Opposition Brief — Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc.

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No. 01-1324 APRiO wi

PE OPFICE CO? tik Oring

In The as

Supreme Court of the United States

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THE METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF

NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, AND

EMMITT TURNER, CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Petitioners,

Vv.

DEJA VU OF NASHVILLE, INC., et al.,

Respondents.

¢

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Sixth Circuit

*

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

6

H. Louts Sirkin BRADLEY J. SHAFER

SirKIN, PINALES, MEzIBOV (Counsel of Record)

& SCHWARTZ SHAFER & Associates, P.C.

920 Fourth & Race Tower 3800 Capital City Blvd.,

105 West Fourth Street Suite 2

Cincinnati, Ohio Lansing, Michigan 48906

45202-2776 517-886-6560

MicHAeEL F. PLEASANTS

8 South Third, Suite 200

Memphis, Tennessee 38103

JOHN E. HERBISON

2016 Eighth Avenue South

Nashville, Tennessee 37204

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

.

-

sinaiubieesal

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Chap-

ter 6.54 of the Metropolitan Code of Nashville and David-

son County lacks the required prompt judicial review by

failing to guarantee access to state courts. The question of

whether the prompt judicial review component requires

prompt judicial access or prompt judicial determination

played little if any role in the court’s decision. Because

the only available “appellate” remedy available in the

State of Tennessee is the discretionary common law writ

of certiorari, the ordinance fails under even the less

restrictive access definition of the prompt judicial review

requirement. As such, this case presents the question of

whether a discretionary review procedure satisfies the

prompt judicial review requirement, without regard to

whether that requirement mandates prompt determina-

tion or merely prompt access to the courts.

li

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ......scccccsccssasssseons

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......csccsscsssussususss

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT

OF CERTIORARI .........:.s0scscsccessuspeueene

ADDITIONAL RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVI-

SIONS .......0006s0055060 555500 eee

STATEMENT IN OPPOSITION ......cccsssccsesssas

REASONS THAT THE PETITION SHOULD BE

DENIED .......000000000000850 000 0 On en

i

II.

Ill.

THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

WAS PREDICATED UPON THE FACT THAT

THE “JUDICIAL REVIEW” AFFORDED BY

CHAPTER 6.54 AND TENNESSEE LAW IS

DISCRETIONARY IN NATURE .............

THE SCOPE OF REVIEW UNDER THE TEN-

NESSEE COMMON LAW WRIT OF CER-

TIORARI IS FAR TOO NARROW TO AFFORD

ADEQUATE PROTECTIONS TO FIRST

AMENDMENT PROTECTED ACTIVITIES ...

THE PETITIONER’S ABANDONMENT OF A

FUNDAMENTAL TENANT OF ITS ARGU-

MENT BELOW DOES NOT SERVE TO OBVI-

ATE THE REALITY THAT CHAPTER 6.54

FAILS TO GUARANTEE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF

AN ADVERSE ADMINISTRATIVE RULING,

IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER SUCH RELIEF

IS AFFORDED PROMPTLY OR NOT.........

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

IV. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED

BECAUSE THE SIXTH CIRCUIT RULED

CORRECTLY IN THIS ACTION........... 15

V. THE CONFLICT AMONGST THE CIRCUITS

IDENTIFIED BY PETITIONER IS NOT AS

FRACTIOUS AS PETITIONER ASSERTS.... 17

ees bas 6 oNhG 56 bU pended bake 0s 48 0 18

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's Cty., 58

Oe SOO CGE GC, Boon cc cnncsacsnsccassenasans 17

Baby Tam & Co. v. Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir.

PP cd iS pada aseasdsdedesiceatiniatsssisasrernavn 17

peeent w. Risel, 50 US. GIO CIG7E) oc aces cccccccnans 16

Boyce v. Williams, 389 S.W.2d 272 (Tenn. 1965)........ 4

Clark v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 827 S.W.2d

SES CEO. AMD. BSPT) oon cc cccsscrwesisvnnssnes 4,15

Connection Distributing Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281

SE SR ES wn ons ss cecdacanticensadnseadengssan 13

Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metropolitan Gov't of

Nashville and Davidson Cty., Tenn., 274 F.3d 377

SE ee RD Ko can csadeesedudd civenanane 4,5, 13, 14

Enochs v. Narren, 949 S.W.2d 686 (Tenn. App. 1996) .... 10

Fite v. State Board of Paroles, 925 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn.

BD. THGG) oo acs cratneieacasencasgenssantadsiavenas 15

Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) ........ passim

FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1980) ........ 7, 16

Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1509 (7th Cir. 1993) .... 17

Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248 (5th

Sk MEE A4ceMidedhaw cae eaeb i ieasedasendanbatecns 13

Helton v. State, 250 S.W.2d 540 (Tenn. 1952) .......... 6

Henry v. Board of Claims, 638 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn.

RD. TIGR) 6 acc cstnacncivrcczsccsecssevenievisecens 7

Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transporta-

tion Authority, 984 F.2d 1319 (1st Cir. 1993) ....... 17

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Nightclubs, Inc. v. Paducah, 202 F.3d 884 (6th Cir.

rrr rrr errr ry ye ere et eee 17

Powell v. Parole Eligibility Review Board, 879 S.W.2d

S71 (Tem. App. 1996) . 0.20. ccsscccccscascsns 6, 7,9

Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147

(ROGIE os ikinivickn an ancekidadsseeasis tee 16

Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.

| re reer es rir Perr eset ts 11, 16

State ex rel. McMurrow v. Hunt, 192 S.W. 931 (Tenn.

WOU) ok inc da nnduawhancnkaeeesnees eee 6

Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 122 S.Ct. 775 (2002) ..3, 17

Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., 484.U.S. 383

(ROE) ooo vnndcia0neecevnaednees ake nese erenanenene 15

Yokley v. State, 632 S.W.2d 123 (Tenn. App. 1981)..... 7

STATUTES:

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TCA. S27 BUM. 0.00 ona cksesessavseguaheqacewer eae 5

TCA. GBF ODDS oo oo sc nanstneennscanenanianedaaneen 1, 8

Metropolitan Code of Nashville and Davidson

County Cirapter 6.56... 6 cc sccsinccansananeanns passim

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vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

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Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Ss PN 6 4 8:ib ben cusdddnnenccsedddccanes 8

Se este sonchakedscekssnanatnwsesssabuns 8

Gs PE heb bcccancnddicdesnvaeecnsdensadens +

Metropolitan Code of Nashville and Davidson

COC CRON FBO es co sneciscocnsccccescuss 1, 8

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

ae GND, MME, Bo oc cnscccisanestscscescccenssasae O

MISCELLANEOUS:

Mark Guthrie, Methods of Judicial Review Over

Administrative Actions in Tennessee, 13 Memphis

St. Univ. L.Rev. 657 (T983).......... SE ee ray 10

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc., Michael Rucker, Michael

Butler, Meroney Entertainment, Inc., the Pleasure Palace,

Inc., Dawn Pierce, Elizabeth Martz, the 822 Corporation

and 421 Corporation (collectively “Respondents”),

respectfully request that this Court deny the Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari filed by the Metropolitan Government

of Nashville and Davidson County and Emmett Turner to

review the judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rendered in this case.

