Appendix — In Re Kelly

upreme VOUT, U.o

ae FILED

Q11240 FEB 26 2002

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

In re:

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY

ON PETITION FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF PROHIBITION

FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, TAMPA DIVISION

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY

522 Cleveland Street

Clearwater, Florida 33755

(727) 442-5093

Petitioner Pro Se.

Washington, 0.C. ¢ THIEL PRESS © (202) 328-3286

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Exhibit A Al

Exhibit B A2

Document 1, Florida Department of

Transportation/City of Clearwater Roadway

Transfer Agreement A3

Document 2, Plaintiff's PETITION FOR

PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS A7

Document 3, Petitioner’s NOTICE OF

APPEARANCE A12

Document 4, ORDER TRANSFERRING

PETITION Al4

Document 5, Plaintiff's RESPONSE TO ORDER

TRANSFERRING PETITION - Al15

Document 6, Plaintiff's PETITION FOR

REVIEW A17

Exhibit C, “Tragic Roundabout,” The London

Mirror A21

Exhibit D, “Decision Made In A Roundabout

Way” A24

Document 7 Plaintiff's Complaint A26

Document 8 Plaintiff's MOTION TO AMEND

COMPLAINT A39

Document 9 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint A40

(t)

14)

15)

16)

17)

18)

Document 10, DEFENDANT CHIEF JUSTICE

WELLS’ AND THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES

AND NAMED EMPLOYEES OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF FLORIDA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

OR, ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT A52

Document 11, Plaintiff's RESPONSE TO

DEFENDANT CHIEF JUSTICE WELLS’ AND

NAMED EMPLOYEES OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF FLORIDA’S MOTION TO

DISMISS OR, ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT A56

Document 12, DEFENDANT CHIEF JUSTICE

WELLS’ AND THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES

AND NAMED EMPLOYEES OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF FLORIDA’S REPLY IN SUPPORT

OF MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED

COMPLAINT OR, ALTERNATIVELY

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Aé60

Document 13, Plaintiff's RESPONSE TO

DEFENDANT CHIEF JUSTICE WELLS’

AND THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES AND

NAMED EMPLOYEES OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF FLORIDA’S REPLY IN SUPPORT

OF MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED

COMPLAINT OR, ALTERNATIVELY,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT A63

Document 14, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS A67

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20)

21)

22)

23)

26)

Document 15, DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM

IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO

DISMISS A70

Document 16, Plaintiff's RESPONSE TO

DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS A76

Document 17, ORDER filed 8/22/01

a. Granting in Part Movants’ Motions to

Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint

b. Denied as Moot Movants’ Alternative

Motions for Summary Judgment A85

Document 18, ORDER filed 8/24/01 sighting

deficiencies of Plaintiff's Response to Reply A93

Document 19, ORDER filed 10/15/01

a. Granting in Part Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint

b. Dismissing Plaintiff's claims against

Defendant's

C. Denied as Moot Alternative Motion for

Summary Judgment A9%5

Document 20, ORDER filed 10/31/01, Ordering

Plaintiff to SHOW CAUSE A97

Document 21, ORDER filed 11/2/01

a. Granting Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint

b. Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to

Amend A98

Document 22, ORDER filed 11/6/01, Ordering

Plaintiff to SHOW CAUSE regarding Defendant

(22)

Charles Siemon A104

27) Document 23, ORDER filed 11/27/01,

Dismissing case for FAILURE TO SHOW

CAUSE A105

28) Document 24 Plaintiff's NOTICE OF APPEAL A106

29) Exhibit E, “Goin’ Round in Circles: Latest Traffic

Trend Leaves Drivers Dazed,” Wall Street

Journal A108

(wv)

Exhibit A

E

+

2 lanes-————> 2 lanes

East Shore Marina

N - #

4 lanes-——> 4 lanes

Poinsettia Marina

<4——__

4 lanes—> 4 lanes

Mandalay Coronado

(4 lanes) (4 lanes)

W

Drawing not to scale.

A‘

Exhibit B

E

2 lanes ?+——— 2 lanes

Marina

East Shore

N ~

Poinsettia [_

Marina

Small Parking —

Lot

2 lane

roundabout

Mandalay Coronado

Second

proposed

fountain

Drawing not to scale. w

A2

Document 1:1; Filed 11/1998

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION / CITY OF

CLEARWATER

ROADWAY TRANSFER AGREEMENT

CAUSEWAY BOULEVARD AND MARIANNE STREET

ONE-WAY PAIRS OF SR 60 TO CITY JURISDICTION

THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this

day of 1998, by and between the FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, an agency of the

State of Florida, hereinafter called the DEPARTMENT, and

the CITY OF CLEARWATER, hereinafter called the CITY.

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS, the CITY has requested the transfer of SR

60/Causeway Boulevard from Mandalay Avenue to Bridge

Number 43 and SR 60/ Marianne Street from Bridge Number

43 to Mandalay Avenue from the State Highway System,

and this transfer is mutually agreed upon between the CITY

and the DEPARTMENT.

NOW, THEREFORE, THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH:

in consideration of the mutual covenants and promises

herein contained, and for other good and valuable

consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby

acknowledged, the CITY and the DEPARTMENT agree as

set forth below:

This Agreement sets forth the terms and conditions under

which the CITY and the DEPARTMENT will abide,

commencing on the date of approval by the Secretary of the

Florida Department of Transportation.

(a) The CITY accepts all responsibility for operation and

maintenance of the roadway. In addition to the roadbed,

this agreement includes all curbs, culverts, and drainage

- structures within the right-of-way at the time of transfer.

The CITY shall be responsibility for maintenance of

public sidewalks, and other ways in the right-of-way.

A3

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ee

Document 1:2

(b) All agreements with the State directly affecting SR

(c)

60 that are part of the existing development orders

shall become commitments to the CITY and the

CITY will be responsible for their disposition.

The DEPARTMENT gives up all its rights to the road,

except as specified in this agreement.

(d) It is agreed that all obligations of the DEPARTMENT

(e)

(f)

under any maintenance, utility, or any other such

agreement, relating to this specific road to be transferred,

shall be transferred to the CITY at the same time and in

the same manner as jurisdictional responsibility. The

roadway transfer of SR 60/Causeway Boulevard and SR

60/ Marianne Street shall be effective upon approval by

the Secretary of the Florida Department of

Transportation.

Existing deeds or right-of-way maps will be recorded, by

the CITY, in the public land records of Pinellas County in

which the right-of-way maps will be recorded, by the

CITY, in the public land records of Pinellas County in

which the rights-of way are located. If right-of-way

maps do not exist, it is recommended that the

DEPARTMENT make maps and file them for possible

future use.

No action will be taken to compromise the integrity of

Causeway Boulevard and Marianne Street as part of the

SR 60 hurricane evacuation route. The CITY agrees that

there will be no lane reduction or reconstruction that will

compromise the current operating Level of Service —

for Marianne Street and Causeway Boulevard.

(g) The CITY will not impose a toll on the portion of the

roadway that is being transferred from the State

Highway System.

A4

ost Kates Cate

Document 1:3

(h) In the even that the CITY does not comply wit (f) and/or

herein, the roadway will revert back to the

DEPARTMENT.

All words used herein in the singular form shall extend to

and include the plural. All words used in the plural form

shall extend to and include the singular. All words used in

any gender shall extend to and include all genders.

This Agreement embodies the whole agreement of the

parties. There are no promises, terms, conditions, or

obligations other than those contained herein, and this

Agreement shall supersede all

previous communications, representations, or agreements,

either verbal or written, between the parties hereto.

This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in

accordance with the laws of the State of Florida.

For communication purposes, the parties may be reached at

the following addresses and phone numbers.

Florida Department of Transportation

Mr. Kenneth A. Hartmann, P.E.

District Secretary

District Seven

1201 N. McKinley Drive

Tampa, Florida 33612

Telephone: (813) 975-6039, SunCom 512-7515

FAX: (813) 975-6443, SunCom 512-7800

City of Clearwater

Mr. Michael J. Roberto

City Manager

Post Office Box 4748

Clearwater, Florida 33758-4748

AS

Document 1:4

Telephone: (727) 562-4040

FAX: (727)562-4052

Each Party is an independent contractor and is not an

agent of the other party. Nothing contained in this

Agreement shall be construed to create any fiduciary

relationship between the parties, during or after the

performance of this Agreement. Neither party shall have the

authority to bind the other party to any obligation

whatsoever to any third party without the express specific

written consent of the other.

A6

Document 2:1; Filed 1/13/00

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF

FLORIDA

GEORGE KELLY,

Plaintiff

v.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

THOMAS F. BARRY JR, as Secretary

KENNETH A. HARTMAN, P.E. as District Secretary,

District Seven

and:

CITY OF CLEARWATER,

BRIAN AUNGST SR as Mayor;

ED HART as Commissioner;

ED HOOPER as Commissioner;

BOB CLARK as Commissioner;

J.B. JOHNSON as Commissioner,

Defendants.

PETITION FOR PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS

COMES NOW GEORGE KELLY, Plaintiff pro se, to

file suit against aforementioned Defendants and says:

1. That this an extraordinary action for a Peremptory

Writ of Mandamus;

A7

Document 2:2

2. That Petitioner is a resident, homeowner and

taxpayer of the City of Clearwater, County of Pinellas, State

of Florida;

3. That this Court has jurisdiction in that matter

pursuant to Article V §3 (b)(8) of the Constitution of the

State of Florida;

4. Petitioner sues Defendants and alleges;

a.

That the City of Clearwater, at it’s own

initiative, had the State of Florida,

Department of Transportation, vacate,

abandon and have cause to transfer over title

to that section of SR 60 / Causeway Blvd.,

from Mandalay venue to Bridge No. 43

(Section 15220000, M.P. 0.000 to 0.197) and SR

60 / Marianne Street from Bridge No. 43 to

Mandalay Avenue (Section 15220101, M.P.

0.000 TO 0.190) from the State Highway

System to the City of Clearwater Road

System;

That said transfer occurred on or about the 5'

day of November, 1998;

That the City of Clearwater did then proceed

to create and have constructed on the

aforementioned roadways a traffic

roundabout;

That the City of Clearwater did not seek, nor

did it receive, approval from the State of

Florida for the changes it contemplated and

then proceeded to construct in specific

contravention of the covenants expressed in

the Transfer document (article f) where it

states:

A8

rb DE IA AIP a LT CAA SIA Ee NTS ate an BER PATS

Document 2:3

“No action will be taken to compromise the

integrity of Causeway Boulevard and

Marianne Street as part of the SR60 hurricane

evacuation route. The City agrees that there

will be no lane reduction or reconstruction

that will compromise the current operating

Level of Service “D” for Marianne Street and

Causeway Boulevard.”

That actions were taken which compromised

the integrity of the Causeway Boulevard and

Marianne Street as part of the SR 60 hurricane

evacuation route, to wit:

that the construction of a massive and

overwhelming fountain occupying

100% of the center island of the

roundabout interchange contravenes

the generally accepted sight line

requirements summarized in the

Florida Roundabout Guide (a Florida

Department of Transportation

publication) where it simply states:

“To the extent possible, drivers

approaching the roundabout should

be able to see other entering vehicles

before they reach the yield line.” 4.93

“In addition to the requirements in the

previous sections, a driver should be

provided enough visibility to readily

assess the driving task. This cannot be

precisely quantified but general

guidance can be given” 4.93

and:

Ag

il.

iil.

iv.

Document 2:4

“ As emphasized in other sections, the

layout of the roundabout must be

clearly visible to approaching drivers.

4.10

that in its prior configuration

Marianne Street and Causeway

Boulevard both flared immediately

west of Bridge Number 43 from two

lanes to four lanes such that the inner

lanes permitted access to the parking

spaces between the two streets as well

as allowing traffic to enter and utilize

the two cross streets - Poinsettia and

East Shore Drive;

that the outside lanes of both

Marianne Street and Causeway

Boulevard allowed ease of access to

both Poinsettia and East Shore on the

North and both of the marina

entrances/exits on the South;

that the reduction in available lanes

from four to two will allow minor

accidents or mishaps to impede or

block access either to or from the

Beach where previously such

accidents or mishaps could be

bypassed by utilizing the other

available lanes;

that the reduction in available lanes

from four to two on both Marianne

Street and Causeway Boulevard

adversely impacts the

A10_ -

Seite nbn SORE

5 aa

iti RMR ISIS Mallon aan ae Rhus

Document 2:5

ability of Emergency vehicles to either

enter or leave the Beach area;

vi. that the lack of any crossover *

provisions in the center median

leading to and from the roundabout

carries with it the potential to see the

north of the beach isolated in the event

of an accident or mishap affecting

roundabout operations;

f. That the specific remedy for the City’s

violation of the integrity of Causeway

Boulevard and Marianne Street as part of the

SR 60 hurricane evacuation route is to be

found in article (g) of the Transfer Document

where it states:

“In the event that the City does not comply

with (f) herein, the roadway will revert back

to the Department.”

Wherefore, Plaintiff prays that this Court will issue

as a matter of specific relief to the Plaintiff a Peremptory

Writ of Mandamus returning ownership and operation of

the aforementioned roadways to the Department of

Transportation for reconstruction in accordance with

applicable standards.

George Kelly

George Kelly

522 Cleveland Street

Clearwater, Fl 33755

727.442.5093

A11

Document 3:1; Filed 1/19/2000

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

GEORGE KELLY,

Petitioner,

Vv. CASE NO. 2000-93

STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT

OF TRANSPORTATION; THOMAS F.

BARRY JR., Secretary of the Department

of Transportation; KENNETH A.

HARTMAN, as District 7 Secretary; et als.,

Respondents.

/

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that without waiving its right to

contest the jurisdiction of this Court, and whether should

this Court choose to issue an order of dismissal, issue an

order to show cause, or otherwise allow this action to

proceed, MARIANNE A. TRUSSELL will appear as counsel

for the Respondents, STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT

OF TRANSPORTATION, THOMAS F. BARRY, JR.,

Secretary of the Department of Transportation, and

KENNETH A. HARTMANN, District 7 Secretary, in the

above-styled appellate proceedings. All appellate

documents and correspondence should be directed to her

attention.

Respectfully submitted,

Ai2

RO a a Rast Wa Abed TENT Me

Document 3:2

MARIANNE A. TRUSSELL

Deputy General Counsel

FLORIDA BAR NO. 437166

Department of Transportation

Haydon Burns Building, MS 58

605 Suwannee Street

Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458

(850) 414-5265

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

| HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of

the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail on this 19th

day of January, 2000, to George Kelly, pro se, 522 Cleveland

Street, Clearwater, Florida 33755; and to the Mayor and City

Commissioners of the City of Clearwater, 112 So. Osceola

Avenue, Clearwater, Florida.

MARIANNE A. TRUSSELL

A13

Document 4; Filed 4/4/00 |

Supreme Court of Florida

Tuesday, April 4, 2000

GEORGE KELLY ”

Petitioner, =

vs. oad CASE NO. SC00-93

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF™

TRANSPORTATION, et al., ™

Respondents.

ORDER TRANSFERRING PETITION

Petitioner has submitted a Petition for Writ of

Mandamus in this Court. It appears to the Court that the

claims raised in the instant petition are more appropriately

addressed in an action seeking declaratory relief under

Chapter 86, Florida Statues. The petition is therefore hereby

transferred instanter to the Circuit Court of the Sixth judicial

Circuit, in and for Pinellas County. The transferee court shall

treat the petition as if it had been originally filed there on the

date it was filed in this Court, and petitioner has previously

submitted a filing fee of $250 in this Court. The transfer of

this case is not an adjudication or comment on the merits,

nor is it a determination as to the transferee court's

jurisdiction or whether this case should properly be

considered as an action seeking declaratory relief.

A True Copy H

[seal of the Supreme cc: Hon. Karleen F. DeBlaker,

Court; s:/ Debbie Clerk

Casseaux, Acting Mr. George Kelly

Clerk, Supreme Court] Mr. Thomas F. Barry, Jr.,

etc.

