Opposition Brief — Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc.
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No. 01-1324 APRiO wi
PE OPFICE CO? tik Oring
In The as
Supreme Court of the United States
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THE METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, AND
EMMITT TURNER, CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Petitioners,
Vv.
DEJA VU OF NASHVILLE, INC., et al.,
Respondents.
¢
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Sixth Circuit
*
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
6
H. Louts Sirkin BRADLEY J. SHAFER
SirKIN, PINALES, MEzIBOV (Counsel of Record)
& SCHWARTZ SHAFER & Associates, P.C.
920 Fourth & Race Tower 3800 Capital City Blvd.,
105 West Fourth Street Suite 2
Cincinnati, Ohio Lansing, Michigan 48906
45202-2776 517-886-6560
MicHAeEL F. PLEASANTS
8 South Third, Suite 200
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
JOHN E. HERBISON
2016 Eighth Avenue South
Nashville, Tennessee 37204
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
.
-
sinaiubieesal
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Chap-
ter 6.54 of the Metropolitan Code of Nashville and David-
son County lacks the required prompt judicial review by
failing to guarantee access to state courts. The question of
whether the prompt judicial review component requires
prompt judicial access or prompt judicial determination
played little if any role in the court’s decision. Because
the only available “appellate” remedy available in the
State of Tennessee is the discretionary common law writ
of certiorari, the ordinance fails under even the less
restrictive access definition of the prompt judicial review
requirement. As such, this case presents the question of
whether a discretionary review procedure satisfies the
prompt judicial review requirement, without regard to
whether that requirement mandates prompt determina-
tion or merely prompt access to the courts.
li
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ......scccccsccssasssseons
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......csccsscsssussususss
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT
OF CERTIORARI .........:.s0scscsccessuspeueene
ADDITIONAL RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVI-
SIONS .......0006s0055060 555500 eee
STATEMENT IN OPPOSITION ......cccsssccsesssas
REASONS THAT THE PETITION SHOULD BE
DENIED .......000000000000850 000 0 On en
i
II.
Ill.
THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
WAS PREDICATED UPON THE FACT THAT
THE “JUDICIAL REVIEW” AFFORDED BY
CHAPTER 6.54 AND TENNESSEE LAW IS
DISCRETIONARY IN NATURE .............
THE SCOPE OF REVIEW UNDER THE TEN-
NESSEE COMMON LAW WRIT OF CER-
TIORARI IS FAR TOO NARROW TO AFFORD
ADEQUATE PROTECTIONS TO FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTED ACTIVITIES ...
THE PETITIONER’S ABANDONMENT OF A
FUNDAMENTAL TENANT OF ITS ARGU-
MENT BELOW DOES NOT SERVE TO OBVI-
ATE THE REALITY THAT CHAPTER 6.54
FAILS TO GUARANTEE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
AN ADVERSE ADMINISTRATIVE RULING,
IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER SUCH RELIEF
IS AFFORDED PROMPTLY OR NOT.........
ili
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page
IV. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED
BECAUSE THE SIXTH CIRCUIT RULED
CORRECTLY IN THIS ACTION........... 15
V. THE CONFLICT AMONGST THE CIRCUITS
IDENTIFIED BY PETITIONER IS NOT AS
FRACTIOUS AS PETITIONER ASSERTS.... 17
ees bas 6 oNhG 56 bU pended bake 0s 48 0 18
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases:
11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's Cty., 58
Oe SOO CGE GC, Boon cc cnncsacsnsccassenasans 17
Baby Tam & Co. v. Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir.
PP cd iS pada aseasdsdedesiceatiniatsssisasrernavn 17
peeent w. Risel, 50 US. GIO CIG7E) oc aces cccccccnans 16
Boyce v. Williams, 389 S.W.2d 272 (Tenn. 1965)........ 4
Clark v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 827 S.W.2d
SES CEO. AMD. BSPT) oon cc cccsscrwesisvnnssnes 4,15
Connection Distributing Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281
SE SR ES wn ons ss cecdacanticensadnseadengssan 13
Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metropolitan Gov't of
Nashville and Davidson Cty., Tenn., 274 F.3d 377
SE ee RD Ko can csadeesedudd civenanane 4,5, 13, 14
Enochs v. Narren, 949 S.W.2d 686 (Tenn. App. 1996) .... 10
Fite v. State Board of Paroles, 925 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn.
BD. THGG) oo acs cratneieacasencasgenssantadsiavenas 15
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) ........ passim
FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1980) ........ 7, 16
Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1509 (7th Cir. 1993) .... 17
Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248 (5th
Sk MEE A4ceMidedhaw cae eaeb i ieasedasendanbatecns 13
Helton v. State, 250 S.W.2d 540 (Tenn. 1952) .......... 6
Henry v. Board of Claims, 638 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn.
RD. TIGR) 6 acc cstnacncivrcczsccsecssevenievisecens 7
Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transporta-
tion Authority, 984 F.2d 1319 (1st Cir. 1993) ....... 17
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Nightclubs, Inc. v. Paducah, 202 F.3d 884 (6th Cir.
rrr rrr errr ry ye ere et eee 17
Powell v. Parole Eligibility Review Board, 879 S.W.2d
S71 (Tem. App. 1996) . 0.20. ccsscccccscascsns 6, 7,9
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147
(ROGIE os ikinivickn an ancekidadsseeasis tee 16
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
| re reer es rir Perr eset ts 11, 16
State ex rel. McMurrow v. Hunt, 192 S.W. 931 (Tenn.
WOU) ok inc da nnduawhancnkaeeesnees eee 6
Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 122 S.Ct. 775 (2002) ..3, 17
Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., 484.U.S. 383
(ROE) ooo vnndcia0neecevnaednees ake nese erenanenene 15
Yokley v. State, 632 S.W.2d 123 (Tenn. App. 1981)..... 7
STATUTES:
BOA. GA7G4G0 ain c ncn kccnnutauseesseeeeaeee 1, 4, 10
phew WE vr, 2 POPeTeTerT eT eer rere 1, 10
TA. G27 BGG). 0 occas incncacaanessaesasaweseae ee 10
TCA. S27 BUM. 0.00 ona cksesessavseguaheqacewer eae 5
TCA. GBF ODDS oo oo sc nanstneennscanenanianedaaneen 1, 8
Metropolitan Code of Nashville and Davidson
County Cirapter 6.56... 6 cc sccsinccansananeanns passim
Grd. GOIGUD) «0 00 cnkssdenvsncdonsedencohs niaer ee 12
Ow. GRIGKS) oo inci ccccesecesdscaxciadaenuseeaees 12
Ont. GOODILD oc asaidtinsisise ee 12
Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
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Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
Ord.
