Appendices — Oregon Arena Corp. v. Lee
Supreme Court brief2002
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[Filed January 10, 2002]
No. 00-35755
DANIEL LEE; MICHAEL CARR; EDWARD GATHRIGHT;
and JEREMY SONNIER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
VERA KATZ; JAMES FRANCESCONI; CHARLES JORDAN; SHANE
NICHOLSON; STEPHANIE DEKOEYER; JOHN MONTGOMERY;
J.M. PATTERSON; ROBERT HAWKINS; KIMBERLEY ADAMS;
CURTIS CHINN; MACE WINTER; BRIAN DUDDY; STUART
PALMITER; TIMOTHY BACON; OREGON ARENA CORPORA-
TION; MICHAEL FENNELL; PIONEER COURTHOUSE SQUARE,
INC.; and PORTLAND ROSE FESTIVAL ASSOCIATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
OPINION
Before: DAVID R. THOMPSON, A. WALLACE
TASHIMA, and SUSAN P. GRABER, Circuit Judges.
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge:
The plaintiffs are self-described “street preachers” who
brought this lawsuit in the district court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 seeking to enjoin the defendants’ alleged violations of
their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to preach the
Gospel of Jesus Christ on the Rose Quarter Commons, an
outdoor area next to city-owned public facilities in the city of
Portland. Only the Oregon Arena Corporation (OAC) and its
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general counsel, Michael Fennell, are parties in this appeal.’
The other defendants were dismissed either voluntarily or
by an order of the district court that the plaintiffs do
not challenge.
The OAC leased the Commons and some of the adjacent
structures from the City of Portland. In connection with its
administration of the leased area, it promulgated policies
regulating speech on the Commons. In general, those policies
regulated the areas on the Commons where public speaking
could occur, the conduct of the speaker and the volume of the
speech. Because the plaintiffs violated the OAC’s public
speech policy, they were excluded from the Commons for
limited periods of time. That prompted this lawsuit.
After a bench trial, the district court granted judgment in
favor of the OAC. The court determined that the OAC was
not a State actor, and thus any abridgment of the plaintiffs’
constitutional rights was not State action within the meaning
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs appeal.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
reverse. We conclude that, in regulating speech on the Com-
mons, the OAC is a State actor. Thus, the plaintiffs’
§ 1983 action is viable. We remand to the district court for it
to determine whether the restrictions imposed by the OAC’s
public speech policy are reasonable restrictions on the time,
place, and manner of protected speech, and are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. See
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L. Ed.
2d 661, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
' Both the OAC and Fennell, who joined in the OAC’s appellate brief,
were alleged to be “State actors” who violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights. For purposes of this appeal, we need not consider Fennell’s
potential liability independent of the OAC. Thus, both are referred to as
“the OAC.”
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I
The Rose Quarter Commons is a large open-air plaza in
Portland, Oregon, next to the Rose Garden Arena, Memorial
Coliseum, One Center Court, and three parking garages.
Portland owns the real property on which the Commons is
located, as well as the Coliseum and two of the parking
garages. The OAC, a private corporation, owns the rest of the
structures, the Arena, One Center Court, and Garden Garage.
The OAC has never challenged the plaintiffs’ charac-
terization of the Commons as a traditional public forum. In its
brief, the OAC concedes that “the government may impose
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on public for a
such as the Rose Quarter Commons.” (Emphasis added).
From January 1993 through June 1997, the OAC leased the
Commons from the City of Portland. The lease required the
OAC to “permit access to and free speech on the Commons
as may be required by laws.” The lease expired and was not
renewed, but the OAC continues to act as the exclusive lessee
of the Commons under terms substantially similar to those of
the lease.
In its administration of the leased area, the OAC prom-
ulgated a Code of Conduct for the Commons that includes
free speech policies. The Code prohibits “yelling or scream-
ing with the intention of disturbing persons or disturbing a
lawful assembly; or playing radios, musical instruments or
any other sound producing or reproducing equipment which
is plainly audible at a distance of 25 feet.” The Code also
prohibits disturbing the peace, acting for the purpose of
disturbing the peace, physically threatening anyone, engaging
in tumultuous behavior, provoking a disturbance, or
embroiling others in open conflict. The OAC’s “Petitioning
and Free Speech Rules” define free speech as “conduct by a
speaker . . . which has a purpose that is constitutionally
protected, including the dissemination or distribution of
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expressive material.” If a person violates the rules, then the
OAC may issue an exclusion order barring him or her from
returning to the Commons for a limited period.
The OAC designated three free speech zones within the
Commons, each approximately 10 feet by 10 feet in size. The
OAC believes that by designating these areas for free speech
activity it is better able to monitor the safety of both patrons
and speakers, in order “to prevent potentially violent con-
frontations and to maintain the quality of entertainment that
the OAC offers at the Rose Quarter.” The OAC also asserts
that this policy prevents speakers from impeding the high-
volume flow of patrons to and from events and parking.
The OAC’s policies were developed, and are administered,
independent of the City of Portland or any other public
entity. The OAC supplied copies of its policies to the
Assistant District Attorney of Multnomah County (which
county encompasses the City of Portland) and to a sergeant
in Portland’s traffic division, but did not solicit any gov-
ernmental comment or approval. The OAC enforces its
policies with both in-house security officers and contracted
security personnel.
The plaintiffs describe themselves as street preachers who
believe it is their religious duty to spread the Gospel of Jesus
Christ by engaging in open-air preaching. Such preaching
includes making oral statements and carrying signs and
banners with religious messages. The plaintiffs engage in this
preaching at various locations, including the Commons. On
several occasions, persons using the Commons have taken
offense at the plaintiffs’ conduct and language. Potentially
violent confrontations have ensued.” The plaintiffs have also,
? For example, on one occasion plaintiff Lee preached so loudly that
his voice could be heard over an African marimba band performing on a
stage in the Commons. He flailed his arms about, called people in the area
whores, and told them they were going to burn in hell. On another occa-
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on occasion, violated the free speech zones. In some
instances, the OAC has issued orders excluding the plaintiffs
from the Commons for specified time periods.
In response to the OAC’s exclusion orders, the plaintiffs
brought this suit seeking injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. After a bench trial based primarily on
stipulated facts, the district court concluded that the OAC, a
private entity, is not a State actor subject to § 1983 liability.
The court determined that the City is not entwined with the
OAC’s management and control of the Commons, the
Commons is not encumbered by an easement for public
access, and the plaintiffs failed to show that the OAC and its
security personnel perform any functions that are exclusively
reserved to the City. The court entered judgment for the
defendants, and this appeai followed.
II
We review de novo the district court’s conclusion that the
OAC is not a State actor and review for clear error its find-
ings of fact. See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 823 (9th Cir.
1997) (mixed questions of law and fact implicating constitu-
tional rights reviewed de novo); Freeman v. Allstate Life Ins.
