Appendix — Rives v. Interstate Commerce Commission
Supreme Court brief1992
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No. 1 OFFiCy
hen
In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
| October Term, 1991
CHARLES F. RIVES, II,
Marv A. Seurer; Ronald D. Pester,
Tom Hampleman; R.D. Griffin;
John A. Cameron; Marv Slusser;
and Gene Dudley,
Petitioners,
¥.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
United States of America,
Respondents.
UNION PACIFIC MOTOR FREIGHT COMPANY,
Intervenor.
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Of Counsel:
M.J. Ogborn A.M. Lewandowski*
Harding & Ogborn Dysart Taylor
1200 17th Street 4420 Madison Ave.
Denver, CO 80202 Kansas City, MO
(303) 629-0300 (816) 931-2700
_
Attorneys for Petitioners
*Counsel of Record
DATE: November 15, 1991
INDEX TO APPENDIX
PAGE
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit in
Rives v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 934 F.2d 1171
(4008 Gar, 2992) ...54<«« »« te
Order Denying Petition for
Rehearing (10th Cir.
August 20, 1991). ....,.. - 24a
Decision of the Interstate
Commerce Commission in Union
Pacific Corp., et al.--Control
--Missouri Pacific Corp,
et al., Finance Docket No.
MC-30,000 (April 3, 1987) .. . 26a
Decision of the Interstate
Commerce Commission denying
benefits to Petitioners
(April 12, SWE s es es. Sa 54a
Statutes:
49 U.S.C. §11344 ji + we « « » « Fe
9 U.G.C. §112347. . s« « > - « « 89a
New York Dock Railway--
ontrol--Brooklyn Eastern
District, 360 I.C.C.
60, 84-90 (1979). . ...... Ola
UNITED STATES cCouURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 89-9530
Charles F, RIVES, II; Marv A.
Seurer; Ronald D. Pester; Tom
Hampleman; R.D. Griffin; John A.
Cameron; Marv Slusser; Gene Dudley,
Petitioners,
Vv.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION:
United States of America,
Respondents.
Union Pacific Motor Freight Company,
Intervenor.
June 6, 1991
Before LOGAN’ and MOORE, Circuit
Judges, and GREENE, District Judge. *
LOGAN, Circuit Judge.
Eight former employees of the
Union Pacific Motor Freight Company
(petitioners) appeal a decision of
the Interstate Commerce Commission
a
*The Honorable J. Thomas Greene,
United States District Judge for the
district of Utah, Sitting by
designation.
ee ee Ce
2 a
(Icc) denying them labor protective
conditicns following consolidation
of three major railroads. Pe-
titioners contend that the ICC erred
in determining “+hat they were not
entitled to mandatory labor
protection under 49 U.S.C. §11347,
and, alternatively, in failing to
exercise its discretion to award
labor protection benefits under 49
S.8-C.. §L154665
This appeal arises out of the
consolidation of three western
railroads, the Union Pacific
Railroad Company, the Missouri
Pacific Railroad Company, and the
Western Pacific Railroad Company,
under the Union Pacific name. The
Ice approved the consolidation
pursuant to 49 y.S.C. §11343. Union
Pac. Corp., 366 I.C.C. 459 (1982),
aff’d sub nom. Southern Pac. Trans.
—
Co. v. ICC, 736 F.2d 708 (D.Cc.Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208,
105 >.CC. oe eo 84 L.. EG.24 322
(1985). In conjunction therewith,
the ICC approved Union Pacific’s
acquisition of Missouri Pacific’s
and Western Pacific’s motor carrier
Subsidiaries. Union Pacific’s motor
Carrier, the Union Pacific Motor
Freight Company (UPMF), continued
under the control of Union Pacific.
Petitioners were employees of
UPMF at the time of the con-
SOlidation. UPMF, as Union Pacific’s
wholly-owned motor carrier sub-
Sidiary, was responsible for ramping
and deramping trailers and con-
tainers to and from rail cars.
Petitioners performed these ramping
and deramping operations using
“piggy packers”, equipment capable
of transporting the trailers and
containers to and from_- staging
areas. UPMF had ICC authority to
perform regular trucking services,
but was limited to auxiliary and
supplemental rail service.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §11347,
the ICC imposed New York Dock labor
protective conditions to protect
railraod employees affected by the
consolidation.2/ Petitioners, who
were terminated following the
consolidation, were denied New York
Dock conditions, the ICC holding
that petitioners were not entitled
because they were not~ railroad
employees. McPherson v. Union Pac.
Motor Freight Co., 1.¢.¢. Dee.,; Fin,
i/ These conditions were fashioned
by the ICC in New York Dock Ry., 360
I.C.C. 60 (1979), Af£f’d sub non.,
New York Dock Ry. v. Uited States,
609 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1979), and
include such benefits as dis-
placement or dismissal allowances
and continuation of benefits for a
specified period.
Dkt. No. 30000, Sub-NO. 45
(McPherson) (Order of April -
1987). The ICC later reopened the
proceeding to consider further
evidence on whether petitioners were
entitled to the New York Dock
conditions it had imposed for the
benefit of others or, alternatively,
whether the ICC should use is
discretionary authority to impose
additional conditions for pe-
titioners’ benefit.2/ The ICC again
denied petitioners relief, stating
a The ICC reopened the proceedings
at the request of Union Pacific.
Before this request, seven former
UPMF employees from Kansas City
filed a petition for review with the
Eighth Circuit, and seven former
UPMF employees from Denver filed a
petition for review with this court.
The two cases were later
consolidated and set for review by
the Eighth Circuit. The case was
transferred back to this’ court,
however, apparently because six of
the Kansas City petitioners, all who
resided in the Eighth Circuit,
entered into a settlement agreement
with Union Pacific.
that its refusal to exercise its
oe eee authority was because
petitioners had failed to present
any evidence or arguments in favor
of the Icc exercising its
discretion. McPherson, (Order of
April 12, 1989).
I
On appeal, petitioners first
argue that the ICC erred in finding
that they were not within the class
of employees protected by the New
York Dock conditions imposed for the
benefit of those directly employed
by the parent railroads. They
contend that the ICC’s decision,
based solely on the identity of the
employer, ignores the intent of
employee protective conditions and
goes against commission and court
precedent. The ICC asserts that its
decision is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s holding in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
1094 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed2d 694
(1984), and that it acted with due
deference to prior commission and
court cases.
The statute governing labor
protective conditions :.tates, in
pertinent part:
"When a rail carrier is
involved in a transaction
for which approval is
sought under sections
11344 and 11345 or section
11346 of this title, the
Interstate Commerce cCom-
mission shall require the
carrier to provide a fair
arrangement at least as
protective of the interest
of employees who are af-
fected by the transaction
as the terms imposed under
this section before Feb-
ruary 5, 1976, and the
terms established under
section 405 of the Rail
Passenger Service Act (45
U.S.C. 565).”
Ye Pe Pe ee Pe ey OP In the instant
case, the ICC construed §11347’s
mandatory protections as applying
only to those “directly employed by
a rail carrier,” and, therefore,
petitioners, “who were employed by
non-rail subsidiaries of the rail
Carrier” were excluded. McPherson
(Order of April 12, 1989, at 3).
When reviewing an agency’s
construction of a statute it
administers, a court must follow a
two-step analysis. First, if
Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue and its
intent is clear, “that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed. intent
of Congress.” Chevron, 467-U.S. at
842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82. If
Congress has not addressed directly
the precise question at issue, the
reviewing court “does not’ simply
impose its own construction on the
statute... . Rather, if the statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether’ the
agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the
statute.” Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at
2782 (footnote omitted). In such a
case, the agency’s construction is
permissible unless it is “arbitrary,
Capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute.” Id. at 844, 104
S.Ct. at 2782.
A
Applying the first step in the
Chevron analysis, we are satisfied
that Congress has not unambiguously
expressed an intent that employees
of a motor carrier subsidiary are
entitled to the mandatory
protections afforded in §11347.
*
10 a
Although §11347 requires protection
for “employees who are affected by”
an approved consolidation, the term
“employees” is not defined in the
Interstate Commerce Act, and we
believe, from the words used, it is
unclear whether Congress intended to
include just those employed directly
by the rail carrier or, more
broadly, to include at least some
employees of noncarrier subsidiary
corporations whose jobs might be
affected.
The legislative and statutory
history of §11347 does not clear up
this ambiguity. The ICC argues that
the committee reports accompanying
§11347, and the language from
§11347’s predecessor, 49 U.S.C.
§5(2)(f), demonstrate Congress’
intent that only those directly
employed by a rail carrier are
lla
entitled to mandatory protection.
The ICC points to the fact that
§5(2)(f) used the phrase “railroad
employees”, directing the IcC to
“require a fair and equitable
arrangement to protect the interests
of the railroad employees affected.”
49 U.S.C. §5(2)(f) (repealed 1978).
It also notes that the committee
reports accompanying §11347 state
that §5(2)(f) was recodified for
“clarity” and that it was not
intended to change the substance of
the statute. See H.R.Rep. No. 1395,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 166,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. &
Admin.News 3009, 3016, 3175. We are
not persuaded. Like §11347,
§5(2)(f) did not define “railroad
employees.” Nowhere in the pre-1978
Act or the legislative history
accompanying §11347 is the phrase
12 a
“railroad employees” defined;
Congress simply never addressed the
issue presented in this case.
Two other circuits have
considered the issue with opposite
results. In Cosby v. ICC, 741 F.2d
1077 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1110, 105 S.Ct. 2344, 85
L.Ed.2d 861 (1985), the court held
that employees of an _ exclusive
auxiliary-to-rail motor: carrier were
“employees” within the meaning of
the Act because the motor carrier
was “intimately tied to the
railroad’s main transportation
function.” Id. at 1081. In
contrast, the court in Kansas City
Southern Indus., Inc. v. ICC, 902
F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1990), held that
former §5(2) (f) and the reports
accompanying the 1978 recodification
indicated «clearly Congress’ intent
13 a
that §11347 did “not mandate labor
protective conditions for employees
of motor carrier subsidiaries of a
merging railroad.” Id. at 438. Of
course, this court is not bound by
the decisions of other circuits. We
note that Cosby did not discuss the
Chevron analysis. We note also that
the motor carrier in Kansas City
Southern was not restricted to
auxiliary-to-rail services and
received a majority of its revenues
from nonrail-related activities.