Mr. Kenneth A. Hartman

Mr. Michael J. Roberto

Ms. Marianne Trussell

A14

Sati Baas will bad Dui

Document 5:1; Filed 4/10/00

Supreme Court of Florida

Monday, April 10, 2000

GEORGE KELLY, = |

Petitioner, my

VS. ** CASE NO. SC00-93

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ss

TRANSPORTATION, et al.,

Respondents.

RESPONSE TO ORDER TRANSFERRING PETITION

On Friday, the 7% of April, I received the ORDER

TRANSFERRING PETITION.

I categorically reject this Order.

The Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus is not an

effort to ensure or enforce a right, power or privilege but is

in fact an effort to have the Court enforce the acceptance of

clearly defined responsibilities on the part of both the City

and the State.

The first responsibility of the Secretary of Transportation is

to provide for safe passage on the roadways which

constitute the State road system and never more so than

when these roadways are expected to be used as an

emergency hurricane evacuation route.

The Peremptory Writ of Mandamus is a deliberate and

specific effort to have the Court compel the Secretary of

Transportation to fulfill this primary responsibility as it

relates to that portion of State Road 60 at the entrance to

Clearwater Beach.

The Transfer Agreement between the City and the State

which effectively passed control over the affected roadways

from the State to the City clearly states in article (f) that:

A15

Document 5:2

No action will be taken to compromise the integrity of

Causeway Boulevard and Marianne Street as part of the SR

60 hurricane evacuation route. The CITY agrees that there

will be no lane reduction or reconstruction that will

compromise the current operation Level of Service “D” for

Marianne Street and Causeway Boulevard. m

In testimony before the Court in the matter of Boschen vs.

City of Clearwater* the City’s own expert witness has

testified that the roadways as currently constructed by the

City do not meet the prescribed Schedule of operation Level

of Service D.

The remedy for such a default is clearly delineated in the

Transfer Agreement as article (h):

In the event that the CITY does not comply with (f) and/or

(g)' ein, the roadway will revert back to the

DL XTMENT.

The Peremptory Writ of Mandamus would see the Court

return the affected roadways to the State for reconstruction

in conformity to their own standards.

| would specifically ask and request that the Peremptory

Writ of Mandamus be placed forthwith before the Court for

its determination.

George Kelly

Petitioner cc: Hon. Kathleen F. DeBlaker, Clerk

Debbie Causseaux, Clerk

Mr. Thomas F. Barry, Jr., etc.

Mr. Kenneth A. Hartman

Mr. Michael J. Roberto

Ms. Marianne Trussell

“Currently on appeal in the Florida Supreme Court

A16

Document 6:1; Filed 4/17/01

Supreme Court of Florida

MONDAY, APRIL 17, 2000

GEORGE KELLY, ne

Petitioner,

VS.

“CASE NO. SC00-93

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT

OF TRANSPORTATION,

et al., sd

Respondents.

PETITION FOR REVIEW

This is a Petition for Review to the Named Members of the

Supreme Court of the State of Florida which seeks certain

specific measures of relief where such relief is the

prerogative of the Named Members. The Named Members

are: Chief Justice Major B. Harding; Justice Leander J. Shaw,

Jr.; Justice Charles T. Wells; Justice Harry Lee Anstead;

Justice Barbara J. Pariente; Justice R. Fred Lewis; and Justice

Peggy A. Quince.

On Friday, the 7 of April, 2000, | received an ORDER

TRANSFERRING PETITION issued under the hand and seal

of the Acting Clerk of the Supreme Court.

A17

Document 6:2

The Order referred to my previously submitted and

accepted Petition for a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus

which sought to have the Court compel the Secretary of

Transportation for the State of Florida to retake certain

described portions of State Road 60 back from the City of

Clearwater (A City) for reconstruction in accordance with

the States own standards.

The affected roadways had been previously transferred

from the State to the City with the specific stipulation that

the roadways had to be maintained to a certain standard as

part of the State Road 60 Hurricane Evacuation Route.

Upon the taking of the affected roadways by the City, the

City did then proceed to construct on the aforementioned

roadways a traffic circle which was itself encumbered by a

massive and overwhelming fountain which violates both the

State and Federal Standards for forward vision such that a

driver can never see more than a slice of the approaching

roadway.

This restriction on forward vision places an inordinate

burden on the motorist who cannot see and thus cannot

begin to predict the actions of the other motorists involved

in and/or entering the circle.

This has created a hazardous driving environment which

by published accounts sees better than an accident a day in

the affected intersection.

The first responsibility of the Secretary of Transportation is

to provide for safe passage on the roadways which

constitute the State Road system and never more so than

when these roadways are expected to be used as an

emergency hurricane evacuation route.

A18

wn, al) Wide Al of oe FP les

Document 6:3

My Peremptory Writ of Mandamus was a deliberate

and specific effort to have the Court compel the

Secretary of Transportation to fulfill this primary

responsibility as it relates to that portion of State Road

60 at the entrance to Clearwater Beach by having the

State retake the affected roadways and reconstruct

them in accordance with the States own standards.

The ORDER TRANSFERRING PETITION issued under the

hand of the Acting Clerk of the Supreme Court was a

deliberate and specific attempt to thwart the progress of my

Peremptory Writ of Mandamus by redirecting it to the Sixth

Judicial Circuit, in and for Pinellas County, on the patently

false assumption that I was somehow seeking declaratory

relief which would fall as a matter of course under Chapter

86, Florida Statutes.

This patently false assumption that | was somehow

seeking declaratory relief is itself an outrageous act of

Obstruction of Justice. Even a first year law student would

know the difference between an effort to secure a

Declaratory Judgment and a Writ of Mandamus. The first is

about rights and the second is about responsibilities -

FAILED responsibilities and never more so than is the case

presented in my Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus.

Quite simply and quite bluntly the integrity of the Court

has been brought into question by the actions of the Acting

Clerk of the Supreme Court. These actions on the part of the

Acting Clerk are too gross of an error to be anything other

than deliberate.

Today a significant portion of this Community stands at

risk because of the incompetence and misfeasance of both

A19

Document 6:4

the City and the State and to this burden we now add the

element of Obstruction of Justice on the part of the Office of

the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Florida.

Petitioner would therefore ask and request of the Named

Members such certain and specific relief as would see the

ORDER TRANSFERRING PETITION made null and void

and that the Peremptory Writ of Mandamus be brought

forward to the full Court for its immediate adjudication.

~

George Kelly

522 Cleveland Street

Clearwater, FL 33755

727.442.5093

cc: Hon. Karleen F. DeBlaker, Clerk

Mr. Thomas F. Barry, Jr., etc.

Mr. Kenneth A. Hartman

Mr. Michael J. Roberto

Ms. Marianne Trussel

A20

Exhibit C:1; 8/29/00

TRAGIC ROUNDABOUT

The London Mirror, Tuesday, August 29, 2000, full-

page article

[caption for photograph of fountain/ roundabout]

CRASH COURSE: The new £5million roundabout

at Clearwater, Florida, where so may unwary

drivers have come to grief

309 accidents in seven months as American drivers

fail to master British traffic scheme

THEY’RE no problem for British motorists, but

roundabouts are virtually unknown in America

and this one has caused chaos.

Since it opened seven months ago, there have

been 309 crashes.

British holidaymakers at the Florida resort of

Clearwater are so amazed at the number of pile-

ups that they’ve even been lining up to watch the

locals playing dodgems.

And council officials have now called in British

consultant Barry Crown to advise on changes to

help the traffic flow and stop drivers bumping into

each other. Barry said: “The number of accidents is

significantly above the average of other new

roundabouts in the USA.

“Almost all are exit accidents. Remedial

measures are needed.”

One holidaymaker, Ron Cohen from Bristol, said:

“It’s a bit like watching the Wacky races.

A21

Exhibit C:2

There’s nothing wrong with the roundabout, it’s

just the same as the ones at home.

But American driers don’t know how to use them

properly.” Many residents in the seaside town

want the £5million roundabout scraped. Three

hundred turned up at a protest meeting.

They say it’s dangerous and only a mater of time

before someone is killed.

Clearwater Beach motel owner Suzanne Boschen

said: “The whole bloody thing is tragic. You've

just got to look at the money they’ ve thrown away

on it.”

Another local, Paul Koenig, said simply: “I would

purchase a bulldozer.”

But the council are already planning another

roundabout nearby at north Clearwater Beach.

They feel it’s the best way of streaming traffic into

the popular tourist areas.

Commissioner Ed Hooper suggested calling the

roundabout something else -like an “intersection

reconfiguration feature.”

He joked: “Anything to avoid using the r word.”

Other America states are also experimenting with

roundabouts.

At the Colorado ski resort of Vail, officials had to

promise the rich residents they would tear theirs

down if it didn’t work.

A22

Exhibit C:3

They also paid for detailed instructions which

went out on local television telling drivers how to

handle the roundabout.

a.lines@mirror.co.uk

~ A23

Exhibit D:1; 1/27/01

Decision made in a roundabout way

Tampa Tribune, January 27, 2001

Florida’s highest court, known in the legal

community as “The Supremes,” has sided with the

city of Clearwater in the now-settled legal dispute

over funding for the notorious Mike Roberto

Memorial Beach Roundabout.

The court had to use some pretzel logic disguised

as legal jargon to conclude that the roundabout and

its famous, windshield-misting fountain are a

public safety device. _

That's good for the city, because it is now free to

borrow the $12 million budgeted to fund the traffic

monument.

Under city law, any project that requires the city

to borrow more than $1 million has to be approved

by a voter referendum. Exceptions are granted for

emergencies such as civil defense - or public safety.

Some pesky residents felt that a fancy

roundabout with its gigantic water fountain, which

has created a traffic bottleneck worse than the

intersection it replaced, did not qualify for an

exemption from the referendum requirement.

A trial court agreed with the city’s arguments

that the roundabout was intended to calm anxious

motorists who might otherwise be colliding with

one another.

A24

Exhibit D:2

It also agreed that the roundabout promotes

cleaner air by eliminating the need for cars to sit

idling at several stop lights.

In their written ruling upholding the lower court,

the Supreme Court justices made no mention of the

numerous, daily traffic wrecks that have plagued

the roundabout since its debut in December 1999.

Nor did they stretch to say the $2 million

fountain comes in handy as a spot for injured

pedestrians to wash their wounds after being

struck by motorists “zombitized” by the

roundabout’s much-ballyhooed traffic-calming

effects.

But the justices made strict legal sense:

“The wisdom or desirability of a bond issue is not

a matter for our consideration, “ the justices wrote.

“Roundabouts typically reduce the number of

accidents that occur by 60 to 70 percent,” the Robed

Ones continued.

“We are charged only with judging the legality of

the undertaking, though conceivable a project

might be as ill-advised as it is legal.”

There you have it.

A25

Document 7:1, Filed 6/19/2001

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY

Plaintiff Case No.

V.

CHIEF JUSTICE CHARLES T. WELLS, individually

JUSTICE MAJOR B. HARDING, individually

JUSTICE LEANDER J. SHAW JR., individually

JUSTICE HARRY LEE ANSTEAD, individually

JUSTICE BARBARA J. PARIENTE, individually

JUSTICE R. FRED LEWIS, individually

JUSTICE PEGGY A. QUINCE, individually

CLERK THOMAS D. HALL, individually

ACTING CLERK DEBBIE CAUSSEAU\, individually

and,

FLORIDA STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

a State entity

and,

SECRETARY THOMAS F. BARRY JR., individually

KENNETH A. HARTMAN, individually

MARIANNE A. TRUSSEL, individually

and,

CITY OF CLEARWATER, a Municipal entity of the State of

Florida

and,

A26

Document 7:2

MAYOR BRIAN AUNGST, individually

COMMISSIONER ED HART, individually

ED HOOPER, individually

BOB CLARK, individually

J.B. JOHNSON, individually

MICHAEL J. ROBERTO, individually

PAMELA AKIN, individually

CHARLES SIEMON, individually

and,

JUDGE CROCKETT FARNELL, individually.

COMPLAINT

1) COMES NOW GEORGE KELLY, Plaintiff pro se,

2)

a resident, homeowner and taxpayer of the City of

Clearwater, County of Pinellas, State of Florida to

file suit against aforementioned Defendants and

Says:

Defendants are, variously, Justices of the Florida

Supreme Court, Clerk and Acting Clerk of tine Florida

Supreme Court; the Secretary of the Florida

Department of Transportation, a District Manager of

the Florida Department of Transportation, the Counsel

of Record for the Florida Department of

Transportation; the City of Clearwater, the Mayor, one

current and former Commissioners, the former City

Manager, the City Attorney, the City’s Development

Consultant; and a Judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in

and for Pinellas County, Florida.

A27

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

Document 7:3

JURISDICTION.

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to (i) 28

U.S.C. 1331 and (II) 28 U.S.C. 1343.

NATURE OF THIS ACTION

This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to _

U.S.C. 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 to address violations

of Plaintiff's rights under the first and fourteenth

amendments to the United States Constitution.

Plaintiff challenges Defendants failure to address the

issues raised by Plaintiff in Plaintiff's PETITIONS FOR

PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS, RESPONSE

TO ORDER TRANSFERRING PETITION and

Plaintiff's PETITION FOR REVIEW.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.

That on or about the 20% day of December, 1999

Plaintiff did file in the Circuit Court of the Sixth

Judicial Circuit, in and for Pinellas County, Florida, a

PETITION FOR (A) PEREMPTORY WRIT OF

MANDAMUS (a copy of which is attached and made

a part hereto as EXHIBIT 1) which sought to have the

Court compel the Secretary of the Florida Department

of Transportation retake from the City of Clearwater, a

certain portion of State Road 60 at the entrance to

Clearwater Beach.

That said and certain portion of State Road 60 at the

entrance to Clearwater Beach had been transferred

from the State to the City, at the request of the City, so

that the City could undertake to build a grand

entryway to the Beach centered on a roundabout traffic

configuration.

That by the Transfer Agreement between the City and

the State (a copy of which is attached and made a part

A28

Document 7:4

hereto as EXHIBIT 2) the City was to maintain the

roundabout intersection to achieve a certain measure of

traffic movement given that the affected roadways

constituted an essential and integral part of the State’s

Hurricane Evacuation Routes.

9) That it was the specific contention of Plaintiff in the

aforementioned Petition For Peremptory Writ of

Mandamus that the City failed to construct a

roundabout / intersection capable of moving the

necessary volume of traffic as specifically required

under the terms of the Transfer Agreement (between

the City and the State) and that at the time of filing the

City’s roundabout had, instead, the perverse effect of

constituting itself as a demonstrable hazard averaging

better than one accident per day.

10) That as a demonstrable hazard with no bypass

provisions the roundabout / intersection had, and still

has, the capability to isolate a significant portion of

Clearwater Beach and make evacuation thereof

difficult, if not impossible, should the roundabout be

compromised by accident or mishap or in the event of

an emergency.

11) That by the Transfer Agreement between the City and

the State the cure for any deficiencies or shortcomings

was for the affected roadway to be reverted back to the

State for reconfiguration in a manner appropriate to

achieve the State’s own standards of vehicular

movement.

12) That Plaintiff's Petition For Peremptory Writ Of

Mandamus was filed with the Circuit Court of the

Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and for Pinellas County,

Florida as Case No. 99-8463-C1-88B on the 20% day of

A29

Document 7:5

December, 1999 and assigned to Judge David A. Demers.

13) That on or about the 4 day of January, 2000, Judge

Demers did issue an order Requiring Plaintiff to file

(an) Amended Petition addressing the question of

Jurisdiction.

14) That upon further research and review by Plaintiff,

Plaintiff concluded that the lower court did not have

jurisdiction in the matter as only the Florida Supreme

Court could effect the remedy sought by Plaintiff, to

wit, the ordering of the Secretary of Transportation to

retake the affected roadways for reconstruction in a

manner consistent with the State’s own guidelines.