Co., 253 F.3d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 2001) (findings of fact
reviewed for clear error). The plaintiffs bear the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the OAC
is a State actor for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156, 56 L. Ed. 2d 185, 98
S. Ct. 1729 (1978).
sion, his preaching in a similar manner attracted a crowd that physically
assauited him. Plaintiff Gathright also preached in the Commons, calling a
woman a whore, a prostitute, and a daughter of Babylon, which incited a
shouting match between him and the man escorting the woman.
cams a
RS
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Conduct that is actionable under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as State action is also action under color of State law
supporting a suit under § 1983. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 935, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482, 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982).
“State action may be found if, though only if, there is such a
‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that
seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of
the State itself.”” Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary
Sch. Athletics Ass’n., 531 U.S. 288, 295, 148 L. Ed. 2d 807,
121 S. Ct. 924 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477, 95 S. Ct.
449 (1974)).
“What is fairly attributable [as State action ] is a matter of
normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity. . . .
[No] one fact can function as a necessary condition across
the board . . . nor is any set of circumstances absolutely
sufficient, for there may be some countervailing reason... .”
Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295-96. Because of the fact-intensive
nature of the inquiry, courts have developed a variety of
approaches to the State actor issue. See id. at 296 (listing seven
approaches to the issue including the coercion test, the joint
action test, the public function test, and the entwinement test).
Previously, we expressed uncertainty as to whether satis-
faction of a single test could be sufficient to establish that a
private entity was a State actor. See, e.g., George v. Pacific
CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996) (per
curiam); Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement &
Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1989). However, in
Brentwood, the Court determined that the nominally private
entity whose conduct was challenged was a State actor solely
on the basis that the entity was entwined with the State. The
Court held that satisfaction of this single test was sufficient,
so long as no countervailing factor existed. See Brentwood,
531 U.S. at 304 (“When . . . the relevant facts show perva-
Ta
sive entwinement . . . , the implication of state action is not
affected by pointing out that the facts might not loom large
under a different test.”).°
Applying this same logic here, the plaintiffs argue that the
OAC is a State actor under both the public function test and
what they label the “nexus” test. Because we agree with the
plaintiffs that in regulating free speech within the Commons
the OAC performs an exclusively and traditionally public
function within a public forum, we focus only upon the public
function test. See id. We therefore do not reach the plaintiffs’
argument that the OAC is a State actor under what they label
the “nexus” test.’
Under the public function test, “when private individuals or
groups are endowed by the State with-powers or functions
governmental in nature, they become agencies or instru-
mentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional
limitations.” Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 15 L. Ed.
2d 373, 86 S. Ct. 486 (1966). To satisfy the public function
test, the function at issue must be both traditionally and
exclusively governmental. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.
830, 842, 73 L. Ed. 2d 418, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982).
* Even the four dissenting Justices in Brentwood, who disagreed with
the majority’s conclusion that entwinement alone could establish a private
entity as a State actor, employed a disjunctive analysis to the tests they
would apply to determine whether a private entity is a State actor. See id.
at 305, 309-11 (Justice Thomas dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy). -
* We note, however, that in Brentwood the Court treated “nexus” as a
status that is found in all cases where private action is attributable to the
State, whether that attribution is made under the “pervasive entwinement”
test upon which the Court relied in Brentwood, or the public function test
upon which we rely today. See id. at 295-96; see also Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991, 1005, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534, 102 S. Ct. 2777 (1982) (“The
required nexus may be present if the private entity has exercised powers
that are ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.’”) (quoting
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353).
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The particular public function that the plaintiffs allege the
OAC performed was the regulation of free speech within the
Commons, a public forum.” Previous courts have found this
function to be a traditional and exclusive public function. For
example, in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505-06, 90
L. Ed. 265, 66 S. Ct. 276 (1946), the Court examined whether
a company that regulated speech in a shopping district in its
privately owned town became a State actor. The Court
concluded that it did. The Court explained that “the town and
its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by the
public in general and there is nothing to distinguish them
from any other town and shopping center except the fact that
the title to the property belongs to a private corporation.” /d.
at 503. Given that circumstance, the fact that the property is
private” is not sufficient to justify the State’s permitting a
corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict
their fundamental liberties.” /d. at 509. “Ownership does not
always mean absolute dominion . . . . [Where] facilities are
built and operated primarily to benefit the public . . . their
operation is essentially a public function . . . subject to state
regulation.” /d. at 506; see also Citizens To End Animal
Suffering and Exploiiation, Inc. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace,
Inc., 745 F. Supp. 65 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding that a private
corporation’s regulation of free speech activities on publicly
owned land leased by the corporation was a public function,
where that land was a public forum over which the public
held an easement).
Although not a free speech case, Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296, 15 L. Ed. 2d 373, 86 S. Ct. 486 (1966), is also
instructive because it involved the management by private
trustees of a city-owned park that previously had been
managed by the city. In that case, the Court rejected the
* It is important to identify the function at issue because “an entity may
be a State actor for some purposes but not for others.” George, 91 F.3d
at 1230.
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argument that the transfer of the park to nominally private
control meant that the trustees were not performing a public
function. The Court held, after examining the history and use
of the park, that “the public character of this park requires
that it be treated as a public institution subject to the
command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of who
now has title under state law.” /d. at 302.
Here, the Commons functions as a freely accessible public
forum through which people pass on their way to shows,
concerts, games, and restaurants. The Commons is also a
gathering place for public events. Just three days after this
case was argued, three thousand people gathered at the
Commons for a multi-faith service that was Oregon’s largest
public event in response to the September 11, 2001 “Attack
on America.” See Courtney Thompson, Betsy Hammond, and
Erin H. Barnett, Oregonians Find Comfort, Strength in Many
Faiths, The Oregonian, Sept. 15, 2001, at DI. Moreover, as
we have noted, the character of the Commons as a public
forum is conceded by the OAC.° Thus, the regulation of
speech in the Commons is a public function and the OAC
became a State actor when the City delegated that regulation
to the OAC.
We do not hold that everyone who leases or obtains a
permit to use a state-owned public forum will necessarily
° The character of the Commons as a public forum was also confirmed
in the OAC’s former lease. That lease required the OAC to “permit access
to and free speech on the [Commons] as may be required by laws.” Even
without this former lease provision, however, so long as the Commons is
a public forum, constitutional protections of free speech within it may not
be altered simply because the City has disassociated itself from the OAC’s
policymaking activities. Cf Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715, 725, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961) (silence of lease as to
private restaurant’s duty to obey Fourteenth Amendment is not decisive
because “no State may effectively abdicate its [Constitutional] respons-
ibilities by either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge them
whatever the motive may be.”).