See Kansas City Southern, 902 F.2d
at 438.
B
Because we are satisfied that
Congress has not unambiguously
expressed its intent, we must decide
under the second prong of Chevron
whether the ICC’s itnerpretation of
§11347 is “a permissible
I ee
14 a
construction of this statute.”
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 8.Ct.
at 2782. In making this deter-
mination, we are governed by the
following standard:
“Thle) view of the agency
charged with administering
the statute is entitled to
considerable deference;
and to sustain it, we need
not find that it is the
only permissible con-
struction that [the
agency] might have adopted
but only that {the
agency’s] understanding of
this very ‘complex sta-
tute’ is a sufficientiy
rational one to preclude a
court from substituting
its judgment for that of
(the agency]}.”
Chemical Mfgrs. Ass’n v. National
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470
U.S. 116, 125, 105 S.ct. 1102, 1107,
84 L.Ed.2d 90 (1985). See also Young
Vv. Community Nutrition Inst., 476
U.S. 974, 981i, 106 S.Ct. 2360,
2364-65, 90 L.Ed.2d 959 (1986).
15 a
Bound by this standard, we hold
the ICC’s interpretation of §11347-
-that only those directly employed
by a rail carrier are entitled to
mandatory labor protective con-
ditions--a permissible and rational
construction of the statute. The
language in former §5(2)(f) mandates
protection only for “railroad
employees” and the legislative
reports accompanying §11347 state
that the recodification intended no
substantive changes in existing
law.2/ Restricting §11347’s
3/ the House report states:
“Substant.ve change not
intended--Like other codi-
fications undertaken to enact
into positive law all titles
of the United States Code,
this bill makes no substantive
change in the law. It is
sometimes feared that’ mere
changes in terminology and
style will result in changes
in substance or impair the
precedent value of earlier
judicial decisions and other
interpretations. This fear
16 a
mandatory protections to rail
carrier employees provides certainty
and a logical limit to the scope of
employees protected by §11347.
Also, a reading as expansive as that
petitioners request would render
superfluous the stc’s use of
discretionary authority under 49
might have some weight if this
were the usual kind of
amendatory legislation where
it can be inferred that a
change of language is intended
to change substance. In a
codification statute, however,
the courts uphold the contrary
presumption: the statute is
intended to remain sub-
stantively unchanged.”
H.R.Rep. No. 1395 at 9, reprinted in
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News at
3018. In accord with this
legislative history we stated, in
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Lennen, 732 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir.
1981), that recodification of the
Interstate Commerce Act in 1978 "was
not intended to change the law” and
that any substantive conflicts
between the original language and
the new language must be resolved
“in favor of the original language.”
Id. at 1497.
i7 a
3.8.¢c. §11344 to give labor
protection for other employees
affected by a consolidation.
Petitioners may be correct that
a more rational interpretation of
§11347 would focus on the nature of
the work performed, not just the
identity of the employer. 4/ That
does not make the ccs
4/ petitioners also argue that the
IcC’s interpretation of §11347 is
unreasonable because it has in the
past treated a railroad and its
subsidiary as a Single trans-
portation system. Under this "single
system doctrine,” the ICC considers
that a corporate family comprised of
“a single, integrated transportation
system, even though it is made up of
several separate corporations...
to be, in effect, one carrier.”
Brotherhood of Ry. & Airline Clerks
v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 671
F.2d 1085, 1089 (8th Cir. 1982).
Although the ICC has utilized this
doctrine in determining that all
rail employees of a railroad’s
subsidiaries were entitled to labor
protection, see Pennsylvania R.R.
Co., 347 I.C.C. 536, 546-47 (1974),
we know of no cases in which the ICC
has applied this doctrine to nonrail
employees of a motor carrier
subsidiary of a railroad.
18 a
interpretation unreasonable. And
once we have determined that the
agency’s interpretation is rea-
sonable, we may not disturb it on
review. "(A] court may not
substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.”
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct.
at 2782. “The responsibilities for
assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle
between competing views of the
public interest are not judicial
ones: "Our Constitution vests such
responsibilities in the political
branches.’” - Id. at 866, 104 S.Ct.
at 2793 (citation omitted) .2/
>/ Because we hold that the ICC’s
interpretation of §11347 is rea-
sonable, we need not consider
petitioners’ argument that the Icc
erred in not considering evidence
relating to thier job descriptions
Il
Finally, petitioners argue that
the ICC erred in refusing to award
protective conditions under its
discretionary authority. This
argument centers on 49 U.S.C.
§11344(c), which permits the ICC, in
its discretion, to provide labor
protection for other persons
affected by a rail consolidation. &/
and relationships with Union Pacific
before making its determination.
Under the IcC”s “identity of the
employer” standard, such evidence is
not relevant in deciding whether
petitioners are “railroad employees”
entitled to labor protection.
Therefore, it does not affect our
determination of reasonableness.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto.Ins., 463 U.S.
29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866-67, 77
L.Ed.2d 443 (1983).
§/ section 11344 (c) states
pertinent part:
“The Commission shall appr
and authorize a transaction
under this’ section when
finds the transaction
consistent with the public
interest. The Commission may
) Vi
20 a
In the instant case, the Icc
expressly refused to consider using
its discretion because petitioners
failed to present any supporting
arguments at the reopening pro-
ceeding, despite being invited to do
so. See McPherson (Order of April
12, 1989, at 3). The ICC now
contends that this failvre precludes
our consideration of this issue on
appeal.
All issues a party contests on
appeal must be raised at the
appropriate time under the agency
practice. United States v. L.A.
Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. ri Pe >
73 S.Ct. 67, 69, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952).
Failure of a party to represent its
contentions properly to the agency
precludes appellate review. New
__
Mexico Envtl. Improvement Div. v.
impose conditions governing the
transaction...”
21a
Thomas, 789 F.2d 825, 835-36 (10th
Cir. 1986). A court may not
substitute its judgment for that of
the agency when "the agency has not
had an opportunity to make a factual
record or apply its expertise.” Id.
at 835.
In the instant case, all of the
evidence presented by petitioners
was directed tc whether they were
employees within the meaning of
§11347. The petitioners’ evidence
sought to demonstrate the
Similarities between UPMF employees
and Union Pacific employees.
Petitioners contend that their
employment comparison evidence
presented in reference to §11344 was
sufficient for the ICC to consider
using its discretionary power.’ We
disagree. The ICc reopened the
proceedings to reconsider the issue
22 a
of employment protective conditions
for UPMF employees. The Icc
expressly requested evidence and
arguments on two issues:
“The [petitioners]...may
present evidence on whe-
ther they were railroad
employees who qualify for
mandatory labor protection
under 49 U.S.C. 11347.
They may also seek to
demonstrate that the Com-
mission should exercise
its discretionary auth-
ority under 49 U.S.C.
11344(c) to provide pro-
tection for motor carrier
employees.”
McPherson (reopening order of August
10, 1987, at 2). The evidence
Submitted by petitioners was, in
essence, the same as that submitted
in the original proceeding when the
only issue was whether they were
railroad employees under §11347. No
separate evidence or argument was
Girected at the availability of
discretionary protection. Peti-
tioners presented no evidence of
23 a
financial hardship or a lack of
marketable skills, which the Icc
might consider relevant in deciding
whether to grant discretionary
benefits. Petitioners had the burden
to present their case to the ICC for
consideration and their failure to
properly present the issue of
discretionary protection to the ICC
precludes our review.
AFFIRMED.
24 a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 89-9530
CHARLES F. RIVES, II, et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
Filed August 20, 1991
Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, LOGAN,
KCKAY, SEYMOUR, MOORE, ANDERSON,
TACHA, BALDOCK, BRORBY and_ EBEL,
Circuit Judges, and GREENE*,
District Judge.
*The Honorable J. Thomas’ Greene,
United States District Judge for the
District of Utah, sitting by
designation.
This matter comes on _ for
consideration of petitioners’ pe-
tition for rehearing and suggestion
for rehearing en banc in- the
captioned case.
25 a
Upon consideration whereof, the
petition for rehearing is denied by
the panel that rendered the decision
sought to be reheard.
In accordance with Rule 35(b)
of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the suggestion for
rehearing en banc was transmitted to
all the judges of the court in
regular active service. No member
of the panel and no judge in regular
service on the court having
requested that the court be polled
on rehearing en banc, Rule 35,
Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the suggestion for
rehearing en banc is denied.
Entered for the Court
ROBERT L. HOECKER, CLERK
26a
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
DECISION
Finance Docket No. 30000
UNION PACIFIC CORPORATION,
PACIFIC RAIL SYSTEM, INC. AND
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY -
CONTROL - MISSOURI PACIFIC
CORPORATION AND
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
Finance Docket No. 30000
(Sub-No. 45)
GARY W. MCPHERSON
Ve
UNION PACIFIC MOTOR FREIGHT COMPANY,
ET AL.
Decided: April 3, 1987
In Union Pacific - Control -
Missouri Pacific; Western Pacific,
366 I.C.C. 459 (1982) (UP/MP/WP), we
authorized, inter alia, the Union
Pacific Corporation and Union
Pacific Railroad and Missouri
Pacific Railroad Company (MP),
subject to certain conditions
including labor protective con-
ditions. For the protection of
27 a
carrier employees affected by that
transaction, we imposed the
conditions specified in New York
Dock Ry. - Control -_ Brooklyn
Eastern Dist., 360 I.C.C. 60 (1979)
(New York Dock), unless an agreement
for employee protection had been
entered into, in which case we
imposed the specified negotiated
level of protection. 366 I.C.C. at
618-622.
In UP/MP/WP, 366 I.C.C. at 654,
we also approved the acquisition by
UP of a motor carrier subsidiary of
MP -- Missouri Pacific Truck Lines,
Inc. (MPTL). At the time of the
acquisition, UP also controlled, and
it continues to control, a motor
carrier -- Union Pacific Motor
Freight Company (UPMF).
This proceeding involves a
number of complaints by employees of
28 a
the UP-MP controlled motor carriers.
They allege that the protections we
mandated have not been effected.
