

Intervenor.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Of Counsel:

M.J. Ogborn A.M. Lewandowski*

Harding & Ogborn Dysart Taylor

1200 17th Street 4420 Madison Ave.

Denver, CO 80202 Kansas City, MO

(303) 629-0300 (816) 931-2700

_

Attorneys for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

DATE: November 15, 1991

INDEX TO APPENDIX

PAGE

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit in

Rives v. Interstate Commerce

Commission, 934 F.2d 1171

(4008 Gar, 2992) ...54<«« »« te

Order Denying Petition for

Rehearing (10th Cir.

August 20, 1991). ....,.. - 24a

Decision of the Interstate

Commerce Commission in Union

Pacific Corp., et al.--Control

--Missouri Pacific Corp,

et al., Finance Docket No.

MC-30,000 (April 3, 1987) .. . 26a

Decision of the Interstate

Commerce Commission denying

benefits to Petitioners

(April 12, SWE s es es. Sa 54a

Statutes:

49 U.S.C. §11344 ji + we « « » « Fe

9 U.G.C. §112347. . s« « > - « « 89a

New York Dock Railway--

ontrol--Brooklyn Eastern

District, 360 I.C.C.

60, 84-90 (1979). . ...... Ola

UNITED STATES cCouURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 89-9530

Charles F, RIVES, II; Marv A.

Seurer; Ronald D. Pester; Tom

Hampleman; R.D. Griffin; John A.

Cameron; Marv Slusser; Gene Dudley,

Petitioners,

Vv.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION:

United States of America,

Respondents.

Union Pacific Motor Freight Company,

Intervenor.

June 6, 1991

Before LOGAN’ and MOORE, Circuit

Judges, and GREENE, District Judge. *

LOGAN, Circuit Judge.

Eight former employees of the

Union Pacific Motor Freight Company

(petitioners) appeal a decision of

the Interstate Commerce Commission

a

*The Honorable J. Thomas Greene,

United States District Judge for the

district of Utah, Sitting by

designation.

ee ee Ce

2 a

(Icc) denying them labor protective

conditicns following consolidation

of three major railroads. Pe-

titioners contend that the ICC erred

in determining “+hat they were not

entitled to mandatory labor

protection under 49 U.S.C. §11347,

and, alternatively, in failing to

exercise its discretion to award

labor protection benefits under 49

S.8-C.. §L154665

This appeal arises out of the

consolidation of three western

railroads, the Union Pacific

Railroad Company, the Missouri

Pacific Railroad Company, and the

Western Pacific Railroad Company,

under the Union Pacific name. The

Ice approved the consolidation

pursuant to 49 y.S.C. §11343. Union

Pac. Corp., 366 I.C.C. 459 (1982),

aff’d sub nom. Southern Pac. Trans.

—

Co. v. ICC, 736 F.2d 708 (D.Cc.Cir.

1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208,

105 >.CC. oe eo 84 L.. EG.24 322

(1985). In conjunction therewith,

the ICC approved Union Pacific’s

acquisition of Missouri Pacific’s

and Western Pacific’s motor carrier

Subsidiaries. Union Pacific’s motor

Carrier, the Union Pacific Motor

Freight Company (UPMF), continued

under the control of Union Pacific.

Petitioners were employees of

UPMF at the time of the con-

SOlidation. UPMF, as Union Pacific’s

wholly-owned motor carrier sub-

Sidiary, was responsible for ramping

and deramping trailers and con-

tainers to and from rail cars.

Petitioners performed these ramping

and deramping operations using

“piggy packers”, equipment capable

of transporting the trailers and

containers to and from_- staging

areas. UPMF had ICC authority to

perform regular trucking services,

but was limited to auxiliary and

supplemental rail service.

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §11347,

the ICC imposed New York Dock labor

protective conditions to protect

railraod employees affected by the

consolidation.2/ Petitioners, who

were terminated following the

consolidation, were denied New York

Dock conditions, the ICC holding

that petitioners were not entitled

because they were not~ railroad

employees. McPherson v. Union Pac.

Motor Freight Co., 1.¢.¢. Dee.,; Fin,

i/ These conditions were fashioned

by the ICC in New York Dock Ry., 360

I.C.C. 60 (1979), Af£f’d sub non.,

New York Dock Ry. v. Uited States,

609 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1979), and

include such benefits as dis-

placement or dismissal allowances

and continuation of benefits for a

specified period.

Dkt. No. 30000, Sub-NO. 45

(McPherson) (Order of April -

1987). The ICC later reopened the

proceeding to consider further

evidence on whether petitioners were

entitled to the New York Dock

conditions it had imposed for the

benefit of others or, alternatively,

whether the ICC should use is

discretionary authority to impose

additional conditions for pe-

titioners’ benefit.2/ The ICC again

denied petitioners relief, stating

a The ICC reopened the proceedings

at the request of Union Pacific.

Before this request, seven former

UPMF employees from Kansas City

filed a petition for review with the

Eighth Circuit, and seven former

UPMF employees from Denver filed a

petition for review with this court.

The two cases were later

consolidated and set for review by

the Eighth Circuit. The case was

transferred back to this’ court,

however, apparently because six of

the Kansas City petitioners, all who

resided in the Eighth Circuit,

entered into a settlement agreement

with Union Pacific.

that its refusal to exercise its

oe eee authority was because

petitioners had failed to present

any evidence or arguments in favor

of the Icc exercising its

discretion. McPherson, (Order of

April 12, 1989).

I

On appeal, petitioners first

argue that the ICC erred in finding

that they were not within the class

of employees protected by the New

York Dock conditions imposed for the

benefit of those directly employed

by the parent railroads. They

contend that the ICC’s decision,

based solely on the identity of the

employer, ignores the intent of

employee protective conditions and

goes against commission and court

precedent. The ICC asserts that its

decision is consistent with the

Supreme Court’s holding in Chevron

U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,

1094 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed2d 694

(1984), and that it acted with due

deference to prior commission and

court cases.

The statute governing labor

protective conditions :.tates, in

pertinent part:

"When a rail carrier is

involved in a transaction

for which approval is

sought under sections

11344 and 11345 or section

11346 of this title, the

Interstate Commerce cCom-

mission shall require the

carrier to provide a fair

arrangement at least as

protective of the interest

of employees who are af-

fected by the transaction

as the terms imposed under

this section before Feb-

ruary 5, 1976, and the

terms established under

section 405 of the Rail

Passenger Service Act (45

U.S.C. 565).”

Ye Pe Pe ee Pe ey OP In the instant

case, the ICC construed §11347’s

mandatory protections as applying

only to those “directly employed by

a rail carrier,” and, therefore,

petitioners, “who were employed by

non-rail subsidiaries of the rail

Carrier” were excluded. McPherson

(Order of April 12, 1989, at 3).

When reviewing an agency’s

construction of a statute it

administers, a court must follow a

two-step analysis. First, if

Congress has directly spoken to the

precise question at issue and its

intent is clear, “that is the end of

the matter; for the court, as well

as the agency, must give effect to

the unambiguously expressed. intent

of Congress.” Chevron, 467-U.S. at

842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82. If

Congress has not addressed directly

the precise question at issue, the

reviewing court “does not’ simply

impose its own construction on the

statute... . Rather, if the statute

is silent or ambiguous with respect

to the specific issue, the question

for the court is whether’ the

agency’s answer is based on a

permissible construction of the

statute.” Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at

2782 (footnote omitted). In such a

case, the agency’s construction is

permissible unless it is “arbitrary,

Capricious, or manifestly contrary

to the statute.” Id. at 844, 104

S.Ct. at 2782.

A

Applying the first step in the

Chevron analysis, we are satisfied

that Congress has not unambiguously

expressed an intent that employees

of a motor carrier subsidiary are

entitled to the mandatory

protections afforded in §11347.

*

10 a

Although §11347 requires protection

for “employees who are affected by”

an approved consolidation, the term

“employees” is not defined in the

Interstate Commerce Act, and we

believe, from the words used, it is

unclear whether Congress intended to

include just those employed directly

by the rail carrier or, more

broadly, to include at least some

employees of noncarrier subsidiary

corporations whose jobs might be

affected.

The legislative and statutory

history of §11347 does not clear up

this ambiguity. The ICC argues that

the committee reports accompanying

§11347, and the language from

§11347’s predecessor, 49 U.S.C.

§5(2)(f), demonstrate Congress’

intent that only those directly

employed by a rail carrier are

lla

entitled to mandatory protection.

The ICC points to the fact that

§5(2)(f) used the phrase “railroad

employees”, directing the IcC to

“require a fair and equitable

arrangement to protect the interests

of the railroad employees affected.”

49 U.S.C. §5(2)(f) (repealed 1978).

It also notes that the committee

reports accompanying §11347 state

that §5(2)(f) was recodified for

“clarity” and that it was not

intended to change the substance of

the statute. See H.R.Rep. No. 1395,

95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 166,

reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. &

Admin.News 3009, 3016, 3175. We are

not persuaded. Like §11347,

§5(2)(f) did not define “railroad

employees.” Nowhere in the pre-1978

Act or the legislative history

accompanying §11347 is the phrase

12 a

“railroad employees” defined;

Congress simply never addressed the

issue presented in this case.

Two other circuits have

considered the issue with opposite

results. In Cosby v. ICC, 741 F.2d

1077 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,

471 U.S. 1110, 105 S.Ct. 2344, 85

L.Ed.2d 861 (1985), the court held

that employees of an _ exclusive

auxiliary-to-rail motor: carrier were

“employees” within the meaning of

the Act because the motor carrier

was “intimately tied to the

railroad’s main transportation

function.” Id. at 1081. In

contrast, the court in Kansas City

Southern Indus., Inc. v. ICC, 902

F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1990), held that

former §5(2) (f) and the reports

accompanying the 1978 recodification

indicated «clearly Congress’ intent

13 a

that §11347 did “not mandate labor

protective conditions for employees

of motor carrier subsidiaries of a

merging railroad.” Id. at 438. Of

course, this court is not bound by

the decisions of other circuits. We

note that Cosby did not discuss the

Chevron analysis. We note also that

the motor carrier in Kansas City

Southern was not restricted to

auxiliary-to-rail services and

received a majority of its revenues

from nonrail-related activities.

See Kansas City Southern, 902 F.2d

at 438.

B

Because we are satisfied that

Congress has not unambiguously

expressed its intent, we must decide

under the second prong of Chevron

whether the ICC’s itnerpretation of

§11347 is “a permissible

I ee

14 a

construction of this statute.”

