Appendices — Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 00-5069

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

Nov. 20, 2001

Before MAYER, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, MICHEL,

LOURIE, CLEVENGER, RADER, SCHALL, BRYSON,

GAJARSA, LINN, and DYK, Circuit Judges.”

DYK, Circuit Judge.

This case is one of a large number of cases brought in the

Court of Federal Claims challenging the constitutionality of

the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat.

2776 (codified as amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C.)

(“EPACT” or “the Act’), which imposes special monetary

assessments on domestic utilities for the remediation of

environmentally contaminated uranium processing facilities

owned by the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 2297g 1. After

argument before a panel on April 4, 2001, we sua sponte

ordered that the case be heard in banc without additional

briefing. The case was heard in banc on October 3, 2001.

* Circuit Judge Prost, who entered on duty on October 3, 2001, has not

participated in the disposition of this case.

2a

In light of our decision in Consolidated Edison Co. v.

United States, 247 F.3d 1378 (Fed.Cir.2001),' Edison’s

request for a stay of the proceedings in the Court of Federal

Claims has become moot.

On the merits, we conclude that requiring plaintiff

Commonwealth Edison Company (“Edison”) and the other

domestic utilities that benefited from the uranium processing

services to contribute to the remediation costs does not

constitute a Fifth Amendment taking because the Takings

Clause does not apply to legislation requiring the payment of

money. We also conclude that the Act does not violate the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The retroactive

application of the Act rationally furthers a_ legitimate

legislative objective—the remediation of contaminated facili-

ties used by the United States to process uranium for

domestic utilities. Congress reasonably concluded that the

utilities received benefits from the processing and that the

utility processing contributed to the contamination. Liability

was imposed on those utilities for only a portion of the

cleanup costs. As a matter of law, Edison and other similarly

situated utilities could have reasonably expected to be liable

for a share of the remediation costs arising from the

contamination of the processing facilities. Edison’s other

arguments on the merits are foreclosed by our decision in

Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569

(Fed.Cir.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 951, 118 S.Ct. 2365,

141 L.Ed.2d 735 (1998).

We therefore dismiss as moot the appeal from the denial of

the stay request and affirm the decision of the Court of

Federal Claims dismissing the complaint.

' This opinion replaced our previous decision in that case, reported at

234 F.3d 642 (Fed.Cir.2000).

_—

3a

BACKGROUND

This case arises against the background of our earlier decision

in Yankee Atomic where we rejected contentions that EPACT

breached uranium processing contracts between Yankee Atomic

Electric Co. (“Yankee Atomic”) and the United States and

constituted a taking of those contract rights. Some of the claims

asserted by Edison are the same as those asserted in Yankee

Atomic. Edison also claims that the statutory obligation to pay

money to the government constitutes a taking of that money,

and that the retroactivity of the Act renders it unconstitutional

under the Due Process Clause.

Resolution of this appeal requires a brief overview of the

history of the United States government’s involvement in the

enrichment of low-grade uranium for Edison and other

domestic utilities, as well as the provisions of EPACT.

The uranium processing facilities involved here were

originally constructed and operated. by the United States

government for national defense purposes. Between 1945

and 1970, approximately 96% of the enriched uranium

produced by the government was used for weapons

production. These facilities were also capable of producing

enriched uranium for nuclear power reactors.

Before 1954, United States law permitted only the United

States government to own nuclear power reactors. In 1954,

however, Congress enacted amendments to the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954, Pub.L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919, which

for the first time authorized private ownership of nuclear

power reactors. The government extensively regulated these

reactors, inter alia, “to protect the health and safety of the

public” from the possible environmental hazards. /d. at § 2

(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210).

Plaintiff Edison is a domestic utility company with its

principal place of business in Illinois. Beginning in 1960,

Edison owned and operated nuclear reactors, which it used to

4a

generate electrical power for sale and distribution to its

customers in Illinois. Those nuclear reactors, in turn,

required enriched uranium.

Edison alleges that in 1960 it began to “purchase or lease”

enrichment services from the government. However, we note

that until 1964 the government retained strict control over the

technology used to enrich low-grade uranium for use in

nuclear reactors, and barred private ownership of enriched

uranium. In that year, Congress passed the Private

Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials Act, Pub.L. No. 88-

489, 78 Stat. 602 (1964), which authorized the private

ownership of enriched uranium. After the passage of that act,

the government began to offer uranium enrichment services

to commercial customers like Edison.

Beginning in 1969, Edison entered into a series of

- multi-year contracts with the United States government in

which Edison agreed to purchase uranium enrichment

services from the United States. Those enrichment services

were provided at enrichment plants operated first by the

Atomic Energy Commission and later (beginning in 1974) by

the Energy Research and Development Administration and,

ultimately (beginning in 1977) by the Department of Energy

(collectively, “DOE”).

Under those contracts, Edison delivered low-grade uranium

to the government-owned facilities for enrichment. The

government took title to the low-grade uranium, processed

the uranium, and returned enriched uranium to Edision. The

enrichment services were measured in terms of “separative

work -units” (“SWUs”). The plaintiff here, like other

domestic utilities, paid for the services by multiplying the

number of SWUs provided by the unit price set forth in its

contracts with the government. Although the utilities’

contracts varied somewhat, each stated that the price paid by

the utility for the enrichment services would be based on an

“established Commission pricing policy,” defined under the

Sa

contracts as the price in effect at the time the service was

rendered. A number of these contracts also capped the

maximum per unit charge for the enrichment services.

Edison alleges in its complaint that it purchased a portion of

its uranium enrichment services “with the Government’s

knowledge and consent, from other sources.” First Amended

Complaint of Plaintiff-Appellant Commonwealth Edison

Company (hereinafter “Complaint”) at q 50.

Edison alleges that “[b]y the late 1970s and early 1980s,

foreign suppliers of uranium enrichment services emerged,

threatening the Government’s monopoly power and creating

significant competition for the Government.” Jd. at { 41.

Edison further alleges that the Government’s share of the

uranium processing market “declined substantially, from

nearly 100% in the 1960s and 1970s, to below 50% in 1983.”

Id. Edison elected, however, to continue to use government

processing facilities even though those foreign alternatives

became available.

In January 1984, the government developed a standard

requirements-type contract for uranium enrichment services,

referred to as a Utility Services Contract. In July 1984,

Edison entered into a Utility Services Contract after

terminating all of its existing uranium enrichment services

contracts with the government through a Supplemental

Agreement of Settlement (“Settlement Agreement”). This

Utility Services Contract, like the previous contracts, charged

the utilities for the services according to the “established

pricing policy,” and likewise capped the maximum unit

charge. It appears that the government developed this Utility

Services Contract, at least in part, at the request of Edison and

the other domestic utilities.

As a result of the government’s use of the processing

facilities for national defense purposes, they had become

contaminated, even before the utilities’ uranium processing

commenced. Although Edison alleges that the facilities were

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“fully contaminated with radioactive and other hazardous

materials” before they began to be used for the processing of

the utilities’ uranium, Complaint at ¥ 23, there is no questions -

that the processing of the utilities’ uranium caused the same

type of contamination as the government’s earlier use of the

facilities to enrich uranium for weapons purposes. Indeed,

Edison at oral argument specifically conceded that that was

the case, and agreed that contamination cleanup costs are

incurred any time uranium is enriched, including when it is

enriched for the benefit of the utilities. Edison alleged,

however, that the cleanup costs were not “materially”

increased by the later contamination resulting from the utility

uranium processing.”

? At oral argument, counsel for Edison explained Edison’s contribution

to the contamination as follows:

COUNSEL FOR EDISON: If it can be demonstrated—in our cases

there’s nothing in the record—but if it can be demonstrated that

there was additional cost associated with the enrichment being—

services provided to the commercial utilities, then perhaps there

would be an argument that we have a certain responsibility. . . .

THE COURT: Well, of course there are. You can’t run a nuclear

enrichment program without creating contamination, so of course-

we can quarrel about exactly how to measure them or how big they

are, but of course there are contamination cleanup costs.

COUNSEL FOR EDISON: There are. Let me try to make an P

analogy. . . . I know in terms of nuclear utilities, when they have

boiling water, nuclear generated, and they periodically are required

to decontaminate, what they do is they have these very large deep

swimming pool type reactors. What they do is paint the well of the

reactor with a rubberized paint that the contamination adheres to.

Then they peel that paint off and the—. . . The contamination

adheres to that paint. So regardless of whether there is a half inch of

contamination or a full inch of contamination, all the contamination

adheres to that rubberized paint and you just peel it off, and the cost

is nO more.

THE COURT: Well, that’s basically your point, that the processing

of the utilities’ uranium caused pollution, but it didn’t cost any more

7a

Edison also admits in its complaint that the obligation to

decontaminate and decommission the facilities “was an

obligation well understood by operators of nuclear facilities

throughout the industry.” Complaint at § 31. Although the

contracts provided for recovery of the government’s costs of

operating the plants and fixed the price as of the time of

delivery, the original contracts, the Utility Services Contract,

and the Settlement Agreement did not expressly preclude (or

even address) the government’s future assignment to Edison

of any remediation costs for the decontamination of the

government’s uranium enrichment facilities.’

These remediation costs were addressed by Congress in

1992. Faced with its declining share of the uranium

processing market, Congress decided to restructure the

government’s uranium processing services in order to remain

competitive with its overseas providers. Congress created a

new, for-profit, governmental corporation called the United

States Enrichment Corporation (“USEC”) to provide those

services to Edison and other domestic utilities.

to clean it up than it would have cost to clean up the weapons

pollution, right?

COUNSEL FOR EDISON: Exactly. Yes, Sir.

} The Utility Services Contract merely stated, in pertinent part, that:

[T]he Customer and DOE desire to terminate all previous long-term

contracts between the Customer and DOE for the furnishing of

uranium enrichment services in order to accommodate the

Customer's desire to obtain such services under the Utility Services

form of uranium enrichment services contract .

(Emphasis added.). That contract further shite that “the unit charge

for enrichment services under this contract shall not exceed a ceiling

charge of $135.00 per separative work unit through September 30, 1985.”

The Settlement Agreement provided that “the Government agrees that all

obligations arising under the [previous] contracts or by reason of their

termination shall be deemed to be concluded.”

8a

At the same time that it created the USEC, Congress in

EPACT addressed the need to decontaminate and decom-

mission the government’s uranium enrichment facilities. The

DOE “estimated that the total cost of this clean up could

exceed $20 billion over 40 years, which amounted to about

$500 million per year, indexed to inflation.” Yankee Atomic,

112 F.3d at 1572. As this court noted in Yankee Atomic,

“[bjecause [the magnitude of] this decontamination and

decommissioning fiscal problem was not [fully] recognized

until the 1980s, the prices charged in the Government’s past

uranium enrichment contracts had not accounted for the

probiem.” /d.

EPACT established a Uranium Enrichment Deconta-

mination and Decommissioning Fund (the “Fund’) to

accumulate over a fifteen-year period the funds necessary to

remediate the uranium enrichment facilities. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2297g, 2297g 1. The Act provided that the costs were to

be shared by the government and those domestic utilities that

benefited from processing at government facilities. The Act

accordingly provided that the annual deposits of $480 million

(adjusted for inflation) would come from two sources: (1) up

to $150 million (or up to approximately 32% of the total

amount) was to be collected as a special assessment from

domestic utilities* that purchased (on the primary or

secondary markets) the uranium enriched at these facilities;

and (2) the balance of at least $330 million-the lion’s share of

the costs, amounting to at least 68%-was to be paid by the

government. The Act further provided that the imposition of

these special assessments on Edison and the other utilities

would cease after the earlier of 15 years after October 24,

1992 (the date of EPACT’s enactment) or the collection of

* The implementing regulations for the Fund defined “domestic utility”

as any utility in the United States that purchased SWUs from the

government between 1945 and October 23, 1992. See 10 C.F.R.

§ 766.3. It is undisputed that Edison meets this definition.

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9a

$2.25 billion (again adjusted for inflation) from the domestic

utilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 2297g-1. —-

Under the Act, the special assessment imposed on each

domestic utility was based on the percentage of SWUs

purchased from the DOE relative to the total number of

SWUs produced by the DOE. 42 U.S.C. § 2297g-1(c). As

noted above, the Act provided that a domestic utility was

considered to have purchased a SWU from the DOE if the

SWU was originally produced by the DOE, even if the utility

actually purchased it from another source. Similarly, a utility

was not considered to have purchased a SWU from the DOE

if it subsequently resold that SWU to another utility. As this

court noted in Yankee Atomic, “[i]n sum, the Act impose[d]

the assessment upon whichever utility company eventually

use [d] the enrichment services.” 112 F.3d at 1572.

Two groups of purchasers of uranium enrichment services

were exempt from the special assessment: (1) domestic

utilities that purchased USEC services any time after 1992;

and (2) foreign utilities, which represented 25% of DOE’s

pre-1992 customer base. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v.

United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 29, 33 n. 1 (2000); ~see also

Complaint at § 25 (alleging that sales to foreign utilities

historically “accounted for approximately 25% of the

Government’s commercial uranium enrichment market’’).

EPACT also provided the utilities with a “pass-through”

provision, providing in pertinent part that the special

assessment “shall be deemed a necessary and reasonable

current cost of fuel and shall be fully recoverable in rates in

all jurisdictions in the same manner as the utility’s other fuel

cost.” 42 U.S.C. § 2297g-1(g). This statutorily mandated

pass-through provision was binding on state regulatory

agencies. See Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi,

487 U.S. 354, 369-72, 108 S.Ct. 2428, 101 L.Ed.2d 322

(1988); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476

U.S. 953, 962-65, 106 S.Ct. 2349, 90 L.Ed.2d 943 (1986). At

10a

-oral argument, counsel for Edison conceded that Edison

sought to recover the costs of the special assessment by

passing the costs through to Edison’s customers, though

counsel expressed some doubt whether Edison recovered

those costs in light of deregulation of the market and the

competitive rates that deregulation produced.

The cost-sharing provisions were enacted after “much

congressional debate over the issue of how these costs should

be recovered, especially to what extent DOE’s nuclear utility

customers should be expected to share in paying for these

costs.” 138 Cong. Rec. H11,399, H11,401 (1992) (statement

of Rep. Phillip Sharp on Conference Report), reprinted in

Senate Comm. On Energy & Natural Res., 103d Congress 2d.

Sess., 6 Legislative History of the Energy Policy Act of 1992,

at 4519, 4553 (Comm. Print 1994). Ultimately, the utilities’

share was limited to 32% even though the House Report

concluded that “[h]istorical production from these plants

ha[d] been divided almost evenly between the government

and commercial sectors.” H.R.Rep. No. 102-474(D, at 144

(1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1953, 1967.

Indeed, Edison and other utilities participated actively in

shaping the legislation that became EPACT and approved the

concept of cost sharing. See Comprehensive National Energy

Policy Act: Hearings on H.R. 776 Before the House Comm.

on Ways & Means, 102d Cong. 170-83 (1992) (“Committee

Hearings I’). During the course of EPACT’s consideration,

the House Committee on Energy and Commerce proposed to

impose “a $419 million annual liability, or a $9 billion

[liability] over 20 years,” on the utility industry for

remediation of the enrichment facilities. Jd. at 181. In

Edison’s case the company estimated that this funding

proposal, if enacted, would increase its uranium enrichment

costs by “one third” over the amount it had already agreed

to pay. Id.

lla

In the hearings on EPACT, Edison’s President complained

that the industry was being asked to pay a “disproportionate

share” of the costs, and, as in the present Complaint, stated

that “virtually all the contamination at [the government

enrichment] facilities occurred during the first 20 years of

operations, when operations were strictly for the defense

program.” Id. at 180-81 (statement of Bide L. Thomas,

President, Commonwealth Edison Co., et al.).° Edison

offered no independent study of the industry’s relative

contribution to the contamination and relied entirely on the

testimony of the Department of Energy. That testimony, by

Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy William Young, was

that “there is additional pollution in the area of the sites [of

the enrichment facilities] because of commercial operations

subsequent to the exclusive operation [of the facilities] for the

government.” Department of Energy Budget Request for

Fiscal Year 1993: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm.