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become a State actor. We agree with the Sixth Circuit that,
for example, a street festival organizer given non-exclusive
powers over a traditional public forum does not, in the
absence of other facts, become a State actor when the State
maintains the ultimate power to regulate activities in the
forum. See Lansing v. City of Memphis, 202 F.3d 821, 828-29
(6th Cir. 2000) (“Although [the street festival organizer} had
permission from the city to put its streets to special use during
the time of the festival, the city retained ultimate control of
the streets at all times.”). Here, however, Portland retained
little, if any, power over the OAC’s free speech policies
governing the Commons. The OAC’s functionally exclusive
regulation of free speech within the Commons, a public
forum, is a traditional and exclusive function of the State.
The OAC argues it is not a State actor because, unlike in
Faneuil Hall, 745 F. Supp. at 71, no public easement exists
through the Commons. The absence of such an easement,
however, does not control our analysis, given the reality that
the Commons is a public forum. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at
505 n.2 (determination of State court that company town was
not “dedicated” under law to public use “does not decide the
question under the Federal Constitution” whether company
town is a State actor); Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 301 n.4 (noting
that the State actor determination often emphasizes practical
reality over legal formalities). It is the function of the OAC’s
administration of the Commons that guides and informs our
inquiry, not the precise legal arrangement under which the
OAC leases the area. That “function” is the administration of
free speech rules within a public forum. Cf West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 55-56, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988)
(contract physician is a State actor even though not a State
employee because “it is the physician’s function within the
state system, not the precise terms of his employment, that
determines whether his actions can fairly be attributed to
the State”).
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The OAC asserts that the policing of the Commons is not
an exclusive public function, citing Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d
902, 904-06 (7th Cir. 1996). In Wade, the Seventh Circuit
held that a private security guard was not a State actor
because, even though his exercise of limited police powers
over a public housing project was a traditional public
function, it was not an exclusively public one. The present
case, unlike Wade, does not turn on whether the use of
limited police powers on public land is a public function. It
turns on what is quintessentially an exclusive and traditional
public function—the regulation of free speech within a
public forum.
We conclude that, in regulating speech within the Com-
mons, the OAC performs an exclusively and traditionally
public function within a public forum. “There being no
offsetting reason to see the [OAC’s] acts in any other way,”
Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 291, we need not consider whether
the implication of State action would be affected by other
facts that “might not loom large under a different test.” /d. at
303. In regulating free speech within the Commons, the OAC
is a State actor.
ll
The OAC’s status as a State actor does not end this case,
but it does, for the moment, end this court’s inquiry. The
OAC may still “impose reasonable restrictions on the time,
place, or manner of protected speech [within the Commons],
provided the restrictions ‘are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that
they leave open ample alternative channels for commu-
nication of the information.’”” Ward v. Rock against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989)
(quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293, 82 L. Ed. 2d 221, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984)). The
district court did not reach this question, which involves a
factual inquiry best undertaken by that court. ,
|
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On remand, the district court shall determine whether any
or all of the OAC’s free speech policies and procedures are
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Although the
district court will, of course, separately evaluate all
challenged aspects of the OAC’s policies and procedures, we
draw its attention in particular to the need for further
factfinding as to the reasonableness of: (1) the noise limits
imposed by the OAC; (2) the rule banning the wearing of
sandwich boards; and (3) the designation of limited free
speech zones, including both the policy in general and its
specific provisions identifying the size, location, and number
of such zones. We express no opinion on the merits of these
issues.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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APPENDIX B
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
(Filed May 31, 2000]
CV 00-310-PA
DANIEL LEE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
. £
VERA KATZ, et al.,
Defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
PANNER J.
Plaintiffs, Daniel Lee, Michael Carr, Edward Gathright,
and Jeremy Sonnier, filed this action against defendants,
including City of Portland,’ Oregon Arena Corporation,” and
Portland Rose Festival Association. Plaintiffs bring claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants have
violated and continue to violate plaintiffs’ rights to speech as
protected by the First Amendment, that defendants have
violated and continue to violate plaintiffs’ rights to religion as
protected by the First Amendment, that defendants have
' This opinion collectively refers to defendants Vera Katz, James
Francesconi, Charles Jordan, Shane Nicholson, Stephanie Dekoeyer, John
Montgomery, Robert Hawkins, Kimberly Adams, Curtis Chinn, Mace
Winter, Brian Duddy, Timothy Bacon, and Pioneer Courthouse Square,
Inc. as the City of Portland. Defendants J. M. Patterson and Elmer Button,
private security officers contracted to provide security at Pioneer Court-
house Square, have not been served with this action.
? This opinion collectively refers to defendants Oregon Arena Cor-
poration and Michael Fennel as Oregon Arena Corporation.
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violated the Fourth Amendment rights of Lee, Sonnier and
Gathright to be free from unreasonable seizures of their
persons, and that defendants have violated ORS 181.575 by
collecting and maintaining information about plaintiffs. Plain-
tiffs also allege that defendants have breached contracts
between City of Portland, Oregon Arena Corporation and
Portland Rose Festival Association to which plaintiffs are
third party beneficiaries. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declar-
atory relief, compensatory and punitive damages.
On April 5, 2000, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary
injunction, seeking the following relief: (1) suspension of all
exclusions issued by defendants against plaintiffs for plain-
tiffs’ open air preaching; (2) enjoin City of Portland from
enforcing PCC 20.08.060 against plaintiffs while they are
engaged, in open air preaching; (3) enjoin Oregon Arena
Corporation from enforcing its written free speech policy
against plaintiffs while they are engaged in open air preach-
ing at the Rose Quarter; and (4) enjoin Portland Rose Festival
Association from enforcing its regulations that prohibit wear-
ing signboards during the Rose Festival at Waterfront Park.
Defendants opposed the motion for a preliminary injunction.
After reviewing the parties’ submissions on the preliminary
injunction motion, this court determined that no material
factual disputes existed and suggested that the parties submit
the issue of permanent injunctive relief to the court for
resolution at this time. The parties agreed. The court ordered
that the issues of relief be bifurcated such that the issue of
permanent injunctive relief be resolved first, and if neces-
sary, the additional issues of relief would be handled in a
separate proceeding.
The court then conducted a court trial on the merits of
permanent injunctive relief. The parties submitted stipulated
facts. The parties also relied on their witness statements, and
no party requested the opportunity to cross-examine another
party’s witnesses. Additionally, all exhibits submitted by the
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parties were received into evidence without objection. On
May 4, 2000, the court heard oral argument on the legal
issues and requested supplemental briefing. The following
constitutes my Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law. Fed.
R. Civ. Pro. 52(a). For the reasons explained below, I dismiss
in part and deny in part plaintiffs’ claims for permanent
injunctive relief.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiffs are street preachers who believe it is their
religious duty to spread the Gospel of Jesus Christ by
engaging in open air preaching. Open air preaching includes
making oral statements and carrying signs and banners with
religious messages. Open air preaching is an essential part of
plaintiffs’ religious practices, and plaintiffs believe that they
must contact the general public to spread the Christian
Gospel. Plaintiffs engage in open air preaching at various
locations in Portland, including the Pioneer Courthouse
Square, Rose Quarter Commons and Waterfront Park. Plain-
tiffs’ claims for permanent injunctive relief stem from
incidents occurring at those three locations.