15) That in furtherance of the conclusion expressed in 14,

above, Plaintiff did amend Plaintiff's Petition for

Peremptory Writ of Mandamus and re-file it with the

Florida Supreme Court on or about the 13" day of

January, 2000, where it stands as Case No: SC 00-93 (a

copy of which is attached and made a part hereto as

EXHIBIT 3).

16) That on or about the 4% day of April, 2000 the Florida

Supreme Court, under the hand of the Acting Clerk of

the Court, Debbie Causseaux, did issue an ORDER

TRANSFERRING PETITION (a copy of which is

attached and made a part hereto as EXHIBIT 4)

directing that the Plaintiff's Petition for Peremptory

Writ of Mandamus be transferred back to the Circuit

Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and for Pinellas

County, on the assumption and / or presumption that

Plaintiff “appears” to seek Declaratory Relief under

Chapter 86 and not, as Plaintiff contends, relief affected

by a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus.

A30

Document 7:6

17) That on or about the 12 day of April, 2000, Plaintiff

did file with the Supreme Court of the State of Florida

a RESPONSE TO ORDER TRANSFERRING PETITION

(copy of which is attached and made a part hereto as

EXHIBIT 5) specifically rejecting the Order issued

under the hand of the Acting Clerk of the Court and

requesting that the Petition for (a) Peremptory Writ of

Mandamus be placed before the Court for it’s

consideration.

18) That Plaintiff's Response to Order Transferring Petition

was accepted by the Court as a Motion for Rehearing.

19) That subsequently on or about the 234 day of May,

2000 the Court did issue under the hand of the Clerk of

the Court an Order denying Plaintiff's Petition for (a)

Motion for Rehearing (a copy of which is attached and

made a part hereto as EXHIBIT 6).

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

20) The Plaintiff, George Lawson Kelly, repeats and

realleges the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 19

and same are incorporated herein by reference as

though pleaded in full and further alleges:

21) That on or about the 17% day of April, 2000, Plaintiff

did address a PETITION FOR REVIEW (a copy of

which is attached and made a part hereto as EXHIBIT

7) to the individually named members of the Florida

Supreme Court where such Petition sought to have the

individually named members of the Court confront

and address what to the Plaintiff / Petitioner were

outrageous illegalities, or demonstrated ignorance of

the law, on the part of the Clerk and / or Acting Clerk

of the Court.

Document 7:7

22) That Plaintiff did specifically contend in the Petition

for Review that the first responsibility of the Secretary

of Transportation is to provide for safe passage on the

roadways which constitute the State Road System and

never more so than when these roadways are expected

to be used as Emergency Hurricane Evacuation Routes.

23) That Plaintiff's Petition for Peremptory Writ of

Mandamus was a deliberate and specific effort to have

the Court compel the Secretary of Transportation to

fulfill this primary responsibility as it relates to that

portion of State Road 60 at the entrance to Clearwater

Beach by having the State retake the affected roadways

and reconstruct them in accordance with the State’s

own standards.

24) That the Order Transferring Petition issued under the

hand of the Acting Clerk of the Supreme Court was a

deliberate and specific attempt to thwart the progress

of Plaintiff's Petition for Peremptory Writ of

Mandamus by redirecting it to the Sixth Judicial

Circuit, in and for Pinellas County, on the patently

false assumption that Plaintiff was somehow seeking

declaratory relief which would fall as a matter of

course under Chapter 86, Florida Statutes.

25) That this patently false assumption that Plaintiff was

somehow seeking declaratory relief was itself an

outrageous act of Obstruction of Justice as “even a first

year law student would know the difference between

an effort to secure a Declaratory Judgment and a

Peremptory Writ of Mandamus. The first being about

rights and the second being about responsibilities -

FAILED responsibilities and never more so than is the

case presented in Plaintiff's Petition For Peremptory

Writ of Mandamus.”

A32

Document 7:8

26) That the first duty of a Jurist is to preserve and uphold

the integrity of the Court and never more so than when

the Jurist is a Justice of a Supreme Court.

\

27) That none of the individually named members of the

Florida Supreme Court did respond in any manner to

Plaintiff / Petitioner’s Petition for Review where such a

non-response response constituted a willful and

deliberate denial with prejudice.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

28) The Plaintiff, George Lawson Kelly, repeats and

realleges the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 27

and same are incorporated herein by reference as

though pleaded in full and further alleges:

29) That on or about the 27% day of February, 2001,

Plaintiff did file for a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus (a

copy of which is attached and made a part hereto as

EXHIBIT 7) where such filing was constituted as Case

No. 01-001524-CI-15 and where such filing did seek to

have the Court order the City of Clearwater to comply

with the provisions of the City Charter which

specifically compels the City to provide for a

referendum in matters or instances where the City

sought to spend in excess of $1,000,000.

30) That a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus is a Writ of the

First Order and is, by law, meant to be addressed and

dealt with in an expeditious manner.

31) That as of the date of the submission of this action

there has been no response on the part of Judge

Crockett Farnell to address the issues raised in

Plaintiff's Petition for a Peremptory Writ of

Mandamus.

A33

Document 7:9

32) That the rationale behind the deliberate delay on the

part of Judge Crockett Farnell et. al. relates specifically

to a beach redevelopment program which has been

challenged by Plaintiff where such a redevelopment

program would see in excess of 80-million dollars of

“development rights” passed from the City to private

developers with no cash return to the City and it’s

taxpayers, but which would at the same time see the

City spend additional millions of dollars in

furtherance’s of said development program where

such expenditures in the absence of an approved vote

by referendum constitutes a specific violation of the

City’s Charter.

33) That the granting of the Plaintiff / Petitioner’s Petition

for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus in the above styled

action would cause the development program as

currently structured to be put to a referendum where a

NO vote would most likely lead to a more appropriate

development program.

34) That the failure on the part of judge Crockett Farnell to

address Plaintiff's Petition for (a) Peremptory Writ of

Mandamus constitutes a willful and deliberate denial

with prejudice. 3

SUMMARY

34) In the first instance Plaintiff has sought to have the City,

the State and, finally, the Supreme Court of the State of

Florida confront and address the issues of vehicular

movement and safety associated with the roundabout /

intersection at the entrance to Clearwater Beach.

35) It is the specific contention of Plaintiff that the

roundabout / intersection constitutes an ongoing

hazard which carries with it the very real potential to

A34

36)

37)

38)

39)

Document 7:10

see a significant portion of Clearwater Beach become

isolated and made inaccessible by accident, mishap or

the ravages of a hurricane.

It is the further contention of Plaint .f that the

responsibility for providing safe passage on the

roadways of the state rests with the Secretary of the

Florida Department of Transportation and he, aided and

abetted by his officials, by the City and it’s officials, and

the officials and officers of the Supreme Court of the

State of Florida, has failed to exercise this responsibility

as regards the roundabout / intersection at the entrance -

to Clearwater Beach thus placing the City and it’s

taxpayers at considerable and continuing risk.

In the second instance Plaintiff has sought to have the

City follow it’s own Charter requirements in the matter

of expenditures of funds in excess of one million dollars

and this effort on the part of Plaintiff has been willfully,

deliberately and maliciously blocked by one Judge

Crockett Farnell in association with the City and it’s

agents.

CONCLUSION

It is the specific contention of Plaintiff that Defendants

herein, under color of the laws of the State of Florida

and statutes, customs, or usages of the State of Florida

did purposefully conspire and cause or permit Plaintiff

to be subjected to the deprivation of rights, privileges

and immunities secured to Plaintiff by the Constitution

and Laws of the United States.

It is the further contention of Plaintiff that the object of —

the conspiracy was to deprive, either directly or

indirectly, Plaintiff of Plaintiff's first amendment Right

of Petition and of the equal protection of the laws or the

A35

Document 7:11

equal privileges and immunities under the laws and,

further, that the conspiracy was and is motivated by an

invidious animus towards Plaintiff that would

substantially obviate Plaintiff's legitimate efforts and

concerns.

40) Plaintiff contends specifically that there were numerous

acts committed in furtherance of this conspiracy the

three most egregious of which were:

a. Defendants’ willful, deliberate and malicious

attempts to shunt Plaintiff's efforts aside by

insidiously mislabeling Petitioner’s Petition

for a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus as an

effort to secure Declaratory Relief where

“even a first year law student would know

the difference between an effort to secure a

Declaratory Judgment and a Writ of

Mandamus. The first is about rights and the

second is about responsibilities - FAILED

responsibilities and never more so than in the

case presented by Plaintiff in Plaintiff's

Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus”

and; |

b. Defendants’, in this instance, the Justices of

the Florida Supreme Court, willful,

deliberate, and malicious failure to add: +s

Plaintiffs concerns as expressed in Plaintiff's

Petition for Review and;

c. Defendant, Judge Crockett Farnell’s willful,

deliberate and malicious failure to address

Plaintiff's concerns as expressed in Plaintiff's

Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus.

The right to Petition carries with it the right to

A36

Document 7:12

have the Petition acknowledged and answered

lest it constitute no right at all.

RELIEF SOUGHT

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays, that upon

Judgment by the Court, relief will be awarded:

1) for Plaintiff's attorney’s fees

2) for Plaintiff's costs and disbursements in

this action

3) for such other and further relief as the

Court may deem just and equitable in

bringing this matter before the Court,

and;

Plaintiff further prays that the Court will award at the

determination of the Jury such damages and punitive

damages that would see the principle agents of conspiracy

subject to punitive damages of not less than one million

dollars, individually, and that those individuals who

participated in a peripheral manner be subject to punitive

damages of not less than 50-thousand dollars.

Further, at the determination of the Jury and the

concurrence of the Court, the individually named members

of the Florida Supreme Court shall be subject to punitive

damages in an amount not less than one million dollars

each. ~-

Plaintiff specifically requests that the matters as presented

be put to a Jury.

So prays the Plaintiff.

A37

Document 7:13

Submitted by: George Lawson Kelly

George Lawson Kelly, Plaintiff pro se

522 Cleveland Street

Clearwater, FL 33755

727.442.5093

A38

Document 8; Filed 7/24/01

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY,

Plaintiff CASE NO.: 8:01-CV-1162-T-24-TBM

V.

CHIEF JUSTICE CHARLES T. WELLS,

et.al., :

Defendants

MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

COMES NOW GEORGE LAWSON KELLY, Plaintiff

pro se, to amend above Complaint to reflect and remove any

claim on the part of the Plaintiff for damages as to the

actions of the Members of the Florida Supreme Court, the

Named employees of the Court and the State of Florida.

Plaintiff would as well amend Complaint to reflect as

a matter of Relief Sought that a Declaratory Judgment be _

entered by the Court where such Declaratory Judgment

would reflect the Courts views and concerns as to the

nature, impact and import of the Order Transferring Petition

on Plaintiff's rights to Due Process and Equal Protection.

Wherefore, Plaintiff moves that the Complaint be

amended as above.

So prays the Plaintiff.

George Kelly, Plaintiff Pro Se

522 Cleveland Street

Clearwater, FL 33755

727.442.5093

A39

Document 9:1; Filed 6/22/2001

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY

Plaintiff Case No. 8:01 - CV - 1162 - T - 24

TBM

Vv.

CHIEF JUSTICE CHARLES T. WELLS,

JUSTICE MAJOR B. HARDING,

JUSTICE LEANDER J. SHAW JR.,

JUSTICE HARRY LEE ANSTEAD,

JUSTICE BARBARA J. PARIENTE,

JUSTICE R. FRED LEWIS,

JUSTICE PEGGY A. QUINCE,

CLERK THOMAS D. HALL,

ACTING CLERK DEBBIE CAUSSEAUX,

and,

FLORIDA STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

a State entity

and,

SECRETARY THOMAS F. BARRY JR.,

KENNETH A. HARTMAN,

MARIANNE A. TRUSSEL,

and, ,

CITY OF CLEARWATER, a Municipal entity of the State of

Florida

A40

Document 9:2

and,

MAYOR BRIAN AUNGST,

COMMISSIONER ED HART,

ED HOOPER,

BOB CLARK, ©

J.B. JOHNSON,

MICHAEL J. ROBERTO,

PAMELA AKIN,

CHARLES SIEMON,

and,

JUDGE CROCKETT FARNELL,

AMENDED COMPLAINT

COMES NOW GEORGE KELLY, Plaintiff pro se, a

resident, homeowner and taxpayer of the City of Clearwater,

County of Pinellas, State of Florida to file suit against

aforementioned Defendants individually and in their official

capacities and says:

1) Defendants are, variously, Justices of the Florida

Supreme Court, Clerk and Acting Clerk of the Florida

Supreme Court; the Secretary of the Florida Department of

Transportation, a District Manager of the Florida

Department of Transportation, the Counsel of Record for the

Florida Department of Transportation; the City of

Clearwater, the Mayor, one current and former

Commissioners, the former City Manager, the City Attorney,

the City’s Development Consultant; and a Judge of the Sixth

Judicial Circuit, in and for Pinellas County, Florida.

JURISDICTION

2) Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to (i) 28

U.S.C. 1331 and (II) 28 U.S.C. 1343.

A41

Document 9:3

NATURE OF THIS ACTION

3) This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42

U.S.C. 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 to address violations of

Plaintiff's rights under the first and fourteenth amendments

to the United States Constitution.

Plaintiff challenges Defendants failure to address the

issues raised by Plaintiff in Plaintiff's PETITIONS FOR

PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS, RESPONSE TO

ORDER TRANSFERRING PETITION and Plaintiff's

PETITION FOR REVIEW.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.

4) That on or about the 20 day of December, 1999

Plaintiff did

file in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and

for Pinellas County, Florida, a PETITION FOR (A)

PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS (a copy of which is

attached and made a part hereto as EXHIBIT 1) which

sought to have the Court compel the Secretary of the Florida

Department of Transportation retake from the City of

Clearwater, a certain portion of State Road 60 at the entrance

to Clearwater Beach. a

5) That said and certain portion of State Road 60 at the

entrance to Clearwater Beach had been transferred from the

State to the City, at the request of the City, so that the City

could undertake to build a grand entryway to the Beach

centered on a roundabout traffic configuration.

a. That by the Transfer Agreement between the

City and the State (a copy of which is attached

- and made a part hereto as EXHIBIT 2) the

City was to maintain the roundabout

intersection to achieve a certain measure of

traffic movement given that the affected

A42

Document 9:4

roadways constituted an essential and integral

part of the State’s Hurricane Evacuation Routes.

b. That it was the specific contention of Plaintiff

in the aforementioned Petition For

Peremptory Writ of Mandamus that the City

failed to construct a roundabout /

intersection capable of moving the necessary

volume of traffic as specifically required

under the terms of the Transfer Agreement

(between the City and the State) and that at

the time of filing the City’s roundabout had,

instead, the perverse effect of constituting

itself as a demonstrable hazard averaging

better than one accident per day.

6) That as a demonstrable hazard with no bypass

provisions the roundabout / intersection had, and still has,

the capability to isolate a significant portion of Clearwater

Beach and make evacuation thereof difficult, if not

impossible, should the roundabout be compromised by

accident or mishap or in the event of an emergency.

7) That by the Transfer Agreement between the City and

the State the cure for any deficiencies or shortcomings was

for the affected roadway to be reverted back to the State for

reconfiguration in a manner appropriate to achieve the

State’s own standards of vehicular movement.

8) That Plaintiff's Petition For Peremptory Writ Of

Mandamus was filed with the Circuit Court of the Sixth

Judicial Circuit, in and for Pinellas County, Florida as Case

No. 99-8463-Cl-88B on the 20% day of December, 1999 and

assigned to Judge David A. Demers.

9) That on or about the 4% day of January, 2000, Judge

Demers did issue an order Requiring Plaintiff to file (an)

Amended Petition addressing the question of Jurisdiction.