On Energy and the Env’t of the House Comm. on Interior and

Insular Affairs, 102d Cong. 80 (1992) (“Committee Hearings

II’). He estimated the remediation costs for that portion of

the pollution attributable to the enrichment of the utilities’

uranium amounted to approximately $1.6 billion, out of a

total cost of approximately $18.5 billion. He concluded

that “[iJf you look at it from a polluter-pays basis, about

$1.6 billion of that $18.5 billion would be properly allocated

to commercial customers” of the enrichment facilities.

Id. at 79.°

> This testimony was a joint statement of Bide L. Thomas; Michael R.

Peevey, President, Southern California Edison Co.; and Joseph M. Farley,

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Southern Nuclear Operating Co.

See id. at 178.

® Assistant Secretary Young further explained this proposed allocation

when questioned by Representative Kostmayer during his testimony:

MR. KOSTMAYER: Who else did the polluting besides the

government?

12a

Based on Edison’s view of the industry’s responsibility for

the contamination, Edison reaffirmed its and other utilities’

“willingness to pay a fair share of the [decontamination and

‘decommissioning costs] for these [enrichment] facilities.”

Committee Hearings I at 182; see also id. at 172 (“[T]he

industry is willing to participate in the cleanup program

...) (testimony of Bide L. Thomas, President, Common-

- MR. YOUNG: In some cases, there is additional pollution in the

area of the sites because of [the] commercial operations subsequent

to the exclusive operation for the government. Some of the tailings

are there as a result of commercial operations, for example.

MR. KOSTMAYER: Commercial operations conducted by some

party other than the government?

MR. YOUNG: No, no. We have run the diffusion plants. A certain

amount of the tails are there because of [the] SWUs produced for

the government. Another certain amount of the tails are there

because of SWUs produced for commercial customers.

MR. YOUNG: ... The largest piece of [the estimated total cleanup

cost] is $14 billion which is [decontamination and

decommissioning] of the buildings and systems themselves. Of

that, because of the government operation having led to the

contamination, we are saying the government would pay 100

percent of that.

There are two other elements of the cleanup that has got to take

place. One is on the grounds around the facilities and we are saying

that some of the contamination that occurred in the ground resulted

not solely from the 20 years of government operation, but a

measurable amount more resulted from the commercial-or operation

to the benefit of commercial customers. And since we did not pass

those costs on in the past, we feel it is equitable to pass those costs

on in the future.

Further, with the tails, some of the tails were created for the benefit

of commercial customers, and the portion that was, and again, not

passed on in the past, we feel it is equitable to pass it on to

commercial customers at this time.

Committee Hearings II at 80-81.

13a

wealth Edison Company). But Edison and other utilities

objected that their share should not exceed the $1.6 billion

estimated by the Department of Energy, and sought “a cap to

protect ratepayers from being assessed more than their fair

share of costs.” Jd. at 181. Edison and other utilities urged

Congress to adopt a compromise funding proposal-one

adopted by the House Committee on Science, Space and

Technology (the “Science Committee”)—that would have

capped the utilities’ liability for the remediation costs at $2.5

billion. Edison and two other utilities stated, on behalf of

themselves and two industry interest groups,’ that:

While $2.5 billion is significantly more than the

$1.6 billion that DOE estimates the civilian sector

should contribute [to the remediation of the enrichment

facilities], the industry is willing to accept this

compromise in the interest of providing certain liability

levels and to move forward with this restructuring

legislation and [decontamination and decommissioning]

program.

Id. at 182. (Emphasis added.). The liability cap proposed by

the Science Committee, which Edison viewed as protecting

its ratepayers from paying more than “their fair share of

[remediation] costs,” essentially became the cap in the

legislation that Edison now challenges, though the ultimate

liability of the utilities under the enacted legislation was

more certain iban under the Science Committee proposal. See

42 U.S.C. § 2297g-1.

7 These interest groups were the American Nuclear Energy Council

(“ANEC”) and the Edison Electric Institute (“EEI”). ANEC “represents

over 100 domestic and international organizations that have an interest in

nuclear energy.” EEI, in turn, “is the national association of investor-

owned electric companies” and represents “approximately three-quarters

of all American electricity customers.” Committee Hearings I at 178.

14a

Following the enactment of EPACT in 1992, as well as

corresponding DOE regulations implementing EPACT, the

government assessed Edison and similarly situated domestic

utilities on an annual basis for each utility’s share of the

special assessment. Edison alleges that as of the date

of the complaint, it had paid the government approximately

$95.5 million in seven special assessments for the decontam-

ination and decommissioning of the enrichment facilities.

These special assessments covered the period from 1969,

when Edison first began to purchase uranium processing

services from the government, until 1992, the year of

EPACT’s enactment.

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On April 9, 1997, Edison commenced an action in the

Court of Federal Claims challenging the legality of the

special assessments authorized by the Act. Edison’s original

complaint alleged that the special assessment breached its

contracts with the government by retroactively increasing the

cost of the uranium enrichment services and constituted an

impermissible taking of those contracts in violation of the

Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Original Complaint of Plaintiff

Appellant Commonwealth Edison Company at 9§ 53, 68-69.

On May 6, 1997, during the pendency of Edison’s action, this

court issued its decision in Yankee Atomic rejecting identical

claims made by another utility.

Following our decision in Yankee Atomic, Edison filed a

new and separate action for declaratory and injunctive relief

in the United States District Court for the Southern District of

New York seeking to invalidate EPACT and to bar the

government from attempting to compel future payments

under the Act (the “New York action”). The district court

subsequently denied a motion by the United States to transfer

the case to the Court of Federal Claims. Consol. Edison Co.

v. United States, 45 F.Supp.2d 331 (S.D.N.Y.1999). In

15a

Consol. Edison Co. v. United States, Dept. of Energy, 247

F.3d 1378 (Fed.Cir.2001), we reversed that decision and

instructed the district court to transfer the New York action to

the Court of Federal Claims for adjudication.

On November 6, 1998, Edison also filed a motion in the

Court of Federal Claims to stay proceedings in that court

pending resolution of the New York action. On February 2,

1999, Edison amended its original complaint in the Court of

Federal Claims to state new and additional theories for

recovery. The amended complaint stated essentially three

theories for recovery. Edison alleged that the special

assessments imposed by EPACT: (1) constituted an unlawful

taking of money under the Takings Clause of the Fifth

Amendment; (2) constituted a breach of contract, inasmuch

as “[t]he fixed price nature of [Edison’s] enrichment

contracts, coupled with the additional release granted by the

Government pursuant to the termination of certain of those

contracts, provided [Edison] with an unmistakable promise

that it would not be subject to future liability to the

Government based upon its contractual purchases of

enrichment services”; and (3) constituted an illegal exaction

in violation of the Due Process Clause of that amendment.

The government moved to dismiss the amended complaint for

failure to state a-claim.

On February 3, 2000, the Court of Federal Claims denied

Edison’s motion for a stay, noting, in part, that the original

action in the Court of Federal Claims was the first filed action

and that it “has the jurisdiction to rule on each of the counts

in the amended complaint and thus need not defer to the

district court’s broader jurisdiction.” Commonwealth Edison,

46 Fed. Cl. at 34. In a well-reasoned opinion, the Court of

Federal Claims also granted the government’s motion to

dismiss, concluding that neither the old nor new theories of

recovery stated a claim. That court rejected Edison’s first

claim—that EPACT constituted an impermissible taking of

16a

Edison’s property without just compensation—on the ground

that “a government-imposed payment of money cannot result

in a compensable taking.” /d. at 41.

The court dismissed the utility’s claim that the imposition

of the special assessments constituted a taking of its contract

rights with the government, finding that “this issue was

squarely addressed” in this court’s decision in Yankee Atomic.

Id. at 46. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected

Edison’s arguments that its contracts with the government

were significantly different from those contracts at issue in

Yankee Atomic. Id.

Finally, the court rejected Edison’s claim that the special

assessment constituted an illegal exaction barred under the

Due Process Clause. Recognizing the well-established

principle that “an economic statute, such as the Energy Policy

Act, comes to the court with a presumption of validity,”

id. at 43, the Court of Federal Claims determined that

although the Act is indeed retroactive, “it cannot be said that

the retroactivity of the Act is irrational or that that

retroactivity unfairly impacted on the plaintiff.” /d. at 44

(citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 18,

96 S.Ct. 2882, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976)). The court further

held that “the liability imposed by the special assessment is

neither disproportional nor excessive,” as EPACT imposed

“liability only on those utilities that benefited from the

government’s uranium enrichment services.” /d. at 45.

This timely appeal followed. We have jurisdiction over

this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).°

* Amicus Curiae briefs in support of Edison were filed in this

case by Sacramento Municipal Utility District and Maine Yankee Atomic

Power Co.

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17a

DISCUSSION

I

As an initial matter, we note that the decision of the Court

of Federal Claims to deny Edison’s request for a stay of those

proceedings pending resolution of the New York action is

now moot, in light of our decision in Consolidated Edison,

247 F.3d 1378, in which we instructed the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New York to

transfer that action to the Court of Federal Claims.

Accordingly, the only question before us is whether the

Court of Federal Claims erred in dismissing this action for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We

review that decision without deference. First Hartford Corp.

Pension Plan & Trust v. United States, 194 F.3d 1279, 1286-

87 (Fed.Cir.1999). In so doing, we also “assume that -all

well-pled factual assertions are true and make all reasonable

inferences in favor of’ Commonwealth Edison, New Valley

Corp. v. United States, 119 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1997),

to the extent that such allegations are relevant to the

constitutional issues.

II

Ever since the New Deal Supreme Court’s discarding of

the Lochner ° line of substantive due process cases, the Court

has repeatedly held that economic legislation “adjusting the

burdens and benefits of economic life” is to be judged under a

deferential standard. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,

428 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). There

remain, however, at least three areas in which judicial review

of federal legislation imposing regulatory burdens still bites.

Not surprisingly, Edison relies on each of these three_theories.

9 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed.

937 (1905).

18a

First, there are the takings cases, in which the government

is alleged to have taken property without just compensation

under the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court has made

clear that government regulation can constitute a taking of

property requiring compensation. See, e.g., Lucas v. So.

Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28, 112 S.Ct.

2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). It is also clear that a fund of

money can be property protected under the Takings Clause.

See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 160,

118 S.Ct. 1925, 141 L.Ed.2d 174 (1998) (holding that interest

income generated by funds held in IOLTA accounts is private

property of the owner of the principal for purposes of the

Takings Clause); see also Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc.

v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164-65, 101 S.Ct. 446, 66 L.Ed.2d

358 (1980) (holding that the Takings Clause can apply to

monetary interest generated from the operation of a specific,

separately identifiable fund of money). However, although a

minority of the Supreme Court has urged that a taking can

occur when Congress has imposed an obligation to pay

money, see Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537,

118 S.Ct. 2131, 141 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998), we are bound to

follow the views of a majority of the Supreme Court.

In United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 110 S.Ct.

387, 107 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989), the Supreme Court held that a

federal statute that required the payment of a portion of an

arbitral award from the Iran-United States Claim Tribunal to

the United States government did not violate the Takings

Clause because, in part, “[i]t is artificial to view deductions of

a percentage of a monetary award as physical appropriations

of property. Unlike real or personal property, money is

fungible.” /d. at 62 n. 9, 110 S.Ct. 387.

In Eastern Enterprises, five justices of the Court rejected

the theory that an obligation to pay money constitutes a

taking. There, the Supreme Court confronted a constitutional

challenge to the retroactive liability provisions of the Coal

ee ee ee ee ee ie

ee, See See ee

19a

Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, codified at

26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (the “Coal Act”). The Coal Act

required coal operators such as petitioner Eastern Enterprises

(“Eastern”) to fund future health benefits of current and

former coal mine employees. There was no majority opinion

of the Supreme Court. Writing for the plurality, Justice

O’Connor, joined by three other justices, concluded that the

retroactive impact of the Coal Act as applied to Eastern

Enterprises resulted in an unconstitutional taking of property

because it placed a “severe, disproportionate and extremely

retroactive burden on Eastern.” Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at

538, 118 S.Ct. 2131.

Justice Kennedy in his concurrence, however, disagreed

with the plurality’s conclusion that the Coal Act resulted in an

unconstitutional taking of property:

Our cases do not support the plurality’s conclusion that

the Coal Act takes property. The Coal Act imposes a

staggering financial burden on the petitioner, Eastern

Enterprises, but it regulates the former mine owner

without regard to property. It does not operate upon or

alter an identified property interest, and it is not

applicable to or measured by a property interest. The

Coal Act does not appropriate, transfer, or encumber an

estate in land (e.g., a lien on a particular piece of

property), a valuable interest in an intangible (e.g.,

intellectual property), or even a bank account or accrued

interest. The law simply imposes an obligation to

perform an act, the payment of benefits.

Id. at 540, 118 S.Ct. 2131. The four dissenters in Eastern

Enterprises (Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginbsurg, and Breyer)

agreed that the Takings Clause was not implicated because

“It]he ‘private property’ upon which the [Takings] Clause

traditionally has focused is a specific interest in physical or

intellectual property. . . . This case involves not an interest in

20a

physical or intellectual property, but an ordinary liability

to pay money. . . .” /d. at 554, 118 S.Ct. 2131 (Citations

omitted.).

Thus five justices of the Supreme Court in Eastern

Enterprises agreed that regulatory actions requiring the

payment of money are not takings.’ We agree with the

prevailing view that we are obligated to follow the views of

that majority.

This court has similarly concluded that the imposition of an

obligation to pay money does not constitute an unconstitu-

tional taking of property. In Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895

F.2d 745 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811, 111 S.Ct. 46,

112 L.Ed.2d 22 (1990), for example, we considered the

constitutionality of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation

' See Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the R.1. Employees’ Retirement Sys., 173

F.3d 46, 58 (ist Cir.1999) (upholding state statute temporarily with-

holding excess retirement benefits against a Takings Clause challenge

because “a majority of justices found that the Takings Clause did not

apply under the facts of Eastern Enterprises, because they concluded that

a Takings Clause issue can arise only after a plaintiff's property right has

been independently established”); Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178

F.3d 649, 659 (3d Cir.) (“[W]e are bound to follow the five-four vote

against the takings claim in Eastern.”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 963, 120

S.Ct. 396, 145 L.Ed.2d 309 (1999); Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp.,

181 F.3d 597, 606 (4th Cir.1999) (following Supreme Court in holding

Takings Clause inapplicable to the Coal Act because five Justices in

Eastern Enterprises reasoned that “no identifiable property interest was

infringed by the legislation”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1117, 120 S.Ct. 936,

145 L.Ed.2d 814 (2000); but see U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. McKeithen,

226 F.3d 412, 416 (Sth Cir.2000) (citing Eastern Enterprises but

analyzing a Takings Clause challenge to retroactive assessments under the

Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Fund under ad hoc, fact-specific

factors), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 121 S.Ct. 1360, 149 L.Ed.2d 289

(2001); United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 722 (8th Cir.2001)

(stating that “inquiry into the constitutionality of CERCLA . . . would be

‘essentially ad hoc and fact intensive’” (quoting Eastern Enterprises, 524

U.S. at 523, 118 S.Ct. 2131)).