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 8.Ct.

at 2782. In making this deter-

mination, we are governed by the

following standard:

“Thle) view of the agency

charged with administering

the statute is entitled to

considerable deference;

and to sustain it, we need

not find that it is the

only permissible con-

struction that [the

agency] might have adopted

but only that {the

agency’s] understanding of

this very ‘complex sta-

tute’ is a sufficientiy

rational one to preclude a

court from substituting

its judgment for that of

(the agency]}.”

Chemical Mfgrs. Ass’n v. National

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470

U.S. 116, 125, 105 S.ct. 1102, 1107,

84 L.Ed.2d 90 (1985). See also Young

Vv. Community Nutrition Inst., 476

U.S. 974, 981i, 106 S.Ct. 2360,

2364-65, 90 L.Ed.2d 959 (1986).

15 a

Bound by this standard, we hold

the ICC’s interpretation of §11347-

-that only those directly employed

by a rail carrier are entitled to

mandatory labor protective con-

ditions--a permissible and rational

construction of the statute. The

language in former §5(2)(f) mandates

protection only for “railroad

employees” and the legislative

reports accompanying §11347 state

that the recodification intended no

substantive changes in existing

law.2/ Restricting §11347’s

3/ the House report states:

“Substant.ve change not

intended--Like other codi-

fications undertaken to enact

into positive law all titles

of the United States Code,

this bill makes no substantive

change in the law. It is

sometimes feared that’ mere

changes in terminology and

style will result in changes

in substance or impair the

precedent value of earlier

judicial decisions and other

interpretations. This fear

16 a

mandatory protections to rail

carrier employees provides certainty

and a logical limit to the scope of

employees protected by §11347.

Also, a reading as expansive as that

petitioners request would render

superfluous the stc’s use of

discretionary authority under 49

might have some weight if this

were the usual kind of

amendatory legislation where

it can be inferred that a

change of language is intended

to change substance. In a

codification statute, however,

the courts uphold the contrary

presumption: the statute is

intended to remain sub-

stantively unchanged.”

H.R.Rep. No. 1395 at 9, reprinted in

1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News at

3018. In accord with this

legislative history we stated, in

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v.

Lennen, 732 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir.

1981), that recodification of the

Interstate Commerce Act in 1978 "was

not intended to change the law” and

that any substantive conflicts

between the original language and

the new language must be resolved

“in favor of the original language.”

Id. at 1497.

i7 a

3.8.¢c. §11344 to give labor

protection for other employees

affected by a consolidation.

Petitioners may be correct that

a more rational interpretation of

§11347 would focus on the nature of

the work performed, not just the

identity of the employer. 4/ That

does not make the ccs

4/ petitioners also argue that the

IcC’s interpretation of §11347 is

unreasonable because it has in the

past treated a railroad and its

subsidiary as a Single trans-

portation system. Under this "single

system doctrine,” the ICC considers

that a corporate family comprised of

“a single, integrated transportation

system, even though it is made up of

several separate corporations...

to be, in effect, one carrier.”

Brotherhood of Ry. & Airline Clerks

v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 671

F.2d 1085, 1089 (8th Cir. 1982).

Although the ICC has utilized this

doctrine in determining that all

rail employees of a railroad’s

subsidiaries were entitled to labor

protection, see Pennsylvania R.R.

Co., 347 I.C.C. 536, 546-47 (1974),

we know of no cases in which the ICC

has applied this doctrine to nonrail

employees of a motor carrier

subsidiary of a railroad.

18 a

interpretation unreasonable. And

once we have determined that the

agency’s interpretation is rea-

sonable, we may not disturb it on

review. "(A] court may not

substitute its own construction of a

statutory provision for a reasonable

interpretation made by the

administrator of an agency.”

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct.

at 2782. “The responsibilities for

assessing the wisdom of such policy

choices and resolving the struggle

between competing views of the

public interest are not judicial

ones: "Our Constitution vests such

responsibilities in the political

branches.’” - Id. at 866, 104 S.Ct.

at 2793 (citation omitted) .2/

>/ Because we hold that the ICC’s

interpretation of §11347 is rea-

sonable, we need not consider

petitioners’ argument that the Icc

erred in not considering evidence

relating to thier job descriptions

Il

Finally, petitioners argue that

the ICC erred in refusing to award

protective conditions under its

discretionary authority. This

argument centers on 49 U.S.C.

§11344(c), which permits the ICC, in

its discretion, to provide labor

protection for other persons

affected by a rail consolidation. &/

and relationships with Union Pacific

before making its determination.

Under the IcC”s “identity of the

employer” standard, such evidence is

not relevant in deciding whether

petitioners are “railroad employees”

entitled to labor protection.

Therefore, it does not affect our

determination of reasonableness.

See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v.

State Farm Mut. Auto.Ins., 463 U.S.

29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866-67, 77

L.Ed.2d 443 (1983).

§/ section 11344 (c) states

pertinent part:

“The Commission shall appr

and authorize a transaction

under this’ section when

finds the transaction

consistent with the public

interest. The Commission may

) Vi

20 a

In the instant case, the Icc

expressly refused to consider using

its discretion because petitioners

failed to present any supporting

arguments at the reopening pro-

ceeding, despite being invited to do

so. See McPherson (Order of April

12, 1989, at 3). The ICC now

contends that this failvre precludes

our consideration of this issue on

appeal.

All issues a party contests on

appeal must be raised at the

appropriate time under the agency

practice. United States v. L.A.

Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. ri Pe >

73 S.Ct. 67, 69, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952).

Failure of a party to represent its

contentions properly to the agency

precludes appellate review. New

__

Mexico Envtl. Improvement Div. v.

impose conditions governing the

transaction...”

21a

Thomas, 789 F.2d 825, 835-36 (10th

Cir. 1986). A court may not

substitute its judgment for that of

the agency when "the agency has not

had an opportunity to make a factual

record or apply its expertise.” Id.

at 835.

In the instant case, all of the

evidence presented by petitioners

was directed tc whether they were

employees within the meaning of

§11347. The petitioners’ evidence

sought to demonstrate the

Similarities between UPMF employees

and Union Pacific employees.

Petitioners contend that their

employment comparison evidence

presented in reference to §11344 was

sufficient for the ICC to consider

using its discretionary power.’ We

disagree. The ICc reopened the

proceedings to reconsider the issue

22 a

of employment protective conditions

for UPMF employees. The Icc

expressly requested evidence and

arguments on two issues:

“The [petitioners]...may

present evidence on whe-

ther they were railroad

employees who qualify for

mandatory labor protection

under 49 U.S.C. 11347.

They may also seek to

demonstrate that the Com-

mission should exercise

its discretionary auth-

ority under 49 U.S.C.

11344(c) to provide pro-

tection for motor carrier

employees.”

McPherson (reopening order of August

10, 1987, at 2). The evidence

Submitted by petitioners was, in

essence, the same as that submitted

in the original proceeding when the

only issue was whether they were

railroad employees under §11347. No

separate evidence or argument was

Girected at the availability of

discretionary protection. Peti-

tioners presented no evidence of

23 a

financial hardship or a lack of

marketable skills, which the Icc

might consider relevant in deciding

whether to grant discretionary

benefits. Petitioners had the burden

to present their case to the ICC for

consideration and their failure to

properly present the issue of

discretionary protection to the ICC

precludes our review.

AFFIRMED.

24 a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 89-9530

CHARLES F. RIVES, II, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,

et al.,

Respondents.

ORDER

Filed August 20, 1991

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, LOGAN,

KCKAY, SEYMOUR, MOORE, ANDERSON,

TACHA, BALDOCK, BRORBY and_ EBEL,

Circuit Judges, and GREENE*,

District Judge.

*The Honorable J. Thomas’ Greene,

United States District Judge for the

District of Utah, sitting by

designation.

This matter comes on _ for

consideration of petitioners’ pe-

tition for rehearing and suggestion

for rehearing en banc in- the

captioned case.

25 a

Upon consideration whereof, the

petition for rehearing is denied by

the panel that rendered the decision

sought to be reheard.

In accordance with Rule 35(b)

of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, the suggestion for

rehearing en banc was transmitted to

all the judges of the court in

regular active service. No member

of the panel and no judge in regular

service on the court having

requested that the court be polled

on rehearing en banc, Rule 35,

Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, the suggestion for

rehearing en banc is denied.

Entered for the Court

ROBERT L. HOECKER, CLERK

26a

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

DECISION

Finance Docket No. 30000

UNION PACIFIC CORPORATION,

PACIFIC RAIL SYSTEM, INC. AND

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY -

CONTROL - MISSOURI PACIFIC

CORPORATION AND

MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

Finance Docket No. 30000

(Sub-No. 45)

GARY W. MCPHERSON

Ve

UNION PACIFIC MOTOR FREIGHT COMPANY,

ET AL.

Decided: April 3, 1987

In Union Pacific - Control -

Missouri Pacific; Western Pacific,

366 I.C.C. 459 (1982) (UP/MP/WP), we

authorized, inter alia, the Union

Pacific Corporation and Union

Pacific Railroad and Missouri

Pacific Railroad Company (MP),

subject to certain conditions

including labor protective con-

ditions. For the protection of

27 a

carrier employees affected by that

transaction, we imposed the

conditions specified in New York

Dock Ry. - Control -_ Brooklyn

Eastern Dist., 360 I.C.C. 60 (1979)

(New York Dock), unless an agreement

for employee protection had been

entered into, in which case we

imposed the specified negotiated

level of protection. 366 I.C.C. at

618-622.

In UP/MP/WP, 366 I.C.C. at 654,

we also approved the acquisition by

UP of a motor carrier subsidiary of

MP -- Missouri Pacific Truck Lines,

Inc. (MPTL). At the time of the

acquisition, UP also controlled, and

it continues to control, a motor

carrier -- Union Pacific Motor

Freight Company (UPMF).

This proceeding involves a

number of complaints by employees of

28 a

the UP-MP controlled motor carriers.

They allege that the protections we

mandated have not been effected.