A43

Document 9:4

10) That upon further research and review by Plaintiff,

Plaintiff concluded that the lower court did not have

jurisdiction in the matter as only the Florida Supreme Court

could effect the remedy sought by Plaintiff, to wit, the

ordering of the Secretary of Transportation to retake the

affected roadways for reconstruction in a manner consistent

with the State’s own guidelines.

11) That in furtherance of the conclusion expressed in 14,

above, Plaintiff did amend Plaintiff's Petition for Peremptory

Writ of Mandamus and re-file it with the Florida Supreme

Court on or about the 13" day of January, 2000, where it

stands as Case No: SC 00-93 (a copy of which is attached and

made a part hereto as EXHIBIT 3).

12) That on or about the 4* day of April, 2000 the Florida

Supreme Court, under the hand of the Acting Clerk of the

Court, Debbie Causseaux, did issue an ORDER

TRANSFERRING PETITION (a copy of which is attached

and made a part hereto as EXHIBIT 4) directing that the

Plaintiff's Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus be

transferred back to the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial .

Circuit, in and for Pinellas County, on the assumption and / -

or presumption that Plaintiff “appears” to seek Declaratory

Relief under Chapter 86 and not, as Plaintiff contends, relief

affected by a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus.

13) That on or about the 12% day of April, 2000, Plaintiff

did file with the Supreme Court of the State of Florida a

RESPONSE TO ORDER TRANSFERRING PETITION (copy

of which is attached and made a part hereto as EXHIBIT 5)

specifically rejecting the Order issued under the hand of the

Acting Clerk of the Court and requesting that the Petition for

(a) Peremptory Writ of Mandamus be placed before the

Court for it’s consideration.

ASS

Document 9:5

14) That Plaintiff's Response to Order Transferring Petition

was accepted by the Court as a Motion for Rehearing.

15) That subsequently on or about the 234 day of May,

2000 the Court did issue under the hand of the Clerk of the

Court an Order denying Plaintiff's Petition for (a) Motion for

Rehearing (a copy of which is attached and made a part

hereto as EXHIBIT 6).

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

16) The Plaintiff, George Lawson Kelly, repeats and

realleges the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 19 and

same are incorporated herein by reference as though

pleaded in full and further alleges:

17) That on or about the 17 day of April, 2000, Plaintiff

did address a PETITION FOR REVIEW (a copy of which is

attached and made a part hereto as EXHIBIT 7) to the

individually named members of the Florida Supreme Court

where such Petition sought to have the individually named

members of the Court confront and address what to the

Plaintiff / Petitioner were outrageous illegalities, or

demonstrated ignorance of the law, on the part of the Clerk

and / or Acting Clerk of the Court.

18) That Plaintiff did specifically contend in the Petition for

Review that the first responsibility of the Secretary of

Transportation is to provide for safe passage on the

roadways which constitute the State Road System and never

more so than when these roadways are expected to be used

as Emergency Hurricane Evacuation Routes.

19) That Plaintiff's Petition for Peremptory Writ of

Mandamus was a deliberate and specific effort to have the

Court compel the Secretary of Transportation to fulfill this

primary responsibility as it relates to that portion of State

Road 60 at the entrance to Clearwater Beach by having the

A45

Document 9:6

20) State retake the affected roadways and reconstruct

them in accordance with the State’s own standards.

21) That the Order Transferring Petition issued under the

hand of the Acting Clerk of the Supreme Court was a

deliberate and specific attempt to thwart the progress of

Plaintiff's Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus by

redirecting it to the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and for Pinellas

County, on the patently false assumption that Plaintiff was

somehow seeking declaratory relief which would fall as a

matter of course under Chapter 86, Florida Statutes.

22) That this patently false assumption that Plaintiff was

somehow seeking declaratory relief was itself an outrageous

act of Obstruction of Justice as “even a first year law student

would know the difference between an effort to secure a

Declaratory Judgment and a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus.

The first being about rights and the second being about

responsibilities - FAILED responsibilities and never more so

than is the case presented in Plaintiff's Petition For

Peremptory Writ of Mandamus.”

23) That the first duty of a Jurist is to preserve and uphold

the integrity of the Court and never more so than when the

Jurist is a Justice of a Supreme Court.

24) That none of the individually named members of the

Florida Supreme Court did respond in any manner to

Plaintiff / Petitioner’s Petition for Review where such a non-

response response constituted a willful and deliberate denial

with prejudice.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

25) The Plaintiff, George Lawson Kelly, repeats and

realleges the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 27 and

same are incorporated herein by reference as though

pleaded in full and further alleges:

A46

Document 9:7

26) That on or about the 27 day of February, 2001,

Plaintiff did file for a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus (a copy

of which is attached and made a part hereto as EXHIBIT 8)

where such filing was constituted as Case No. 01-001524-Cl-

15 and where such filing did seek to have the Court order

the City of Clearwater to comply with the provisions of the

City Charter which specifically compels the City to provide

for a referendum in matters or instances where the City

sought to spend in excess of $1,000,000.

27) That a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus is a Writ of the

First Order and is, by law, meant to be addressed and dealt

with in an expeditious manner.

28) That as of the date of the submission of this action there

has been no response on the part of Judge Crockett Farnell to

address the issues raised in Plaintiff's Petition for a

_ Peremptory Writ of Mandamus.

29) That the rationale behind the deliberate delay on the

part of Judge Crockett Farnell et. al. relates specifically to a

beach redevelopment program which has been challenged

by Plaintiff where such a redevelopment program would see

in excess of 80-million dollars of “development rights”

passed from the City to private developers with no cash

return to the City and it’s taxpayers, but which would at the

same time see the City spend additional millions of dollars

in furtherance’s of said development program where such

expenditures in the absence of an approved vote by

referendum constitutes a specific violation of the City’s

Charter.

30) That the granting of the Plaintiff / Petitioner’s Petition

for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus in the above styled

action would cause the development program as currently

structured to be put to a referendum where a NO vote

A47

Document 9:8

would most likely lead to a more appropriate development

program. ‘

31) That the failure on the part of Judge Crockett Farnell to

address Plaintiff's Petition for (a) Peremptory Writ of

Mandamus constitutes a willful and deliberate denial with

prejudice.

SUMMARY

32) In the first instance Plaintiff has sought to have the

City, the State and, finally, the Supreme Court of the State of

Florida confront and address the issues of vehicular

movement and safety associated with the roundabout /

intersection at the entrance to Clearwater Beach.

33) It is the specific contention of Plaintiff that the

roundabout / intersection constitutes an ongoing hazard

which carries with it the very real potential to see a

significant portion of Clearwater Beach become isolated and

made inaccessible by accident, mishap or the ravages of a

hurricane.

34) It is the further contention of Plaintiff that the

responsibility for providing safe passage on the roadways of |

the state rests with the Secretary of the Florida Department |

of Transportation and he, aided and abetted by his officials,

by the City and it’s officials, and the officials and officers of

the Supreme Court of the State of Florida, has failed to

exercise this responsibility as regards the roundabout / q

intersection at the entrance to Clearwater Beach thus placing |

the City and it’s taxpayers at considerable and continuing 4

risk. e

35) In the second instance Plaintiff has sought to have the

City follow it’s own Charter requirements in the matter of

expenditures of funds in excess of one million dollars and

this effort on the part of Plaintiff has been willfully,

A48

Document 9:9

deliberately and maliciously blocked by one Judge Crockett

Farnell in association with the City and it’s agents.

CONCLUSION

36) It is the specific contention of Plaintiff that Defendants

herein, under color of the laws of the State of Florida and

statutes, customs, or usages of the State of Florida did

purposefully conspire and cause or permit Plaintiff to be

subjected to the deprivation of rights, privileges and

immunities secured to Plaintiff by the Constitution and

Laws of the United States.

37) It is the further contention of Plaintiff that the object of

the conspiracy was to deprive, either directly or indirectly,

Plaintiff of Plaintiffs first amendment Right of Petition and

of the equal protection of the laws or the equal privileges

and immunities under the laws and, further, that the

conspiracy was and is motivated by an invidious animus

towards Plaintiff that would substantially obviate Plaintiff's

legitimate efforts and concerns.

38) Plaintiff contends specifically that there were numerous

acts committed in furtherance of this conspiracy the three

most egregious of which were:

a. Defendants’ willful, deliberate and malicious

attempts to shunt Plaintiff's efforts aside by

insidiously mislabeling Petitioner’s Petition

for a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus as an

effort to secure Declaratory Relief where

“even a first year law student would know

the difference between an effort to secure a

Declaratory Judgment and a Writ of

Mandamus. The first is about rights and the

second is about responsibilities - FAILED

responsibilities and never more so than in the

case presented by Plaintiff in Plaintiff's

A49

Document 9:10

Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus”

and;

b. Defendants’, in this instance, the Justices of

the Florida Supreme Court, willful,

deliberate, and malicious failure to address

Plaintiff's concerns as expressed in Plaintiff's

Petition for Review and;

c. Defendant, Judge Crockett Farnell’s willful,

deliberate and malicious failure to address

Plaintiff's concerns as expressed in Plaintiff's

Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandamus.

39) The right to Petition carries with it the right to have

the Petition acknowledged and answered lest it constitute

no right at all.

RELIEF SOUGHT

40) WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays, that upon

Judgment by the Court, relief will be awarded:

41) for Plaintiff's attorney’s fees

42) for Plaintiff's costs and disbursements in this action

43) for such other and further relief as the Court may deem

just and equitable in bringing this matter before the Court,

and;

Plaintiff further prays that the Court will award at the

determination of the Jury such damages and punitive

damages that would see the principle agents of conspiracy -

subject to punitive damages of not less than one million

dollars, individually, and that those individuals who

participated in a peripheral manner be subject to punitive

damages of not less than 50-thousand dollars.

Further, at the determination of the Jury and the

concurrence of the Court, the individually named members

ASO

Document 9:11

of the Florida Supreme Court shall be subject to punitive

damages in an amount not less than one million dollars

each.

Plaintiff specifically requests that the matters as presented

be put to a Jury.

So prays the Plaintiff.

Submitted by: George Lawson Kelly

George Lawson Kelly, Plaintiff pro se

522 Cleveland Street

Clearwater, FL 33755

727.442.5093

AS‘

Document 10:1; Filed 7/31/01

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Tampa Division

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:01-CV-T-24 TBM

CHIEF JUSTICE CHARLES T. WELLS,

et al.,

Defendants.

[

DEFENDANT CHIEF JUSTICE WELLS’ AND THE

ASSOCIATE JUSTICES AND NAMED EMPLOYEES OF

THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA’S MOTION

TO DISMISS OR, ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The defendants Chief Justice Charles T. Wells, the

associate justices and named employees of the Supreme

Court of Florida, by and through undersigned counsel,

hereby move to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.CivP. 12 (b) for

lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Alternatively, these defendants move pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P.56 (b) for summary judgment in their favor, as

there is no disputed issue of material fact, and these

defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The essence of plaintiff's claim is that the Supreme Court

of Florida either failed or refused to issue a writ of

mandamus directed to a portion of state Road 60 in the

Clearwater, Pinellas County, area-a matter of purely local

concern.

A52

Document 10:2

Without addressing plaintiff's Standing in state court

under Florida jurisprudence,! or his entitlement to a writ of

mandamus,” plaintiff's lawsuit must be dismissed for the

following reasons:

1. Plaintiff fails to allege a case or controversy under

federal law,

2. This court lacks jurisdiction to in effect review

judgments from a states highest court, and

3. Plaintiff's damages claim is barred by Eleventh

Amendment and judicial immunity.

As to the first point, Article III of the United States

Constitution requires that Parties seeking to invoke the

power of the federal courts must allege an actual case or

controversy. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 91974). See

also Jacobs v. The Florida Bar, 50 F. 3d 901, 903 (11% Cir,

1995). In his complaint, plaintiff fails to allege any claimed

deprivation of a right, Privilege or immunity, or any claim

whatever, cognizable under federal law. At most, plaintiff

alleges some disagreement over a local road issue and the

Florida Supreme Court's decision with respect to his filings.

’ A person seeking to raise a constitutional question must show a direct,

personal interest in either himself (herself) or the class represented in

defeating the law asserted to be unconstitutional. Even though a statute is

unconstitutional, only those who have a right to raise its

unconstitutionality may invoke the aid of the courts to have it judicially

set aside. Thus, the constitutionality of legislation is open to attack only

by one whose rights or duties are adversely affected or prejudiced by it.

State ex rel. Utilities ting Co. v. Mason, 172 So.2d 225 (Fla.1965). The

constitutionality of the statute must be attacked, if at all, by one who

< comes within its ambit. Not only must a person be adversely affected by a

statute in order to challenge its constitutionality, but he or she must also

be similarly affected by the part of the statute that is attacked. Henderson

v. Antonacci, 62 So.2d 5 (Fla.1952).

? To be entitled to the issuance of a writ, a petitioner must show that he

has a clear legal right to the performance of a clear legal duty by a public

officer, and that he has no other legal remedies availableto him. Hatten v.

State, 561 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 1990).

AS3

Document 10:3

This does not reach the requisite level necessary to establish

the case or controversy condition precedent to asserting a

claim for which relief can be granted.

As to the second point, it is well-established that “a United

States District Court has no authority to review final

judgments of a state court in judicial proceeding.” District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Fedman, 460 U.S. 462, 482

(1983); Rocker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16

(1923). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a decision of a

states highest court is reviewable only by the Supreme Court

of the Untied States. In essence, plaintiff is asking this court

to direct the Supreme Court of Florida to issue a writ of

mandamus. This cannot be done.

As to the third point, actions for damages in federal court

against state officials sued in their official capacities are

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Green v. Mansour.

474 USS. 64, 68 (1985); Sandoval V. Hagan, 197 F. 3d 484 (11%

Cir. 1999). And judges enjoy absolute immunity from

damages for acts performed in their judicial capacities.

Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 91980).

Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, these

defendants move for dismissal with prejudice, as there is no

set of facts that plaintiff can allege that will or may alter the

outcome of this case; alternatively, these defendants move

for summary judgment in their favor.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH

ATTORNEY GENERAL

George Waas

Assistant Attorney General

Fla. Bar No. 129967

AS4

4

Document 10:4

PL-01 The Capitol

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050

(850) 414-3662

(850) 488-48-4872 (FAX)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the

foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail to George Lawson

Kelly, 522 Cleveland Street, Clearwater, Florida 33755, this —

31st day of July, 2001.

George Waas

AS5

Document 11:1; Filed 7/24/2001

IN THE UNTIED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY,

CASE NO. 8:01-CV-1162-T-24 TBM

Plaintiff,

vs.

CHIEF JUSTICE CHARLES T. WELLS,

et al.,

Defendants.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CHIEF JUSTICE

WELLS’ AND THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES AND

NAMED EMPLOYEES OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF FLORIDA'S REPLY IN SUPPORT

OF MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED F

COMPLAINT OR, ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION |

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT |

The Plaintiff, George Lawson Kelly, having read through

Counsel for the Defendants Reply as above would respond

and answer:

1) To the Counsel for Defendants oft repeated claim that

Plaintiff is somehow lost traveling in circles in a

roundabout and that this case as presented by the

Plaintiff is ALL about a roundabout; Plaintiff would once :

again reiterate that this case is NOT about a roundabout |

AS56

Document 11:2

but about the violation and infringement of Plaintiffs’ rights

to Due Process and Equal Protection.

2) Acase, presented as a claim, supported by arguments,

seeking relief or redress to make oneself “whole” is what

a lawsuit is all about.

The “parts” must relate to the whole. -

If you claim an injury or injustice then you seek redress or

relief that would allow you to overcome that injury or that

injustice.

If someone sues you for the damages you did to their car

they cannot ask the Court to compel you to fix the roof of

their condo or house.

The case and the claim and the relief sought (to make

oneself whole) must bear some immediate and direct

relationship one to the other.

This singular and simple point seems to utterly escape

Counsel for Defendants as he strives mightily to portray

Plaintiff's case as something to do about a roundabout.

