Appendices — Oregon Arena Corp. v. Lee

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[Filed January 10, 2002]

No. 00-35755

DANIEL LEE; MICHAEL CARR; EDWARD GATHRIGHT;

and JEREMY SONNIER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

V.

VERA KATZ; JAMES FRANCESCONI; CHARLES JORDAN; SHANE

NICHOLSON; STEPHANIE DEKOEYER; JOHN MONTGOMERY;

J.M. PATTERSON; ROBERT HAWKINS; KIMBERLEY ADAMS;

CURTIS CHINN; MACE WINTER; BRIAN DUDDY; STUART

PALMITER; TIMOTHY BACON; OREGON ARENA CORPORA-

TION; MICHAEL FENNELL; PIONEER COURTHOUSE SQUARE,

INC.; and PORTLAND ROSE FESTIVAL ASSOCIATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

Before: DAVID R. THOMPSON, A. WALLACE

TASHIMA, and SUSAN P. GRABER, Circuit Judges.

THOMPSON, Circuit Judge:

The plaintiffs are self-described “street preachers” who

brought this lawsuit in the district court under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 seeking to enjoin the defendants’ alleged violations of

their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to preach the

Gospel of Jesus Christ on the Rose Quarter Commons, an

outdoor area next to city-owned public facilities in the city of

Portland. Only the Oregon Arena Corporation (OAC) and its

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general counsel, Michael Fennell, are parties in this appeal.’

The other defendants were dismissed either voluntarily or

by an order of the district court that the plaintiffs do

not challenge.

The OAC leased the Commons and some of the adjacent

structures from the City of Portland. In connection with its

administration of the leased area, it promulgated policies

regulating speech on the Commons. In general, those policies

regulated the areas on the Commons where public speaking

could occur, the conduct of the speaker and the volume of the

speech. Because the plaintiffs violated the OAC’s public

speech policy, they were excluded from the Commons for

limited periods of time. That prompted this lawsuit.

After a bench trial, the district court granted judgment in

favor of the OAC. The court determined that the OAC was

not a State actor, and thus any abridgment of the plaintiffs’

constitutional rights was not State action within the meaning

of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs appeal.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

reverse. We conclude that, in regulating speech on the Com-

mons, the OAC is a State actor. Thus, the plaintiffs’

§ 1983 action is viable. We remand to the district court for it

to determine whether the restrictions imposed by the OAC’s

public speech policy are reasonable restrictions on the time,

place, and manner of protected speech, and are narrowly

tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. See

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L. Ed.

2d 661, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).

' Both the OAC and Fennell, who joined in the OAC’s appellate brief,

were alleged to be “State actors” who violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional

rights. For purposes of this appeal, we need not consider Fennell’s

potential liability independent of the OAC. Thus, both are referred to as

“the OAC.”

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I

The Rose Quarter Commons is a large open-air plaza in

Portland, Oregon, next to the Rose Garden Arena, Memorial

Coliseum, One Center Court, and three parking garages.

Portland owns the real property on which the Commons is

located, as well as the Coliseum and two of the parking

garages. The OAC, a private corporation, owns the rest of the

structures, the Arena, One Center Court, and Garden Garage.

The OAC has never challenged the plaintiffs’ charac-

terization of the Commons as a traditional public forum. In its

brief, the OAC concedes that “the government may impose

reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on public for a

such as the Rose Quarter Commons.” (Emphasis added).

From January 1993 through June 1997, the OAC leased the

Commons from the City of Portland. The lease required the

OAC to “permit access to and free speech on the Commons

as may be required by laws.” The lease expired and was not

renewed, but the OAC continues to act as the exclusive lessee

of the Commons under terms substantially similar to those of

the lease.

In its administration of the leased area, the OAC prom-

ulgated a Code of Conduct for the Commons that includes

free speech policies. The Code prohibits “yelling or scream-

ing with the intention of disturbing persons or disturbing a

lawful assembly; or playing radios, musical instruments or

any other sound producing or reproducing equipment which

is plainly audible at a distance of 25 feet.” The Code also

prohibits disturbing the peace, acting for the purpose of

disturbing the peace, physically threatening anyone, engaging

in tumultuous behavior, provoking a disturbance, or

embroiling others in open conflict. The OAC’s “Petitioning

and Free Speech Rules” define free speech as “conduct by a

speaker . . . which has a purpose that is constitutionally

protected, including the dissemination or distribution of

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expressive material.” If a person violates the rules, then the

OAC may issue an exclusion order barring him or her from

returning to the Commons for a limited period.

The OAC designated three free speech zones within the

Commons, each approximately 10 feet by 10 feet in size. The

OAC believes that by designating these areas for free speech

activity it is better able to monitor the safety of both patrons

and speakers, in order “to prevent potentially violent con-

frontations and to maintain the quality of entertainment that

the OAC offers at the Rose Quarter.” The OAC also asserts

that this policy prevents speakers from impeding the high-

volume flow of patrons to and from events and parking.

The OAC’s policies were developed, and are administered,

independent of the City of Portland or any other public

entity. The OAC supplied copies of its policies to the

Assistant District Attorney of Multnomah County (which

county encompasses the City of Portland) and to a sergeant

in Portland’s traffic division, but did not solicit any gov-

ernmental comment or approval. The OAC enforces its

policies with both in-house security officers and contracted

security personnel.

The plaintiffs describe themselves as street preachers who

believe it is their religious duty to spread the Gospel of Jesus

Christ by engaging in open-air preaching. Such preaching

includes making oral statements and carrying signs and

banners with religious messages. The plaintiffs engage in this

preaching at various locations, including the Commons. On

several occasions, persons using the Commons have taken

offense at the plaintiffs’ conduct and language. Potentially

violent confrontations have ensued.” The plaintiffs have also,

? For example, on one occasion plaintiff Lee preached so loudly that

his voice could be heard over an African marimba band performing on a

stage in the Commons. He flailed his arms about, called people in the area

whores, and told them they were going to burn in hell. On another occa-

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on occasion, violated the free speech zones. In some

instances, the OAC has issued orders excluding the plaintiffs

from the Commons for specified time periods.

In response to the OAC’s exclusion orders, the plaintiffs

brought this suit seeking injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. After a bench trial based primarily on

stipulated facts, the district court concluded that the OAC, a

private entity, is not a State actor subject to § 1983 liability.

The court determined that the City is not entwined with the

OAC’s management and control of the Commons, the

Commons is not encumbered by an easement for public

access, and the plaintiffs failed to show that the OAC and its

security personnel perform any functions that are exclusively

reserved to the City. The court entered judgment for the

defendants, and this appeai followed.

II

We review de novo the district court’s conclusion that the

OAC is not a State actor and review for clear error its find-

ings of fact. See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 823 (9th Cir.

1997) (mixed questions of law and fact implicating constitu-

tional rights reviewed de novo); Freeman v. Allstate Life Ins.