BACKGROUND

1. The Denver complainants. By

letter-petition dated November 14,

1985, six former employees of UPMF2/

contend that they were terminated,

effective November 8, 1985, without

prior notice, from their jobs at

UPMF’s TOFC ramp operations at

Denver, CO. These employees allege

that MPTL now operates the Denver

facility and that they lost their

jobs as a direct result of the 1982

consolidation of UP and MP. They

allege that UPMF should have offered

/wnile the initial letter referred

to six individuals, argument and

evidence was submitted for seven:

Marv Slusser, Wheatridge, CO.; Gene

Dudley, Denver, CO; John A. Cameron,

Erie, CO; Tom Hampleman, Wheatridge,

CO; Marv A. Seurer, Wheatridge, CO;

R.D. Griffin, Erie, CO; and Ronald

D. Pester, Lakewood, Co.

eS

29 a

them other jobs, or compensation, as

required by the New York Dock

conditions imposed in the merger

proceeding.

We reopened the merger

proceeding in a decision served

February 18, 1986, stating that we

were treating the letter as a

petition for clarification. we

directed the employees to _ file

evidence and argument and for UP-MP

to reply.

Complainants state that they

were employees of UPMF in Denver for

at least 22 years and contend that

they lost their jobs at the Denver

ramp as a direct result of the UP-MP

consolidation. They argue that the

labor protection provided in New

York Dock applies to all employees

of UP-MP, including employees of

motor carrier subsidiaries of the

30 a

railroads, citing Cosby v. I.C.C.,

741 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1984).

They base their position on 49

U.S.C. 11347, which provides:

..-.-the Interstate Commerce

Commission shall require

the carrier to provide a

fair arrangement at least

as protective of the

interest of employees who

are affected by the

transaction as the terms

imposed under this section

before February 5, 1976,

and the terms established

under section 565 of Title

45. (Emphasis added by

complainants. )

UP-MP, in rebuttal here, states

that the complainants were not

atteetes by the consolidation and,

even if they were, that the labor

protective conditions imposed in the

consolidation under 49 U.S.C. 11347

are not applicable to employees of

motor carrier subsidiaries of

railroads. UP-MP indicates that its

motor carrier subsidiaries are

completely independent corporate

31a

units. It states that the Denver

employees of UPMF were not replaced

by MPTL employees but by those of

another company that was not related

to the UP-MP corporate family. UPMF

bid against several other companies

on a contract to perform trucking

services at the Denver terminal, and

lost. UP-MP states that it has

sought contracts for many of its

terminals and that its UPMF

subsidiary has to compete with both

corporate affiliates and numerous

non-affiliated firms for the

railroad’s business. It indicates

that in some instances UPMF has been

able to retain contracts for

terminal operations at some

locations, but has been unsuccessful

at others. Its corporate policy

dictates that UP have motor carrier

services provided for it at the

32 a

lowest possible cost. | UP-MP

presented evidence to show that UPMF

and MPTL are independent entities

that must compete with non-

affiliated motor carriers if they

wish to continue to perform

operations for UP.

UP-MP argues that the

protections for employees in New

York Dock were intended to be

restricted to railroad employees and

were not intended to cover employees

of rail-affiliated motor carriers.

Defendant rejects the interpretation

given to 49 U.S.C. 11347 by

complainants and the court in Cosby.

UP-MP argues that the recodified 49

U.S.C. 11347 was never intended to

provide labor protection to non-

railroad employees, because Congress

and the Commission long recognized

that the employment skills of motor

33 a

carrier employees were much more

transferable than those of railroad

workers.

UP-MP also contends that the

Commission has declined to follow

the logic of Cosby, with regard to

labor protection for employees of

motor carrier subsidiaries. It cites

Milwaukee--Acquisition by GTC,

7.€.¢.26 (1985)

(Milwaukee) ; Norfolk Southern

Corp.--Control--North American Van

Lines, 1 1I.C.C. 24 (1985)

(NS/NAVL) .

The Railway Labor Executives

Association filed a comment on March

7, 1986, indicating that it

supported Cosby’s apparent

determination that employees of

motor carrier subsidiaries of

railroads are entitled to labor

protective conditions. This comment

34 a

included a statement by Dean T.

Echols, Associate Director, Industry

Relations with the Brotherhood of

Railway and Airline Clerks. However,

in a supplemental comment’ filed

April 1, 1986, RLEA withdrew Mr.

Echols’ statement.

2. The Kansas City com-

plainants. On May 21, 1986, former

employees of UPMF in Kansas City, MO

filed a "Petition to Reopen and

Request for Enforcement” in the

consolidation proceeding. 2/ Peti-

tioners allege that they were all

employees of UPMF at the time of the

merger of UP and MP and subsequently

lost their jobs as a result of the

merger. They believe they are

2/These employees are: Louis C.

Burris, Gladstone, MO; Larry A.

Creiger, Oak Grove, MO; David C.

Doleshal, Kansas City, MO; Steve

Harter, Kansas City, MO; Raymond

May, Kansas City, MO; Charles Payne,

Kansas City, KS; and Charles F.

Rivers II, Olathe, KS.

35 a

entitled to labor protective

conditions specified in New York

Dock under Cosby.

UP-MP responds to these

allegations in much the same manner

as it did to the filing by the

Denver employees, indicating that

the statements of the court in Cosby

concerning the automatic application

of labor protective conditions to

employees of affiliated motor

carriers were only dicta and that,

subsequent to Cosby, we have

rejected that interpretation. UP-MP

also reiterates its position that

motor carrier employees were never

intended to receive the levels of

labor protection found in 49 U.S.C.

11347, because the nature of their

employment does not require the

enhanced level of protection the

statute provided for employees

36 a

performing railroad work.

3. Gary W. McPherson. In a

complaint filed April 25, 1986, Gary

W. McPherson alleged that he was an

employee of UPMF, that his

employment was terminated, and that

he was entitled to job protection

under 49 U.S.C. 11347.2/

On July 17, 1986, UP-MP filed a

motion to dismiss this complaint,

making the same arguments it made in

response to the pleadings of the

Denver and Kansas City complainants.

Concurrently, UP-MP filed a Petition

for Extension of Time in Which to

Answer Complaint, requesting that

2/ complainant was offered severance

pay of one month for each year of

service. It appears that Mr.

McPherson was in the process of

accepting this offer when he was

told that, instead, he would be

offered a job as vacation relief in

various cities. He apparently

refused this position, was

terminated, and subsequently filed

this complaint.

37 a

the due date on their answer be

extended until twenty days after the

Commission ruled on their motion to

dismiss. Complainant repliea.4/

Because of the similarity of issues,

we are consolidating all three

complaints in this proceeding.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Logic would dictate that the

first question to be answered here

must be whether complainants were

affected by the merger itself, as

such a factual finding is necessary

to relief. However, the Commission

does not resolve disputes over the

applicability of labor protective

conditions to individual employees.

Complainants have asserted, and UP

has contested, that the UP/MP/WP

consolidation was the cause of

complainants’ displacement. This

4/yp-MP has not filed a reply to the

McPherson complaint.

ee

38 a

factual issue of “causation” (i.e.,

whether particular employees. are

“affected” by a Commission-approved

transaction or whether adverse

consequences to employees were the

result of such a transaction) is not

for the Commission’s determination,

but is within the proper province of

an arbitrator or the parties’

negotiations. See Leavens Vv.

Burlington Northern, TRG. « 348

I.C.C. 962, 975, 979 (1977); Walsh

v. United States, 723 F.2d 570, 575

(1983); Bell v. Western Maryland

Railway Company, 366 I.C.C. 64, 67

(1981). Even when we impose labor

protective conditions, we do not

resolve these causation issues.

Therefore, we will not consider

evidence submitted on the question

of whether compiainants’ dis-

placement was a result of the

39 a

UP/MP/WP transactions.

Nevertheless, even assuming for

purposes of discussion that

complainants’ job loss was’ the

result of the UP/MP/WP merger, we

find that the labor’ protective

conditions imposed in our decision

in UP/MP/WP were not for the benefit

of complainants. We also see no

basis for imposing such protection

now.

Complainants’ principal claim

is that they are entitled to the

protections mandated by section

11347, which are reflected in the

New York Dock conditions. Their

claim of mandatory protection must

fail because they were employees of

a motor carrier, UPMF, not railroad

employees, as former section 5(2) (f)

of the Interstate Commerce Act, the

predecessor to section 11347,

40 a

required, and as we must continue to

interpret that provision. 2/ More-

over, long-standing precedent holds

that the mandatory protection of

Section 11347 does not extend even

to employees of non-rail sub-

Sidiaries of a railroad. / Accord-

ingly, there is no requirement in

the Interstate Commerce Act that

complainants, who are not rail

carrier employees, must be protected

3 see Milwaukee, slip op. at 16 and

NS/NAVL, slip op. at 37, discussing

the prohibition on attributing

substantive change to the _ 1978

recodification and citing Cass v.

United States, 417 U.S. 72, 82

(1974) and Atchison, Topeka & Santa

Fe Railway v. United States, 617

F.2d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 1980). a

§/ pennsylvania Railroad-Merger-New

York Central Railroad, 347 I.¢€.C.

536 (1974). See also Milwaukee, slip

op. at 16, discussing differing

standards for motor and railroad

employees due to more adaptable

skills of motor carrier employees,

citing American Bus Lines, Inc. v.

United States, 253 F. Supp. 481

(D.D.C.), aff’d per curiam, 385 U.S.

38 (1966).

41 a

from the effects of the UP/MP/WP

consolidation. Moreover, complain-

ants have not demonstrated that the

motor carriage performed by UPMF was

limited to transportation that is

auxiliary to rail movements and so

intimately connected to UP’s main

transportation system so as _ to

transform complainants into “rail-

road employees,” as described in

dicta in Cosby, 741 F.2d at 1080-81.

Cf. Milwaukee, slip op. at 16-17.

Notwithstanding this con-

clusion, the Commission has

discretionary authority under sec~-

tion 11344(c) to provide protection

for motor carrier employees. There

was, however, no request for

protection by complainants or any

other motor carrier employee during

the UP-MP-WP proceeding. Also, there

has been no showing, as there was in

42 a

Cosby, of pre-merger representations

by management to complainants that

might have deterred them from

seeking protective conditions in the

UP/MP/WP decision. On the contrary,

UP management distinguished between

protection for railroad craft union

employees and “non-agreement”

employees, with the latter eligible

for only separation allowances if

displaced by the transaction.