It is not.

3) It is specifically a case, presented as a claim that argues

that the Justices of the Florida Supreme Court used an

instrument of the Court (an Order Transferring Petition)

to willfully, deliberately and with malice aforethought

advantage the Defendants in a case before the Court at

the expense of the Plaintiff.

4) The relief sought by the Plaintiff in the originally filed

case could ONLY have been provided by the Florida

Supreme Court as ONLY the Florida Supreme Court can

be shown to have the jurisdictional capacity to compel

the Secretary for the Florida Department of

Transportation to retake the affected roadways and bring

AS7

Document 11:3

them into compliance with the State’s own standards of

mobility and safety as those standards relate to the elements

necessary to provide for safe passage on a Major Hurricane

Evacuation Route.

5) It was both by and at Law the duty, obligation and

responsibility of the Justices of the Florida Supreme

Court to address the issues raised in the case presented

to the Court by Plaintiff.

6) The Florida Supreme Court interceded in the matter of

George Lawson

Kelly vs. The Florida Department of Transportation et. al

and did issue the Order Transferring Petition and it is this

Order and the effects of this corrupt edict from which

Plaintiff now seeks redress in this (Federal) court.

In conclusion, this is a case about rights and not

roundabouts and Counsel for Defendants continuing efforts

to have this Court view the matter as the latter and not the

former leads the Plaintiff to question whether the Counsel

for the Defendants is simply ignorant of the composite parts

of a lawsuit or if he is simply trying to provide cover for

what he hopes will be a favorable ruling.

The Florida Supreme Court did intercede anc’ entertain

jurisdiction. It did issue an Order that would NOT have

provided Plaintiff any possible measure of relief or redress

as that relief or redress could be related to the original claim

made by the Plaintiff. That Order Transferring Petition did

advantage the one party over the other in a case before the

Court and that Order did violate Plaintiff's rights to Due

Process and Equal Protection and did of itself constitute a

singular act of Obstruction of Justice

For these specific reasons and for all the reasons set out

above and in Plaintiffs original response, Plaintiff

AS8

Document 11:4

respectfully prays that this Court will deny Defendant's

Motion for Dismissal and/or Summary Judgment.

So prays the Plaintiff.

George Lawson Kelly, Plaintiff

George Lawson Kelly

522 Cleveland Street

Clearwater, FL 33755

727.442.5093

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the

foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail to George Waas,

Assistant Attorney General, PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee,

Florida 32399-1050, this of August, 2001.

George Lawson Kelly, Plaintiff

George Lawson Kelly

522 Cleveland Street

Clearwater, FL 33755

727.442.5093

AS9

Document 12:1; Filed 7/31/01

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY,

CASE NO. 8:01-CV-1162-T-24

TBM

Plaintiff,

vs.

CHIEF JUSTICE CHARLES T. WELLS,

Et al.,

Defendants.

l

DEFENDANT CHIEF JUSTICE WELLS’ AND THE

ASSOCIATE JUSTICES AND NAMED EMPLOYEES OF

THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA'S REPLY IN

SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED

COMPLAINT OR, ALTERNATIVELY

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The defendants Chief Justice Charles T. Wells, the

associate justices of the Supreme Court of Florida (Justices

Major B. Harding, Leander J. Shaw, Jr., Harry Lee Anstead,

Barbara J. Pariente, R. Fred Lewis and Peggy A. Quince) and

named employees of the Supreme Court of Florida Thomas

D. Hall, Clerk, and Debbie Causseaux, Acting Clerk), by and

through undersigned counsel, hereby reply in support of

their motion to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of

subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. Alternatively,

A60

Document 12:2

these defendants reply in support of their motion for

summary judgment in their favor, as there is no disputed

issue of material fact, and these defendants, along with

defendant Judge Farnell, are entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.

In his response, plaintiff first represents that this is not

purely a local matter, but one of great constitutional import,

and then proceeds to explain that at issue is the construction

of a

“roundabout intersection at the entrance to Clearwater

Beach a matter of local concern. The fact that plaintiff

disagrees with the design characteristics does not convert his

dispute into a federal question over which this court may

exercise jurisdiction.

And the fact that the Florida courts have not interceded

similarly does not create the requisite case or controversy so

as to permit this court to exercise its jurisdiction over the

matter.

There is no federal law violation demonstrated here when

a state court decides not to entertain jurisdiction solely

because a party brings an action.

Plaintiff may voice his disagreement with appropriate

local authorities and other administrative officials, after

which he will be entitled to judicial review in state court.

What he cannot do, for the reasons previously set out in the

alternative motions to dismiss and for summary judgment,

is to bring his disagreement over the design of a municipal

road into federal court under the facts as he has alleged.

All judicial and quasi-judicial defendants represented by

the undersigned remain entitled to dismissal of this action or

summary judgment in their favor, as more specifically set

out in the alternative motions, which are re-averred here.

Respectfully submitted,

oe

A61

Document 12:3

ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH

ATTORNEY GENERAL

George Waas

Assistant Attorney General )

Fla. Bar No. 129967 |

PL-01 The Capitol ;

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 ,

(850) 414-3662 |

(850) 488-4872 (FAX)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

| HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the

foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail to George Lawson

Kelly, 522 Cleveland Street, Clearwater, Florida 33755, this

31st day of July, 2001

George Waas

A62

Document 13:1; Filed 8/7/2001

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY,

CASE NO. 8:01-CV-1162-T-24

TBM

Plaintiff,

VS.

CHIEF JUSTICE CHARLES T. WELLS,

et al.,

Defendants.

/

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CHIEF JUSTICE

WELLS’ AND THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES AND

NAMED EMPLOYEES OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF FLORIDA'S REPLY IN SUPPORT

OF MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED

COMPLAINT OR, ALTERNATIVEL Y, MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Plaintiff, George Lawson Kelly, having read through

Counsel for the Defendants Reply as above would respond

and answer:

1) To the Counsel for Defendants oft repeated claim that

Plaintiff is somehow lost traveling in circles in a

roundabout and that this case as presented by the

Plaintiff is ALL about a roundabout: Plaintiff would once

A63

Document 13:2

again reiterate that this case is NOT about a roundabout but

about the violation and infringement of Plaintiffs’ rights to

Due Process and Equal Protection.

2) Acase, presented as a claim, supported by arguments,

seeking relief or redress to make oneself “whole” is what

a lawsuit is all about.

The “parts” must relate to the whole.

If you claim an injury or injustice then you seek redress or

relief that would allow you to overcome that injury or that

injustice.

If someone sues you for the damages you did to their car

they cannot ask the Court to compel you to fix the roof of

their condo or house.

The case and the claim and the relief sought (to make

oneself whole) must bear some immediate and direct

relationship one to the other.

This singular and simple point seems to utterly escape

Counsel for Defendants as he strives mightily to portray

Plaintiff's case as something to do about a roundabout.

It is not.

3) It is specifically a case, presented as a claim that argues

that the Justices of the Florida Supreme Court used an

instrument of the Court (an Order Transferring Petition)

to willfully, deliberately and with malice aforethought

advantage the Defendants in a case before the Court at

the expense of the Plaintiff.

4) The relief sought by the Plaintiff in the originally filed

case could ONLY have been provided by the Florida

Supreme Court as ONLY the Florida Supreme Court can

be shown to have the jurisdictional capacity to compel

the Secretary for the Florida Department of

A64

Document 13:3

Transportation to retake the affected roadways and bring

them into compliance with the State’s own standards of

mobility and safety as those standards relate to the elements

necessary to provide for safe passage on a Major Hurricane

Evacuation Route.

9) It was both by and at Law the duty, obligation and

responsibility of the Justices of the Florida Supreme

Court to address the issues raised in the case presented

to the Court by Plaintiff.

6) The Florida Supreme Court interceded in the matter of

George Lawson Kelly vs. The Florida Department of

Transportation et. al and did issue the Order

Transferring Petition and it is this Order and the effects

of this corrupt edict from which Plaintiff now seeks

redress in this (Federal) court.

In conclusion, this is a case about rights and not

roundabouts and Counsel for Defendants continuing efforts

to have this Court view the matter as the latter and not the

former leads the Plaintiff to question whether the Counsel

for the Defendants is simply ignorant of the composite parts

of a lawsuit or if he is simply trying to provide cover for

what he hopes will be a favorable ruling.

The Florida Supreme Court did intercede and entertain

jurisdiction. It did issue an Order that would NOT have

provided Plaintiff any possible measure of relief or redress

as that relief or redress could be related to the original claim

made by the Plaintiff. That Order Transferring Petition did

advantage the one party over the other in a case before the

Court and that Order did violate Plaintiff's rights to Due

Process and Equal Protection and did of itself constitute a

singular act of Obstruction of Justice

For these specific reasons and for all the reasons set out

above and in Plaintiffs original response, Plaintiff

A65

Document 13:4

respectfully prays that this Court will deny Defendant's

Motion for Dismissal and/or Summary Judgment.

So prays the Plaintiff.

George Lawson Kelly, Plaintiff

George Lawson Kelly

522 Cleveland Street

Clearwater, FL 33755

727.442.5093

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the

foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail to George Waas,

Assistant Attorney General, PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee,

Florida 32399-1050, this of August, 2001.

George Lawson Kelly,

Plaintiff

A66

je PA Ale DANK sh

i cll aisha alsa

ae es ee a ee ee A

7 e

BPN trl at he MoM Np

Document 14:1; Filed 8/15/01

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Tampa Division

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY

Plaintiff,

V. Case No. 8:01-Civ-T-24BM

CHARLES T. WELLS, ET AL.,

Defendants.

/

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

COME NOW the Defendants, CITY OF CLEARWATER,

Mayor BRIAN AUNGST, Commissioners ED HART, BOB

CLARK, ED HOOPER, J.B. JOHNSON, former City Manager

MICHAEL ROBERTO and City Attorney PAMELA AKIN,

and move this court pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), FED. R. CIV.

P., to dismiss this action against them for the following

reasons:

1. Rule 8, FED. R. CIV. P., provides that the complaint

shall set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief,” against the

defendants.

2. By searching the “four corners” of the complaint

defendants have determined that plaintiff's claim is as

follows: 5

(a) Plaintiff asserts a violation of his First

Amendment right of free petition. See, Amended

Complaint at paras. 4 and 39.

(b) Plaintiff asserts a violation of his Fourth

Amendment right to equal protection of the law. See,

Amended Complaint at paras. 4 and 39.

A67

Document 14:2

(c) Plaintiff's complaint arises from the construction

of a public works project constructed by the CITY OF

CLEARWATER. That project is commonly know as the

“roundabout” - a traffic control device constructed at

the west terminus of Causeway boulevard. Plaintiff is

not happy with the project.

(d) Plaintiff's complaint, hc vever, does not assert a

claim based upon injuries caused in some way by the

roundabout, but asserts violations of his rights caused

by the “failure” of the Florida Supreme Court to

adequately address his “Petition for a Peremptory Writ

of Mandamus” [see, Amended Complaint at paras. 6 (First

Cause of Action), 16-19, and 40(a]; and his “Petition for

Review” [see, Amended Complaint at paras. 21 (Second

Cause of Action), 24-27, and40(b)]; and by the failure of

the Pinellas County Circuit Court to adequately address

his “Peremptory Writ of Mandamus” [see, Amended

Complaint at paras. 29 (Third Cause of Action), 34, and

40(c)].

3 Plaintiff has failed to allege a cognizable cause of

action against these defendants.

4. Plaintiff has sued defendants in their individual

capacities and the actions taken by the defendants of which

plaintiff complains were legislative acts to which the

doctrine of absolute legislative immunity 1s applicable.

5. The individual defendants are also sued in their

official capacities. Inasmuch as plaintiff has also sued the

CITY OF CLEARWATER, the individual defendants are not

necessary parties to this action and suing them was

inappropriate.

6. Plaintiff fails to allege an injury in fact; fails to allege

concrete, particularized harm that is either actual or

imminent; fails to allege that the injury is causally linked, or

fairly traceable, to the above defendants; and fails to allege

A68

ements

Document 14:3

that the injury he complains of can likely be redressed by the

court.

Plaintiff fails to allege the existence of any specific

constitutional or statutory right, federal or state, which these

defendants have violated.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the

foregoing has been sent via regular U.S. mail to George

Lawson Kelly, 522 Cleveland Street, Clearwater, Florida

33755, and George Waas, Esq., PL-01, The Capitol,

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050, this 15 day of August,

2001.

Paul Richard Hull

Assistance City Attorney

P.O. Box 4748

Clearwater, Florida 33758-4748

(727) 562-4010

Florida Bar no. 0486108

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS

CITY OF CLEARWATER, Mayor

BRIAN AUNGST, Commissioners ED

HART, BOB CLARK, ED HOOPER, |.B.

JOHNSON, former City Manager

MICHAEL ROBERTO and City

Attorney PAMELA AKIN

A6S

Document 15:1; Filed 8/15/01

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Tampa Division

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY

Plaintiff,

Vv. Case No. 8:01-Civ-T-24BM

CHARLES T. WELLS, ET AL.,

Defendants.

/

DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants, CITY OF CLEARWATER, Mayor BRIAN

AUNGST, Commissioners ED HART, BOB CLARK, ED

HOOPER, J.B. JOHNSON, former City Manager MICHAEL

ROBERTO and City Attorney PAMELA AKIN, file this

memorandum of law in support of their motion to dismiss.

I. Introduction.

Defendants, in seeking to dismiss the complaint for

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), are aware

that “[d]ismissal of a claim on the basis of barebones

pleading is a precarious disposition with a high

mortality rate.” International Erectors, Inc. v. Wilhott Steel

Erectors and Rental Service, 400 F.2d 465, 471 (5 Cir

1968). They are further aware that a complaint will not

be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it

appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no

set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief.” Conley v. Gilbson, 355 U.S. 41, 435-46 78

S.Ct. 99, 102, L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Williams v. Bierman, 46

F.Supp.2d 1262 (M.D.Fla. 1999). Moreover, they

A70

ares,”

Document 15:2

understand that, for purposes of deciding a motion to

dismiss, the material allegations of a plaintiff's

complaint are taken as true. Aquatherm Indus. v. Florida

Power & Light, 971 F.Supp. 1419, 1424 (M.D.Fla.1997).

This case, however, is one of those cases in which, even

assuming plaintiff's allegations to be true, he cannot prove a

set of facts which will entitle him to relief.

Il. Argument

a. Plaintiff has stated no cause of action against these

defendants.

In his complaint, plaintiff voices his concern over a public

works project constructed by the CITY OF CLEARWATER.

That project is known as the “roundabout.” The roundabout

is a traffic control device constructed at the west terminus of

Causeway Boulevard and serves as the intersection for

several streets on “Clearwater Beach.” Plaintiff is obviously

not pleased with the result of that project.

Plaintiff does not allege that he has suffered injuries as a

result of the roundabout. What plaintiff asserts is a violation

of his rights caused by the “failure” of the Florida Supreme

Court to adequately address his “Petition for a Peremptory

Writ of Mandamus” [see, Amended Complaint at paras. 6 (First

Cause of Action), 16-19, and 40(a)J; and his “Petition for

Review” [see, Amended Complaint at paras. 21 (Second Cause of

Action), 24-27, and 40(b)]. Plaintiff also contends that the

Pinellas County Circuit Court failed to adequately address

his “Peremptory Writ of Mandamus” [see, Amended

Complaint at paras. 29 (Third Cause of Action), 34, and 40(c)].

He does not allege any action by these defendants that

affected his First Amendment right of free petition or his

Fourth Amendment right to equal protection. These

defendants are not even alleged to have played a Part in his

litigation in state court.