Co., 253 F.3d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 2001) (findings of fact

reviewed for clear error). The plaintiffs bear the burden of

establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the OAC

is a State actor for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Flagg

Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156, 56 L. Ed. 2d 185, 98

S. Ct. 1729 (1978).

sion, his preaching in a similar manner attracted a crowd that physically

assauited him. Plaintiff Gathright also preached in the Commons, calling a

woman a whore, a prostitute, and a daughter of Babylon, which incited a

shouting match between him and the man escorting the woman.

cams a

RS

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Conduct that is actionable under the Fourteenth Amend-

ment as State action is also action under color of State law

supporting a suit under § 1983. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

457 U.S. 922, 935, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482, 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982).

“State action may be found if, though only if, there is such a

‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that

seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of

the State itself.”” Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary

Sch. Athletics Ass’n., 531 U.S. 288, 295, 148 L. Ed. 2d 807,

121 S. Ct. 924 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan

Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477, 95 S. Ct.

449 (1974)).

“What is fairly attributable [as State action ] is a matter of

normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity. . . .

[No] one fact can function as a necessary condition across

the board . . . nor is any set of circumstances absolutely

sufficient, for there may be some countervailing reason... .”

Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295-96. Because of the fact-intensive

nature of the inquiry, courts have developed a variety of

approaches to the State actor issue. See id. at 296 (listing seven

approaches to the issue including the coercion test, the joint

action test, the public function test, and the entwinement test).

Previously, we expressed uncertainty as to whether satis-

faction of a single test could be sufficient to establish that a

private entity was a State actor. See, e.g., George v. Pacific

CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996) (per

curiam); Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement &

Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1989). However, in

Brentwood, the Court determined that the nominally private

entity whose conduct was challenged was a State actor solely

on the basis that the entity was entwined with the State. The

Court held that satisfaction of this single test was sufficient,

so long as no countervailing factor existed. See Brentwood,

531 U.S. at 304 (“When . . . the relevant facts show perva-

Ta

sive entwinement . . . , the implication of state action is not

affected by pointing out that the facts might not loom large

under a different test.”).°

Applying this same logic here, the plaintiffs argue that the

OAC is a State actor under both the public function test and

what they label the “nexus” test. Because we agree with the

plaintiffs that in regulating free speech within the Commons

the OAC performs an exclusively and traditionally public

function within a public forum, we focus only upon the public

function test. See id. We therefore do not reach the plaintiffs’

argument that the OAC is a State actor under what they label

the “nexus” test.’

Under the public function test, “when private individuals or

groups are endowed by the State with-powers or functions

governmental in nature, they become agencies or instru-

mentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional

limitations.” Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 15 L. Ed.

2d 373, 86 S. Ct. 486 (1966). To satisfy the public function

test, the function at issue must be both traditionally and

exclusively governmental. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.

830, 842, 73 L. Ed. 2d 418, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982).

* Even the four dissenting Justices in Brentwood, who disagreed with

the majority’s conclusion that entwinement alone could establish a private

entity as a State actor, employed a disjunctive analysis to the tests they

would apply to determine whether a private entity is a State actor. See id.

at 305, 309-11 (Justice Thomas dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-

quist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy). -

* We note, however, that in Brentwood the Court treated “nexus” as a

status that is found in all cases where private action is attributable to the

State, whether that attribution is made under the “pervasive entwinement”

test upon which the Court relied in Brentwood, or the public function test

upon which we rely today. See id. at 295-96; see also Blum v. Yaretsky,

457 U.S. 991, 1005, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534, 102 S. Ct. 2777 (1982) (“The

required nexus may be present if the private entity has exercised powers

that are ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.’”) (quoting

Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353).

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The particular public function that the plaintiffs allege the

OAC performed was the regulation of free speech within the

Commons, a public forum.” Previous courts have found this

function to be a traditional and exclusive public function. For

example, in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505-06, 90

L. Ed. 265, 66 S. Ct. 276 (1946), the Court examined whether

a company that regulated speech in a shopping district in its

privately owned town became a State actor. The Court

concluded that it did. The Court explained that “the town and

its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by the

public in general and there is nothing to distinguish them

from any other town and shopping center except the fact that

the title to the property belongs to a private corporation.” /d.

at 503. Given that circumstance, the fact that the property is

private” is not sufficient to justify the State’s permitting a

corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict

their fundamental liberties.” /d. at 509. “Ownership does not

always mean absolute dominion . . . . [Where] facilities are

built and operated primarily to benefit the public . . . their

operation is essentially a public function . . . subject to state

regulation.” /d. at 506; see also Citizens To End Animal

Suffering and Exploiiation, Inc. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace,

Inc., 745 F. Supp. 65 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding that a private

corporation’s regulation of free speech activities on publicly

owned land leased by the corporation was a public function,

where that land was a public forum over which the public

held an easement).

Although not a free speech case, Evans v. Newton, 382

U.S. 296, 15 L. Ed. 2d 373, 86 S. Ct. 486 (1966), is also

instructive because it involved the management by private

trustees of a city-owned park that previously had been

managed by the city. In that case, the Court rejected the

* It is important to identify the function at issue because “an entity may

be a State actor for some purposes but not for others.” George, 91 F.3d

at 1230.

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argument that the transfer of the park to nominally private

control meant that the trustees were not performing a public

function. The Court held, after examining the history and use

of the park, that “the public character of this park requires

that it be treated as a public institution subject to the

command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of who

now has title under state law.” /d. at 302.

Here, the Commons functions as a freely accessible public

forum through which people pass on their way to shows,

concerts, games, and restaurants. The Commons is also a

gathering place for public events. Just three days after this

case was argued, three thousand people gathered at the

Commons for a multi-faith service that was Oregon’s largest

public event in response to the September 11, 2001 “Attack

on America.” See Courtney Thompson, Betsy Hammond, and

Erin H. Barnett, Oregonians Find Comfort, Strength in Many

Faiths, The Oregonian, Sept. 15, 2001, at DI. Moreover, as

we have noted, the character of the Commons as a public

forum is conceded by the OAC.° Thus, the regulation of

speech in the Commons is a public function and the OAC

became a State actor when the City delegated that regulation

to the OAC.

We do not hold that everyone who leases or obtains a

permit to use a state-owned public forum will necessarily

° The character of the Commons as a public forum was also confirmed

in the OAC’s former lease. That lease required the OAC to “permit access

to and free speech on the [Commons] as may be required by laws.” Even

without this former lease provision, however, so long as the Commons is

a public forum, constitutional protections of free speech within it may not

be altered simply because the City has disassociated itself from the OAC’s

policymaking activities. Cf Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.

715, 725, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961) (silence of lease as to

private restaurant’s duty to obey Fourteenth Amendment is not decisive

because “no State may effectively abdicate its [Constitutional] respons-

ibilities by either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge them

whatever the motive may be.”).