In Cosby, supra, the United

States Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Circuit stated that carrier

employees of a wholly owned motor

carrier subsidiary are entitled to

the labor protection benefits

required by section 11347. The court

said that, even if the Commission

had discretion to grant or deny

protective conditions, it was an

abuse of discretion given the facts

43 a

in that case not to grant the motor

carrier employees the same level of

protection granted applicant’s

railroad employees. The court cited

a number of assurances made by

officials of Burlington Northern to

the effect that no employee would

face involuntary unemployment as a

result of the merger and statements

to the effect that the operation of

the motor carrier would not be

changed. Especially relevant to the

court in Cosby was the statement by

C.M. Illg, Assistant Vice

President-Labor Relations of BN, 741

F.2d at 1083:

With the exception of

clerical employees at

Springfield, it is ex-

pected that the bulk of

surplus employees created

at any point and in any

craft will be absorbed

almost immediately on new

positions and other va-

cancies caused by

employees leaving service

in the normal course of

events... Those employees

44 a

who do become surplus, or

are displaced or are

transferred due to the

traction will be covered

by protective benefits.

The Cosby court determined that this

type of assurance gave the motor

carrier employees no reason to seek

to intervene in the merger pro-

ceeding, or to request their union

to do so to protect or clarify

management’s intentions.

Such assurances were not made

to UP/MP employees in this

consolidation proceeding. The

evidence presented in the UP/MP/WP

proceeding by UP-MP clearly and

consistently maintained that certain

specified employees -- almost

exclusively railroad craft union

employees -- would receive the level

of protection mandated in 49 U.S.C.

11347, .while others would receive

“severance benefits.” Thus non-

45 a

railroad craft union employees were

not misled by management assurances

into refraining from seeking

protection by participating in the

merger proceeding.

The testimony of Philip A.

Jordan, Vice President-Labor Re-

lations and Personnel of UP is

especially relevant. In his

verified statement filed with the

merger application, he consistently

maintained that there would be a

dichotomy of treatment with respect

to labor protective conditions for

affected employees. He maintained

the distinction throughout his

testimony between “agreement

employees” (railway craft union) and

"non-agreement employees” (others).

/verified Statement of Phillip A.

Jordan in Finance Docket No. 30000,

"Verified Statements of Applicants,

Part I, Statements of Applicants’

Officers in Support of

Applications.”

46a

He stated:

The principal adverse work

force impact will be felt

by non-agreement' employ-

ees....

In all instances

non-agreement employees

whose jobs are abolished

will be given the

opportunity to transfer to

other positions without

any reduction in salary

level and will be re-

imbursed for moving ex-

penses and any losses on

the sale of their homes.

Based on experience with

past organizational chan-

ges involving nonagreement

employees, we expect that

most will desire to take

advantage of this offer.

For those for whom there

is no other position

available at their present

location and who do not

want to transfer, we will

offer a separation allow-

ance based on years of

service up to one years’

pay with a maximum of

$35,000...

Labor protection

costs for non-agreement

employees affected by the

UPRR-MRRR and UPRR-WPRR

consolidations were cal-

culated using different

assumptions reflecting

different management pol-

icies. Affected UPRR-MPRR

non-agreement employees

47 a

were assumed to be ab-

sorbed by attrition during

the first year after

consolidation as they

transferred to new job

openings or elected a

separation allowance.

UPRR-WPRR non-agreement

affected positions were

assumed to be abolished

promptly upon con-

summation, with incumbents

accepting other non-

agreement positions in the

combined system or re-

ceiving a separation

allowance.... (Emphasis

added. )

...--Non agreement employ-

ees whose positions are

adversely affected will be

given other job oppor-

tunities or a severance

allowance.

(Emphasis added.)

It is apparent that any

employee who examined these

statements would understand that a

clear distinction was being made

between the benefits of agreement

employees and those of non-agreement

employees. These distinctions are

being made by the official in charge

of labor relations-personnel for the

een

48 a

controlling carrier, and are

distinctions widely understood by

the unions, the railroad, and this

Commission. Complainants, by

examining this testimony and the

common parlance of the industry,

could assume that they were not

“agreement employees,” yet they or

their union took no action to

Clarify or challenge management’s

position on the issue of severance

benefits.

Certain assurances made by the

merger applicants in UP/MP/WP also

require review. On pages 189-90 of

the application it is stated:

Union Pacific Corporation,

Pacific Rail System and

Union Pacific Railroad do

not intend to change the

operations of Missouri

Pacific Truck Lines.

Rather, Missouri Pacific

Truck Lines will continue

to provide motor carrier

service as a subsidiary of

Missouri Pacific Railroad.

Therefore, there will not

be any effect on carrier

49 a

employees from approval of

this application.

Viewed in the light’ least

favorable to the merger applicants,

this would appear to be an assurance

that no MPTL employee would be

affected by the merger. Taken in

context of the other testimony

presented in the proceeding, most

notably Mr. Jordan’s statement

quoted above, this statement would

appear at most to assure non-

agreement motor carrier employee a

severance package. °/

8/as discussed above (p. 7), there

is no statutory requirement of

protection for displaced motor

carrier employees, unlike rail

employees, but the Commission has

discretion to impose protection for

motor carrier employees, if

requested. No request was made here.

Even if such a request had been

made, we would not have imposed more

generous protections than the

overall protection offered

nonagreement employees here. See

American Buslines, Inc. (discussed

in n.6, supra) upholding “the

customary protection in motor

carrier cases of three months’

50 a

Because the motor carrier

employees had adequate notice that

the protective conditions required

to be established for rail employees

would not be established by the

applicants for their benefit, and

because the employees did not

request the Commission to impose

such conditions, we did not abuse

our discretion under section

11344(c) by refraining from imposing

protective conditions for the

benefit of the motor carrier

employees in UP/MP/WP. Complainants,

who failed to participate in the

merger proceeding, have shown no

basis for reopening this long-closed

proceeding, and only now imposing

such protection along with the

possibility of unforeseen obli-

severance pay payable to the

adversely affected employees.” 253

F.Supp. 482-83.

51a

gations on the merged carriers,

under section 11344(c) .2/ Accord-

ingly, we find Cosby not —= con-

trolling.

This action will not

significantly affect either the

quality of the human environment or

energy conservation.

It is ordered:

1. The request for labor

protection filed by Marv Slusser,

Gene Dudley, John A. Cameron, Tom

Hampleman, Marv A. Seurer, R.D.

Griffin, and Ronald D. Pester is

denied.

r The petition to reopen and

request for enforcement filed by

Louis C. Burris, Larry A. Creiger,

David C. Doleshal, Steve Harter,

Raymond May, Charles Payne, and

af See Milwaukee, slip op. at 17;

NS/NAVL, Slip op. at 38, n. 46.

52a

Charles F. Rivers II is denied.

3. In F.D. 30000 (Sub.No.

45), the motion to dismiss filed by

defendants Union Pacific Motor

Freight Company, Union Pacific

Railroad Company, Missouri Pacific

Railroad Company, and Missouri

Pacific Truck Lines, Inc. is

granted, the petition for extension

of time is dismissed and _ the

proceeding is dismissed.

4. This decision is effective

on May 18, 1987.

By the Commission, Chairman

Gradison, Vice Chairman Lamboley,

Commissioners Sterrett, Andre, and

Simmons. Vice Chairman Lamboley

dissented in part with a _ separate

expression.

(SEAL)

Noreta R. McGee

Secretary

53a

VICE CHAIRMAN LAMBOLEY, dissenting

in part:

I would reopen this proceeding

and schedule an oral hearing to

examine further the claims of the

Kansas City complainants. In my

view, they have made allegations and

offers of proof of facts arguably

sufficient to bring their complaint

with the ambit of the holding of

Cosby v. I.C.C., 741 F.2d 1077 (8th

.

Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.

2344 (1985).

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

DECISION

Finance Docket No. 30000

UNION PACIFIC CORPORATION,

PACIFIC RAIL SYSTEM, INC.,

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY -

CONTROL - MISSOURI PACIFIC

CORPORATION AND MISSOURI

PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

Finance Docket No. 30000

(Sub-No. 45)

GARY W. MCPHERSON

Vv.

UNION PACIFIC MOTOR FREIGHT

COMPANY, ET AL.

Decided: Aprii 12, 1989

By decision served August 17,

1987, we reopened these matters at

the request of the Union Pacific

parties (UP/MpP) + to entertain

evidence on limited issues _ con-

cerning whether former employees of

Union Pacific Motor’ Freight

Company, Union Pacific Railroad

Company, Missouri Pacific Railroad

Company, and Missouri Pacific Truck

Lines, Inc.

55 a

the Union Pacific Motor Freight

Company (UPMF) are entitled to labor

protection. * Complainants” had

earlier asked the Commission to find

that its decision approving

. Following a review of allegations

by parties seeking judicial review,

UP/MP concluded that the

Commission’s April 21, 1987 decision

denying labor protection for some

petitionérs and refusing to reopen

the matter for others reflected a

misunderstanding of certain evidence

regarding whether the motor carrier

employees had sufficient notice of

the consequences of UP Control and

protections they might receive.

UP/MP believed that other evidence

should have been considered, and

that the proceeding should be

reopened.

3 The Denver complainants are:

Marvin Slusser; Gene Dudley; John A.

Cameron; Tom Hampleman; Marv A.

Seurer; R.D. Griffin; and Ronald D.

Pester. ‘The Kansas city

complainants are: Louis C. Burris;

Larry A. Creiger; David C. Doleshal;

Steve Harter; Raymond May; Charles

Payne; and Charles F. Rivers II.

The Commission included Gary W.

McPherson in the proceeding.

By pleading filed September 13,

1988, the parties advised us that

complainants Burris, Creiger,

Doleshal, Harter and Payne had

entered into a settlement agreement

with UP/MP, and withdrawn their

56 a

consolidation and imposing’ labor

protective conditions in Union

Pacific - Control-Missouri Pacific;

Western Pacific, 366 I.C.C. 459

(1982) (UP Control) mandated

benefits for adversely affected

employees of motor carrier sub-

Sidiaries, as well as-7~ railroad

employees of the Union Pacific

Railroad Company (UP) and the

Missouri Pacific Railroad Company.

In our August decision, we gave

complainants an opportunity to

demonstrate that they should receive

labor protection under the mandatory

standards set forth at 49 U.S.C.

11347, or in the exercise of the

Commission’s discretion under sec-

tion 11344(c). They have demon-

claims. By pleading filed

November 9, 1988, the parties

advised us that complainant May had

entered into a settlement agreement

with UP/MP, and withdrawn his clain.

strated neither. They presented no

evidence or argument concerning our

discretionary authority, although

our August 17 decision specifically

stated that we woula entertain such

a discussion. Instead, they sought

(as they had earlier) to demonstrate

that the Commission should find them

qualified for mandatory labor

protection under section 11347.