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
DRONE 0.0 66000ss08000000880s000 eee 12
4g th PePerPerTreyyrerrrrrr rrr rr rrr 8
DOTS EDs 0 0.0 20006000600000080000e eee 8
SIT OR 005d cencnusccuscucesesetareeeee 8
BIDEN POND 0 606 ¥0'0208000010440000r eee 8
RRGUGED 006 scccubecssanesssensnease 8
SOY S BPPPTTOTererre rere rer re ee Pees 8
ROI ¢ 0 00 0600bssdenenksensneeeeeeee 8
SUG) 000026 0000550006000ns eee 8
OD OGa de 6 0.0 000s55000080000000"e"0 ee 4
SOTIEMSs 0 000 csevdaseesnssuvatesaaneeee 12
SOG). «oc vtcecstedeenseisanseeeeee 12
Sade 6s 06 00800bneoed6seseeteee )
Ft | POPP EP er re ee he 8
GIG 0 sc 600008043 20800000 0e eee 8
SAPO) 6 56 500scetenseevnsneeeeeeeee 4
CTRL 00k 00000050080840sne eee 12
DEFOR 00 0s0060dasecknsensee ee 12
GOS AMED 6000 dkcsatdsesieenaieeee eee 8
GORE 0 00 8000600650019 00 eee 8
D.REBURD 0 ocnssvsnccecsacsvahadapansaeeneeeee 8
S.2900M) ois iscscscvacscessee eee 4
Vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Ss PN 6 4 8:ib ben cusdddnnenccsedddccanes 8
Se este sonchakedscekssnanatnwsesssabuns 8
Gs PE heb bcccancnddicdesnvaeecnsdensadens +
Metropolitan Code of Nashville and Davidson
COC CRON FBO es co sneciscocnsccccescuss 1, 8
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:
ae GND, MME, Bo oc cnscccisanestscscescccenssasae O
MISCELLANEOUS:
Mark Guthrie, Methods of Judicial Review Over
Administrative Actions in Tennessee, 13 Memphis
St. Univ. L.Rev. 657 (T983).......... SE ee ray 10
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc., Michael Rucker, Michael
Butler, Meroney Entertainment, Inc., the Pleasure Palace,
Inc., Dawn Pierce, Elizabeth Martz, the 822 Corporation
and 421 Corporation (collectively “Respondents”),
respectfully request that this Court deny the Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari filed by the Metropolitan Government
of Nashville and Davidson County and Emmett Turner to
review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rendered in this case.
¢
ADDITIONAL RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
In addition to the constitutional, statutory, and ordi-
nance provisions reproduced in the appendix to the Peti-
tion, Respondents submit here the Tennessee common
law writ of certiorari statute found at Tenn. Code Ann.
§27-8-101 (Opp. App. 1a),! the Tennessee statutory writ of
certiorari provision appearing at Tenn. Code Ann.
§27-8-102 (Opp. App. 1a), Tenn. Code Ann. §57-4-204
(Opp. App. 19a-22a), and Metropolitan Code Section
7.24.030 (Opp. App. 22a-25a).
+
1 As used herein, “Pet. App. xxx” refers to pages of the
appendix accompanying the Petition, and “Opp. App. xxx”
refers to pages of the appendix attached hereto.
STATEMENT IN OPPOSITION
If this Court is searching for a case to resolve the
question of whether the “prompt judicial review” compo-
nent of Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) requires a
prompt judicial determination on the merits or merely
“prompt judicial access,” this is not it.
The Ordinance at issue here guarantees neither a
prompt judicial determination of the propriety of the
government’s actions nor prompt access to a judicial
forum. Adverse decisions of the sexually oriented busi-
ness licensing board (“Board”) made pursuant to Chapter
6.54 are reviewable only upon the issuance of a common
law writ of certiorari. This procedure is inherently flawed
in at least three respects. First, because the issuance of the
writ is discretionary in nature, aggrieved applicants and
license holders are not guaranteed access to a judicial
forum. Second, even if the writ is ultimately accepted and
judicial access is granted, the court is not required to
issue a decision as to whether to review a particular case
within a specific and reasonable period of time. The court
could conceivably delay ruling upon a petition for writ of
certiorari indefinitely, during which time the applicant’s
First Amendment rights are continually violated. Third,
even if a writ of certiorari is promptly issued, the court is
precluded from providing adequate judicial review
because it cannot review the intrinsic correctness of a
decision.
Given these flaws, the judicial review provisions con-
tained in Chapter 6.54 do not constitute an adequate and
appropriate mechanism of prompt judicial review,
regardless of how the words “prompt” and “review” are
defined. This was, indeed, the focus of the Sixth Circuit's
ruling and not the question of whether prompt judicial
review requires prompt determination or mere access.
Therefore, not only does this case constitute an inade-
quate vehicle to resolve any conflict amongst the circuits,
but that dispute may well never be reached by this Court
should it elect to review the Sixth Circuit’s decision.
In addition, Petitioner overstates the disparity
between circuit rulings addressing the construction of the
phrase “prompt judicial review.” A number of the deci-
sions that Petitioner relies on to establish a conflict actu-
ally involved content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions similar to those at issue in Thomas v. Chicago
Park District, 122 S.Ct. 775 (2002). Because such restric-
tions are not required to contain the Freedman procedural
guarantees generally necessary for targeted adult busi-
ness regulations to pass constitutional muster, Thomas,
122 S.Ct. at 780, n.2, there is no circuit conflict between
those decisions and the ruling of the Sixth Circuit here.
*
REASONS THAT THE PETITION
SHOULD BE DENIED
I. THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT WAS
PREDICATED UPON THE FACT THAT THE “JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW” AFFORDED BY CHAPTER 6.54
AND TENNESSEE LAW IS DISCRETIONARY IN
NATURE.
Petitioner appropriately acknowledges here, as it has
throughout the entirety of these legal proceedings, that
the potentially available “judicial review” of an adverse
administrative decision by the Board is by way of a
“common law writ of certiorari from a state trial court.”
Petition, p. 4, citing, Ord. §§.040(E)(2),2 .070(D)(2),
.110(M), and .150(E)(6). See also, Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc.
v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Cty., Tenn.,
274 F.3d 377, 401 n.6 (6th Cir. 2001) (Metro acknowledg-
ing at oral argument in the Sixth Circuit that the provi-
sions of Chapter 6.54 only authorize review “via the
common law writ”). Petitioner admits that the Metro-
politan code does not “guarantee that the appeal will be
decided by a date certain.” Petition, p. 2. In fact, Chapter
6.54 and the overlying Tennessee statute of common law
certiorari does not even guarantee that any form of judi-
cial review will be provided at all.
The Tennessee “common law” writ of certiorari is
found in Tenn. Code Ann. 27-8-101. Opp. App. 1a. Pur-
suant to that statute, a court has the absolute discretion to
deny a petition for issuance of the writ, and never then
reach the merits of the issues sought to be reviewed.
“(Whether the common law writ of certiorari will
issue is a matter of discretion. It is not issued as a matter
of right.” Boyce v. Williams, 389 S.W.2d 272, 277 (Tenn.
1965). See also, Clark v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 827
S.W.2d 312, 316-17 (Tenn. App. 1991) (“the remedy of
certiorari is not available as of right, but is granted under
unusual or extraordinary circumstances. It is instituted by
an application to a court of competent jurisdiction which
2 The designation of “Ord. §.xxx” specifies particular
provisions of Chapter 6.54. The sections and subsections
referred to are found in the version of that Ordinance which are
reproduced at Pet. App. 130a-176a.
may or may not authorize the writ”) (emphasis added).
And, the Petitioner acknowledges this discretionary
nature of the common law writ. See, Petition, p. 4 (“If the
trial court grants the writ, and thus determines to con-
sider the appeal ... ”) (emphasis added).
In addition, not only is granting of the writ discre-
tionary, but there is no time limit for a court to decide
upon whether to grant the petition or not, and then
review the merits of the dispute. Tenn. Code Ann.