BACKGROUND
1. The Denver complainants. By
letter-petition dated November 14,
1985, six former employees of UPMF2/
contend that they were terminated,
effective November 8, 1985, without
prior notice, from their jobs at
UPMF’s TOFC ramp operations at
Denver, CO. These employees allege
that MPTL now operates the Denver
facility and that they lost their
jobs as a direct result of the 1982
consolidation of UP and MP. They
allege that UPMF should have offered
/wnile the initial letter referred
to six individuals, argument and
evidence was submitted for seven:
Marv Slusser, Wheatridge, CO.; Gene
Dudley, Denver, CO; John A. Cameron,
Erie, CO; Tom Hampleman, Wheatridge,
CO; Marv A. Seurer, Wheatridge, CO;
R.D. Griffin, Erie, CO; and Ronald
D. Pester, Lakewood, Co.
eS
29 a
them other jobs, or compensation, as
required by the New York Dock
conditions imposed in the merger
proceeding.
We reopened the merger
proceeding in a decision served
February 18, 1986, stating that we
were treating the letter as a
petition for clarification. we
directed the employees to _ file
evidence and argument and for UP-MP
to reply.
Complainants state that they
were employees of UPMF in Denver for
at least 22 years and contend that
they lost their jobs at the Denver
ramp as a direct result of the UP-MP
consolidation. They argue that the
labor protection provided in New
York Dock applies to all employees
of UP-MP, including employees of
motor carrier subsidiaries of the
30 a
railroads, citing Cosby v. I.C.C.,
741 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1984).
They base their position on 49
U.S.C. 11347, which provides:
..-.-the Interstate Commerce
Commission shall require
the carrier to provide a
fair arrangement at least
as protective of the
interest of employees who
are affected by the
transaction as the terms
imposed under this section
before February 5, 1976,
and the terms established
under section 565 of Title
45. (Emphasis added by
complainants. )
UP-MP, in rebuttal here, states
that the complainants were not
atteetes by the consolidation and,
even if they were, that the labor
protective conditions imposed in the
consolidation under 49 U.S.C. 11347
are not applicable to employees of
motor carrier subsidiaries of
railroads. UP-MP indicates that its
motor carrier subsidiaries are
completely independent corporate
31a
units. It states that the Denver
employees of UPMF were not replaced
by MPTL employees but by those of
another company that was not related
to the UP-MP corporate family. UPMF
bid against several other companies
on a contract to perform trucking
services at the Denver terminal, and
lost. UP-MP states that it has
sought contracts for many of its
terminals and that its UPMF
subsidiary has to compete with both
corporate affiliates and numerous
non-affiliated firms for the
railroad’s business. It indicates
that in some instances UPMF has been
able to retain contracts for
terminal operations at some
locations, but has been unsuccessful
at others. Its corporate policy
dictates that UP have motor carrier
services provided for it at the
32 a
lowest possible cost. | UP-MP
presented evidence to show that UPMF
and MPTL are independent entities
that must compete with non-
affiliated motor carriers if they
wish to continue to perform
operations for UP.
UP-MP argues that the
protections for employees in New
York Dock were intended to be
restricted to railroad employees and
were not intended to cover employees
of rail-affiliated motor carriers.
Defendant rejects the interpretation
given to 49 U.S.C. 11347 by
complainants and the court in Cosby.
UP-MP argues that the recodified 49
U.S.C. 11347 was never intended to
provide labor protection to non-
railroad employees, because Congress
and the Commission long recognized
that the employment skills of motor
33 a
carrier employees were much more
transferable than those of railroad
workers.
UP-MP also contends that the
Commission has declined to follow
the logic of Cosby, with regard to
labor protection for employees of
motor carrier subsidiaries. It cites
Milwaukee--Acquisition by GTC,
7.€.¢.26 (1985)
(Milwaukee) ; Norfolk Southern
Corp.--Control--North American Van
Lines, 1 1I.C.C. 24 (1985)
(NS/NAVL) .
The Railway Labor Executives
Association filed a comment on March
7, 1986, indicating that it
supported Cosby’s apparent
determination that employees of
motor carrier subsidiaries of
railroads are entitled to labor
protective conditions. This comment
34 a
included a statement by Dean T.
Echols, Associate Director, Industry
Relations with the Brotherhood of
Railway and Airline Clerks. However,
in a supplemental comment’ filed
April 1, 1986, RLEA withdrew Mr.
Echols’ statement.
2. The Kansas City com-
plainants. On May 21, 1986, former
employees of UPMF in Kansas City, MO
filed a "Petition to Reopen and
Request for Enforcement” in the
consolidation proceeding. 2/ Peti-
tioners allege that they were all
employees of UPMF at the time of the
merger of UP and MP and subsequently
lost their jobs as a result of the
merger. They believe they are
2/These employees are: Louis C.
Burris, Gladstone, MO; Larry A.
Creiger, Oak Grove, MO; David C.
Doleshal, Kansas City, MO; Steve
Harter, Kansas City, MO; Raymond
May, Kansas City, MO; Charles Payne,
Kansas City, KS; and Charles F.
Rivers II, Olathe, KS.
35 a
entitled to labor protective
conditions specified in New York
Dock under Cosby.
UP-MP responds to these
allegations in much the same manner
as it did to the filing by the
Denver employees, indicating that
the statements of the court in Cosby
concerning the automatic application
of labor protective conditions to
employees of affiliated motor
carriers were only dicta and that,
subsequent to Cosby, we have
rejected that interpretation. UP-MP
also reiterates its position that
motor carrier employees were never
intended to receive the levels of
labor protection found in 49 U.S.C.
11347, because the nature of their
employment does not require the
enhanced level of protection the
statute provided for employees
36 a
performing railroad work.
3. Gary W. McPherson. In a
complaint filed April 25, 1986, Gary
W. McPherson alleged that he was an
employee of UPMF, that his
employment was terminated, and that
he was entitled to job protection
under 49 U.S.C. 11347.2/
On July 17, 1986, UP-MP filed a
motion to dismiss this complaint,
making the same arguments it made in
response to the pleadings of the
Denver and Kansas City complainants.
Concurrently, UP-MP filed a Petition
for Extension of Time in Which to
Answer Complaint, requesting that
2/ complainant was offered severance
pay of one month for each year of
service. It appears that Mr.
McPherson was in the process of
accepting this offer when he was
told that, instead, he would be
offered a job as vacation relief in
various cities. He apparently
refused this position, was
terminated, and subsequently filed
this complaint.
37 a
the due date on their answer be
extended until twenty days after the
Commission ruled on their motion to
dismiss. Complainant repliea.4/
Because of the similarity of issues,
we are consolidating all three
complaints in this proceeding.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Logic would dictate that the
first question to be answered here
must be whether complainants were
affected by the merger itself, as
such a factual finding is necessary
to relief. However, the Commission
does not resolve disputes over the
applicability of labor protective
conditions to individual employees.
Complainants have asserted, and UP
has contested, that the UP/MP/WP
consolidation was the cause of
complainants’ displacement. This
4/yp-MP has not filed a reply to the
McPherson complaint.
ee
38 a
factual issue of “causation” (i.e.,
whether particular employees. are
“affected” by a Commission-approved
transaction or whether adverse
consequences to employees were the
result of such a transaction) is not
for the Commission’s determination,
but is within the proper province of
an arbitrator or the parties’
negotiations. See Leavens Vv.
Burlington Northern, TRG. « 348
I.C.C. 962, 975, 979 (1977); Walsh
v. United States, 723 F.2d 570, 575
(1983); Bell v. Western Maryland
Railway Company, 366 I.C.C. 64, 67
(1981). Even when we impose labor
protective conditions, we do not
resolve these causation issues.
Therefore, we will not consider
evidence submitted on the question
of whether compiainants’ dis-
placement was a result of the
39 a
UP/MP/WP transactions.
Nevertheless, even assuming for
purposes of discussion that
complainants’ job loss was’ the
result of the UP/MP/WP merger, we
find that the labor’ protective
conditions imposed in our decision
in UP/MP/WP were not for the benefit
of complainants. We also see no
basis for imposing such protection
now.
Complainants’ principal claim
is that they are entitled to the
protections mandated by section
11347, which are reflected in the
New York Dock conditions. Their
claim of mandatory protection must
fail because they were employees of
a motor carrier, UPMF, not railroad
employees, as former section 5(2) (f)
of the Interstate Commerce Act, the
predecessor to section 11347,
40 a
required, and as we must continue to
interpret that provision. 2/ More-
over, long-standing precedent holds
that the mandatory protection of
Section 11347 does not extend even
to employees of non-rail sub-
Sidiaries of a railroad. / Accord-
ingly, there is no requirement in
the Interstate Commerce Act that
complainants, who are not rail
carrier employees, must be protected
3 see Milwaukee, slip op. at 16 and
NS/NAVL, slip op. at 37, discussing
the prohibition on attributing
substantive change to the _ 1978
recodification and citing Cass v.
United States, 417 U.S. 72, 82
(1974) and Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Railway v. United States, 617
F.2d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 1980). a
§/ pennsylvania Railroad-Merger-New
York Central Railroad, 347 I.¢€.C.
536 (1974). See also Milwaukee, slip
op. at 16, discussing differing
standards for motor and railroad
employees due to more adaptable
skills of motor carrier employees,
citing American Bus Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 253 F. Supp. 481
(D.D.C.), aff’d per curiam, 385 U.S.
38 (1966).
41 a
from the effects of the UP/MP/WP
consolidation. Moreover, complain-
ants have not demonstrated that the
motor carriage performed by UPMF was
limited to transportation that is
auxiliary to rail movements and so
intimately connected to UP’s main
transportation system so as _ to
transform complainants into “rail-
road employees,” as described in
dicta in Cosby, 741 F.2d at 1080-81.
Cf. Milwaukee, slip op. at 16-17.
Notwithstanding this con-
clusion, the Commission has
discretionary authority under sec~-
tion 11344(c) to provide protection
for motor carrier employees. There
was, however, no request for
protection by complainants or any
other motor carrier employee during
the UP-MP-WP proceeding. Also, there
has been no showing, as there was in
42 a
Cosby, of pre-merger representations
by management to complainants that
might have deterred them from
seeking protective conditions in the
UP/MP/WP decision. On the contrary,
UP management distinguished between
protection for railroad craft union
employees and “non-agreement”
employees, with the latter eligible
for only separation allowances if
displaced by the transaction.