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become a State actor. We agree with the Sixth Circuit that,

for example, a street festival organizer given non-exclusive

powers over a traditional public forum does not, in the

absence of other facts, become a State actor when the State

maintains the ultimate power to regulate activities in the

forum. See Lansing v. City of Memphis, 202 F.3d 821, 828-29

(6th Cir. 2000) (“Although [the street festival organizer} had

permission from the city to put its streets to special use during

the time of the festival, the city retained ultimate control of

the streets at all times.”). Here, however, Portland retained

little, if any, power over the OAC’s free speech policies

governing the Commons. The OAC’s functionally exclusive

regulation of free speech within the Commons, a public

forum, is a traditional and exclusive function of the State.

The OAC argues it is not a State actor because, unlike in

Faneuil Hall, 745 F. Supp. at 71, no public easement exists

through the Commons. The absence of such an easement,

however, does not control our analysis, given the reality that

the Commons is a public forum. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at

505 n.2 (determination of State court that company town was

not “dedicated” under law to public use “does not decide the

question under the Federal Constitution” whether company

town is a State actor); Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 301 n.4 (noting

that the State actor determination often emphasizes practical

reality over legal formalities). It is the function of the OAC’s

administration of the Commons that guides and informs our

inquiry, not the precise legal arrangement under which the

OAC leases the area. That “function” is the administration of

free speech rules within a public forum. Cf West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 55-56, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988)

(contract physician is a State actor even though not a State

employee because “it is the physician’s function within the

state system, not the precise terms of his employment, that

determines whether his actions can fairly be attributed to

the State”).

lla

The OAC asserts that the policing of the Commons is not

an exclusive public function, citing Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d

902, 904-06 (7th Cir. 1996). In Wade, the Seventh Circuit

held that a private security guard was not a State actor

because, even though his exercise of limited police powers

over a public housing project was a traditional public

function, it was not an exclusively public one. The present

case, unlike Wade, does not turn on whether the use of

limited police powers on public land is a public function. It

turns on what is quintessentially an exclusive and traditional

public function—the regulation of free speech within a

public forum.

We conclude that, in regulating speech within the Com-

mons, the OAC performs an exclusively and traditionally

public function within a public forum. “There being no

offsetting reason to see the [OAC’s] acts in any other way,”

Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 291, we need not consider whether

the implication of State action would be affected by other

facts that “might not loom large under a different test.” /d. at

303. In regulating free speech within the Commons, the OAC

is a State actor.

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The OAC’s status as a State actor does not end this case,

but it does, for the moment, end this court’s inquiry. The

OAC may still “impose reasonable restrictions on the time,

place, or manner of protected speech [within the Commons],

provided the restrictions ‘are justified without reference to the

content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly

tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that

they leave open ample alternative channels for commu-

nication of the information.’”” Ward v. Rock against Racism,

491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989)

(quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468

U.S. 288, 293, 82 L. Ed. 2d 221, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984)). The

district court did not reach this question, which involves a

factual inquiry best undertaken by that court. ,

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On remand, the district court shall determine whether any

or all of the OAC’s free speech policies and procedures are

reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Although the

district court will, of course, separately evaluate all

challenged aspects of the OAC’s policies and procedures, we

draw its attention in particular to the need for further

factfinding as to the reasonableness of: (1) the noise limits

imposed by the OAC; (2) the rule banning the wearing of

sandwich boards; and (3) the designation of limited free

speech zones, including both the policy in general and its

specific provisions identifying the size, location, and number

of such zones. We express no opinion on the merits of these

issues.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

(Filed May 31, 2000]

CV 00-310-PA

DANIEL LEE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

. £

VERA KATZ, et al.,

Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

PANNER J.

Plaintiffs, Daniel Lee, Michael Carr, Edward Gathright,

and Jeremy Sonnier, filed this action against defendants,

including City of Portland,’ Oregon Arena Corporation,” and

Portland Rose Festival Association. Plaintiffs bring claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants have

violated and continue to violate plaintiffs’ rights to speech as

protected by the First Amendment, that defendants have

violated and continue to violate plaintiffs’ rights to religion as

protected by the First Amendment, that defendants have

' This opinion collectively refers to defendants Vera Katz, James

Francesconi, Charles Jordan, Shane Nicholson, Stephanie Dekoeyer, John

Montgomery, Robert Hawkins, Kimberly Adams, Curtis Chinn, Mace

Winter, Brian Duddy, Timothy Bacon, and Pioneer Courthouse Square,

Inc. as the City of Portland. Defendants J. M. Patterson and Elmer Button,

private security officers contracted to provide security at Pioneer Court-

house Square, have not been served with this action.

? This opinion collectively refers to defendants Oregon Arena Cor-

poration and Michael Fennel as Oregon Arena Corporation.

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violated the Fourth Amendment rights of Lee, Sonnier and

Gathright to be free from unreasonable seizures of their

persons, and that defendants have violated ORS 181.575 by

collecting and maintaining information about plaintiffs. Plain-

tiffs also allege that defendants have breached contracts

between City of Portland, Oregon Arena Corporation and

Portland Rose Festival Association to which plaintiffs are

third party beneficiaries. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declar-

atory relief, compensatory and punitive damages.

On April 5, 2000, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary

injunction, seeking the following relief: (1) suspension of all

exclusions issued by defendants against plaintiffs for plain-

tiffs’ open air preaching; (2) enjoin City of Portland from

enforcing PCC 20.08.060 against plaintiffs while they are

engaged, in open air preaching; (3) enjoin Oregon Arena

Corporation from enforcing its written free speech policy

against plaintiffs while they are engaged in open air preach-

ing at the Rose Quarter; and (4) enjoin Portland Rose Festival

Association from enforcing its regulations that prohibit wear-

ing signboards during the Rose Festival at Waterfront Park.

Defendants opposed the motion for a preliminary injunction.

After reviewing the parties’ submissions on the preliminary

injunction motion, this court determined that no material

factual disputes existed and suggested that the parties submit

the issue of permanent injunctive relief to the court for

resolution at this time. The parties agreed. The court ordered

that the issues of relief be bifurcated such that the issue of

permanent injunctive relief be resolved first, and if neces-

sary, the additional issues of relief would be handled in a

separate proceeding.

The court then conducted a court trial on the merits of

permanent injunctive relief. The parties submitted stipulated

facts. The parties also relied on their witness statements, and

no party requested the opportunity to cross-examine another

party’s witnesses. Additionally, all exhibits submitted by the

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parties were received into evidence without objection. On

May 4, 2000, the court heard oral argument on the legal

issues and requested supplemental briefing. The following

constitutes my Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law. Fed.

R. Civ. Pro. 52(a). For the reasons explained below, I dismiss

in part and deny in part plaintiffs’ claims for permanent

injunctive relief.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiffs are street preachers who believe it is their

religious duty to spread the Gospel of Jesus Christ by

engaging in open air preaching. Open air preaching includes

making oral statements and carrying signs and banners with

religious messages. Open air preaching is an essential part of

plaintiffs’ religious practices, and plaintiffs believe that they

must contact the general public to spread the Christian

Gospel. Plaintiffs engage in open air preaching at various

locations in Portland, including the Pioneer Courthouse

Square, Rose Quarter Commons and Waterfront Park. Plain-

tiffs’ claims for permanent injunctive relief stem from

incidents occurring at those three locations.