§27-9-111(e) (Pet. App. 129a).3 Accordingly, Chapter 6.54,
together with the common law writ, does not even pro-
vide prompt access to a judicial forum. It is this aspect of
Chapter 6.54 and Tennessee law which served as the
lynchpin of the Sixth Circuit ruling, and not any deter-
mination as to whether “prompt judicial review” necessi-
tated a prompt judicial determination or merely
mandated prompt access to a court. Deja Vu of Nashville,
274 F.3d at 401-02 (the appellate court referring to the
discretionary nature of the common law writ as the “big-
gest problem with the Ordinance’s judicial review provi-
sion”) (emphasis added).
3 Petitioner states that the Metropolitan Government “has
no power to require a state court to grant a writ of certiorari or
to act on an appeal by any particular date.” Petition, p. 4. While
technically true, that statement is not, as they say, accurate.
After the District Court issued its first preliminary injunction
enjoining Chapter 6.54 for failing to comply with the Freedman
procedural guarantees, Metro successfully lobbied for the
Tennessee Legislature to enact what is the current version of
Tenn. Code Ann. §27-9-111(e). That statute does, of course,
compel a court “to act on an appeal by .. . [a] particular date.”
Pet. App. 129a.
II. THE SCOPE OF REVIEW UNDER THE TENNES-
SEE COMMON LAW WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS
FAR TOO NARROW TO AFFORD ADEQUATE
PROTECTIONS TO FIRST AMENDMENT PRO-
TECTED ACTIVITIES.
Simply put, the Tennessee common law writ of cer-
tiorari is not appellate review at all. See, Helton v. State, 250
S.W.2d 540, 541 (Tenn. 1952), quoting, State ex rel. McMur-
row v. Hunt, 192 S.W. 931, 933 (Tenn. 1917) (the super-
visory powers of Tennessee Courts to issue a common
law writ of certiorari “should not be confounded with its
appellate jurisdiction”).
The writ has never been employed to inquire into the
correctness of the judgment rendered where the court
had jurisdiction, and was therefore competent.
Hence, it has been held that the supervisory
jurisdiction of the court on a certiorari must be
restricted to an examination into the external
validity of the proceedings had in the lower
court. It cannot be exercised to review the judgment
as to its intrinsic correctness, either on the law or on
the facts of the case.
Helton, 250 S.W.2d at 540-41 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, “[t]he scope of review under the com-
mon law writ... is very narrow. It covers only an inquiry
into whether the board has exceeded its jurisdiction or is
acting illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily. ...” Powell v.
Parole Eligibility Review Board, 879 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn.
App. 1994), appeal denied (June 20, 1994) (emphasis
added). “At the risk of oversimplification, one may say
that it is not the correctness of the decision that is subject
to judicial review, but the manner in which the decision is
reached. If the agency or board has reached its decision in
a constitutional or lawful manner, then the decision
would not be subject to judicial review.” Id. (emphasis
added).4
This limited inquiry under Tennessee law is not the
form of appellate review that this Court has mandated in
order to insure that First Amendment rights are not tram-
pled upon by an overzealous government. Cf., FW/PBS,
Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 228 (1980) (The First Amend-
ment requires that there be “prompt judicial review in the
event that the license is erroneously denied”) (emphasis
added). And, the actions of the Board here well illustrate
that the Tennessee common law writ-of certiorari is not
the type of “sensitive tool” necessary to protect First
Amendment rights from governmental infringement,
regardless of when that judicial review may ultimately be
provided.
After the District Court lifted the first preliminary
injunction (concluding that Metro had “fixed” the Freed-
man procedural issues), the adult businesses in Nashville
and Davidson County were then required to undergo the
licensing process of Chapter 6.54. Of the eighteen busi-
nesses that filed applications, only three were initially
granted licenses by the Board. Deja Vu’s application was
4 Accord, Yokley v. State, 632 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Tenn. App.
1981), cert. denied, November 30, 1981 (an erroneous decision is
not an illegal decision, and a court may not substitute its
decision for that of an inferior board “regardless of how
erroneous the decision of the Board may have been”); and Henry
v. Board of Claims, 638 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tenn. App. 1982) (appeal
denied September 7, 1982) (“an erroneous decision of the Board,
absent more, is not an illegal, arbitrary, or fraudulent decision”).
denied based upon a conclusion by the Board that the
establishment needed to clean a number of couches, rest-
room walls, fixtures and shower stalls; repair a commode;
and provide covered waste containers. Opp. App.
1la-13a. The Board also concluded that the application
should be denied because an inspector had asserted that
entertainers were in violation of a three-foot dancer/
patron buffer zone restriction> as contained in Chapter
6.54. Id.
5 Petitioner is therefore incorrect when it asserts that initial
“decisions regarding the issuance, renewal, and revocation of
licenses are made at the administrative level by the
Metropolitan Government based on criteria unrelated to the
content of any speech.” Petition, p. 3 (emphasis added), citing,
Ord. §§.040(C)(2), .110(K), .150(A)(1)-(10). Also illustrating the
erroneous nature of this statement is the fact that a license
application can be denied, and an issued license suspended or
revoked, predicated specifically upon the content of expression,
such as violations of obscenity, indecent exposure and public
nudity laws, or even the “performance standards” of Chapter
6.54 itself (Ord. §.140). See, e.g., Ord. §§.050(B)(3) and (4),
.080(A)(2) and (4), .150(A)(9) and (10) (the provisions of Tenn.
Code Ann. §57-4-204 described in subsection 10 is found at Opp.
App. 19a-22a, and “Metropolitan Code section 7.24.030” is
reproduced in Opp. App. 22a-25a, with §.030(C) clearly
illustrating that revocation and/or suspension of a license can
be specifically predicated upon the “content” of expression), and
.150(B)(1). In addition, there will certainly be instances where
the Metropolitan Government asserts that a business is subject
to Chapter 6.54, although the owners and operators of the
establishment contend to the contrary. In that circumstance, the
Board will clearly be required to evaluate the content of the
expression in order to determine whether the business presents
one or more of the types of entertainment which are defined to
be required to comply with the Ordinance. See, e.g., Ord.
§§.010(Y)(1), (2), (3), and (4), (Z), (AA) and (BB).
Other establishments suffered similar fates. A busi-
ness known as the “Pleasure Palace” had its application
denied due to the alleged need to repair a hand sink,
clean some walls, air conditioning vents and storage
areas, and to provide for hand towels (Opp. App.
13a-15a); Club Platinum’s application was denied because
it allegedly needed to repair a toilet, clean showers, and
“eliminate storage that may attract rodents and insects”
(Opp. App. 16a-17a); and the Executive Club had its
application denied because the Board felt that it needed
to repair a couch, clean the restroom floors, and provide
covered trasHcans (Opp. App. 17a-18a).
Implicating no constitutional or procedural issues
whatsoever, if the applicants desired to seek to have a
court overturn these decisions, they would strictly have
to attack the intrinsic correctness of the administrative
rulings;® an aspect of review that is specifically precluded
¢ A similar example of this problem would be presented in
the circumstance where the Board, in invoking one of the “civil
disability” provisions of the Ordinance, decided to deny an
application for a license based upon an alleged criminal
conviction or Ordinance violation of the applicant. See, e.g., Ord.
§.050(B)(2). If the applicant, however, contended that the Board
had simply “gotten the wrong guy,” and that he in fact had not
been convicted of a disabling crime, that person would be
precluded under the Tennessee common law writ from seeking
judicial redress in an effort to correct that erroneous decision.