In Cosby, supra, the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit stated that carrier
employees of a wholly owned motor
carrier subsidiary are entitled to
the labor protection benefits
required by section 11347. The court
said that, even if the Commission
had discretion to grant or deny
protective conditions, it was an
abuse of discretion given the facts
43 a
in that case not to grant the motor
carrier employees the same level of
protection granted applicant’s
railroad employees. The court cited
a number of assurances made by
officials of Burlington Northern to
the effect that no employee would
face involuntary unemployment as a
result of the merger and statements
to the effect that the operation of
the motor carrier would not be
changed. Especially relevant to the
court in Cosby was the statement by
C.M. Illg, Assistant Vice
President-Labor Relations of BN, 741
F.2d at 1083:
With the exception of
clerical employees at
Springfield, it is ex-
pected that the bulk of
surplus employees created
at any point and in any
craft will be absorbed
almost immediately on new
positions and other va-
cancies caused by
employees leaving service
in the normal course of
events... Those employees
44 a
who do become surplus, or
are displaced or are
transferred due to the
traction will be covered
by protective benefits.
The Cosby court determined that this
type of assurance gave the motor
carrier employees no reason to seek
to intervene in the merger pro-
ceeding, or to request their union
to do so to protect or clarify
management’s intentions.
Such assurances were not made
to UP/MP employees in this
consolidation proceeding. The
evidence presented in the UP/MP/WP
proceeding by UP-MP clearly and
consistently maintained that certain
specified employees -- almost
exclusively railroad craft union
employees -- would receive the level
of protection mandated in 49 U.S.C.
11347, .while others would receive
“severance benefits.” Thus non-
45 a
railroad craft union employees were
not misled by management assurances
into refraining from seeking
protection by participating in the
merger proceeding.
The testimony of Philip A.
Jordan, Vice President-Labor Re-
lations and Personnel of UP is
especially relevant. In his
verified statement filed with the
merger application, he consistently
maintained that there would be a
dichotomy of treatment with respect
to labor protective conditions for
affected employees. He maintained
the distinction throughout his
testimony between “agreement
employees” (railway craft union) and
"non-agreement employees” (others).
/verified Statement of Phillip A.
Jordan in Finance Docket No. 30000,
"Verified Statements of Applicants,
Part I, Statements of Applicants’
Officers in Support of
Applications.”
46a
He stated:
The principal adverse work
force impact will be felt
by non-agreement' employ-
ees....
In all instances
non-agreement employees
whose jobs are abolished
will be given the
opportunity to transfer to
other positions without
any reduction in salary
level and will be re-
imbursed for moving ex-
penses and any losses on
the sale of their homes.
Based on experience with
past organizational chan-
ges involving nonagreement
employees, we expect that
most will desire to take
advantage of this offer.
For those for whom there
is no other position
available at their present
location and who do not
want to transfer, we will
offer a separation allow-
ance based on years of
service up to one years’
pay with a maximum of
$35,000...
Labor protection
costs for non-agreement
employees affected by the
UPRR-MRRR and UPRR-WPRR
consolidations were cal-
culated using different
assumptions reflecting
different management pol-
icies. Affected UPRR-MPRR
non-agreement employees
47 a
were assumed to be ab-
sorbed by attrition during
the first year after
consolidation as they
transferred to new job
openings or elected a
separation allowance.
UPRR-WPRR non-agreement
affected positions were
assumed to be abolished
promptly upon con-
summation, with incumbents
accepting other non-
agreement positions in the
combined system or re-
ceiving a separation
allowance.... (Emphasis
added. )
...--Non agreement employ-
ees whose positions are
adversely affected will be
given other job oppor-
tunities or a severance
allowance.
(Emphasis added.)
It is apparent that any
employee who examined these
statements would understand that a
clear distinction was being made
between the benefits of agreement
employees and those of non-agreement
employees. These distinctions are
being made by the official in charge
of labor relations-personnel for the
een
48 a
controlling carrier, and are
distinctions widely understood by
the unions, the railroad, and this
Commission. Complainants, by
examining this testimony and the
common parlance of the industry,
could assume that they were not
“agreement employees,” yet they or
their union took no action to
Clarify or challenge management’s
position on the issue of severance
benefits.
Certain assurances made by the
merger applicants in UP/MP/WP also
require review. On pages 189-90 of
the application it is stated:
Union Pacific Corporation,
Pacific Rail System and
Union Pacific Railroad do
not intend to change the
operations of Missouri
Pacific Truck Lines.
Rather, Missouri Pacific
Truck Lines will continue
to provide motor carrier
service as a subsidiary of
Missouri Pacific Railroad.
Therefore, there will not
be any effect on carrier
49 a
employees from approval of
this application.
Viewed in the light’ least
favorable to the merger applicants,
this would appear to be an assurance
that no MPTL employee would be
affected by the merger. Taken in
context of the other testimony
presented in the proceeding, most
notably Mr. Jordan’s statement
quoted above, this statement would
appear at most to assure non-
agreement motor carrier employee a
severance package. °/
8/as discussed above (p. 7), there
is no statutory requirement of
protection for displaced motor
carrier employees, unlike rail
employees, but the Commission has
discretion to impose protection for
motor carrier employees, if
requested. No request was made here.
Even if such a request had been
made, we would not have imposed more
generous protections than the
overall protection offered
nonagreement employees here. See
American Buslines, Inc. (discussed
in n.6, supra) upholding “the
customary protection in motor
carrier cases of three months’
50 a
Because the motor carrier
employees had adequate notice that
the protective conditions required
to be established for rail employees
would not be established by the
applicants for their benefit, and
because the employees did not
request the Commission to impose
such conditions, we did not abuse
our discretion under section
11344(c) by refraining from imposing
protective conditions for the
benefit of the motor carrier
employees in UP/MP/WP. Complainants,
who failed to participate in the
merger proceeding, have shown no
basis for reopening this long-closed
proceeding, and only now imposing
such protection along with the
possibility of unforeseen obli-
severance pay payable to the
adversely affected employees.” 253
F.Supp. 482-83.
51a
gations on the merged carriers,
under section 11344(c) .2/ Accord-
ingly, we find Cosby not —= con-
trolling.
This action will not
significantly affect either the
quality of the human environment or
energy conservation.
It is ordered:
1. The request for labor
protection filed by Marv Slusser,
Gene Dudley, John A. Cameron, Tom
Hampleman, Marv A. Seurer, R.D.
Griffin, and Ronald D. Pester is
denied.
r The petition to reopen and
request for enforcement filed by
Louis C. Burris, Larry A. Creiger,
David C. Doleshal, Steve Harter,
Raymond May, Charles Payne, and
af See Milwaukee, slip op. at 17;
NS/NAVL, Slip op. at 38, n. 46.
52a
Charles F. Rivers II is denied.
3. In F.D. 30000 (Sub.No.
45), the motion to dismiss filed by
defendants Union Pacific Motor
Freight Company, Union Pacific
Railroad Company, Missouri Pacific
Railroad Company, and Missouri
Pacific Truck Lines, Inc. is
granted, the petition for extension
of time is dismissed and _ the
proceeding is dismissed.
4. This decision is effective
on May 18, 1987.
By the Commission, Chairman
Gradison, Vice Chairman Lamboley,
Commissioners Sterrett, Andre, and
Simmons. Vice Chairman Lamboley
dissented in part with a _ separate
expression.
(SEAL)
Noreta R. McGee
Secretary
53a
VICE CHAIRMAN LAMBOLEY, dissenting
in part:
I would reopen this proceeding
and schedule an oral hearing to
examine further the claims of the
Kansas City complainants. In my
view, they have made allegations and
offers of proof of facts arguably
sufficient to bring their complaint
with the ambit of the holding of
Cosby v. I.C.C., 741 F.2d 1077 (8th
.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2344 (1985).
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
DECISION
Finance Docket No. 30000
UNION PACIFIC CORPORATION,
PACIFIC RAIL SYSTEM, INC.,
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY -
CONTROL - MISSOURI PACIFIC
CORPORATION AND MISSOURI
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
Finance Docket No. 30000
(Sub-No. 45)
GARY W. MCPHERSON
Vv.
UNION PACIFIC MOTOR FREIGHT
COMPANY, ET AL.
Decided: Aprii 12, 1989
By decision served August 17,
1987, we reopened these matters at
the request of the Union Pacific
parties (UP/MpP) + to entertain
evidence on limited issues _ con-
cerning whether former employees of
Union Pacific Motor’ Freight
Company, Union Pacific Railroad
Company, Missouri Pacific Railroad
Company, and Missouri Pacific Truck
Lines, Inc.
55 a
the Union Pacific Motor Freight
Company (UPMF) are entitled to labor
protection. * Complainants” had
earlier asked the Commission to find
that its decision approving
. Following a review of allegations
by parties seeking judicial review,
UP/MP concluded that the
Commission’s April 21, 1987 decision
denying labor protection for some
petitionérs and refusing to reopen
the matter for others reflected a
misunderstanding of certain evidence
regarding whether the motor carrier
employees had sufficient notice of
the consequences of UP Control and
protections they might receive.
UP/MP believed that other evidence
should have been considered, and
that the proceeding should be
reopened.
3 The Denver complainants are:
Marvin Slusser; Gene Dudley; John A.
Cameron; Tom Hampleman; Marv A.
Seurer; R.D. Griffin; and Ronald D.
Pester. ‘The Kansas city
complainants are: Louis C. Burris;
Larry A. Creiger; David C. Doleshal;
Steve Harter; Raymond May; Charles
Payne; and Charles F. Rivers II.
The Commission included Gary W.
McPherson in the proceeding.
By pleading filed September 13,
1988, the parties advised us that
complainants Burris, Creiger,
Doleshal, Harter and Payne had
entered into a settlement agreement
with UP/MP, and withdrawn their
56 a
consolidation and imposing’ labor
protective conditions in Union
Pacific - Control-Missouri Pacific;
Western Pacific, 366 I.C.C. 459
(1982) (UP Control) mandated
benefits for adversely affected
employees of motor carrier sub-
Sidiaries, as well as-7~ railroad
employees of the Union Pacific
Railroad Company (UP) and the
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company.
In our August decision, we gave
complainants an opportunity to
demonstrate that they should receive
labor protection under the mandatory
standards set forth at 49 U.S.C.
11347, or in the exercise of the
Commission’s discretion under sec-
tion 11344(c). They have demon-
claims. By pleading filed
November 9, 1988, the parties
advised us that complainant May had
entered into a settlement agreement
with UP/MP, and withdrawn his clain.
strated neither. They presented no
evidence or argument concerning our
discretionary authority, although
our August 17 decision specifically
stated that we woula entertain such
a discussion. Instead, they sought
(as they had earlier) to demonstrate
that the Commission should find them
qualified for mandatory labor
protection under section 11347.