1. City of Portland

Defendant City of Portland (the City) maintains a system

of parks for the recreation and enjoyment of the public.

People who want preferential use of a City Park may obtain a

permit for an event. Pioneer Courthouse Square (the Square)

is a City Park in the center of downtown Portland. The Square

is an outdoor brick plaza between Southwest Broadway and

Southwest Sixth Avenue and between Southwest Yamhill

Street and Southwest Morrison Street. See Rohman v. Citv of

Portland, 909 F. Supp. 767, 769 (D. Or. 1995) (describing

Pioneer Courthouse Square). This City Park is managed by

Pioneer Courthouse Square of Portland, Inc. (PCSI), a

private, nonprofit corporation.

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In part, the mission of the Square is to provide programs

and events that will draw visitors and enliven the atmosphere

of downtown Portland. The income from the permit fees is an

important component of PCSI’s budget for its management

activities. The City and PCSI used to have a written policy

regarding the protection of free speech rights of persons in the

Square. That policy was declared unconstitutional by this

court in Rohman, and a permanent injunction against its

enforcement was issued on April 6, 1996. Currently, the City

and PCSI do not have a written policy regarding free speech

activities in the Square. People are free to engage in expres-

sive activity at all City Parks, at all times and in all places that

the Parks are open to the public, except to the extent that

people unreasonably interfere with permitted events or violate

some other generally applicable law or regulation.

From July 9 through July 11, 1999, the Kids on the Block

Awareness Program, an Oregon nonprofit corporation, held

an exclusive permit for an event called “Sand in the City” in

the Square. The Kids on the Block Awareness Program uses

puppets to help children accept and understand differences in

one another and learn to protect themselves in difficult situa-

tions. The annual event is intended to raise public awareness

and financial support for the Kids on the Block Awareness

Program’s efforts to educate children. Corporate sponsors

build sand sculptures in the Square for public viewing.

During the event, the Kids on the Block Awareness Program

puppeteers circulated through the Square, demonstrating their

puppet shows and interacting with the children. Also,

performers regularly performed at an entertainment stage.

On Saturday, July 10, 1999, plaintiff Daniel Lee, a fulltime

campus preacher and street preacher, engaged in open air

preaching at the Square. He preached loudly at the people in

the Square, calling them “whores” and telling them that they

were “going to burn in Hell.” Lee was preaching loud enough

that the program coordinator of the Kids on the Block

Awareness Program heard Lee’s preaching over the music of

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an African marimba band performing on the entertainment

stage. People listening to the music were distracted by Lee’s

preaching and complained to Lee and asked him to leave. Lee

left the stage area and moved to the top of a brick wall on the

north side of the Square. Security officers asked Lee to get off

the wall, and Lee did so. Lee continued preaching loudly

from the sidewalk, calling people passing by “whores” and

telling them they were “going to Hell.” Several adults and

children were annoyed and bothered by the volume of Lee’s

preaching. Upon the permittee’s request, security officers

asked Lee to preach less loudly so that his preaching would

not unreasonably interfere with the event. Lee refused to

lower his voice, and the police were called.

Portland police officers approached Lee while he was

preaching and asked him to lower his voice and talk with

them. Lee refused to cooperate with the police officers, and

he continued to preach. Police Officer Shane Nicholson

describes Lee’s preaching as yelling and screaming at the

crowd in the Square. Officer Nicholson estimates that 300

people were in the Square while Lee was preaching. As he

preached, Lee flailed his arms at the crowd, and Lee’s arm

struck Officer Nicholson on the right ear and shoulder. The

police officers arrested Lee and took him into custody. Lee

was cited for harassment, unlawful interference with a

permitted activity, PCC 20.08.060, and failure to obey the

reasonable direction of a park officer. Lee was issued a

30-day park exclusion.

After the quasi-criminal proceeding on Lee’s violation of

PCC 20.08.060, Multnomah County Circuit Court Judge

Henry Kantor declared the city ordinance unconstitutional on

the grounds that one ordinance was overly broad in violation

or the First Amendment and declared the ordinance invalid.

2. Oregon Arena Corporation

Defendant Oregon Arena Corporation (OAC) is a private

corporation that operates the Rose Quarter Commons, which

18a

is an Open air plaza surrounding the Rose Garden Arena,

Memorial Coliseum, One Center Court, and the Garden

Garage. This entire area including the various structures is

referred to as the Rose Quarter. The City owns most of the

real property that the Rose Quarter is located upon. Memorial

Coliseum and two parking garages are also owned by the

City. OAC owns the balance of the structures, including the

Rose Garden Arena, One Center Court and the Garden

Garage. The City owns the real property referred to as the

Rose Quarter Commons.

From January 23, 1993 through June 30, 1997, OAC leased

the Rose Quarter Commons from the City for sole occupation

and use as lessee. The lease required OAC to “permit access

to and free speech on the Plaza as may be required by laws.”

That lease was not renewed, but OAC continues to act as the

exclusive lessee and operator of the Rose Quarter Commons.

OAC rents out portions of the Rose Quarter Commons for

private and public events, and OAC remits 80% of the

revenues from such rentals to the City.

OAC’s general counsel, defendant Michael Fennell, pre-

pared a Code of Conduct, which includes free speech policies

that governs the Rose Quarter Commons. The Code prohibits

anyone from “[yJelling or screaming with the intention of

disturbing persons or disturbing a lawful assembly; or playing

radio’s, musical instruments or any other sound producing or

reproducing equipment which is plainly audible at a distance

of 25 feet.” The Code designates “certain areas which are

available on a first-come, first-served basis for petitioning

and free speech.” In addition to the Code of Conduct, the

OAC has “Petitioning and Free Speech Rules.” The Rules

define free speech as “conduct by a speaker . . . which has a

purpose that is constitutionally protected, including the

dissemination or distribution of expressive material.” The

Rules provide that free speech activity “may occur only

during the hours the Rose Quarter Commons is open to the

19a

public and will not be allowed when the Rose Quarter

Commons is under permit for an event that includes the

petitioning and free speech areas.” Three locations are

designated at the Rose Quarter Commons as areas for peti-

tioning and free speech activities. These areas are approxi-

mately 10 feet by 10 feet in size. OAC selected the locations

of the areas by considering “the size and physical design of

the Rose Quarter Commons, the placement of permanent and

semi-permanent objects on the Rose Quarter Commons and

the need for maintaining an unobstructed traffic flow through,

around, and across the Rose Quarter Commons.” OAC’s

purpose in drafting the Code and the Free Speech Rules was

to provide for “safe and reasonably unobstructed crowd con-

trol,> while still giving individuals the ability to exercise First

Amendment rights to passersby.” OAC’s goal was “to allow

activists or speakers to engage any patrons who wished to

communicate with the speakers, but to do so without

unnecessarily and unsafely obstructing the flow of pedestrian

traffic into and out of the buildings.”