1. City of Portland
Defendant City of Portland (the City) maintains a system
of parks for the recreation and enjoyment of the public.
People who want preferential use of a City Park may obtain a
permit for an event. Pioneer Courthouse Square (the Square)
is a City Park in the center of downtown Portland. The Square
is an outdoor brick plaza between Southwest Broadway and
Southwest Sixth Avenue and between Southwest Yamhill
Street and Southwest Morrison Street. See Rohman v. Citv of
Portland, 909 F. Supp. 767, 769 (D. Or. 1995) (describing
Pioneer Courthouse Square). This City Park is managed by
Pioneer Courthouse Square of Portland, Inc. (PCSI), a
private, nonprofit corporation.
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In part, the mission of the Square is to provide programs
and events that will draw visitors and enliven the atmosphere
of downtown Portland. The income from the permit fees is an
important component of PCSI’s budget for its management
activities. The City and PCSI used to have a written policy
regarding the protection of free speech rights of persons in the
Square. That policy was declared unconstitutional by this
court in Rohman, and a permanent injunction against its
enforcement was issued on April 6, 1996. Currently, the City
and PCSI do not have a written policy regarding free speech
activities in the Square. People are free to engage in expres-
sive activity at all City Parks, at all times and in all places that
the Parks are open to the public, except to the extent that
people unreasonably interfere with permitted events or violate
some other generally applicable law or regulation.
From July 9 through July 11, 1999, the Kids on the Block
Awareness Program, an Oregon nonprofit corporation, held
an exclusive permit for an event called “Sand in the City” in
the Square. The Kids on the Block Awareness Program uses
puppets to help children accept and understand differences in
one another and learn to protect themselves in difficult situa-
tions. The annual event is intended to raise public awareness
and financial support for the Kids on the Block Awareness
Program’s efforts to educate children. Corporate sponsors
build sand sculptures in the Square for public viewing.
During the event, the Kids on the Block Awareness Program
puppeteers circulated through the Square, demonstrating their
puppet shows and interacting with the children. Also,
performers regularly performed at an entertainment stage.
On Saturday, July 10, 1999, plaintiff Daniel Lee, a fulltime
campus preacher and street preacher, engaged in open air
preaching at the Square. He preached loudly at the people in
the Square, calling them “whores” and telling them that they
were “going to burn in Hell.” Lee was preaching loud enough
that the program coordinator of the Kids on the Block
Awareness Program heard Lee’s preaching over the music of
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an African marimba band performing on the entertainment
stage. People listening to the music were distracted by Lee’s
preaching and complained to Lee and asked him to leave. Lee
left the stage area and moved to the top of a brick wall on the
north side of the Square. Security officers asked Lee to get off
the wall, and Lee did so. Lee continued preaching loudly
from the sidewalk, calling people passing by “whores” and
telling them they were “going to Hell.” Several adults and
children were annoyed and bothered by the volume of Lee’s
preaching. Upon the permittee’s request, security officers
asked Lee to preach less loudly so that his preaching would
not unreasonably interfere with the event. Lee refused to
lower his voice, and the police were called.
Portland police officers approached Lee while he was
preaching and asked him to lower his voice and talk with
them. Lee refused to cooperate with the police officers, and
he continued to preach. Police Officer Shane Nicholson
describes Lee’s preaching as yelling and screaming at the
crowd in the Square. Officer Nicholson estimates that 300
people were in the Square while Lee was preaching. As he
preached, Lee flailed his arms at the crowd, and Lee’s arm
struck Officer Nicholson on the right ear and shoulder. The
police officers arrested Lee and took him into custody. Lee
was cited for harassment, unlawful interference with a
permitted activity, PCC 20.08.060, and failure to obey the
reasonable direction of a park officer. Lee was issued a
30-day park exclusion.
After the quasi-criminal proceeding on Lee’s violation of
PCC 20.08.060, Multnomah County Circuit Court Judge
Henry Kantor declared the city ordinance unconstitutional on
the grounds that one ordinance was overly broad in violation
or the First Amendment and declared the ordinance invalid.
2. Oregon Arena Corporation
Defendant Oregon Arena Corporation (OAC) is a private
corporation that operates the Rose Quarter Commons, which
18a
is an Open air plaza surrounding the Rose Garden Arena,
Memorial Coliseum, One Center Court, and the Garden
Garage. This entire area including the various structures is
referred to as the Rose Quarter. The City owns most of the
real property that the Rose Quarter is located upon. Memorial
Coliseum and two parking garages are also owned by the
City. OAC owns the balance of the structures, including the
Rose Garden Arena, One Center Court and the Garden
Garage. The City owns the real property referred to as the
Rose Quarter Commons.
From January 23, 1993 through June 30, 1997, OAC leased
the Rose Quarter Commons from the City for sole occupation
and use as lessee. The lease required OAC to “permit access
to and free speech on the Plaza as may be required by laws.”
That lease was not renewed, but OAC continues to act as the
exclusive lessee and operator of the Rose Quarter Commons.
OAC rents out portions of the Rose Quarter Commons for
private and public events, and OAC remits 80% of the
revenues from such rentals to the City.
OAC’s general counsel, defendant Michael Fennell, pre-
pared a Code of Conduct, which includes free speech policies
that governs the Rose Quarter Commons. The Code prohibits
anyone from “[yJelling or screaming with the intention of
disturbing persons or disturbing a lawful assembly; or playing
radio’s, musical instruments or any other sound producing or
reproducing equipment which is plainly audible at a distance
of 25 feet.” The Code designates “certain areas which are
available on a first-come, first-served basis for petitioning
and free speech.” In addition to the Code of Conduct, the
OAC has “Petitioning and Free Speech Rules.” The Rules
define free speech as “conduct by a speaker . . . which has a
purpose that is constitutionally protected, including the
dissemination or distribution of expressive material.” The
Rules provide that free speech activity “may occur only
during the hours the Rose Quarter Commons is open to the
19a
public and will not be allowed when the Rose Quarter
Commons is under permit for an event that includes the
petitioning and free speech areas.” Three locations are
designated at the Rose Quarter Commons as areas for peti-
tioning and free speech activities. These areas are approxi-
mately 10 feet by 10 feet in size. OAC selected the locations
of the areas by considering “the size and physical design of
the Rose Quarter Commons, the placement of permanent and
semi-permanent objects on the Rose Quarter Commons and
the need for maintaining an unobstructed traffic flow through,
around, and across the Rose Quarter Commons.” OAC’s
purpose in drafting the Code and the Free Speech Rules was
to provide for “safe and reasonably unobstructed crowd con-
trol,> while still giving individuals the ability to exercise First
Amendment rights to passersby.” OAC’s goal was “to allow
activists or speakers to engage any patrons who wished to
communicate with the speakers, but to do so without
unnecessarily and unsafely obstructing the flow of pedestrian
traffic into and out of the buildings.”