They take the position that the
decision of the court in Cosby v.-
Icc, 741 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1110 (1984) (Cosby)
requires us to conclude that motor
carrier employees of railroad
subsidiaries whose jobs may have
been affected as a consequence of
rail consolidations must be provided
labor protection. As we have
previously, we reject that
58 a
conclusion, and find that the
complainants here are not entitled
to labor protection.
The Cosby court, in considering
Claims for protective benefits from
employees of a motor carrier
subsidiary of a merged railroad,
found that in the ' circumstances
presented there the employees were
entitled both to mandatory pro-
tection under section 11347 as
railroad employees and to dis-
cretionary protection under section
11344. The Commission has’~ con-
sistently disagreed with Cosby to
the extent it requires that labor
protective benefits be awarded,
because it does not reflect
Commission precedent. We again
reject Cosby’s conclusion that motor
carrier employees may be entitled to
59 a
labor protection under 49 U.S.C.
11347, and take this opportunity to
explain our position.
Former section 5(2)(f) of the
Interstate Commerce Act, the pre-
decessor to section 11347, directed
the Commission to “require a fair
and equitable arrangement to protect
the interests of the railroad
employees affected” by consol-
idation. (Emphasis added.) His-
torically, the Commission inter-
preted this to mean that employees
of non-rail subsidiaries were not
entitled to mandatory labor
protections. See Pennsylvania
Railroad-Merger-New York Central
Railroad, 347 I.C.C. 536 (1974)
(Penn Central). The 1978 re-
codification of the Interstate Com-
merce Act requires the Commission to
“provide a fair arrangement at least
60 a
as protective of the interests of
employees who are affected by the
transaction. . .”. (Emphasis added.)
Language in the recodification
Clearly states that “Sections 1 and
2 of this Act [which includes
section 11347] restate, without
substantive change, laws enacted
before May 16, 1978.” Section 3(a)
of Public Law 95-473, 92 Stat. 1466.
(Emphasis added.) In Cass v. United
States, 417 U.S. 72 (1974), the
Supreme Court found that Con-
gressional comments that there would
be no substantive change, combined
with the fact that no consideration
of any change in the standards at
issue appeared in the legislative
history, conclusively demonstrated
that no changes in the standards
were contemplated by Congress when
it made some changes in style and
61a
form in the statute at issue there.
In a case concerning the _ 1978
recodification at issue in the
instant proceeding, the court stated
that, where Congress had twice and
without qualification stated that
the recodification effects no
substantive change i: the prior law,
the court must examine the language
of the Interstate Commerce Act prior
to recodification to determine the
intent of Congress. Atchison, T. &
S.F.Ry. Co. v. United States, 617
F.2d 485 (1980). Consequently we
adhere to the view that 49 U.S.C.
11347 directs us to protect the
interests of aff2cted railroad
employees, and not employees of
non-rail subsidiaries. Penn Central,
supra. The interpretation given to
the recodification by the Cosby
62 a
court is inconsistent with’ the
expressed intent of the Congress
concerning the recodification.
Relying on that part of Cosby
that focused on the type of work
performed at the motor carrier (741
F.2d at 1080-81), complainants
attempted to demonstrate that the
work they did was “railroad” work,
and that they consequently should be
considered railroad employees for
our purposes here. We find it
difficult to determine the appro-
priate boundaries of "railroad” work
(that is, deciding the nature of the
tasks that might under Cosby bring
non-railroad employees within
section 11347 and qualify them for
mandatory 6 year protection at their
current wage level). We question
whether Congress intended such a
flexible interpretation of the
63 a
statute, particularly when it has
supplied no guidelines for this
task. Our conclusion in Penn
Central, which we affirm, was that
the identity of the employer was
determinative as to who was entitled
to mandatory labor protection. *
As we have discussed, Congress
specified that mandatory protection
was to be provided for “railroad
employees,” i.e., employees of
railroads. We are simply assuming
that Congress meeant what it said.
Consistent with the approach we
are taking here, we have not in the
past analyzed the nature of the work
performed by those employed directly
by a railroad. If affected, they
are entitled to protection by virtue
of their employment relationship and
not because they perform so-called
“railroad” work. See Finance Docket
No. 21478 (Sub-No. 6), Great
Northern Pacific & Burlington Lines,
Inc. Merger - Great Northern
Railroad (not printed), served
December 11, 1986 (tax agent) ;
Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901
(3a Cir. 1977) (eligibility of
protection for attorney for railroad
questioned because he was arguably a
member of management but not because
of nature of work).
64 a
Only individuals directly
employed by a rail carrier are
entitled to protection under section
11347. This excludes the _ conm-
plainants, who were employed by
non-rail subsidiaries of the rail
carrier.” This conclusion is
consistent with our holdings in
Milwaukee - Reorganization - Acq-
uisition by Gre, 2 £.¢.¢.324 427
(1985), and Norfolk Sourthern Corp.
-- Control -- North American Van
Lines, Inc., 1 I.C.C.2d 844 (1985),
rev’d. on other grounds’ sub _ non.
Our April 21, 1987 decision in
this proceeding originally rejecting
complainants’ claims discussed the
failure to demonstrate the work
performed by UPMF was so intimately
connected to UP’s main
transportation system so as_ to
transform the complainants into
railroad employees. AS we
indicated, this approach was
described in Cosby at 1080-81. we
adhere to the view that, whatever
the nature of the werk, the crucial
test is the identity of the
employer.
International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. ICC, 801 F.2d 143 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), aff’d on rehearing, 818
F.2a 87 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In these
cases we discussed (and rejected)
arguments that petitioners performed
rail-related work, but this does not
mean that we were accepting Cosby’s
conclusion that section 11347 may
require labor protection for
employees of non-rail subsidiaries
of the rail carrier. To adopt an
approach requiring the Commission to
examine each job performed in a
non-rail subsidiary to determine
whether it is the type of work that
strikes us as being railroad work is
both an unnecessary and undesirable
role for the Commission to fashion
for itself.
a ee ee
66 a
In the case noted above, we did
consider Cosby’s alternative dis-
cussion of our discretionary
authority under section 11344(c),
and found protection not to be
justified. There is no need to
discuss whether we should exercise
our discretionary authority under 49
U.S.C. 11344 (c) here because
complainants did not address that
issue, in spite of our invitation
that they do so.
For all the foregoing reasons,
we will deny complainants’ request
for labor protection under 49 U.S.C.
11347.
This decision will not
Significantly affect either’ the
quality of the human environment or
the conservation of energy’ re-
sources.
It is ordered:
67 a
1. Complainants’ requests for
labor protection are denied, and
this proceeding is discontinued.
2. This decision will be
effective on the date served.
By the Commission, Chairman
Gradison, Vice Chairman Simmons,
Commissioners Andre, Lamboley, and
Phillips. Vice Chairman Simmons and
Commissioner Lamboley dissented with |
separate expressions.
Noreta R. McGee
Secretary
(SEAL)
VICE CHAIRMAN SIMMONS, dissenting:
I disagree with the majority’s
refusal to consider and determine
the facts and issues of this case
under Cosby. When faced with the
issue of whether employees of a
motor carrier subsidiary of a merged
ee ttl
68 a
railroad are “railroad employees”
for purposes of 49 U.S.C. 11347, I
believe that the Commission must
take into account the Cosby decision
and not simply shrug it off. While
we may view that decision as
inconsistent with prevailing
Commission precedent, it is,
nevertheless, controlling and
binding until otherwise reversed by
the courts or legislation.
Given that, I agree that there
may be instances when it might be
difficult to determine what con-
stitutes the boundaries of railroad
work. However, for motor carrier
employees involved directly and
exclusively in TOFC/COFC operations,
it is much easier to make a
determination under Cosby where the
court found persuasive the argument
that those motor carrier operations
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;
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.
69 a
incidental to the parent railroad’s
operations may entitle the employees
of the carrier to protections. This
is because the Commission has
already declared that railroad
affiliated motor carrier operations
involving the over-the-road portion
of trailer-on-flatcars (TOFC) and
container-on-flatcar (COFC) are
services “related to a rail
carrier.” See Improvement of
TOFC/COFC Regulations (Railroad-
Affiliated Motor Carriers and Other
Motor Carriers), 3 I1.C.C. 2d 869
(1987). While that decision dealt
with whether the rates of railroad
affiliated motor carriers involved
in TOFC/COFC operations should be
exempt, the Commission had to first
make a determination that the type
of transportation provided by the
motor carriers’ affiliates is
70 a
“related to a rail carrier” under 49
U.S.C. 10505. It stands to re. son
then that if the nature of the
transportation in which these
employees were involved at the time
of the merger are rail-related, they
have met one Cosby requirement. On
the other hand, I am not certain
whether complainants have_ proven
that they were persuaded by proper
UP management that they would
receive New York Dock and therefore,
relying on such representations, did
not assert their interests during
the merger proceeding. It may be
that both factors of Cosby must be
present. Because of this, I would
invoke Commission discretion, and
leave this matter to arbitration. I
would also leave open the question
as to whether these particular
employees were solely and
71a
exclusively involved in TOFC
operations and whether they were
adversely affected as a result of
the merger.
-26 = oe ee oe oe ee oe ee ee oe oe ee ee ee ee ee ee em oe oe ee ee ee ee ee oe oe oe ee oe oe oe oe
COMMISSIONER LAMBOLEY, dissenting:
Earlier, in this case as in
others, I have dissented from the
majority’s rejection of the view,
that in appropriate circumstances,
employees of an integrated motor
carrier subsidiary may be eligible
for labor protection under
provisions of § 11347.*
In my view, the majority’s
position runs contrary to statute
and precedent. * Nothing in the
See, e.g., earlier dissent in FD
No. 32000, Et Al., Rio rande
Industries, Inc., SPTC Holding,
Inc., and The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company - Control -
Southern Pacific Transportation
Company, 4 I.C.C.2d 834, 974 (1988)
(DRGW) .
2
See and compare 49 U.S.C. § 11347
72a
legislative history limits or
precludes eligibility for pro-
tections of persons employed by
motor carriers providing services
substantially integrated with and
directly beneficial to the rail
carrier activity involved in the
subject transaction.