OAC enforces the Code of Conduct and Free Speech Rules

with both in-house security officers and contracted security

personnel. Both the in-house and contracted security officers

are instructed by OAC to impartially and fairly enforce the

Code and the Rules in the Rose Quarter Commons. A variety

of individuals and interest groups have utilized the designated

areas without incident over the past 32 years. However, on

several occasions, patrons of the Rose Quarter Commons

have taken offense at the conduct of plaintiffs while plaintiffs

are engaged in open air preaching both in and out of the

designated areas, and potentially violent confrontations have

occurred between plaintiffs and patrons. OAC believes that it

must protect the safety of both patrons of the Rose Quarter

3 The Rose Garden Arena’s capacity is approximately 20,000 people,

and Memorial Coliseum’s capacity is approximately 11,000 people. At

times, both venues are used simultaneously.

20a

and individuals engaging in free speech activity in the Rose

Quarter Commons. By having designated areas for free

speech activity, OAC believes it is better able to monitor the

situation, to prevent potentially violent confrontations and to

maintain the quality of entertainment that OAC offers at the

Rose Quarter.

Plaintiffs, Daniel Lee, Michael Carr, Edward Gathright,

and Jeremy Sonnier, frequently engage in open air preaching

at the Rose Quarter Commons. Plaintiffs especially prefer to

preach at the Rose Quarter Commons when large events are

occurring at either the Rose Garden Arena or the Memorial

Coliseum. Within the past year, plaintiffs have had numerous

encounters with OAC’s security officers and Portland police

officers involving OAC’s enforcement of its Code of Conduct

and Free Speech Rules.

The parties have submitted witness affidavits describing

the encounters between plaintiffs, and OAC security per-

sonnel and the Portland police. Additionally, plaintiffs have

submitted several videotapes that show plaintiffs preaching

and carrying signs at the Rose Quarter Commons on eight

different occasions. Nearly all of these videotapes show

plaintiffs’ preaching activities at the Rose Quarter Commons

after this lawsuit was filed and, as plaintiffs state on the

videotapes, plaintiffs would usually preach outside the desig-

nated areas when they were videotaping and they would

preach inside the designated areas when they were not

videotaping. In addition to the witness affidavits., some of the

videotapes show encounters between plaintiffs and OAC’s

security personnel and Portland police officers. Several

encounters are described below and are fairly representative

of plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the free speech policy at

the Rose Quarter Commons.

On April 15, 1999, Portland police officers were assigned

to crowd control at the Rose Quarter because more than

30,000 people were expected to attend dual concerts, one at

ee

=-

2la

the Rose Garden Arena and one at Memorial Coliseum.

While observing the crowd between the Rose Garden Arena

and Memorial Coliseum, Sergeant Kim. Adams and Officer

Rob Hawkins received complaints from several young

women that a man was calling them “whores,” “sluts,” and

“Jezebels,” and declaring that they were “going to Hell.” The

police officers advised the women that the man was standing

in a free speech area from which he was permitted to say

anything he desired. The officers told the women to avoid and

ignore the man. After the police officers received several

more complaints and observed that an argument was taking

place between the man and a patron, the officers went to

check out what was happening.

The officers observed Gathright engaged in a heated dis-

cussion with a young man and woman. Another young man

escorting a young woman passed near Gathright, and

Gathright called the woman a “whore,” a “prostitute”, and a

“daughter of Babylon.” The man escorting the woman was

i extremely offended, and a shouting match between the man

and Gathright, followed. The police officers intervened and

attempted to diffuse the situation. Gathright continued to

“provok[e] strangers with language [the officers] believe was

intended to evoke an emotional, if not physical response.”

Concerned about Gathright’s safety, the police officers asked

Gathright to leave the Rose Quarter Commons. Gathright

refused, and the police officers arrested him for disorderly

conduct and removed him from the area. Another police

officer drove Gathright to his car. Gathright claims he was

spit on by one the patrons he engaged with his preaching.

On September 12, 1999, Sonnier was standing near the

fountain at the Rose Quarter Commons but outside of a

designated area. Sonnier was standing with a sign and

engaging in some preaching. Sonnier claims that one man

thanked him for doing what he was doing. An OAC security

officer told Sonnier that he must move to a free speech area.

nore Pe Pee ee) Cen oe ene Cte ene mene Crete RT iid

22a

Sonnier told the security officer that he believed OAC’s

management approved of free speech activities anywhere in

the Rose Quarter Commons when no event was taking place.

Portland police officers were summoned to the Rose Quarter

Commons to assist OAC’s security officers enforce OAC’s

free speech rules. The police officers approached Sonnier

who was still standing outside of a designated area. The

police officers explained to Sonnier that if he wished to

engage in free speech activities at the Rose Quarter Com-

mons, Sonnier would need to move to a designated area or a

public sidewalk. Sonnier did not argue or resist the police

officers. Sonnier was issued an exclusion order, and he left

the Rose Quarter Commons.

On September 17, 1999, at the Rose Quarter Commons,

Jessica Gachupin and her fifteen-year old daughter were

passing out flyers to a music concert, but they were not within

a designated area. OAC’s security officers claim they told

Gachupin that she must either move to a designated area or to

a public sidewalk. Gathright was also at the Rose Quarter

Commons wearing a signboard, which expressed his religious

views. Security officers asked Gathright to move to a free

speech area.

After the security officers’ instructions to move, Gachupin

the flyers from a designated area and the public sidewalks.

Sometime later, she crossed the plaza, and she was by men

with a religious sign, a video camera and religious placards.

She was told by them that she was not allowed to pass out

flyers in the plaza unless she was in a free speech area. She

felt they were angry at her because they thought she was

passing out flyers outside of a designated area. She claims

that the men began to verbally harass her, intending to create

a scene. The men told her she should “become a submissive

wife,” that she should “return to the kitchen,” they referred to

her as a “bloody tampon,” and they told her she was for

passing out the flyers. She was videotaped by the men, and

23a

she asked them to stop and told them she did not give them

permission to tape her. Gachupin’s daughter approached

Gauchupin while the men were harassing her. The men told

Gachupin’s daughter that she was a “whore” for wearing

shorts and a halter top and that she was “going to Hell with

her mother.” Gachupin’s daughter was fearful of the men, and

Gachupin was outraged by their conduct. Gachupin shouted

at the men and grabbed one of their notebooks. Security

officers intervened and removed the most verbal man from

the scene.