¢

ADDITIONAL RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

In addition to the constitutional, statutory, and ordi-

nance provisions reproduced in the appendix to the Peti-

tion, Respondents submit here the Tennessee common

law writ of certiorari statute found at Tenn. Code Ann.

§27-8-101 (Opp. App. 1a),! the Tennessee statutory writ of

certiorari provision appearing at Tenn. Code Ann.

§27-8-102 (Opp. App. 1a), Tenn. Code Ann. §57-4-204

(Opp. App. 19a-22a), and Metropolitan Code Section

7.24.030 (Opp. App. 22a-25a).

+

1 As used herein, “Pet. App. xxx” refers to pages of the

appendix accompanying the Petition, and “Opp. App. xxx”

refers to pages of the appendix attached hereto.

STATEMENT IN OPPOSITION

If this Court is searching for a case to resolve the

question of whether the “prompt judicial review” compo-

nent of Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) requires a

prompt judicial determination on the merits or merely

“prompt judicial access,” this is not it.

The Ordinance at issue here guarantees neither a

prompt judicial determination of the propriety of the

government’s actions nor prompt access to a judicial

forum. Adverse decisions of the sexually oriented busi-

ness licensing board (“Board”) made pursuant to Chapter

6.54 are reviewable only upon the issuance of a common

law writ of certiorari. This procedure is inherently flawed

in at least three respects. First, because the issuance of the

writ is discretionary in nature, aggrieved applicants and

license holders are not guaranteed access to a judicial

forum. Second, even if the writ is ultimately accepted and

judicial access is granted, the court is not required to

issue a decision as to whether to review a particular case

within a specific and reasonable period of time. The court

could conceivably delay ruling upon a petition for writ of

certiorari indefinitely, during which time the applicant’s

First Amendment rights are continually violated. Third,

even if a writ of certiorari is promptly issued, the court is

precluded from providing adequate judicial review

because it cannot review the intrinsic correctness of a

decision.

Given these flaws, the judicial review provisions con-

tained in Chapter 6.54 do not constitute an adequate and

appropriate mechanism of prompt judicial review,

regardless of how the words “prompt” and “review” are

defined. This was, indeed, the focus of the Sixth Circuit's

ruling and not the question of whether prompt judicial

review requires prompt determination or mere access.

Therefore, not only does this case constitute an inade-

quate vehicle to resolve any conflict amongst the circuits,

but that dispute may well never be reached by this Court

should it elect to review the Sixth Circuit’s decision.

In addition, Petitioner overstates the disparity

between circuit rulings addressing the construction of the

phrase “prompt judicial review.” A number of the deci-

sions that Petitioner relies on to establish a conflict actu-

ally involved content-neutral time, place, and manner

restrictions similar to those at issue in Thomas v. Chicago

Park District, 122 S.Ct. 775 (2002). Because such restric-

tions are not required to contain the Freedman procedural

guarantees generally necessary for targeted adult busi-

ness regulations to pass constitutional muster, Thomas,

122 S.Ct. at 780, n.2, there is no circuit conflict between

those decisions and the ruling of the Sixth Circuit here.

*

REASONS THAT THE PETITION

SHOULD BE DENIED

I. THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT WAS

PREDICATED UPON THE FACT THAT THE “JUDI-

CIAL REVIEW” AFFORDED BY CHAPTER 6.54

AND TENNESSEE LAW IS DISCRETIONARY IN

NATURE.

Petitioner appropriately acknowledges here, as it has

throughout the entirety of these legal proceedings, that

the potentially available “judicial review” of an adverse

administrative decision by the Board is by way of a

“common law writ of certiorari from a state trial court.”

Petition, p. 4, citing, Ord. §§.040(E)(2),2 .070(D)(2),

.110(M), and .150(E)(6). See also, Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc.

v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Cty., Tenn.,

274 F.3d 377, 401 n.6 (6th Cir. 2001) (Metro acknowledg-

ing at oral argument in the Sixth Circuit that the provi-

sions of Chapter 6.54 only authorize review “via the

common law writ”). Petitioner admits that the Metro-

politan code does not “guarantee that the appeal will be

decided by a date certain.” Petition, p. 2. In fact, Chapter

6.54 and the overlying Tennessee statute of common law

certiorari does not even guarantee that any form of judi-

cial review will be provided at all.

The Tennessee “common law” writ of certiorari is

found in Tenn. Code Ann. 27-8-101. Opp. App. 1a. Pur-

suant to that statute, a court has the absolute discretion to

deny a petition for issuance of the writ, and never then

reach the merits of the issues sought to be reviewed.

“(Whether the common law writ of certiorari will

issue is a matter of discretion. It is not issued as a matter

of right.” Boyce v. Williams, 389 S.W.2d 272, 277 (Tenn.

1965). See also, Clark v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 827

S.W.2d 312, 316-17 (Tenn. App. 1991) (“the remedy of

certiorari is not available as of right, but is granted under

unusual or extraordinary circumstances. It is instituted by

an application to a court of competent jurisdiction which

2 The designation of “Ord. §.xxx” specifies particular

provisions of Chapter 6.54. The sections and subsections

referred to are found in the version of that Ordinance which are

reproduced at Pet. App. 130a-176a.

may or may not authorize the writ”) (emphasis added).

And, the Petitioner acknowledges this discretionary

nature of the common law writ. See, Petition, p. 4 (“If the

trial court grants the writ, and thus determines to con-

sider the appeal ... ”) (emphasis added).

In addition, not only is granting of the writ discre-

tionary, but there is no time limit for a court to decide

upon whether to grant the petition or not, and then

review the merits of the dispute. Tenn. Code Ann.

§27-9-111(e) (Pet. App. 129a).3 Accordingly, Chapter 6.54,

together with the common law writ, does not even pro-

vide prompt access to a judicial forum. It is this aspect of

Chapter 6.54 and Tennessee law which served as the

lynchpin of the Sixth Circuit ruling, and not any deter-

mination as to whether “prompt judicial review” necessi-

tated a prompt judicial determination or merely

mandated prompt access to a court. Deja Vu of Nashville,

274 F.3d at 401-02 (the appellate court referring to the

discretionary nature of the common law writ as the “big-

gest problem with the Ordinance’s judicial review provi-

sion”) (emphasis added).

3 Petitioner states that the Metropolitan Government “has

no power to require a state court to grant a writ of certiorari or

to act on an appeal by any particular date.” Petition, p. 4. While

technically true, that statement is not, as they say, accurate.

After the District Court issued its first preliminary injunction

enjoining Chapter 6.54 for failing to comply with the Freedman

procedural guarantees, Metro successfully lobbied for the

Tennessee Legislature to enact what is the current version of

Tenn. Code Ann. §27-9-111(e). That statute does, of course,

compel a court “to act on an appeal by .. . [a] particular date.”

Pet. App. 129a.

II. THE SCOPE OF REVIEW UNDER THE TENNES-

SEE COMMON LAW WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS

FAR TOO NARROW TO AFFORD ADEQUATE

PROTECTIONS TO FIRST AMENDMENT PRO-

TECTED ACTIVITIES.