And, the Petitioner is incorrect when it contends that a writ of
certiorari must be issued “when an administrative ruling
prohibits speech activities.” Petition, p. 10 n.8. An erroneous
ruling does not a constitutional violation make. See, e.g., Powell,
879 S.W.2d at 873 (error in calculating a prisoner release
eligibility date, which therefore arguably led to a violation of
10
under the Tennessee common law writ of certiorari.”
These factually driven license application denials would
simply then be immune from review under the common
law writ.
Therefore, regardless of any consideration of the tim- |
ing of judicial review, the mere limited scope of the
Tennessee common law writ establishes that it fails to
comply with this Court’s rulings in regard to the manda-
tory nature of available judicial review. In fact, this Court
the petitioner’s equal protection and due process rights under
the Constitution, was not reviewable by a common law writ).
7 The limited nature of review of the common law writ |
should be contrasted with the broader appellate review as |
provided by the statutory writ of certiorari found in Tenn. Code
Ann. §27-8-102 (Opp. App. 1a). Unlike the common law writ, the
statutory writ is “a substitute for appeal.” Tenn. Code Ann.
§27-8-102(3). More importantly, while the common law writ is
discretionary, see discussion, supra, and Tenn. Code Ann.
§27-8-101 (“the writ of certiorari may be granted... ”), the
statutory writ contains no such limitation (“certiorari lies... asa
substitute for appeal”). As one commentator summed it up, “in
order to obtain a broader scope of review, the statutory writ of
certiorari must be utilized,” and that “the statutory writ of
certiorari provides a de novo review of both law and facts;
therefore, it is the favored procedure.” Mark Guthrie, Methods of
Judicial Review Over Administrative Actions in Tennessee, 13
Memphis St. Univ. L.Rev. 657, 666 (1983) (emphasis added). See
also, Enochs v. Narren, 949 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tenn. App. 1996),
appeal denied (May 27, 1997) (statutory writ of certiorari
involved some type of trial de novo). The Metropolitan
Government could easily have provided for review by the
statutory as opposed to the common law writ, but not having
done so, this challenged ordinance is certainly then |
constitutionally infirm regardless of whether the “judicial
review” that it provides for is “prompt.”
11
reviewed the Tennessee system of appeals from adminis-
trative decisions in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546 (1975), and concluded that the procedures
were unconstitutional because state courts did not timely
“review the merits of the decision.” Id. at 561-62
(emphasis added).
III. THE PETITIONER’S ABANDONMENT OF A
FUNDAMENTAL TENANT OF ITS ARGUMENT
BELOW DOES NOT SERVE TO OBVIATE THE
REALITY THAT CHAPTER 6.54 FAILS TO GUAR-
ANTEE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AN ADVERSE
ADMINISTRATIVE RULING, IRRESPECTIVE OF
WHETHER SUCH RELIEF IS AFFORDED
PROMPTLY OR NOT.
Perhaps recognizing the fact that the majority of peti-
tions by aggrieved applicants will be denied by courts
because they do not raise questions of whether the
administrative board exceeded its jurisdiction or acted
illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily, the Petitioner aban-
dons in this Court a position that it has consistently
maintained over the past four plus years of litigation.
Specifically, Petitioner now contends for the first time
that if a trial court declines to grant the petition for a writ
of certiorari, the “adult business prevails as a matter of
right.” Petition, p. 10. And, Petitioner acknowledges it is
now taking a position inconsistent with its arguments
below. Petition, p. 6 n.6.
This revised “position” should be contrasted with the
claim that the Petitioner first raised as far back as 1998,
when in a hearing before the District Court, counsel for
the Petitioner succinctly stated:
12
Let me go back to the Court's first question,
what would happen if the writ of cert. was
denied. Case law is clear in Tennessee, a denial of a
writ of cert. is a decision on the merits .. . [and] the
stay would be lifted... .
Opp. App. 7a-8a. (emphasis and clarification added).
Petitioner's “change of heart” is unavailing for
numerous reasons.
First, the position that the Petitioner now takes does
not alleviate the constitutional infirmity for numerous
businesses and individuals affected by Chapter 6.54. Peti-
tioner changes direction on this long-held position in an
effort to emphasize to this Court the provisions of Ord.
§§.040(E)(3) (Pet. App. 148a) and .070(D)(3) (Pet. App.
159a), which hold that for what are defined to be “exis-
ting” adult businesses and “current” entertainers,’ any
adverse administrative decision that is appealed to any
court “shall not take effect until the decision has been
upheld by the Court after adjudication on the merits.”
Yet, and inexplicably, for “new” businesses and
entertainers (those not in operation or performing in the
Metropolitan area as of March 1, 1999 (Ord. §.010(L) and
(M) (Pet. App. 132a)), there is no such “protection.”
Rather, for them, an adverse administrative decision
“shall take effect the day the decision is issued by the
Board.” Ord. §§.040(E)(4) (Pet. App. 148a), and .070(D)(4)
(Pet. App. 159a).
8 These “existing” businesses and “current” entertainers
are those that were operating/ performing in the Metropolitan
area as of March 1, 1999. Ord. §.010(D) and (G) (Pet. App. 131a).
13
Respondents challenged the constitutionality of
Chapter 6.54 not only as applied, but facially as well (see,
Complaint excerpts, Opp. App. 2a-6a, and Deja Vu of
Nashville, 274 F.3d at 398-99).? Consequently, particularly
in light of the fact that literally hundreds of entertainers
have come and gone from the Respondents’ businesses
since March 1, 1999, the concentration by the Petitioner
upon this purported “saving language” rings hollow in
that it is simply not applicable to the circumstance of those
entertainers who commenced performing in the Metro-
politan area after March 1, 1999, let alone to the new
adult entertainment establishments which have opened
up for business after that date.
Second, the new “position” of the Petitioner makes
little logical or practical sense. Petitioner now contends
that the “ordinance provides that the administrative rul-
ing is void unless considered by the court on appeal and
sustained.” Petition, p. 4. See also, Petition, p. 7 (“ .. . if
the trial court did not grant the writ of certiorari and
decide the appeal ‘on the merits,’ respondents would
automatically prevail”) (emphasis in original).!° Yet, under
* Given this facial challenge, Respondents certainly had
standing to raise the constitutional concerns of these “new”
entertainers. See, e.g., Connection Distributing Co. v. Reno, 154
F.3d 281, 295 (6th Cir. 1998) (magazine had ability to assert
rights of readers); and Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d
1248, 1252-53 (Sth Cir. 1995) (exotic dance club had standing to
assert constitutional claims of entertainers who performed at
the establishment).
10 Again, these arguments of the Petitioner truly apply, if at
all, only in the circumstance of existing businesses and current
entertainers. As spurious as they may be, these assertions have
absolutely no application to new businesses or entertainers.
14
the Petitioner’s “logic,” an aggrieved applicant or license
holder could prevail in regard to any adverse administra-
tive ruling by the Board simply by filing a petition for a
common law writ, making no arguments of merit, and
then “winning” their case when the court denies the
petition!