They take the position that the

decision of the court in Cosby v.-

Icc, 741 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir.), cert.

denied, 471 U.S. 1110 (1984) (Cosby)

requires us to conclude that motor

carrier employees of railroad

subsidiaries whose jobs may have

been affected as a consequence of

rail consolidations must be provided

labor protection. As we have

previously, we reject that

58 a

conclusion, and find that the

complainants here are not entitled

to labor protection.

The Cosby court, in considering

Claims for protective benefits from

employees of a motor carrier

subsidiary of a merged railroad,

found that in the ' circumstances

presented there the employees were

entitled both to mandatory pro-

tection under section 11347 as

railroad employees and to dis-

cretionary protection under section

11344. The Commission has’~ con-

sistently disagreed with Cosby to

the extent it requires that labor

protective benefits be awarded,

because it does not reflect

Commission precedent. We again

reject Cosby’s conclusion that motor

carrier employees may be entitled to

59 a

labor protection under 49 U.S.C.

11347, and take this opportunity to

explain our position.

Former section 5(2)(f) of the

Interstate Commerce Act, the pre-

decessor to section 11347, directed

the Commission to “require a fair

and equitable arrangement to protect

the interests of the railroad

employees affected” by consol-

idation. (Emphasis added.) His-

torically, the Commission inter-

preted this to mean that employees

of non-rail subsidiaries were not

entitled to mandatory labor

protections. See Pennsylvania

Railroad-Merger-New York Central

Railroad, 347 I.C.C. 536 (1974)

(Penn Central). The 1978 re-

codification of the Interstate Com-

merce Act requires the Commission to

“provide a fair arrangement at least

60 a

as protective of the interests of

employees who are affected by the

transaction. . .”. (Emphasis added.)

Language in the recodification

Clearly states that “Sections 1 and

2 of this Act [which includes

section 11347] restate, without

substantive change, laws enacted

before May 16, 1978.” Section 3(a)

of Public Law 95-473, 92 Stat. 1466.

(Emphasis added.) In Cass v. United

States, 417 U.S. 72 (1974), the

Supreme Court found that Con-

gressional comments that there would

be no substantive change, combined

with the fact that no consideration

of any change in the standards at

issue appeared in the legislative

history, conclusively demonstrated

that no changes in the standards

were contemplated by Congress when

it made some changes in style and

61a

form in the statute at issue there.

In a case concerning the _ 1978

recodification at issue in the

instant proceeding, the court stated

that, where Congress had twice and

without qualification stated that

the recodification effects no

substantive change i: the prior law,

the court must examine the language

of the Interstate Commerce Act prior

to recodification to determine the

intent of Congress. Atchison, T. &

S.F.Ry. Co. v. United States, 617

F.2d 485 (1980). Consequently we

adhere to the view that 49 U.S.C.

11347 directs us to protect the

interests of aff2cted railroad

employees, and not employees of

non-rail subsidiaries. Penn Central,

supra. The interpretation given to

the recodification by the Cosby

62 a

court is inconsistent with’ the

expressed intent of the Congress

concerning the recodification.

Relying on that part of Cosby

that focused on the type of work

performed at the motor carrier (741

F.2d at 1080-81), complainants

attempted to demonstrate that the

work they did was “railroad” work,

and that they consequently should be

considered railroad employees for

our purposes here. We find it

difficult to determine the appro-

priate boundaries of "railroad” work

(that is, deciding the nature of the

tasks that might under Cosby bring

non-railroad employees within

section 11347 and qualify them for

mandatory 6 year protection at their

current wage level). We question

whether Congress intended such a

flexible interpretation of the

63 a

statute, particularly when it has

supplied no guidelines for this

task. Our conclusion in Penn

Central, which we affirm, was that

the identity of the employer was

determinative as to who was entitled

to mandatory labor protection. *

As we have discussed, Congress

specified that mandatory protection

was to be provided for “railroad

employees,” i.e., employees of

railroads. We are simply assuming

that Congress meeant what it said.

Consistent with the approach we

are taking here, we have not in the

past analyzed the nature of the work

performed by those employed directly

by a railroad. If affected, they

are entitled to protection by virtue

of their employment relationship and

not because they perform so-called

“railroad” work. See Finance Docket

No. 21478 (Sub-No. 6), Great

Northern Pacific & Burlington Lines,

Inc. Merger - Great Northern

Railroad (not printed), served

December 11, 1986 (tax agent) ;

Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901

(3a Cir. 1977) (eligibility of

protection for attorney for railroad

questioned because he was arguably a

member of management but not because

of nature of work).

64 a

Only individuals directly

employed by a rail carrier are

entitled to protection under section

11347. This excludes the _ conm-

plainants, who were employed by

non-rail subsidiaries of the rail

carrier.” This conclusion is

consistent with our holdings in

Milwaukee - Reorganization - Acq-

uisition by Gre, 2 £.¢.¢.324 427

(1985), and Norfolk Sourthern Corp.

-- Control -- North American Van

Lines, Inc., 1 I.C.C.2d 844 (1985),

rev’d. on other grounds’ sub _ non.

Our April 21, 1987 decision in

this proceeding originally rejecting

complainants’ claims discussed the

failure to demonstrate the work

performed by UPMF was so intimately

connected to UP’s main

transportation system so as_ to

transform the complainants into

railroad employees. AS we

indicated, this approach was

described in Cosby at 1080-81. we

adhere to the view that, whatever

the nature of the werk, the crucial

test is the identity of the

employer.

International Brotherhood of

Teamsters v. ICC, 801 F.2d 143 (D.C.

Cir. 1986), aff’d on rehearing, 818

F.2a 87 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In these

cases we discussed (and rejected)

arguments that petitioners performed

rail-related work, but this does not

mean that we were accepting Cosby’s

conclusion that section 11347 may

require labor protection for

employees of non-rail subsidiaries

of the rail carrier. To adopt an

approach requiring the Commission to

examine each job performed in a

non-rail subsidiary to determine

whether it is the type of work that

strikes us as being railroad work is

both an unnecessary and undesirable

role for the Commission to fashion

for itself.

a ee ee

66 a

In the case noted above, we did

consider Cosby’s alternative dis-

cussion of our discretionary

authority under section 11344(c),

and found protection not to be

justified. There is no need to

discuss whether we should exercise

our discretionary authority under 49

U.S.C. 11344 (c) here because

complainants did not address that

issue, in spite of our invitation

that they do so.

For all the foregoing reasons,

we will deny complainants’ request

for labor protection under 49 U.S.C.

11347.

This decision will not

Significantly affect either’ the

quality of the human environment or

the conservation of energy’ re-

sources.

It is ordered:

67 a

1. Complainants’ requests for

labor protection are denied, and

this proceeding is discontinued.

2. This decision will be

effective on the date served.

By the Commission, Chairman

Gradison, Vice Chairman Simmons,

Commissioners Andre, Lamboley, and

Phillips. Vice Chairman Simmons and

Commissioner Lamboley dissented with |

separate expressions.

Noreta R. McGee

Secretary

(SEAL)

VICE CHAIRMAN SIMMONS, dissenting:

I disagree with the majority’s

refusal to consider and determine

the facts and issues of this case

under Cosby. When faced with the

issue of whether employees of a

motor carrier subsidiary of a merged

ee ttl

68 a

railroad are “railroad employees”

for purposes of 49 U.S.C. 11347, I

believe that the Commission must

take into account the Cosby decision

and not simply shrug it off. While

we may view that decision as

inconsistent with prevailing

Commission precedent, it is,

nevertheless, controlling and

binding until otherwise reversed by

the courts or legislation.

Given that, I agree that there

may be instances when it might be

difficult to determine what con-

stitutes the boundaries of railroad

work. However, for motor carrier

employees involved directly and

exclusively in TOFC/COFC operations,

it is much easier to make a

determination under Cosby where the

court found persuasive the argument

that those motor carrier operations

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.

69 a

incidental to the parent railroad’s

operations may entitle the employees

of the carrier to protections. This

is because the Commission has

already declared that railroad

affiliated motor carrier operations

involving the over-the-road portion

of trailer-on-flatcars (TOFC) and

container-on-flatcar (COFC) are

services “related to a rail

carrier.” See Improvement of

TOFC/COFC Regulations (Railroad-

Affiliated Motor Carriers and Other

Motor Carriers), 3 I1.C.C. 2d 869

(1987). While that decision dealt

with whether the rates of railroad

affiliated motor carriers involved

in TOFC/COFC operations should be

exempt, the Commission had to first

make a determination that the type

of transportation provided by the

motor carriers’ affiliates is

70 a

“related to a rail carrier” under 49

U.S.C. 10505. It stands to re. son

then that if the nature of the

transportation in which these

employees were involved at the time

of the merger are rail-related, they

have met one Cosby requirement. On

the other hand, I am not certain

whether complainants have_ proven

that they were persuaded by proper

UP management that they would

receive New York Dock and therefore,

relying on such representations, did

not assert their interests during

the merger proceeding. It may be

that both factors of Cosby must be

present. Because of this, I would

invoke Commission discretion, and

leave this matter to arbitration. I

would also leave open the question

as to whether these particular

employees were solely and

71a

exclusively involved in TOFC

operations and whether they were

adversely affected as a result of

the merger.

-26 = oe ee oe oe ee oe ee ee oe oe ee ee ee ee ee ee em oe oe ee ee ee ee ee oe oe oe ee oe oe oe oe

COMMISSIONER LAMBOLEY, dissenting:

Earlier, in this case as in

others, I have dissented from the

majority’s rejection of the view,

that in appropriate circumstances,

employees of an integrated motor

carrier subsidiary may be eligible

for labor protection under

provisions of § 11347.*

In my view, the majority’s

position runs contrary to statute

and precedent. * Nothing in the

See, e.g., earlier dissent in FD

No. 32000, Et Al., Rio rande

Industries, Inc., SPTC Holding,

Inc., and The Denver and Rio Grande

Western Railroad Company - Control -

Southern Pacific Transportation

Company, 4 I.C.C.2d 834, 974 (1988)

(DRGW) .

2

See and compare 49 U.S.C. § 11347

72a

legislative history limits or

precludes eligibility for pro-

tections of persons employed by

motor carriers providing services

substantially integrated with and

directly beneficial to the rail

carrier activity involved in the

subject transaction.