Simply put, the Tennessee common law writ of cer-

tiorari is not appellate review at all. See, Helton v. State, 250

S.W.2d 540, 541 (Tenn. 1952), quoting, State ex rel. McMur-

row v. Hunt, 192 S.W. 931, 933 (Tenn. 1917) (the super-

visory powers of Tennessee Courts to issue a common

law writ of certiorari “should not be confounded with its

appellate jurisdiction”).

The writ has never been employed to inquire into the

correctness of the judgment rendered where the court

had jurisdiction, and was therefore competent.

Hence, it has been held that the supervisory

jurisdiction of the court on a certiorari must be

restricted to an examination into the external

validity of the proceedings had in the lower

court. It cannot be exercised to review the judgment

as to its intrinsic correctness, either on the law or on

the facts of the case.

Helton, 250 S.W.2d at 540-41 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, “[t]he scope of review under the com-

mon law writ... is very narrow. It covers only an inquiry

into whether the board has exceeded its jurisdiction or is

acting illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily. ...” Powell v.

Parole Eligibility Review Board, 879 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn.

App. 1994), appeal denied (June 20, 1994) (emphasis

added). “At the risk of oversimplification, one may say

that it is not the correctness of the decision that is subject

to judicial review, but the manner in which the decision is

reached. If the agency or board has reached its decision in

a constitutional or lawful manner, then the decision

would not be subject to judicial review.” Id. (emphasis

added).4

This limited inquiry under Tennessee law is not the

form of appellate review that this Court has mandated in

order to insure that First Amendment rights are not tram-

pled upon by an overzealous government. Cf., FW/PBS,

Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 228 (1980) (The First Amend-

ment requires that there be “prompt judicial review in the

event that the license is erroneously denied”) (emphasis

added). And, the actions of the Board here well illustrate

that the Tennessee common law writ-of certiorari is not

the type of “sensitive tool” necessary to protect First

Amendment rights from governmental infringement,

regardless of when that judicial review may ultimately be

provided.

After the District Court lifted the first preliminary

injunction (concluding that Metro had “fixed” the Freed-

man procedural issues), the adult businesses in Nashville

and Davidson County were then required to undergo the

licensing process of Chapter 6.54. Of the eighteen busi-

nesses that filed applications, only three were initially

granted licenses by the Board. Deja Vu’s application was

4 Accord, Yokley v. State, 632 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Tenn. App.

1981), cert. denied, November 30, 1981 (an erroneous decision is

not an illegal decision, and a court may not substitute its

decision for that of an inferior board “regardless of how

erroneous the decision of the Board may have been”); and Henry

v. Board of Claims, 638 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tenn. App. 1982) (appeal

denied September 7, 1982) (“an erroneous decision of the Board,

absent more, is not an illegal, arbitrary, or fraudulent decision”).

denied based upon a conclusion by the Board that the

establishment needed to clean a number of couches, rest-

room walls, fixtures and shower stalls; repair a commode;

and provide covered waste containers. Opp. App.

1la-13a. The Board also concluded that the application

should be denied because an inspector had asserted that

entertainers were in violation of a three-foot dancer/

patron buffer zone restriction> as contained in Chapter

6.54. Id.

5 Petitioner is therefore incorrect when it asserts that initial

“decisions regarding the issuance, renewal, and revocation of

licenses are made at the administrative level by the

Metropolitan Government based on criteria unrelated to the

content of any speech.” Petition, p. 3 (emphasis added), citing,

Ord. §§.040(C)(2), .110(K), .150(A)(1)-(10). Also illustrating the

erroneous nature of this statement is the fact that a license

application can be denied, and an issued license suspended or

revoked, predicated specifically upon the content of expression,

such as violations of obscenity, indecent exposure and public

nudity laws, or even the “performance standards” of Chapter

6.54 itself (Ord. §.140). See, e.g., Ord. §§.050(B)(3) and (4),

.080(A)(2) and (4), .150(A)(9) and (10) (the provisions of Tenn.

Code Ann. §57-4-204 described in subsection 10 is found at Opp.

App. 19a-22a, and “Metropolitan Code section 7.24.030” is

reproduced in Opp. App. 22a-25a, with §.030(C) clearly

illustrating that revocation and/or suspension of a license can

be specifically predicated upon the “content” of expression), and

.150(B)(1). In addition, there will certainly be instances where

the Metropolitan Government asserts that a business is subject

to Chapter 6.54, although the owners and operators of the

establishment contend to the contrary. In that circumstance, the

Board will clearly be required to evaluate the content of the

expression in order to determine whether the business presents

one or more of the types of entertainment which are defined to

be required to comply with the Ordinance. See, e.g., Ord.

§§.010(Y)(1), (2), (3), and (4), (Z), (AA) and (BB).

Other establishments suffered similar fates. A busi-

ness known as the “Pleasure Palace” had its application

denied due to the alleged need to repair a hand sink,

clean some walls, air conditioning vents and storage

areas, and to provide for hand towels (Opp. App.

13a-15a); Club Platinum’s application was denied because

it allegedly needed to repair a toilet, clean showers, and

“eliminate storage that may attract rodents and insects”

(Opp. App. 16a-17a); and the Executive Club had its

application denied because the Board felt that it needed

to repair a couch, clean the restroom floors, and provide

covered trasHcans (Opp. App. 17a-18a).

Implicating no constitutional or procedural issues

whatsoever, if the applicants desired to seek to have a

court overturn these decisions, they would strictly have

to attack the intrinsic correctness of the administrative

rulings;® an aspect of review that is specifically precluded

¢ A similar example of this problem would be presented in

the circumstance where the Board, in invoking one of the “civil

disability” provisions of the Ordinance, decided to deny an

application for a license based upon an alleged criminal

conviction or Ordinance violation of the applicant. See, e.g., Ord.

§.050(B)(2). If the applicant, however, contended that the Board

had simply “gotten the wrong guy,” and that he in fact had not

been convicted of a disabling crime, that person would be

precluded under the Tennessee common law writ from seeking

judicial redress in an effort to correct that erroneous decision.

And, the Petitioner is incorrect when it contends that a writ of

certiorari must be issued “when an administrative ruling

prohibits speech activities.” Petition, p. 10 n.8. An erroneous

ruling does not a constitutional violation make. See, e.g., Powell,

879 S.W.2d at 873 (error in calculating a prisoner release

eligibility date, which therefore arguably led to a violation of

10

under the Tennessee common law writ of certiorari.”

These factually driven license application denials would

simply then be immune from review under the common

law writ.

Therefore, regardless of any consideration of the tim- |

ing of judicial review, the mere limited scope of the

Tennessee common law writ establishes that it fails to

comply with this Court’s rulings in regard to the manda-

tory nature of available judicial review. In fact, this Court

the petitioner’s equal protection and due process rights under

the Constitution, was not reviewable by a common law writ).

7 The limited nature of review of the common law writ |

should be contrasted with the broader appellate review as |

provided by the statutory writ of certiorari found in Tenn. Code

Ann. §27-8-102 (Opp. App. 1a). Unlike the common law writ, the

statutory writ is “a substitute for appeal.” Tenn. Code Ann.

§27-8-102(3). More importantly, while the common law writ is

discretionary, see discussion, supra, and Tenn. Code Ann.