OAC enforces the Code of Conduct and Free Speech Rules
with both in-house security officers and contracted security
personnel. Both the in-house and contracted security officers
are instructed by OAC to impartially and fairly enforce the
Code and the Rules in the Rose Quarter Commons. A variety
of individuals and interest groups have utilized the designated
areas without incident over the past 32 years. However, on
several occasions, patrons of the Rose Quarter Commons
have taken offense at the conduct of plaintiffs while plaintiffs
are engaged in open air preaching both in and out of the
designated areas, and potentially violent confrontations have
occurred between plaintiffs and patrons. OAC believes that it
must protect the safety of both patrons of the Rose Quarter
3 The Rose Garden Arena’s capacity is approximately 20,000 people,
and Memorial Coliseum’s capacity is approximately 11,000 people. At
times, both venues are used simultaneously.
20a
and individuals engaging in free speech activity in the Rose
Quarter Commons. By having designated areas for free
speech activity, OAC believes it is better able to monitor the
situation, to prevent potentially violent confrontations and to
maintain the quality of entertainment that OAC offers at the
Rose Quarter.
Plaintiffs, Daniel Lee, Michael Carr, Edward Gathright,
and Jeremy Sonnier, frequently engage in open air preaching
at the Rose Quarter Commons. Plaintiffs especially prefer to
preach at the Rose Quarter Commons when large events are
occurring at either the Rose Garden Arena or the Memorial
Coliseum. Within the past year, plaintiffs have had numerous
encounters with OAC’s security officers and Portland police
officers involving OAC’s enforcement of its Code of Conduct
and Free Speech Rules.
The parties have submitted witness affidavits describing
the encounters between plaintiffs, and OAC security per-
sonnel and the Portland police. Additionally, plaintiffs have
submitted several videotapes that show plaintiffs preaching
and carrying signs at the Rose Quarter Commons on eight
different occasions. Nearly all of these videotapes show
plaintiffs’ preaching activities at the Rose Quarter Commons
after this lawsuit was filed and, as plaintiffs state on the
videotapes, plaintiffs would usually preach outside the desig-
nated areas when they were videotaping and they would
preach inside the designated areas when they were not
videotaping. In addition to the witness affidavits., some of the
videotapes show encounters between plaintiffs and OAC’s
security personnel and Portland police officers. Several
encounters are described below and are fairly representative
of plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the free speech policy at
the Rose Quarter Commons.
On April 15, 1999, Portland police officers were assigned
to crowd control at the Rose Quarter because more than
30,000 people were expected to attend dual concerts, one at
ee
=-
2la
the Rose Garden Arena and one at Memorial Coliseum.
While observing the crowd between the Rose Garden Arena
and Memorial Coliseum, Sergeant Kim. Adams and Officer
Rob Hawkins received complaints from several young
women that a man was calling them “whores,” “sluts,” and
“Jezebels,” and declaring that they were “going to Hell.” The
police officers advised the women that the man was standing
in a free speech area from which he was permitted to say
anything he desired. The officers told the women to avoid and
ignore the man. After the police officers received several
more complaints and observed that an argument was taking
place between the man and a patron, the officers went to
check out what was happening.
The officers observed Gathright engaged in a heated dis-
cussion with a young man and woman. Another young man
escorting a young woman passed near Gathright, and
Gathright called the woman a “whore,” a “prostitute”, and a
“daughter of Babylon.” The man escorting the woman was
i extremely offended, and a shouting match between the man
and Gathright, followed. The police officers intervened and
attempted to diffuse the situation. Gathright continued to
“provok[e] strangers with language [the officers] believe was
intended to evoke an emotional, if not physical response.”
Concerned about Gathright’s safety, the police officers asked
Gathright to leave the Rose Quarter Commons. Gathright
refused, and the police officers arrested him for disorderly
conduct and removed him from the area. Another police
officer drove Gathright to his car. Gathright claims he was
spit on by one the patrons he engaged with his preaching.
On September 12, 1999, Sonnier was standing near the
fountain at the Rose Quarter Commons but outside of a
designated area. Sonnier was standing with a sign and
engaging in some preaching. Sonnier claims that one man
thanked him for doing what he was doing. An OAC security
officer told Sonnier that he must move to a free speech area.
nore Pe Pee ee) Cen oe ene Cte ene mene Crete RT iid
22a
Sonnier told the security officer that he believed OAC’s
management approved of free speech activities anywhere in
the Rose Quarter Commons when no event was taking place.
Portland police officers were summoned to the Rose Quarter
Commons to assist OAC’s security officers enforce OAC’s
free speech rules. The police officers approached Sonnier
who was still standing outside of a designated area. The
police officers explained to Sonnier that if he wished to
engage in free speech activities at the Rose Quarter Com-
mons, Sonnier would need to move to a designated area or a
public sidewalk. Sonnier did not argue or resist the police
officers. Sonnier was issued an exclusion order, and he left
the Rose Quarter Commons.
On September 17, 1999, at the Rose Quarter Commons,
Jessica Gachupin and her fifteen-year old daughter were
passing out flyers to a music concert, but they were not within
a designated area. OAC’s security officers claim they told
Gachupin that she must either move to a designated area or to
a public sidewalk. Gathright was also at the Rose Quarter
Commons wearing a signboard, which expressed his religious
views. Security officers asked Gathright to move to a free
speech area.
After the security officers’ instructions to move, Gachupin
the flyers from a designated area and the public sidewalks.
Sometime later, she crossed the plaza, and she was by men
with a religious sign, a video camera and religious placards.
She was told by them that she was not allowed to pass out
flyers in the plaza unless she was in a free speech area. She
felt they were angry at her because they thought she was
passing out flyers outside of a designated area. She claims
that the men began to verbally harass her, intending to create
a scene. The men told her she should “become a submissive
wife,” that she should “return to the kitchen,” they referred to
her as a “bloody tampon,” and they told her she was for
passing out the flyers. She was videotaped by the men, and
23a
she asked them to stop and told them she did not give them
permission to tape her. Gachupin’s daughter approached
Gauchupin while the men were harassing her. The men told
Gachupin’s daughter that she was a “whore” for wearing
shorts and a halter top and that she was “going to Hell with
her mother.” Gachupin’s daughter was fearful of the men, and
Gachupin was outraged by their conduct. Gachupin shouted
at the men and grabbed one of their notebooks. Security
officers intervened and removed the most verbal man from
the scene.