Third, and illustrative of the questionable logic of the
Petitioner's “new and improved” approach, the fact
remains that for four plus years, Metro has taken the
unwaivering position with the District Court and with
the Circuit Court of Appeals that under Tennessee law, a
denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari was a “decision
on the merits.” In addition, certainly in regard to “new”
entertainers and businesses, a denial of a petition for a
common law writ means that an aggrieved applicant or
license holder will have received absolutely no judicial
review at all to an adverse administrative ruling by the
Board.'}
a
11 Petitioner asserts that “there is no dispute that the writ
would be denied, if ever, only in the most extraordinary
circumstances.” Petition, p. 10 n.8. That is far from an accurate
characterization of the law in Tennessee and the proceedings
below. First, the Affidavit of Claudia Bonnyman submitted by
the Petitioner in the District Court (Opp. App. 9a-10a) falls far
short of asserting that all petitions for a common law writ of
certiorari are granted. See, Deja Vu of Nashville, 274 F.3d at 402.
Second, the non-constitutional and non-procedural factual
matters that would be at issue in many of the requests for
judicial review could only be rectified by seeking redress in
regard to the intrinsic correctness of the administrative ruling,
which is not an appropriate function of the common law writ.
Accordingly, most of those petitioners would be denied as a
matter of due course. And, there is no shortage of Tennessee
cases illustrating courts denying writs based upon just that fact.
15
Fourth, while the Petitioner attempts to dismiss this
significant change of position as merely agreeing with a
“construction of state law,” Petition, p. 6 n.6, that is not
the case. Not only did the District and Circuit Courts not
“construe” the ordinance in the fashion as suggested by
the Petitioner, but, more to the point, those federal courts
are not even empowered to provide such a limiting con-
struction of state law. Virginia v. American Booksellers
Assn., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (“we will not rewrite a
state law to conform it to constitutional requirements”);
and Freedman, 380 U.S. at 369 (federal courts lack jurisdic-
tion to authoritatively construe state legislation).
IV. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT RULED CORRECTLY IN
THIS ACTION.
-
Irrespective of any perceived “split” in the circuits,
and irrespective of the other constitutional infirmities of
Chapter 6.54 as referenced, supra, Petitioner simply fails
to present any persuasive argument that the Sixth Circuit
See, e.g., Fite v. State Board of Paroles, 925 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn. App.
1996) (appeal denied May 28, 1996) (“petition does not state any
facts that would support a claim that the Board acted illegally,
fraudulently, or arbitrarily, or that it exceeded its authority,”
and therefore petitioner “is not entitled to a Writ of Certiorari”).
Third, the Petitioner itself clearly acknowledges that the courts
have the authority and discretion to deny a petition for a
common law writ. See, e.g., Petition, p. 4. Finally, the Petitioner
actually has it backwards, in that a common law writ of
certiorari is to be granted only under “unusual or extraordinary
circumstances.” Clark, 827 S.W.2d at 316-17.
16
was incorrect in its ruling that Freedman requires a
prompt judicial determination. This Court has never held
that mere judicial access affords appropriate First
Amendment protections, and since the time of the deci-
sion in Freedman, the rulings of this Court have repeat-
edly used language affirming that a prompt final judicial
resolution is required.
In Freedman itself, in defining “prompt judicial
review,” this Court used the phrases “final judicial deter-
mination on the merits,” and “judicial resolution.” Freed-
man, 380 U.S. at 59. In Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 417
(1971), reference is made to a requirement for a “final
judicial determination on the merits within a specified,
brief period.” Similarly, in Southeastern Promotion, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975), which coincidentally also
dealt with the writ system in the State of Tennessee, this
Court found the existing state procedures lacking and
once again articulated that Freedman required a “prompt
final judicial determination.” See, also, Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 161 n.3 969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (“although Shuttlesworth could have peti-
tioned for a writ of mandamus in the Alabama Circuit
Court if the City Commission denied his application, that
state court is not obligated to render a decision within
any fixed period of time”); and FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 228
(the plurality of the Court noting that in a licensing
scheme involving “adult” businesses, “the first two [Freed-
man] safeguards are essential”) (emphasis and clarification
added).
17
V. THE CONFLICT AMONGST THE CIRCUITS
IDENTIFIED BY PETITIONER IS NOT AS FRAC-
TIOUS AS PETITIONER ASSERTS.
Petitioner argues that this Court should grant the
petition because the circuits are in conflict on the ques-
tion of whether this Court’s decisions in Freedman and
FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990), require merely
prompt judicial access or a prompt judicial decision. Peti-
_tion, p. 8. Yet, upon closer examination, this conflict is not
as apparent and troublesome as it may appear at first
blush.
To date, three circuits have explicitly held that in the
context of adult business licensing schemes, a prompt
judicial determination on the merits is required to satisfy
the Freedman prompt judicial review requirement. See,
Nightclubs, Inc. v. Paducah, 202 F.3d 884, 892-93 (6th Cir.
2000); Baby Tam & Co. v. Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th
Cir. 1998); and 11126 Baltimore Blud., Inc. v. Prince George’s
Cty., 58 F.3d 988, 998-1001 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). While
the First and Seventh Circuits are claimed to be in conflict
with these decisions (Petition, p. 9), that is not the case. In
both Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority, 984 F.2d 1319 (1st Cir. 1993), and Graff v. City of
Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309 (7th Cir. 1993), the appellate courts
evaluated time, place, and manner restrictions on public
fora closely akin to the regulation at issue in Thomas v.
Chicago Park District, 122 S.Ct. 775 (2002). In Thomas, this
Court determined that time, place, and manner restric-
tions of public fora need not comply with the Freedman
procedural safeguards ordinarily required of prior
restraints targeting sexually oriented expression. To the
extent that the First and Seventh Circuits reached similar
18
conclusions, they are not in conflict with the majority
construction of the prompt judicial review requirement.
As such, this Court should not accept certiorari in this
case because the alleged conflict amongst the circuits is
not as pronounced as the Petitioner suggests.
+
CONCLUSION
Because the Sixth Circuit ruled correctly in this case,
and because resolution of the prompt judicial determina-
tion/access question is not necessary to uphold the deci-
sion of the Sixth Circuit, Respondents respectfully
request that the petition be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
BRADLEY J. SHAFER
(Counsel of Record)
SHAFER & Associates, P.C.
3800 Capital City Boulevard
Suite 2
Lansing, Michigan 48906
(517) 886-6560
H. Louis SirkIn
SIRKIN, PINALES, MeEzisov &
SCHWARTZ
920 Fourth & Race Tower
105 West Fourth Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-2776
MICHAEL F. PLEASANTS
8 South Third, Suite 200
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
JoHN E. HERBISON
2016 Eighth Avenue South
Nashville, Tennessee 37204
la
APPENDIX
Tennessee Code Annotated
27-8-101. Constitutional basis. - The writ of certiorari
may be granted whenever authorized by law, and also in
all cases where an inferior tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial functions has exceeded the jurisdiction
conferred, or is acting illegally, when, in the judgment of
the court, there is no other plain, speedy, or adequate
remedy. [Code 1858, § 3123 (deriv. Const. 1834, art. 6,
§ 10); Shan., § 4853; Code 1932, § 8989; T.C.A. (orig. ed.),
§ 27-801.]
27-8-102. Cases in which writ lies. — Certiorari lies:
(1) On suggestion if diminution;
(2) Where no appeal is given;
(3) As a substitute for appeal;
(4) Instead of audita querela; or
(5) Instead of writ of error. [Code 1858, § 3124; Shan.,
§ 4854; Code 1932, § 8990; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 27-802.]