§27-8-101 (“the writ of certiorari may be granted... ”), the

statutory writ contains no such limitation (“certiorari lies... asa

substitute for appeal”). As one commentator summed it up, “in

order to obtain a broader scope of review, the statutory writ of

certiorari must be utilized,” and that “the statutory writ of

certiorari provides a de novo review of both law and facts;

therefore, it is the favored procedure.” Mark Guthrie, Methods of

Judicial Review Over Administrative Actions in Tennessee, 13

Memphis St. Univ. L.Rev. 657, 666 (1983) (emphasis added). See

also, Enochs v. Narren, 949 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tenn. App. 1996),

appeal denied (May 27, 1997) (statutory writ of certiorari

involved some type of trial de novo). The Metropolitan

Government could easily have provided for review by the

statutory as opposed to the common law writ, but not having

done so, this challenged ordinance is certainly then |

constitutionally infirm regardless of whether the “judicial

review” that it provides for is “prompt.”

11

reviewed the Tennessee system of appeals from adminis-

trative decisions in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,

420 U.S. 546 (1975), and concluded that the procedures

were unconstitutional because state courts did not timely

“review the merits of the decision.” Id. at 561-62

(emphasis added).

III. THE PETITIONER’S ABANDONMENT OF A

FUNDAMENTAL TENANT OF ITS ARGUMENT

BELOW DOES NOT SERVE TO OBVIATE THE

REALITY THAT CHAPTER 6.54 FAILS TO GUAR-

ANTEE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AN ADVERSE

ADMINISTRATIVE RULING, IRRESPECTIVE OF

WHETHER SUCH RELIEF IS AFFORDED

PROMPTLY OR NOT.

Perhaps recognizing the fact that the majority of peti-

tions by aggrieved applicants will be denied by courts

because they do not raise questions of whether the

administrative board exceeded its jurisdiction or acted

illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily, the Petitioner aban-

dons in this Court a position that it has consistently

maintained over the past four plus years of litigation.

Specifically, Petitioner now contends for the first time

that if a trial court declines to grant the petition for a writ

of certiorari, the “adult business prevails as a matter of

right.” Petition, p. 10. And, Petitioner acknowledges it is

now taking a position inconsistent with its arguments

below. Petition, p. 6 n.6.

This revised “position” should be contrasted with the

claim that the Petitioner first raised as far back as 1998,

when in a hearing before the District Court, counsel for

the Petitioner succinctly stated:

12

Let me go back to the Court's first question,

what would happen if the writ of cert. was

denied. Case law is clear in Tennessee, a denial of a

writ of cert. is a decision on the merits .. . [and] the

stay would be lifted... .

Opp. App. 7a-8a. (emphasis and clarification added).

Petitioner's “change of heart” is unavailing for

numerous reasons.

First, the position that the Petitioner now takes does

not alleviate the constitutional infirmity for numerous

businesses and individuals affected by Chapter 6.54. Peti-

tioner changes direction on this long-held position in an

effort to emphasize to this Court the provisions of Ord.

§§.040(E)(3) (Pet. App. 148a) and .070(D)(3) (Pet. App.

159a), which hold that for what are defined to be “exis-

ting” adult businesses and “current” entertainers,’ any

adverse administrative decision that is appealed to any

court “shall not take effect until the decision has been

upheld by the Court after adjudication on the merits.”

Yet, and inexplicably, for “new” businesses and

entertainers (those not in operation or performing in the

Metropolitan area as of March 1, 1999 (Ord. §.010(L) and

(M) (Pet. App. 132a)), there is no such “protection.”

Rather, for them, an adverse administrative decision

“shall take effect the day the decision is issued by the

Board.” Ord. §§.040(E)(4) (Pet. App. 148a), and .070(D)(4)

(Pet. App. 159a).

8 These “existing” businesses and “current” entertainers

are those that were operating/ performing in the Metropolitan

area as of March 1, 1999. Ord. §.010(D) and (G) (Pet. App. 131a).

13

Respondents challenged the constitutionality of

Chapter 6.54 not only as applied, but facially as well (see,

Complaint excerpts, Opp. App. 2a-6a, and Deja Vu of

Nashville, 274 F.3d at 398-99).? Consequently, particularly

in light of the fact that literally hundreds of entertainers

have come and gone from the Respondents’ businesses

since March 1, 1999, the concentration by the Petitioner

upon this purported “saving language” rings hollow in

that it is simply not applicable to the circumstance of those

entertainers who commenced performing in the Metro-

politan area after March 1, 1999, let alone to the new

adult entertainment establishments which have opened

up for business after that date.

Second, the new “position” of the Petitioner makes

little logical or practical sense. Petitioner now contends

that the “ordinance provides that the administrative rul-

ing is void unless considered by the court on appeal and

sustained.” Petition, p. 4. See also, Petition, p. 7 (“ .. . if

the trial court did not grant the writ of certiorari and

decide the appeal ‘on the merits,’ respondents would

automatically prevail”) (emphasis in original).!° Yet, under

* Given this facial challenge, Respondents certainly had

standing to raise the constitutional concerns of these “new”

entertainers. See, e.g., Connection Distributing Co. v. Reno, 154

F.3d 281, 295 (6th Cir. 1998) (magazine had ability to assert

rights of readers); and Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d

1248, 1252-53 (Sth Cir. 1995) (exotic dance club had standing to

assert constitutional claims of entertainers who performed at

the establishment).

10 Again, these arguments of the Petitioner truly apply, if at

all, only in the circumstance of existing businesses and current

entertainers. As spurious as they may be, these assertions have

absolutely no application to new businesses or entertainers.

14

the Petitioner’s “logic,” an aggrieved applicant or license

holder could prevail in regard to any adverse administra-

tive ruling by the Board simply by filing a petition for a

common law writ, making no arguments of merit, and

then “winning” their case when the court denies the

petition!

Third, and illustrative of the questionable logic of the

Petitioner's “new and improved” approach, the fact

remains that for four plus years, Metro has taken the

unwaivering position with the District Court and with

the Circuit Court of Appeals that under Tennessee law, a

denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari was a “decision

on the merits.” In addition, certainly in regard to “new”

entertainers and businesses, a denial of a petition for a

common law writ means that an aggrieved applicant or

license holder will have received absolutely no judicial

review at all to an adverse administrative ruling by the

Board.'}

a

11 Petitioner asserts that “there is no dispute that the writ

would be denied, if ever, only in the most extraordinary

circumstances.” Petition, p. 10 n.8. That is far from an accurate

characterization of the law in Tennessee and the proceedings

below. First, the Affidavit of Claudia Bonnyman submitted by

the Petitioner in the District Court (Opp. App. 9a-10a) falls far

short of asserting that all petitions for a common law writ of

certiorari are granted. See, Deja Vu of Nashville, 274 F.3d at 402.

Second, the non-constitutional and non-procedural factual

matters that would be at issue in many of the requests for

judicial review could only be rectified by seeking redress in

regard to the intrinsic correctness of the administrative ruling,

which is not an appropriate function of the common law writ.

Accordingly, most of those petitioners would be denied as a

matter of due course. And, there is no shortage of Tennessee

cases illustrating courts denying writs based upon just that fact.