As mentioned above, around the time this lawsuit was

filed, plaintiffs began videotaping their preaching sessions at

the Rose Quarter Commons, and plaintiffs submitted six

videotapes of those preaching sessions. Several of the

videotapes show Lee preaching outside the designated areas,

and the videotapes show OAC’s security personnel request

that Lee preach from a designated area. Lee either ignores the

security officer’s request or he tells the officer that he is not

required to preach from the designated area. For example, on

March 7, 2000, Lee preached outside the designated areas

with a megaphone to amplify his voice. A large crowd had

gathered around him and were generally hostile towards Lee

and his preaching. Security officers attempted to remove Lee

from the scene, but Lee flailed his arms at the officers and

told them not to touch him. Lee continued to preach into his

megaphone. The crowd became emboldened, and the crowd

physically and verbally attacked Lee and his cameraman.

However, on other occasions, Lee and other plaintiffs

preached or carried signs outside the designated areas without

security asking them to move to the designated areas.

3. Portland Rose Festival Association

Defendant Portland Rose Festival Association (PRFA) is a

private, not-for-profit corporation qualified for tax-exempt

status under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code.

PRFA’s mission is to promote civic pride and awareness

24a

through numerous civic festival activities produced by PRFA

for the enjoyment of the general public. PRFA’s festival

activities revolve around the symbol of the rose and utilize

the natural beauty of the State of Oregon with an emphasis on

the state’s indigenous flora and fauna. The purpose of the

festival is to provide good, clean, safe, family-oriented

entertainment for patrons of the Rose Festival. PRFA receives

funding from a variety of sources including gate receipts,

private contributions, and sponsorship. PRFA does not

receive contributions from local governments.

PRFA operates a number of different events during the

Rose Festival, including the Festival Center in Waterfront

Park. PRFA obtains a permit from the City to use Waterfront

Park for the Festival Center. PRFA’s permit covers a large

area of Waterfront Park, including the Esplanade. The City

provides the assistance of its traffic department and its police -

department. In large part, a small permanent staff and a large

crew of volunteers staff the Festival Center, and PRFA hires a

private security company to provide security for the Festival

Center. The City plays no significant active role in planning

or managing the Festival Center, except to coordinate the

public safety aspects of PRFA’s events. The City does pro-

vide a larger police presence during the Festival Center, and a

temporary on-site jail is constructed at the Festival Center.

The Rose Festival is an annual event that occurs in June at

locations around the greater Portland metropolitan area. The

Festival Center is located at Waterfront Park, and the main

entrance to the Festival Center is located under the Morrison

Bridge. A significant flow of traffic often occurs at the

location. Also, a fire lane and vehicle access point are located

under the Morrison Bridge.

PRFA’s policy for safety and security for the Festival

Center at Waterfront Park requires that PRFA regulate certain

conduct of patrons of the Festival Center that pose a safety

hazard to other patrons. Conduct that poses a safety hazard to

25a

any patron is prohibited. Certain areas pose greater safety

concerns. Also, hazardous conduct that restricts the flow of

traffic in and out of the Festival Center and vendor tents is

prohibited. PRFA’s security personnel asks persons creating

such safety hazards to move or to conduct themselves in a

manner that does not create a safety hazard.

In June 1999, plaintiff Michael Carr alleges that on three

occasions he was prohibited by PRFA’s security personnel

from entering various locations at the Festival Center. First,

he was stopped from entering a vendor’s tent while wearing a

sideboard, which expressed religious views. The security

officer told Carr that if he removed the signboard, he would

be permitted to enter the tent. Two days later, Carr was

prohibited from walking in front of a music stage while

people were dancing and he was wearing his signboard.

Several days later, a Portland police officer told Carr that he

must remain on the promenade area while wearing a

signboard and that he was prohibited from walking on the

grass area while wearing the signboard.

Carr has been told by PRFA officials that he cannot wear a

signboard in certain areas because of safety concerns such as

restricting aisle ways, access points and crowded areas, and

the possibility that the signboard could be used as a weapon

during an altercation or civil disturbance. Carr has contacted

defendant Vera Katz, Mayor of the City of Portland, about his

problems at the June 1999 Rose Festival.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking

permanent injunctive relief against defendants to enjoin

defendants from engaging in “objectionable practices” that

plaintiffs contend violate their constitutional rights of free

expression and free exercise of religion. To prevail on Section

1983 claims, plaintiffs must establish that an action taken

under color of state law has deprived them of rights secured

26a

under the United State Constitution or laws of the United

States. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150

(1970). The acts of private parties are sometimes considered

acts taken under color of state law. E.g., George v. Pacific-

CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996),

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1081 (1997). Courts construe acts of |

private parties as public acts “sparingly” in order to preserve

individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal judicial

power and law. Mathis v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 75 F.3d

498, 501 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

Inc., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)). Federal courts have applied “joint

action”, “public function”, “state compulsion”, and “close

nexus” tests to determiiie whether the conduct of private

parties should be construed as state action. George, 91 F.3d

at 1230.

1. The City of Portland =

Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction enjoining the City

from enforcing PCC 20.08.060 on the grounds that Judge

Kantor declared the ordinance unconstitutional and invalid.

For his conduct at the Sand in the City event, Lee was

arrested for violating PCC 20.08.060, which provides, in part:

“Tt is unlawful for any person unreasonably to interfere with a

permittee’s use of a Park.” At the quasi-criminal hearing on

the information charging Lee with various violations

including violating PCC 20.08.060, Lee and the City agreed

that the City would offer evidence that Lee was preaching

loudly and flailing his arms wildly on a sidewalk in or

adjacent to the Square during the Sand in the City event,

which was a properly permitted event. The parties also agreed

that Lee would offer evidence that Lee was not interfering,

reasonably or unreasonably, with anyone’s use of the Square.

Lee also asserted that he was not inside the Square.

Instead of resolving any of the factual disputes, Multnomah

County Circuit Court Judge Henry Kantor addressed Lee’s

arguments that the ordinance was “unconstitutionally vague

27a

and/or overbroad because it appears to prohibit free speech

uttered in or near a park.” In a written opinion, the state court

determined that the quasi-criminal proceeding on Lee’s

motion to dismiss the information against him could be

decided “more simply on federal First Amendment over-

breadth grounds.” The state court decided not to address any

arguments made under the Oregon Constitution. Relying on

the three-part test in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 US.

781 (1989), Judge Kantor concluded that while the ordinance

was “obviously content neutral,” the phrase “unreasonably

unreasonably to interfere” was “far too broad to not sweep

into its reach any protected speech, which any permittee, user,

guard, or police officer concludes might be unreasonable.”

The state court concluded that the actual effect of the ordi-

nance is censorship. The state court declared PCC 08.060

to be unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore fai The

City decided not to appeal that decision.