—

2la

Control Act (“UMTRCA”), Pub.L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat. 3021

(1978), which required that uranium producers spend large

sums of money to clean up uranium tailings piles, a by-

product of uranium manufacture. We held that the

UMTRCA’s imposition of the obligation to pay money to

clean up the tailings piles did not constitute an

unconstitutional taking of property under the Takings Clause:

In this case, [the uranium producer] has not alleged a

physical taking of any of its property. Its complaint

alleges only that it will be required to spend sums of

money for reclamation of tailings and mill decom-

missioning. Requiring money to be spent is not a taking

of property.

Id. at 756 (citing United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52,

62 n. 9, 110 S.Ct. 387, 107 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989)).

In short, while a taking may occur when a specific fund of

money is involved, the mere imposition of an obligation to

pay money, as here, does not give rise to a claim under the

Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Ill

The second area, represented by the Supreme Court’s

decision in United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839,

116 S.Ct. 2432, 135 L.Ed.2d 964 (1996), involves contracts

in which the government has agreed to pay damages if it

engages in certain types of regulation.

A similar contract claim was made with respect to the

present contracts and rejected by this court in Yankee Atomic.

In that case, this court was confronted with a claim that the

special assessments imposed under EPACT breached the

utility’s fixed-price contracts with the government by, “in

effect, retroactively increasing the price that it must pay

for the previously supplied uranium enrichment services.”

112 F.3d at 1573. Relying on the analysis prescribed by the

22a

Supreme Court’s decision in Winstar, we held that the

imposition of the special assessments was a lawful exercise of

Congress’s taxing power under the sovereign acts doctrine,

and was not designed to retroactively increase the price of

the government’s earlier contracts with Yankee Atomic.

Id. at 1575. In other words, this court concluded that the

special assessments constituted “a general exercise of

Congress’s taxing power for the purpose of addressing a

societal problem rather than an act that retroactively increases

the price charged to contracting parties for uranium

enrichment services.” Jd. at 1577.

We further held that because the contracts between the

plaintiff in that case and the government “did not include an

unmistakable promise that precluded the Government from

later imposing an assessment upon all domestic utilities that

employed the DOE’s uranium enrichment services,” id. at

1580, the special assessments imposed by the Act did not

constitute a breach of contract. We similarly disposed of the

plaintiff's takings claim by concluding that “[bJecause the

contracts did not contain an unmistakable promise against a

future assessment, [the utility] had no property right (via a

vested contract right) which was subsequently taken by the

assessment.” Jd. at 1580 n. 8. This court denied Yankee

Atomic’s motion to rehear the case in banc, 112 F.3d 1569

(Fed.Cir.1997), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 524

U.S. 951, 118 S.Ct. 2365, 141 L.Ed.2d 735 (1998).

We reject Edison’s request that we distinguish our decision

in Yankee Atomic. There is no meaningful difference

between the contract theories asserted here and in Yankee

Atomic, and we therefore agree with the Court of Federal

Claims’ conclusion that Edison’s claims based on its

contracts with the government are barred by that decision.

This also disposes of Edison’s argument that the Act

constitutes a taking of Edison’s supposed contract rights to be

free of future government assessments.

23a

IV

The third area of judicial review occurs where a regulation

is retroactive and accordingly implicates the Due Process

Clause. The Supreme Court has made clear that federal

legisiation is to be construed to avoid retroactivity.'' No such

issue is presented here since the statute is clear on its face,

and no party urges that a narrowing construction is either

possible or appropriate. Accordingly, we must address the

Due Process issue. :

The standard of review in this area is well-settled. As the

Supreme Court stated in Turner. Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 15,

96 S.Ct. 2882, “[i]t is by now well established that legislative

Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life

come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality,

and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process

violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an

arbitrary and irrational way.” So too the Supreme Court

observed in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray &

Co., 467 U.S. 717, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984):

Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is

supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered

by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such

legislation remain within the exclusive province of the

legislative and executive branches.

Id. at 729, 104 S.Ct. 2709 (citing Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at

15-16, 96 S.Ct. 2882). Where the basis for the challenge is

'' See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483,

128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (“Since the early days of this Court, we have

declined to give retroactive effect to statutes burdening private rights

unless Congress had made clear its intent.”); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.

Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988)

“(Clongressional enactments and administrative rules will not be

construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires

this result.”).

24a

retroactivity, the Supreme Court has held that Due Process is

satisfied “simply by showing that the retroactive application

of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative

purpose.” /d. at 730, 96 S.Ct. 2882.

In judging the rationality of legislation under the Due

Process Clause, an evidentiary trial of facts, such as the

relative contributions of weapons processing and utility fuel

processing to the total contamination at the government

plants, is not required. Rather, as the Supreme Court has

noted in another context:

the question is whether the legislative conclusion [to

enact the statute] was reasonable and supported by

substantial evidence in the record before Congress. In

making that determination, we are not to re-weigh the

evidence de novo, or to replace Congress’ factual

predictions with our own. Rather, we are simply to

determine if the standard [of review] is satisfied. If it is,

summary judgment . . . is appropriate regardless of

whether the evidence is in conflict.

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 211, 117 S.Ct.

1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997) (Citations omitted.). In short,

legislative facts control the analysis. In these Due Process

cases the federal courts are not assigned the task of making

policy, determining a fair outcome, or determining the actual

state of facts. We are charged simply with determining

whether the congressional action was rational.

Under that rational purpose standard it will be a rare-

circumstance where federal legislation that is retroactive

will be held unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause.

In the modern era this has occurred on only a very few

occasions, even if we count Eastern Enterprises as being such

a case. See Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 47 S.Ct. 710,

71 L.Ed. 1184 (1927); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142,

48 S.Ct. 105, 72 L.Ed. 206 (1927) (per curiam); R.R. Ret.

25a

Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 55 S.Ct. 758, 79 L.Ed.

1468 (1935); Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. 498, 118 S.Ct. 2131,

141 L.Ed.2d 451.’

The cases that invalidated these statutes were most

unusual.

Both Blodgett v. Holden and Nichols v. Coolidge involved

the government’s retroactive application of revenue statutes

to transactions made well before the enactment of the

respective statutes. The Supreme Court held in both cases

that such retroactive application violated due process.

Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 147, 48 S.Ct. 105; Nichols, 274 US.

at 542-43, 47 S.Ct. 710."°

In United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 114 S.Ct. 2018,

129 L.Ed.2d 22 (1994), the Court questioned the continuing

relevance of those decisions to present day challenges to

retroactive statutes, concluding that “[t]hose cases were

decided during an era characterized by exacting review of

economic legislation under an approach that has long since

been discarded.” Jd. at 34, 114 S.Ct. 2018. In any event

those decisions were limited to situations involving a “wholly

new tax.” Jd. EPACT, unlike the statutes at issue in those

two Cases, is not a mere revenue-raising measure. Rather, it

represents an assessment on particular existing domestic

utilities, which Congress concluded benefited from the

government’s operation of the uranium enrichment facilities,

'2 Cf. United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78-82, 103 S.Ct.

407, 74 L.Ed.2d 235 (1982) (declining to retroactively construe a

provision of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 95-542, 92 Stat.

2549 (1978), without clear evidence of Congressional intent to apply that

Statute retroactively, and expressing “substantial doubt whether the

retroactive” application would “comport with the Fifth Amendment”).

'> Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 48 S.Ct. 353, 72 L.Ed. 645

(1928), involved a challenge to the same statute at issue in Blodgett, and

reached the same result.

a

26a

and which Congress also concluded were themselves partially

responsible for the problem the statute seeks to remedy.

In Alton, the Court invalidated a statute that required

railroads to establish a pension fund covering both current

employees and former employees who had worked for the

railroad within the year before passage of the statute because

of the retroactive effect of the statute. Alton bears little

resemblance to this case, and it appears that Alton, in any

event, has effectively been overruled. See Pension Benefit,

467 U.S. at 733, 104 S.Ct. 2709 (questioning whether Alton

“retains vitality’ despite the changes in judicial review of

economic legislation that have occurred in the ensuing

years”); see also Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 19, 96 S.Ct.

2882. We note that neither Edison nor any of its amici relies

on Alton.

Eastern Enterprises, which is the focus of the parties’

attention, is also starkly different from this case. There, the

employees’ claims of entitlement to the payment of future

health benefits arose from a number of National Bituminous

Coal Wage Agreements (“NBCWAs” or “Agreements”’)

between the employees’ union and various coal mine

operators. The statute in Eastern Enterprises was justified on

the ground that expectations of future benefits had been

created by these agreements. A majority of the Court

concluded that the obligation to pay benefits could not be

imposed on companies that had no role in creating those

expectations.

The plurality noted that Agreements negotiated in 1974,

1978, and subsequently first suggested an industry commit-

ment to the funding of health benefits for former employees

and their dependents. Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 530, 118

S.Ct. 2131. The plurality emphasized, however, that Eastern

“ceased its coal mining operations in 1965 and neither

participated in negotiations nor agreed to make contributions

in connection with the [employees’] Benefit Plans under the

27a

1974, 1978 or subsequent NBCWA’s.” /d. Under the

particular facts of that case, the plurality accordingly

reasoned that the Coal Act’s retroactive provisions violated

the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In_ his

concurrence, Justice: Kennedy agreed with the plurality that

the particular facts of the case warranted the invalidation of

the statute, but based his reasoning on Due Process grounds.

He wrote:

Eastern was once in the coal business and employed

many of the beneficiaries, but it was not responsible for

their expectation of lifetime health benefits. . . . As the

plurality opinion discusses in detail, the expectation was

created by »romises and agreements made long after

Eastern lem the coal business. Eastern was not

responsible for the resulting chaos in the funding

mechanism caused by other coal companies leaving the

framework of the [NBCWA]. This case is far outside the

bounds of retroactivity permissible under our law.

524 USS. at 550, 118 S.Ct. 2131 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Even if the Eastern Enterprises plurality and concurrence

could be read together to announce a binding holding on the

Due Process issue,'* this case does not involve the

imposition of liability on companies having no responsibility

for creating the expectation of a future benefit. Rather, it

involves a congressional determination to impose liability on

companies that received a benefit, the production of which

benefit contributed to a societal problem.

'* The District of Columbia Circuit has concluded that the plurality and

concurrence in Eastern Enterprises cannot be combined into a single

holding on the Due Process issue. Ass’n of Bituminous Contractors v.

Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1254-55 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“Justice Kennedy’s

concurrence in the judgment is of no help in appellant’s efforts to cobble

together a due process holding from Eastern Enterprises’ fragmented

parts. . . . Justice Kennedy’s due process reasoning can in no sense be

thought a logical subset of the plurality’s takings analysis.”). ~

28a

On the other side of the balance, on more than ten

occasions, the Supreme Court has rejected challenges to

economic legislation based on the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26,

35, 114 S.Ct. 2018, 129 L.Ed.2d 22 (1994) (upholding a

retroactive amendment to the federal estate tax, even though

the taxpayer received no advance notice of the amendment

and relied to his detriment on pre-amendment law); Concrete

Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust

for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 636-41, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124

L.Ed.2d 539 (1993) (upholding retroactive withdrawal

liability provisious of the Multiemployer Pension Plan

Amendments Act (“MPPAA”) which assessed employer

nearly $300,000 for its withdrawal from a pension plan prior

to the effective date of the MPPAA); Gen. Motors Corp. v.

Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191-92, 112 S.Ct. 1105, 117 L.Ed.2d

328 (1992) (finding that Michigan workers’ compensation

statute did not violate the Due Process Clause, even though it

required the petitioners to pay nearly $25 million for

retroactive benefits to disabled employees); United States v.

Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 64-65, 110 S.Ct. 387, 107 L.Ed.2d

290 (1989) (upholding retroactive imposition of an arbitration

fee on prevailing parties before the Iran United States Claim

Tribunal); United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 571, 106

S.Ct. 2071, 90 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (rejecting Due Process

challenge to statutorily-prescribed transitional rule that

retroactively applied to gifts made before enactment of rule);

United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105-06, 105 S.Ct. 1785,

85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (upholding the retroactive application

of the filing requirements of the Federal Land Policy and

Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”), codified at 43 U.S.C.

§ 1744, that resulted in the forfeiture of mining claims made

before the enactment of the FLPMA); Nat’! R.R. Passenger

Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451,

475-79, 105 S.Ct. 1441, 84 L.Ed.2d 432 (1985) (upholding

legislation requiring private railroads to reimburse Amtrak for

29a

rail travel privileges provided by Amtrak to the private

railroads’ employees and former employees even though

Amtrak for some years had not imposed such costs on

the private railroads); Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 731-32,

104 S.Ct. 2709 (upholding the retroactive application of

the withdrawal liability provisions of the MPPAA during

period before the MPPAA’s enactment); United States v.

Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 296-302, 101 S.Ct. 549, 66

L.Ed.2d 513 (1981) (upholding the retroactive application of

an amendment to the federal tax statute to transactions made

before enactment of amendment); Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S.

at 18, 96 S.Ct. 2882 (upholding requirement that coal mine

operators compensate former employees disabled by

work-related illnesses, even though those operators had never

contracted for such liability, and the employees involved”

were no longer employed by the operators); FHA v. The

Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91, 79 S.Ct. 141, 3 L.Ed.2d

132 (1958) (upholding application of statutory requirement

that occupants of mortgaged housing must be residents as

opposed to transients to apartment buildings mortgaged prior

to enactment of the statute); Lichter v. United States, 334

U.S. 742, 788, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 92 L.Ed. 1694 (1948)

(upholding statute permitting government to require private

parties to pay excessive profits realized during wartime to the

government); Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-51, 59 S.Ct.

121, 83 L.Ed. 87 (1938) (sustaining retroactive Wisconsin

Statute that taxed shareholder dividénds paid two years before

Sstatute’s enactment); Funkhouser v. J.B. Preston Co., 290

U.S. 163, 167-68, 54 S.Ct. 134, 78 L.Ed. 243 (1933)

(upholding retroactive application of statute providing that

interest be added to damages awards for breach of contract

claims); Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15, 21-24, 51

S.Ct. 324, 75 L.Ed. 809 (1931) (upholding retroactive

application of federal estate tax statute to tax gifts made prior

to enactment of the statute). In Eastern Enterprises, both the

plurality and Justice Kennedy suggested that liability for

30a

health care costs limited to miners formerly employed by the

companies could be retroactively imposed, presumably

because the companies benefited from their services, and the

performance of those services contributed to the health

problems.'° Significantly, other courts of appeals have

rejected claims that similar retroactive effects of the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and

Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq., (“CERCLA”) violate

Due Process. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. &

Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 734 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied,

484 US. 848, 108 S.Ct. 146, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987); United

States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174 (4th Cir.1988),

cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106, 109 S.Ct. 3156, 104 L.Ed.2d

1019 (1989); Franklin County Convention Facilities Auth. v.

Am. Premier Underwriters, Inc., 240 F.3d 534, 551-52

(6th Cir. 2001).'° And we also have repeatedly rejected Due

'S See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 536, 118 S.Ct. 2131 (“Eastern might

be responsible for employment-related health problems of all former

employees whether or not the cost was foreseen at the time of

employment ... .”) (plurality opinion); id. at 549, 118 S.Ct. 2131 (noting

that the Supreme Court has “upheld the imposition of liability on former

employers based on past employment relationships”) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring); see also Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 18, 96 S.Ct. 2882

(“[T]jhe imposition of liability for the effects of disabilities bred in the past

is justified as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees’

disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor. . . .”).

'© These courts have reasoned that “{cjleaning up inactive and

hazardous waste disposal sites is a legitimate legislative purpose, and

Congress acted in a rational manner in imposing liability for the cost of

cleaning up such sites upon those parties who created and profited from

the sites and upon the chemical industry as a whole.” Northeastern

Pharm., 810 F.2d at 734. See also, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176,

183 n. 12 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied sub nom. American Cyanamid Co.

v. O'Neil, 493 U.S. 1071, 110 S.Ct. 1115, 107 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1990);

United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1506 (6th Cir.1989),

cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057, 110 S.Ct. 1527, 108 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990);

Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364,

1366 (9th Cir.1994).