15

Fourth, while the Petitioner attempts to dismiss this

significant change of position as merely agreeing with a

“construction of state law,” Petition, p. 6 n.6, that is not

the case. Not only did the District and Circuit Courts not

“construe” the ordinance in the fashion as suggested by

the Petitioner, but, more to the point, those federal courts

are not even empowered to provide such a limiting con-

struction of state law. Virginia v. American Booksellers

Assn., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (“we will not rewrite a

state law to conform it to constitutional requirements”);

and Freedman, 380 U.S. at 369 (federal courts lack jurisdic-

tion to authoritatively construe state legislation).

IV. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT RULED CORRECTLY IN

THIS ACTION.

-

Irrespective of any perceived “split” in the circuits,

and irrespective of the other constitutional infirmities of

Chapter 6.54 as referenced, supra, Petitioner simply fails

to present any persuasive argument that the Sixth Circuit

See, e.g., Fite v. State Board of Paroles, 925 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn. App.

1996) (appeal denied May 28, 1996) (“petition does not state any

facts that would support a claim that the Board acted illegally,

fraudulently, or arbitrarily, or that it exceeded its authority,”

and therefore petitioner “is not entitled to a Writ of Certiorari”).

Third, the Petitioner itself clearly acknowledges that the courts

have the authority and discretion to deny a petition for a

common law writ. See, e.g., Petition, p. 4. Finally, the Petitioner

actually has it backwards, in that a common law writ of

certiorari is to be granted only under “unusual or extraordinary

circumstances.” Clark, 827 S.W.2d at 316-17.

16

was incorrect in its ruling that Freedman requires a

prompt judicial determination. This Court has never held

that mere judicial access affords appropriate First

Amendment protections, and since the time of the deci-

sion in Freedman, the rulings of this Court have repeat-

edly used language affirming that a prompt final judicial

resolution is required.

In Freedman itself, in defining “prompt judicial

review,” this Court used the phrases “final judicial deter-

mination on the merits,” and “judicial resolution.” Freed-

man, 380 U.S. at 59. In Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 417

(1971), reference is made to a requirement for a “final

judicial determination on the merits within a specified,

brief period.” Similarly, in Southeastern Promotion, Ltd. v.

Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975), which coincidentally also

dealt with the writ system in the State of Tennessee, this

Court found the existing state procedures lacking and

once again articulated that Freedman required a “prompt

final judicial determination.” See, also, Shuttlesworth v.

City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 161 n.3 969) (Harlan, J.,

concurring) (“although Shuttlesworth could have peti-

tioned for a writ of mandamus in the Alabama Circuit

Court if the City Commission denied his application, that

state court is not obligated to render a decision within

any fixed period of time”); and FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 228

(the plurality of the Court noting that in a licensing

scheme involving “adult” businesses, “the first two [Freed-

man] safeguards are essential”) (emphasis and clarification

added).

17

V. THE CONFLICT AMONGST THE CIRCUITS

IDENTIFIED BY PETITIONER IS NOT AS FRAC-

TIOUS AS PETITIONER ASSERTS.

Petitioner argues that this Court should grant the

petition because the circuits are in conflict on the ques-

tion of whether this Court’s decisions in Freedman and

FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990), require merely

prompt judicial access or a prompt judicial decision. Peti-

_tion, p. 8. Yet, upon closer examination, this conflict is not

as apparent and troublesome as it may appear at first

blush.

To date, three circuits have explicitly held that in the

context of adult business licensing schemes, a prompt

judicial determination on the merits is required to satisfy

the Freedman prompt judicial review requirement. See,

Nightclubs, Inc. v. Paducah, 202 F.3d 884, 892-93 (6th Cir.

2000); Baby Tam & Co. v. Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th

Cir. 1998); and 11126 Baltimore Blud., Inc. v. Prince George’s

Cty., 58 F.3d 988, 998-1001 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). While

the First and Seventh Circuits are claimed to be in conflict

with these decisions (Petition, p. 9), that is not the case. In

both Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation

Authority, 984 F.2d 1319 (1st Cir. 1993), and Graff v. City of

Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309 (7th Cir. 1993), the appellate courts

evaluated time, place, and manner restrictions on public

fora closely akin to the regulation at issue in Thomas v.

Chicago Park District, 122 S.Ct. 775 (2002). In Thomas, this

Court determined that time, place, and manner restric-

tions of public fora need not comply with the Freedman

procedural safeguards ordinarily required of prior

restraints targeting sexually oriented expression. To the

extent that the First and Seventh Circuits reached similar

18

conclusions, they are not in conflict with the majority

construction of the prompt judicial review requirement.

As such, this Court should not accept certiorari in this

case because the alleged conflict amongst the circuits is

not as pronounced as the Petitioner suggests.

+

CONCLUSION

Because the Sixth Circuit ruled correctly in this case,

and because resolution of the prompt judicial determina-

tion/access question is not necessary to uphold the deci-

sion of the Sixth Circuit, Respondents respectfully

request that the petition be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

BRADLEY J. SHAFER

(Counsel of Record)

SHAFER & Associates, P.C.

3800 Capital City Boulevard

Suite 2

Lansing, Michigan 48906

(517) 886-6560

H. Louis SirkIn

SIRKIN, PINALES, MeEzisov &

SCHWARTZ

920 Fourth & Race Tower

105 West Fourth Street

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-2776

MICHAEL F. PLEASANTS

8 South Third, Suite 200

Memphis, Tennessee 38103

JoHN E. HERBISON

2016 Eighth Avenue South

Nashville, Tennessee 37204

la

APPENDIX

Tennessee Code Annotated

27-8-101. Constitutional basis. - The writ of certiorari

may be granted whenever authorized by law, and also in

all cases where an inferior tribunal, board, or officer

exercising judicial functions has exceeded the jurisdiction

conferred, or is acting illegally, when, in the judgment of

the court, there is no other plain, speedy, or adequate

remedy. [Code 1858, § 3123 (deriv. Const. 1834, art. 6,

§ 10); Shan., § 4853; Code 1932, § 8989; T.C.A. (orig. ed.),

§ 27-801.]

27-8-102. Cases in which writ lies. — Certiorari lies:

(1) On suggestion if diminution;

(2) Where no appeal is given;

(3) As a substitute for appeal;

(4) Instead of audita querela; or

(5) Instead of writ of error. [Code 1858, § 3124; Shan.,

§ 4854; Code 1932, § 8990; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 27-802.]

2a

[Page 1]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

DEJA VU OF NASHVILLE, INC. a

Tennessee corporation; MICHAEL

RUCKER, individually; MICHAEL

BUTLER, individually; MERONEY CIVIL

ENTERTAINMENT, INC., d/b/a ACTION NO.

KEN’S GOLD CLUB, a Tennesse 3-97-1066

corporation, THE PLEASURE

PALACE, INC., a Tennessee - JUDGE

corporation; CAROUSEL NIXON

AMUSEMENT CENTER, INC., a

Tennessee corporation; DAWN

PIERCE and ELIZEBETH MARTZ,

individually,

Plaintiffs,

v.