Plaintiffs believe that the City has not repealed PCC

20.08.060. Plaintiffs fear that the invalid ordinance will be

used against them in the future, and therefore, plaintiffs seek

a permanent injunction enjoining the City from enforcing the

ordinance. Prior to Lee’s arrest, the City had not enforced

PCC 20.08.060 against any of the other plaintiffs or any other

person, and after Lee’s successful challenge, the City has not

enforced the ordinance against anyone else. However, at oral

argument, the City stated that it had not decided whether to

continue to enforce PCC 20.08.060, or whether to rewrite the

ordinance. The City raises several arguments against granting

plaintiffs injunctive relief. Primarily, the City argues that the

state court decision declaring PCC 20.08.060 unconstitutional

is wrong in numerous respects, that this court should

conclude that the ordinance is constitutional in light of City of

Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 120 S. Ct. 1382 (March 29, 2000), and

that this court should overrule the contrary state court

decision. Both plaintiffs and the City are asking this court to

28a

review the state court decision declaring PCC 20.08.060

unconstitutional in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief

to plaintiffs.

Federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction,

have no authority to review the final determinations of a state

court in judicial proceedings. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust

Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (district courts have no power to sit

in direct review of state court decisions); Worldwide Church

of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).

Only the United States Supreme Court may take direct review

of state court decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257. This doctrine,

known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, applies even when

the challenged state court decision involves federal consti-

tutional issues, because state courts are as competent as

federal courts to resolve federal constitutional issues. McNair,

805 F.2d at 891. The Supreme Court has explained that when

a district court is presented with a constitutional claim that is

inextricably intertwined with a state court’s decision, then the

district court is in essence being called upon to review the

state court decision. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483-84 (1983).

In general, a case invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

involves one party seeking relief against the other party in

state court; a party is denied the desired relief in state court;

and that party files in federal court a section 1983 action

against the other party seeking the desired relief. The factual

circumstances of this case are unusual: (1) the City brought

an action against one of the plaintiffs, Lee, alleging that he

had violated PCC 20.08.060; (2) Lee challenged the ordi-

nance as unconstitutional and the state court declared PCC

20.08.060 facially unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds;

(3) in the state court proceeding, Lee was the defendant and

the City was the prosecutor; (4) in this federal court pro-

ceeding, the roles are reversed in that Lee is now one of four

plaintiffs and the City is a defendant; (5) Lee succeeded,

rather than failed, in getting-the-relief he desired in the state

ie ere. | ‘

ee ee a ee eee

29a

court proceeding; (6) Lee along with three other plaintiffs are

seeking injunctive relief in federal court to enforce the state

court decision; and (7) the City, as a defendant in this federal

court proceeding, is seeking to reverse the state court

decision. Although this is not a typical Rooker-Feldman case,

the fundamental principle is the same: plaintiffs’ request for

injunctive relief presents a constitutional challenge that is

“inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision, and

resolution of the challenge by this court would require review

of the state court decision. According to the principles

underlying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257, 1 conclude that this court lacks subject matter juris-

diction to address plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief against

the City. In any event, I conclude that plaintiffs’ chances of

success on the merits are remote. Plaintiffs’ claim for injunc-

tive relief against the City is dismissed.

2. The Rose Quarter Commons

Defendant OAC has enforced its Code of Conduct and Free

Speech Rules at the Rose Quarter Commons against plaintiffs

on numerous occasions. As described above, OAC’s security

personnel has requested that plaintiffs engage in free speech

activities only from the designated free speech areas, and

plaintiffs have been asked to leave and arrested for

trespassing for not complying with OAC’s Code and Rules.

Plaintiffs seek to enjoin OAC from enforcing its Code of

Conduct and Free Speech Rules against them while they

are engaging street preaching and carrying signs with

religious messages.

Plaintiffs bring their claim for injunctive relief against

OAC under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Plaintiffs allege that

OAC is a state actor under the public function test because in

policing the Rose Quarter Commons, OAC is performing the

public function of deciding who can use City property. OAC

responds that it is not a state actor under the public function

test or any other applicable test.

30a

Ordinarily, section 1983 liability for violating a person’s

constitutional rights attaches only to the acts of government

officials. Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F. 3d 1114 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 522 U.S. 996 (1997). However, private parties may be

held liable under section 1983 and the “public function” test

if the private party performs a function that has been

“traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State. Rendell-

Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).

Plaintiff relies on Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966)

for the argument that OAC exercises functions traditionally

and exclusively reserved to the state. In Evans, land was

bequeathed to the Mayor and City Council of Macon, Georgia

as trustee to be used as a park for “white people only.” The

park was managed by a board of managers, and the city

allowed the park to remain segregated for many years.

However, over time, the city took the position that the park

was a public facility, and as such, the city could not manage it

as a segregated park. The members of the board of managers

brought suit to remove the city as trustee and, to appoint a

new trustee to whom title could be transferred. The court

removed the city as trustee and appointed private trustees.

However, the city continued to maintain the park by sweep-

ing, watering and patrolling the park grounds. The Supreme

Court recognized that the city officials were working in

tandem with private actors to perpetuate racial discrimination.

Therefore, the court held that if the city remained entwined in

the management or control of the park, it would remain

subject to the restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiffs have not shown that the City is entwined with the

management or control of the Rose Quarter Commons such

that the City would remain subject to the Fourteenth Amend-

ment. Moreover, Evans does not address whether the private

actors in that case were state actors based on their conduct.

Evans does not assist plaintiffs’ argument that OAC is a

State actor based on the public function test or any of the

other tests.

a

3la

Plaintiffs also rely on Citizens to End Animal Suffering and

Exploitation, Inc. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, inc., 745 F.

Supp. 65 (D. Mass 1990). In that case, the Faneuil Hall

Marketplace (the Marketplace) leased its land from the city.

Protesters gathered at the Marketplace to pass out leaflets and

to protest the inhumane treatment of calves used for veal. A

commercial tenant complained to the Marketplace security

about the protestors. The Marketplace’s security officers told

the protestors that they could not protest on private property

and asked them to disperse. When the protestors refused to

leave, the police were summoned. Two of the protestors were

arrested for trespassing, although most protestors -dispersed

when the police responded to the Marketplace. The protestors

sued the Marketplace for violations of section 1983, among

other claims.

The court in Citizens to End Animal Suffering concluded

that the sidewalks upon which the protestors were protesting

were encumbered by an easement for public access, and by

determining who could use the public sidewalks, the Market-

place was performing a function more akin to a policeman or

a State legislature.

As the parties have stipulated in this proceeding, OAC

independently owns facilities in the Rose Quarter, and it

exclusively operates the Rose Quarter Commons, which is

City property. At one time, OAC formally leased that

property from the City. Currently, no formal lease has been

executed between the City and OAC. Nonetheless, the City

permits OAC to operate the Rose Quarter Commons in the

same exclusive manner as OAC did under the formal lease.

OAC is the lessee and exclusive operator of the Rose Quarter

Commons. As such, OAC employs in-house and contracted

security personnel to protect the property and to control the

crowds of patrons that visit the Rose Quarter for scheduled

events. There is no evidence that the Rose Quarter Com-

32a

mons is encumbered by an easement for public access,

and plaintiffs’ reliance on Citizens to End Animal Suffering

is misplaced.