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Document 15:3

In order to successfully plead a case under § 1983, plaintiff

must show that the conduct complained of was “(1)

committed by the [defendants] acting under color of state

law, and 92) deprived [plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States.” Williams v. Bierman, supra at 1266. Plaintiff

has neither pled that defendants committed “acts under

color of state law” nor pled that the named defendants

somehow deprived him of his rights.

b. Defendants are entitled to absolute legislative immunity.

Plaintiff sues these defendants (except for the C/TY) in

their individual capacities. One is the mayor, four are

present or former city commussioners, one is a former city

manager, and one is the present city attorney. All are

evidently sued for their part in the roundabout.' No

allegations are made specifically with respect to these

defendants either as individuals or as a group. Since they

are not alleged to have played a part in his denial of due

process and right of petition before the state courts, he must

be complaining about something they did as city officials.’

With regard to the suit against these defendants in their

individual capacities, local government officials are entitled

to absolute immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 for

“all actions taken in the sphere of legitimate legislative

activity.” Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 522 U.S. 44, 54, 118 S.Ct. 966,

972, 140 L.Ed.2d 79 (1998) (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341

U.S. 367, 376, 71 S.Ct. 783, 788, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951));

Housing Investors, Inc. v. City of Clanton, Ala., 68 F. Supp2d

1287, 1289 (M.D.Ala. 1999). “This immunity 1s broad-

i This is a presumption on the writer's part

> If this amounts to speculation, counsel apologizes. It is the best he can

do under the circumstances

A72

ee ee ee ee

ee | ee et eee eee Mee See ee ne ee

Document 15:4

sweeping and protects its bearer from liability for damages

as well as for declaratory and injunctive relief.” Housing

Investors, Inc., supra at 1295; Supreme Court of Va. V.

Consumers union, 446, U.S. 719, 731-32, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1974,

64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980).

Legislative immunity is accorded not merely to legislators

(or commussioners) per se, but also to those government

officials who are sued for performing legislative functions.

Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55, 118 S.Ct. at 973; Woods v. Gamel, 132

F.3d 1417, 1419 (11% Cir. 1998).

The named defendants are sued presumably because of

their actions related to the roundabout. Since there are no

allegations that they actually designed or constructed it, we

must assume they were sued because they approved its

construction contrary to plaintiff's wishes.

Courts have held that acts such as voting, Kilbourn v.

Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204, 26 1.Ed. 377 (1880), debate,

United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 86 S.Ct. 749, 15 L.Ed.2d

681 (1966), participating ir. _.mmittee investigations and

proceedings, Tenney, supra, 341 U.S. at 377-79, 71 S.Ct. at 788-

89, and voting on land-use regulation, Baytree of Inverrary

Realty Partners v. City of Lauderhill, 873 F.2d 1407, 1409 (11%

Cir. 1989), have in the past been deemed legislative actions

or functions and, therefore, have been protected by the

doctrine of legislative immunity.

Speaking in more general terms, an act is legislative, rather

than administrative or managerial, when it establishes

official policy and is of general application. Woods,, supra,

132 F.3d at 1417.

Clearly the named defendants’ actions in approving the

public work known as the “roundabout” were legislative

and defendants are entitled to absolute immunity.

c. Defendants are not necessary parties.

Plaintiff has also sued the named individual defendants in

their official capacities and, in addition, has sued the CITY

A73 -

Document 15:5

OF CLEARWATER. To the extent plaintiff has sued the

above named defendants in their official capacities he has

essentially sued the CITY OF CLEARWATER. Housing

Investors, Inc., supra, 68 F.Supp.2d at 1295; Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d

114 (1985) (Official-capacity lawsuits are, “in all respects

other than name, ...treated as a suit against the entity.”).

While individuals may be sued in their official capacity

when suit against the governmental agency is barred by the

Eleventh Amendment, no such immunity issues are

presented here. There is, therefore, no need to maintain suit

against the named defendants in their official capacities.

d. Plaintiff lacks standing to sue.

The requirements plaintiff must meet for standing to sue

are that he (1) claim an injury in fact, (2) allege concrete,

particularized harm that is actual or imminent, (3) show a

causal link to the defendants, and (4) that the injury can be

redressed by the court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); see

also, Housing Investors, Inc., supra at 1293.

The injury plaintiff alleges to have suffered is the violation

of his right to “equal protection” and the violation of his

“right of free petition.” He fails to allege the particularized

harm that is actual or imminent. And he completely fails to

link or trace, even obliquely, his injury to these named

defendants. The actions he complains of and for which he

seeks redress were the actions of the Clerk of the Florida

Supreme Court and a judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of

Florida. Under these requirements, plaintiff does not have

standing to sue.

III. Conclusion

Defendants have shown that plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief. Plaintiff has failed to plead a case for relief under

§1983, he has failed to overcome the defense of legislative

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Document 15:6

immunity, he has no need to sue the individual defendants

in their official capacities, and he lacks standing to bring suit

against these defendants in the first place. Defendants are

entitled to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the

foregoing has been sent via regular U.S. mail to George

Lawson Kelly, 522 Cleveland Street, Clearwater, Florida

33755, and George Waas, Esq., PL-01, The Capitol,

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050, this _15% day of August,

2001.

Paul Richard Hull

Assistance City Attorney

P.O. Box 4748

Clearwater, Florida 33758-4748

(727) 562-4010

Florida Bar no. 0486108

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS

CITY OF CLEARWATER, Mayor

BRIAN AUNGST, Commissioners ED

HART, BOB CLARK, ED HOOPER, J.B.

JOHNSON, former City Manager

MICHAEL ROBERTO and City

Attorney PAMELA AKIN

A75

Document 16:1; Filed 9/6/2001

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY

Plaintiff, CASE NO. 8:01-CV-1162-T-24-

TBM

Vv.

CHIEF JUSTICE CHARLES T. WELLS

et. al

Defendants

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS

MOTION TO DISMISS

The Plaintiff, George Lawson Kelly, having read through

Counsel for the Defendant’s (CITY OF CLEARWATER,

Mayor BRIAN AUNGST, Commissioners ED HART, BOB

CLARK, ED HOOPER, J.B. JOHNSON, former City Manager

MICHAEL ROBERTO and City Attorney PAMELA AKIN)

Motion to Dismiss would respond and answer:

1) Defendants, in seeking to dismiss the complaint for

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), are aware

that “dismissal of a claim on the basis of barebones

pleadings is a precarious disposition with a high

mortality rate.” International Erectors, Inc v. Wilhoit Steel

Erectors and Rental Service, 400 F.2d 465, 471 (5% Cir.1968).

They are further aware that a complaint will not be

dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears

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Document 16:2

“beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102, 2

L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Williams v. Bierman, 46 F. Supp.2d 1262

(M.D.Fla. 1999). Moreover, they understand that, for

purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss, the material

allegations of a plaintiff's complaint are taken as true.

Aquatherm Indus. V. Florida Power & Light, 971 F.Supp. 1419,

1424 (M.D.Fla.1997).

2) “...assuming plaintiff's allegations to be true, he cannot

prove a set of facts which will entitle him to relief.”

What are the specific allegations of the Plaintiff?”

a) “Plaintiff asserts a violation of his First

Amendment right of free petition See, Amended

Complaint at paras. 2 and 39.

b) Plaintiff asserts a violation of his Fourth

Amendment right to equal protection of the law.

See, Amended Complaint at paras. 4 and 39.”

3) Where or from what do these allegations arise?

They arise from an Order issued by the Supreme Court of

the State of Florida which had the desired (from the point of

view of the Defendants - City of Clearwater and State DOT)

effect of “dead ending’ Plaintiff's efforts to secure relief from

the risk associated with the construction and operation of

what Plaintiff contends is a hazardous intersection at the

entrance to a mandated State Majo- Hurricane Evacuation

Route.

4) The specific allegation of the Plaintiff is that

elements of the City, State and Supreme Court of the State of

Florida did conspire to produce a result that advantaged the

one party (the Defendants) in a dispute before the court at

the expense of the other party (the Plaintiff.)

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Document 16:3

It is the further specific allegation of the Plaintiff that the

‘instrument used to effect the above was an Order

Transferring Petition which sough to shuffle the Plaintiff off

to the lower courts to pursue a Declaratory Judgment where

such a judgment by definition has no enforcement

provisions and for all intents and purposes no meaning and

would certainly not provide the relief sought by the Plaintiff

where such relief was the sole prerogative of the Florida

Supreme Court. .

*Allegations of conspiratorial conduct between a state.court judge

and Plaintiffs in a nonjury state court libel action stated a

procedural due process violation which could be addressed in a §

1983 action; civil rights plaintiffs alleged covert ex parte meetings

and telephone conversations during course of trial in which

plaintiffs and judge conspired to produce a verdict based on extra-

Judicial considerations. Lipson v. Snyder, E.D.Pa.1988, 701

F.Supp. 541.

5) To appreciate the level and degree of corruption

presented by the Order Transferring Petition all a

reasonable person has to do is read through Plaintiff's

Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the Supreme Court of

the State of Florida and then contrast the specifics of it’s

presentation with the deliberately loose and vague

generalities of the Order Transferring Petition.

6) Plaintiff sought specifically as a measure of relief to have

the Supreme Court of the Staie of Florida compel the

Secretary of the Department of Transportation to retake a

roadway from the City where such roadway constitutes

the entrance to Clearwater Beach and the beginning of

State Road 60 - a Major Hurricane Evacuation Route.

7) This “measure of relief’ sought by the Plaintiff could

ONLY be gotten from the Florida Supreme Court as per

A78

Document 16:4

Article V § 3(b)(8) of the Constitution of the State of Florida.

8) “...even assuming piaintiff’s allegation to be true, he

cannot prove a set of facts which entitle him to relief.”

The principal fact in this case is the Order Transferring

Petition, an Order issued by the Supreme Court of the State

of Florida, an Order which the Court let Stand after Review.

9) The principal fact of this fact is that the Order did

advantage the one party (the Defendants) in a suit before

the court at the expense of the other party (the Plaintiff)

in the ONLY court which could have provided the

specific measure of relief sought by the Plaintiff where

such relief would have seen the Secretary of the Florida

Department of Transportation retake the roadways at the

entrance to Clearwater Beach and provide some measure

of an intersection or intersections capable of providing

“safe passage” on what is a mandated State Major

Hurricane Evacuation Route.

10) In issuing the Order Transferring Petition the Florida

Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction and did not

challenge in any way shape or form the Standing of the

Plaintiff.

11) The Order itself presents two issues. One regards the

substance of the Order. The other regards the effect of

the order.

12) This case in this court is about the effect of the Order

which plaintiff alleges and contends advantaged the one

Party (the Defendant's) in a dispute before the court at

the expense of the other party (the Plaintiff) by in effect

“dead ending” Plaintiff's efforts to secure relief

13) As to the substance of the Order it is amenable to

appeal directly to the United States Supreme Court

where it represents the interesting controversy of

A79

Document 16:5

whether a Court, which is the ONLY court capable of

granting the relief sought by Plaintiff, can willfully and

deliberately avoid the issues raised and the relief sought by

Plaintiff.

14) The specific cause of action in this case before this court

is to be found in the Order Transferring petition and the

effect it had on the Plaintiff as it unlawfully advantaged

the Defendants over the Plaintiff in an action before the

Florida Supreme Court.

15) Defendants may not like the claim raised by Plaintiff.

Defendants may not appreciate the claim raised by

Plaintiff. Defendants may disagree and challenge the

claim made by Plaintiff, but to state that the Plaintiff has

failed “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”

is a deliberate falsehood.

16) This is a case as Counsel for the Defendant's

acknowledges about what the Plaintiff contends are

specific violations of the Plaintiffs Rights of Petition and

Due Process and Equal Protection.

17) As such it is a matter to be addressed in this court.

18) The question of standing raised by the Defendants in

the initial case about a roundabout is one that should

have been addressed by the Florida Supreme Court prior

to it’s issuing the Order Transferring Petition. THAT

order and the challenges and claims made by the

Plaintiff regarding THAT order of itself confirms

standing on the part of the Plaintiff in this court in a suit

regarding what Plaintiff contends are violations of

- Plaintiffs Civil Rights.

19) As far as the Plaintiff's standing in the case presented to

the Florida Supreme Court it should be said as a matter

of historical fact that the Plaintiff did not just wake up

A80

Document 16:5

one morning and decide that Plaintiff had nothing better to

do with his time and money than to commence a suit against

the City and the State.

Plaintiff had challenged the construction and the

operation of the Clearwater Beach roundabout in

innumerable letters to the Mayor, the members of the City

Commission and the media.

Indeed, Plaintiff, at Plaintiff's own expense, addressed the

issue of the roundabout in a number of full page and half

page “advertisements” placed in the Saint Petersburg Times.

After a year of operation in which there was acknowledged

to have occurred more than 450 accidents, Plaintiff sought

out the proper avenue of the Law to relieve this City (and it’s

taxpayers) of the burden associated with the operation of a

demonstrably hazardous intersection where such an

intersection stands as the entryway to a mandated State

Major Hurricane Evacuation Route.

As the attached and included article from the London Daily

Mirror illustrates, this is to the best of the Plaintiff’ s

knowledge the ONLY internationally infamous intersection

in the country.

20) Because of the intersections’ location the simplest of

accidents can and almost always does compromise

mobility North, South, East and West, leaving in effect

only one alternate avenue of escape.

A clearly unacceptable situation and condition of

imminent and continuing risk.

21) Even at this late date the City (and the State) have failed

to address the fundamental design fault of the

Clearwater Beach roundabout where such a design fault

allows the inner of the two lanes to cross over the outer

A81

Document 16:6

lane to exit while still allowing for the outer lane to continue

forward.

This design, allowing the inner lane to exit while not

forcing the outer lane to also exit, creates in effect an

intersection so that in the final analysis there are 5 (or 6)

intersections following closely and quickly one after the

other around the roundabouts very limited circumference.

What exists, in effect, is a series of unregulated intersections.

What exists, in effect, is a “defective’ product that by design

is predisposed to accident.

When the accidents occur the level of mobility of a

mandated State Major Hurricane Evacuation Route often

and almost invariably falls to ZERO!

A clearly unacceptable situation and condition of

imminent and continuing risk.

22) If there was any legitimate question as to the element of

risk and the Plaintiff's rights to sue to be relieved from

that evident risk, that as a subject should have been

addressed in an evidentiary hearing before the Florida

Supreme Court or at a trial which would deal with it as a

dispute about a material issue of fact.

23) The extreme good fortune that this community has

enjoyed in not having the mobility of the roundabout

tested in an evacuation situation does not remove or

discharge the fundamental responsibility of the Secretary

of the Florida Department of Transportation to provide

for safe passage on the roadways of this State and never

more so than when those roadways are part of a

mandated State Major Hurricane Evacuation Route.

24) This lawsuit is about the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights

to Petition, Due Process and Equal Protection occasioned

by the issuing of an Order Transferring Petition which

A82

Document 16:7

had the singular and sole effect of “dead ending” Plaintiff's

efforts to secure relief from the demonstrable element of

continuing risk associated with the operation of the

roundabout intersection at the entrance to Clearwater Beach.

25) Plaintiff does not and has not challenged the right of the

Defendants to construct or operate the above mentioned

roundabout nor has Plaintiff sought relief from same in

this court, but Plaintiff does challenge the participation

of any of the Defendants in procuring the Order

Transferring Petition an Order which Plaintiff clearly

contends deprived Plaintiff of Plaintiff's rights to

Petition, Due Process and Equal Protection.

That is what this case is all about. Lipson v. Snyder, E.D.

Pa., 1988, 701F Supp. 541 (as above);

26) Plaintiff recognizes and acknowledges that Defendants

are protected from damage claims by the Eleventh

Amendment and Plaintiff will, by separate instrument

amend the Complaint to reflect this on the part of the

above named Defendants and will Pursue in it’s stead as

a matter of relief a Declaratory Judgment as to the

participation of any of the above named Defendants in

the procuring of the Order Transferring Petition, MSA

Reality v. State of Ill., N.D. Ill. 1992, 794 F. Supp.267,

affirmed 990 F.2d 299; Loukas v. Hofbaum, E.D. Mich

1991, 784 F. Supp. 377.