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT

OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON

COUNTY, TENNESSEE; EMMITT

TURNER, Chief of Police of the

Metro Police Department,

Defendants.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION, PERMANENT INJUNCTION,

AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

1. This is a civil action whereby Plaintiffs pray for a

preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the

3a

Defendants from enforcement of Chapter 6.54 of the Code

of Ordinances of the Metropolitan Government of

Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (hereinafter

“Chapter 6.54” or the “Ordinance”), passed on third

[Page 2]

reading by its Metropolitan County Council on August

19, 1997, on the ground that this Ordinance is unconstitu-

tional on its face and as applied, and in its threatened

application to Plaintiffs in their activities described

below. Further, Plaintiffs pray for a declaratory judgment

to determine the constitutionality of said Ordinance on its

face, as applied to Plaintiffs, and in its threatened appli-

cation to them, and Plaintiffs also request attorney fees as

a result of the injuries sustained to their fundamental

constitutional rights.

[Page 9]

20. Chapter 6.54 is an extremely lengthy and com-

plex licensing and permitting scheme containing

numerous and various restrictions, regulations and prohi-

bitions affecting the constitutionally protected conduct of

the Plaintiffs, their agents, representatives and employees

as well as those individuals from the consenting adult

audience which seek to view the entertainment or to

purchase, rent and/or view other expressive media pro-

vided by the Plaintiffs. Because of the length and com-

plexity of the Ordinance, the Plaintiffs, for the sake of

clarity, will state the general grounds upon which they

rely that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and will then

4a

specifically list the provisions which violate one or more

of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

21. Plaintiffs aver that the licensing scheme as a

whole is unconstitutional on its face, or as applied,

because of the lack of procedural safeguards. It violates

due process and is overbroad.

[Page 10]

It further violates equal protection. In addition, individ-

ual provisions of the Ordinance are unconstitutional or

unconstitutional as applied to the Plaintiffs.

+ +

[Page 15]

+ +

22. Plaintiffs aver that the following licensing provi-

sions in the Ordinance are in violation of one or more of

the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs as listed in the pre-

ceding paragraphs. Plaintiffs aver that these are examples

of the unconstitutionality of the Ordinance in violation of

said constitutional provisions and do not constitute all of

the provisions which will be demonstrated as unconstitu-

tional on their face, or as applied.

+ +

[Page 21]

(P) The provision for a permit is denial of the

right to travel of any featured dancers from out

of state who could not be engaged to entertain

because of the lengthy permit procedure.

ce eee

[Page 26]

WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS PRAY that the Court

grant its relief as follows:

(A) A preliminary injunction enjoining the Defen-

dants, their agents, servants and employees from enforc-

ing the Ordinance as alleged herein.

(B) A declaration that the Ordinance is unconstitu-

tional and violative of First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights guaranteed to Plaintiffs by the United

States Constitution and Article 1, Section 19, Article 1,

Section 8, and Article 11, Section 8 of the Tennessee

Constitution.

(C) A permanent injunction, permanently enjoining

and restraining the Defendants, their agents, servants and

employees from enforcing the Ordinance.

(D) For attorneys fees and costs of this action, pur-

suant to 42 U.S.C. 1988.

(E) For all such other, further and different relief,

both general and special, as to which the Plaintiffs may

be entitled in the premises and as justice and equity may

require.

[Page 27]

Michael F. Pleasants, Esq.

8 South Third, Suite 200

Memphis, Tennessee 38103

901/572-7332

6a

Bradley J. Shafer, *Esq.

Shafer & Associates

3800 Capital City Blvd.

Suite 2

Lansing, Michigan 48906

517/886-6560

*Motion to be admitted counsel

pro hac vice to be filed

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

+ + *

7a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

DEJA VU OF NASHVILLE, INC.,

et al., ’

Plaintiffs,

’

Case No.:

)

)

)

)

VS. )

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT 3-97-1066

)

)

)

)

OF NASHVILLE AND

DAVIDSON COUNTY,

TENNESSEE, et al.,

Defendants.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

November 5, 1998 /

BEFORE THE HONORABLE SENIOR JUDGE

JOHN T. NIXON,

DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff MICHAEL F. PLEASANTS

Deja Vu: Pleasants’ Law Firm

Winchester Building

8 South Third Street

Suite 200

Memphis, Tenn. 38103

For the Defendant: JAMES L. CHARLES

SHAYNA R. ABRAMS

Metropolitan Legal Department

204 Metro Courthouse

Nashville, Tennessee 37291

8a

CHARLOTTE H. BARR, RPR

Official Court Reporter

837-A U.S. Courthouse

Nashville, Tennessee 37203

Phone: 1-615-726-0355

[Page 19]

MR. CHARLES: Your Honor, my name is Jim

Charles. I will just have a short response to that.

Let me go back to the Court’s first question, what

would happen if the writ of cert was denied. Case law is

clear in Tennessee, a denial of a writ of cert is a decision

on the merits; you then appeal to the Court of Appeals.

You would have the right -

THE COURT: What happens to the stay?

MR. CHARLES: The stay would be lifted, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: All right. -

ae

9a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

DEJA VU OF NASHVILLE, INC.,

a Tennessee Corporation, et al.,

V.

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT

OF NASHVILLE AND

DAVIDSON COUNTY,

Defendant

)

)

Plaintiffs, ‘

Vv. ) Case No.

THE METROPOLITAN ) 3:97-1066

GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE ) Judge

AND DAVIDSON COUNTY ) Nixon

TENNESSEE, and EMMETT ) eneten

TURNER, Chief of Police, in his ) — —

- ' ) Griffin

official capacity

Defsaduate ) Consolidated

) cases

and ) Case No.

JERRY C. PENDERGRASS, et al., ) 3:97-1176

: Plaintiffs, ;

)

)

)

)

)

AFFIDAVIT OF CLAUDIA BONNYMAN

The affiant, Claudia Bonnyman, having been duly

sworn, makes oath as follows:

1. I am the Clerk and Master for the Chancery Courts of

Davidson County.

2. I have been the Clerk and Master for nine (9) years.

10a

3. Generally, when a petition for a writ of certiorari is

filed, the petition, a proposed brief order (“fiat”) and

proposed writ of certiorari are placed before a Chan-

cellor the same day

[Page 2]

the petition is filed. The short order (“fiat”) directs

the Clerk and Master to issue the writ of certiorari in

the case.

4. When the signed order is returned to my office by the

chancellor, the writ of certiorari is signed by the Clerk

(or a deputy clerk) and it is issued usually within one

hour of receipt of the court order.

5. Generally, our office processes all petitions for a writ of

certiorari including presenting the proposed order and

petition to a chancellor, docketing the signed order and

issuing the writ of certiorari within two days of the filing

of the petition.

6. I am over the age of 18 years and I am competent to

testify as to the matters contained herein.

And further Affiant sayeth not.

/s/

Claudia Bonnyman

State of Tennessee )

County of Davidson )

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 4th day of

November, 1998.

/s/ [Vicki J. Bailey]

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires:

My Commission Expires JAN. 27, 2001

ate ie Rls Woe Lc

ee a SN Oe

lla

Page 1

AGENDA

April 27, 1999

9:00 a.m.