3la

Process challenges to retroactive federal statutes. See, e.g.,

Atlas, 895 F.2d at 756 (upholding retroactive legislation

requiring uranium producers to spend large sums of money to

clean up uranium tailings piles).

Not surprisingly, in light of this history, the Supreme Court

has repeatedly advised us that such Due Process challenges

will only succeed in the rarest of cases. As Justice Kennedy

noted in Eastern Enterprises, “[s]tatutes may be invalidated

on due process grounds only under the most egregious of

circumstances.” 524 U.S. at 550, 118 S.Ct. 2931.

Although such “most egregious circumstances” do not

exist unless the legislation is severely retroactive, they do not

exist merely because the legislation is severely retroactive

and costly, as is the case here. Without attempting to define

exactly when retroactive legislation will be held

unconstitutional, we perceive that the imposition of even

severe retroactive obligations for past a:ts will be found

rational and will be held constitutional under the Due Process

Clause if two conditions are satisfied: (1) Congress

reasonably concluded that the party subjected to retroactive

obligations benefited from activity that contributed to a

societal problem, and liability is not disproportionately

imposed on that party; and (2) the imposition of retroactive

liability would not be contrary to that party’s reasonable

expectations. It may well be that legislation is constitutional

if either of the two conditions is satisfied, but we need not

decide that question in this case. Both of those conditions

are present.

The first is easily disposed of. Whether or not Edison

received the enrichment services below cost from the govern-

ment, as the government asserts, it certainly benefited from

the government’s provision of enrichment services. Edison

admits that it received a benefit from the government’s

enrichment services (though it claims to have fully

32a

compensated the government for the benefit).'’ Indeed,

Edison could hardly have operated nuclear reactors without

the benefit of uranium enrichment services from the United

States government or some other approved source.

Congress could reasonably conclude that the processing of

the utilities’ uranium contributed to a societal problem

(processing plant pollution) on two separate theories. First,

while the weapons processing may have fully contaminated

the buildings at the plants, the utility processing contributed

to increased costs associated with decontaminating the

grounds around the facilities and disposing of the tails.

Second, whether or not the utility processing marginally

increased the remediation costs, Congress could reasonably

conclude that the later pollution should bear a share of the

costs. Edison and utility industry groups themselves

contributed to Congress’ conclusion that the utilities were

responsible by explicitly recognizing in the course of the

legislative consideration that it would be fair to impose a

share of the remediation costs on the utilities. See ante at

1334-36. The Court of Federal Claims does not sit to retry as

a factual matter the reasonableness of such congressional

judgments.'®

'7 See Brief for Plaintiff Appellant Commonwealth Edison Co. at 62

(“Although Commonwealth Edison obviously received a ‘benefit’ when it

obtained cnrichment services from the government, it paid a price agreed

between the parties to represent the fair value of that benefit.”’).

'8 Even if the legislative history here were devoid of support for

Congress’ conclusions, it would not, of course, be “significant for due

process purposes that the legislative history” did not address the issue of

causation. Ass’n of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246,

1256 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1998). “[{T]he government can create a rational

explanation ex post to support a statute attacked on due process grounds.

That being so, we can hardly require a showing that Congress specifically

identified [the] cause of the problem before it passed the [Act] in order to

sustain the Act under rational basis review.” Id. See also FCC v. Beach

Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d

33a

The remediation costs imposed on Edison and the other

domestic utilities also are not severely disproportionate;

these utilities are obligated to pay only about a third of the

remediation costs, even though evidence was presented that

the “production from these plants ha[d] been divided almost

evenly between the government and commercial sectors.”

H.R.Rep. No. 102-474(I), at 144 (1992), reprinted in 1992

U.S.C.C.A.N. 1953, 1967.'? In Pension Benefit, 475 U.S. at

225-26, 106 S.Ct. 1018, for example, the Supreme Court held

that the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of

1980, 94 Stat. 1208 (“MPPAA”) did not constitute an

unconstitutional taking of property under the Takings Clause

of the Fifth Amendment because “[t]here is nothing to show

that the [retroactive] withdrawal liability actually imposed on

an employer will always be out of proportion to its experience

with the plan, and the mere fact that the employer must pay

money to comply with the [MPPAA] is but a necessary

consequence of the MPPAA’s regulatory scheme.” /d. The

mere fact that foreign utilities are exempted from the

assessment also does not mean that the liability imposed on

the domestic utilities is severely disproportionate. See Ass’n

of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246,

1255-56 (D.C.Cir.1998); Holland v. Keenan Trucking Co.,

102 F.3d 736, 741-42 (4th Cir. 1996).

211 (1993) (“[B]ecause we never require a legislature to articulate its

reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional

purposes whether the conceived reason . . . actually motivated the

legislature. Thus, the absence of ‘legislative facts’ . . . has no significance

in rational-basis analysis. In other words, a legislative choice is not

subject to courtroom factfinding. . . .”) (Citations omitted.).

'? Amici Sacramento Municipal Utility District and Maine Yankee

Atomic Power Company urge that a small portion of the Fund

(approximately $75 million) has been used for thorium cleanup for which

the utilities were not responsible. Considering that $7.2 billion was

authorized for the Fund, see 42 U.S.C. § 2297g-1(a), (d), this de minimus

diversion of funds does not affect our analysis.

34a

This conclusion standing alone may be sufficient to

warrant rejection of Edison’s Due Process argumman. The

Supreme Court has held that it is rational for Congress to

impose costs for certain activities on “those who have

profited from the fruits of” activities that contributed to a

societal problem, Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 18, 96 S.Ct.

2882, and that “our cases are clear that legislation readjusting

rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets

otherwise settled expectations,” id. at 16, 96 S.Ct. 2882.

However, Edison also has failed to establish that the

retroactivity violated the utilities’ reasonable expectations.

That issue requires more extensive discussion.

Vv

One of the key questions in the Supreme Court's

retroactivity decisions is whether the regulated party could

have reasonably expected that it would be free from the

regulatory exaction. Those decisions suggest that if the

regulated party could have reasonably expected that it would

be subject to regulation, there can be no constitutional Due

Process violation. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal.,

508 U.S. at 646, 113 S.Ct. 2264.” This critical theme was

reiterated by each of the separate opinions in Eastern

Enterprises. There the question was directed to reasonable

expectations at the time that Eastern operated coal mines.

The plurality concluded that the Coal Act constituted an

impermissible taking because, in part, it “substantially

interferes with Eastern’s reasonable investment-backed

expectations.” Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 532, 118 S.Ct.

2131. In reaching this conclusion, the plurality emphasized,

2 Cf. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 1700-01,

149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001) (retroactive judicial abolition of archaic common

law rule, which precluded murder conviction where victim did not die

within year and a day of stabbing, was not unexpected under prior law,

and thus did not violate Due Process).

35a

in part, that Eastern had left the coal mining industry and had

ocased to employ miners years before “lifetime medical

benefits . . . [could] have been viewed as promised” by the

industry. /d. at 535, 118 S.Ct. 2131.

Justice Kennedy, on Due Process grounds, agreed with the

plurality that the three-factor regulatory takings analysis set

forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,

438 U.S. 104, 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978),

including investment-backed expectations, was relevant to the

analysis of the Coal Act’s retroactivity. Eastern Enters, 524

U.S. at 547, 118 S.Ct. 2131 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He

sustained Eastern’s challenge to the Coal Act, in part, because

the miners’ expectations of future health benefits were

“created by promises and agreements made long after Eastern

left the coal business.” Jd. at 550, 118 S.Ct. 2131.

The dissenters likewise focused on Eastern’s reasonable

expectations to conclude that “the historical circumstances,

taken together, prevent Eastern from showing that the Coal

Act’s ‘reachback’ liability provision so frustrates Eastern’s

reasonable settled expectations as to impose an unconsti-

tutional liability.” /d. at 559, 118 S.Ct. 2131. Thus, in

Eastern Enterprises there was remarkable agreement on the

reasonable expectations standard, if not its application to the

particular case.

In addressing the issue of reasonable expectations here, we

must separate the government as sovereign from the

government as contracting party. The question, in other

words, is not what Edison could expect the United States as

contracting party to do but what it could reasonably expect

the United States as sovereign to do. See United States v.

Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 116 S.Ct. 2432, 135 L.Ed.2d

964 (1996). Nor does the question require an evidentiary

trial. Edison’s subjective expectations are irrelevant. The

question is what a reasonable company in Edison’s position

should have anticipated.

36a

VI

The cases suggest three factors relevant to a determination

of a party’s reasonable expectations. First, was the company

operating in a highly regulated industry? Second, did the

company know of the problem at the time it engaged in the

activity? Third, in the light of the regulatory environment at

the time of the activities, could the possibility of the

assessments have been reasonably anticipated? We conclude

that each of these three factors is present here, and therefore

we do not need to decide whether the presence of only one of

these factors, without more, suffices to establish a lack of

reasonable expectations.

Operation in a Highly Regulated Industry

First, it is undisputed that Edison operates in a highly

regulated industry. As has been noted, “the production of

energy from nuclear sources is one of the most highly

regulated human activities.” Peter Riley, Legal Control of

Nuclear Energy Between States, 21 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 303,

303 (1991).

We have previously held that participants in this highly

regulated field can expect liability for remediation costs.

Thus, in Atlas, 895 F.2d at 745, we considered the

constitutionality of the UMTRCA, codified at 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2022, 2113, 2114, 7901-7942, which required that

uranium producers spend large sums of money to clean up

uranium tailings piles. We held that the Court of Federal

Claims had properly dismissed the complaint for failure to

state a claim:

From the outset of the uranium procurement program,

the nuclear industry has been highly regulated, as the

plaintiffs admit. “Those who do business in the regulated

field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed

by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative

end.” Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227, 106 S.Ct. 1018,

37a

quoting FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91,

79 S.Ct. 141, 146, 3 L.Ed.2d 132 (1958). The only

“expectation” that [the processors] could have under the

circumstances it has alleged is that it expected it would

not have to spend its own money to remediate health and

environmental hazards created by its production of

uranium. Such an expectation cannot be a reasonable

commercial expectation.

Id. at 758. This holding was directly supported by the

Supreme Court’s decision in Connolly, in which the Court

concluded that the imposition of withdrawal liability from a

multiemployer pension plan on certain employers did not

interfere with the company’s reasonable expectations

because, in part, the companies were well aware that

“[p]ension plans . . . were the objects of legislative concern,”

and “it was clear” to those companies operating in that highly

regulated industry that withdrawal liability could be

retroactively imposed. 475 U.S. at 226-27, 106 S.Ct. 1018.

We are aware of no case to the contrary.

Edison’s Knowledge of the Hazards of the Uranium

Processing

Second, it is undisputed that all parties here were aware of

the hazardous nature of the materials. In its amended

complaint, Edison admitted that the need to decontaminate

and decommission the facilities “was an obligation well

understood by operators of nuclear facilities throughout the

industry.” Complaint at 4-31. Likewise, counsei for Edison

conceded at oral argument here that “[i]t was recognized from

way back in the 1950s that there would be decontamination

and decommissioning costs” arising from the operation of the

uranium processing facilities.

A number of Supreme Court decisions make clear that

company knowledge of the dangers present in their operations

is relevant to a determination of reasonable expectations. In

38a

Turner Elkhorn, for example, the Supreme Court noted that

the coal mine operators had “been aware of the danger of

pneumoconiosis for at least 20 years. . . .” 428 U.S. at 17,

96 S.Ct. 2882. So too in Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein,

503 U.S. 181, 112 S.Ct. 1105, 117 L.Ed.2d 328 (1992), the

Supreme Court ruled that a retroactive 1987 Michigan

workers’ compensation statute had not “unreasonably

interfered with closed transactions” because the employers

“knew they were taking a risk in reducing benefits to their

workers, but they took their chances with their interpretation

of the 1981 law.” Id. at 191-92, 112 S.Ct. 1105.

The Regulatory Environment

Finally, the regulatory environment is pertinent. We first

consider the regulatory environment at the time when Edison

received uranium enrichment services from the government-

This focus on the regulatory climate at the time of the

processing is supported not only by the Due Process cases

discussed above but also by the regulatory takings cases.

The Eastern Enterprises plurality judged reasonable

expectations for purposes of the takings analysis at the time

of the relevant activity. Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 532,

118 S.Ct. 2131. So too in Pension Benefit, 475 U.S. 211, 106

S.Ct. 1018, 89 L.Ed.2d 166, for example, the Supreme Court

rejected the employer’s takings claim that money had been

taken unconstitutionally because, in part, it found that:

Pension plans, however, were the objects of legislative

concern long before the passage of ERISA in 1974....

Prudent employers then had more than sufficient notice

not only that pension plans were currently regulated, but

21 Other courts of appeals have also rejected challenges to CERCLA’s

retroactivity because, in part, “it was certainly foreseeable at the time that

improper disposal could cause enormous damage to the environment.”

Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 174.

: 39a

also that withdrawal itself might trigger additional

financial obligations.

Id. at 226-27, 106 S.Ct. 1018.72

Where a Due Process violation is alleged because the

government has ordered the payment of money, we think that

reasonable expectations are to be judged as of the point at

which the complaining party entered into the activity that

triggered the obligation—here the submission of uranium for

processing. We have no doubt that the utilities were on notice

of the possible imposition of remediation liability at the times

when the material was submitted for processing. .

We first address the period following the enactment in

1980 of CERCLA, when the utilities should have been aware

that statutory liability might be extended to cover other

hazardous substances.”

CERCLA is a broad, remedial statute enacted by Congress

in order to ensure “that those responsible for any damage,

environmental harm, or injury from chemical poisons bear

the costs of their actions.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO

Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 285 (2d Cir.1992)

72 Where a regulatory taking of real property is alleged, the state cannot

defeat liability simply by showing that the current owner was aware of the

regulatory restrictions at the time that the property was purchased. See

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,___, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 2462, 150

L.Ed.2d 592 (2001). As Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in

Palazzolo makes clear, however, even in that context the regulatory

environment at the time of the acquisition of the property remains both

relevant and important in judging reasonable expectations. /d. at 2465-66.

3 CERCLA liability only attached to cleanup costs arising from the

remediation of substances defined to be “hazardous substances” under

CERCLA and the Environmental Protection Agency’s implementing

regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14); 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (listing, inter alia,

arsenic, lead, mercury and methane as hazardous substances). There is no

dispute here that the uranium was a “hazardous substance” under

CERCLA.

40a

(quoting S.Rep. No. 96-848, at 13 (1980)). Under CERCLA,

the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”’) is authorized

to undertake remedial efforts to clean up hazardous waste

spills, and, where an “imminent and substantial endangerment

to the public health exists,” to take legal action in order to

compel potentially responsible parties to undertake their

own private cleanup efforts. Gen. Elec. Co., 962 F.2d at 285;

42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).

There are several aspects of CERCLA of immediate

relevance here:

“CERCLA is a strict liability statute, one of the

purposes of which is to shift the cost of cleaning up

environmental harm from the taxpayers to the parties

who benefited from the disposal of the wastes that

caused the harm.” Jn re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d

889, 897 (Sth Cir.1993); see also United States v.

Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1378 (8th

Cir. 1989).

CERCLA by its terms has unlimited retroactivity. Indeed,

every court of appeals to consider the question has concluded

that Congress intended CERCLA to apply retroactively. See,

e.g., Northeastern Pharm., 810 F.2d at 732; Monsanto, 858

F.2d at 174.

While the statute does cap those costs that may be imposed

on current and former owners and other potentially

responsible parties, those caps are quite high. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(c). For example, the liability for the release of a

hazardous substance from a facility is “the total of all costs

of response plus $50,000,000 for any damages ... .”