Heretofore, the Commission has
declared that it has never specified
the “class of employees” covered by
its protective conditions, and has
consistently declined to define
“employee” on the ground that once
the conditions have been imposed,
the matter is for interpretation by
the Courts, or resolution by
with former § 5(2)(f) (49 U.S.C.
§ 5(2)(f). 49 U.S.C. § 11344(c) and
Cosby v. I.C.C. 741 F.2d 1077 (8th
Cir. 1984) cert. den. 471 U.S. 1110
(1984). But see Milwaukee
Reorganization I, 2 I1.C.C.2d 161
(1984) and II 2 I.C.C.2d 427 (1985),
and DRGW, supra.
73a
arbitration. Bell Vv. Western
Maryland Ry. Co. 366 I.C.C. 64, 66-
67 (1981).°
Accordingly, I fail to
understand the relevancy of the
majority’s argument that determining
whether employee activity is rail
work “is both an unnecessary and
undesirable role for the Commission
to fashion for itself.” There is
neither reason nor need for the
Commission to determine the
parameters of such activity. Ar@-
bitration is a readily available and
appropriate resolution for those
fact-bound circumstances.
The present record evidences
that Union Pacific Motor Freight
Company (UPMF) was intimately and
Significantly tied to the railroad’s
See also Chicago St. P M & O Ry
Co. Lease 295 EeGeGs 441, 443
(1956).
74a
main service functions as an
integral part of the overall
transportation system. * UPMF’s
primary role was to participate in
the railroad’s TOFC/COFC operations.
In doing so, the petitioning
employees, among other’ intermodal
duties, operated rail equipment
known as a “Piggy Packer” to off-
load trailers from the flat cars.
These operations are obviously
directly rail-related for
substantial and beneficial railroad
purposes.
In general, I conclude that
employees of motor carrier sub-
Sidiaries, who perform rail-related
services substantially integrated
with and directly beneficial to the
Indeed, the public reports of
reason for UP acquisition of motor
carrier, Overnite Transportation
Co., reflect the railroad’s desire
to effectively and efficiently
integrate intermodal subsidiaries.
Ee ee Se ne eee
75 a
rail carrier activity involved in
the transaction subjected to
conditions, may be considered eli-
gible for coverage by the imposed
conditions. In this particular
case, I find that employees who
directly and substantially perform
rail-related services for an
integrated motor carrier subsidiary
operation may be eligible for
protection to ameliorate adverse
employment consequences of the 1982
merger transaction. Employment and
causation questions concerning the
nature and scope of employment
activities as being directly and
significantly rail-related, and
whether the actions taken in Kansas
City and Denver do, in fact, result
from the merger, can, and should be
| 4
resolved by an arbitration.”
Because I conclude protection is
available under § 11347, I do not
76a
Finally, the recent proceeding
in FD No. 31423, Missouri Pacific
Truck Lines, Inc. - Merger Exemption
- Katy Transportation Co. (not
printed), served March 17, 1989,
(MoPac/Katy) deserves comment. In
MoPac/Katy, the Commission, in
exempting the merger of the motor
carriers respectively owned by
merging rail carriers, “MoPac and
Katy,° mandated protection for
"railroad employees”. Obviously,
the Commission found a sufficient
nexus of activity between the
integrated motor carrier sub-
sidiaries and the merged rail
carrier for the purposes of
reach the question of "discretionary
imposition of conditions.” See
e.g., Walters v. Roadway Express,
Inc. 557 F.2G S21 (Sth Cir. 1977).
6 See FD No. 30800, Union Pacific
Corp. Et Al. = Control - Mo-Ks-Tx
Co. Et Al. 4 1.C.C.2d 409 (1988)
(UP/MKT).
pte ll a
74
protective conditions. A similar
premise for protection of motor
carrier employees may likewise exist
in rail carrier merger proceedings.’
I fail to see a rational basis
for distinguishing the grant of
merger protection for “railroad”
employees of integrated motor
carrier subsidiaries, on the one
hand, form the denial of protections
for “other” employees of similarly
integrated motor carriers who can
demonstrate that they too perform
substantial services directly
realted and beneficial to the rail
component in the merging
transportation systems, on the
per omemerinemenmneemaenaintane
"Railroad employees” are not
defined in the MoPac/Katy motor
carrier decision. Protection was
mandated for “rail employees” in the
UP/MKT rail carrier case. Id. at
531.
78 a
other. It is the character of
employment not the identity of the
employer that I find determinative.
© Xo htmwned 6
79 a
§ 11344. Consolidation, merger, and
acquisition of control: general
procedure and conditions of approval
(a) The Interstate Commerce
Commission may begin a proceeding to
approve and authorize a transaction
referred to in section 11343 of this
title [49 USCS § 11343] on
application of the person seeking
that authority. When an application
is filed with the Commission, the
Commission shall notify the chief
executive officer of each State in
which property of the’ carriers
involved in the proposed transaction
is located and shall notify those
carriers. If a motor carrier
providing transportation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission
under subchapter II of chapter 105
of this title [49 USCS §§ 10521 et
seq. ] is involved in the
transaction, the Commission must
80 a
notify the persons specified in
section 10328(b) of this title [49
USCS § 10328(b)]. The Commission
shall hold a public hearing when a
rail carrier providing trans-
portation subject to the juris-
diction of the Commission’ under
subchapter I of that chapter [49
USCS §§ 10501 et seq.] is involved
in the transaction unless7~ the
Commission determines that a public
hearing is not necessary in the
public interest.
(b) (1) In a proceeding under this
section which involves the merger or
control of at least two class I
railroads, as defined by the
Commission, the Commission _ shall
consider at least the following:
8la
(A) the effect of the proposed
transaction oon the adequacy of
transportation to the public.
(B) the effect on the public
interest of including, or failing to
include, other rail carriers in the
area involved in the proposed
transaction.
(C) the total fixed charges
that result from the proposed
transaction.
(D) the interest of carrier
employees affected by the proposed
transaction.
(E) whether the proposed
transaction would have an adverse
effect on competition among rail
carriers in the affected region.
(2) In a proceeding under this
section which involves only carriers
of passengers providing trans-
portation subject to the juris-
82 a
diction of the Interstate Commerce
Commission under subchapter II of
chapter 105 of this title [49 USCS
§§ 10521 et seq.], the Commissioner
shall consider at least the
following:
(A) the effect of the proposed
transaction on the adequacy of
transportation to the public.
(B) the effect on the public
interest of including, or failing to
include, other rail carriers in the
area involved in the proposed
transaction.
(C) the total fixed charges
that result from the proposed
transaction.
(D) the interest of carrier
employees affected by the proposed
transaction.
83 a
(c) The Commission shall approve
and authorize a transaction under
this section when it finds’ the
transaction is consistent with the
public interest. The Commission may
impose conditions governing’ the
transaction. When the transaction
contemplates a guaranty or
assumption of payment of dividends
or of fixed charges or will result
in an increase of total fixed
charges, the Commission may approve
and authorize the transaction only
if it finds that the guaranty,
assumption, or increase is
consistent with the public interest.
When a rail carrier, or a person
controlled by or affiliated with a
rail carrier, is an applicant and
the transaction involves a motor
carrier, the Commission may approve
and authorize the transaction only
if it finds that the transaction is
consistent with the public interest,
will enable the rail carrier to use
motor carrier transportation to
public advantage in its operations,
and will not unreasonably restrain
competition. When a rail carrier is
involved in the transaction, the
Commission may require inclusion of
other rail carriers located in the
area involved in the transaction if
they apply for inclusion and the
Commission finds their inclusion to
be consistent with the public
interest. (Oct. 17, 1978, P.L. 95-
473, § 1, 92 Stat. 1436.)
(d) In a proceeding under this
section which does not involve the
merger or control of at least two
Class I railroads, as defined by the
85 a
Commission, the Commission _ shall
approve such an application unless
it finds that-
(1) as a result of the
transaction, there is likely to be
substantial lessening of com-
petition, creation of a monopoly, or
restraint of trade in freight
surface transportation in any region
of the United States; and
(2)the anticompetitive effects
of the transaction outweigh the
public interest in meeting sig-
nificant transportation needs.
” «
In making such findings, the
Commission shall, with respect to
any application that is part of a
plan or proposal developed under
section 333(a)-(d) of this title [49
USCS $ 333(a)-(d)], accord sub-
stantial weight to any re-
86 a
commendations of the Secretary of
Transportation. The provisions of
this subsection do not apply to any
proceeding under this section which
involves only carriers of passengers
providing transportation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission
under subchapter II of chapter 105
of this title {49 USCS §§ 10521 et
seq. }
(e) A rail carrier, or a person
controlled by or affiliated with a
rail carrier, together with one or
more affected shippers, may apply
for approval under this subsection
of a transaction for the purpose of
providing motor carrier trans-
portation prior or subsequent to
rail transportation to serve
inadequately served shippers located
on a railroad other than the
applicant carriers. Such application
87 a
shall be approved by the Commission
if the applicants demonstrate
presently impaired rail service and
inadequate motor common’ carrier
service which results in the serious
failure of the rail carrier serving
the shippers to meet the rail
equipment or transportation
schedules of shippers or seriously
to fail otherwise to provide
adequate normal rail services
required by shippers and_ which
shippers would reasonably expect the
rail carrier to provide. The
Commission shall approve or
disapprove applications under this
subsection within 30 days after
receipt of such application. The
Commission shall approve
applications which are not protested
88 a
by interested parties within 30 days
following receipt of such
application.
(As amended Oct. 14, 1980, P.L. 96-
448, Title II, § 228(a)-(c), 94
Stat. 1931; Sept. 20, 1982, P. L.
97-261, § 21(f), (9g), 96 Stat. 1123;
Feb. 14, 1984, P. L. 98-216, § 2(4),
98 Stat. 5.)
89 a
Section 11347 of the Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.8s.C. § 11347
(1982), provides:
When a rail carrier is involved
in a transaction for which approval
is sought under sections 11344 and
11345 or section 11346 of this
title, the Interstate Commerce
Commission shall require the carrier
to provide a fair arrangement at
least as protective of the interest
of employees who are affected bv the
transaction as the terms’ imposed
under this section before
February 5, 1976, and the terms
established under section 565 of
title 45. Notwithstanding this
subtitle, the arrangement may be
made by the rail carrier and the
authorized representative of its
employees. The arrangement and the
order approving the transaction must
require that the employees of the
90 a
affected rail carrier will not be in
a worse position related to their
employment as a result of the
transaction during the 4. years
following the effective date of the
final action of the Commission (or
if an employee was employed for a
lesser period of time by the carrier
before the action became effective,
for that lesser period).