2a
[Page 1]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
DEJA VU OF NASHVILLE, INC. a
Tennessee corporation; MICHAEL
RUCKER, individually; MICHAEL
BUTLER, individually; MERONEY CIVIL
ENTERTAINMENT, INC., d/b/a ACTION NO.
KEN’S GOLD CLUB, a Tennesse 3-97-1066
corporation, THE PLEASURE
PALACE, INC., a Tennessee - JUDGE
corporation; CAROUSEL NIXON
AMUSEMENT CENTER, INC., a
Tennessee corporation; DAWN
PIERCE and ELIZEBETH MARTZ,
individually,
Plaintiffs,
v.
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT
OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON
COUNTY, TENNESSEE; EMMITT
TURNER, Chief of Police of the
Metro Police Department,
Defendants.
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION, PERMANENT INJUNCTION,
AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
1. This is a civil action whereby Plaintiffs pray for a
preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the
3a
Defendants from enforcement of Chapter 6.54 of the Code
of Ordinances of the Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (hereinafter
“Chapter 6.54” or the “Ordinance”), passed on third
[Page 2]
reading by its Metropolitan County Council on August
19, 1997, on the ground that this Ordinance is unconstitu-
tional on its face and as applied, and in its threatened
application to Plaintiffs in their activities described
below. Further, Plaintiffs pray for a declaratory judgment
to determine the constitutionality of said Ordinance on its
face, as applied to Plaintiffs, and in its threatened appli-
cation to them, and Plaintiffs also request attorney fees as
a result of the injuries sustained to their fundamental
constitutional rights.
[Page 9]
20. Chapter 6.54 is an extremely lengthy and com-
plex licensing and permitting scheme containing
numerous and various restrictions, regulations and prohi-
bitions affecting the constitutionally protected conduct of
the Plaintiffs, their agents, representatives and employees
as well as those individuals from the consenting adult
audience which seek to view the entertainment or to
purchase, rent and/or view other expressive media pro-
vided by the Plaintiffs. Because of the length and com-
plexity of the Ordinance, the Plaintiffs, for the sake of
clarity, will state the general grounds upon which they
rely that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and will then
4a
specifically list the provisions which violate one or more
of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
21. Plaintiffs aver that the licensing scheme as a
whole is unconstitutional on its face, or as applied,
because of the lack of procedural safeguards. It violates
due process and is overbroad.
[Page 10]
It further violates equal protection. In addition, individ-
ual provisions of the Ordinance are unconstitutional or
unconstitutional as applied to the Plaintiffs.
+ +
[Page 15]
+ +
22. Plaintiffs aver that the following licensing provi-
sions in the Ordinance are in violation of one or more of
the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs as listed in the pre-
ceding paragraphs. Plaintiffs aver that these are examples
of the unconstitutionality of the Ordinance in violation of
said constitutional provisions and do not constitute all of
the provisions which will be demonstrated as unconstitu-
tional on their face, or as applied.
+ +
[Page 21]
(P) The provision for a permit is denial of the
right to travel of any featured dancers from out
of state who could not be engaged to entertain
because of the lengthy permit procedure.
ce eee
[Page 26]
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS PRAY that the Court
grant its relief as follows:
(A) A preliminary injunction enjoining the Defen-
dants, their agents, servants and employees from enforc-
ing the Ordinance as alleged herein.
(B) A declaration that the Ordinance is unconstitu-
tional and violative of First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights guaranteed to Plaintiffs by the United
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 19, Article 1,
Section 8, and Article 11, Section 8 of the Tennessee
Constitution.
(C) A permanent injunction, permanently enjoining
and restraining the Defendants, their agents, servants and
employees from enforcing the Ordinance.
(D) For attorneys fees and costs of this action, pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. 1988.
(E) For all such other, further and different relief,
both general and special, as to which the Plaintiffs may
be entitled in the premises and as justice and equity may
require.
[Page 27]
Michael F. Pleasants, Esq.
8 South Third, Suite 200
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
901/572-7332
6a
Bradley J. Shafer, *Esq.
Shafer & Associates
3800 Capital City Blvd.
Suite 2
Lansing, Michigan 48906
517/886-6560
*Motion to be admitted counsel
pro hac vice to be filed
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
+ + *
7a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
DEJA VU OF NASHVILLE, INC.,
et al., ’
Plaintiffs,
’
Case No.:
)
)
)
)
VS. )
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT 3-97-1066
)
)
)
)
OF NASHVILLE AND
DAVIDSON COUNTY,
TENNESSEE, et al.,
Defendants.
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
November 5, 1998 /
BEFORE THE HONORABLE SENIOR JUDGE
JOHN T. NIXON,
DISTRICT JUDGE
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff MICHAEL F. PLEASANTS
Deja Vu: Pleasants’ Law Firm
Winchester Building
8 South Third Street
Suite 200
Memphis, Tenn. 38103
For the Defendant: JAMES L. CHARLES
SHAYNA R. ABRAMS
Metropolitan Legal Department
204 Metro Courthouse
Nashville, Tennessee 37291
8a
CHARLOTTE H. BARR, RPR
Official Court Reporter
837-A U.S. Courthouse
Nashville, Tennessee 37203
Phone: 1-615-726-0355
[Page 19]
MR. CHARLES: Your Honor, my name is Jim
Charles. I will just have a short response to that.
Let me go back to the Court’s first question, what
would happen if the writ of cert was denied. Case law is
clear in Tennessee, a denial of a writ of cert is a decision
on the merits; you then appeal to the Court of Appeals.
You would have the right -
THE COURT: What happens to the stay?
MR. CHARLES: The stay would be lifted, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right. -
ae
9a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
DEJA VU OF NASHVILLE, INC.,
a Tennessee Corporation, et al.,
V.
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT
OF NASHVILLE AND
DAVIDSON COUNTY,
Defendant
)
)
Plaintiffs, ‘
Vv. ) Case No.
THE METROPOLITAN ) 3:97-1066
GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE ) Judge
AND DAVIDSON COUNTY ) Nixon
TENNESSEE, and EMMETT ) eneten
TURNER, Chief of Police, in his ) — —
- ' ) Griffin
official capacity
Defsaduate ) Consolidated
) cases
and ) Case No.
JERRY C. PENDERGRASS, et al., ) 3:97-1176
: Plaintiffs, ;
)
)
)
)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF CLAUDIA BONNYMAN
The affiant, Claudia Bonnyman, having been duly
sworn, makes oath as follows:
1. I am the Clerk and Master for the Chancery Courts of
Davidson County.
2. I have been the Clerk and Master for nine (9) years.
10a
3. Generally, when a petition for a writ of certiorari is
filed, the petition, a proposed brief order (“fiat”) and
proposed writ of certiorari are placed before a Chan-
cellor the same day
[Page 2]
the petition is filed. The short order (“fiat”) directs
the Clerk and Master to issue the writ of certiorari in
the case.
4. When the signed order is returned to my office by the
chancellor, the writ of certiorari is signed by the Clerk
(or a deputy clerk) and it is issued usually within one
hour of receipt of the court order.
5. Generally, our office processes all petitions for a writ of
certiorari including presenting the proposed order and
petition to a chancellor, docketing the signed order and
issuing the writ of certiorari within two days of the filing
of the petition.
6. I am over the age of 18 years and I am competent to
testify as to the matters contained herein.
And further Affiant sayeth not.
/s/
Claudia Bonnyman
State of Tennessee )
County of Davidson )
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 4th day of
November, 1998.