As mentioned above, around the time this lawsuit was
filed, plaintiffs began videotaping their preaching sessions at
the Rose Quarter Commons, and plaintiffs submitted six
videotapes of those preaching sessions. Several of the
videotapes show Lee preaching outside the designated areas,
and the videotapes show OAC’s security personnel request
that Lee preach from a designated area. Lee either ignores the
security officer’s request or he tells the officer that he is not
required to preach from the designated area. For example, on
March 7, 2000, Lee preached outside the designated areas
with a megaphone to amplify his voice. A large crowd had
gathered around him and were generally hostile towards Lee
and his preaching. Security officers attempted to remove Lee
from the scene, but Lee flailed his arms at the officers and
told them not to touch him. Lee continued to preach into his
megaphone. The crowd became emboldened, and the crowd
physically and verbally attacked Lee and his cameraman.
However, on other occasions, Lee and other plaintiffs
preached or carried signs outside the designated areas without
security asking them to move to the designated areas.
3. Portland Rose Festival Association
Defendant Portland Rose Festival Association (PRFA) is a
private, not-for-profit corporation qualified for tax-exempt
status under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code.
PRFA’s mission is to promote civic pride and awareness
24a
through numerous civic festival activities produced by PRFA
for the enjoyment of the general public. PRFA’s festival
activities revolve around the symbol of the rose and utilize
the natural beauty of the State of Oregon with an emphasis on
the state’s indigenous flora and fauna. The purpose of the
festival is to provide good, clean, safe, family-oriented
entertainment for patrons of the Rose Festival. PRFA receives
funding from a variety of sources including gate receipts,
private contributions, and sponsorship. PRFA does not
receive contributions from local governments.
PRFA operates a number of different events during the
Rose Festival, including the Festival Center in Waterfront
Park. PRFA obtains a permit from the City to use Waterfront
Park for the Festival Center. PRFA’s permit covers a large
area of Waterfront Park, including the Esplanade. The City
provides the assistance of its traffic department and its police -
department. In large part, a small permanent staff and a large
crew of volunteers staff the Festival Center, and PRFA hires a
private security company to provide security for the Festival
Center. The City plays no significant active role in planning
or managing the Festival Center, except to coordinate the
public safety aspects of PRFA’s events. The City does pro-
vide a larger police presence during the Festival Center, and a
temporary on-site jail is constructed at the Festival Center.
The Rose Festival is an annual event that occurs in June at
locations around the greater Portland metropolitan area. The
Festival Center is located at Waterfront Park, and the main
entrance to the Festival Center is located under the Morrison
Bridge. A significant flow of traffic often occurs at the
location. Also, a fire lane and vehicle access point are located
under the Morrison Bridge.
PRFA’s policy for safety and security for the Festival
Center at Waterfront Park requires that PRFA regulate certain
conduct of patrons of the Festival Center that pose a safety
hazard to other patrons. Conduct that poses a safety hazard to
25a
any patron is prohibited. Certain areas pose greater safety
concerns. Also, hazardous conduct that restricts the flow of
traffic in and out of the Festival Center and vendor tents is
prohibited. PRFA’s security personnel asks persons creating
such safety hazards to move or to conduct themselves in a
manner that does not create a safety hazard.
In June 1999, plaintiff Michael Carr alleges that on three
occasions he was prohibited by PRFA’s security personnel
from entering various locations at the Festival Center. First,
he was stopped from entering a vendor’s tent while wearing a
sideboard, which expressed religious views. The security
officer told Carr that if he removed the signboard, he would
be permitted to enter the tent. Two days later, Carr was
prohibited from walking in front of a music stage while
people were dancing and he was wearing his signboard.
Several days later, a Portland police officer told Carr that he
must remain on the promenade area while wearing a
signboard and that he was prohibited from walking on the
grass area while wearing the signboard.
Carr has been told by PRFA officials that he cannot wear a
signboard in certain areas because of safety concerns such as
restricting aisle ways, access points and crowded areas, and
the possibility that the signboard could be used as a weapon
during an altercation or civil disturbance. Carr has contacted
defendant Vera Katz, Mayor of the City of Portland, about his
problems at the June 1999 Rose Festival.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiffs filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking
permanent injunctive relief against defendants to enjoin
defendants from engaging in “objectionable practices” that
plaintiffs contend violate their constitutional rights of free
expression and free exercise of religion. To prevail on Section
1983 claims, plaintiffs must establish that an action taken
under color of state law has deprived them of rights secured
26a
under the United State Constitution or laws of the United
States. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970). The acts of private parties are sometimes considered
acts taken under color of state law. E.g., George v. Pacific-
CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1081 (1997). Courts construe acts of |
private parties as public acts “sparingly” in order to preserve
individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal judicial
power and law. Mathis v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 75 F.3d
498, 501 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
Inc., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)). Federal courts have applied “joint
action”, “public function”, “state compulsion”, and “close
nexus” tests to determiiie whether the conduct of private
parties should be construed as state action. George, 91 F.3d
at 1230.
1. The City of Portland =
Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction enjoining the City
from enforcing PCC 20.08.060 on the grounds that Judge
Kantor declared the ordinance unconstitutional and invalid.
For his conduct at the Sand in the City event, Lee was
arrested for violating PCC 20.08.060, which provides, in part:
“Tt is unlawful for any person unreasonably to interfere with a
permittee’s use of a Park.” At the quasi-criminal hearing on
the information charging Lee with various violations
including violating PCC 20.08.060, Lee and the City agreed
that the City would offer evidence that Lee was preaching
loudly and flailing his arms wildly on a sidewalk in or
adjacent to the Square during the Sand in the City event,
which was a properly permitted event. The parties also agreed
that Lee would offer evidence that Lee was not interfering,
reasonably or unreasonably, with anyone’s use of the Square.
Lee also asserted that he was not inside the Square.
Instead of resolving any of the factual disputes, Multnomah
County Circuit Court Judge Henry Kantor addressed Lee’s
arguments that the ordinance was “unconstitutionally vague
27a
and/or overbroad because it appears to prohibit free speech
uttered in or near a park.” In a written opinion, the state court
determined that the quasi-criminal proceeding on Lee’s
motion to dismiss the information against him could be
decided “more simply on federal First Amendment over-
breadth grounds.” The state court decided not to address any
arguments made under the Oregon Constitution. Relying on
the three-part test in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 US.
781 (1989), Judge Kantor concluded that while the ordinance
was “obviously content neutral,” the phrase “unreasonably
unreasonably to interfere” was “far too broad to not sweep
into its reach any protected speech, which any permittee, user,
guard, or police officer concludes might be unreasonable.”
The state court concluded that the actual effect of the ordi-
nance is censorship. The state court declared PCC 08.060
to be unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore fai The
City decided not to appeal that decision.