In Wade v. Byles, 83 F. 3d 902 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 519

U.S. 935 (1996), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

concluded that a private security officer employed to provide

security to public property was not performing duties that

transformed him into a state actor. /d. at 905-06. The Wade

court concluded that powers such as carrying a handgun,

arresting people for criminal trespass pending arrival of the

police and using deadly force in self-defense are not powers

that are exclusively reserved to the police. /d. at 906. The

court recognized that those types of powers were commonly

employed by a private security officer on private property. /d.

The court held that the fact the private security officer

performed his duties on public property, or for the public’s

benefit, does not make him a state actor. /d.

Similarly, OAC is a private corporation that employs both

in-house security personnel and contracts with outside

security personnel to staff large events at the Rose Quarter.

The duties those security personnel perform include enforce-

ment of OAC’s Code of Conduct and Free Speech Rules. In

enforcing the Code and the Rules, OAC’s security personnel

performs no greater duties and has no greater powers than the

security officer in Wade. Plaintiffs have failed to show that

OAC and its security personnel are performing any functions

that are exclusively reserved to the state. Plaintiffs have failed

to show that OAC is a state actor based on the public function

test, and the evidence does not support a conclusion that OAC

is a state actor under any of the other tests. Plaintiffs’ Section

1983 claim against OAC is denied.

3. The Portland Rose F: estival Association

During the 1999 Portland Rose Festival, defendant PRFA

enforced its safety regulations against plaintiff Michael Carr

and requested that he not enter certain areas of the Festival

LEE RO, ee Pe de

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33a

Center at Waterfront Park during the Rose Festival while

wearing a signboard. Plaintiffs bring a claim under section

1983 against PRFA for violating their First Amendment

rights. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin PRFA from enforcing safety

regulations that would prohibit plaintiffs from entering any

part of the Festival Center while wearing a signboard with

religious messages. Plaintiffs allege that PRFA is a state actor

under the joint action, public function and close nexus tests.

PRFA disputes that it is a state actor.

Under the joint action test, a private party who willfully

participates with state officials may be considered to have

acted under color of state law within the meaning of section

1983. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). Private

parties may be liable under this joint action test only if their

actions are “inextricably intertwined with those of the gov-

ernment.” Mathis v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Ca., 75 F.3d 498,

503 (9th Cir. 1996). The joint action test is satisfied if state

and private parties agree to violate constitutionally protected

rights. See Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983).

However, more than mere acquiescence is required to

establish that a private party has “intended to join or further”

a conspiracy with a state action. /d.

Similarly, a private party may be a state actor when a

sufficiently close nexus exists between the State and the

action of the private party. Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agr.

Imp. and Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1989). The

Supreme Court has concluded that such a nexus may exist if

the public entity derives such profit from the activities of the _

private party that a symbiotic relationship exists between

the two. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.

715 (1961).

Plaintiffs contend that because PRFA has established

safety regulations based on directives from the Portland

Police Department and the Portland Fire Department, PRFA

is jointly acting with the state in enforcing its safety

34a

regulation. Plaintiffs also argue that PRFA and the City have

a symbiotic relationship in that PRFA receives funds from the

City for the Rose Festival and the City earns money from the

Rose Festival.

PRFA first responds that “if everyone who followed the

diréction of the Fire Marshal were a state actor, [then]

everyone who owns a building in Oregon would be a state

actor, since all buildings must abide by the State Fire Code,

which is enforced by the Fire Marshal.” Similarly, PRFA

responds that “if everyone who follows the direction of the

police were a state actor, virtually everyone in the state would

be a staie actor.”

The Sixth Circuit recently addressed the issue of whether a

festival association was a state actor in the context of a street

preacher engaged in open air preaching at a festival. Lansing

v. City of Memphis, et al., 202 F. 3d 821 (6th Cir. 2000). The

court addressed the issue of whether the festival association

that plans and coordinates the annual Memphis in May

festival was a state actor for the purpose of liability under 42

U.S.C. section 1983. In Lansing, the plaintiff was a street

preacher who engaged in open air preaching at several

Memphis in May festivals from a location near the festival

entrance on a city street between the traffic barricades and the

event barricades. During peak attendance periods, Memphis

in May officials have asked the plaintiff to move 50-300 feet

away from his preferred preaching location. The plaintiff

brought suit against Memphis in May under Section 1983,

alleging that Memphis in May violated his First Amendment

right by making him move away from his preferred preaching

location during the festival.

The Lansing court analyzed whether the festival asso-

ciation was a state actor under the public function, state

compulsion and close nexus tests, and the court concluded

that the festival association was not a state actor under any of

the those tests. With respect to the close nexus test, the court

35a

made the following conclusions: (1) conferring an economic

benefit on the City is insufficient to establish that the festival

association is a state actor; (2) receiving minimal funding

from government sources is not sufficient to convert deci-

sions of the festival association into state action; (3) leasing a

park and contiguous public ways from the City does not

convert the festival association from a private actor to a state

actor; (4) complying with the City’s requirements that the

festival association coordinate with City agencies regarding

the regulation of alcoholic beverages, advertising, traffic and

security at the festival demonstrates the independence of

the City’s operations from the festival’s operations; and (5)

requesting police officers to help enforce the festival

association’s decision to remove a street preacher does not

establish the festival association as a state actor.

The facts of this case are analogous to the facts of Lansing.

PRFA obtains a permit from the City to use Waterfront Park

for its annual Rose Festival. PRFA does not receive any

funding from the City for the Rose Festival. The Rose

Festival does confer an economic benefit on the City. PRFA

coordinates the regulation of certain activities, like traffic and

police assistance with the City’s agencies. However, for the

most part, PRFA plans, coordinates and manages the Rose

Festival without, assistance or input from the City. PRFA

does regulate conduct that poses a safety hazard to Rose

Festival patrons based upon directives from the Portland Fire

Marshal and the Portland Police Department. However, none

of these facts is sufficient to establish PRFA as a state actor

under the close nexus test.

Analyzing the facts of this case under the joint action test,

plaintiffs have also failed to establish an agreement or con-

spiracy between the City and PRFA with respect to the

Portland Rose Festival. The joint action test requires a

substantial degree of cooperation between the state actor and

the private actor. Collins v. Womancare, 878 F. 2d 1145,

36a

1154 (9th Cir. 1989). The City in this case has not “insinuated

itself into a position of interdependence” with PRFA that the

City must be recognized as a joint participant in prohibiting

plaintiffs from wearing signboards in certain areas of the

Festival Center. See Gorenc, 869 F.2d at 507. Similarly, the

facts of this case are, insufficient to conclude under the public

function test that PRFA performs functions that have been

traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.

Plaintiffs have failed to show that PRFA is a state actor

under section 1983, and therefore plaintiffs’ section 1983

claim against-PRFA is denied.

This constitutes my Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).

Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction (#1 1-1) is denied

as moot, and plaintiffs’ claims for permanent injunctive relief

in their Complaint (#1-1) are dismissed in part and denied

in part.

DATED this 31st day of May, 2000.

/s/ Owen M. Panner

OwEN M. PANNER

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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