/s/ [Vicki J. Bailey]
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:
My Commission Expires JAN. 27, 2001
ate ie Rls Woe Lc
ee a SN Oe
lla
Page 1
AGENDA
April 27, 1999
9:00 a.m.
METROPOLITAN ADULT ENTERTAINMENT BOARD
700 SECOND AVENUE SOUTH
HOWARD OFFICE BUILDING NASHVILLE
ELITE REPORTING SERVICES
ANGELA M. SYES, CCR
806 Porter Road
Nashville, Tennessee 37206
(615) 262-9592
Page 10
Applications for adult entertainment licenses. Deja
Vu of Nashville, 1214 Demonbreun Street.
Page 11
MS. BORUM: Our recommendation is that it
does not comply with health inspections. Some of the
items on that health inspection report is: To clean the
couches, rest room walls, fixtures, shower stall; repair
commode; provide covered waste containers. Charles, in
his inspection, noted a violation of the 3-foot rule.
MR. CHAIRMAN: All right.
MS. SCHAFFNER: I take it the fourth sheet
back in the packet is the health inspection report?
MS. BORUM: That is correct.
12a
MS. SCHAFFNER: And that inspection indi-
cates that the couches need to be cleaned. Sanitation of
the floors and the cubicles need to be improved. Covered
waste containers need to be provided throughout the
establishment. The commode in the dressing room needs
to be repaired. The rest room walls and fixtures need to
be cleaned. And the shower stall in the dressing room
needs to be cleaned; is that right?
MS. BORUM: Yes, ina’am, that is correct.
MS. SCHAFFNER: Then...
MR. CHAIRMAN: Okay. So that it...
MS. SCHAFFNER: Then the inspector’s report
is the last sheet; is that right?
MS. BORUM: Yes, ma’am.
MS. SCHAFFNER: And the inspector’s
PAGE 12
finding upon inspection was that the dancers were in
violation of the 3-foot rule; is that correct?
MS. BORUM: That is correct.
MS. SCHAFFNER: On the codes or building
there was no findings since there were no booths; is that
right?
MS. BORUM: Yes, ma’am, that is correct.
MS. SCHAFFNER: And as far as the police
report, it was approved?
MS. BORUM: Yes, ma’am.
13a
MS. SCHAFFNER: And the zoning was
approved?
MS. BORUM: Yes, ma’am.
MS. SCHAFFNER: I move that we deny this
application on the basis of the health inspection and the —
this board’s inspector’s report.
MR. CHAIRMAN: It has been moved that we
deny this report based on the - deny this application
based on the inspector’s report and this report from
health.
Is there a second?
MS. STEVENS: Second.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Any discussions? All in
favor signify by aye.
(All board members voted aye.)
+ + +
Page 15
The next application is Pleasure Palace, 2407 Dicker-
son Pike.
Ms. Borum.
MS. BORUM: Our recommendation is that it
does not comply with health codes. Some of these items
were: Repair hand sink; clean walls ared all air condition-
ing vents; clean storage areas; provide hand towels.
14a
On your checklist sheet from Charles and myself, we
received a late report yesterday afternoon from the build-
ing inspector who went out and made another inspection
and approved the booth requirements.
MS. STEVENS: What does nonconforming
mean? ;
MS. BORUM: Legally, “nonconforming” means
that it was there prior to the funding. It’s grandfathered
in.
MS. SCHAFFNER: I take it that the building
inspector’s report disapproval since it. . .
MS. BORUM: It is marked disapproved on the
checklist. I was handed the report about 5 until 4 yester-
day afternoon.
MS. SCHAFFNER: Which disapproves or
Page 16
approves?
MS. BORUM: That approves, as far as the
building inspector.
MS. SCHAFFNER: So the only thing that’s dis-
approved, then, is the health...
MS. BORUM: That is correct.
MS. SCHAFFNER: . . . report, which includes a
need for repairing hand sink for the ease of cleaning;
thoroughly cleaning the walls in booths and air condi- |
tioning vents in the hall; providing a minimum of 10-foot |
candles of illumination at the floor level in booths; clean-
ing up storage areas; eliminate all unnecessary items on ip
15a
lower level; and provide hand towels in the bathrooms; is
that correct?
MS. BORUM: Yes, ma’am.
MS. SCHAFFNER: I move that this application
be denied on the basis of the health report.
MR. CHAIRMAN: It has been moved that this
application be denied on the basis of the health report. Is
there a second?
MS. STEVENS: Second.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Any discussion?
MR. BANKS: One question, Mr. Chairman.
How will - how do they determine what the candle -
how do they determine that?
Page 17
MS. SCHAFFNER: I think it’s a lighting
machine, you know, that...
MR. BANKS: That they carry with them that
determines the lighting?
MS. BORUM: It’s measured from the feet.
MR. BANKS: That’s all I have.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Okay. All in favor signify by
aye.
(All board members voted aye)
MR. CHAIRMAN: Any nays?
Motion carries. This application is denied.
l6a
Page 26
MR. CHAIRMAN: The next is Club Platinum,
1711 Hayes Street.
MS. BORUM: We recommend disapproval. It
does not comply with health code. Some of those items:
Repair toilet; clean showers; eliminate storage that may
attract rodents and insects.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Everything else is approved?
MS. BORUM: Yes, sir, everything else is
approved.
MS. SCHAFFNER: So that includes repairing
the toilet in the men’s rest room, cleaning the floors along
the lockers in the dressing room?
Page 27
MS. BORUM: That is correct.
MS. SCHAFFNER: Cleaning the showers in the
dressing room, eliminating storage that may attract
rodents and insects and cause — something.
MS. BORUM: Harborage.
MS. SCHAFFNER: What is harborage?
MR. CHARLES WATKINS: Places for rodents or
insects to hide.
MS. SCHAFFNER: All right. I move this appli-
cation be denied based upon the health inspection report.
MR. CHAIRMAN: Do we have a second?
Cea oes WR ARLE
17a
MS. STEVENS: Second.
MR. CHAIRMAN: It has been moved and prop-
erly seconded that this application be denied based on
the health inspector’s report. All in favor say aye.
(All board members voted aye.)
MR. CHAIRMAN: Any nays? Application is
denied.
+ %
Page 43
+ * %
The next application is the Executive Club,
Page 44
701 4th Avenue South.
MS. BORUM: We recommend disapproval. It
does not comply with health codes. Some of these items:
Repair couch, clean rest room floors, provide covered
trash cans.
MS. SCHAFFNER: I move this application be
denied on the basis of the health violations.
; MR. CHAIRMAN: Is there a second?
MR. STEVENS: Second.
MR. CHAIRMAN: It has been moved and prop-
erly seconded that this application be denied based on
the health violations. All those in favor signify by -— is
there any discussion from the board? All in favor signify
by aye.
18a
(All board members voted aye.)
MR. CHAIRMAN: Any nays? This application
is denied.
+ + +
19a
TN ST S 57-4-204
T. C. A. § 57-4-204
WEST’S TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED TITLE 57.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS CHAPTER 4.
CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES ON
PREMISES PART 2 —- ADMINISTRATION,
ENFORCEMENT, PROHIBITED ACTS
Current through End of 2001 First Reg Sess.