Plaintiffs believe that the City has not repealed PCC
20.08.060. Plaintiffs fear that the invalid ordinance will be
used against them in the future, and therefore, plaintiffs seek
a permanent injunction enjoining the City from enforcing the
ordinance. Prior to Lee’s arrest, the City had not enforced
PCC 20.08.060 against any of the other plaintiffs or any other
person, and after Lee’s successful challenge, the City has not
enforced the ordinance against anyone else. However, at oral
argument, the City stated that it had not decided whether to
continue to enforce PCC 20.08.060, or whether to rewrite the
ordinance. The City raises several arguments against granting
plaintiffs injunctive relief. Primarily, the City argues that the
state court decision declaring PCC 20.08.060 unconstitutional
is wrong in numerous respects, that this court should
conclude that the ordinance is constitutional in light of City of
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 120 S. Ct. 1382 (March 29, 2000), and
that this court should overrule the contrary state court
decision. Both plaintiffs and the City are asking this court to
28a
review the state court decision declaring PCC 20.08.060
unconstitutional in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief
to plaintiffs.
Federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction,
have no authority to review the final determinations of a state
court in judicial proceedings. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (district courts have no power to sit
in direct review of state court decisions); Worldwide Church
of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
Only the United States Supreme Court may take direct review
of state court decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257. This doctrine,
known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, applies even when
the challenged state court decision involves federal consti-
tutional issues, because state courts are as competent as
federal courts to resolve federal constitutional issues. McNair,
805 F.2d at 891. The Supreme Court has explained that when
a district court is presented with a constitutional claim that is
inextricably intertwined with a state court’s decision, then the
district court is in essence being called upon to review the
state court decision. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483-84 (1983).
In general, a case invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
involves one party seeking relief against the other party in
state court; a party is denied the desired relief in state court;
and that party files in federal court a section 1983 action
against the other party seeking the desired relief. The factual
circumstances of this case are unusual: (1) the City brought
an action against one of the plaintiffs, Lee, alleging that he
had violated PCC 20.08.060; (2) Lee challenged the ordi-
nance as unconstitutional and the state court declared PCC
20.08.060 facially unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds;
(3) in the state court proceeding, Lee was the defendant and
the City was the prosecutor; (4) in this federal court pro-
ceeding, the roles are reversed in that Lee is now one of four
plaintiffs and the City is a defendant; (5) Lee succeeded,
rather than failed, in getting-the-relief he desired in the state
ie ere. | ‘
ee ee a ee eee
29a
court proceeding; (6) Lee along with three other plaintiffs are
seeking injunctive relief in federal court to enforce the state
court decision; and (7) the City, as a defendant in this federal
court proceeding, is seeking to reverse the state court
decision. Although this is not a typical Rooker-Feldman case,
the fundamental principle is the same: plaintiffs’ request for
injunctive relief presents a constitutional challenge that is
“inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision, and
resolution of the challenge by this court would require review
of the state court decision. According to the principles
underlying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257, 1 conclude that this court lacks subject matter juris-
diction to address plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief against
the City. In any event, I conclude that plaintiffs’ chances of
success on the merits are remote. Plaintiffs’ claim for injunc-
tive relief against the City is dismissed.
2. The Rose Quarter Commons
Defendant OAC has enforced its Code of Conduct and Free
Speech Rules at the Rose Quarter Commons against plaintiffs
on numerous occasions. As described above, OAC’s security
personnel has requested that plaintiffs engage in free speech
activities only from the designated free speech areas, and
plaintiffs have been asked to leave and arrested for
trespassing for not complying with OAC’s Code and Rules.
Plaintiffs seek to enjoin OAC from enforcing its Code of
Conduct and Free Speech Rules against them while they
are engaging street preaching and carrying signs with
religious messages.
Plaintiffs bring their claim for injunctive relief against
OAC under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Plaintiffs allege that
OAC is a state actor under the public function test because in
policing the Rose Quarter Commons, OAC is performing the
public function of deciding who can use City property. OAC
responds that it is not a state actor under the public function
test or any other applicable test.
30a
Ordinarily, section 1983 liability for violating a person’s
constitutional rights attaches only to the acts of government
officials. Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F. 3d 1114 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 996 (1997). However, private parties may be
held liable under section 1983 and the “public function” test
if the private party performs a function that has been
“traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State. Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
Plaintiff relies on Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966)
for the argument that OAC exercises functions traditionally
and exclusively reserved to the state. In Evans, land was
bequeathed to the Mayor and City Council of Macon, Georgia
as trustee to be used as a park for “white people only.” The
park was managed by a board of managers, and the city
allowed the park to remain segregated for many years.
However, over time, the city took the position that the park
was a public facility, and as such, the city could not manage it
as a segregated park. The members of the board of managers
brought suit to remove the city as trustee and, to appoint a
new trustee to whom title could be transferred. The court
removed the city as trustee and appointed private trustees.
However, the city continued to maintain the park by sweep-
ing, watering and patrolling the park grounds. The Supreme
Court recognized that the city officials were working in
tandem with private actors to perpetuate racial discrimination.
Therefore, the court held that if the city remained entwined in
the management or control of the park, it would remain
subject to the restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiffs have not shown that the City is entwined with the
management or control of the Rose Quarter Commons such
that the City would remain subject to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Moreover, Evans does not address whether the private
actors in that case were state actors based on their conduct.
Evans does not assist plaintiffs’ argument that OAC is a
State actor based on the public function test or any of the
other tests.
a
3la
Plaintiffs also rely on Citizens to End Animal Suffering and
Exploitation, Inc. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, inc., 745 F.
Supp. 65 (D. Mass 1990). In that case, the Faneuil Hall
Marketplace (the Marketplace) leased its land from the city.
Protesters gathered at the Marketplace to pass out leaflets and
to protest the inhumane treatment of calves used for veal. A
commercial tenant complained to the Marketplace security
about the protestors. The Marketplace’s security officers told
the protestors that they could not protest on private property
and asked them to disperse. When the protestors refused to
leave, the police were summoned. Two of the protestors were
arrested for trespassing, although most protestors -dispersed
when the police responded to the Marketplace. The protestors
sued the Marketplace for violations of section 1983, among
other claims.
The court in Citizens to End Animal Suffering concluded
that the sidewalks upon which the protestors were protesting
were encumbered by an easement for public access, and by
determining who could use the public sidewalks, the Market-
place was performing a function more akin to a policeman or
a State legislature.
As the parties have stipulated in this proceeding, OAC
independently owns facilities in the Rose Quarter, and it
exclusively operates the Rose Quarter Commons, which is
City property. At one time, OAC formally leased that
property from the City. Currently, no formal lease has been
executed between the City and OAC. Nonetheless, the City
permits OAC to operate the Rose Quarter Commons in the
same exclusive manner as OAC did under the formal lease.
OAC is the lessee and exclusive operator of the Rose Quarter
Commons. As such, OAC employs in-house and contracted
security personnel to protect the property and to control the
crowds of patrons that visit the Rose Quarter for scheduled
events. There is no evidence that the Rose Quarter Com-
32a
mons is encumbered by an easement for public access,
and plaintiffs’ reliance on Citizens to End Animal Suffering
is misplaced.