METROPOLITAN ADULT ENTERTAINMENT BOARD

700 SECOND AVENUE SOUTH

HOWARD OFFICE BUILDING NASHVILLE

ELITE REPORTING SERVICES

ANGELA M. SYES, CCR

806 Porter Road

Nashville, Tennessee 37206

(615) 262-9592

Page 10

Applications for adult entertainment licenses. Deja

Vu of Nashville, 1214 Demonbreun Street.

Page 11

MS. BORUM: Our recommendation is that it

does not comply with health inspections. Some of the

items on that health inspection report is: To clean the

couches, rest room walls, fixtures, shower stall; repair

commode; provide covered waste containers. Charles, in

his inspection, noted a violation of the 3-foot rule.

MR. CHAIRMAN: All right.

MS. SCHAFFNER: I take it the fourth sheet

back in the packet is the health inspection report?

MS. BORUM: That is correct.

12a

MS. SCHAFFNER: And that inspection indi-

cates that the couches need to be cleaned. Sanitation of

the floors and the cubicles need to be improved. Covered

waste containers need to be provided throughout the

establishment. The commode in the dressing room needs

to be repaired. The rest room walls and fixtures need to

be cleaned. And the shower stall in the dressing room

needs to be cleaned; is that right?

MS. BORUM: Yes, ina’am, that is correct.

MS. SCHAFFNER: Then...

MR. CHAIRMAN: Okay. So that it...

MS. SCHAFFNER: Then the inspector’s report

is the last sheet; is that right?

MS. BORUM: Yes, ma’am.

MS. SCHAFFNER: And the inspector’s

PAGE 12

finding upon inspection was that the dancers were in

violation of the 3-foot rule; is that correct?

MS. BORUM: That is correct.

MS. SCHAFFNER: On the codes or building

there was no findings since there were no booths; is that

right?

MS. BORUM: Yes, ma’am, that is correct.

MS. SCHAFFNER: And as far as the police

report, it was approved?

MS. BORUM: Yes, ma’am.

13a

MS. SCHAFFNER: And the zoning was

approved?

MS. BORUM: Yes, ma’am.

MS. SCHAFFNER: I move that we deny this

application on the basis of the health inspection and the —

this board’s inspector’s report.

MR. CHAIRMAN: It has been moved that we

deny this report based on the - deny this application

based on the inspector’s report and this report from

health.

Is there a second?

MS. STEVENS: Second.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Any discussions? All in

favor signify by aye.

(All board members voted aye.)

+ + +

Page 15

The next application is Pleasure Palace, 2407 Dicker-

son Pike.

Ms. Borum.

MS. BORUM: Our recommendation is that it

does not comply with health codes. Some of these items

were: Repair hand sink; clean walls ared all air condition-

ing vents; clean storage areas; provide hand towels.

14a

On your checklist sheet from Charles and myself, we

received a late report yesterday afternoon from the build-

ing inspector who went out and made another inspection

and approved the booth requirements.

MS. STEVENS: What does nonconforming

mean? ;

MS. BORUM: Legally, “nonconforming” means

that it was there prior to the funding. It’s grandfathered

in.

MS. SCHAFFNER: I take it that the building

inspector’s report disapproval since it. . .

MS. BORUM: It is marked disapproved on the

checklist. I was handed the report about 5 until 4 yester-

day afternoon.

MS. SCHAFFNER: Which disapproves or

Page 16

approves?

MS. BORUM: That approves, as far as the

building inspector.

MS. SCHAFFNER: So the only thing that’s dis-

approved, then, is the health...

MS. BORUM: That is correct.

MS. SCHAFFNER: . . . report, which includes a

need for repairing hand sink for the ease of cleaning;

thoroughly cleaning the walls in booths and air condi- |

tioning vents in the hall; providing a minimum of 10-foot |

candles of illumination at the floor level in booths; clean-

ing up storage areas; eliminate all unnecessary items on ip

15a

lower level; and provide hand towels in the bathrooms; is

that correct?

MS. BORUM: Yes, ma’am.

MS. SCHAFFNER: I move that this application

be denied on the basis of the health report.

MR. CHAIRMAN: It has been moved that this

application be denied on the basis of the health report. Is

there a second?

MS. STEVENS: Second.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Any discussion?

MR. BANKS: One question, Mr. Chairman.

How will - how do they determine what the candle -

how do they determine that?

Page 17

MS. SCHAFFNER: I think it’s a lighting

machine, you know, that...

MR. BANKS: That they carry with them that

determines the lighting?

MS. BORUM: It’s measured from the feet.

MR. BANKS: That’s all I have.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Okay. All in favor signify by

aye.

(All board members voted aye)

MR. CHAIRMAN: Any nays?

Motion carries. This application is denied.

l6a

Page 26

MR. CHAIRMAN: The next is Club Platinum,

1711 Hayes Street.

MS. BORUM: We recommend disapproval. It

does not comply with health code. Some of those items:

Repair toilet; clean showers; eliminate storage that may

attract rodents and insects.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Everything else is approved?

MS. BORUM: Yes, sir, everything else is

approved.

MS. SCHAFFNER: So that includes repairing

the toilet in the men’s rest room, cleaning the floors along

the lockers in the dressing room?

Page 27

MS. BORUM: That is correct.

MS. SCHAFFNER: Cleaning the showers in the

dressing room, eliminating storage that may attract

rodents and insects and cause — something.

MS. BORUM: Harborage.

MS. SCHAFFNER: What is harborage?

MR. CHARLES WATKINS: Places for rodents or

insects to hide.

MS. SCHAFFNER: All right. I move this appli-

cation be denied based upon the health inspection report.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Do we have a second?

Cea oes WR ARLE

17a

MS. STEVENS: Second.

MR. CHAIRMAN: It has been moved and prop-

erly seconded that this application be denied based on

the health inspector’s report. All in favor say aye.

(All board members voted aye.)

MR. CHAIRMAN: Any nays? Application is

denied.

+ %

Page 43

+ * %

The next application is the Executive Club,

Page 44

701 4th Avenue South.

MS. BORUM: We recommend disapproval. It

does not comply with health codes. Some of these items:

Repair couch, clean rest room floors, provide covered

trash cans.

MS. SCHAFFNER: I move this application be

denied on the basis of the health violations.

; MR. CHAIRMAN: Is there a second?

MR. STEVENS: Second.

MR. CHAIRMAN: It has been moved and prop-

erly seconded that this application be denied based on

the health violations. All those in favor signify by -— is

there any discussion from the board? All in favor signify

by aye.

18a

(All board members voted aye.)

MR. CHAIRMAN: Any nays? This application

is denied.

+ + +

19a

TN ST S 57-4-204

T. C. A. § 57-4-204

WEST’S TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED TITLE 57.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS CHAPTER 4.

CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES ON

PREMISES PART 2 —- ADMINISTRATION,

ENFORCEMENT, PROHIBITED ACTS

Current through End of 2001 First Reg Sess.

§ 57-4-204. Prohibited sexual conduct or representations

(a) In addition to the other duties imposed under

this title, the commission is authorized to enforce the

provisions of subsections (b), (c), and (d); and upon viola-

tion of such subsections by any person, firm or corpora-

tion licensed under the provisions of this chapter, the

commission shall revoke the privilege license of such

violator.