Heretofore, the Commission has

declared that it has never specified

the “class of employees” covered by

its protective conditions, and has

consistently declined to define

“employee” on the ground that once

the conditions have been imposed,

the matter is for interpretation by

the Courts, or resolution by

with former § 5(2)(f) (49 U.S.C.

§ 5(2)(f). 49 U.S.C. § 11344(c) and

Cosby v. I.C.C. 741 F.2d 1077 (8th

Cir. 1984) cert. den. 471 U.S. 1110

(1984). But see Milwaukee

Reorganization I, 2 I1.C.C.2d 161

(1984) and II 2 I.C.C.2d 427 (1985),

and DRGW, supra.

73a

arbitration. Bell Vv. Western

Maryland Ry. Co. 366 I.C.C. 64, 66-

67 (1981).°

Accordingly, I fail to

understand the relevancy of the

majority’s argument that determining

whether employee activity is rail

work “is both an unnecessary and

undesirable role for the Commission

to fashion for itself.” There is

neither reason nor need for the

Commission to determine the

parameters of such activity. Ar@-

bitration is a readily available and

appropriate resolution for those

fact-bound circumstances.

The present record evidences

that Union Pacific Motor Freight

Company (UPMF) was intimately and

Significantly tied to the railroad’s

See also Chicago St. P M & O Ry

Co. Lease 295 EeGeGs 441, 443

(1956).

74a

main service functions as an

integral part of the overall

transportation system. * UPMF’s

primary role was to participate in

the railroad’s TOFC/COFC operations.

In doing so, the petitioning

employees, among other’ intermodal

duties, operated rail equipment

known as a “Piggy Packer” to off-

load trailers from the flat cars.

These operations are obviously

directly rail-related for

substantial and beneficial railroad

purposes.

In general, I conclude that

employees of motor carrier sub-

Sidiaries, who perform rail-related

services substantially integrated

with and directly beneficial to the

Indeed, the public reports of

reason for UP acquisition of motor

carrier, Overnite Transportation

Co., reflect the railroad’s desire

to effectively and efficiently

integrate intermodal subsidiaries.

Ee ee Se ne eee

75 a

rail carrier activity involved in

the transaction subjected to

conditions, may be considered eli-

gible for coverage by the imposed

conditions. In this particular

case, I find that employees who

directly and substantially perform

rail-related services for an

integrated motor carrier subsidiary

operation may be eligible for

protection to ameliorate adverse

employment consequences of the 1982

merger transaction. Employment and

causation questions concerning the

nature and scope of employment

activities as being directly and

significantly rail-related, and

whether the actions taken in Kansas

City and Denver do, in fact, result

from the merger, can, and should be

| 4

resolved by an arbitration.”

Because I conclude protection is

available under § 11347, I do not

76a

Finally, the recent proceeding

in FD No. 31423, Missouri Pacific

Truck Lines, Inc. - Merger Exemption

- Katy Transportation Co. (not

printed), served March 17, 1989,

(MoPac/Katy) deserves comment. In

MoPac/Katy, the Commission, in

exempting the merger of the motor

carriers respectively owned by

merging rail carriers, “MoPac and

Katy,° mandated protection for

"railroad employees”. Obviously,

the Commission found a sufficient

nexus of activity between the

integrated motor carrier sub-

sidiaries and the merged rail

carrier for the purposes of

reach the question of "discretionary

imposition of conditions.” See

e.g., Walters v. Roadway Express,

Inc. 557 F.2G S21 (Sth Cir. 1977).

6 See FD No. 30800, Union Pacific

Corp. Et Al. = Control - Mo-Ks-Tx

Co. Et Al. 4 1.C.C.2d 409 (1988)

(UP/MKT).

pte ll a

74

protective conditions. A similar

premise for protection of motor

carrier employees may likewise exist

in rail carrier merger proceedings.’

I fail to see a rational basis

for distinguishing the grant of

merger protection for “railroad”

employees of integrated motor

carrier subsidiaries, on the one

hand, form the denial of protections

for “other” employees of similarly

integrated motor carriers who can

demonstrate that they too perform

substantial services directly

realted and beneficial to the rail

component in the merging

transportation systems, on the

per omemerinemenmneemaenaintane

"Railroad employees” are not

defined in the MoPac/Katy motor

carrier decision. Protection was

mandated for “rail employees” in the

UP/MKT rail carrier case. Id. at

531.

78 a

other. It is the character of

employment not the identity of the

employer that I find determinative.

© Xo htmwned 6

79 a

§ 11344. Consolidation, merger, and

acquisition of control: general

procedure and conditions of approval

(a) The Interstate Commerce

Commission may begin a proceeding to

approve and authorize a transaction

referred to in section 11343 of this

title [49 USCS § 11343] on

application of the person seeking

that authority. When an application

is filed with the Commission, the

Commission shall notify the chief

executive officer of each State in

which property of the’ carriers

involved in the proposed transaction

is located and shall notify those

carriers. If a motor carrier

providing transportation subject to

the jurisdiction of the Commission

under subchapter II of chapter 105

of this title [49 USCS §§ 10521 et

seq. ] is involved in the

transaction, the Commission must

80 a

notify the persons specified in

section 10328(b) of this title [49

USCS § 10328(b)]. The Commission

shall hold a public hearing when a

rail carrier providing trans-

portation subject to the juris-

diction of the Commission’ under

subchapter I of that chapter [49

USCS §§ 10501 et seq.] is involved

in the transaction unless7~ the

Commission determines that a public

hearing is not necessary in the

public interest.

(b) (1) In a proceeding under this

section which involves the merger or

control of at least two class I

railroads, as defined by the

Commission, the Commission _ shall

consider at least the following:

8la

(A) the effect of the proposed

transaction oon the adequacy of

transportation to the public.

(B) the effect on the public

interest of including, or failing to

include, other rail carriers in the

area involved in the proposed

transaction.

(C) the total fixed charges

that result from the proposed

transaction.

(D) the interest of carrier

employees affected by the proposed

transaction.

(E) whether the proposed

transaction would have an adverse

effect on competition among rail

carriers in the affected region.

(2) In a proceeding under this

section which involves only carriers

of passengers providing trans-

portation subject to the juris-

82 a

diction of the Interstate Commerce

Commission under subchapter II of

chapter 105 of this title [49 USCS

§§ 10521 et seq.], the Commissioner

shall consider at least the

following:

(A) the effect of the proposed

transaction on the adequacy of

transportation to the public.

(B) the effect on the public

interest of including, or failing to

include, other rail carriers in the

area involved in the proposed

transaction.

(C) the total fixed charges

that result from the proposed

transaction.

(D) the interest of carrier

employees affected by the proposed

transaction.

83 a

(c) The Commission shall approve

and authorize a transaction under

this section when it finds’ the

transaction is consistent with the

public interest. The Commission may

impose conditions governing’ the

transaction. When the transaction

contemplates a guaranty or

assumption of payment of dividends

or of fixed charges or will result

in an increase of total fixed

charges, the Commission may approve

and authorize the transaction only

if it finds that the guaranty,

assumption, or increase is

consistent with the public interest.

When a rail carrier, or a person

controlled by or affiliated with a

rail carrier, is an applicant and

the transaction involves a motor

carrier, the Commission may approve

and authorize the transaction only

if it finds that the transaction is

consistent with the public interest,

will enable the rail carrier to use

motor carrier transportation to

public advantage in its operations,

and will not unreasonably restrain

competition. When a rail carrier is

involved in the transaction, the

Commission may require inclusion of

other rail carriers located in the

area involved in the transaction if

they apply for inclusion and the

Commission finds their inclusion to

be consistent with the public

interest. (Oct. 17, 1978, P.L. 95-

473, § 1, 92 Stat. 1436.)

(d) In a proceeding under this

section which does not involve the

merger or control of at least two

Class I railroads, as defined by the

85 a

Commission, the Commission _ shall

approve such an application unless

it finds that-

(1) as a result of the

transaction, there is likely to be

substantial lessening of com-

petition, creation of a monopoly, or

restraint of trade in freight

surface transportation in any region

of the United States; and

(2)the anticompetitive effects

of the transaction outweigh the

public interest in meeting sig-

nificant transportation needs.

” «

In making such findings, the

Commission shall, with respect to

any application that is part of a

plan or proposal developed under

section 333(a)-(d) of this title [49

USCS $ 333(a)-(d)], accord sub-

stantial weight to any re-

86 a

commendations of the Secretary of

Transportation. The provisions of

this subsection do not apply to any

proceeding under this section which

involves only carriers of passengers

providing transportation subject to

the jurisdiction of the Commission

under subchapter II of chapter 105

of this title {49 USCS §§ 10521 et

seq. }

(e) A rail carrier, or a person

controlled by or affiliated with a

rail carrier, together with one or

more affected shippers, may apply

for approval under this subsection

of a transaction for the purpose of

providing motor carrier trans-

portation prior or subsequent to

rail transportation to serve

inadequately served shippers located

on a railroad other than the

applicant carriers. Such application

87 a

shall be approved by the Commission

if the applicants demonstrate

presently impaired rail service and

inadequate motor common’ carrier

service which results in the serious

failure of the rail carrier serving

the shippers to meet the rail

equipment or transportation

schedules of shippers or seriously

to fail otherwise to provide

adequate normal rail services

required by shippers and_ which

shippers would reasonably expect the

rail carrier to provide. The

Commission shall approve or

disapprove applications under this

subsection within 30 days after

receipt of such application. The

Commission shall approve

applications which are not protested

88 a

by interested parties within 30 days

following receipt of such

application.

(As amended Oct. 14, 1980, P.L. 96-

448, Title II, § 228(a)-(c), 94

Stat. 1931; Sept. 20, 1982, P. L.

97-261, § 21(f), (9g), 96 Stat. 1123;

Feb. 14, 1984, P. L. 98-216, § 2(4),

98 Stat. 5.)

89 a

Section 11347 of the Interstate

Commerce Act, 49 U.8s.C. § 11347

(1982), provides:

When a rail carrier is involved

in a transaction for which approval

is sought under sections 11344 and

11345 or section 11346 of this

title, the Interstate Commerce

Commission shall require the carrier

to provide a fair arrangement at

least as protective of the interest

of employees who are affected bv the

transaction as the terms’ imposed

under this section before

February 5, 1976, and the terms

established under section 565 of

title 45. Notwithstanding this

subtitle, the arrangement may be

made by the rail carrier and the

authorized representative of its

employees. The arrangement and the

order approving the transaction must

require that the employees of the

90 a

affected rail carrier will not be in

a worse position related to their

employment as a result of the

transaction during the 4. years

following the effective date of the

final action of the Commission (or

if an employee was employed for a

lesser period of time by the carrier

before the action became effective,

for that lesser period).