In Wade v. Byles, 83 F. 3d 902 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 935 (1996), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that a private security officer employed to provide
security to public property was not performing duties that
transformed him into a state actor. /d. at 905-06. The Wade
court concluded that powers such as carrying a handgun,
arresting people for criminal trespass pending arrival of the
police and using deadly force in self-defense are not powers
that are exclusively reserved to the police. /d. at 906. The
court recognized that those types of powers were commonly
employed by a private security officer on private property. /d.
The court held that the fact the private security officer
performed his duties on public property, or for the public’s
benefit, does not make him a state actor. /d.
Similarly, OAC is a private corporation that employs both
in-house security personnel and contracts with outside
security personnel to staff large events at the Rose Quarter.
The duties those security personnel perform include enforce-
ment of OAC’s Code of Conduct and Free Speech Rules. In
enforcing the Code and the Rules, OAC’s security personnel
performs no greater duties and has no greater powers than the
security officer in Wade. Plaintiffs have failed to show that
OAC and its security personnel are performing any functions
that are exclusively reserved to the state. Plaintiffs have failed
to show that OAC is a state actor based on the public function
test, and the evidence does not support a conclusion that OAC
is a state actor under any of the other tests. Plaintiffs’ Section
1983 claim against OAC is denied.
3. The Portland Rose F: estival Association
During the 1999 Portland Rose Festival, defendant PRFA
enforced its safety regulations against plaintiff Michael Carr
and requested that he not enter certain areas of the Festival
LEE RO, ee Pe de
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33a
Center at Waterfront Park during the Rose Festival while
wearing a signboard. Plaintiffs bring a claim under section
1983 against PRFA for violating their First Amendment
rights. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin PRFA from enforcing safety
regulations that would prohibit plaintiffs from entering any
part of the Festival Center while wearing a signboard with
religious messages. Plaintiffs allege that PRFA is a state actor
under the joint action, public function and close nexus tests.
PRFA disputes that it is a state actor.
Under the joint action test, a private party who willfully
participates with state officials may be considered to have
acted under color of state law within the meaning of section
1983. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). Private
parties may be liable under this joint action test only if their
actions are “inextricably intertwined with those of the gov-
ernment.” Mathis v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Ca., 75 F.3d 498,
503 (9th Cir. 1996). The joint action test is satisfied if state
and private parties agree to violate constitutionally protected
rights. See Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983).
However, more than mere acquiescence is required to
establish that a private party has “intended to join or further”
a conspiracy with a state action. /d.
Similarly, a private party may be a state actor when a
sufficiently close nexus exists between the State and the
action of the private party. Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agr.
Imp. and Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1989). The
Supreme Court has concluded that such a nexus may exist if
the public entity derives such profit from the activities of the _
private party that a symbiotic relationship exists between
the two. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961).
Plaintiffs contend that because PRFA has established
safety regulations based on directives from the Portland
Police Department and the Portland Fire Department, PRFA
is jointly acting with the state in enforcing its safety
34a
regulation. Plaintiffs also argue that PRFA and the City have
a symbiotic relationship in that PRFA receives funds from the
City for the Rose Festival and the City earns money from the
Rose Festival.
PRFA first responds that “if everyone who followed the
diréction of the Fire Marshal were a state actor, [then]
everyone who owns a building in Oregon would be a state
actor, since all buildings must abide by the State Fire Code,
which is enforced by the Fire Marshal.” Similarly, PRFA
responds that “if everyone who follows the direction of the
police were a state actor, virtually everyone in the state would
be a staie actor.”
The Sixth Circuit recently addressed the issue of whether a
festival association was a state actor in the context of a street
preacher engaged in open air preaching at a festival. Lansing
v. City of Memphis, et al., 202 F. 3d 821 (6th Cir. 2000). The
court addressed the issue of whether the festival association
that plans and coordinates the annual Memphis in May
festival was a state actor for the purpose of liability under 42
U.S.C. section 1983. In Lansing, the plaintiff was a street
preacher who engaged in open air preaching at several
Memphis in May festivals from a location near the festival
entrance on a city street between the traffic barricades and the
event barricades. During peak attendance periods, Memphis
in May officials have asked the plaintiff to move 50-300 feet
away from his preferred preaching location. The plaintiff
brought suit against Memphis in May under Section 1983,
alleging that Memphis in May violated his First Amendment
right by making him move away from his preferred preaching
location during the festival.
The Lansing court analyzed whether the festival asso-
ciation was a state actor under the public function, state
compulsion and close nexus tests, and the court concluded
that the festival association was not a state actor under any of
the those tests. With respect to the close nexus test, the court
35a
made the following conclusions: (1) conferring an economic
benefit on the City is insufficient to establish that the festival
association is a state actor; (2) receiving minimal funding
from government sources is not sufficient to convert deci-
sions of the festival association into state action; (3) leasing a
park and contiguous public ways from the City does not
convert the festival association from a private actor to a state
actor; (4) complying with the City’s requirements that the
festival association coordinate with City agencies regarding
the regulation of alcoholic beverages, advertising, traffic and
security at the festival demonstrates the independence of
the City’s operations from the festival’s operations; and (5)
requesting police officers to help enforce the festival
association’s decision to remove a street preacher does not
establish the festival association as a state actor.
The facts of this case are analogous to the facts of Lansing.
PRFA obtains a permit from the City to use Waterfront Park
for its annual Rose Festival. PRFA does not receive any
funding from the City for the Rose Festival. The Rose
Festival does confer an economic benefit on the City. PRFA
coordinates the regulation of certain activities, like traffic and
police assistance with the City’s agencies. However, for the
most part, PRFA plans, coordinates and manages the Rose
Festival without, assistance or input from the City. PRFA
does regulate conduct that poses a safety hazard to Rose
Festival patrons based upon directives from the Portland Fire
Marshal and the Portland Police Department. However, none
of these facts is sufficient to establish PRFA as a state actor
under the close nexus test.
Analyzing the facts of this case under the joint action test,
plaintiffs have also failed to establish an agreement or con-
spiracy between the City and PRFA with respect to the
Portland Rose Festival. The joint action test requires a
substantial degree of cooperation between the state actor and
the private actor. Collins v. Womancare, 878 F. 2d 1145,
36a
1154 (9th Cir. 1989). The City in this case has not “insinuated
itself into a position of interdependence” with PRFA that the
City must be recognized as a joint participant in prohibiting
plaintiffs from wearing signboards in certain areas of the
Festival Center. See Gorenc, 869 F.2d at 507. Similarly, the
facts of this case are, insufficient to conclude under the public
function test that PRFA performs functions that have been
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.
Plaintiffs have failed to show that PRFA is a state actor
under section 1983, and therefore plaintiffs’ section 1983
claim against-PRFA is denied.
This constitutes my Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction (#1 1-1) is denied
as moot, and plaintiffs’ claims for permanent injunctive relief
in their Complaint (#1-1) are dismissed in part and denied
in part.
DATED this 31st day of May, 2000.
/s/ Owen M. Panner
OwEN M. PANNER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.