§ 9607(c)(1)(D).

Costs may be imposed on any current or former property

owner or other potentially responsible party. See Monsanto,

858 F.2d at 167. Under CERCLA’s liability provision,

responsible parties include those who arrange for the

hte a) Ss nat ats Te BY EY ee

4la

treatment of hazardous substances. A party may be liable

under CERCLA for the arrangement for treatment of any

“hazardous substances owned or possessed by [that party]...

at any facility owned or operated by another party or entity

and containing such hazardous substances. . . .” /d.24

This type of “arranger liability” may be imposed even if

the party who arranges for the treatment of the hazardous

substance does not actually perform the treatment. In Aceto,

872 F.2d 1373, for example, the Eighth Circuit held, inter

alia, that the defendants which hired another company to

formulate their technical grade pesticides into commercial

grade pesticides, would be liable as an arranger under

CERCLA if it were established that the defendants owned the

technical grade pesticides and the final product and, in

addition, knew that the generation of hazardous wastes was

inherent in the formulation process. Id. at 1381-82.2°

4 Section 9607(a)(3) imposes liability for “all costs of removal or

remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State” on:

[A]ny person who, by contract, agreement, or otherwise

arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter

for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances

owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at

any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another

party or entity and containing such hazardous substances ....

42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (Emphases added.).

> Numerous other courts of appeals have approved the holding in

Aceto. See, e.g., Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc.,

973 F.2d 688, 695 (9th Cir.1992).

Edison and the supporting amici unsuccessfully attempt to limit the reach

of Aceto, based on decisions from other courts of appeals suggesting that

that case would not extend to other situations, for example, situations in

which the utilities merely arranged for the transportation of hazardous

substances, see United States v. Cello-Foil Products, Inc., 100 F.3d 1227,

1232 (6th Cir.1996), and Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d

746, 751 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1044, 114 S.Ct. 691, 126

L.Ed.2d 658 (1994), or the material submitted for processing was not

42a

In other words, by 1980, Edison could have reasonably

expected that the enrichment of its uranium by an indepen-

dent contractor (the United States) could result in the passage

of legislation retroactively imposing liability for a portion of

the remediation costs on Edison and the other utilities that

_benefited from the processing facilities.

Even before the enactment of CERCLA in _ 1980

liability-imposing regulations were either already in place, or

could have been anticipated. CERCLA was not an

unheralded statute. Federal statutes enacted in the 1960s and

1970s imposed obligations on the federal government to

develop and maintain certain minimum standards for clean

air, see “Clean Air Act” of 1963, Pub.L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat.

392, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642, and clean water, see

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,

Pub.L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, codified as amended at

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (the “Clean Water Act” of 1972). In

1970, Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy

Act, Pub.L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), codified at

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a, which required all federal

agencies, inter alia, to conduct thorough assessments of the

environmental impacts of all major programs.

By 1969, a number of federal statutes had been enacted or

interpreted to impose liability for environmental damages.

Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of

1899, 30 Stat. 1152 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 407),

for example, prohibited the discharge of refuse into navigable

waters without a permit. In the 1960s, the Supreme Court

interpreted that prohibition broadly to impose strict liability

on companies for obstruction of waterways caused by the

discharge of industrial waste. See, e.g., United States v.

Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491, 80 S.Ct. 884,

itself hazardous, see Concrete Sales & Services, Inc., v. Blue Bird Body

Co., 211 F.3d 1333, 1339 (11th Cir.2000).

43a

4 L.Ed.2d 903 (1960); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384

U.S. 224, 229-30, 86 S.Ct. 1427, 16 L.Ed.2d 492 (1966)

(construing the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of

1899 to prohibit discharge of oil). Other statutes enacted in

the 1970s imposed liability, inter alia, for the improper

handling, storage and disposal of hazardous wastes. See, e.g.,

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub.L.

No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-

6987; Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-

469, 90 Stat. 2003, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

§§ 2601-2629. These statutes Clearly telegraphed that envi-

ronmental regulation was an area of intense federal concern,

and that liability could be imposed under federal law.

The possibility of common law liability is also relevant, as

the Supreme Court recognized in Turner Elkhorn. There, the

Supreme Court, in addressing the issue of reasonable

expectations, specifically referred to pre-existing state

“workmen’s compensation principles analogous to those

enacted here.” Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct.

2882. So too in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.

DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 94 L.Ed.2d

472 (1987), the Supreme Court noted the “Court’s hesitance

to find a taking when the State merely restrains uses of

property that are tantamount to public nuisances. . . .” At

common law, Edison and other utilities could have potentially

been held liable, under the well-established theories of

nuisance and strict liability, for environmental damage and

other harms resulting from the uranium processing on their

behalf. The utilities should have anticipated that such

liability could be imposed by the federal government,

particularly since the federal government in a number of

environmental statutes had taken pains to approvingly

Preserve common-law liability, an approval which was

extended, for example, by the Supreme Court to common

~ law tort liability for nuclear materials contamination. See

44a

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251, 104 S.Ct.

615, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984).

When discussing the contours and scope of the common

law, the Supreme Court has instructed that it is appropriate

for us to look to the pertinent Restatement and other

secondary sources.” The Restatement of Torts has long

recognized both injunctive and damages liability for nuisance.

Nuisances may be public or private. A public nuisance has

been defined as “an activity or a physical condition which

endangers the health, safety or property of a considerable

number of persons .. . .” See Restatement (First) of Torts,

Intro. to ch. 40, at 217 (1939).”’ A private nuisance has been

defined as “an interference with the use and enjoyment of

land, and is a wrong only to persons who have property rights

or privileges in the land.” Jd. at 219.7% Numerous courts

have recognized nuisance liability for the failure to contain a

variety of hazardous substances in the period before 1969

when the uranium processing began. See, e.g., Georgia v.

Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238, 27 S.Ct. 618,

51 L.Ed. 1038 (1907) (Holmes, J.) (discharge of sulfurous

gas); Exley w. So. Cotton Oil Co., 151 F. 101, 102

(C.C.D.Ga.1907)) (seepage of chemically polluted water);

Johnson v. City of Fairmont, 188 Minn. 451, 247 N.W. 572,

© See, e.g., Har:ris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc.,

530 U.S. 238, 250,, 120 S.Ct. 2180, 147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000) (looking to

Restatement (Secomd) of Trusts as source for the common law of trusts);

Kolstad v. Am. Demtal Ass’ n, 527 U.S. 526, 538, 542, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144

L.Ed.2d 494 (19919) (looking to Restatement (Second) of Torts and

Restatement (Secomd) of Agency for guidance in interpreting a federal

statute).

27 See also Resitatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1979), defining

public nuisance as “an unreasonable interference with a right common to

the general public.”

8 See also Resstatement (Second) of Torts § 821D (1979), defining

private nuisance as; “a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the

private use and enjoyment of land.”

45a

573 (1933) (discharge into stream from sewer and factory);

City of Clanton v. Johnson, 245 Ala. 470, 17 So.2d 669,

671 (Ala.1944) (defective sewer leaking waste); Carson v.

Hercules Powder Co., 240 Ark. 887, 402 S.W.2d 640, 641

(1966) (discharge of industrial waste); City of Syracuse v.

Farmers Elevator, Inc., 182 Neb. 783, 157 N.W.2d 394,

399 (1968) (discharge of air poilution by anhydrous ammonia

facility).””

The utilities could not have had reasonable expectations of

escaping liability by claiming that they were mere bystanders

to the processing by the United States. Section 427B of the

Restatement (Second) of Torts, published in 1965, made clear

that those arranging for processing of hazardous materials

could potentially have been liable under the common law for

environmental damages arising from the processing:

One who employs an independent contractor to do work

which the employer knows or has reason to know to be

likely to involve . . . the creation of a public or private

nuisance, is subject to liability for harm resulting to

others from such . . . nuisance.

Id. at § 427B. See, e.g., Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Or. 242, 362

P.2d 312, 318 (1961) (spraying of chemicals by independent

® Professor Keeton makes clear, for example, that damage to the

environment can constitute a public nuisance:

Another general type of “public nuisance” is one that is regarded as

such because of its impact on the environment, and therefore the use

and enjoyment of private property, now and in the future. .. . The

air pollution, the soil pollution, the noise pollution or the water

pollution must affect the plaintiff in a substantial way and for that

reason Constitute a private nuisance. It is not irrelevant that others

are affected and that so many others are affected as to constitute a

public nuisance. This would mean that the conduct is unreasonable

and enjoinable.

W. Page Keeton, et al., The Law of Torts 651 (Sth ed. 1984).

46a

contractor).°” So too, the utilities could reasonably have

anticipated potential strict liability because of the hazardous

nature of nuclear fuel. Indeed, at the time that the processing

began in 1969, section 519 of the Restatement (First) of

Torts, published in 1938, recognized strict liability for

“ultrahazardous activity,” defined as activity that: “(a)

necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land

or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the

exercise of utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of common

usage.” Id. at § 520. By the time the Restatement (Second) of

Torts was published in 1977, atomic energy was singled out

for special attention. Comment g to section 520 of that

Restatement, for example, characterized atomic energy as an

abnormally dangerous activity, concluding that “[s]ome

activities, such as the use of atomic energy, necessarily and

inevitably involve major risks of harm to others, no matter

how or where they are carried on.” >! For all these reasons

we conclude that Edison and the other utilities could not have

reasonably expected that Congress would not enact

legislation imposing remediation costs on the utilities

submitting uranium for processing.

* See also, e.g., 7 Stuart M. Speiser, et al., The American Law of Torts

§ 20.16, at 124 (1990) (“[A]s a general rule—all persons who do

participate either in the creation or maintenance of a nuisance are liable

for injuries suffered therefrom by others.”); 58 Am.Jur.2d Nuisances §

132, at 772 (1989) (“[A]n employer cannot escape liability by employing

an independent contractor to do the work, where a nuisance will result

from the performance of such work in the ordinary mannet....

Furthermore, it is immaterial in determining liability for nuisance that the

employer refrains from directing the . . . contractor in the execution of the

work procured to be done.”).

3! See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 cmt. h, at 39 (1977)

(“There is probably no activity, unless it is perhaps the use of atomic

energy, from which all risks of harm could not be eliminated by the taking

of all conceivable precautions, and the exercise of the utmost care,

particularly as to the place where it is carried on.”).

a

49.248 TARYN TY RE NE 0b Ps 6 ck Ni eas

47a

The parties have paid little attention to the reasonable

expectations of utilities that did not submit uranium for

processing but instead purchased enriched uranium from

other utilities and then used it in their own reactors. With

respect to this material, Congress confronted a choice

between assessing the beneficiaries of the processing (that is,

the ultimate users of the SWUs) or those utilities that

submitted the uranium for processing and then sold it. We

conclude that the utilities could have reasonably expected that

Congress might impose the assessment on those most directly

benefited-that is, the ultimate SWU users.

Despite the existence of these liability risks, Edison

appears to argue that the utilities that submitted uranium for

processing had no reasonable expectation that liability would

be imposed. (On appeal, Edison does not separately address

the expectations of the purchasers of already-processed

uranium.)

First, it urges that, even if the contracts did not bar the

imposition of liability, they led Edison to believe that it

would escape liability. In other words, Edison claims that it

was lulled into believing that no liability would be imposed.

This seems to us little more than an effort to reargue the very

contention rejected in Yankee Atomic—namely, that the

special assessments essentially constituted impermissible

retroactive price increases to the utility’s fixed-price contracts

with the government. As we held there, the contracts said

nothing about freedom from possible regulation or its

monetary consequences. Yankee Atomic, 112 F.3d at 1579.

Edison and the other utilities are presumed to have been

aware that under well-established principles going back more

than a century these contracts could not deprive the United

States of the authority to regulate in the area, and could not

impose contract liability for such regulation absent an

unmistakable promise, which we have held did not exist. See

Winstar, 518 U.S. at 874, 116 S.Ct. 2432; Jefferson Branch

48a

Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436, 446, 17 L.Ed. 173

(1861) (“[N]either the right of taxation, nor any other power

of sovereignty, will be held . . . to have been surrendered,

unless such surrender has been expressed in terms too plain to

be mistaken.”). Edison cannot properly rely on the contracts

as shielding it from liability. Indeed, we specifically held in

Atlas that the mere existence of a fixed price in a government

contract cannot create expectations that the government will

not use its sovereign power to impose additional costs. Atlas,

895 F.2d at 754.

Second, Edison also contends that it was led to believe by

government officials that the contract price included

remediation costs. Significantly, Edison does not allege that

those officials represented that regulatory legislation would

not be enacted.*” Even if such promises or representations

had been made about subsequent regulatory assessments,

those authorities had no authority to bind the government.

Third, Edison complains that the contamination resulted

from the government’s failure to dispose of the uranium

processing byproducts in a manner that would have avoided

remediation costs. No such allegation appears in the

complaint, and, even if it had, there is no allegation that

Edison and the other utilities were reasonably unaware of the

government’s waste-disposal methods when it submitted the

uranium for processing.

Fourth, Edison argues that it could not anticipate liability

because title to the (unenrichedy uranium passed from the

utilities to the government during the time that the uranium

32 In its amended complaint, Edison alleges in pertinent part that “the

Government expressly represented to its customers, and to Congress, that

its prices [for the processing services} not only included provisions for

[decontamination and decommissioning] expense, but that [deconta-

mination and decommissioning] costs would also be recovered from

future sales.” Complaint at ¢ 34.

49a

was processed at the government-owned plants and back to

the utilities only after processing was complete. Edison’s

argument is essentially that, by temporarily giving up

ownership and control of the uranium during processing,

those arranging for the processing and receiving uranium

after processing should not be liable. We see no basis for the

utilities to assume that the technicality of temporary title

transfer would necessarily excuse liability that would

otherwise exist for those that submitted unenriched uranium

for processing and then received enriched uranium after the

processing.”*

Fifth, Edison argues that it could not anticipate liability

because the facilities_were already largely (if not completely)

contaminated when the uranium was processed, and because

no significant additional cleanup costs were attributable to the

pollution caused by utilities’ uranium processing.

Both under the common law and CERCLA, shared liability

was well known when multiple parties caused a single injury.

Restatement (First) of Torts § 879 cmt. a, at 446 (1939);

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 879 cmt. a, at 324 (1979).

So too “[mJost courts have held [that] CERCLA imposes

strict liability and joint and several liability.” Aceto, 872 F.2d

at 1377-78 (collecting cases).

However, Edison argues that both under CERCLA and the

common law, in a suit between the responsible parties,

liability would be allocated between those responsible parties

according to their relative contributions to the cleanup costs,

* See Northeastern Pharm., 810 F.2d at 743 (holding that ownership

of a hazardous substance is not required for liability under CERCLA to

attach); Hercules, 247 F.3d at 720-21 (holding that where “the ownership

issue [is] debatable,” CERCLA liability may exist because courts have “

‘not hesitated to look beyond defendants’ characterizations to determine

whether a transaction in fact involves an arrangement for the disposal of a

hazardous substance.’” (quoting Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381)).

50a

relying on cases and other authority such as United States v.

Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 715 (8th Cir.2001),

Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metai Co.,

14 F.3d 321, 326 (7th Cir.1994), and Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 433A (1965). Edison effectively argues that

it could reasonably have anticipated that it would have

had the opportunity to show that the government was

100% responsible.

We do not agree. Under CERCLA and the common law it

was notoriously difficult, both as a matter of law and fact, to

separate contributions made by particular causes of harm.