(b) The following acts or conduct on licensed prem-

ises are deemed contrary to public policy, and therefore

no license shall be held at any premises where such

conduct or acts are permitted:

(1) To employ, use or allow any person in the sale or

service of alcoholic beverages or malt beverages in or

upon the licensed premises while such person is

unclothed or in such attire, costume or clothing as to

expose to view any portion of the female breast below the

top of the areola or of any portion of the pubic hair, anus,

cleft of the buttocks, vulva or genitals;

(2) To employ, use or allow the services of any

hostess or other person to mingle with the patrons while

such hostess or other person is unclothed or in such

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attire, costume or clothing as described in subdivision

(b)(1);

(3) To encourage or permit any person on the

licensed premises to touch, caress or fondle the breasts,

buttocks, anus or genitals of any other person;

(4) To permit any employee or person to wear or

use any device or covering, exposed to view, which simu-

lates the breast, genitals, anus, pubic hair or any portion

thereof.

(c)(1) Conduct or acts on licensed premises in viola-

tion of this subsection are deemed contrary to public

policy, and therefore no license shall be held at any

premises where such conduct or acts are permitted.

_ (2) Live entertainment is permitted on any licensed

premises, except that:

(A) No licensee shall permit any person to

perform acts of or acts which simulate:

(i) Sexual intercourse, masturbation,

sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagella-

tion or any sexual acts which are prohibited

by law;

(ii) The touching, caressing or fon-

dling of the breast, buttocks, anus or geni-

tals; or

(iii) The displaying of the pubic hair,

anus, vulva or genitals.

(B) Subject to the provisions of subdivision

(2)(A), any entertainer who is employed in

whole or in part by the licensee to dance at such

licensee’s premises shall perform only upon a

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stage at least eighteen inches (18”) above the

immediate floor level and removed at least six

feet (6’) from the nearest patron.

(3) No licensee shall permit any person to use artifi-

cial devices or inanimate objects to depict any of the

prohibited activities described above.

(4) No licensee shall permit any person to remain in

or upon the licensed premises who exposes to public

view any portion of his genitals or anus.

(d) The following conduct or acts on licensed prem-

ises are deemed contrary to public policy, and therefore

no license shall be held at any premises where such

conduct or acts are permitted:

(1) The showing of film, still pictures, elec-

tronic reproduction, or other visual reproduc-

tions depicting:

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(A) Acts or simulated acts of sexual

intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, bestial-

ity, oral copulation, flagellation or any sex-

ual acts which are prohibited by law;

(B) Any person being touched,

caressed or fondled on the breast, buttocks,

anus or genitals;

(C) Scenes wherein a person displays

the vulva or the anus or the genitals; or

(D) Scenes wherein artificial devices

or inanimate objects are employed to

depict, or drawings are employed to por-

tray, any of the prohibited activities

described above.

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(e) Each county, city, or metropolitan government is

empowered upon approval by a two-thirds (/s) vote of its

legislative body to authorize its law enforcement officers

to conduct investigations into alleged violations of sub-

sections (a)-(d), and such law enforcement officers shall

report such violations to the commission for appropriate

action by such commission.

(f) The commission shall be immune from liability

resulting from conduct or acts of any law enforcement

officers authorized to investigate violations of subsec-

tions (a)-(d) as provided in subsection (e).

1980 Pub.Acts, c. 904, §§ 1 to 3.

Metropolitan Code Section 7.24.030

Prohibited acts or conduct - Enforcement authority.

A. In addition to the other duties imposed by the

metropolitan beer permit board by the Metropolitan Code

of Laws, it shall be the duty of such board to enforce the

provisions of this section and revoke or suspend the beer

permit of any person, firm, corporation, syndicate or

association, upon notice and hearing, for violation of the

provisions of this section.

B. The following acts or conduct have been declared

contrary to public policy by the General Assembly of the

State of Tennessee when such activities take place upon

premises licensed by the alcoholic beverage commission,

pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 57-4-101,

et seq.; and the same are declared to be against the public

\ 23a

policy of the metropolitan government of Nashville and

Davidson County, and therefore, no beer permit shall be

held at any premises where such contract or acts are

permitted:

1. To employ, use or allow any person in the

sale or service of beer or like alcoholic beverages in

or upon the premises of a permittee while such per-

son is unclothed or in such attire, costume or

clothing as to expose to view any portion of the

female breast below the top of the areola or any

portion of the pubic hair, anus, cleft of the buttocks,

vulva or genitals;

2. To employ, use or allow the services of any

hostess or other person to mingle with the patrons

while such hostess or other person is unclothed or in

such attire, costume or clothing as described in sub-

division 1 of this subsection;

3. To en¢ourage or permit any person on the

premises of a permittee to touch, caress or fondle the

breast, buttocks, anus or genitals of any other per-

son; z

4. To permit any employee or person to wear or

use any device or covering, exposed to view, which

simulates the breast, genitals, anus, pubic hair or any

portion thereof.

C. Acts or conduct in premises licensed by the alco-

holic beverage commission pursuant to Tennessee Code

Annotated Sections 57-4-101, et seq. have been deemed

contrary to public policy by the General Assembly of the

state of Tennessee, and are declared against the public

policy of the metropolitan government of Nashville and

Davidson County; and, therefore, no beer permit shall! be

held at any premises where such conduct or acts are

ne

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permitted. Live entertainment is permitted on premises

of a permittee except that:

1. No permittee shall permit any person to per-

form acts of or acts which simulate:

a. Sexual intercourse, masturbation, sod-

omy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation or

any sexual acts which are prohibited by law;

b. The touching, caressing or fondling of

the breast, buttocks, anus or genitals;

c. The displaying of the pubic hair, anus,

vulva or genitals.

2. Subject to the provisions of subdivision 1 of

this subsection, any entertainer who is employed in

whole or in part by the permittee to dance at such

permittee’s premises shall perform only upon a stage

at least eighteen inches above the immediate floor

level and removed at least six feet from the nearest

patron.

3. No permittee shall permit any person to use

artificial devises or inanimate objects to depict any of

the prohibited activities described above.

4. No permittee shall permit any person to

remain in or upon the premises who exposes to

public view any portion of his or her genitals or

anus.

D. The following acts or conduct have been

declared contrary to public policy by the General Assem-

bly of the state of Tennessee when such activities take

place upon premises licensed by the alcoholic beverage

commission, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Sec-

tions 57-4-101, et seq.; and the same are declared to be

against the public policy of the metropolitan government

a |

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of Nashville and Davidson County; and, therefore, no

beer permit shall be held at any premises where such

conduct or acts are permitted:

1. The showing of film, still pictures, electronic

reproduction, or other visual reproductions depict-

ing:

a. Acts or simulated acts of sexual inter-

course, masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral

copulation, flagellation or any sexual acts which

are prohibited by law;

b. Any person being touch [sic], caressed

or fondled on the breast, buttocks, anus or geni-

tals;

c. Scenes wherein a person displays the

vulva or the anus or the genitals;

d. Scenes wherein artificial devices or

inanimate objects are employed to depict, or

drawings are employed to portray, any of the

prohibited activities described above. (Ord.

90-1339 § 1(5-7), 1990; prior code § 5-1-34)

(Nashville 4-93)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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