27) Assuming that “the material allegations of the

plaintiff's complaint are taken as true” Defendants are

certainly not entitled to dismissal prior to discovery.

Aquatherm Indus. V. Florida Power and Light, 971 F.

Supp. 1419, 1424 (M.D.Fla 1997)

28) The specific claim of the Plaintiff is that the Order

Transferring Petition as issued by the Florida Supreme

A8&3

Document 16:8

Court was a corrupt edict which did advantage the one

party (the Defendants) in a dispute before the Court at the

expense of the other party (the Plaintiff) to the dispute and

did of itself violate Plaintiff's rights to Petition, Due Process

and Equal Protection and for this reason and the reasons set

out above and in the original Complaint, Plaintiff would

pray that this Court will deny Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss.

So prays the Plaintiff.

George Kelly, Plaintiff Pro Se

522 Cleveland Street

Clearwater, FL 33755

727.442.5093

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true correct copy of the

foregoing has been sent via regular U.S. mail to Paul Richard

Hill, Assistant City Attorney, PO Box 4748, Clearwater, FL

33758-4748 this 5% day of September, 2001.

George Kelly, Plaintiff Pro Se

522 Cleveland Street

Clearwater, FL 33755

727.442.5093

A84

Document 17:1; Filed 8/22/01

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY,

Plaintiff,

V. Case No. 8:01-Civ-1162-T-24TBM

CHIEF JUSTICE CHARLES T. WELLS,

et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on

Defendants’ Chief Justice Charles T. Wells, Justice

Major B. Harding, Justice Leander J. Shaw, Jr., Justice

Harry Lee Anstead, Justice Barbara J. Pariente, Justice

R. Fred Lewis, Justice Peggy A. Quince, Thomas D.

Hall, and Debbie Casseaux Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint or, Alternatively,

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 5). Judge

Crockett Farnell filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint, or Alternatively, Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 6), which adopted the

above Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Hereinafter, the

A85

Document 17:2

above named Defendants will be referred to as

“Movants.”! Plaintiff opposes these motions

(Doc. No. 8).

Movants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended

Complaint (Doc No. 2) pursuant to Red. R. Civ. P. 12(b)

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and personal

jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Movants also move, alternatively,

for summary judgment in their favor pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(b). Because the Court finds Plaintiff's

complaint fails to allege an actual case or controversy

and that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff's claim, the Court need not address Movants’

Motions for Summary Judgment in the Alternative.

I. Background

The claims Plaintiff George Lawson Kelly asserts in

his Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 2) originate in a

Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed on December 20,

1999 in the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit,

in and for Pinellas County, Florida, which sought to

have that court “compel the Secretary of the Florida

Department of Transportation retake from the City of

Clearwater, a certain portion of State Road 60 at the

entrance of Clearwater Beach.” (Doc No. 2 Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint at 3). Plaintiff alleged that the

! Defendants Florida Department of Transportation, Thomas F.

Barry, Secretary, Florida Department of Transportation, Kenneth

A. Hartman, Marianne Trussel, City of Clearwater, Brian Aungst,

Mayor of Clearwater, Ed Hart, Ed Hooper, Bob Clark, J.B. Johnson,

Micheal J. Roberto, and Pamela Akin have not joined in Movant's

Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Motion for Summary

Judgment.

A86

Document 17:3

construction of the “roundabout” at the entrance of

Clearwater Beach constituted a “demonstrable hazard”

which had resulted in increased accidents and would

make evacuation of Clearwater Beach “difficult, if not

impossible.” Id. At 4. Eventually Plaintiff “concluded

that...only the Florida Supreme Court could effect the

remedy sought by Plaintiff’ and filed his Petition for

Writ of Mandamus with the Florida Supreme Court on

January 13, 2000. On April 4, 2000, the Florida Supreme

Court issued an Order Transferring plaintiff's petition

for Writ of Mandamus back to the Circuit Court for the

Sixth Judicial Circuit. Plaintiff filed a response to the

Florida Supreme Court's Order Transferring the

Petition for Writ of Mandamus. The Florida Supreme

Court, treating the response as a Motion for Rehearing,

issued an order denying the plaintiff's Petition for

Rehearing on May 23, 2000. Plaintiff alleges that

Florida Supreme Court's Order Transferring Petition

for Writ of Mandamus was a deliberate and specific

attempt to “thwart the progress” of his petition.

Plaintiff later filed another Writ of Mandamus

on February 27, 2001 with the Circuit Court. (Doc. No. 2

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 7). This Petition

sought to have the court “order the City of Clearwater

to comply with the provisions of the City Charter

which specifically compels the City to provide for a

referendum in matters..where the City sought to spend

in excess of $1,000,000.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff alleges that ~

the Circuit Court's “failure to address” his Petition

“constitutes a willful and deliberate denial with

prejudice.” Id. at 10. In Plaintiff's Summary of his

amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the Secretary

A87

Document 17:4

of the Florida Department of Transportation, “aided

and abetted” by the City of Clearwater and the Justices

and officers of the Florida Supreme Court, has failed to

“exercise his responsibility as [sic] regards the

roundabout/ intersection at the entrance of Clearwater

Beach” and has thus placed the City of Clearwater

Beach and its taxpayers at “considerable and

continuing risk.” Id. Plaintiff further concludes that

Movants and the other Defendants have conspired

together to cause Plaintiff to be “subjected to the

deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities.” Id. at

11.

Il. Standard of Review

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the district court

is required to view the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. See Murphy v. Federal

Deposit Ins. Corp., 208 F.3d 959, 962 (11' Cir. 2000)

(citing Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.39 1285, 1289 (11" Cir.

1999)). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure

to state a cause of action “unless it appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”

Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1109, 111-12 (11" Cir. 1991) (citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The

Federal Rules of Civil procedure “do not require a

claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he

bases his claim.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. All that is

required is “a short and plain statement of the claim.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The standard on a 12(b)(6)

motion is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately

prevail in his or her theories, but whether the

A88

Document 17:5

allegations are sufficient to allow the plaintiff to

conduct discovery in an attempt to prove the

allegations. See, Jackam v. Hospital Corp. of Am.

Mideast, Ltd., 800 F.2d 1577, 1579 (11th Cir. 1986).

III. Movants’ Motion to Dismiss

Movants move to dismiss Plaintiff's amended

complaint based on Plaintiff's failure to allege a case or

controversy under federal law and lack of subject

matter and personal jurisdiction. Movants also allege

that Plaintiff's claim is barred by Eleventh Amendment

Immunity and judicial immunity. Plaintiff's claim is

barred by Eleventh Amendment Immunity and judicial

immunity. Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Leave to

Amend Complaint to eliminate any claim for damages

(Doc. No. 7). However, because this Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim, even after

considering the proposed amendment, the Court finds

that the motion to amend is futile and is therefore

DENIED. Furthermore, since the Court finds the

complaint fails to allege an actual case or controversy

and that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the

Plaintiff's claim as discussed below, it need not address

Movants’ Eleventh Amendment and judicial immunity

arguments.

Movants first assert that Plaintiff has failed to allege

an actual case or controversy in his complaint. In his

complaint Plaintiff basically makes two assertions: (1)

The Secretary of the Florida Department of

Transportation and its staff, together with the Florida

Supreme Court and its officers, have failed to carry out

the duties of their positions and as a result have placed

the citizens and taxpayers of Clearwater Beach at

A89

Document 17:6

“considerable and continuing risk.” (Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint at 10). (2) Movants have

conspired together with the other Defendants to cause

Plaintiff to be “subjected to the deprivation of rights,

privileges and immunities.” Id. at 11.

This Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to

satisfy the threshold requirement of Article III of the

United States Constitution that parties seeking “to

invoke the power of the federal courts must allege an

actual case or controversy.” O'Shea v. Littleton, 414

U.S. 488, 493 (1974); see also, Jacobs v. The Florida Bar,

350 F.3d 901, 903 (11' Cir. 1995). Plaintiffs must assert

“some threatened or actual injury resulting from the

putatively illegal action before a federal court may

assume }'risdiction.” O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 493 (quoting

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410, U.S. 614, 617 (1973)). In

his complaint, plaintiff has failed to allege any

threatened or actual injury other than his disagreement

and frustration over a local road matter. Plaintiff has

failed to demonstrate any threat of injury or harm that

is real and immediate. Rather, Plaintiff's allegations

that the actions of the Secretary of the Department of

Transportation and the Florida Supreme Court have

placed the City of Clearwater and taxpayers ‘at risk’

are, at best, hypothetical and conjectural. Such vague

allegations are not sufficient to demonstrate a real and

immediate threat of injury, and as such, fail to meet the

threshold requirements of Article III. See id. at 494

(citing Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-110

(1969)).

Second, Movants assert that this Court lacks

authority to review final judgments of a state court in

A90

a) Sak clei Se onsen

Document 17:7

judicial proceedings. Review of a decision of a stat’s

highest court may be had only in the United States

Supreme Court on certiorari. See District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 US. 462, 482 (1983);

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923);

Kilpatrick v. Shaw, 70 F.3d 100, 102 (11% Cir. 1994).

This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff's claim as it amounts to an appeal of the

Florida Supreme Court's decision to deny Plaintiff a

rehearing concerning the transfer of his petition to the

Circuit Court of the Sixth judicial Circuit. In all

respects, Plaintiff is asking this Court to reverse and

remand to the Florida Supreme Court with directions to

issue a Writ of mandamus. This Court, however, does

not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's

claim and therefore lacks the authority to address

Plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the Florida

Supreme Court.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

that

(1) Movants’ motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended

Complaint or, Alternatively, Motions for Summary

judgment (Doc. No. 5 & 6) are GRANTED IN PART:

(a) With respect to Movants’ motions to Dismiss

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 5 &

6), the motions are GRANTED; Plaintiff's

claims against Chief Justice Charles T. Wells,

Justice Major B.

Harding, Justice Leander J. Shaw, Jr., Justice

Harry Lee Anstead, Justice Barbara J. Pariente,

Justice R. Fred Lewis, Justice Peggy A. Quince,

A91

Document 17:7

Thomas D. Hall, Debbie Casseaux, and Judge

Crockett Farnel are DISMISSED.

(b) With respect to Movants’ Alternative

Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 5

and 6), the motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

(2) Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. No. 7)

is DENIED;

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida this |

22 day of August, 2001. .

SUSAN C. BUCKLEW

United States District Judge

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

Pro se Plaintiff

Document 18:1; Filed 8/24/01

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY,

Plaintiff(s)

vs. Case No. 8:01-cv-1162-T-24TBM

: CHIEF JUSTICE CHARLES T. WELLS, et al.

- Defendant(s)

ORDER

In this action, Plaintiff has filed a document captioned

“Response to Reply.

Upon review, the document is found to be deficient in the

following respects:

Local Rule Requirements: The enclosed document

does not comply with Local Rule.

Filed in the Wrong District Court: The caption of the

instrument(s) indicates that this should have been

filed in another District Court other than Middle

Florida.

20-Page Rule for Briefs and Memoranda: Absent

prior permission of the Court, no party shall file any

brief or legal memorandum in excess of 20 Pages in

length.

Non-filing of Discovery Materials: As a matter of

course, discovery materials shall not be filed with the

Court, but may be later filed, in whole or in part, if

necessary to presentation and consideration of a

motion [Local Rule 3.03].

A93

r i 6

Document 18:2

X Non-filing of Additional Briefs or Memoranda:

Opposing party shall file and serve, within ten (10)

days after being served with written motion, a brief

or legal memorandum in opposition to relief

requested. Unless requested by the Court, no other

briefs or legal memoranda, directed to the motion,

shall be filed. [Local Rule 3.01(b)].

. Original Signature Required: The document

requires the original signature of offering counsel.

Copies and Facsimiles Not Accepted for Filing:

Copies and facsimiles of pleadings are not acceptable

for filing.

IS 44(c) Civil Cover Sheet Required: A completed

AO Form JS 44(c), Civil Cover Sheet, Rev. 07/89,

shall accompany each civil case as a condition to the

filing thereof. [Local Rule 1.05(e)].

X.___ The Clerk is herby directed to return this pleading to

counsel

or pro se party.

The pleading shall remain as filed.

_ DATED at Tampa, Florida, this 234 day of August,

2000.

United States District Judge

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

Pro Se Party

A94

Document 19:1; Filed 10/15/01

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY,

Plaintiff,

VS. Case No. 8:01-cv-1162-T-24TBM

CHARLES T. WELLS, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

This cause comes before the Court for sua

sponte. On August 22, 2001, this Court entered an

Order (Doc. No. 120 granting Defendants’ Chief Justice

Charles T. Wells, Justice Major B Harding, Justice

Leander J. Shaw, Jr., Justice Harry Lee Anstead, Justice

Barbara J. Pariente, Justice R. Fed Lewis, Justice Peggy

A. Quince, Thomas D. Hall, Debbie Cassseaux (Doc.

No. 5), and Judge Crockett Farnell (Doc. No. 6) Motions

to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and

denying as moot Defendants’ Motions for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 5 & 6).

Defendants Chief Justice Charles T. Wells,

Justice Major B. Harding, Justice Leander J. Shaw, Jr.,

Justice Harry Lee Anstead, Justice Barbara J. Pariente,

Justice R. Fred Lewis, Justice Peggy A. Quince, Thomas

| D. Hall, and Debbie Casseaux filed another Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, or

AQ95

Document 19:2

Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

No. 4-1, 4-2) which is nearly identical to their other

motion (Doc. No. 5). The only difference in these two

motions is that document number 4 did not include a

certificate of service. As such, it is ORDERED AND

ADJUDGED that Defendants’ Chief Justice Charles T.

Wells, Justice Major B. Harding, Justice Leander J.

Shaw, Jr., Justice Harry Lee Anstead, Justice Barbara J.

Pariente, Justice R. Fred Lewis, Justice Peggy A.

Quince, Thomas D. Hall, and Debbie Casseaux Motion

to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint or,

Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. N.

4-1, 4-2) is GRANTED IN PART:

(a) With respect to the Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 4-

1), the motion is GRANTED; Plaintiff's

claims against Chief Justice Charles T. Wells,

Justice Major B. Harding, Justice Leander J.

Shaw, Jr., Justice Harry Lee Anstead, Justice

Barbara J. Pariente, Justice R. Fred Lewis,

Justice Peggy A. Quince, Thomas D. Hall,

and Debbie Casseaux are DISMISSED.

(b) With respect to the Alternative Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 4-2), the

motion is DENIED AS MOOT.

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, this

15'* day of October, 2001.

SUSAN C. BUCKLEW

United States District Judge

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

A96

’

Document 20; Filed 10/31/01

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 8:01-cv-1162-T-24TBM

CHARLES T. WELLS, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Plaintiff filed this complaint on June 19, 2001 (Doc

No. 1). A review of the file reveals that Plaintiff has not

made service of the summons and the complaint upon

Defendants Department of Transportation, Thomas F. Barry,

Kenneth A. Hartman, and Marianne A. Trussel within 120

days after the filing of the complaint as required by Rule

4(m), Federal Rules of Civil procedure.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

that Plaintiff shall SHOW CAUSE in writing on or before

November 14, 2001 for failure to perfect service within 120

das after filing the complaint. Failure to do so will result in

dismissal of this action as to Defendants Department of

Transportation, Thomas F. Barry, Kenneth A. Hartman,

and Marianne A Trussel without prejudice.

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida this 31

day of October, 2001.

SUSAN C. BUCKLEW

Copies to: United States District Judge

Counsel of Record

Deputy Clerk

Document 21:1; Filed 11/2/01

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 8:01-Civ-1162-T-24TBM

CHARLES T. WELLS,

et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on Defendants’,

City of Clearwater, Mayor Brian Aungst, Commissioners Ed

Hart, Bob Clark, Ed Hooper, and J.B. Johnson, former City

Manager Michael Roberto and City Attorney Pamela Akin,

(hereinafter “ Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 11) Plaintiff opposes this

motion. (Doc. O. 14).