91a
LABOR PROTECTIVE CONDITIONS
In New York Dock Railway--
Control--Brooklyn Eastern District,
360 1.C.C. 60, 84-90 (1979), the
Commission set forth the following
as the standard level of protection
mandated by 49 U.S.C. § 11347
(1982):
Labor protective conditions to
be imposed in railroad transactions
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 11343 et seq.
[formerly sections £(2) and 5(3) of
the Interstate Commerce Act], except
for trackage rights and lease
proposals which are being considered
elsewhere, are as follows:
1. Definitions.--(a) ”Transac-
tion” means any action taken
pursuant to authorizations of this
Commission on which these provisions
have been imposed.
92 a
(b) “Displaced employee” means
an employee of the railroad who, as
a result of a transaction is placed
in a worse position with respect to
his compensation and rules governing
his working conditions.
(c) “Dismissed employee” means
an employee of the railroad who, as
a result of a transaction is
deprived of employment with the
railroad because of the abolition of
his position or the loss thereof as
the result of the exercise of
seniority rights by an _ employee
whose position is abolished as a
result of a transaction.
(d) “Protective period” means
the period of time during which a
displaced or dismissed employee is
to be provided protection hereunder
and extends from the date on which
an employee is displaced or
Deere een meen eee
93 a
dismissed to the expiration of 6
years therefrom, provided, however,
that the protective period for any
particular employee shall not
continue for a longer period
following the date he was displaced
or dismissed than the period during
which such employee was in the
employ of the railroad prior to the
date of his displacement or his
dismissal. For purposes of this
appendix, an employee’s length of
service shall be determined in
accordance with the provisions of
section 7(b) of the Washington Job
Protection Agreement of May 1936.
2. The rates of pay, rules,
working conditions and all
collective bargaining and. other
rights, privileges and benefits
(including continuation of pension
rights and benefits) of the
ee
94 a
railroad’s employees under appli-
cable laws and/or existing col-
lective bargaining agreements or
otherwise shall be preserved unless
changed by future collective bar-
gaining agreements or applicable
statutes.
3. Nothing in this appendix
shall be construed as depriving any
employee of any rights or benefits
or eliminating any obligations which
such employee may have under any
existing job security oor other
protective conditions or arrange-
ments; provided, that if an employee
otherwise is eligible for protection
under both this appendix and some
other job security or other
protective conditions or arrange-
ments, he shall elect between the
benefits. under this appendix and
Similar benefits under such other
95 a
arrangement and, for so long as he
continues to receive such benefits
under the provisions which he_ so
elects, he shall not be entitled to
the same type of benefit under the
provisions which he does not. so
elect; provided further, that the
benefits under this appendix, or any
other arrangement, shall be
construed to include the conditions,
responsibilities and obligations
accompanying such benefits; and,
provided further, that after
expiration of the period for which
such employee is entitled to
protection under the arrangement
which he so elects, he may then be
entitled to protection under the
other arrangement for the remainder,
if any, of this protective period
under that arrangement.
96 a
4. Notice and agreement or
decision.--(a) Each railroad con-
templating a transaction which is
subject to these conditions and may
cause the dismissal or displacement
of any employees, or rearrangement
of forces, shall give at least
ninety (90) days written notice of
such intended transaction by posting
a notice on bulletin boards
convenient to the interested
employees of the railroad and by
sending registered mail notice to
the representatives of such
interested employees. Such notice
shall contain a full and adequate
statement of the proposed changes to
be affected by such transaction,
including an estimate of the number
of employees of each class affected
97 a
by the intended changes. Prior to
consummation the parties shall
negotiate in the following manner.
Within five (5) ‘days from the
date of receipt of notice, at the
request of either the railroad or
representatives of such interested
employees, a place shall be selected
to hold negotiations for the purpose
of reaching agreement with respect
to application of the terms and
conditions of this appendix, and
these negotiations shall commence
immediately thereafter and continue
for at least thirty (30) days. Each
transaction which may result in a
dismissal or displacement of en-
ployees or rearrangement of forces,
Shall provide for the selection of
forces from all employees involved
on a basis accepted as appropriate
for application in the particular
98 a
case and any assignment of employees
made necessary by the transaction
shall be made on the basis of an
agreement or decision under this
section 4. If at the end of thirty
(30) days there is a failure to
agree, either party to the dispute
may submit it for adjustment in
accordance with the following
procedures:
(1) Within five (5) days from
the request for arbitration the
parties shall select a neutral
referee and in the event they are
unable to agree within said five (5)
days upon the selection of said
referee then the National Mediation
Board shall immediately appoint a
referee.
99 a
-
(2) No later than twenty (20)
days after a referee has_ been
designated a hearing on the dispute
shall commence.
(3) The decision of the referee
shall be final, binding and
conclusive and shall be rendered
within thirty (30) days from the
commencement of the hearing of the
dispute.
(4) The salary and expenses of
the referee shall be borne equally
by the parties to the proceeding;
all other expenses shall be paid by
the party incurring then.
(b) No change in operations,
services, facilities, or equipment
shall occur until after an agreement
is reached or the decision of a
referee has been rendered.
100 a
5. Displacement allowances.--
(a) So long after a displaced
employee’s displacement as he is
unable, in the normal exercise of
his seniority rights under existing
agreements, rules and practices, to
obtain a position producing
compensation equal to or exceeding
the compensation he received in the
position from wnich he was
displaced, he shall, during his
protective period, be paid a monthly
displacement allowance equal to the
difference between the monthly
compensation received by him in the
position in which he is retained and
the average monthly compensation
received by him in the position from
which he was displaced.
Each displaced employee’s
displacement allowance shall_ be
determined by dividing separately by
101 a
12 the total compensation received
by the employee and the total time
for which he was paid during the
last 12 months in which he performed
services immediately preceding the
date of his displacement as a result
of the transaction (thereby
producing average monthly compensa-
tion and average monthly time paid
for in the test period), and
provided further, that such
allowance shall also be adjusted to
reflect subsequent general wage
increases.
z¢ a displaced employee’s
compensation in his retained
position in any month is less in any
month in which he performs work than
the aforesaid average compensation
(adjusted to reflect subsequent
general wage increases) to which he
would have been entitled, he shall
102 a
be paid the difference, less
compensation for time lost oon
account of his voluntary absences to
the extent that he is not available
for service equivalent to his
average monthly time during the test
period, but if in his’ retained
position he works in any month in
excess of the aforesaid average
monthly time paid for during the
test period he shall be additionally
compensated for such excess time at
the rate of pay of the retained
position.
(b) If a displaced employee
fails to exercise his’ seniority
rights tc secure another position
available to him which does not
require a change in his place of
residence, to which he is entitled
under the working agreement and
which carries a rate of pay and
103 a
compensation exceeding those oc the
position which he elects to retain,
he shall thereafter be treated for
the purposes of this section as
occupying the position he elects to
decline.
(c) The displacement allowance
shall cease prior to the expiration
of the protective period in the
event of the displaced employee’s
resignation, death, retirement, or
dismissal for justifiable cause.
6. Dismissal allowances.--(a)
A dismissed employee shall be paid a
monthly dismissal allowance, from
the date he is deprived of
employment and continuing during his
protective period, equivalent to
one-twelfth of the compensation
received by him in the last 12
months of his employment in which he
earned compensation prior to the
104 a
date he is first deprived of
employment as a result of the
transaction. Such allowance shall
also be adjusted to reflect
subsequent general wage increases.
(b) The dismissal allowance of
any dismissed employee who returns
to service with the railroad shall
cease while he is so reemployed.
During the time of such reemploy-
ment, he shall be entitled to
protection in accordance with the
provisions of section 5.
(c) The dismissal allowance of
any dismissed employee who is
otherwise employed shall be reduced
to the extent that his combined
monthly earnings in such other
employment, any benefits received
under any unemployment’ insurance
law, and his dismissal allowance
exceed the amount upon which his
105 a
dismissal allowance is based. Such
employee, or his representative, and
the railroad shall agree upon a
procedure by which the railroad
Shall be currently informed of the
earnings of such employee in
employment other than with the
railroad, and the benefits received.
(da) The dismissal allowance
shall cease prior to the expiration
of the protective period in the
event of the employee’s resignation,
death, retirement, dismissal for
justifiable cause under existing
agreements, failure to return to
service after beirg notified in
accordance with the working
agreement, failure without good
cause to accept a comparable
position which does not require a
change in his place of residence for
which he is qualified and eligible
106 a
after appropriate notification, if
his return does not infringe upon
the employment rights of other
employees under a working agreement.
- 7. Separation allowance.--A
dismissed employee entitled to
protection under this appendix, may,
at his option within 7 days of his
dismissal, resign and (in lieu of
all other benefits and protections
provided in this appendix) accept a
lump sum payment computed in
accordance with section 9 of the
Washington Job Protection Agreement
of May 1936.
8. Fringe benefits.--No em-
ployee of the railroad who is
affected by a transaction shall be
deprived, during his’ protection
period, of benefits attached to his
previous employment, such as free
transportation, hospitalization,
107 a
pensions, reliefs, et cetera, under
the same conditions and so long as
such benefits continue to be
accorded to other employees of the
railroad, in active or on furlough
as the case may be, to the extent
that such benefits can be so
maintained under present authority
of law or _ corporate action or
through future authorization which
may be obtained.
9. Moving expenses.--Any em-
ployee retained in the service of
the railroad or who is later
restored to service after being
entitled to receive a dismissal
allowance, and who is required to
change the point of his employment
as a result of the transaction, and
who within his protective period is
required to move his place of
residence, shall be reimbursed for
108 a
all expenses of moving his household
and other personal effects for the
traveling expenses of himself and
members of his family, including
living expenses for himself and his
family and for his own actual wage
loss, not to exceed 3 working days,
the exact extent of the responsibi-
lity of the railroad during the time
necessary for such transfer and for
reasonable time thereafter and the
ways and means of transportation to
be agreed upon in advance by the
railroad and the affected employee
or his representatives; provided,
however, that changes in place of
residence which are not a result of
the transaction, shall not be
considered to be within the purview
of this section; provided further,
that the railroad shall, to the same
extent provided above, assume the
—Eeeeeaaaaa
109 a
expenses, et cetera, for any
employee furloughed within three (3)
years after changing his point of
employment as a result of a
transaction, who elects to move his
Place of residence back to his
Original point of enployment. No
Claim for reimbursenent shall be
paid under the provision of this
section unless such Claim is
presented to railroad within 90 days
after the date on which the expenses
were incurred.