91a

LABOR PROTECTIVE CONDITIONS

In New York Dock Railway--

Control--Brooklyn Eastern District,

360 1.C.C. 60, 84-90 (1979), the

Commission set forth the following

as the standard level of protection

mandated by 49 U.S.C. § 11347

(1982):

Labor protective conditions to

be imposed in railroad transactions

pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 11343 et seq.

[formerly sections £(2) and 5(3) of

the Interstate Commerce Act], except

for trackage rights and lease

proposals which are being considered

elsewhere, are as follows:

1. Definitions.--(a) ”Transac-

tion” means any action taken

pursuant to authorizations of this

Commission on which these provisions

have been imposed.

92 a

(b) “Displaced employee” means

an employee of the railroad who, as

a result of a transaction is placed

in a worse position with respect to

his compensation and rules governing

his working conditions.

(c) “Dismissed employee” means

an employee of the railroad who, as

a result of a transaction is

deprived of employment with the

railroad because of the abolition of

his position or the loss thereof as

the result of the exercise of

seniority rights by an _ employee

whose position is abolished as a

result of a transaction.

(d) “Protective period” means

the period of time during which a

displaced or dismissed employee is

to be provided protection hereunder

and extends from the date on which

an employee is displaced or

Deere een meen eee

93 a

dismissed to the expiration of 6

years therefrom, provided, however,

that the protective period for any

particular employee shall not

continue for a longer period

following the date he was displaced

or dismissed than the period during

which such employee was in the

employ of the railroad prior to the

date of his displacement or his

dismissal. For purposes of this

appendix, an employee’s length of

service shall be determined in

accordance with the provisions of

section 7(b) of the Washington Job

Protection Agreement of May 1936.

2. The rates of pay, rules,

working conditions and all

collective bargaining and. other

rights, privileges and benefits

(including continuation of pension

rights and benefits) of the

ee

94 a

railroad’s employees under appli-

cable laws and/or existing col-

lective bargaining agreements or

otherwise shall be preserved unless

changed by future collective bar-

gaining agreements or applicable

statutes.

3. Nothing in this appendix

shall be construed as depriving any

employee of any rights or benefits

or eliminating any obligations which

such employee may have under any

existing job security oor other

protective conditions or arrange-

ments; provided, that if an employee

otherwise is eligible for protection

under both this appendix and some

other job security or other

protective conditions or arrange-

ments, he shall elect between the

benefits. under this appendix and

Similar benefits under such other

95 a

arrangement and, for so long as he

continues to receive such benefits

under the provisions which he_ so

elects, he shall not be entitled to

the same type of benefit under the

provisions which he does not. so

elect; provided further, that the

benefits under this appendix, or any

other arrangement, shall be

construed to include the conditions,

responsibilities and obligations

accompanying such benefits; and,

provided further, that after

expiration of the period for which

such employee is entitled to

protection under the arrangement

which he so elects, he may then be

entitled to protection under the

other arrangement for the remainder,

if any, of this protective period

under that arrangement.

96 a

4. Notice and agreement or

decision.--(a) Each railroad con-

templating a transaction which is

subject to these conditions and may

cause the dismissal or displacement

of any employees, or rearrangement

of forces, shall give at least

ninety (90) days written notice of

such intended transaction by posting

a notice on bulletin boards

convenient to the interested

employees of the railroad and by

sending registered mail notice to

the representatives of such

interested employees. Such notice

shall contain a full and adequate

statement of the proposed changes to

be affected by such transaction,

including an estimate of the number

of employees of each class affected

97 a

by the intended changes. Prior to

consummation the parties shall

negotiate in the following manner.

Within five (5) ‘days from the

date of receipt of notice, at the

request of either the railroad or

representatives of such interested

employees, a place shall be selected

to hold negotiations for the purpose

of reaching agreement with respect

to application of the terms and

conditions of this appendix, and

these negotiations shall commence

immediately thereafter and continue

for at least thirty (30) days. Each

transaction which may result in a

dismissal or displacement of en-

ployees or rearrangement of forces,

Shall provide for the selection of

forces from all employees involved

on a basis accepted as appropriate

for application in the particular

98 a

case and any assignment of employees

made necessary by the transaction

shall be made on the basis of an

agreement or decision under this

section 4. If at the end of thirty

(30) days there is a failure to

agree, either party to the dispute

may submit it for adjustment in

accordance with the following

procedures:

(1) Within five (5) days from

the request for arbitration the

parties shall select a neutral

referee and in the event they are

unable to agree within said five (5)

days upon the selection of said

referee then the National Mediation

Board shall immediately appoint a

referee.

99 a

-

(2) No later than twenty (20)

days after a referee has_ been

designated a hearing on the dispute

shall commence.

(3) The decision of the referee

shall be final, binding and

conclusive and shall be rendered

within thirty (30) days from the

commencement of the hearing of the

dispute.

(4) The salary and expenses of

the referee shall be borne equally

by the parties to the proceeding;

all other expenses shall be paid by

the party incurring then.

(b) No change in operations,

services, facilities, or equipment

shall occur until after an agreement

is reached or the decision of a

referee has been rendered.

100 a

5. Displacement allowances.--

(a) So long after a displaced

employee’s displacement as he is

unable, in the normal exercise of

his seniority rights under existing

agreements, rules and practices, to

obtain a position producing

compensation equal to or exceeding

the compensation he received in the

position from wnich he was

displaced, he shall, during his

protective period, be paid a monthly

displacement allowance equal to the

difference between the monthly

compensation received by him in the

position in which he is retained and

the average monthly compensation

received by him in the position from

which he was displaced.

Each displaced employee’s

displacement allowance shall_ be

determined by dividing separately by

101 a

12 the total compensation received

by the employee and the total time

for which he was paid during the

last 12 months in which he performed

services immediately preceding the

date of his displacement as a result

of the transaction (thereby

producing average monthly compensa-

tion and average monthly time paid

for in the test period), and

provided further, that such

allowance shall also be adjusted to

reflect subsequent general wage

increases.

z¢ a displaced employee’s

compensation in his retained

position in any month is less in any

month in which he performs work than

the aforesaid average compensation

(adjusted to reflect subsequent

general wage increases) to which he

would have been entitled, he shall

102 a

be paid the difference, less

compensation for time lost oon

account of his voluntary absences to

the extent that he is not available

for service equivalent to his

average monthly time during the test

period, but if in his’ retained

position he works in any month in

excess of the aforesaid average

monthly time paid for during the

test period he shall be additionally

compensated for such excess time at

the rate of pay of the retained

position.

(b) If a displaced employee

fails to exercise his’ seniority

rights tc secure another position

available to him which does not

require a change in his place of

residence, to which he is entitled

under the working agreement and

which carries a rate of pay and

103 a

compensation exceeding those oc the

position which he elects to retain,

he shall thereafter be treated for

the purposes of this section as

occupying the position he elects to

decline.

(c) The displacement allowance

shall cease prior to the expiration

of the protective period in the

event of the displaced employee’s

resignation, death, retirement, or

dismissal for justifiable cause.

6. Dismissal allowances.--(a)

A dismissed employee shall be paid a

monthly dismissal allowance, from

the date he is deprived of

employment and continuing during his

protective period, equivalent to

one-twelfth of the compensation

received by him in the last 12

months of his employment in which he

earned compensation prior to the

104 a

date he is first deprived of

employment as a result of the

transaction. Such allowance shall

also be adjusted to reflect

subsequent general wage increases.

(b) The dismissal allowance of

any dismissed employee who returns

to service with the railroad shall

cease while he is so reemployed.

During the time of such reemploy-

ment, he shall be entitled to

protection in accordance with the

provisions of section 5.

(c) The dismissal allowance of

any dismissed employee who is

otherwise employed shall be reduced

to the extent that his combined

monthly earnings in such other

employment, any benefits received

under any unemployment’ insurance

law, and his dismissal allowance

exceed the amount upon which his

105 a

dismissal allowance is based. Such

employee, or his representative, and

the railroad shall agree upon a

procedure by which the railroad

Shall be currently informed of the

earnings of such employee in

employment other than with the

railroad, and the benefits received.

(da) The dismissal allowance

shall cease prior to the expiration

of the protective period in the

event of the employee’s resignation,

death, retirement, dismissal for

justifiable cause under existing

agreements, failure to return to

service after beirg notified in

accordance with the working

agreement, failure without good

cause to accept a comparable

position which does not require a

change in his place of residence for

which he is qualified and eligible

106 a

after appropriate notification, if

his return does not infringe upon

the employment rights of other

employees under a working agreement.

- 7. Separation allowance.--A

dismissed employee entitled to

protection under this appendix, may,

at his option within 7 days of his

dismissal, resign and (in lieu of

all other benefits and protections

provided in this appendix) accept a

lump sum payment computed in

accordance with section 9 of the

Washington Job Protection Agreement

of May 1936.

8. Fringe benefits.--No em-

ployee of the railroad who is

affected by a transaction shall be

deprived, during his’ protection

period, of benefits attached to his

previous employment, such as free

transportation, hospitalization,

107 a

pensions, reliefs, et cetera, under

the same conditions and so long as

such benefits continue to be

accorded to other employees of the

railroad, in active or on furlough

as the case may be, to the extent

that such benefits can be so

maintained under present authority

of law or _ corporate action or

through future authorization which

may be obtained.

9. Moving expenses.--Any em-

ployee retained in the service of

the railroad or who is later

restored to service after being

entitled to receive a dismissal

allowance, and who is required to

change the point of his employment

as a result of the transaction, and

who within his protective period is

required to move his place of

residence, shall be reimbursed for

108 a

all expenses of moving his household

and other personal effects for the

traveling expenses of himself and

members of his family, including

living expenses for himself and his

family and for his own actual wage

loss, not to exceed 3 working days,

the exact extent of the responsibi-

lity of the railroad during the time

necessary for such transfer and for

reasonable time thereafter and the

ways and means of transportation to

be agreed upon in advance by the

railroad and the affected employee

or his representatives; provided,

however, that changes in place of

residence which are not a result of

the transaction, shall not be

considered to be within the purview

of this section; provided further,

that the railroad shall, to the same

extent provided above, assume the

—Eeeeeaaaaa

109 a

expenses, et cetera, for any

employee furloughed within three (3)

years after changing his point of

employment as a result of a

transaction, who elects to move his

Place of residence back to his

Original point of enployment. No

Claim for reimbursenent shall be

paid under the provision of this

section unless such Claim is

presented to railroad within 90 days

after the date on which the expenses

were incurred.