See, e.g., Hercules, 247 F.3d at 717 (observing that under

CERCLA “proving divisibility is a very difficult proposi-

tion”); Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal

Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir.1998) (“Given the nature of

hazardous waste disposal, rarely if ever will a [potentially

responsible party] be able to demonstrate divisibility of harm,

and therefore joint and several liability is the norm [under

CERCLA].”) **; ‘Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. 1

(“Certain kinds of harm, by their very nature, are normally

incapable of any logical, reasonable or practical division.”).

Under these circumstances the utilities should reasonably

have expected that Congress might conclude that Edison and

the other utilities did in fact make a major contribution to the

cleanup costs and that they should share responsibility. The

statute here does not impose all liability on the utilities. They

are required to pay less than approximately one-third of the

* See also Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Menasha Corp., 228 F.3d

648, 658 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that the district court erroneously

required the plaintiff to show that each defendant’s discharge of hazardous

waste was causally linked to an incurrence of response costs and that the

correct standard does not include a specific causation requirement, but

only that a plaintiff prove that a release of hazardous substances has

occurred; that the release caused the plaintiff to incur “necessary costs of

response”; and that each defendant is a potentially responsible party).

Sla

cost, with the remainder being borne by the government. And

even this liability may be passed on to the customers of the

utilities to the extent that the utilities’ rates are established by

traditional rate-making.

In any event, Edison misses the larger point in arguing that

CERCLA or the common law would not be construed to

impose liability in similar circumstances. The reasonable

expectations test does not require that the law existing at the

time of processing would impose liability, or that liability

would be imposed only with minor changes in then-existing

law. The critical question is whether extension of existing

law could be foreseen as reasonably possible. Given the

broad scope of CERCLA and the common law, we have no

doubt that such an extension was easily foreseen, not

necessarily as a certainty, but as a reasonable possibility.

In light of Edison’s receipt of benefits, the proportionate

nature of its liability, and its reasonable expectations, we

conclude that its amended complaint failed to state a Due

Process claim for which relief may be granted. We also

conclude that EPACT is otherwise constitutional.°>

“ CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of

Federal Claims dismissing the complaint for failure to state a

claim is affirmed. The appeal from the denial of the Stay is

dismissed as moot.

AFFIRMED.

COSTS

No costs.

** This case does not raise an equal protection challenge to EPACT.

Such a claim was made and is rejected in Maine Yankee Atomic Power

Co. v. United States, No. 99-5156, 2001 WL 1472668 (Fed.Cir. Nov.20,

2001), which we decide today.

52a

MAYER, Chief Judge, with whom Circuit Judges

NEWMAN and RADER join, dissenting.

For the reasons set forth in Judge Friedman’s opinion in

Maine Yankee Atomic Power v. United States, Nos. 99-5156,

-5158, -5160, also issued today, I would reverse the judgment

of the Court of Federal Claims to the extent it rejected the due

process challenge to the assessment. I also believe the

assessment is an illegal exaction. Therefore, I would overrule

Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569

(Fed.Cir.1997), in accordance with my dissent in that case.

112 F.3d at 1582-85.

53a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Nos. 99-5156, 99-5158 and 99-5160.

MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

ae

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee,

SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

_

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee,

OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

Nov. 20, 2001

Before MAYER, Chief Judge, FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit -

Judge, and GAJARSA, Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

In the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Congress imposed

liability upon nuclear electric power companies that had

purchased enriched uranium from the United States—the

54a

purchases having been made as far back as 1969—for a

substantial portion of the government’s costs of decon-

taminating the plants in which it had enriched the uranium.

The three appellants—electric utilities that had purchased

enriched uranium from the government for their nuclear

power plants and who were subject to, and had paid part of,

the statutory liability—sued the United States in the Court of

Federal Claims,-challenging the assessments as a taking of

their property for which they sought just compensation and as

an unconstitutional retroactive statutory application that

denied them due process and equal protection. On the

government’s motion, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed

the complaints, holding that they did not set forth valid

constitutional claims.

In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, No.

00-5069, also decided today, this court en banc has upheld the

constitutionality of that statutory assessment against similar

challenges, namely that it takes the property of another utility

and denies that utility due process. That decision binds this

panel, and requires us to reject the utilities’ taking and due

process arguments in the instant case.

Two of the utilities in this case, Maine Yankee Atomic

Power Company and Sacramento Municipal Utility District,

also argue that the statute denies them equal protection—a

contention not made in Commonwealth Edison. As the Court

of Federal Claims stated, the utilities argued that “the fact that

foreign utilities were exempted from the assessment imper-

missibly differentiates between similarly—situated entities—

i.e., all those that had consumed government-enriched ura-

nium. In addition, plaintiffs contend, the Act draws an

illegitimate distinction between purchasers who resold the

uranium, and those who kept it for their own purposes, as

well as between pre 1992 consumers (who are subject to

the fee) and post 1992 consumers (who are exempt).” Maine

Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 44 Fed.Cl. 372,

383 (1999).

5Sa

The Court of Federal Claims correctly rejected those

contentions. We rely upon and accept that court’s reasoning:

Id.

The judgments of the Court of Federal Claims dismissing

With regard to Congress’s decision to exempt foreign

utilities from liability, we refer to the Supreme Court’s

observation in Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U.S. 442,

451, 45 S.Ct. 348, 69 L.Ed. 703 (1924) that “[c]on-

siderations of policy toward foreign countries may very

well justify an exemption of the foreign corporations

from taxes that might legitimately be imposed on them,

but which Congress does not think it wise to exact.” In

addition, we think it significant that, as defendant points

Out in its motion to dismiss, the exclusion of foreign

utilities from the liability equation in no way increases

or otherwise affects plaintiffs’ portion of domestic

utility usage.

Similarly, legislatures need not burden the most respons-

ible party to survive rational basis review. Association

of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246,

1255-56 (D.C.Cir.1998). While the original purchasers

of uranium (those who resold it and were therefore

exempt from assessment) may seem, to plaintiffs,

equally to have benefited from the enrichment services,

we cannot conclude that Congress’s decision to target

end-users was without rational basis. And although

plaintiffs may have preferred a system under which

USEC’s post 1992 customers likewise picked up the

tab, Congress’s assignment of liability for a past prob-

lem to past consumers does not stretch the limits of

the reasonable.

the complaints are

AFFIRMED.

56a

* * * * * *

Concurring opinion of FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit Judge,

in which MAYER, Chief Judge, joins.

Since I agree that we are bound by Commonwealth Edison

and also agree with the court’s rejection of the equal

protection contention, I join in the opinion and judgment of

the court. If I were not bound by Commonwealth Edison,

however, I would hold that the retroactive assessment denies

the appellants due process. My reasons for that conclusion

follow.

I

A. During World War II, the United States began enriching

uranium, first for military purposes and, starting in the mid

1960s, as nuclear fuel for commercial generation of

electricity, which it sold to domestic and foreign utilities.

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 44 Fed.Cl.

372, 374 (1999). The government sold the enriched uranium

under fixed price contracts, which did not authorize the

government to collect any additional amounts. /d. The

decontamination and decommissioning of these polluted

facilities is expected to take 40 years and to cost up to

$20 billion. Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 112

F.3d 1569, 1572 (Fed.Cir. 1997).

Congress dealt with this problem in the Energy Policy Act

of 1992 (“the Act” or “the Energy Act”). See generally id.

That was comprehensive legislation designed to implement a

“national energy policy,” a reaction, at least-in part, to the

adverse economic effects of an oil embargo associated with

the military conflict in the Persian Gulf. H.R.Rep. No.

102-474(I), at 132 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.

1953, 1955.

In this legislation, Congress sought to “reform the current

uranium enrichment program of the [government] so that

it will be operated in a more business-like fashion.”

57a

H.R.Rep. No. 102-474(1), at 142 (1992), reprinted in 1992

U.S.C.C.A.N. 1953, 1965. The Act established the United

States Enrichment Corporation (“Enrichment Corporation’’)

as a government corporation to assume the operation of the

government’s uranium enrichment services, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2297, and “which eventually could be sold to the pri-

vate sector.” H.R.Rep. No. 102-474(1), at 142-43 (1992),

reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1953, 1965-66. The Act

required that the Enrichment Corporation “[w]Jithin 2 years

prepare a strategic plan for transferring ownership of the

Corporation to private investors.” 42 U.S.C. § 2297d(a). The

“key purposes of the Corporation includ{ed] providing

enrichment services in a business-like fashion, maximizing

the economic return to the [government].” H.R.Rep. No.

102-474(I), at 198 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.

1953, 2021.

The Act provided that the Enrichment Corporation would

not be liable for the costs of cleaning up and closing

the government’s uranium enrichment facilities. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2297c-2(d). Instead, the Act established the Uranium

Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund

(“Fund”) for that purpose. § 2297g. The Fund is financed

through both Congressional appropriations and an assessment

on those domestic utilities that purchased and _ used

government enriched uranium. § 2297g-1(b).

The Fund is instructed to obtain up to $480 million per year

(to be adjusted annually for inflation), with at most $150

million from a special assessment on the domestic utilities.

§ 2297g-1(a), (c). That assessment is based on each utility’s

share of the government’s enriched uranium sales (whether

purchased directly from the government or from another

source), which were made prior to October 24, 1992 and that

it did not resell. § 2297g l(c). The special assessment

terminates after 15 years or after $2.25 billion has been

collected. § 2297g-1(e).

58a

The Act also provided that the special assessments “shall

be deemed a necessary and reasonable current cost of fuel and

shall be fully recoverable in rates in all jurisdictions in the

same manner as the utility’s other fuel cost.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2297g-1(g).

B. The three appellants filed separate complaints in the

Court of Federal Claims, as did a number of other sim-

ilarly-situated electric utilities. They contend that the special

assessment constituted a breach of the fixed-price contract

under which they had purchased enriched uranium from the

government. The complaints included the following factual

allegations, which we accept for purposes of the govern-

ment’s motions to dismiss. Highland Falls-Fort Montgomery

Cent. Sch. Dist. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1166, 1169-70

(Fed.Cir.1995) (“[W]e assume that all well-pled factual

allegations are true and indulge in all reasonable inferences in

favor of the movant.’’).

The appellants—Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company

(“Maine Yankee’), Sacramento Municipal Utility District

(“Sacramento District”), and Omaha Public Power District

(“Omaha District”) (collectively “the Utilities”)—all operated

nuclear power plants and purchased government-produced

enriched uranium before 1992. Thus, as domestic utilities

that purchased and used government provided enriched

uranium, each is liable for a portion of the Act’s special

assessment, and each has paid millions of dollars.

The Utilities also allege that the government completely

contaminated its enrichment facilities (buildings, equipment,

property, and surrounding property) prior to 1969, at a time

when they were used almost exclusively for defense purposes.

Little, if any, additional contamination occurred after 1969,

when these facilities were used to enrich uranium for sale to

commercial utilities.

.

&

59a

Maine Yankee is a domestic utility that operated a single

nuclear power plant, which was permanently closed in 1996.

It purchased enriched uranium from the government from

1970 to 1986 under two contracts, one executed on October 2,

1970 and the other on November 4, 1982. On its purchases of

government enriched uranium, Maine Yankee is subject to a

$25 million special assessment, of which it has paid more

than $9.8 million.

Sacramento District is a municipal utility district in

California that generates electricity and operated a nuclear

generating facility, which it closed in 1989. During the

operation of that facility, the Sacramento District purchased

enriched uranium from the government, beginning in 1969

and ending in 1981. In 1990, the Sacramento District

terminated its contract for purchasing enriched uranium.

Because of those purchases, Sacramento District has paid

$5.8 million in special assessments and expects its total

liability to reach $8 million.

Omaha District is a domestic utility that generates and

supplies electricity in Nebraska. It purchased enriched ura-

nium from the government between 1969 and 1992 under two

contracts. Omaha District has paid special assessments of

more than $7.4 million, and estimates its total liability to be

nearly $20 million.

One of the other utilities that filed such a suit in the Court

of Federal Claims was Yankee Atomic Electric Company.

That court granted Yankee Atomic summary judgment,

holding that “the assessment imposed upon Yankee Atomic to

fund clean-up costs constitutes an unlawful exaction because

it violates the Government’s earlier contractual agreements to

supply enriched uranium at fixed prices.” Yankee Atomic

Elec. Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569, 1571 (Fed.

Cir.1997). On the government’s appeal, we reversed. /d. We

held that the special assessment did not constitute a

retroactive increase of the contract price, id. at 1575, but

60a

instead “constitutes a general exercise of Congress's taxing

power for the purpose of addressing a societal problem rather

than an act that retroactively increases the price charged

to contracting parties for uranium enrichment services,”

id. at 1577.

After our decision in Yankee Atomic, the Utilities amended

their complaints to assert claims not addressed in Yankee

Atomic; namely, that the assessment was a taking of their

property and denied them due process in violation of the Fifth

Amendment. Maine Yankee and the Sacramento District also

asserted that the assessment denied them equal protection.

On the government’s motion, the Court of Federal Claims

granted summary judgment dismissing the complaints for

failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl.

372 (1999); Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. United States, 44

Fed. Cl. 383 (1999); Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 44 Fed.Cl.

395 (1999).

In an opinion dealing with the three cases (but issued

separately for each case), the court first held that Yankee

Atomic was not stare decisis on the constitutional issues the

Utilities raised. Maine Yankee, 44 Fed.Cl. at 376-77. In

holding that the complaints did not state a valid takings claim,

the court concluded that none of the factors in “a traditional

takings analysis . ..—the economic impact of the legislation,

the reasonableness of plaintiffs’ investment-backed expec-

tations and the character of the government action—support

the finding of a taking of property.” /d. at 381. The court

rejected the Utilities’ due process claim based on the

retroactivity of the assessment. /d. at 379-80. The court

concluded its discussion of these issues with the following

statement:

Whether we analyze the assessment under the Due

Process Clause, under the Takings Clause, or under some

amalgam of the two, we are, in the end, faced with a

6la

single, basic question: Is it inherently unfair, unjust, or

irrational for Congress, when faced with costs resulting

from the enrichment of uranium, to ask those parties

who received the uranium to contribute to the solution?

The answer, quite clearly, is no. Plaintiffs’ assessments

are directly proportional to their usage of uranium

enrichment services the very services which created the

contamination. Congress itself took responsibility for

more than two thirds of the clean-up costs and assigned

the rest, as a general tax, to the rate-payers in districts

which had previously benefited from nuclear power.

Such a scheme can hardly be construed as beyond the

reach of fairness or rationality.

Id. at 382-83.

Finally, the court rejected the claim that the special

assessment denied Maine Yankee and the Omaha District

equal protection because it did not cover (1) foreign utilities

or (2) utilities that purchased but resold government-enriched

uranium. The court denied this claim since “legislatures need

not burden the most responsible party to survive rational basis

review.” /d. at 383 (citing Ass'n of Bituminous Contractors,

Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1255-56 (D.C.Cir.1998)).

II

A. The Supreme Court has noted that “the presumption

against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our juris-

prudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than

our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate

that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the

law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled

expectations should not be lightly disrupted.” Landgraf v.

USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128

L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (footnotes omitted). When the retro-

activity is severe, the legislation may violate the Due Process

Clause. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 32, 114

62a

S.Ct. 2018, 129 L.Ed.2d 22 (1994) (concluding that the

application of a 1987 federal tax statute to a 1986 transaction

did not violate due process in part because “Congress acted

promptly and established only a modest period of retro-

activity.”); see also id. at 38, 114 S.Ct. 2018 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring) (“A period of retroactivity longer than the year

preceding the legislative session in which the law was enacted

would raise, in my view, serious constitutional questions.”).

In exceptional circumstances not involving tax law, however,

longer retroactivity has been held not to deny due process.

See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct.

2882, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976), discussed in Part III B below.

Another pertinent principle is that economic legislation has

a presumption of constitutionality, which may be overcome

by demonstrating that the legislation is arbitrary or irrational.

Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882 (noting that

“legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of

economic life come to the Court with a presumption of

constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of

a due process violation to establish that the legislature has

acted in an arbitrary and irrational way”) (citing, for example,

Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 10 L.Ed.2d

93 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483,

487-88, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955)). Thus, to prevail

here, the Utilities must demonstrate that the Act is arbitrary

and irrational as applied to them. They have carried that

burden.

The special assessment was wholly retroactive: it covered

only purchases of enriched uranium before the effective date

of the Act. The retroactivity was severe. It reached back to

the Utilities’ enriched uranium purchases that occurred up to

twenty-two years (or twenty-three years, in the case of Omaha

District) before the Act was passed, six years after Maine

Yankee had stopped purchasing government enriched ura-

nium, and three years after Sacramento District closed its

63a

plant. It also was substantial, subjecting the Utilities to

additional charges which they assert would total $25 million,

$8 million and almost $20 million for the three companies.

The Utilities did not cause or contribute to the contam-

ination of the government's plants, which the special assess-

ment was designed to cure, and did not benefit from it. The

Utilities allege that the contamination occurred prior to the

beginning of their purchases, when the plants were producing

enriched uranium “almost exclusively” for the military, and

that “[l}ittle, if any additional contamination” occurred there-

after. Moreover, when the Utilities entered into the purchase

contracts at a fixed price, they had no reason to believe, or

even suspect, that years later the government would seek to

make them pay for a substantial portion of its cleanup costs.

They may well have understood and expected that the

government would incur substantial expenses ir: making that

cleanup, but they reasonably would have believed that the

charges the government made for the enriched uranium

included the cleanup cost. They certainly had no basis to

expect that they would be subject to the additional large

amounts of the assessments.

To be sure, the Utilities benefited from their participation

in the government’s uranium enrichment program, but the

plant contamination and the cost of cleaning it up arose from

an earlier stage of that program (when the Utilities were not

participants). For the reasons just given, however, the

Utilities’ participation is not a sufficient basis under the Due

Process Clause to subject the Utilities to such a substantial

portion of the costs of cleaning up the contamination, which

they did not cause and from which they did not benefit.

B. The government contends that Usery v. Turner Elkhorn

Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 24, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 49 L.Ed.2d 752

(1976), supports the retroactive assessment against the

Utilities. Turner Elkhorn involved a provision of the Federal

Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 792, as

64a

amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 86 Stat.

150, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., that required mining companies

to pay death or total disability benefits to employee miners

suffering from pneumoconiosis (black lung disease), as

applied to miners who had stopped so working before the

effective date of the Act. The disease, whose symptoms may

“become apparent only after a miner has left the coal mines,”

id. at 8, 96 S.Ct. 2882, “is caused by long-term inhalation of

coal dust,” id. at 6, 96 S.Ct. 2882. The mining companies

challenged this retroactive application of the Act as violating

due process.

The Supreme Court upheld the Act against this challenge.

The Court recognized that the legislation imposed new

liability for disabilities developed prior to enactment, but

concluded that such retroactivity was “justified as a rational

measure to spread the costs of the employees’ disabilities to

those who have profited from the fruits of their labor.” /d. at

18, 96 S.Ct. 2882. It reflected the “interlocking economic

rights and duties of employers and employees,” and “ad-

just[ed] the burdens and benefits of economic life.” /d. at 15,

96 S.Ct. 2882. Thus, Turner Elkhorn held that it was not a

due process violation for legislation “to satisfy a specific need

created by the dangerous conditions under which the former

employee labored—to allocate to the mine operator an actual,

measurable cost of his business.” /d. at 19, 96 S.Ct. 2882.

The Court, however, in sustaining the presumptions of the

Coal Act relating to total disability, which were also at issue

in the case, stated: “To the extent that the presumption of

death due to pneumoconiosis is viewed as requiring com-

pensation for damages resulting from death unrelated to the

operator’s conduct, its application to employees who

terminated their employment before the Act was passed

would present difficulties not encountered in our prior

discussion of retroactivity. The justification we found for the

retrospective application of the Act is that it serves to spread

65a

costs in a rational manner—by allocating to the operator an

actual cost of his business, the avoidance of which might be

thought to have enlarged the operator’s profits. The damage

resulting from a miner’s death that is due to causes other than

the operator’s conduct can hardly be termed a ‘cost’ of the

operator’s business.” /d. at 24, 96 S.Ct. 2882; see also Con-

crete Pipe and Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508

U.S. 602, 641, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993);

United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 31, 114 S.Ct. 2018,

129 L.Ed.2d 22 (1994). Thus, in Turner Elkhorn, the

Supreme Court recognized culpability as an important factor

supporting the imposition of retroactive liability.

There is a critical difference between Turner Elkhorn and

the present case that precludes the application of Turner

Elkhorn here. In Turner Elkhorn the miners’ illness was

caused by conditions that existed when they were working for

the company, for which it was responsible and which

“profited from the fruits of their labor.” The company,

therefore, could fairly be charged with responsibility for its

former employees’ condition.

In the present case, however, the contamination occurred

before the government sold enriched uranium to the Utilities,

which neither were responsible for nor benefited from the

contamination. In these circumstances, as shown, it would be

unfair and unreasonable to subject the Utilities to a substantial

additional charge to cure the contamination they neither

caused nor benefited from.

In many (if not most) of the cases in which the Supreme

Court rejected Due Process challenges to retroactive legis-

lation, the statute dealt with the relationships, financial and

otherwise, among private parties; the government’s role was

only the regulation of those relationships. In the present case,

however, the statute deals with the relationship between the

government and private parties; it seeks to transfer to those

parties a substantial portion of the government’s costs of

66a

rectifying the contamination of its plants used to produce the

product it sold to those parties. It is by no means clear that

those Supreme Court cases may be automatically and

uncritically applied to the significantly different situation

here involved.

C. The government contends that the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of

1980 (“Environmental Response Act’), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et

seq. (1994), supports the validity under the Due Process

Clause of the retroactive assessment of clean-up costs on the

Utilities. Among other things, that Act provides for the

clean-up of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites and

established a Hazardous Substances Response Trust Fund

(“Superfund”) to pay for it. The Superfund was funded

initially, and in large part, by special taxes on certain

petroleum products and chemicals and was to be replenished

by assessments on persons responsible for the waste.

Hazardous Substance Response Revenue Act of 1980, Title

II, Subtitle A §§ 4611, 4661, Title II, Subtitle B, § 221, 26

U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4661, 42 U.S.C. § 9631. The government

used the Superfund to fund the clean-up and replenished the

cost by charging the persons responsible for the hazardous

waste. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(1), 9607. Such responsible

persons include those involved in the cleanup work, including

“the owner and operator of . . . a facility,” anyone who at the

time of disposal “owned or operated any facility at which

such hazardous substances were disposed of,” anyone who

arranged for or participated in the “transport for disposal or

treatment, of hazardous substances” and anyone who

“accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal

treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by

such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened

release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a

hazardous substance.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).

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The Environmental Response Act thus retroactively

imposes liability on numerous persons for cleanup of

pre-enactment contamination.

The government cites two Court of Appeals cases that

upheld the retroactive application of the Environmental

Response Act against Due Process challenges to its

constitutionality, as support for the constitutionality of the

retroactive assessment against the Utilities. United States v.

Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th

Cir.1986), held liable for cleanup costs individuals who

arranged for the transportation and dumping of hazardous

waste before the effective date of the Act. In United States v.

Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174 (4th Cir.1988), the court

ruled that retroactive application of the Environmental

Response Act did not violate due process as applied to (1)

landowners who leased their property to a company that

stored hazardous waste on the land and (2) the companies that

generated the waste but which contracted with another

waste-handling business, which provided transportation,

recycling and disposal of chemical waste. Noting that the

companies that generated the waste profited from inexpensive

waste disposal methods that may have been technically legal

prior to the [Environmental Response Act]’s enactment, it

was certainly foreseeable at the time that improper disposal

could cause enormous damage to the environment. [The

Environmental Response Act] operates remedially to spread

the costs of responding to improper waste disposal among all

parties that played a role in creating the hazardous condi-

tions. . . . [T]he retroactive application of [the Environmental

Response Act] does not violate due process. /d. at 174

(citations omitted).

In the present case, however, the Utilities did not

participate in any way, directly or indirectly, or play any role

in, the creation of the hazardous conditions at the gov-

ernment’s uranium facilities. The Utilities merely purchased

enriched uranium after the contamination had occurred, long

68a

before the passage of the Energy Act. The Utilities’ tangential

connection with the contamination of the government’s

uranium enrichment facilities is quite different from the

relationships to the hazardous waste disposal of the

persons held constitutionally liable under the Environmental

Response Act.

D. The government also contends that because 42 U.S.C.

§ 2297g-1(g) provides that the assessments “shall be deemed

a necessary and reasonable current cost of fuel and shall be-

fully recoverable in rates in all jurisdictions in the same

manner as the utility’s other fuel cost,” the Utilities will be

able to pass the assessments on to their customers, and that

the assessments, therefore, will not have any substantial

economic impact on them.

It is impossible to predict, however, to what extent (if any)

state and local regulatory agencies and courts would per-

mit the Utilities to treat the assessments as a “current cost

of fuel” in determining their rates. The question whether

§ 2297g-1(g) preempts state regulatory authority in this area

appears difficult. The power of Congress to require that

particular items be included in the Utilities’ costs for rate

making purposes is uncertain. Regulation of retail electric

power rates is a traditional function of state government. The

likelihood of the state action that the government envisions is

far too speculative and conjectural to constitute a valid basis

for upholding the assessments.

In any event, the question whether, and to what extent, the

state regulatory agencies and courts will recognize the

assessment as part of the Utilities’ costs for rate making

purposes appears more appropriately an issue for the damages

phase of these cases than for the liability phase.

E. In sum, I conclude that the Utilities’ complaints have

stated a valid claim under the Due Process Clause, and that the

Court of Federal Claims erred in dismissing the complaints for

failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

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APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

99-1464

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.,

NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY, NIAGARA MOHAWK

POWER CORPORATION, ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC

CORPORATION, ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, DUKE ENERGY

CORPORATION, ENTERGY GULF STATES, INC., FLORIDA

POWER CORPORATION, FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT

COMPANY, GPU NUCLEAR, INC. (on behalf of Jersey

Central Power & Light Company, Metropolitan Edison

Company, and Pennsylvania Electric Company), INDIANA

MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY, NEBRASKA PUBLIC

POWER DISTRICT, PECO ENERGY COMPANY, SOUTHERN

2 CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, SOUTHERN NUCLEAR

: OPERATING COMPANY, INC., SYSTEM FUELS, INC., TEXAS

UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY, VIRGINIA ELECTRIC &

POWER COMPANY, WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY

SYSTEM, WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION, AND

WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION (on

behalf of Kansas City Power & Light Company, Kansas

Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., and Kansas Gas and

Electric Company),

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Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

UNITED STATES, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, DEPARTMENT OF

ENERGY AS SUCCESSOR TO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC

ENERGY COMMISSION, and ENERGY RESEARCH AND

DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION,

Defendants-Appellants.

70a

DECIDED: May 3, 2001

Senior Judge Whitman Knapp

Before RADER, Circuit Judge, PLAGER, Senior Circuit

_ Judge,” and GAJARSA, Circuit Judge.

RADER, Circuit Judge.

Consolidated Edison Company of New York and twenty-one

other nuclear utilities (collectively, Con Ed) sued the United

States, the Department of Energy, and the Energy Research and

Development Administration in the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York seeking declaratory

judgments and injunctive relief. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v.

United States, 45 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Con Ed’s

suit challenged the constitutionality of the Energy Policy Act of

1992 (EPACT), 42 U.S.C. § 2297g (1994), on due process and

takings grounds. The district court denied the Government’s

motion to transfer the case to the United States Court of Federal

Claims, or alternatively, to dismiss.

On December 5, 2000, this court affirmed the district court’s

decision to deny the Government’s motion. The Government

filed a suggestion that this court rehear that December 5

decision en banc. This court unanimously accepted the

petition. Accordingly, this court, acting en banc, vacated the

judgment of this court entered on December 5, 2000, and

reported at 234 F.3d 642 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The en banc court

then reassigned the opinion to the panel for revision. Because

the Court of Federal Claims can offer an adequate remedy in

this case, this court now reverses and remands.

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Con Ed sued the Government, challenging the constitution-

ality of EPACT. Before EPACT, Con Ed contracted with the

Government for uranium enrichment services under a series of

fixed-price agreements. After enactment of EPACT in 1992,

the Government began decontaminating and decommissioning

several of its uranium processing facilities. EPACT stipulated

that the Government would pay sixty-eight percent of the

decontamination and decommissioning costs; annual assess-

ments on domestic nuclear utilities would supply the remain-

ing thirty-two percent. EPACT made the Department of

Energy responsible for computing each utility’s share of the

assessment in proportion to that utility’s use of Government

enrichment sefvices in the past. 42 U.S.C. § 2297g-1(c) (1994)

(amended 1998).

After making initial payments under EPACT, Con Ed, and

other nuclear utilities not parties to this suit, sued the

Government in the Court of Federal Claims seeking refunds of

those payments. The lawsuits before the Court of Federal

Claims asserted many of the same constitutional grounds as this

lawsuit. In one such case, this court reversed the Court of

Federal Claims’ grant of summary judgment in favor of a

nuclear utility, concluding that collection of the assessments

under EPACT did not violate the utility’s contract under which

it had purchased the enriched uranium from the government,

nor constituted a taking of the utility’s contract rights. Yankee

Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir.

1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2365 (1998).

~ After several subsequent nuclear utility losses in the Court of

Federal Claims, Con Ed filed this suit in the district court.

Instead of seeking refunds of assessments, however, Con Ed

sought a declaratory judgment that EPACT was unconstitu-

tional on several grounds and an injunction on enforcement of

the EPACT assessments. By taking this procedural posture,

Con Ed sought a hearing in another forum. To achieve this

72a

objective, Con Ed drew its complaint to avoid prayers for relief

actionable in the Court of Federal Claims, such as claims

against the United States for — damages. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 702 (1994).

The Government moved the district court to transfer this case

to the Court of Federal Claims, where other nuclear utility cases

await disposition. The Government contended that Con Ed’s

suit in the district court under the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA) amounts to impermissible forum shopping. The APA,

according to the Government, does not. waive sovereign

immunity from this suit in the district court because Con Ed can

obtain full legal relief, if successful, in the Court of Federal

Claims. Specifically, the Government noted that the Court of

Federal Claims has, on occasion, asserted power under the

Tucker Act to order a full refund of illegally exacted funds. See

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994); New York Life Ins. Co. v.

United States, 118 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Thus, if Con Ed

can show illegal exaction of EPACT assessments, the

Government maintained, the Court of Federal Claims may have

authority to order a refund. Lawsuits seeking that remedy were

already pending in the Court of Federal Claims.

The Government discounted potential restrictions on the

Court of Federal Claims’ power to order injunctive or other

prospective relief. If the EPACT assessments in fact violate

constitutional guarantees, the Government asserted, injunctive

relief would not be necessary. Rather, res judicata would bar

the Government from future assessments against Con Ed under

EPACT in the face of a Court of Federal Claims illegal

exaction judgment. In addition, the Government assured that it

would not attempt to make future assessments after a loss in the

Court of Federal Claims.

In the face of these arguments, the district court denied the

Government’s motion. The district court cited cases from the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the

United States Supreme Court to confirm that the APA waives

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the sovereign immunity of the United States for suits that

properly invoke equitable relief from agency action. Bowen v.

Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 904 (1988); In re Chateaugay

Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 493 (2d Cir. 1995). After denying the

Government’s motion, the district court certified the

jurisdictional question for interlocutory review. This court has

exclusive jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(d)(4)(A) (1994).