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended

Complaint (Doc. No. 2) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

I. Background

The claims Plaintiff George Lawson Kelly asserts in

his Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 2) originate in a Petition

for Writ of Mandamus filed on December 20, 1000 in the

Circuit court for the sixth Judicial Circuit, in and for

Pinellas County, Florida, which sought to have that court

“compel the secretary of he Florida Department o

Transportation retake from the City of Clearwater, a certain

portion of State road 60 at the entrance of Clearwater

Beach.” (Doc. No. 2 Plaintiff's Amended

AgS8

Document 21:2

Complaint at 3). Plaintiff alleged that the construction of the

“roundabout' at the entrance of Clearwater Beach

constituted a “demonstrable hazard” which had resulted in

increased accidents and would make evacuation of

Clearwater Beach “difficult, if not impossible.” Id. at 4.

Eventually Plaintiff “concluded that...only the Florida

Supreme Court could effect the remedy sought by Plaintiff’

and filed his Petition for Writ of Mandamus with the Florida

Supreme Court on January 13, 2000. On April 4, 2000, the

Florida Supreme Court issued an Order Transferring

plaintiff's Petition for writ of mandamus back to the Circuit

Court for the Sixth judicial Circuit. Plaintiff filed a response

to the Florida Supreme Court's Order Transferring the

Petition for Writ of Mandamus. The Florida Supreme Court,

treating the response as a Motion for Rehearing, issued an

order denying Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing on May 23,

2000. Plaintiff alleges that the Florida Supreme Court's

order Transferring Petition for Writ of Mandamus was a

“deliberate and specific attempt to thwart the progress” of

his petition.

Plaintiff later filed another Writ of Mandamus on

February 27, 2001 with the Circuit Court. (Doc. No. 2

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 7). This Petition sought to

have the court “order the City of Clearwater to comply with

the provisions of the City Charter which specifically compels

the City to provide for a referendum in matters..where the

City sought to spend in excess of $1,000,000.” Id. at 9.

Plaintiff alleges that the Circuit

Court's ‘failure to address” his Petition “constitutes a willful

and deliberate denial with prejudice.” Id. at 10. In Plaintiff's

Summary of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that

the Secretary of the Florida Department of Transportation,

“aided and abetted” by the City of Clearwater and the

Justices and officers of the Florida Supreme Court, has failed

to exercise his responsibility as [sic] regards the

Ag9g

Document 21:3

roundabout/ intersection at the entrance of Clearwater

Beach” and has thus placed the City of Clearwater Beach

and its taxpayers at “considerable and continuing risk.” id.

Plaintiff further concludes that Defendants have conspired

with the Florida Supreme Court, the Sixth judicial Circuit

Court, and the Department of Transportation to cause

Plaintiff to be “subjected to the deprivation of rights,

privileges and immunities.” Id. at 11.

Il. Standard of Review

in deciding a motion to dismiss, the district court is

required to view the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. See Murphy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 208

F.39 959, 962 (11% Cir. 2000) (citing Kirby v. Siegelman, 195

F.3d 1285, 1289 (11% Cir. 1999)). A complaint should not be

dismissed for failure to state a cause of action “unless it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1111-12 (11% Cir. 1991)

(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The

federal rules of Civil procedure “do not require a claimant

to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.”

Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. All that required is “a short and plain

statement of the claim.” Fed.R. Civ. P.8(a)(2). The standard

on a 12(b)(6) motion is not whether the plaintiff will

ultimately prevail in his or her theories, but whether the

allegations are sufficient to allow the plaintiff to conduct

discovery in an attempt to prove the allegations. See Jackam

vy. Hospital Corp. of Am. Mideast, Ltd., 800 F.2d 1577, 1579

(11% Cir. 1986).

III. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's amended

complaint based on Plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Defendants contend that (1)

Plaintiff has stated no cause of action against them, (2) that

Defendants are entitled to absolute legislative immunity,

A100

Document 21:4

(3) that Defendants are not necessary parties, and that 94)

Plaintiff lacks standing to sue. Plaintiff has filed a Motion

for Leave to Amend Complaint to eliminate any claim for

damages. (Doc. No. 15). However, since this Court finds

Plaintiff lacks standing to sue, even after considering the

proposed amendment, the Court finds that the motion to

amend is futile and is therefore DENIED. Furthermore,

because Plaintiff lacks standing to

sue as discussed below, it need not address Defendants’

other arguments.

Defendants assert that Plaintiff lacks standing to sue.

To establish Article III standing, a Plaintiff must

demonstrate that (1) he has suffered an injury-in-fact, or one

which is concrete and particularized, (2) that there is a casual

connection between the injury and the defendants, and (3)

that he injury will be redressed by a favorable decision of the

court. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-

61 (1992); Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11 Cir. 2001).

In his complaint Plaintiff basically makes two

assertions: (1) the Secretary of the Florida Department of

Transportation and its staff, together with the Florida

Supreme Court and its officers and the City of Clearwater

and its officers, have failed to carry out the duties of their

positions and as a result have placed the citizens and

taxpayers of Clearwater beach at “considerable and

continuing risk.” (Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 10); (2)

Defendants have conspire together with the Florida Supreme

Court and the Department of Transportation to cause

Plaintiff to be “subjected to the deprivation of rights,

privileges and immunities.” Id. at 11. The injuries Plaintiff

alleges to have suffered as a result of his petition on the

Supreme Court being transferred and later denied, is the

violation of his right to equal protection and the violation of

his “right of free petition.” The harm Plaintiff alleges is

neither actual nor imminent; rather he alleges the sort of

A101

Document 21:5

abstract injury which is insufficient to establish standing.

Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege a causal connection

between Defendants and the injury of which he complains

except for the alleged fact that Defendants were in some

manner benefited by the actions of the Florida Supreme

Court. As such, Plaintiff lacks standing to sue.'Accordingly,

it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

(1) Defendants’ City of Clearwater, Mayor Brian Aungst,

Commissioners Ed hart, Bob Clark, Ed Hooper, J.B. Johnson,

former City Manager Michael Roberto, and City Attorney

Pamela Akin, Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended

Complaint (Doc. No. 11) is GRANTED.

1Standing is also an element of the case or controversy requirement of

Article III and this Court is required to inquire, sua sponte, into the

presence of subject matter jurisdiction if it appears it may be absent. See

University of South Alabama v. the American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405,

410 (11% Cir. 1999). This Court also finds that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy

the threshold requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution

that parties seeking “to invoke the power of the federal courts must allege

an actual case or controversy.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 288, 493

(1974); see also, Jacobs v. The Florida Bar, 50 F.3d 901, 903 (11¢ Cir. 1995.

Plaintiffs must assert “some threatened or actual injury resulting from the

putatively illegal action before a federal court may assume jurisdiction.”

O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 493(quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617

(1973)). In his complaint, Plaintiff has failed to allege any threatened or

actual injury other than his frustration over a local road matter and his

disagreement over the manner in which his case was handled in the state

courts. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any threat of injury or harm

that is real and immediate. Rather, plaintiff's allegations that the actions

of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and the Florida

Supreme Court have placed the City of Clearwater and taxpayers ‘at risk’

are, at best, hypothetical and conjectural. Such vague allegation s are not

sufficient to demonstrate a real and immediate threat of injury, and as

such, sail to meet the threshold requirements of Article III. See id. at 494-

(citing Golden v. Zwicker, 394 U.S. 103, 109-110(1969)). Moreover, other

than the alleged benefit Defendants derived from the actions of the

Florida courts, Plaintiff does not even set forth any basis for Defendants’

part in the ‘conspiracy’ between the Florida Supreme Court and the

Department of transportation.

A102

Document 21:6

(2) Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. No. 15) is

DENIED;

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, this 1st

day of November, 2001.

SUSAN C. BUCKLEW

United States District Judge

Copies to: Counsel of Record

Pro se Plaintiff

A103

Document 22; Filed 11/6/01

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY,

Plaintiff,

VS. Case No. 8:01-cv-1162-T-24TBM

CHARLES T. WELLS, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Plaintiff filed a complaint (Doc. No. 1) on June 19,

2001. A review of the file reveals that Plaintiff has not made

service of the summons and the complaint upon the

_ Defendant Charles Siemon within 120 days after the filing of

the complaint as required by Rule 4(m), Federal rules of

Civil procedure.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

that Plaintiff shall SHOW CAUSE, in writing, by November

19, 2001 for failure to perfect service within 120 days after

filing the complaint. Failure to do so will result in

dismissal of this action as to the Defendant Charles

Siemon without prejudice.

| DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, this 6%

day of November, 2001.

SUSAN C. BUCKLEW

Copies to: United States District Judge

Pro Se Plaintiff

Counsel of Record

Deputy Clerk

A104

Document 23; Filed 11/27/01

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY,

Plaintiff,

VS. Case No. 8:01-cv-1162-T-24TBM

CHARLES T. WELLS, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

This cause comes before the Court sua sponte.

On October 31, 2001, this Court entered an Order (Doc.

No. 17) directing the Plaintiff to show cause why this

case should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution

due to failure to perfect service within 120 days after

filing the complaint. A review of the file reveals that

Plaintiff has failed to file a response to the Court's

Order.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND

ADJUDGED that:

(1) This case is DISMISSED without

prejudice.

(2) | The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, this

26'* day of November, 2001.

SUSAN C. BUCKLEW

United States District Judge

Copies to:

All Parties and Counsel of Record

A105

Document 24:1, Filed 12/21/2001

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GEORGE LAWSON KELLY,

CASE NO.:: 8:01-CV-1162-T-24 TBM

Plaintiff,

VS.

CHIEF JUSTICE CHARLES T. WELLS,

et al.,

Defendants.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

In the above styled action the Plaintiff,

George Lawson Kelly, wishes to advise and inform the

Court that an Appeal will be launched in a timely

fashion as to all of the variously styled Orders issued

by the Court in this case with the issue dates of theses

Orders being -

22 August, 2001

24 August, 2001

15 October, 2001

31 October, 2001

2 November, 2001

6 November, 2001

-27 November, 2001

A106

Document 24:2

This appeal will be brought forward under the

terms and provisions of Article Three, Section One, of

the Constitution of the United States; 28 USC 455; 28

USC 1257 and 28 USC 1651.

George Lawson Kelly,

Plaintiff

George Lawson Kelly

522 Cleveland Street

Clearwater, FL 33755

727.442.5093

A107

Exhibit E:1

Goin’ Round in Circles: Latest Traffic Trend leaves Driver

Dazed

-Wall Street Journal, Friday January 18, 2002, Front page

For Safety’s Sake, Roundabouts Replaced many Stop Lights;

Then the Pileups Piled Up by Rick Brooks, Staff reporter of

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

CLEARWATER, Fla. - Carol Cullen had 15 years of dent-

free driving under her belt when she steered a rented van

last July onto a new circular intersection here. Seconds later,

a delivery truck that was supposed to stay in the next lane

plowed into the van, leaving Ms. Cullen unhurt but

disoriented.

“The whole world is trained to look straight ahead,” says

Ms. Cullen, who sets up promotional displays for Hilton

Hotels Corp. “Now they’ ve got us trying to stare around

curves?”

It seemed like a good idea at the time. The $8 million

Clearwater roundabout would replace a dangerous tangle of

streets and intersections often choked with beach-bound

traffic. It would create an artistic entry point for visitors.

Confusion Reigns |

But since opening in December 1999, the roundabout has

scared the wits out of drivers trying to navigate it. No one

knows which cars are supposed to have the right-of-way. _

Some discombobulated motorists hug the right shoulder,

making it hard for other cars to exit and causing backups at

side streets. The wedding-cake shaped fountain in the

center has doused windshields and obstructed views of cars

rounding the circle from the opposite side.

So far, there have been more than 500 accidents at the

roundabout, which was touted at its opening as the greatest

ever built in the U.S. The site “has been very good for

A108

Exhibit E:2

business,” says James McKeever, manager of nearby Pinellas

Auto Body & Service Inc, which had one of its own tow

trucks hit there. The frequency of accidents is eight times

higher at the roundabout than at the intersections it

replaced.

City officials say the crashes are less severe, primarily

because cars are now moving more slowly.

It’s a similar story elsewhere. As traffic planners across

the U.S. rip out stop signs to install roundabouts that can

Slow aggressive drivers, some cities are discovering that

these so-called “traffic calming devices” do exactly the

opposite. Some drivers go the wrong way, figuring it’s OK

te turn left into the roundabout if you plan to hop off at the

first side street. Trucks flatten curbs and landscaping. In

some places, accident rates have surge after the installation

of roundabouts, causing them to be razed in favor of old-

fashioned traffic lights or stop signs.

The Circle Game

Roundabout designers, a number of whom are British or

Australian, grudgingly acknowledge that they have a lot to

teach Americans about going in circles. In April 2000,

officials in Claremont, Calif., demolished the town’s only

roundabout just eight months after it was installed, saying

drivers found it bewildering. Driver confusion at two

roundabouts near Las Vegas has put them on Nevada’s

annual list of the worst crash spots. A video called

“Roundabout Rules of the Road” was broadcasted

in Nashville, Tenn., for several weeks last year after a

roundabout opened on music Row.

In Clearwater, disoriented drivers smacked into each other

or into the fountain at the an average of almost five a week.

Tires squeal, horns honk and brakes screech as drivers try to

make their way through the loop.

The nearby beach is also harder to reach without taking a

spin around the circle. “It’s a monster, and I was an

A109

Exhibit E:3

engineer myself,” says retiree Bernice Lazar, who take a

nine-mile detour to avoid the roundabout.

Roundabouts are the latest incarnation of the circular

intersections that began in this country with New York

City’s Columbus Circle in 1905. Defenders claim the

modern roundabout is a much-safer alternative to the

traditional traffic circles typical of New England, which were

usually larger rotaries that didn’t slow cars much and

gradually fell out of favor. The new roundabouts-based on a

slimmed-down British version-are designed with a much

smaller diameter, making the circle tighter and forcing

driver to lower speeds to about 15 miles an hour.

Forced Slowdown

The circles’ defenders claim they are safer than typical

intersections, since drivers are forced to navigate slowly.

About 9,500 fatal accidents occur at traditional intersections

every year, according to the Federal highway

Administration. Several academic studies have shown

declines in crashes where roundabouts were built, including

in Europe, but federal officials say it depends on where and

how the circles are built.

“You can’t just put these down everywhere,” says Harry

Campbell, the chief transportation engineer of

Orlando, Fla., which spent $25,000 to build a small circle and

then concluded that four $75 stop signs would have worked

better. “It’s like art,” he says of the roundabout-building

boom. “It evokes controversy.”

The controversy erupted quickly in Clearwater. As the

pileups piled up, some drivers began adopting survival

techniques that reduce the efficiency of roundabouts, like

straddling both lanes at once to avoid side collisions. Angry

drivers flooded city hall and local newspapers with

complaints.

A110

Exhibit E:4

Missing Arrows

And some roundabout rules don’t make much sense,

including permitting cars to exit from the inside lane. At the

most notorious exit point in the Clearwater circle, there still

are no arrows on the pavement to point drivers in the right

direction. On busy beach-gong days, the roundabout has

handled more than 50,000 vehicles, much more than the

32,000 it was designed for.

Clearwater is trying to turn things around. The

fountain has been turned off and is likely to be

demolished, and changes to lane marking give drivers a

better idea of where to aim. The most recent accident

reports also offer some encouragement: 23 crashed in

the final three months of last year compared with 49 in

the same period of 2000.

Michael Wallwork, a transplanted Australian who helped

design Clearwater’s roundabout, pins much of the blame on

drivers. “A lot of the opposition to roundabouts comes from

a very simple bias,” he says.

“Americans are fed a diet of speed all the way from

freeways to residential streets.”

A111