10. Should the railroad

rearrange or adjust its forces in

anticipation of a transaction with

the purpose or effect of depriving

an employee of benefits to which he

otherwise would have become entitled

under this appendix, this appendix

will apply to such employee.

110 a

11. Arbitration of disputes.-

-(a) In the event the railroad and

its employees or their authorized

representatives cannot settle any

dispute or controversy with respect

to the interpretation, application

or enforcement of any provision of

this appendix, except sections 4 and

12 of this article I, within 20 days

after the dispute arises, it may be

referred by either party to an

arbitration committee. Upon notice

in writing served by one party on

the other of intent by that party to

refer a dispute or controversy to an

arbitration committee, each party

shall, within 10 days, select one

member of the committee and the

members thus chosen shall select a

neutral member who shall serve as

chairman. If any party fails to

select its member of the arbitration

lll a

committee within the prescribed time

limit, the general chairman of the

involved labor organization or the

highest officer designated by the

railroads, as the case may be, shall

be deemed the selected member and

the committee shall then function

and its decision shall have the same

force and effect as though all

parties had selected their members.

Should the members be- unable to

agree upon the appointment of the

neutral member within 10 days, the

parties shall then within an

additional 10 days endeavor to agree

to a method by which a neutral

member shall be appointed, and,

failing such agreement, either party

may request the National Mediation

Board to designate within 10 days

the neutral member whose designation

will be binding, upon the parties.

112 a

(b) In the event a dispute

involves more than cone labor

organization, each will be entitled

to a representative on the

arbitration committee, in which

event the railroad will be entitled

to appoint additional representa-

tives so as to equal the number of

labor organization representatives.

(c) The decision, by majority

vote, of the arbitration committee

shaii be final, binding, and

conclusive and shall be rendered

within 45 days after the hearing of

the dispute or controversy has been

concluded and the record closed.

(d) The salaries and expenses

of the neutral member shall be borne

equally by the parties to the

proceeding and all other expenses

shall be paid by the party incurring

them.

113 a

(e) In the event of any

dispute as to whether or not a

particular employee was affected by

a transaction, it shall be his

obligation to identify the trans-

action and Specify the pertinent

facts of that transaction relied

upon. It shall then be the rail-

road’s burden to prove that factors

other than a transaction affected

the employee.

12. Losses from home re-

moval.--(a) The following conditions

Shall apply to the extent they are

applicable in each instance to any

employee who is retained in the

service of the railroad (or who is

later restored to. service after

being entitled to receive a

dismissal allowance) who is required

to change the point of his

employment within his protective

114 a

period as a result of the transac-

tion and is therefore required to

move his place of residence:

(i) If the employee owns his

own home in the locality from which

he is required to move, he shall at

his option be reimbursed by the

railroad for any loss suffered in

the sale of his home for less than

its fair value. In each case the

fair value of the home in question

shall be determined as of a date

sufficiently prior to the date of

the transaction so as to be un-

affected thereby. The railroad shall

in each instance be afforded an

opportunity to purchase the home at

such fair value before it is sold by

the empioyee to any other person.

(ii) If the employee is under a

contract to purchase his home, the

railroad shall protect him against

115 a

loss to the extent of the fair value

of equity he may have in the home

and in addition shall relieve him

from any further obligation under

his contract.

(iii) If the employee holds an

unexpired lease of dwelling

occupied by him as his home, the

railroad shall protect him from all

loss and cost in securing the

cancellation of said lease.

(b) Changes in place of

residence which are not the result

of a transaction shall not be

considered to be within the purview

of this section.

(Cc) No claim for loss shall be

paid under the provisions of this

section unless such claim is

presented to the railroad within 1

year after the date the employee is

required to move.

116 a

(d) Should a controversy arise

in respect to the value of the home,

the loss sustained in its sale, the

loss under a contract for purchase,

loss and cost in securing termina-

tion of a lease, or any other

question in connection with these

matters, it shall be decided through

joint conference between the

employee, or their representatives

and the railroad. In the event they

are unable to agree, the dispute or

controversy may be referred by

either party to a board of competent

real estate appraisers, selected in

the following manner. One to be

selected by the representatives of

the employees and one by the

railroad, and these two, if unable

to agree within 30 days upon a

valuation, shall endeavor by

agreement within 10 days thereafter

Pence remem wee nee mere

117 a

to select a third appraiser, or to

agree to a method by .which a third

appraiser ‘shall be selected, and

failing such agreement, either party

may request the National Mediation

Board to designate within 10 days a

third appraiser whose designation

Will be binding upon the parties. A

decision of a majority of the

appraisers shall be required and

Said decision shall be final and

conclusive. The Salary and expenses

of the third or neutral appraiser,

including the expenses of the

appraise) board, shall be borne

equally by the parties to the

proceedings. All other expenses

shall be paid by the party incurring

them, including the compensation of

the appraiser selected by such

party.

ARTICLE ITI

118 2

1. Any employee who is

terminated or furloughed as a result

of a transaction shall, if he so

requests, be granted priority of

employment or reemployment to fill a

position comparable to that which he

held when his employment was

terminated or he was’ furloughed,

even though in a different craft or

class, on the railroad which he is,

or by training or retraining

physically and mentally can become,

qualified, not, however, in

contravention of collective bar-

gaining agreements relating thereto.

2. In the ever.t such training

or retraining is requested by such

employee, the railroad shall provide

for such training or retraining at

no cost to the employee.

119 a

3. If such a terminated or

furloughed employee who had made a

request under section 1 or 2 of the

article II fails without good cause

within 10 calendar days to accept an

offer of a position comparable to

that which he held when terminated

or furloughed for’ which he is

qualified, Or for which he has

Satisfactorily completed such

training, he Shall, effective at the

expiration of such 10-day period,

forfeit all rights, and benefits

under this appendix.

ARTICLE III

Subject to this appendix, as if

employees of railroad, shall be

employees, if affected by a

transaction, of separately incor-

porated terminal companies which are

Owned (in whole or in part) or used

by railroad and employees of any

120 a

other enterprises within the

definition of common carrier by

railroad in section 1(3) of part I

of the Interstate Commerce Act, as

amended, in which railroad has an

interest, to which railroad provides

facilities, or with which railroad

contracts for use of facilities, or

the facilities of which railroad

otherwise uses; except that the

provisions of this appendix shall be

suspended with respect to each such

employee until and unless he applies

for employment with each owning

carrier and each using carrier;

provided that said carriers shali

establish one convenient’ central

location for each terminal or other

enterprises for receipt of one such

application which will be effective

as to all said carriers and railroad

shall notify such employees of this

1l2la

requirement and of the location for

receipt of the application. Such

employees shall not be entitled to

any of the benefits of this appendix

in the case of failure, without good

cause, to accept comparable en-

ployment, which does not require a

change in place of residence, under

the same conditions as apply to

other employees under this appendix,

with any carrier for which

application for employment has been

made in accordance with this

section.

ARTICLE Iv

Employees of the railroad who

are not represented by labor or-

ganization shall be afforded

Substantially the same levels of

protection as are afforded to

members of labor organizations under

these terms and conditions.

eeee—ea~ ea

122 a

In the event any dispute or

controversy arises between the

railroad and an employee not

represented by a labor organization

with respect to the interpretation,

application or enforcement of any

provision hereof which cannot be

settled by the parties within 30

days after the dispute arises,

either party may refer the dispute

to arbitration.

ARTICLE V

1. It is the intent of this

appendix to provide employee

protections which are not less than

the benefits established under 49

¥.6.C. 11347 before February 5,

1976, and under section 565 of title

45. In so doing, changes in wording

ne and organization from arrangements

earlier developed under those

sections have been necessary to make

123 a

such benefits applicable to

transactions as defined in article I

of this appendix. In making such

changes, it is not the intent of

this appendix to diminish such

benefits. Thus, the terms of this

appendix are to be resolved in favor

of this intent to provide employee

protections and benefits no less

than those established under 49

U.S.C. 11347 before February 5, 1976

and under section 565 of title 45.

2. In the event any provision

of this appendix is held to be

invalid or otherwise unenforceable

under applicable law, the remaining

provisions of this appendix shall

not be affected.

a

124 a

STATUTES

Section 5 (2) (c) of the

Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.

§ 5(2)(c) (1976), provides:

(c) in passing upon any

proposed transaction under the

provisions of this paragraph, the

Commission shall give weight to the

following considerations, among

others: (1) The effect of the

proposed transaction upon adequate

transportation service to the

public; (2) the effect upon the

public interest of the inclusion, or

failure to include, other railroads

in the territory involved in the

proposed transaction; (3) the total

fixed charges resulting from the

proposed transaction; and (4) the

interest of the carrier employees

affected.

125 a

Section 5(2) (f) of the

Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.c.

§ 5(2) (f) (1976), provides:

(f) As a condition of its

approval, under this paragraph or

Paragraph (3), of any transaction

involving a Carrier or carriers by

railroad subject to the provisions

of this Chapter, the Commission

Shall require a fair and equitable

arrangement to protect the interests

of the railroad employees affected.

In its order of approval the

Commission shall include terms and

conditions Providing that during the

Period of four years from the

effective date of Such order such

transaction will not result in

employees of the carrier Or carriers

by railroad affected by such order

being in a_ worse position with

respect to their employment except

126 a

that the protection afforded to any

employee pursuant to this sentence

shall not be required to continue

for a longer period, following the

effective date of such order, than

the period during which such

employee was in the employ of such

carrier or carriers prior to the

effective date of such order. Such

arrangement shall contain provisions

no less protective of the interests

of employees than those imposed

before February 5, 1976, pursuant to

this subdivision and those

established pursuant to section 565

of Title 45. Notwithstanding any

other provisions of this Act, an

agreement pertaining to the

protection of the interests of said

employees may be entered into after

September 18, 1940, by any carrier

or carriers by railroad and the duly

adidiian ice Aah atk on ahead minarets oa

127 a

authorized representative or

representatives of its oor their

employees.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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