Il.

The sole question in this case is whether the APA waives

sovereign immunity for an action in a district court on the

merits of Con Ed’s claim because Con Ed seeks declaratory and

prospective injunctive relief, rather than a refund of EPACT

payments. This court reviews legal questions, such as

jurisdiction and authority of the Court of Federal Claims and

the district court, without deference. Terran v. Sec’y of Health

& Human Servs., 195 F.3d 1302, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

To invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court for relief from

monetary obligations imposed by a federal agency, a litigant

must show that the United States has waived its sovereign

immunity. Kanemoto v. Reno, 41 F.3d 641, 644 (Fed. Cir.

1994) (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586-87

(1941) (“The terms of [the sovereign’s] consent to be sued in

any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.”’)).

The Supreme Court has explained that a litigant may invoke the

APA as a waiver of sovereign immunity, thereby invoking

district court jurisdiction, if the litigant can. satisfy both

5 U.S.C. § 702 (by requesting “relief other than money

damages’) and 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994) (no “adequate remedy” is

available elsewhere, such as the Court of Federal Claims).

Bowen, 487 U.S. at 892-93, 904-05. Although Con Ed may

satisfy § 702 by not seeking “money damages,” jurisdiction still

lies in the Court of Federal Claims because that court can

provide an “adequate remedy” in this case within the meaning

of § 704.

74a

Under specified circumstances, the APA waives sovereign

immunity for actions challenging agency actions in district

court. Section 702 provides:

A person suffering legal wrong because of agency

action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action

within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to

judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the United

States seeking relief other than money damages and

stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee

thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or

under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor

relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the

United States or that the United States is an indispensable

party.... Nothing herein... confers authority to grant

relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit

expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.

5 U.S.C. § 702 (emphasis added). Thus, the APA “eliminat[es]

the defense of sovereign immunity in cases covered by

[§ 702].” Bowen, 487 U.S. at 892.

Section 702, however, denies this sovereign immunity

waiver to claims for money damages or for claims that seek

remedies “expressly or impliedly” precluded by other statutes.

5 U.S.C. § 702; Transohio Sav. Bank v. Dir., Office of Thrift

Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In Bowen,

the Supreme Court examined this limitation on APA waivers.

In that case, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sought

review of a final order of the Secretary of Health and Human

Services refusing to reimburse a category of Medicaid

expenses. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 882. The Supreme Court set

forth reasons that § 702’s exclusion for money damages claims

did not foreclose district court judicial review of Massachusetts’

monetary claims. As explained below, however, this court need

not address the § 702 limitation in this case because another

limitation on APA review precludes district court review.

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75a

In addition to § 702’s “money damages” limitation, § 704 of

the APA further excludes from the APA’s sovereign immunity

waiver those claims for which adequate remedies are elsewhere

available. 5 U.S.C. § 704; Transohio, 967 F.2d at 608. Section

704 states, in relevant part: “Agency action made reviewable

by statute and final agency action for which there is no other

adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.”

5 U.S.C. § 704 (emphasis added). In other words, a claimant

with an alternative adequate remedy in another court, such as

the Court of Federal Claims, cannot seek review of agency

action in a district court under the APA.

Therefore, Con Ed must show that § 704 does not withdraw

any waiver of sovereign immunity otherwise granted by § 702.

Section 704 codifies a requirement ensuring that the general

grant of review in the APA does not “duplicate existing

procedures for review of agency action.” Bowen, 487 U.S. at

903. In effect, § 704 withdraws the limited waiver of immunity

under § 702 if an adequate judicial remedy is already available

elsewhere. 5 U.S.C. § 704; see also Kanemoto, 41 F.3d at 644

(“[W]here agency action is otherwise reviewable in court and

an adequate remedy is available in connection with that review,

the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity under section 702 is

not available.”); Mitchell v. United States, 930 F.2d 893, 895-

96 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

As noted earlier, the district court relied on the Supreme

Court’s Bowen decision for the proposition that the Court of

Federal Claims could not offer an adequate remedy in this

case. Consolidated Edison, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 336 (stating that

APA has waived sovereign immunity “[bJecause the relief

sought here is disproportionately prospective and therefore

equitable (as opposed to compensatory).”). Bowen, however,

does not enunciate a broad rule that the Court of Federal Claims

cannot supply an adequate remedy in any case seeking

injunctive relief.

76a

At the outset, this court notes that the Supreme Court’s ruling

in Bowen emphasized the complexity of the continuous

relationship between the federal and state governments

administering the Medicaid program. The Supreme Court was

“not willing to assume, categorically, that a naked money

judgment against the United States will always be an adequate

substitute for prospective relief fashioned in the iight of the

rather complex ongoing relationship between the parties.”

Bowen, 487 U.S. at 905. The Supreme Court’s choice of

absolute language such as “categorically” and “always” leaves

room for the proposition that the Court of Federal Claims may

well supply an adequate remedy in cases without a complex

ongoing federal-state interface. See, e.g., Kanemoto, 41 F.3d at

645. Unlike the Medicaid program with its shifting populations

and demographics, advancing medical technologies, unfore-

seenable health threats, and varying state and federal economic

conditions, the relationship between Con Ed and the United

States features a known and fixed series of payments over time.

For this reason, among others, Bowen does not enunciate the

categorical rule that the district court attributed to it.

In Bowen, the Supreme Court gave several other reasons that

the Court of Federal Claims could not supply an adequate

remedy in that particular complex ongoing federal-state

relationship. For instance, the Court labeled “doubtful” “the

jurisdiction of the [Court of Federal Claims] to entertain the

action, or perhaps even to enter a specific money judgment

against the United States.” /d. at 905; see also Bowen at 906

n.42. Although the Supreme Court had doubts about the Court

of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction over Medicaid disallowance

decisions, this case presents no jurisdictional problems. The

Court of Federal Claims has long possessed jurisdiction to

consider constitutional claims, such as Con Ed’s claims about

the EPACT assessments, under the “illegal exaction” doctrine.

New York Life Ins., 118 F.3d at 1553; Eastport S.S. Corp. v.

United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Mallow v.

United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 446 (1963). Indeed, the factual

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77a

background and the constitutional claims at issue in the current

litigation overlap with those already before the Court of Federal

Claims. Thus, another reason for the Supreme Court’s

apprehensions in Bowen is not present in this case.

The Supreme Court further suggested in Bowen that “the

nature of the controversies that give rise to disallowance

decisions typically involve state governmental activities that a

district court would be in a better position to understand and

evaluate than a single tribunal headquartered in Washington.”

487 U.S. at 907-08. Unlike Bowen, which involved a dispute

between the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the United

States, this case does not involve a state at all. This case relates

to a contract between the utilities and the Government, and

specifically, the utilities’ financial obligations under EPACT.

This case does not involve the complexities of government-to-

government relationships. This case does not involve

“[mJanaging the relationships between States and the Federal

Government that occur over time and that involve constantly

shifting balance sheets.” /d. at 904 n.39. In sum, this case does

not “involve state governmental activities that a district court

would be in a better position to understand and evaluate” than

the Court of Federal Claims. /d. at 907-08. In Bowen, the

Supreme Court linked its judgment to a specific set of

circumstances that are not present in this case. The Supreme

Court’s language and reasoning in that case do not preclude the

Court of Federal Claims’ illegal exaction doctrine from

providing an adequate remedy in the circumstances of this case.

Il.

Indeed the procedural background and facts of this case

indicate that the Court of Federal Claims can supply an

adequate remedy even without an explicit grant of

prospective relief. Turning first to the facts of this case, Con

Ed’s district court complaint seeks a prospective injunction

on its future payments of money under EPACT. In the event

of success in its claims before the Court of Federal Claims,

78a

Con Ed will receive a refund of all payments under EPACT

because the United States illegally exacted those funds. In

the face of such a judgment, the United States could not

proceed to assess further EPACT payments without again

illegally exacting funds. Res judicata principles would

require immediate refund of any assessment with interest. See

Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., Inc., 947 F.2d 469, 475-76 (Fed.

Cir. 1991) (“The principles of law denominated ‘res judicata’

embody the public policy of putting an end to litigation.”).

Moreover, this court cannot imagine that the United States

would continue to require the utility companies to pay

unlawful exactions.

In sum, Con Ed’s district court case in reality seeks only

prospective monetary relief. Con Ed’s case for retrospective

monetary relief before the Court of Federal Claims overlaps

with its claims for prospective monetary relief before the

district court. Relief from its retrospective obligations will

also relieve it from the same obligations prospectively. In

this case, without the complexities of the ongoing federal-

state relationships present in Bowen, a money judgment in the

Court of Federal Claims will provide Con Ed with an

adequate remedy against the same exactions in the future.

See, e.g., Kanemoto, 41 F.3d at 645 (“[A] ‘naked money

judgment’ would provide Kanemoto an adequate remedy.”).

The procedural background of this case seals the

conclusion that Con Ed has an adequate remedy in the Court

of Federal Claims. Con Ed originally sued in the Court of

Federal Claims seeking a refund of payments made under

EPACT, asserting many of the same constitutional claims it

asserts before the district court. After initial successes, the

utility companies’ cases took a turn against its position.

Yankee Atomic, 112 F.3d at 1571. Only at that late stage of

the litigation did Con Ed file this suit in district court deleting

all reference to monetary recovery and instead seeking a

declaratory judgment and an injunction.

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79a

This court and its sister circuits will not tolerate a litigant’s

attempt to artfully recast its complaint to circumvent the

jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. Veda, Inc. v.

United States Dep't of Air Force, 111 F.3d 37, 39 (6th Cir.

1997) (citing A.E. Finley & Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 898

F.2d 1165, 1167 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[O]ne cannot circumvent

exclusive jurisdiction in the Claims Court by suing simply for

declaratory or injunctive relief in a case where such relief

would be the equivalent of a judgment for money

damages.”’)); Marshall Leasing, Inc. v. United States, 893

F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1990); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v.

United States, 901 F.2d 1530, 1532 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting

Rogers v. Ink, 766 F.2d 430, 434 (10th Cir. 1985) (“A party

may not circumvent the Claims Court’s exclusive jurisdiction

by framing a complaint in the district court as one seeking

injunctive, declaratory or mandatory relief where the thrust of

the suit is to obtain money from the United States.”)); see

also Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Califano, 571 F.2d 58, 61-63

(1st Cir. 1978); Ala. Rural Fire Ins. Co. v. Naylor, 530 F.2d

1221, 1225-26 (Sth Cir. 1976). The circuits have consistently

rebuffed such blatant forum shopping to avoid adequate

remedies in an alternative forum. /d.

Every legal issue that Con Ed seeks to resolve in this

district court case could be (and, in some cases, has been)

decided in a suit before the Court of Federal Claims.

Likewise, as evidenced by the previously filed Court of

Federal Claims litigations, a refund of the EPACT payments

could provide an adequate remedy for Con Ed and other

utilities. Moreover, a decision by the Court of Federal Claims

would effectively moot any prospective relief that the district

court could afford. Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims

can supply an “adequate remedy” to prevent the constitutional

wrongs alleged by Con Ed. Therefore, under § 704, an

adequate remedy in the Court of Federal Claims deprives Con

Ed of duplicative district court adjudication.

80a

CONCLUSION

Because §704’s exception for alternative adequate

remedies forecloses a waiver cf immunity under § 702 in this

case, the district court erred in denying the Government’s

motion to transfer to the Court of Federal Claims. This court

returns this case to the district court with directions to

transfer.

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

99-1464

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.,

NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY, NIAGARA MOHAWK

POWER CORPORATION, ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC

CORPORATION, ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, DUKE ENERGY

CORPORATION, ENTERGY GULF STATES, INC., FLORIDA

POWER CORPORATION, FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT

COMPANY, GPU NUCLEAR, INC. (on behalf of Jersey

Central Power & Light Company, Metropolitan Edison

Company, and Pennsylvania Electric Company), INDIANA

MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY, NEBRASKA PUBLIC

POWER DISTRICT, PECO ENERGY COMPANY, SOUTHERN

CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, SOUTHERN NUCLEAR

OPERATING COMPANY, INC., SYSTEM FUELS, INC., TEXAS

UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY, VIRGINIA ELECTRIC &

POWER COMPANY, WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY

SYSTEM, WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION, AND

WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION (on

behalf of Kansas City Power & Light Company, Kansas

Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., and Kansas Gas and

Electric Company),

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

¥.

UNITED STATES, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, DEPARTMENT OF

ENERGY AS SUCCESSOR TO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC

ENERGY COMMISSION, and ENERGY RESEARCH AND

DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION,

Defendants-Appellants.

82a

PLAGER, Senior Circuit Judge,” concurring.

This case confronts the court with a choice between a

seemingly illogical Supreme Court rule, calling for a less-than-

sensible result, on the one hand, or under-ruling the Supreme

Court decision, here Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879

(1988), on the other. This time the court has chosen the latter

course. I cannot disagree; it remains to be seen whether the

Supreme Court will.

** Judge Plager assumed senior status on November 30, 2000.

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83a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

99-1464

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.,

NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY, NIAGARA MOHAWK

POWER CORPORATION, ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC

CORPORATION, ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, DUKE ENERGY

3 CORPORATION, ENTERGY GULF STATES, INC., FLORIDA

POWER CORPORATION, FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT

COMPANY, GPU NUCLEAR, INC. (on behalf of Jersey

‘ Central Power & Light Company, Metropolitan Edison

; Company, and Pennsylvania Electric Company), INDIANA

: MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY, NEBRASKA PUBLIC

§ POWER DISTRICT, PECO ENERGY COMPANY, SOUTHERN

CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, SOUTHERN NUCLEAR

: OPERATING COMPANY, INC., SYSTEM FUELS, INC., TEXAS

t UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY, VIRGINIA ELECTRIC &

t POWER COMPANY, WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY

SYSTEM, WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION, AND

WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION (on

behalf of Kansas City Power & Light Company, Kansas

Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., and Kansas Gas And

Electric Company),

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

UNITED STATES, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, DEPARTMENT OF

ENERGY AS SUCCESSOR TO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC

ENERGY COMMISSION, And ENERGY RESEARCH AND

DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION,

Defendants-Appellants.

84a

ORDER

The Appellants filed a combined petition for rehearing and

rehearing en banc. A response thereto invited by the court, and

filed by the Appellees. The petition for rehearing and response

were referred to the panel that heard the appeal, and thereafter,

the petition for rehearing en banc and response were referred to

the circuit judges who are in regular active service. A poll

having been taken, it is

ORDERED that the petition for rehearing en banc was

granted; the judgment of the court entered on December 5,

2000, and reported at 234 F.3d 642 (Fed. Cir. 2000), is hereby

vacated; and the opinion of the court accompanying the

judgment is withdrawn. The en banc court returned this appeal

to the merits panel, who issue the revised opinion that

accompanies this order.

FOR THE COURT,

May 3, 2001

Date

s/ Jan Horbaly

JAN HORBALY

Clerk

cc: Daniel R. Murdock, Esq.

Mark W. Pennak, Esq.

Melvin C. Garbow, Esq.

85a

APPENDIX D

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

[Filed: February 3, 2000]

No. 97-269C

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

7,

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

Energy Policy Act of 1992

Takings Clause; Illegal Exactions;

- Yankee Atomic; Eastern Enterprises

OPINION

ALLEGRA, Judge:

This case is before the court on plaintiff’s motion to stay

the proceedings and defendant’s motion to dismiss under

RCFC 12(b)(4). Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that a special

assessment imposed by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42

U.S.C. § 2297g et seq., is unlawful as either effectuating a

taking or an illegal exaction. After careful consideration of

the briefs filed by the parties, the oral argument, and for the

reasons discussed below,

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

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