§ 57-4-204. Prohibited sexual conduct or representations
(a) In addition to the other duties imposed under
this title, the commission is authorized to enforce the
provisions of subsections (b), (c), and (d); and upon viola-
tion of such subsections by any person, firm or corpora-
tion licensed under the provisions of this chapter, the
commission shall revoke the privilege license of such
violator.
(b) The following acts or conduct on licensed prem-
ises are deemed contrary to public policy, and therefore
no license shall be held at any premises where such
conduct or acts are permitted:
(1) To employ, use or allow any person in the sale or
service of alcoholic beverages or malt beverages in or
upon the licensed premises while such person is
unclothed or in such attire, costume or clothing as to
expose to view any portion of the female breast below the
top of the areola or of any portion of the pubic hair, anus,
cleft of the buttocks, vulva or genitals;
(2) To employ, use or allow the services of any
hostess or other person to mingle with the patrons while
such hostess or other person is unclothed or in such
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attire, costume or clothing as described in subdivision
(b)(1);
(3) To encourage or permit any person on the
licensed premises to touch, caress or fondle the breasts,
buttocks, anus or genitals of any other person;
(4) To permit any employee or person to wear or
use any device or covering, exposed to view, which simu-
lates the breast, genitals, anus, pubic hair or any portion
thereof.
(c)(1) Conduct or acts on licensed premises in viola-
tion of this subsection are deemed contrary to public
policy, and therefore no license shall be held at any
premises where such conduct or acts are permitted.
_ (2) Live entertainment is permitted on any licensed
premises, except that:
(A) No licensee shall permit any person to
perform acts of or acts which simulate:
(i) Sexual intercourse, masturbation,
sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagella-
tion or any sexual acts which are prohibited
by law;
(ii) The touching, caressing or fon-
dling of the breast, buttocks, anus or geni-
tals; or
(iii) The displaying of the pubic hair,
anus, vulva or genitals.
(B) Subject to the provisions of subdivision
(2)(A), any entertainer who is employed in
whole or in part by the licensee to dance at such
licensee’s premises shall perform only upon a
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stage at least eighteen inches (18”) above the
immediate floor level and removed at least six
feet (6’) from the nearest patron.
(3) No licensee shall permit any person to use artifi-
cial devices or inanimate objects to depict any of the
prohibited activities described above.
(4) No licensee shall permit any person to remain in
or upon the licensed premises who exposes to public
view any portion of his genitals or anus.
(d) The following conduct or acts on licensed prem-
ises are deemed contrary to public policy, and therefore
no license shall be held at any premises where such
conduct or acts are permitted:
(1) The showing of film, still pictures, elec-
tronic reproduction, or other visual reproduc-
tions depicting:
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(A) Acts or simulated acts of sexual
intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, bestial-
ity, oral copulation, flagellation or any sex-
ual acts which are prohibited by law;
(B) Any person being touched,
caressed or fondled on the breast, buttocks,
anus or genitals;
(C) Scenes wherein a person displays
the vulva or the anus or the genitals; or
(D) Scenes wherein artificial devices
or inanimate objects are employed to
depict, or drawings are employed to por-
tray, any of the prohibited activities
described above.
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(e) Each county, city, or metropolitan government is
empowered upon approval by a two-thirds (/s) vote of its
legislative body to authorize its law enforcement officers
to conduct investigations into alleged violations of sub-
sections (a)-(d), and such law enforcement officers shall
report such violations to the commission for appropriate
action by such commission.
(f) The commission shall be immune from liability
resulting from conduct or acts of any law enforcement
officers authorized to investigate violations of subsec-
tions (a)-(d) as provided in subsection (e).
1980 Pub.Acts, c. 904, §§ 1 to 3.
Metropolitan Code Section 7.24.030
Prohibited acts or conduct - Enforcement authority.
A. In addition to the other duties imposed by the
metropolitan beer permit board by the Metropolitan Code
of Laws, it shall be the duty of such board to enforce the
provisions of this section and revoke or suspend the beer
permit of any person, firm, corporation, syndicate or
association, upon notice and hearing, for violation of the
provisions of this section.
B. The following acts or conduct have been declared
contrary to public policy by the General Assembly of the
State of Tennessee when such activities take place upon
premises licensed by the alcoholic beverage commission,
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 57-4-101,
et seq.; and the same are declared to be against the public
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policy of the metropolitan government of Nashville and
Davidson County, and therefore, no beer permit shall be
held at any premises where such contract or acts are
permitted:
1. To employ, use or allow any person in the
sale or service of beer or like alcoholic beverages in
or upon the premises of a permittee while such per-
son is unclothed or in such attire, costume or
clothing as to expose to view any portion of the
female breast below the top of the areola or any
portion of the pubic hair, anus, cleft of the buttocks,
vulva or genitals;
2. To employ, use or allow the services of any
hostess or other person to mingle with the patrons
while such hostess or other person is unclothed or in
such attire, costume or clothing as described in sub-
division 1 of this subsection;
3. To en¢ourage or permit any person on the
premises of a permittee to touch, caress or fondle the
breast, buttocks, anus or genitals of any other per-
son; z
4. To permit any employee or person to wear or
use any device or covering, exposed to view, which
simulates the breast, genitals, anus, pubic hair or any
portion thereof.
C. Acts or conduct in premises licensed by the alco-
holic beverage commission pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated Sections 57-4-101, et seq. have been deemed
contrary to public policy by the General Assembly of the
state of Tennessee, and are declared against the public
policy of the metropolitan government of Nashville and
Davidson County; and, therefore, no beer permit shall! be
held at any premises where such conduct or acts are
ne
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permitted. Live entertainment is permitted on premises
of a permittee except that:
1. No permittee shall permit any person to per-
form acts of or acts which simulate:
a. Sexual intercourse, masturbation, sod-
omy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation or
any sexual acts which are prohibited by law;
b. The touching, caressing or fondling of
the breast, buttocks, anus or genitals;
c. The displaying of the pubic hair, anus,
vulva or genitals.
2. Subject to the provisions of subdivision 1 of
this subsection, any entertainer who is employed in
whole or in part by the permittee to dance at such
permittee’s premises shall perform only upon a stage
at least eighteen inches above the immediate floor
level and removed at least six feet from the nearest
patron.
3. No permittee shall permit any person to use
artificial devises or inanimate objects to depict any of
the prohibited activities described above.
4. No permittee shall permit any person to
remain in or upon the premises who exposes to
public view any portion of his or her genitals or
anus.
D. The following acts or conduct have been
declared contrary to public policy by the General Assem-
bly of the state of Tennessee when such activities take
place upon premises licensed by the alcoholic beverage
commission, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Sec-
tions 57-4-101, et seq.; and the same are declared to be
against the public policy of the metropolitan government
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of Nashville and Davidson County; and, therefore, no
beer permit shall be held at any premises where such
conduct or acts are permitted:
1. The showing of film, still pictures, electronic
reproduction, or other visual reproductions depict-
ing:
a. Acts or simulated acts of sexual inter-
course, masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral
copulation, flagellation or any sexual acts which
are prohibited by law;
b. Any person being touch [sic], caressed
or fondled on the breast, buttocks, anus or geni-
tals;
c. Scenes wherein a person displays the
vulva or the anus or the genitals;
d. Scenes wherein artificial devices or
inanimate objects are employed to depict, or
drawings are employed to portray, any of the
prohibited activities described above. (Ord.
90-1339 § 1(5-7), 1990; prior code § 5-1-34)
(Nashville 4-93)
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