10. Should the railroad
rearrange or adjust its forces in
anticipation of a transaction with
the purpose or effect of depriving
an employee of benefits to which he
otherwise would have become entitled
under this appendix, this appendix
will apply to such employee.
110 a
11. Arbitration of disputes.-
-(a) In the event the railroad and
its employees or their authorized
representatives cannot settle any
dispute or controversy with respect
to the interpretation, application
or enforcement of any provision of
this appendix, except sections 4 and
12 of this article I, within 20 days
after the dispute arises, it may be
referred by either party to an
arbitration committee. Upon notice
in writing served by one party on
the other of intent by that party to
refer a dispute or controversy to an
arbitration committee, each party
shall, within 10 days, select one
member of the committee and the
members thus chosen shall select a
neutral member who shall serve as
chairman. If any party fails to
select its member of the arbitration
lll a
committee within the prescribed time
limit, the general chairman of the
involved labor organization or the
highest officer designated by the
railroads, as the case may be, shall
be deemed the selected member and
the committee shall then function
and its decision shall have the same
force and effect as though all
parties had selected their members.
Should the members be- unable to
agree upon the appointment of the
neutral member within 10 days, the
parties shall then within an
additional 10 days endeavor to agree
to a method by which a neutral
member shall be appointed, and,
failing such agreement, either party
may request the National Mediation
Board to designate within 10 days
the neutral member whose designation
will be binding, upon the parties.
112 a
(b) In the event a dispute
involves more than cone labor
organization, each will be entitled
to a representative on the
arbitration committee, in which
event the railroad will be entitled
to appoint additional representa-
tives so as to equal the number of
labor organization representatives.
(c) The decision, by majority
vote, of the arbitration committee
shaii be final, binding, and
conclusive and shall be rendered
within 45 days after the hearing of
the dispute or controversy has been
concluded and the record closed.
(d) The salaries and expenses
of the neutral member shall be borne
equally by the parties to the
proceeding and all other expenses
shall be paid by the party incurring
them.
113 a
(e) In the event of any
dispute as to whether or not a
particular employee was affected by
a transaction, it shall be his
obligation to identify the trans-
action and Specify the pertinent
facts of that transaction relied
upon. It shall then be the rail-
road’s burden to prove that factors
other than a transaction affected
the employee.
12. Losses from home re-
moval.--(a) The following conditions
Shall apply to the extent they are
applicable in each instance to any
employee who is retained in the
service of the railroad (or who is
later restored to. service after
being entitled to receive a
dismissal allowance) who is required
to change the point of his
employment within his protective
114 a
period as a result of the transac-
tion and is therefore required to
move his place of residence:
(i) If the employee owns his
own home in the locality from which
he is required to move, he shall at
his option be reimbursed by the
railroad for any loss suffered in
the sale of his home for less than
its fair value. In each case the
fair value of the home in question
shall be determined as of a date
sufficiently prior to the date of
the transaction so as to be un-
affected thereby. The railroad shall
in each instance be afforded an
opportunity to purchase the home at
such fair value before it is sold by
the empioyee to any other person.
(ii) If the employee is under a
contract to purchase his home, the
railroad shall protect him against
115 a
loss to the extent of the fair value
of equity he may have in the home
and in addition shall relieve him
from any further obligation under
his contract.
(iii) If the employee holds an
unexpired lease of dwelling
occupied by him as his home, the
railroad shall protect him from all
loss and cost in securing the
cancellation of said lease.
(b) Changes in place of
residence which are not the result
of a transaction shall not be
considered to be within the purview
of this section.
(Cc) No claim for loss shall be
paid under the provisions of this
section unless such claim is
presented to the railroad within 1
year after the date the employee is
required to move.
116 a
(d) Should a controversy arise
in respect to the value of the home,
the loss sustained in its sale, the
loss under a contract for purchase,
loss and cost in securing termina-
tion of a lease, or any other
question in connection with these
matters, it shall be decided through
joint conference between the
employee, or their representatives
and the railroad. In the event they
are unable to agree, the dispute or
controversy may be referred by
either party to a board of competent
real estate appraisers, selected in
the following manner. One to be
selected by the representatives of
the employees and one by the
railroad, and these two, if unable
to agree within 30 days upon a
valuation, shall endeavor by
agreement within 10 days thereafter
Pence remem wee nee mere
117 a
to select a third appraiser, or to
agree to a method by .which a third
appraiser ‘shall be selected, and
failing such agreement, either party
may request the National Mediation
Board to designate within 10 days a
third appraiser whose designation
Will be binding upon the parties. A
decision of a majority of the
appraisers shall be required and
Said decision shall be final and
conclusive. The Salary and expenses
of the third or neutral appraiser,
including the expenses of the
appraise) board, shall be borne
equally by the parties to the
proceedings. All other expenses
shall be paid by the party incurring
them, including the compensation of
the appraiser selected by such
party.
ARTICLE ITI
118 2
1. Any employee who is
terminated or furloughed as a result
of a transaction shall, if he so
requests, be granted priority of
employment or reemployment to fill a
position comparable to that which he
held when his employment was
terminated or he was’ furloughed,
even though in a different craft or
class, on the railroad which he is,
or by training or retraining
physically and mentally can become,
qualified, not, however, in
contravention of collective bar-
gaining agreements relating thereto.
2. In the ever.t such training
or retraining is requested by such
employee, the railroad shall provide
for such training or retraining at
no cost to the employee.
119 a
3. If such a terminated or
furloughed employee who had made a
request under section 1 or 2 of the
article II fails without good cause
within 10 calendar days to accept an
offer of a position comparable to
that which he held when terminated
or furloughed for’ which he is
qualified, Or for which he has
Satisfactorily completed such
training, he Shall, effective at the
expiration of such 10-day period,
forfeit all rights, and benefits
under this appendix.
ARTICLE III
Subject to this appendix, as if
employees of railroad, shall be
employees, if affected by a
transaction, of separately incor-
porated terminal companies which are
Owned (in whole or in part) or used
by railroad and employees of any
120 a
other enterprises within the
definition of common carrier by
railroad in section 1(3) of part I
of the Interstate Commerce Act, as
amended, in which railroad has an
interest, to which railroad provides
facilities, or with which railroad
contracts for use of facilities, or
the facilities of which railroad
otherwise uses; except that the
provisions of this appendix shall be
suspended with respect to each such
employee until and unless he applies
for employment with each owning
carrier and each using carrier;
provided that said carriers shali
establish one convenient’ central
location for each terminal or other
enterprises for receipt of one such
application which will be effective
as to all said carriers and railroad
shall notify such employees of this
1l2la
requirement and of the location for
receipt of the application. Such
employees shall not be entitled to
any of the benefits of this appendix
in the case of failure, without good
cause, to accept comparable en-
ployment, which does not require a
change in place of residence, under
the same conditions as apply to
other employees under this appendix,
with any carrier for which
application for employment has been
made in accordance with this
section.
ARTICLE Iv
Employees of the railroad who
are not represented by labor or-
ganization shall be afforded
Substantially the same levels of
protection as are afforded to
members of labor organizations under
these terms and conditions.
eeee—ea~ ea
122 a
In the event any dispute or
controversy arises between the
railroad and an employee not
represented by a labor organization
with respect to the interpretation,
application or enforcement of any
provision hereof which cannot be
settled by the parties within 30
days after the dispute arises,
either party may refer the dispute
to arbitration.
ARTICLE V
1. It is the intent of this
appendix to provide employee
protections which are not less than
the benefits established under 49
¥.6.C. 11347 before February 5,
1976, and under section 565 of title
45. In so doing, changes in wording
ne and organization from arrangements
earlier developed under those
sections have been necessary to make
123 a
such benefits applicable to
transactions as defined in article I
of this appendix. In making such
changes, it is not the intent of
this appendix to diminish such
benefits. Thus, the terms of this
appendix are to be resolved in favor
of this intent to provide employee
protections and benefits no less
than those established under 49
U.S.C. 11347 before February 5, 1976
and under section 565 of title 45.
2. In the event any provision
of this appendix is held to be
invalid or otherwise unenforceable
under applicable law, the remaining
provisions of this appendix shall
not be affected.
a
124 a
STATUTES
Section 5 (2) (c) of the
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 5(2)(c) (1976), provides:
(c) in passing upon any
proposed transaction under the
provisions of this paragraph, the
Commission shall give weight to the
following considerations, among
others: (1) The effect of the
proposed transaction upon adequate
transportation service to the
public; (2) the effect upon the
public interest of the inclusion, or
failure to include, other railroads
in the territory involved in the
proposed transaction; (3) the total
fixed charges resulting from the
proposed transaction; and (4) the
interest of the carrier employees
affected.
125 a
Section 5(2) (f) of the
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.c.
§ 5(2) (f) (1976), provides:
(f) As a condition of its
approval, under this paragraph or
Paragraph (3), of any transaction
involving a Carrier or carriers by
railroad subject to the provisions
of this Chapter, the Commission
Shall require a fair and equitable
arrangement to protect the interests
of the railroad employees affected.
In its order of approval the
Commission shall include terms and
conditions Providing that during the
Period of four years from the
effective date of Such order such
transaction will not result in
employees of the carrier Or carriers
by railroad affected by such order
being in a_ worse position with
respect to their employment except
126 a
that the protection afforded to any
employee pursuant to this sentence
shall not be required to continue
for a longer period, following the
effective date of such order, than
the period during which such
employee was in the employ of such
carrier or carriers prior to the
effective date of such order. Such
arrangement shall contain provisions
no less protective of the interests
of employees than those imposed
before February 5, 1976, pursuant to
this subdivision and those
established pursuant to section 565
of Title 45. Notwithstanding any
other provisions of this Act, an
agreement pertaining to the
protection of the interests of said
employees may be entered into after
September 18, 1940, by any carrier
or carriers by railroad and the duly
adidiian ice Aah atk on ahead minarets oa
127 a
authorized representative or
representatives of its oor their
employees.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.